Volume 258 — United States Reports

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA,</p> <p>Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia sustaining a conviction and sentence of the plaintiff in error for having knowingly permitted and allowed a certain person or persons to have and possess and locate on his premises apparatus for the distilling and manufacturing of liquors specified in the Act of March 28, 1917, Acts Ex. Sess. 1917, p. 7.</p>

Held: that there was no misrepresentation by the United States that any part of the work could be done “ in the dry ” and that claimant could not recover. P. 9. 55 Ct. Clms. 181, affirmed. ' Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing appellant’s second amended petition upon demurrer.

Held: That the telegraph company acquired no vested right through the judgment, and its right to condemn was repealed by the later act. P. 18. (2) Kentucky Stats., § 465, declaring against construing a new law to repeal a former law as to rights accrued or claims arising under it, or in any way whatever to affect any right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes effect, was inapplicable. P. 19.

<p>l..An agreement in a drover’s railroad pass, made pursuant to a tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and conditioning his right to recover for personal injuries upon the giving of a written notice of claim, within thirty days after injury, to . the general manager of the carrier upon whose line the accident occurs, is valid, at least where his injuries do not disable him from complying with t]je condition-. P. 24.</p> <p>2. Actual knowledge on the part of the railroad’s employees is no excuse for not giving the notice. P. 24.</p> <p>3. The action of Congress in fixing not less than 90 days for giving notice of claims in respect of goods (Cummins Amendment, March 4, 1915, c. 176, § 1, 38 Stat. 1196), is not a declaration of public policy against allowing a less, though reasonable, time in the case of personal injuries. P. 24.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing appellant’s petition.</p>

<p>1. Massachusetts Statutes 1909, c. 490, Part III, §§ 70 and 71, provides, as the exclusive remedy for recovering a tax illegally exacted under the act, a petition to the Supreme Judicial Court and prompt repayment by the State of the sum there adjudged, .and relieves the collector from liability-to personal action.' P. 37.</p> <p>2. The time fixed for filing the petition — six months — is reasonable. P. 37. .</p> <p>3. In the absence óf a controlling act of Congress, the right of a foreign corporation to recover taxes exacted under an unconstitu- ■ tional state statute may be confined by the state law- to the direct responsibility of the State-and the collector of the. taxes be thereby relieved of personal liability, even when sued in the federal court, at least where the remedy afforded is adequate. P. 37.</p> <p>4. Quaere: Whether the proceeding, given by the Massachusetts statute, supra, could be instituted in the Federal District Court? P. 39.</p> <p>5. The Constitution, standing alone, does not create a paramount, unchangeable liability to an action of tort’ on- the part of all persons who may take part in enforcing a state law that it invalidates, but leaves the remedies to Congress and the States. P.38..</p>

<p>Decided upon the authority of Burrill v. Locomobile Co., ante, 34. Affirmed.</p>

’ Entrymen unable to make improvements by reason of age or poverty may contract with another to build dwellings, clear land and furnish money to buy stock and provisions, without violation of the homestead laws. Conway v. United States, 95 Fed. 615; Grubbs v. United States, 105 Fed. 314, 319. Mortgaging the homestead by entryman is not alienation where the mortgage is given to procure money to improve the land.

Held: That the business, including the buying of the grain in North Dakota, was interstate commerce. P. 54. Dahnke-Walket Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 .

