Volume 26 — Immigration & Naturalization Decisions

E-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2012) ID 3766 (PDF) (1) In assessing whether there are serious reasons for believing that an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal has committed a serious nonpolitical crime, an Immigration Judge should balance the seriousness of the criminal acts against the political aspect of the conduct to determine whether the criminal nature of the acts outweighs their political character. (2) When considered together, the applicant's actions as a member of a group that burned passenger buses and cars, threwstones, and disrupted the economic activity of merchants in the market, while pretending to be from the opposition party, reached the level of serious criminal conduct that, when weighed against its political nature, constituted a serious nonpolitical crime.

Y-N-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 10 (BIA 2012) ID 3767 (PDF) An applicant for special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2006), cannot utilize a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006), to overcome the section 240A(b)(2)(A)(iv) bar resulting from inadmissibility under section 212(a)(2).

LEAL, 26 I&N Dec. 20 (BIA 2012) ID 3768 (PDF) The offense of "recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death" in violation of section 13-1201(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude under the definition in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008), even though Arizona law defines recklessness to encompass a subjective ignorance of risk resulting from voluntary intoxication.

M-Z-M-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2012) ID 3769 (PDF) (1) In assessing an asylum applicant's ability to internally relocate, an Immigration Judge must determine whether the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country of nationality and whether, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so. (2) For an applicant to be able to internally relocate safely, there must be an area of the country where the circumstances are substantially better than those giving rise to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim. (3) If an applicant is able to internally relocate, an Immigration Judge should balance the factors identified at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (2012) in light of the applicable burden of proof to determine whether it would be reasonable under all the circumstances to expect the applicant to relocate.

DAVEY, 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012) ID 3770 (PDF) (1) For purposes of section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), the phrase "a single offense involving possession for one's own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana" calls for a circumstance-specific inquiry into the character of the alien's unlawful conduct on a single occasion, not a categorical inquiry into the elements of a single statutory crime. (2) An alien convicted of more than one statutory crime may be covered by the exception to deportability for an alien convicted of "a single offense involving possession for one's own use of thirty grams or less ofmarijuana" if all the alien's crimeswere closely related to or connected with a single incident in which the alien possessed 30 grams or less of marijuana for his or her own use, provided that none of those crimeswas inherently more serious than simple possession.

SANCHEZ-HERBERT, 26 I&N Dec. 43 (BIA 2012) ID 3771 (PDF) Where an alien fails to appear for a hearing because he has departed the United States, termination of the pending proceedings is not appropriate if the alien received proper notice of the hearing and is removable as charged.

M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46 (BIA 2012) ID 3772 (PDF) The holding in Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), that an offense need not be an aggravated felony to be considered a particularly serious crime for purposes of barring asylum or withholding of removal, should be applied to cases within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

VALENZUELA-FELIX, 26 I&N Dec. 53 (BIA 2012) ID 3773 (PDF) When theDepartment ofHomeland Security paroles a returning lawful permanent resident for prosecution, it need not have all the evidence to sustain its burden of proving that the alien is an applicant for admission but may ordinarily rely on the results of a subsequent prosecution to meet that burden in later removal proceedings.

SANCHEZ-LOPEZ, 26 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 2012) ID 3774 (PDF) The offense of stalking in violation of section 646.9 of the California Penal Code is "a crime of stalking" under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006).

CORTES MEDINA, 26 I&N Dec. 79 (BIA 2013) ID 3775 (PDF) The offense of indecent exposure in violation of section 314(1) of the California Penal Code, which includes the element of lewd intent, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

G-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 2013) ID 3776 (PDF) (1) The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 ("UNTOC"), which is intended to help protect witnesses of transnational organized crime from retaliation and intimidation, does not provide an independent basis for relief from removal in immigration proceedings. (2) The objectives of the UNTOC are advanced in the United States through existing immigration laws and regulations, including the S, T, and U nonimmigrant visas and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46. 39 U.N. GAORSupp.No. 51, at 197,U.N.Doc.A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987 for the United States Apr. 18, 1988). (3) The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Judges do not have the authority to rule on the constitutionality of the statutes they administer and therefore lack jurisdiction to address a claimthat the statute barring relief for particularly serious crimes is void for vagueness.

ORTEGA-LOPEZ, 26 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 2013) ID 3777 (PDF) The offense of sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting venture in violation of 7U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (2006) is categorically a crime involvingmoral turpitude.

CENTRAL CALIFORNIA LEGAL SERVICES, INC., 26 I&N Dec. 105 (BIA 2013) ID 3778 (PDF) A recognized organization's application for initial accreditation of a proposed representative must show that the individual has recently completed at least one formal training course that was designed to give new practitioners a solid overview of the fundamentals of immigration law and procedure.

B-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 119 (BIA 2013) ID 3780 (PDF) An alien who is a citizen or national of more than one country but has no fear of persecution in one of those countries does not qualify as a "refugee" under section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), and is ineligible for asylum.

MONTOYA-SILVA, 26 I&N Dec. 123 (BIA 2013) ID 3781 (PDF) A parent's lawful permanent resident status and residence in the United States cannot be imputed to an unemancipated minor for purposes of establishing the child's eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006). Matter of Escobar, 24 I&N Dec. 231 (BIA 2007) and Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I&N Dec. 599 (BIA 2008), reaffirmed.

