Volume 26 — Oregon Reports

Pipes, Judge. This action was brought by Sylvester Pennoyer, governor, George W. McBride, secretary cf state, and G. W. Webb, state treasurer, constituting the state board of land commissioners for the sale of school and university lands against Wm.

Stearns, Judge. This is a suit to foreclose a mechanics’ lien.

<p>1. Fees of District Attorney — Adjudication of Account by Circuit Court— Code, § 1074.— The action of the circuit court, under section 1074, Hill’s Code, in ascertaining the district attorney’s fees, and ordering them paid, is not a final adjudication, as in such case the court acts only in an auditing capacity, and a county may recover from the district attorney so much of the amount allowed and paid as was unauthorized by law.</p> <p>2. Fees of District Attorney—Not Teue Bills—Code, §§ 1073, 1210.— Under section 1073, Hill’s Code, prescribing the district attorney’s fees in criminal actions, he is not entitled to fees for “not true bills” returned by the grand jury, a3, under section 1210, a criminal action is commenced only when an indictment is found, and filed with the clerk.</p> <p>3. District Attorney—Costs and Fees — Code, § 1073.— The district attorney is not entitled to a separate fee for each of several defendants who are jointly indicted for the same offense and jointly tried, under section 1073, Hill’s Code, providing for fees in a criminal action.</p> <p>4. District Attorney—Costs and Fees—Code, §2167.— The district attorney is not entitled to a separate fee for each of several defendants arrested and examined.before a committing magistrate, for, under section 2167, Hill’s Code, he is allowed afee for attending and conducting an examination before a committing magistrate, without regard to the number of defendants. ,</p>

Clifford, Judge. This is a suit to determine the right to the possession of certain surface ground included within the boundaries of both the Collateral quartz mining claim, located and owned by the plaintiffs, and the Palmer quartz mining claim, located and owned by the defendants, in Baker County, Oregon.

Clifford, Judge. The defendant, Daniel Tarter, was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree, and, upon being tried before a jury, was found guilty of the crime of manslaughter, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the period of twelve years.

Clifford, Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of R. G-. Thompson, as administrator of the estate of Wm. Ross, deceased, in an action commenced in August, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, on two promissory notes in favor of Ms intestate, dated October ninth, eighteen hundred and eigbty-four, and November first, eighteen hundred and eighty-four, respectively, executed by the defendant, S. R. Reeves. The complaint is in the usual form.

<p>Appeal from Union: Morton D. Clippord, Judge.</p> <p>This is an action by the La Grande National Bank against N. Blum and Ben W. Grandy on a promissory note for one thousand three hundred and forty-six dollars and sixty-six cents, executed and delivered to the plaintiff by defendants on February twelfth, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, payable three months after date. The complaint is in the usual form. The answer admits the execution and delivery of the note, but, as a defense, avers, in substance, that at the time of such execution and delivery plaintiff was the owner and in possession of two certain promissory notes for six hundred dollars each on one O. N. Ramsay, which it delivered to defendant Blum for collection, under an agreement that he would pay over the proceeds to plaintiff if collected, or, if unable to collect the notes, or any part thereof, he would return them; that the note in question was given to secure the performance of such agreement on Blum’s part, and that he had performed the same. The reply denies the allegations of the answer, and a trial was had upon the issues thus made. The bill of exceptions discloses that after plaintiff had given evidence tending to support the allegations of its complaint, “the defendants introduced evidence tending to support the allegations in their further and separate answer,” and rested, whereupon the plaintiff moved the court “to strike out all the evidence offered by defendants in support of the separate answer and defense, and to instruct the jury to bring in a verdict as prayed for in the complaint, on the ground that all the evidence offered is immaterial and incompetent, and the facts pleaded in the answer constitute no defense in this action. ” This motion was allowed, the evidence given by the defendants withdrawn, and the jury instructed not to consider it, and, the trial resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants appeal, assigning as error the ruling of the court in sustaining the motion above referred to.</p>

Clifford, Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendants Fred Nodine, Geo. Blacker, and John Nodine in an action on a promissory note made by them to Thisler & Spilman, and alleged to have been sold and assigned before .maturity, for value, to the Abilene National Bank.