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>Error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which denied the right of a carrier to recover charges for refrigerator cars employed in interstate shipments. ■</p> <p>The court below held Circular No. 12, Western Trunk Lines, which was on file at the originating stations, not applicable to shipments destined by Southwestern Lines to Oklahoma and Texas, unless made applicable by Southwestern Lines Tariff, and that this tariff, while adopting Circular No. 12 by reference, was' not valid as to the shipments in question because not filed at stations where those shipments originated. . .</p> <p>The judgment is reviewable by writ of error. Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135; Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Journey, 257 U. S. 111; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334. Distinguishing, New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U. S. 406; Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. R. Co. v. Nichols & Co., 256 U. S. 540; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477, 481; Ireland v. Woods, 246 U. S. 323, 328; Champion Lumber Co. v. Fisher, 227 U. S. 445, 450. This case meets the requirement laid down in United States v. Lynch, 137 U. S. 280, 285, and Baltimore & Potomac R. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 130 U. S. 210.</p> <p>In the Journey Case, supra, the court could not have intended, without discussion, to hold that there was no jurisdiction on writ of error, for, like the North Dakota Case, supra, it clearly involved the validity of- an authority exercised under the United States. As pointed out in Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, some cases may be subject both to writ of error and certiorari, under Jud. Code, § 237. It is difficult to conceive a case where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, the decision being against their validity (in which case writ of error lies under the first clause of § 237), which does not also fall under the class of cases described in the last clause of that section (in which case certiorari is the proper writ). Such cases are subject to both writs.</p> <p>Cases of writ of error or appeal from the District of Columbia and the Territories under the Act of March 3, 1885, and under § 250, Jud. Code, are in point as defining the cases where writ of error lies under the Act of 1916. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U. S. 543; McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 38, 47; Smoot v. Heyl, 227 U. S. 518, 522.</p> <p>As to the merits: The court, construing the Interstate Commerce Act, held it required filing of every tariff at the shipping station and that a tariff was invalid for any purpose if not so filed, though otherwise duly filed and published as required by the act.</p> <p>The contrary rule has been repeatedly decided by this court. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Chicago & Erie R. R. Co., 235 U. S. 371; American Express Co. v. U. S. Horse Shoe Co., 244 U. S. 58; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 441; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U. S. 449.</p> <p>How far one circular or tariff may be incorporated into another by reference is a question for the Interstate Commerce Commission, and its discretion is controlling. As to this particular tariff, the Commission, after full hearings, has held that the car rental charge is properly referred to and therefore a part of the Southwestern Lines Tariff. Hale-Halsell Grocery Co. v. Missouri, Kansas &. Texas Ry. Co., 42 I. C. C. 491; 45 I. C. C. 523.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE ' ' THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Certiorari to review a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing a decree entered by the District Court after a rehearing, in a suit for patent infringement and unfair competition, and directing reinstatement of. another previously entered under its mandate.</p>

The case is determined by Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, and Boldt v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 245 U. S. 441. These are not in conflict with Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>Appeal from a decree of the District Court dismissing a libel to recover damages and enforce a lien for repairs.</p> <p>The identity of the car-float was completely lost by the conversion into an amusement steamer. Mere identity of hull is not sufficient to preserve the identity of the vessel. McMaster v. One Dredge, 95 Fed. 832; The Dredge A, 217 Fed. 617, 629, 630; Thames Towboat Co. v. The “ Francis McDonald,” 254 U. S. 242.</p> <p>The work done was not to repair, reconstruct, or furnish anything to the steamer “ Jack-O-Lantern,” the vessel which the libelant has libeled in this case. Such a craft was not in existence. The work done was not necessary to the repair of the original car-float. It was only necessary to bring the steamer which was libeled into existence. The car-float itself was destroyed and disappeared as a craft by means of the very work which the libelant did, and a new and entirely different type of vessel came into existence. This was construction of a steamboat and not repairs to a car-float.</p> <p>The Act of June 23, 1910, gives a lien for “ repairs, supplies, or other necessaries,” etc. Even if the contract in this case were maritime in its nature, the libelant must show that the work done comes within the description of “ repairs.” The distinction between repairs and reconstruction is drawn in The Susquehanna, 267 Fed. 811; and The Harvard, 270 Fed. 668. The statute, so far as it applies, only removes the distinction between .foreign and domestic vessels, making no change in general principles of the law of maritime liens. Piedmont Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U. S. 1, 11; The Oceana, 244 Fed. 82; The Hatteras, 255 Fed. 518; The Muskegon, 275 Fed. 348. It does not include reconstruction. The Schuylkill, 267 Fed. 811.</p> <p>It does not create new classes of liens or make maritime what was not maritime before. The J. Doherty, 207 Fed. 997; The Sinaloa, 209 Fed. 287; The Hatteras, supra; Thames Towboat Co. v. The “Francis McDonald,” 254 U. S. 242; Piedmont Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., supra; The “ United States,” 193 Fed. 552. It does not include all services, even though the contract be maritime. The Hatteras, supra; The Convoy, 257 Fed. 843.</p> <p>“Repairs.” may be very extensive. Hardy v. Ruggles, Fed. Cas. No. 6,062; North Pacific S. S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Co., 249 U. S. 119; The Harvard, supra; Donnell v. The Starlight, 103 Mass. 227. But they must not change the identity of the vessel.</p>

1. Appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the District of Alaska sustaining a demurrer to, and dismissing, the amended complaint, in a suit brought by the Territory and the Juneau Hardware Company to restrain' the local Collector of Customs from confiscating, merchandise, shipped or to be shipped by the Hardware Company or others in Alaska, from points in the United States over Canadian Railroads to Canadian ports, and thence to Alaska by British…

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>These were actions in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, brought by the present respondents, respectively, as indorsees of certificates of deposit issued by the respective petitioners. The petitioners pleaded res judicata, based on judgments rendered by the Florida courts in suits to which it had been sought to make the respondents parties through service by publication. The District Court held the service valid and the judgments conclusive; but the Circuit Court of Appeals held otherwise, and its judgments, reversing those of the District Court, are here by certiorari.</p>

Held: where the contractor acquiesced in the first suspension and thereafter made no protest, nor any claim until the suit was . brought. P. 121. 55 Ct. Clms. 533, affirmed. Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims rejecting a claim for damages arising from suspension of work under claimants’ contract.

Appeal from a decree of the District Court dismissing the bill, for want of equity, in a suit brought by-the appellant to restrain the appellees, county officials, from collecting a tax on the appellant’s bridge, alleged to discriminate, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a general citizen, in a state that already had women's suffrage, lacked standing to challenge the validity of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. A companion case, Leser v. Garnett, upheld the ratification.

Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Nineteenth Amendment was constitutional.

<p>Whether the advertising of a medicinal preparation, through the mails, so grossly overstates its true virtue as to work a fraud upon the public, is a question of fact committed to the decision of the Postmaster General, and his conclusion will not be reviewed by the courts when fairly arrived at and supported by substantial evidence. P. 139.</p>

Writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court óf New York, Appellate Division, entered on remittitur from the Court of Appeals ;of the State.

<p>Decree reciting report of commissioners heretofore appointed Lo run, locate and designate the boundary between Minnesota and Wisconsin involved in this case; confirming the report; establishing the boundary as set forth in said report and upon the maps accompanying the same; and allowing the expenses and compensation of said commissioners as part of the costs of the suit to be borne equally by the parties.</p>

IN EQUITY. On motions to dismiss an original bill in this court, brought by the State- of Texas against the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Railroad Labor Board, and seeking to have declared unconstitutional certain portions of the Transportation Act of 1920, to annul all action taken thereunder by either defendant in respect of railroad carriers in Texas, and to restrain the defendants from taking any further action- thereunder in respect of those carriers.

Held: sufficient to support conclusions of the master and trial court that the eighty-cent gas rate fixed by New York Laws 1906, c. 125, and upheld in Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 , had become confiscatory when this suit was begun and decided due to increased costs of labor and materials, and would so continue. P. 174. 3.

<p>Approving the conclusion of the master and the District Court that a gas .rate fixed under Laws New York, 1906, c. 125, had become confiscatory.</p>

<p>Approving the conclusion of the. master and of the District Court, that the gas rate imposed on appellee under New York Laws, 1906, c. 125; 1916, c. 604, had become confiscatory.</p>

<p>1. The constitutionality of a-state statute presenting very important, questions should not be decided unless the case before the court so requires. P. 184.</p> <p>2. Whether the Kansas-Industrial Relations Act (Laws 1920, c. 29), in providing in effect for compulsory arbitration of labor controversies in certain industries before an administrative body-whose orders it makes reviewable and enforceable through the State Supreme Court, violates the Federal Constitution, is not deter-minable upon a review of a judgment of that court sustaining, as a separable feature of the act,.the pó.wer it gives -the administrative body to call witqefeses to testify in a general investigation of indus-.. trial conditions and the power of the State District Court, of general jurisdiction, to order their attendance and to enforce their . obedience through contempt proceedings. P. 185.</p> <p>3. An injunction issued by a court of general jurisdiction and equity powers upon proper pleadings, and served upon parties within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed, even if erroneous and based upon an invalid statute, until set aside by orderly review. P. 190.</p> <p>4. Where a sentence imposed by the Kansas District "Ceurt for contempt in disobeying an injunction issued in a suit brought by the State to prevent execution of a conspiracy to cause a general strike and cessation of work in coal mines' contrary to the state laws, including the Industrial Relations Act, supra, was affirmed by the State Supreme Court independently of that act (though its constitutionality was drawn in- question) upon the ground that the District Court had general power to grant the injunction and that the validity of the injunction could not be questioned collaterally in the contempt proceeding, held that the judgment of affirmance, having a non-federal basis, was not reviewable by this court. P. 189.</p>