OTIENDE, 26 I&N Dec. 127 (BIA 2013) ID 3782 (PDF) Although a visa petition filed by a petitioner for a spouse may be subject to denial under section 204(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (2006), based on the spouse's prior marriage, that section does not prevent the approval of a petition filed on behalf of the spouse's child, which must be considered on its merits to determine whether the child qualifies as the petitioner's "stepchild" under the Act.

RIVAS, 26 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 2013) ID 3783 (PDF) A waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006), is not available on a "stand-alone" basis to an alien in removal proceedings without a concurrently filed application for adjustment of status, and a waiver may not be granted nunc pro tunc to avoid the requirement that the alien must establish eligibility for adjustment.

E-S-I-, 26 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 2013) ID 3784 (PDF) (1) Where the indicia of a respondent's incompetency are manifest, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") should serve the notice to appear on three individuals: (1) a person with whom the respondent resides, who, when the respondent is detained in a penal or mental institution, will be someone in a position of demonstrated authority in the institution or his or her delegate and, when the respondent is not detained, will be a responsible party in the household, if available (2) whenever applicable or possible, a relative, guardian, or person similarly close to the respondent and (3) in most cases, the respondent. (2) If the DHS did not properly serve the respondent where indicia of incompetency were either manifest or arose at a master calendar hearing that was held shortly after service of the notice to appear, the Immigration Judge should grant a continuance to give the DHS time to effect proper service. (3) If indicia of incompetency become manifest at a later point in the proceedings and the Immigration Judge determines that safeguards are needed, he or she shouldevaluate the benefit of re-serving the notice to appear in accordance with 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.8(c)(2)(i) and (ii) (2013) as a safeguard.

V-X-, 26 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 2013) ID 3785 (PDF) (1) A grant of asylum is not an "admission" to the United States under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)(2006). (2) When termination of an alien's asylum status occurs in conjunction with removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24 (2013), the Immigration Judge should ordinarily make a threshold determination regarding the termination of asylum status before resolving issues of removability and eligibility for relief from removal. (3) An adjudication of "youthful trainee" status pursuant to section 762.11 of the Michigan Compiled Laws is a "conviction" under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act because such an adjudication does not correspond to a determination of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (2006). Matter of Devison, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000), followed.

FLORES, 26 I&N Dec. 155 (BIA 2013) ID 3786 (PDF) The offense of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of an unlawful drug enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1)(A) (2006) is not an "aggravated felony" under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), because it is neither a "drug trafficking crime" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) nor "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), followed.

ZELENIAK, 26 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 2013) ID 3787 (PDF) Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104 199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996), is no longer an impediment to the recognition of lawful same-sex marriages and spouses under the Immigration and Nationality Act if the marriage is valid under the laws of the State where it was celebrated.

J-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 161 (BIA 2013) ID 3788 (PDF) (1) An alien who is subject to an in absentia removal order need not first rescind the order before seeking reopening of the proceedings to apply for asylum and withholding of removal based on changed country conditions arising in the country of the alien's nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered. (2) The numerical limitations on filing a motion to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(2013) are not applicable to an alien seeking reopening to apply for asylum and withholding of removal based on changed country conditions arising in the country of the alien's nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.

TAVAREZ-PERALTA, 26 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 2013) ID 3789 (PDF) (1) An alien convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5) (2006), who interfered with a police helicopter pilot by shining a laser light into the pilot's eyes while he operated the helicopter, is removable under section 237(a)(4)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2006), as an alien who has engaged in criminal activity that endangers public safety. (2) A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5) is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006).

ESTRADA, 26 I&N Dec. 180 (BIA 2013) ID 3790 (PDF) A spouse or child accompanying or following to join a principal grandfathered alien cannot qualify as a derivative grandfathered alien for purposes of section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (2006), by virtue of a spouse or child relationship that arose after April 30, 2001.

PINZON, 26 I&N Dec. 189 (BIA 2013) ID 3791 (PDF) (1) An alien who enters the United States by falsely claiming United States citizenship is not deemed to have been inspected by an immigration officer, so the entry is not an "admission" under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012). (2) The offense of knowingly and willfully making any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement to obtain a United States passport in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006) is a crime involving moral turpitude.

DOUGLAS, 26 I&N Dec. 197 (BIA 2013) ID 3792 (PDF) A child who has satisfied the statutory conditions of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (2000), before the age of 18 years has acquired United States citizenship, regardless of whether the naturalized parent acquired legal custody of the child before or after the naturalization. Matter of Baires, 24 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2008), followed. Jordon v. Attorney General of U.S., 424 F.3d 320 (3d Cir. 2005), not followed.

OPPEDISANO, 26 I&N Dec. 202 (BIA 2013) ID 3793 (PDF) The offense of unlawful possession of ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) (2012).