L. Bradshaw, Judge. Suit by S. R. Husbands to have J. H. Mosier declared a trustee for plaintiff of certain lands. The facts in this case are that on October twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and seventy, the legislature of this state passed “An act providing for the selection and sale of the swamp and overflowed lands,” granted to the state by the act of congress of March twelfth, eighteen hundred and sixty: Laws, 1870, p. 54.

H. Burnett, Judge. This is a suit in equity to have the will of Moses Edgar, deceased, judicially construed.

Clifford, Judge. This is an action by K. and P. Heidenreich against the HGtna Insurance Company to recover the sum of eight hundred dollars upon a policy of insurance issued to the plaintiffs upon a certain building described in the complaint, which was destroyed by fire.

Clifford, Judge. This is an action by John Jenkins against G-. T. Hall and others to recover the possession of a certain tract of land in Union County, Oregon, particularly described in the complaint.

A. McBride, Judge. This is a suit by Nancy Welch against the City of Astoria and others to restrain the collection of city taxes on certain real property owned by the plaintiff.

H. Burnett, Judge. This is a suit to quiet title. The facts show that on September eighth, eighteen hundred and fifty-seven, in pursuance of an act of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Oregon, passed January twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and fifty-six, the superintendent of common schools of Marion County, Oregon, sold as school land to one John A. Johns the south half of the southwest quarter of section twenty-eight in township seven south of range three west of…

H. Burnett, Judge. This is a suit to foreclose a mechanics’ lien.

A. McBride, Judge. This is a suit to establish a preference and a lien upon the assets of the partnership of Arndt & Ferchen, in the hands of B. W. Robinson as receiver, for certain moneys alleged to have been received in trust by said firm.

Stearns, Judge. This was originally a suit by Penumbra Kelly and others to wind up the affairs of the Northwest Loan and Trust Company, an alleged banking concern in the City of Portland, manipulated by one George B. Markle.

Stearns, Judge. The Northwest Loan and Trust Company is a banking corporation which, prior to July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, was doing business at the City of Portland, Oregon. Like many others, it became embarrassed in the financial panic of eighteen hundred and ninety-three, and was forced, on July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, to suspend business.

<p>Appeal from Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge.</p> <p>This is a suit by Louise Friese to set aside a former decree of this court, rendered March twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, in the case of Hummel v. Friese, 24 Or. 286, 29 Pac. 488, and for a new trial, on account of the alleged perjury of a witness. The plaintiff, for cause of suit, alleges inter alia: “That by perjury and fraud the plaintiff in the suit above named in this answer (referring to the answer in the former decree) had sufficient testimony to warrant the court in ordering and entering the decree above set forth. That C. G-. Hummel, by whose testimony alone it was established that the conveyance named in said answer, described all the property purchased by the plaintiff from him in said block, perjured himself in the oath he took in this, in eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, by writing made and signed by him and delivered to one-, he agreed for twelve hundred dollars, to be paid within one year, to deed all the land within said enclosure to said W. Beutelspacher, that in order to enable himself to convey all such land to plaintiff, said Hummel, by agreement with said W. Beutelspacher, and payment to him of twenty-five dollars, canceled such agreement, and it was returned to him with said understanding, in the presence of another party. That after testifying, and before said decree, said Hummel died; that since said decree was given, plaintiff discovered said testimony, not knowing of it before; that on a new trial of said suit plaintiff will introduce such testimony, and prove said facts by said witnesses. ” The court having sustained a demurrer to the complaint for the reason that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of suit, and the plaintiff refusing to further plead, a decree was rendered dismissing the suit, from which decree the plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Coupon ation s—Ratification—Agents.— The rule that a principal, who, after knowledge of the facts, neglects to promptly disavow the unauthorized act of an agent, adopts the act as his own, applies to corporations as well as to individuals, and where part of the directors of a corporation, without authority, entered into a contract for the corporation, and the balance of the hoard allowed it to continue in force, without objection, after the matter was called to their attention, the corporation will be considered to have ratified the contract, and no formal vote or resolution is necessary for that purpose: Calvert v. Idaho Stage Company, 25 Or. 412, cited and approved.</p>

Í). Si-iattuck, Judge. This is an action brought by N. G-. Hedin against the City & Suburban Railway Company to recover damages for expenses incurred in the care of, and medical attendance rendered to, his minor daughter, and for the loss of her services, on account of injuries caused by one of defendant’s electric cars .running over her while, as is alleged, being carelessly and negilently propelled at an unusual and dangerous rate of speed by the employes of defendant,…

This is an action by Wiley B. Allen against John M. Leavens to recover money. Upon a trial thereof without a jury the court made the following findings of fact: “1. That on the twenty-eighth day of November, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, the said James Cusick was in the employ of the defendant Leavens and his partners, and that there was at that time wages due him from the defendant and his partners for work and labor. 2.