The grant by the State to the Board of Commissioners was a grant in praesenti. The terms of this grant further left it entirely at the option of the grantee when to require a title deed to be executed to it. Decisions of the State Supreme Court interpreting this very contract in two cases as withdrawing the lands from sale by the State and conveying a continuing title deed became a part of the contract.

Levinson v. United States, 258 U.S. 198 (1922), was a United States Supreme Court decision governing the sale by the United States Navy of the yacht USS Wadena. The court held that the government acted within its authority in selling the yacht to someone who was not actually the highest bidder, and was therefore bound by the sale even after the higher bid was discovered. The case is one of a line of cases that established that the federal government can be bound by the apparent authority of its agents. The Navy had used the Wadena in World War I and auctioned it off after the war ended. Levinson and Johnson both submitted bids. Johnson's was the higher bid, but his bid was lost, inadvertently assigned to the similarly-spelled USS Wandena, which was also being sold.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>Appeal from a decree of the District Court dismissing a bill filed by the appellant, on behalf of himself and others in like situation, to enjoin the assessment and collection of state taxes on lands ' within a federal reclamation project.</p>

which the bills of a company engaged in distributing gas supplied by plaintiff in error were reduced and refunds to consumers were'required.

two judgments entered in the Supreme Court of New York pursuant to remittiturs from the Court of Appeals and dismissing actions brought by the present plaintiffs in error, in the first case to recover rent under a lease and in the second to eject a tenant holding over after the expiration of his lease. The premises leased were apartments in New York City. ■ In both cases there were appeals in the first instance to the Appellate Division, and thence to the Court of Appeals.

<p>1. IVhether scienter is a necessary element of a statutory crime, ' though not expressed in the statute, is a question of legislative intent to be .answered by a construction of the statute. P. 251.’</p> <p>2. Punishment for an illegal act done by one in ignorance of the facts making it illegal, is not contrary to due process of law. P. 252.</p> <p>3. To constitute the offense of selling drugs contrary to § 2 of the Anti-Narcotie Act, it is not necessary that the seller bé aware of their character. P. 253.</p>

This case comes here for answer to the following question of law: “ May a prisoner, with the consent of the Attorney General, while serving a sentence imposed by a District Court of the United States, be lawfully taken on a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the master of the House of Correction, who, as Federal agent under a mittimus issued out of said District Court, has custody of such prisoner, into a state court, in the custody of said master and there put to trial upon…

<p>CERTIORARI to the circuit court of appeals for the NINTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Certiorari to a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a decree of the District Court in admiralty awarding the libelant the amounts he was compelled to pay for subsistence and medical treatment at a port of call where he left the ship for hospital treatment, and the amount of his wages from that time until the ship completed her voyage.</p>

United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that limited liability for landowners regarding injuries to child trespassers.

United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a violation of the Harrison Narcotics Act did not require a mens rea element and was thus a strict liability crime.

<p>.1. Error of state authorities in treating interstate as intrastate business in computing a corporation excise tax under a statute meant to include the latter only in the computation, goes to the constitutionality of the tax and not of the statute. P. 293,</p> <p>2. Business doné by a corporation through orders approved in a State where its tangible property and business office were located and’ its manufacturing conducted, but first obtained by its salesmen from residents in other States, held interstate, .if. 294.</p> <p>3. Where a state law for taxing foreign corporations for the privilege of doing local business bases the tax upon the capital stock actually represented by property located and business transacted within the . State, plainly intending not to tax interstate commerce, and is reasonable as to amount and free, from discrimination in favor of local corporations, a tax .assessed under it will not'be unconstitu-tional merely because a trifling part resulted from inclusion of interstate business in the basis of' computation. P. 295.</p>

Petition for rehearing and motion to remand for further finding. On a petition for rehearing and for a remand of the case to the Court of Claims for a further finding of fact. See s. c. 257 U. S. 541.

Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution did not apply to territories not incorporated into the union. It originated when Jesús M. Balzac was prosecuted for criminal libel in a district court of Puerto Rico. Balzac declared that his rights had been violated under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as he was denied a trial by jury since the code of criminal procedure of Puerto Rico did not grant a jury trial in misdemeanor cases. In the appeal, the U.S.

Held: that it was estopped by its contract from claiming a perpetual franchise under the later statute, and that, upon the expiration of the term, the municipality, as against the trustee for the company’s bondholders, could require that the pipes, etc., be removed from the streets. P. 334. 2.

Held: where notice was not given after the first two years, to have remained effective for two years longer and three months thereafter. P. 353. . '2. A suit to restrain a violation of a contract does not become moot ■ with the expiration of the'contract if the bill also prays for damages capable of ascertainment. P. 353. 3.

Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming a decree of the District Court, which dismissed the bill in a suit brought by the appellant to restrain the appellee from prosecuting an action in a state court.

<p>The obligation of a land-grant-aided railroad to transport at reduced rates “ troops ” of the United States applies to the transportation of members of the Coast Guard when serving as part of the Navy but not when serving under the Treasury. P. 375.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ' FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversing an order of the District Court, which granted an interlocutory- injunction, and directing that the injunction be dissolved and the bill dismissed for want of jurisdiction, in a suit by the appellant to restrain the appellee from following certain rules of car distribution, and to require it to furnish cars upon another basis.</p>

<p>1. The fact that a public utility, such as a street railway, may reach financial success only in time, or not at all, is a reason for allowing a liberal return on the money invested in the enterprise; but it does not make past’losses an element to be considered in deciding what the base value is and whether.a rate fixed is confiscatory. P. 395.</p> <p>2. A so-called “going concern value and development cost” based on calculations, for various periods, of past deficiencies of net income, allowing 4 per cent, for annual depreciation and 8 per cent, compound interest on the value of the property used as a fair return, should not be included in the base value of appellant’s street railway in determining whether an existing rate is confiscatory. P. 395.</p> <p>3. Neither should an allowance for hypothetical brokerage fees based on a percentage customarily obtained by bankers for financing such enterprises. P. 397.</p> <p>4. In determining the sufficiency of such rates, the amount normally required for maintenance, not necessarily the amount expended, annually, should be allowed; and many items included in overhead cost of original construction may be excluded in calculating depreciation annuity. P. 398.</p> <p>5. Appellant’s request that prospective cost of maintenance deferred during the war at the wish of the Government be allowed from earnings of future years, in testing the rate, was an attempt to capitalize past losses and rightly refused. P. 399.</p> <p>6. In calculating whether a rate fixed will yield an adequate return, income taxes which would be payable if a fair return were earned are appropriate deductions from gross revenue. P. 399.</p> <p>7. But, where the federal corporate income tax, .(Act of February 24, 1919, c. 18, §§ 230-238, 40 Stat. 1057, 1075-1080,) is thus deducted,’the exemption of the stockholder from the “normal” tax on dividends received from the corporation must be taken into consideration in determining what rate of return to the corporation shall be deemed fair. P. 399.</p> <p>8. An ordinance rate inadequate .when adopted will be valid when, through change of conditions, it yields á fair return. P. 400.</p> <p>9. The court knows judicially that prices, in general', and current rates of return.on capital have declined since, the conclusion of the war, but not the extent to which the economic .changes occurring have affected- the gross revenues or the net return of the ' appellant company. P. 402.</p> <p>10. A decree of the .District Court dismissing without prejudice the bill of a street railway company to restrain enforcement of an ■'•ordinance rate as confiscatory, affirmed,,where an operation test ■ of more than a year 'and a half was inconclusive because of abnormal economic conditions then existing, and where the lower court’s view of the probable future adequacy of the rate was necessarily based largely on prophecy,-and was free from substantial error as to the elements to be considered, and where the actual facts were substantially undisputéd and the evidence did not compel a contrary conviction. P. 401.</p>