W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014) ID 3794 (PDF) (1) In order to clarify that the "social visibility" element required to establish a cognizable "particular social group" does not mean literal or "ocular" visibility, that element is renamed as "social distinction." Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008) Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008) Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007) and Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), clarified. (2) An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal seeking relief based on "membership in a particular social group" must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question. (3) An applicant has the burden of demonstrating not only the existence of a cognizable particular social group and his membership in that particular social group, but also a risk of persecution "on account of" his membership in that group. (4) The respondent did not establish that "former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership" constitute a "particular social group" or that there is a nexus between the harm he fears and his status as a former gang member.

M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014) ID 3795 (PDF) (1) In order to clarify that the "social visibility" element required to establish a cognizable "particular social group" does not mean literal or "ocular" visibility, that element is renamed as "social distinction." Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008) Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008) Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007) and Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), clarified. (2) An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal seeking relief based on "membership in a particular social group" must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question. (3) Whether a social group is recognized for asylum purposes is determined by the perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of the persecutor.

ABDELGHANY, 26 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2014) ID 3796 (PDF) (1) A lawful permanent resident who has accrued 7 consecutive years of lawful unrelinquished domicile in the United States and who is removable or deportable by virtue of a plea or conviction entered before April 24, 1996, is eligible to apply for discretionary relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), unless: (1) the applicant is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(3)(A), (B), (C), or (E), or (10)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A), (B), (C), or (E), or (10)(C) (2012) or (2) the applicant has served an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years as a result of one or more aggravated felony convictions entered between November 29, 1990, and April 24, 1996. (2) A lawful permanent resident who has accrued 7 consecutive years of lawful unrelinquished domicile in the United States and who is removable or deportable by virtue of a plea or conviction entered between April 24, 1996, and April 1, 1997, is eligible to apply for discretionary relief from removal or deportation under former section 212(c) of the Act unless: (1) the applicant's removal or deportation proceedings commenced on or after April 24, 1996, and the conviction renders the applicant removable or deportable under one or more of the deportability grounds enumerated in section 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (as amended) or (2) the applicant is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility under sections 212(a)(3)(A), (B), (C), or (E), or (10)(C) of the Act or (3) the applicant has served an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years as a result of one or more aggravated felony convictions entered between November 29, 1990, and April 24, 1996. (3) A lawful permanent resident who is otherwise eligible for relief under former section 212(c) of the Act may apply for such relief in removal or deportation proceedings without regard to whether the relevant conviction resulted from a plea agreement or a trial and without regard to whether he or she was removable or deportable under the law in effect when the conviction was entered.

CHAVEZ-ALVAREZ, 26 I&N Dec. 274 (BIA 2014) ID 3797 (PDF) (1) Adjustment of status constitutes an "admission" for purposes of determining an alien's removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony "at any time after admission." Matter of Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999), reaffirmed. (2) An element listed in a specification in the Manual for Courts-Martial ("MCM"), which must be pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is the functional equivalent of an "element" of a criminal offense for immigration purposes. (3) The crime of sodomy by force in violation of article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000), and the Punitive Articles of the MCM relating to sodomy, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) within the definition of an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)(2012).

C-J-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 2014) ID 3798 (PDF) An alien whose status has been adjusted from asylee to lawful permanent resident cannot subsequently readjust status under section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2012).

SIERRA, 26 I&N Dec. 288 (BIA 2014) ID 3799 (PDF) Under the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the offense of attempted possession of a stolen vehicle in violation of sections 193.330 and 205.273 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, which requires only a mental state of "reason to believe," is not categorically an aggravated felony "theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)" under sections 101(a)(43)(G) and (U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and (U) (2012).

ACEIJAS-QUIROZ, 26 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 2014) ID 3800 (PDF) In adjudicating cases involving the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, the Board of Immigration Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a "no risk" determination by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, including the appropriate standard of proof to be applied.

INTROCASO, 26 I&N Dec. 304 (BIA 2014) ID 3801 (PDF) (1) In a visa petition case involving the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that he has not been convicted of a "specified offense against a minor." (2) In assessing whether a petitioner has been convicted of a "specified offense against a minor," adjudicators may apply the "circumstance-specific" approach, which permits an inquiry into the facts and conduct underlying the conviction to determine if it is for a disqualifying offense.

JACKSON and ERANDIO, 26 I&N Dec. 314 (BIA 2014) ID 3802 (PDF) Section 402(a)(2) of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 622, which bars the approval of a family-based visa petition filed by a petitioner who has been convicted of a "specified offense against a minor" and has not shown that he poses "no risk" to the beneficiary, does not have an impermissible retroactive effect when applied to convictions that occurred before its enactment.

E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2014), vacated, 27 I&N Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018) ID 3803 (PDF) In the ordinary course of removal proceedings, an applicant for asylum or for withholding or deferral of removal is entitled to a hearing on the merits of those applications, including an opportunity to provide oral testimony and other evidence, without first having to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief. Matter of Fefe, 20 I&N Dec. 116 (BIA 1989), followed.

DUARTE-LUNA and LUNA, 26 I&N Dec. 325 (BIA 2014) ID 3804 (PDF) A parent's continuous physical presence and continuous residence in the United States cannot be imputed to a child for purposes of establishing the child's eligibility for Temporary Protected Status.

