LEAL

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 (BIA 2012)                                 Interim Decision #3768




                    Matter of Edgar LEAL, Respondent

                           Decided September 21, 2012

                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals


 The offense of “recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent
death” in violation of section 13-1201(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes is categorically
a crime involving moral turpitude under the definition in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 

 (A.G. 2008), even though Arizona law defines recklessness to encompass a
subjective ignorance of risk resulting from voluntary intoxication.

FOR RESPONDENT: Nicomedes E. Suriel, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Brent Landis, Senior Attorney

BEFORE: Board Panel: COLE, PAULEY, and GREER, Board Members.

PAULEY, Board Member:


    In a decision dated June 22, 2010, an Immigration Judge denied the
respondent’s application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2006), and ordered
him removed from the United States. The respondent has appealed from
that decision. The issue in this case is whether “recklessly endangering
another person with a substantial risk of imminent death” in violation of
section 13-1201(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes is a crime involving
moral turpitude under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act, 

(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006), even though recklessness is defined to include
unawareness of a risk created by the actor resulting from voluntary
intoxication. We conclude that it is and will dismiss the respondent’s appeal.

             I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the
United States on January 1, 1990, without being admitted or paroled. In 2007
he was convicted of endangerment in violation of section 13-1201(A) of the
Arizona Revised Statutes.
   The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal
proceedings by filing a notice to appear in Immigration Court charging the

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respondent with removability as an alien who is present in the United States
without having been admitted or paroled under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Act. The respondent conceded removability as charged and requested an
opportunity to apply for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge
denied the respondent’s application on grounds of statutory ineligibility,
finding that his conviction for endangerment under Arizona law precluded him
from proving that he “has not been convicted of an offense under section
212(a)(2),” as required by section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act. To be precise, the
Immigration Judge found that the respondent’s endangerment offense was a
crime involving moral turpitude under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act.
    On appeal, the respondent does not dispute the existence of his conviction
for endangerment under section 13-1201(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes.
Instead, he argues that the offense is not a crime involving moral turpitude
under applicable precedents of this Board and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction these proceedings arise.
The respondent maintains that endangerment under Arizona law is not a crime
involving moral turpitude because it carries a mens rea of mere recklessness
(as opposed to specific intent, knowledge, or willfulness) and does not require
that a victim actually be killed or seriously injured.

                                   II. ANALYSIS
    To determine whether the respondent’s endangerment conviction was for
a crime involving moral turpitude, we employ the analytical framework set
forth in Matter of Silva-Trevino, 

 (A.G. 2008). Under the
first step of that framework, we conduct a “categorical” inquiry in which the
law defining the respondent’s offense of conviction is examined to ascertain
whether moral turpitude is intrinsic to all offenses that have a “realistic
probability” of being prosecuted thereunder. 

. According
to the Attorney General, moral turpitude is intrinsic to an offense that
necessarily involves “reprehensible conduct” committed with some form of
“scienter,” such as specific intent, knowledge, willfulness, or recklessness. 

at 689 n.1, 706 n.5.1

1
  The respondent contends that Matter of Silva-Trevino was wrongly decided and that it
would have an impermissibly retroactive effect if applied to his conviction, which resulted
from a plea agreement entered into before the Attorney General rendered his decision. We
recognize that courts of appeals are divided as to whether to accept all aspects of the
methodology in that decision. See Bobadilla v. Holder, 

 (8th Cir. 2012)
(collecting cases and deferring to Silva-Trevino). However, we are bound to apply Matter
of Silva-Trevino since the Ninth Circuit has not rejected it. See 

(d)(1)(i)
(2012) (“The Board shall be governed . . . by decisions of the Attorney General. . . .”);
                                                                             (continued...)

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   The respondent was convicted of “endangerment” in violation of section
13-1201(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes, which at all relevant times has
provided as follows:

      A. A person commits endangerment by recklessly endangering another person with
      a substantial risk of imminent death or physical injury.
      B. Endangerment involving a substantial risk of imminent death is a class 6 felony.
      In all other cases, it is a class 1 misdemeanor.