<p>1. In a proceeding in habeas corpus on behalf of a person imprisoned under sentence of a court-martial, the inquiry must be limited to the jurisdiction of the court-martial over the offense charged and1 the punishment inflicted. P. 418.</p> <p>2. To sustain the, jurisdiction of a court-martial in a collateral attack by. habeas corpus, the facts essential to its existence must appear. P. 418.</p> <p>3. Taking property “ from the presence of ” another feloniously and by putting him in fear is equivalent to taking it from his personal protection, and is, -in law, a taking from the person — a robbery, as defined by § 284 of the Criminal Code, ■ P. 419. .</p> <p>4. It is not necessary that a charge in court-martial proceedings should be framed with the technical precision of a common-law indictment. P. 420.</p> <p>5. In habeas corpus, objections to a court-martial trial .which are mere conclusions not supported by the record, or concern merely errors in the admission of testimony, cannot be considered. P. 420.</p>

James C. Davis, successor of Mr. Payne as Director General, ;was substituted as respondent by order of this court, he having been designated by the President as agent for the defense of such actions under § 206 of the Transportation Act, 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 461. The receipt of benefit under the Compensation Act does 'not constitute an election barring the plaintiff of his remedy.

United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922), was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 9 and 10, 1922, and decided a month later on April 17. The case involved a Fifth Amendment rights issue centering on whether or not hard labor was an infamous punishment (thus triggering the necessity of a grand jury indictment) or whether imprisonment in a penitentiary was a necessity for punishment to be considered infamous. The majority opinion also included the court's contention for continued support of the findings of a previously held case, Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). Lawyers for the United States argued that Wong Wing was improperly applied in the Moreland case, and had been modified or overruled by subsequent cases.

Held: That, although there was no specific agreement not to use machinery of a competitor, the practical effect of these restrictive provisions, thus tied together, was to prevent such use and necessarily to lessen competition and to tend to create monopoly, .in violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act. P. 456. 4.

Held: that the charge, as applied to local transactions, is an excise, and is ■ (a) Not arbitrary or. unreasonable, in violation of the Fourteenth ' . Amendment. P. 479. (b) Nor-contrary to Art. 7, § 2, par. 1, of the Georgia!

Held: on the authority of the Swift Case, that the delivery and sale of wheat by farmers to local grain elevators in North Dakota to be shipped to Minneapolis, when practically all the wheat purchased by such elevators was so shipped and the price was fixed by that in the Minneapolis market less profit and freight, constituted a course of business and determined the interstate character of the transaction.

Held: that the act does not apply to transactions consummated before its passage. P. 534. 3. The reenactment of these provisions with an added provision that the transfer or trust should be taxed whether made before or after the passage of the act (February 24, 1919, c. 18, § 402. (c), 40 Stat. 1097 ) is not a construction of the earlier act as retroactive but the expression of a new purpose. P. 536. 4.

Held: or expended, by you, according to your judgment, for the benefit-' of my grandchildren, the children of my said daughter, Rebecca Metzger, and upon the youngest of said children attaining the age of majority, all the then surviving children of my said daughter, Rebecca Metzger, shall be immediately entitled to said two thousand four hundred and ninety (2.490) shares in equal proportions.

Held: That the bill stated a cause of action against the Fleet Corporation, cognizable by a District Court, since (b) It could not be assumed from the allegations that the taking was in pursuance of powers which had been delegated to the Fleet Corporation by the President, directly or through the Shipping Board, when the taking occurred, or that it was within the ratification of past acts of the Fleet Corporation made by…

Held: fa) That, as the river, opposite the tract, had no permanent channel other than a broad sandy bed extending from one cut bank to the *576 other, traversed only by shifting ribbons of water in dry seasons, but over which the water was well distributed in times of substantial flow, the medial line of this t^ed was the boundary of the Reservation and of the pasture reserve. P. 593.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.-</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico.</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana'.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.</p>

<p>Error to the Superior Court in and for the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>