D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action by Mrs. E. S. Rash against W. D. Jenne, and Ida J. Jenne, his wife, to recover damages for the breach of a general covenant of warranty in a conveyance of real property, and arises upon the following facts, as appears from the pleadings and findings of the court: On January eighth, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine, the defendant being the owner of a tract of land near the City of Portland, containing eleven and forty-five hundredth…

D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action by John E. Wallace, administrator of the estate of Mary Bodiala, deceased, against the City and Suburban Railway Company to recover damages for the death of plaintiff’s intestate, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant corporation in the management and operation of one of its electric street cars on Savier Street, in the City of Portland.

C. Hale, Judge. This is an appeal brought by Wm. E. Howe to reverse a judgment refusing to discharge him from arrest on a habeas corpus proceeding.

D. Shattuck, Judge. Action by Parker and Topping against Robertson Brothers and Jeffery & Bays to recover on a bond executed by the latter persons, and comes here on appeal from a judgment given in favor of plaintiffs for want of an answer, the defendants electing to stand by their demurrer to the complaint, which was overruled by the court.

This action was commenced on the third of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, by the firm of Sutton & Beebe against the boat Victorian under the provision of the boat lien law (section 3690 et seq. Hill’s Code,) to enforce a lien for materials furnished to one John F. Steffen, and used by him as a contractor in the construction of the boat. The complaint contains three causes of action.

Appear from Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action brought by the North British and Mercantile Fire Insurance Company against its agents, Lambert and Sargent, to recover a sum of money which it is alleged it was compelled to pay in consequence of a loss under a policy written by them contrary to instructions, and which they neglected to cancel when directed so to do.

H. Burnett, Judge. This suit was instituted by the State upon the relation of A. C. Taylor, to have the defendants Sylvester Pennoyer, governor; Philip Metschan, state treasurer; and Geo.

This is an action by the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company against Chas. Hertzberg to recover possession of a portion of block one hundred and eighty-eight in the City of Portland, damages for removing earth and stone therefrom, and for the reasonable value of the rents thereof.

Stearns, Judge. This is a suit by an abutting owner to enjoin and restrain the defendant from occupying a portion of the street in front of plaintiff’s property with an approach to its bridge across the Willamette Eiver at Portland.

D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action brought by E. C. Little, as assignee of the Oregon Paving and Contract Company, against the City of Portland, for damages caused by the nonpayment of certain warrants amounting to one thousand one hundred dollars, drawn by the defendant upon a special fund to be raised by assessment of real property benefited by the improvement of Twelfth Street in said city.

D. Shattuck, Judge. This was an action of replevin brought by M. Fisher, Sons & Company against Penumbra Kelly, sheriff, to recover possession of a stock of cloths that the sheriff held un der a writ of attachment against O. C. McLeod. Plaintiffs claimed possession of the goods as chattel mortgagees, while defendant claimed that the mortgage was fraudulent.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This is an action in behalf of the estate of Daniel Wil son, deceased, brought by Geo. W. Wilson as the administrator thereof, by appointment of a probate court in the State of Washington, against W. C. Wilson and Mary J. Wilson, upon their promissory note executed in September, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, and made payable to the said Daniel Wilson, now deceased, three years after the date thereof.

Appear, from. Morrow; ’N* L.. Bradshaw, Judge. This is. an action by the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company against E. R. Swinburne and some eighty other residents of Morrow County to recover certain moneys claimed to have been expended by plaintiff in securing the right of way and terminal facilities for the branch of its line extending from Willows to Heppner.

Stearns, Judge. This is a suit to foreclose a mechanics’ lien.

This is an action by the Richardson and Boynton Company against Caroline Dunlap to recover fifty dollars, alleged to be a balance due upon the sale of a hot-air furnace.

