Volume 259 — United States Reports

Held: that the petitioner’s tug was guilty of negligence in talcing her tow, the respondent’s barge, dangerously near to the shore, and in then changing her course by a right angle suddenly, without a warning signal, with the result that the barge’s shackle, to which the tow-line was attached, gave way under a sudden lateral strain and .the barge was cast adrift and grounded. P. 4. 4.

Held: that, as the case had become moot, the merits could not be considered, but the decree should be reversed with direction to dismiss the bill without costs. P. 15. Reversed. Appeal from a decree of the District Court granting a permanent injunction. See Child Labor Tax Case, post, 20.

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled the 1919 Child Labor Tax Law unconstitutional as an improper attempt by Congress to penalize employers using child labor. The Court indicated that the tax imposed by the statute was actually a penalty in disguise. The Court later abandoned the philosophy underlying the Bailey case. For example, see United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).

Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision overturning the legality of the Futures Trading Act of 1921. The law, approved August 24, 1921, by the U.S. Congress attempted to institute Federal regulation of grain futures contract trading by imposing a prohibitive tax on futures contracts traded on any market other than those that met the statute's requirements and were regulated by the Secretary of Agriculture. The court found it was an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power of Congress. Congress responded to the Court's decision by passing the Grain Futures Act in September 1922 based on the Commerce Clause. The Grain Futures Act was held to be constitutional by the Court in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen (1923)

Held: A contract, and not a requisition under the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, c. 134, § 120, 39 Stat. 213 , which authorized, in addition to purchase, the obtaining of material by compulsory orders, for a fair and just compensation.

Held: that the compensation allowed in these cases was excessive. P. 105.' Reversed. *102 Appeals from decrees of the District Court holding the gas rate prescribed by New York Laws of 1906, c. 125, unconstitutional, and from supplemental decrees fixing the compensation óf a master. See Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U. S. 165 .

Held: That the order, taking character from its criminal feature, was subject as a final judgment to immediate review, on behalf of the defendant, by writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals. P. 110. (b) That, when the order was thus brought before it, the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction to review it in its civil as well as its criminal aspects. P.T11.

Held: not as a separate fund for the District, but subject to the disposal of Congress, notwithstanding the fact that the persons taxed lack the suffrage and have politically no voice in the expenditure of the money. P. 124. 269 Fed. 1015 ; 50 App.

Held: that the Pierce Company had carried oil for the Phoenix Company and for various others for several years at rates agreed upon; that its pipe line was the only available and practicable line by which the Phoenix Company could procure oil from the Cushing Field for its refinery; that the Pierce Company, in competition with others, purchased oil in the Cushing Field, which it transported to its refinery at Sand…

Held: upon the evidence, that a stipulation to dismiss this suit, and a quit-claim deed, both affecting valuable property rights of an Indian, were executed by him when incompetent, due to his addiction to drink, and should be set aside. P. 148. 5.

Held: \d) That the so-ealle(clf sale is in effect a distribution of forbidden surplus assets of the Reading Company to its Stockholders, small payments being requited for the purpose of providing the company with additional capital for the operation of its railway system. P. 176.

Held: that there *189 was no taking by the Government and no contract to be implied that it would indemnify claimant for the loss. P. 189. 55 Ct. Clms. 310, affirmed. Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing appellant’s petition upon demurrer. Mr. Gibbs L. Baker, with whom Mr. Karl Knox Gartner was on the brief, for appellant.

Held: that the prices last referred to are only those to be paid by the Government, and that the act cannot be constrúed as an undertaking by the United States to indemnify producers who sold to third parties where the prices fixed were unjust and unreasonable. P. 195. 2..

Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to Major League Baseball.

Held: that error in submitting the case to the jury on the theory of the owner’s negligence was harmless, since the facts as found by the jury warranted the recovery upon the ground of unseaworthiness. P. 259. 5.

Held: that his contract of employment did not contemplate any dominant *264 federal rule concerning his-employer’s liability in damages; and that whether awards under the State Compensation Act are to be regarded as made upon implied agreement of employer and employee, or otherwise,- the act was applicable to the case, since this would not conflict with any federal statute ór work material prejudice to any characteristic…

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), is a United States Supreme Court decision holding that habeas corpus petitioners are entitled to a de novo judicial hearing to adjudicate claims that they are citizens of the United States.

Held: that the plaintiff was not obliged to prove the profits made by the two other companies, generally or in the business thus done with the plaintiff. P. 323. 3.

Held: (а) That review of a finding of the Final Classificatiqn Board placing an officer in class B is discretionary with the President, not a right of the officer, and that the finality of the Board’s action is not dependent on the President’s approval, either personal or delegated. P. 332.

Held: inconsistently, that although Colonel Creary was entitled to a hearing before the 'Honest and Faithful Board, which is to.the effect that the proceedings of that board were judicial in character, *341 the duty of review imposed upon the President was. nevertheless administrative and delegable to the Secretary of War.

Held: that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting several allied corporations to be joined as plaintiffs in an action prosecuted by tbeir receiver to recover triple' damages under § 7 of the Sherman Act for the destruction of their properties and business committed in an alleged conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce. P. 382. *345 2.

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) is a set of court cases, all dealing with water distribution from the Laramie River. A petition for rehearing was granted, which revised the original decision. A motion to dismiss was later denied.

Held: that the appropriation was superior in right to later appropriations from the stream made in Colorado for use on Colorado lands, and that state officials of Colorado were properly enjoined from interfering with it and from treating the appropriator, in the distribution of water, otherwise than if the canal and lands irrigated therefrom were wholly within that State, notwithstanding their objection that the waters of…

Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that state governments did not need to limit their worker's compensation programs to those in hazardous industries, allowing them to instead target medium and large employers.