The respondent does not dispute that his offense of conviction was
denominated a class 6 felony.2 Thus, it follows that he was convicted of
“[e]ndangerment involving a substantial risk of imminent death,” rather than
endangerment involving a substantial risk of lesser “physical injury.”

                                      A. Scienter
    As the foregoing statutory language makes clear, an actor may be convicted
of endangerment in Arizona only if the prosecution establishes that he acted
“recklessly.” In 2006, when the respondent committed his offense, Arizona
defined the term “recklessly” as follows:

      “Recklessly” means, with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a
      statute defining an offense, that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a
      substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance
      exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard of such risk
      constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
      would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware of
      such risk solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect
      to such risk.

(9) (2006). The first two sentences of this
definition adhere to the familiar common law rule that recklessness means a
conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross


(...continued)
see also Matter of Guevara Alfaro, 

 (BIA 2011). In any event, we do
not apply here the most controversial facet of Silva-Trevino, namely, permitting recourse
in some circumstances to evidence that is not in the record of conviction, and we would
reach the same conclusion irrespective of that decision.
2
   In 2006, when the respondent committed his offense, the maximum sentence for a
class 6 felony in Arizona was imprisonment for 1.5 years. 

(A)
(2006). Because the “maximum penalty possible” exceeded imprisonment for 1 year, the
“petty offense” exception is inapplicable. Section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act; see also
Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 

 (BIA 2011), aff’d, 

 (6th Cir.
2012).

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deviation from the standard of conduct a reasonable person would observe
under the circumstances. In the third sentence, however, Arizona has extended
the concept of recklessness to also encompass a subjective ignorance of risk
resulting from voluntary intoxication.3
    According to the respondent, the voluntary intoxication component of
Arizona’s recklessness standard does not satisfy the corrupt “scienter”
requirement in Matter of Silva-Trevino because it does not require a conscious
disregard of a known risk. Accordingly, the respondent maintains that moral
turpitude does not inhere in all offenses that have a realistic probability of
being prosecuted under Arizona’s endangerment statute. We do not agree.
    In a series of cases, we have held that recklessness is a culpable mental
state for moral turpitude purposes where it entails a conscious disregard of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk posed by one’s conduct. See Matter of
Ruiz-Lopez, 

 (BIA 2011), aff’d, 

(6th Cir. 2012); Matter of Franklin, 

 (BIA 1994),
aff’d, 

 (8th Cir. 1995); Matter of Wojtkow, 

 (BIA 1981); Matter of Medina, 

 (BIA 1976),
aff’d sub nom. Medina-Luna v. INS, 

 (7th Cir. 1977). For the
following reasons, we conclude that an actor who fails to perceive a manifest
risk of harm solely because of voluntary intoxication is no less culpable than
an actor who consciously disregards a known risk. Therefore, recklessness
arising from voluntary intoxication qualifies as a form of “scienter” within the
meaning of Silva-Trevino.
    Arizona is not unique in treating unawareness of risk resulting from
voluntary intoxication as a form of recklessness. E.g., Ala. Code § 13A-3-2(b)
(2012); 

(a)(3) (2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-7
(2012); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 37(2) (West 2012); 

(II)(c) (2012); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-8(b) (West 2012); 

(3) (McKinney 2012); 

(2)
(2012); 

(2) (West 2012); 

(b) (West 2010); 

(3) (West 2011).
Further, many jurisdictions that have not specifically defined recklessness to
encompass voluntary intoxication have accomplished the same practical result
by prohibiting defendants from invoking voluntary intoxication as a defense
to a recklessness charge. E.g., 

 (West 2012);

 (West 2012); 

(c) (West
2012); 

 (West 2012); 

 (West

3
   In a request for supplemental briefing, we asked the parties to address whether
“an Arizona offense with a mens rea of ‘recklessness’ satisf[ies] Silva-Trevino’s corrupt
‘scienter’ requirement, given that Arizona defines recklessness to encompass a subjective
ignorance of risk resulting from voluntary intoxication.”