P-S-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 329 (BIA 2014) ID 3805 (PDF) To terminate a grant of asylum pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24 (2013), the Department of Homeland Security must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there was fraud in the alien's asylum application and (2) the fraud was such that the alien was not eligible for asylum at the time it was granted however, proof that the alien knew of the fraud in the application is not required in order to satisfy the first criterion. Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2012), clarified.

G-G-S-, 26 I&N Dec. 339 (BIA 2014) ID 3806 (PDF) An alien's mental health as a factor in a criminal act falls within the province of the criminal courts and is not considered in assessing whether the alien was convicted of a "particularly serious crime" for immigration purposes.

CHAIREZ, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014) ID 3807 (PDF) (1) The categorical approach, which requires a focus on the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being prosecuted under the statute of conviction, is employed to determine whether the respondent's conviction for felony discharge of a firearm under section 76-10-508.1 of the Utah Code is for a crime of violence aggravated felony or a firearms offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013), followed. (2) The Department of Homeland Security did not meet its burden of establishing the respondent's removability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony where it did not show that section 76-10-508.1 of the Utah Code was divisible with respect to the mens rea necessary to constitute a crime of violence. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), followed. Matter of Lanferman, 25 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA 2012), withdrawn. (3) Where the respondent did not demonstrate that he or anyone else was successfully prosecuted for discharging an "antique firearm" under section 76-10-508.1 of the Utah Code, which contains no exception for "antique firearms" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(16) (2012), the statute was not shown to be categorically overbroad relative to section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2012). Matter of Mendez-Orellana, 25 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 2010), clarified.

M-L-M-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 360 (BIA 2014) ID 3808 (PDF) (1) Because an application for special rule cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (2006), is a continuing one, false testimony given by the respondent more than 3 years prior to the entry of a final administrative order should not be considered in determining whether she is barred from establishing good moral character under section 101(f)(6) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2006). Matter of Garcia, 24 I&N Dec. 179 (BIA 2007), and Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793 (BIA 2005), followed. (2) Although the respondent was divorced from her abusive husband and subsequently had a long-term relationship with another man, she had not previously been granted special rule cancellation of removal based on her abusive marriage and had significant equities that merited a favorable exercise of discretion. Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2009), distinguished.

L-G-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) ID 3809 (PDF) Sale of a controlled substance in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes, which lacks a mens rea element with respect to the illicit nature of the substance but requires knowledge of its presence and includes an affirmative defense for ignorance of its unlawful nature, is an "illicit trafficking" aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012).

C-C-I-, 26 I&N Dec. 375 (BIA 2014) ID 3810 (PDF) (1) Reopening of removal proceedings for a de novo hearing to consider termination of an alien's deferral of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d)(1) (2014), is warranted where the Government presents evidence that was not considered at the previous hearing if it is relevant to the possibility that the alien will be tortured in the country to which removal has been deferred. (2) The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not prevent an Immigration Judge from reevaluating an alien's credibility in light of additional evidence presented at a hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(d)(3).

A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014) ID 3811 (PDF) Depending on the facts and evidence in an individual case, "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship" can constitute a cognizable particular social group that forms the basis of a claim for asylum or withholding of removal under sections 208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1231(b)(3) (2012).

HERNANDEZ, 26 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2014) ID 3812 (PDF) Malicious vandalism in violation of section 594(a) of the California Penal Code with a gang enhancement under section 186.22(d) of the California Penal Code, which requires that the underlying offense be committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote criminal conduct by gang members, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

PAEK, 26 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA 2014) ID 3813 (PDF) An alien who was admitted to the United States at a port of entry as a conditional permanent resident pursuant to section 216(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a) (2012), is an alien "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" who is barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), if he or she was subsequently convicted of an aggravated felony.

DOMINGUEZ-RODRIGUEZ, 26 I&N Dec. 408 (BIA 2014) ID 3814 (PDF) For purposes of section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012), the phrase "a single offense involving possession for one's own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana" calls for a circumstance-specific inquiry into the character of the alien's unlawful conduct on a single occasion, not a categorical inquiry into the elements of a single statutory crime. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013), distinguished. Matter of Davey, 26 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2012), reaffirmed.

FERREIRA, 26 I&N Dec. 415 (BIA 2014) ID 3815 (PDF) Where a State statute on its face covers a controlled substance not included in the Federal controlled substances schedules, there must be a realistic probability that the State would prosecute conduct under the statute that falls outside the generic definition of the removable offense to defeat a charge of removability under the categorical approach.

PINA-GALINDO, 26 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 2014) ID 3816 (PDF) An alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012), if he or she falls within the scope of section 212(a)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (2012), as having been convicted of two or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences imposed were 5 years or more.

MUNROE, 26 I&N Dec. 428 (BIA 2014) ID 3817 (PDF) For purposes of establishing an alien's eligibility for a waiver under section 216(c)(4)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A) (2012), the relevant period for determining whether an alien's removal would result in extreme hardship is the 2-year period for which the alien was admitted as a conditional permanent resident.

BETT, 26 I&N Dec. 437 (BIA 2014) ID 3818 (PDF) A Form I-9 (Employment Eligibility Verification) is admissible in immigration proceedings to support charges of removability against an alien and to determine his or her eligibility for relief from removal.