<p>1. Cbiminal Libel — Evidence — Opinions of Witnesses as to Person Referred To—Code, g 1364.—When a libelous article does not directly name the person referred to, and the application of the words used is uncertain, persons who are acquainted with the prosecuting witness and the circumstances alluded to in the article, may state their judgment and understanding as to whom the libelous matter was intended to refer; and the rule is the same in both civil and criminal cases, especially in view of the terms of section 1364, Hill’s Code.</p> <p>2. Criminal Libel—Presumption of Malice.— Every injurious publication concerning another, if it contains libelous matter, is presumed to have been made maliciously, and this presumption continues until it appears that the libelous matter is in fact true, and was published with good motives and justifiable ends.</p> <p>3. Criminal Libel—Reference to Property of Prosecuting Witness.— Where the words of a publication apply to a person’s property in such a way as to injure his reputation by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or ridicle, it is a libel on such person.</p> <p>•4. Criminal Libel—Intent to Injure—Malice—Code, g 1749.—Although section 1749 of Hill’s Code provides that if any person shall publish or cause to be published concerning another any false or scandalous matter “ with intent to injure or defame” he shall be punished, etc., it is not necessary, in order to constitute the ofíense of libel, that the defendant should have entertained a specific malicious intent to injure or defame the prosecuting witness; the natural and probable consequence of such a publication is to injure and defame, and the law presumes that the defendant intended such results when he committed the act complained of. To render an act malicious it is not necessary that it be done from a bad heart or with a distinct purpose to injure; but any intentional infliction upon others of a wrong not warranted by law is malicious, though it may have been honestly intended to accomplish a good end.</p> <p>5. Criminal Libel—Knowledge of Manager or Proprietor.*—When a libel is published in a newspaper the proprietor is prima fame criminally liable, and he cannot excuse himself by showing that the article was published without his knowledge or consent, unless it further appears that its publication did not occur through any negligence or want of ordinary care on his part.</p>

C. Fullerton, Judge. This action was commenced on the twenty-sixth day of October, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, by filing a complaint signed by W. R. Willis as attorney, and verified by him as president, of the plaintiff corporation. The defendant appeared, and, based upon affidavits, applied for a rule on counsel for plaintiff to show by what right or authority he appeared and prosecuted this action as such attorney.

Stearns, Judge. This suit was instituted on October twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety, by twenty-seven property owners whose lots abut upon Second and South Second Streets, between the south line of Montgomery Street and the south line of Sheridan Street, in the City of Portland, to restrain the defendants from collecting an assessment levied for the purpose of making a street improvement.

: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge. This is a suit brought by G. H. Strout, Peter Johnson, •Rosetta Kuhn, J. H. E. Cramer, and Joseph Noonan, to enjoin C. H. Hunt, the chief of police of the City of Portland, from selling certain lots of the plaintiffs in said city, in pursuance of warrants issued to him for the collection of an assessment made thereon for the improvement of Weidler Street, in said city, and to have such assessment canceled and declared void.

C.' Fullerton, Judge. This is an action by James C. Christensen to recover damages for the alleged breach of a written contract. Briefly, the facts are, that on the first day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, the plaintiff and defendant made and entered into the following contract in writing:— '‘April the 1, 1891. “I the undersigned agree to mine on a pease of ground that has bin lade of for me by W. W. Gray for the Pacifick coast Boarx compna.

<p>Appeal from Multnomah.: M. G-. Munly, Judge.</p> <p>Charles A. Bowker, having been convicted of manslaughter by procuring an abortion to be performed on Helen H. Wilson, appeals.</p>

C. Fullerton, Judge. This in an action in behalf of the estate of Daniel Wilson, deceased, brought by Geo. W. Wilson, as the administrator thereof, by appointment of a probate court in the State of Washington, against the defendant, upon his promissory note, executed on December twenty-third, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, and made payable to the said Daniel Wilson, now deceased, on or before twelve months after date.

D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action brought by Chas. Held: managed, and expended by such guardian for their benefit.” She appointed Ingalls sole executor thereof, and charged him, both as trustee and as executor, with the execution in his several capacities of the various trusts reposed in him, and expressly directed that no bonds should be required of him.