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2012); 

(C) (West 2011); 18 Pa. Const. Stat.
Ann. § 308 (West 2012); 

(a) (West 2011); 

 (West 2012). Indeed, as one leading treatise has
observed, “the majority of cases in America support the creation of a special
rule relating to intoxication, so that, if the only reason why the defendant does
not realize the riskiness of his conduct is that he is too intoxicated to realize it,
he is guilty of the recklessness which the crime requires.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Substantive Criminal Law § 9.5(c) (2d ed. Westlaw 2011). This majority
view is also embodied in the Model Penal Code, which states that “[w]hen
recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to
self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been
aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.” Model Penal Code
§ 2.08(2) (Westlaw through 2011).
    Treating voluntary intoxication as morally equivalent to recklessness
embodies the sound principle that effectively choosing to become unaware of
an obvious and unreasonable risk by deliberately impairing one’s own mind
is a culpable act, akin to a conscious disregard of consequences. By defining
recklessness to encompass acts resulting from voluntary intoxication, Arizona
thus “comports with and implements society’s moral perception that one who
has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the
consequences.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 

 (1996); see also Model
Penal Code § 2.08, cmt. at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (stating that “awareness
of the potential consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity of human
beings to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by now so dispersed in
our culture that it is not unfair to postulate a general equivalence between the
risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and the risks created by his
conduct in becoming drunk”). It is thus evident that recklessness arising from
voluntary intoxication denotes a substantially higher degree of culpability
than mere criminal negligence. Cf. Matter of M-W-, 

(BIA 2012) (finding that voluntary intoxication does not negate the mens rea
required to establish the aggravated felony of “murder”). Under the
circumstances, we are satisfied that recklessness arising from voluntary
intoxication is a culpable mental state that satisfies the corrupt scienter
requirement of Silva-Trevino.

                          B. “Reprehensible Conduct”
   Having determined that recklessness under Arizona law satisfies the
“scienter” requirement of Silva-Trevino, we must now decide whether
“recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent




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death” satisfies the “reprehensible conduct” requirement in the Attorney
General’s decision. We conclude that it does.
    In general, a crime involves moral turpitude if it is “inherently base, vile,
or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties
owed between persons or to society in general.” Matter of Ruiz-Lopez,
25 I&N Dec. at 553. Upon de novo review, we are convinced that recklessly
exposing another person to a “substantial risk of imminent death” is morally
turpitudinous because it is a base act that transgresses the socially accepted
rules of morality and breaches the individual’s ethical duty to society.
    One of the most fundamental (and least onerous) duties a man owes to his
community and his fellow man is that he will take reasonable care to avoid
causing the death of others. One who breaches that duty by consciously
disregarding a known risk of harm or by deliberately impairing his own
capacity for conscious judgment has, in our view, exhibited a base contempt
for the well-being of the community, which is the essence of moral turpitude.
This view finds ample support in the precedents of the Federal courts of
appeals. See Idy v. Holder, 

 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that
recklessly engaging in conduct that places or may place another in danger of
serious bodily injury under New Hampshire law is a crime involving moral
turpitude); Hernandez-Perez v. Holder, 

 (8th Cir. 2009)
(holding that reckless child endangerment under Iowa law is a crime involving
moral turpitude); Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

 (11th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that recklessly endangering the bodily safety
of another under Georgia law is a crime involving moral turpitude); Knapik
v. Ashcroft, 