ST. FRANCIS CABRINI IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, 26 I&N Dec. 445 (BIA 2014) ID 3819 (PDF) Where an organization is physically colocated or financially associated with, or otherwise attached to, a for-profit venture, the Board of Immigration Appeals will not approve an application for recognition unless it is confident that the organization will not be influenced, either explicitly or implicitly, by the pecuniary interests of the commercial affiliate.

AYUDA, 26 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 2014) ID 3820 (PDF) When assessing an organization's application for recognition, the Board of Immigration Appeals makes an individualized determination whether the applicant's fees qualify as "nominal charges" and whether its fee structure is true to the goal of providing competent low-cost legal services. Matter of American Paralegal Academy, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 386 (BIA 1986), clarified.

UNITED FARM WORKERS FOUNDATION, 26 I&N Dec. 454 (BIA 2014) ID 3821 (PDF) A recognized organization need only apply for its representative's accreditation at one location, and if approved, that representative may thereafter practice at any branch location of the organization that has been recognized by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Matter of EAC, Inc., 24 I&N Dec. 563 (BIA 2008), modified.

VELASQUEZ-CRUZ, 26 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 2014) ID 3822 (PDF) An alien's departure from the United States following a criminal conviction for illegal entry under section 275(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (2012), interrupts the 10-year period of continuous physical presence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012).

O. A. HERNANDEZ, 26 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 2015) ID 3823 (PDF) The offense of "deadly conduct" in violation of section 22.05(a) of the Texas Penal Code, which punishes a person who "recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury," is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

ESQUIVEL-QUINTANA, 26 I&N Dec. 469 (BIA 2015) ID 3824 (PDF) (1) For a statutory rape offense that may include a 16- or 17-year-old victim to be categorically "sexual abuse of a minor" under section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (2012), the statute must require a meaningful age differential between the victim and the perpetrator. Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I&N Dec. 991 (BIA 1999), and Matter of V-F-D-, 23 I&N Dec. 859 (BIA 2006), clarified. (2) The offense of unlawful intercourse with a minor in violation of section 261.5(c) of the California Penal Code, which requires that the minor victim be "more than three years younger" than the perpetrator, categorically constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor" and is therefore an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act.

CHAIREZ, 26 I&N Dec. 478 (BIA 2015) (1) With respect to aggravated felony convictions, Immigration Judges must follow the law of the circuit court of appeals in whose jurisdiction they sit in evaluating issues of divisibility, so the interpretation of Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), reflected in Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014), applies only insofar as there is no controlling authority to the contrary in the relevant circuit. (2) Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has taken an approach to divisibility different from that adopted in Matter of Chairez, the law of the Tenth Circuit must be followed in that circuit.

CROSS, 26 I&N Dec. 485 (BIA 2015) A person born out of wedlock may qualify as a legitimated "child" of his or her biological parents under section 101(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1) (2012), for purposes of citizenship if he or she was born in a country or State that has eliminated all legal distinctions between children based on the marital status of their parents or had a residence or domicile in such a country or State (including a State within the United States), if otherwise eligible. Matter of Hines, 24 I&N Dec. 544 (BIA 2008), and Matter of Rowe, 23 I&N Dec. 962 (BIA 2006), overruled in part. Matter of Clahar, 18 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1981), and Matter of Goorahoo, 20 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 1994), reaffirmed.

The respondent is removable under section 237(a)(4)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (2012), where the totality of the record supported the conclusion that, through his "command responsibility" in his role as Director of the Salvadoran National Guard and as Minister of Defense of El Salvador, he participated in the commission of particular acts of torture and extrajudicial killing of civilians in El Salvador, in that they took place while he was in command, he was aware of these abuses during or after the fact, and through both his personal interference with investigations and his inaction, he did not hold the perpetrators accountable.

(1) Where an Immigration Judge finds that an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal has not provided reasonably available corroborating evidence to establish his claim, the Immigration Judge should first consider the applicant's explanations for the absence of such evidence and, if a continuance is requested, determine whether there is good cause to continue the proceedings for the applicant to obtain the evidence. (2) Although an Immigration Judge should consider an applicant's explanation for the absence of corroborating evidence, section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012), does not require the Immigration Judge to identify the specific evidence necessary to meet the applicant's burden of proof and to provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain that evidence prior to rendering a decision on the application.

The rules for applying for a bond redetermination at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(c) (2014) relate to venue, not jurisdiction.

LEACHENG INTERNATIONAL, INC., 26 I&N Dec. 532 (AAO 2015) (1) The definition of "doing business" at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(j)(2) (2014) contains no requirement that a petitioner for a multinational manager or executive must provide goods and or services to an unaffiliated third party. (2) A petitioner may establish that it is "doing business" by demonstrating that it is providing goods and/or services in a regular, systematic, and continuous manner to related companies within its multinational organization.

CHRISTO'S, INC., 26 I&N Dec. 537 (AAO 2015) (1) An alien who submits false documents representing a nonexistent or fictitious marriage, but who never either entered into or attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage, may intend to evade the immigration laws but is not, by such act alone, considered to have "entered into" or "attempted or conspired to enter into" a marriage for purposes of section 204(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (2012). Matter of Concepcion, 16 I&N Dec. 10 (BIA 1976), followed. (2) Misrepresentations relating to a nonexistent marriage may render the beneficiary inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (2012), when the Director adjudicates the application for adjustment of status.

SIMEIO SOLUTIONS, LLC, 26 I&N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015) (1) A change in the place of employment of a beneficiary to a geographical area requiring a corresponding Labor Condition Application for Nonimmigrant Workers ("LCA") be certified to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with respect to that beneficiary may affect eligibility for H-1B status it is therefore a material change for purposes of 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(h)(2)(i)(E) and (11)(i)(A) (2014). (2) When there is a material change in the terms and conditions of employment, the petitioner must file an amended or new H-1B petition with the corresponding LCA.

The Attorney General vacated the opinion in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008).

MONTIEL, 26 I&N Dec. 555 (BIA 2015) Removal proceedings may be delayed, where warranted, pending the adjudication of a direct appeal of a criminal conviction. Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012), followed.

FITZPATRICK, 26 I&N Dec. 559 (BIA 2015) An alien who has voted in an election involving candidates for Federal office in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 611(a) (2012) is removable under section 237(a)(6)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6)(A) (2012), regardless of whether the alien knew that he or she was committing an unlawful act by voting.

J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563 (BIA 2015) An alien who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction. Matter of E.W. Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 784 (BIA 2012), and Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010), withdrawn.

Adjustment of status constitutes an "admission" for purposes of determining an alien's eligibility to apply for a waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2012). Matter of Connelly, 19 I&N Dec. 156 (BIA 1984), distinguished.

(1) An Immigration Judge's predictive findings of what may or may not occur in the future are findings of fact, which are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 2008), and Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008), overruled. (2) Whether an asylum applicant has an objectively reasonable fear of persecution based on the events that the Immigration Judge found may occur upon the applicant's return to the country of removal is a legal determination that is subject to de novo review.

In determining whether a conviction is for an aggravated felony crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012), the proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense presents a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense in the "ordinary case."

A grant of Family Unity Program benefits does not constitute an "admission" to the United States under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012), for purposes of establishing that an alien has accrued the requisite 7 years of continuous residence after having been "admitted in any status" to be eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012). Matter of Reza, 25 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2010), reaffirmed. Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006), not followed.

If an applicant for asylum has competency issues that affect the reliability of his testimony, the Immigration Judge should, as a safeguard, generally accept his fear of harm as subjectively genuine based on the applicant's perception of events.

An alien returning to the United States who has been granted lawful permanent resident status cannot be regarded as seeking an admission and may not be charged with inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012), if he or she does not fall within any of the exceptions in section 101(a)(13)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2012). Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003), distinguished.

An attorney who admitted to engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by enlisting his legal assistant to impersonate him during multiple telephonic appearances before Immigration Judges was appropriately suspended from practice before the Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Department of Homeland Security for a period of 16 months and prohibited from appearing telephonically in the Immigration Courts for 7 years.

The beneficiary of a visa petition who was adopted pursuant to a State court order that was entered when the beneficiary was more than 16 years old, but with an effective date prior to his or her 16th birthday, may qualify as an adopted child under section 101(b)(1)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i)(2012), so long as the adoption petition was filed before the beneficiary's 16th birthday and the State in which the adoption was entered expressly permits an adoption decree to be dated retroactively. Matter of Cariaga, 15 I&N Dec. 716 (BIA 1976), and Matter of Drigo, 18 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 1982), modified.

A notice to appear that was served on an alien but never resulted in the commencement of removal proceedings does not have "stop-time" effect for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2012).

D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2015) (1) Neither an Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to consider whether asylum-only proceedings were improvidently instituted pursuant to a referral under the Visa Waiver Program. (2) It is improper to deem an application for relief abandoned based on the applicant's failure to comply with the biometrics filing requirement where the record does not reflect that the applicant received notification advisories concerning that requirement, was given a deadline for submitting the biometrics, and was advised of the consequences of his or her failure to comply.

(1) Where an applicant has filed an asylum application before the May 11, 2005, effective date of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, and, on or after that date, submitted a subsequent application that is properly viewed as a new application, the later filing date controls for purposes of determining the applicability of section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012), to credibility determinations. (2) A subsequent asylum application is properly viewed as a new application if it presents a previously unraised basis for relief or is predicated on a new or substantially different factual basis. (3) Where an alien has filed more than one application for asylum and the subsequent one is deemed to be a new application, the filing date of the later application controls for purposes of determining whether the 1-year statutory time bar applies under section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Act.

(1) Significant similarities between statements submitted by applicants in different proceedings can be considered by an Immigration Judge in making an adverse credibility determination if certain procedural steps are undertaken to preserve the fairness of the proceedings. (2) When relying on inter-proceeding similarities, the Immigration Judge should give the applicant meaningful notice of the similarities and a reasonable opportunity to explain them prior to making a credibility determination that is based on the totality of the circumstances.

(1) Where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the alien's continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012), in the absence of evidence that he or she was informed of and waived the right to such a hearing. Matter of Avilez, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005), clarified. (2) Evidence that an alien who had the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge was fingerprinted and/or photographed before being allowed to voluntarily depart is not enough, in itself, to demonstrate a waiver of the right to a hearing or to show a process of sufficient formality to break continuous physical presence.