 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that reckless
endangerment under New York law is a crime involving moral turpitude).
    In arguing that the “risk of imminent death” clause of section 13-1201(A)
does not define a categorical crime involving moral turpitude, the respondent
correctly observes that the statute does not require that the victim actually be
killed or injured as a result of the offender’s conduct. However, the actual
infliction of such harm is not determinative of the moral turpitude question.
It is not our position that an offense with a reckless mental state must be
accompanied by the death or serious bodily injury of a victim in order to
qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. See Matter of Ruiz-Lopez,
25 I&N Dec. at 554-56 (holding that moral turpitude inhered in the
Washington offense of driving a vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or
willful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude
a pursuing police vehicle, even though the statute required no actual harm to
a victim); see also Matter of Medina, 

 (holding that
reckless assault with a deadly weapon under Illinois law was a crime involving
moral turpitude, without requiring proof that the deadly weapon was actually


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used against a victim).4 Certainly, if death or serious bodily injury had
resulted from the respondent’s conduct, we would have little difficulty in
finding that it involved moral turpitude; but the respondent’s good fortune in
not killing or injuring anyone does not mitigate the moral baseness of his
offense. See Knapik v. Ashcroft, 

 n.5 (“With regard to reckless
acts, moral turpitude inheres in the conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of severe harm or death. Knapik’s good fortune in not
injuring or killing anyone does not change the quality of his actions.”)
    The respondent also argues that section 13-1201(A) encompasses
conduct that is not reprehensible, such as discharging firearms in public,
obstructing public highways, abandoning life-threatening containers attractive
to children, or throwing water balloons at passing cars. See United States
v. Hernandez-Castellanos, 

 (9th Cir. 2002); Matter of
Navajo County Juvenile Delinquency Action No. 89-J-099, 

 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1990). But that argument overlooks the crucial fact that such conduct
cannot be successfully prosecuted as “endangerment” unless: (1) the accused
recklessly disregarded a substantial risk that the conduct would cause the
imminent death of a victim; and (2) such conduct did, in fact, create a
substantial risk of imminent death to an actual, identifiable person. See State
v. Doss, 

 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). Section 13-1201(A) does
not criminalize the creation of mere hypothetical dangers.
    For instance, the conduct described in Matter of Navajo County Juvenile
Delinquency Action No. 89-J-099, 793 P.2d at 147—throwing water balloons
at passing cars—appears relatively innocuous until one considers the fact that
the balloons were thrown at vehicles that were moving at high speeds on a
public highway. 

 What is more, the balloons were thrown by a person who
admittedly anticipated that his conduct would cause the passing vehicles to
swerve as the drivers took “spontaneous evasive action” to avoid being hit. 

Further, one such vehicle actually did swerve out of its traffic lane, thereby
“plac[ing] in grave peril not only the occupants of the vehicle taking evasive

4
   In Matter of Fualaau, 

 (BIA 1996), we concluded that a simple
reckless assault under Hawaii law was not morally turpitudinous, despite the infliction of
some “bodily harm” upon a victim, where the statute contained no aggravating dimension
that seriously elevated the culpability of the offense. Although we indicated there that the
infliction of serious bodily injury upon a victim was necessary to make a reckless simple
assault crime a crime involving moral turpitude, see 

 we did not indicate that the
infliction of such an injury was a general requirement in all cases involving recklessness.
See Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. at 554 (acknowledging the serious bodily injury
requirement applicable to reckless assault offenses, but declining to extend that requirement
beyond the simple assault context). Nothing in Fualaau contradicts our present
determination that recklessly exposing another person to a substantial risk of imminent death
is a morally turpitudinous offense.

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action but others who may [have been] in the vicinity.” 

 We have no
reservations about declaring such an offense to be a crime involving moral
turpitude.

                             III. CONCLUSION
    In conclusion, we find that “recklessly endangering another person with a
substantial risk of imminent death” in violation of section 13-1201(A) of the
Arizona Revised Statutes is a categorical crime involving moral turpitude
because it necessarily involves reprehensible conduct committed with a corrupt
scienter. There is no realistic probability that an Arizona defendant could be
convicted of “recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of
imminent death” without engaging in conduct that involves moral turpitude.
As an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the respondent is
ineligible for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the
Act. Therefore the Immigration Judge properly denied his application for that
relief. Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.
    ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.




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