(1) Where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the alien's continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012), in the absence of evidence that he or she was informed of and waived the right to such a hearing, regardless of whether the encounter occurred at or near the border. Matter of Avilez, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005), clarified. (2) Evidence that an alien who had the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge was fingerprinted and/or photographed before being allowed to voluntarily depart is not enough, in itself, to demonstrate a waiver of the right to a hearing or to show a process of sufficient formality to break continuous physical presence. Matter of Castrejon-Colino, 26 I&N Dec. 667 (BIA 2015), followed.

(1) Neither party bears a formal burden of proof in immigration proceedings to establish whether or not the respondent is mentally competent, but where indicia of incompetency are identified, the Immigration Judge should determine if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the respondent is competent. (2) An Immigration Judge's finding of competency is a finding of fact that the Board of Immigration Appeals reviews to determine if it is clearly erroneous.

The Attorney General referred the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals to herself for review of an issue relating to the application of Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), ordering that those cases be stayed and not be regarded as precedential or binding as to the issue under review during the pendency of her review.

(1) The requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to the admission of expert testimony are inapposite to a respondent's testimony regarding events of which he or she has personal knowledge. (2) Conduct by an Immigration Judge that can be perceived as bullying or hostile is never appropriate, particularly in cases involving minor respondents, and may result in remand to a different Immigration Judge.

The 10 years of continuous physical presence required by 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(c)(2) (2015) for aliens seeking special rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193, 2196 (1997), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-139, 111 Stat. 2644 (1997), should be measured from the alien's most recently incurred ground of removal, at least where that ground is among those listed in 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(c)(1).

A term of confinement in a substance abuse treatment facility imposed as a condition of probation pursuant to article 42.12, section 14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes a "term of confinement" under section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (2012), for purposes of determining if an offense is a crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act.

The offense of endangering the welfare of a child in violation of section 260.10(1) of the New York Penal Law, which requires knowingly acting in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental, or moral welfare of a child, is categorically a "crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment" under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012).

(1) For a State offense to qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012), the State statute must require as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force. Matter of Martin, 23 I&N Dec. 491 (BIA 2002), withdrawn. (2) The crime of aggravated battery under the Puerto Rico Penal Code, which may be committed by means that do not require the use of violent physical force, is not categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).

(1) Although the Department of Homeland Security has exclusive jurisdiction over applications for adjustment of status under the legalization provisions of section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2012), the Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals have jurisdiction to determine whether an alien was eligible for a previous adjustment under section 245A(b)(1) for purposes of assessing the alien's removability and current eligibility for relief from removal. (2) An alien seeking to acquire lawful permanent resident status through the legalization provisions of section 245A of the Act must establish admissibility, both at the time of the initial application for temporary resident status and again when applying for adjustment to permanent resident status under section 245A(b)(1). (3) An alien who was inadmissible at the time of adjustment of status from temporary resident to permanent resident under section 245A(b)(1) of the Act was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence and is therefore ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under former section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994).

An "offense relating to a failure to appear by a defendant for service of sentence" is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(Q) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(Q) (2012), if the underlying offense was "punishable by" imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more, regardless of the penalty actually ordered or imposed.

Direct sibling-to-sibling DNA test results reflecting a 99.5 percent degree of certainty or higher that a full sibling biological relationship exists should be accepted and considered to be probative evidence of the relationship.

In assessing whether an offense qualifies as an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(T) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T) (2012), the categorical approach applies to decide if the offense relates to an alien's failure to appear before a court, but the circumstance-specific approach applies to determine if the failure to appear was (1) pursuant to a court order (2) to answer to or dispose of a charge of a felony (3) for which a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed.

Within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a returning lawful permanent resident who has a felony conviction for solicitation to possess marijuana for sale is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012), even though that section refers only to attempt and conspiracy to commit a crime involving moral turpitude, and is therefore properly considered to be an arriving alien under section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2012). Matter of Vo, 25 I&N Dec. 426 (BIA 2011), clarified.

(1) In analyzing whether a conviction is for a crime of domestic violence under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012), the circumstance-specific approach is properly applied to determine the domestic nature of the offense. (2) Where the respondent's original sentence for his Georgia conviction was ambiguous as to whether he was sentenced to probation or a probated term of imprisonment, a clarification order issued by the sentencing judge to correct an obvious discrepancy in her original order will be given effect in determining whether the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year.

The "material support bar" in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (2012), does not include an implied exception for an alien who has provided material support to a terrorist organization under duress.

An alien cannot establish good moral character under section 101(f)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2012), if, during the period for which it is required, he or she gives false testimony under oath in proceedings before an Immigration Judge with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits.

In cases involving issues of mental competency, an Immigration Judge has the discretion to select and implement appropriate safeguards, which the Board of Immigration Appeals reviews de novo.

(1) A false claim to United States citizenship falls within the scope of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (2012), where there is direct or circumstantial evidence that the false claim was made with the subjective intent of obtaining a purpose or benefit under the Act or any other Federal or State law, and where United States citizenship actually affects or matters to the purpose or benefit sought. (2) There is a distinction between achieving a "purpose" and obtaining a "benefit" under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) of the Act. (3) Avoiding removal proceedings qualifies as a "purpose" within the meaning of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) of the Act.

In determining whether an alien presents a danger to the community at large and thus should not be released on bond pending removal proceedings, an Immigration Judge should consider both direct and circumstantial evidence of dangerousness, including whether the facts and circumstances present national security considerations.

CHAIREZ and SAMA, 26 I&N Dec. 796 (A.G. 2016) The Attorney General lifted the stay and remanded these cases to the Board of Immigration Appeals for appropriate action.

KHAN, 26 I&N Dec. 797 (BIA 2016) Immigration Judges do not have authority to adjudicate a request for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(d)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012), by a petitioner for U nonimmigrant status.

GUZMAN-POLANCO, 26 I&N Dec. 806 (BIA 2016) The crime of aggravated battery in violation of the Puerto Rico Penal Code is not categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012), but controlling circuit court law should be followed regarding the question whether conduct such as the use or threatened use of poison to injure another person involves sufficient "force" to constitute a crime of violence. Matter of Guzman-Polanco, 26 I&N Dec. 713 (BIA 2016), clarified.

(1) A "theft offense" under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43)(G) (2012), which requires the taking of property "without consent," includes extortionate takings, in which consent is coerced by the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats. (2) Robbery by force or fear in violation of section 211 of the California Penal Code is categorically an aggravated felony theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act.

The offense of criminal copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (2012) is a crime involving moral turpitude.

The respondent's removability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony was not established where section 76-10-508.1 of the Utah Code was not shown to be divisible with respect to the mens rea necessary for the offense to qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012), based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014), and Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 478 (BIA 2015), clarified.

TIMA, 26 I&N Dec. 839 (BIA 2016) A fraud waiver under section 237(a)(1)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (2012), cannot waive an alien's removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, even if the conviction is based on the underlying fraud.

DIAZ-LIZARRAGA, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016) (1) A theft offense is a crime involving moral turpitude if it involves a taking or exercise of control over another's property without consent and with an intent to deprive the owner of his property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded. (2) Shoplifting in violation of section 13-1805(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

OBEYA, 26 I&N Dec. 856 (BIA 2016) Petit larceny in violation of section 155.25 of the New York Penal Law, which requires an intent to deprive the owner of his property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I&N Dec. 847 (BIA 2016), followed.

L-T-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 862 (BIA 2016) (1) An applicant for adjustment of status under section 209 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2012), must be either a refugee or an asylee. (2) Cubans who were paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), between April 1, 1980, and May 18, 1980, are considered to have been admitted as refugees pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. (3) The respondent, who was paroled into the United States on August 25, 1980, with an Arrival/Departure Record (Form I-94) that was stamped "Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending)" and indicates that the purpose of his parole was for "Cuban Asylum," is ineligible to adjust his status under section 209 of the Act because he was neither admitted as a refugee nor granted asylum.

M-S-B-, 26 I&N Dec. 872 (BIA 2016) (1) An untimely application for asylum may be found frivolous under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2012). Luciana v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 502 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2007), distinguished. Matter of X-M-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 322 (BIA 2010), followed. (2) The respondent's asylum application is frivolous because he deliberately made a false statement postdating by more than 2 years his date of entry into this country, which is a material element in determining his eligibility to seek asylum given the general requirement to file the application within 1 year of the date of arrival in the United States.

W-A-F-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 2016) Where the Department of Homeland Security seeks to re-serve a respondent to effect proper service of a notice to appear that was defective under the regulatory requirements for serving minors under the age of 14, a continuance should be granted for that purpose. Matter of E-S-I-, 26 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 2013), followed.

USCIS may grant a national interest waiver if the petitioner demonstrates: (1) that the foreign national's proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance (2) that he or she is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor and (3) that, on balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the job offer and labor certification requirements. Matter of New York State Dep't of Transp., 22 I&N Dec. 215 (Acting Assoc. Comm'r 1998), vacated.

ALVARADO, 26 I&N Dec. 895 (BIA 2016) (1) The generic definition of "perjury" in section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (2012), requires that an offender make a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or affirmation where an oath is authorized or required by law. (2) The crime of perjury in violation of section 118(a) California Penal Code is categorically an offense relating to perjury under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act.

CALCANO DE MILLAN, 26 I&N Dec. 904 (BIA 2017) For purposes of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, and section 204(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) (2012), a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident petitioner has been "convicted" of an offense where either a formal judgment of guilt has been entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where (1) a plea, finding, or admission of facts established the petitioner's guilt and (2) a judge ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on his or her liberty.

The crime of mayhem in violation of section 203 of the California Penal Code, which requires a malicious act that results in great bodily injury to another person, necessarily involves the use of violent force and is therefore categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012).

The crime of transporting a loaded firearm in violation of title 21, section 1289.13 of the Oklahoma Statutes is categorically a firearms offense under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2012), even though the term "transporting" is not included in the Act, because section 237(a)(2)(C) is broadly construed to encompass all types of firearms offenses.