Stearns, Judge. The plaintiff Ira Dodson is the father of the defendant Hiram E. Dodson. The son arrived at the age of majority January tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety. For several years prior to this date the plaintiff was also the general guardian of defendant. The date of his appointment as such is not fixed definitely, but from the evidence it is reasonable to conclude that the appointment was made in the year eighteen hundred and eighty-one.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This is an action brought by Henrietta J. Grubbe against G. W. Grubbe as the executor of the last will and testament of E. T. Grubbe, her deceased husband, to recover money alleged to have been delivered by her to the testator under an agreement to repay it upon her request.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This is a suit by R. D. Hume to enjoin and restrain Chauncy Woodruff and others from interfering with what plaintiff claims and alleges to be a private fishery in Rogue River. A demurrer to the complaint because it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of suit being sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and at the same time a motion for a voluntary nonsuit.

A. McBride, Judge. This is a suit to foreclose a lien brought here on appeal by plaintiff after attaching the property in an action at law. Defendants claim that the seizure by attachment is a waiver of the appeal and move to dismiss it.

This is an action by the North Pacific Cycle Company to recover possession of a bicycle seized by the defendant A1 Thomas, as constable, under an execution issued on a judgment in favor of one Candrian, and against the plaintiff. The only question in the case is as to the validity of the judgment on which the execution in question was issued.

A. McBride, Judge. This is a proceeding for a writ of mandamus by Wm. Deuch against Seaside Lodge, Number Twelve, of the Ancient Order of United Workmen brought here by appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Clatsop County, which appeal the defendant moves to dismiss.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This action was commenced June eighteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, by the Coos Bay, Roseburg, and Eastern Railroad and Navigation Company against Z. T. Siglin to recover nine hundred and twenty-four steel T-rails, with fish plates to match, and a lot of bolts and washers.

: Hartwell Hurley, Judge. This is an action to recover five hundred and fifty dollars advanced by plaintiff Katie Schoellhamer to the defendant John Rometsch on a contract for the purchase of certain land, which it is alleged she was induced to enter into by coercion and fraudulent representations. The complaint, in substance, is that plaintiff, who is a native of Germany, and understands but little of the English.

D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action for damages by an apprentice for a wrongful dismissal and failure to instruct. By a deed of apprenticeship the plaintiff Chas.

Stearns, Judge. 'Phis is a suit by Richard Clinton and Geo. W. McCoy to enjoin the chief of police of the City of Portland from selling certain lots of the plaintiff in said city, and to cancel an assessment made thereon for the improvement of Fifth Street in the former City of Bast Portland, which is now consolidated with the City of Portland, and forms a part thereof.

Stearns, Judge. This is a suit by judgment creditors of the defendant Lebenbaum,—lately a merchant doing business in Portland,—to set aside a certain chattel mortgage executed by Lebenbaum to his codefendant Silvestone on the eighth day of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, to secure the payment of five hundred and twenty-six dollars, and also a general assignment to the defendant Watson, made by Lebenbaum on the second day of September, eighteen hundred and…

Stearns, Judge. This is a suit by H. 0. Chamberlain against Geo. L. Hibbard to foreclose a mechanics’ lien upon lot number one of block number fifty in Couch’s Addition to the City of Portland, Oregon.

<p>Appeal from Multnomah: E. D. Shattuck, Judge.</p> <p>This is an action by A. K. Washburn, a creditor of the Boston Shoe and Leather Company, to recover on a promise of the defendant, the Interstate Investment Company, to the leather company to pay and discharge its debts and liabilities. The action was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and from the pleadings and findings of fact it appears that on November tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, the Boston Shoe and Leather Company, being indebted to sundry persons, including tbis plaintiff, entered into a written contract with tbe defendant,* by which it was stipulated and agreed that the defendant should, within thirty days, pay and discharge such indebtedness, and should also make advances necessary to enable the leather company to carry on its business for a period of four months, the entire amount to be so paid out and advanced not to exceed a balance of thirteen, thousand three hundred and nine dollars and seventy-nine cents, due the leather company from one O. D. Taylor on a subsidy contract. As a consideration for this stipulation on tbe part of the defendant, the leather company-agreed that when the indebtedness should be paid as provided in the contract it would issue and deliver to the defendant one share of its paid-up capital stock of the par value of fifty dollars, for each fifty dollars of indebtedness so paid, and in like manner one share for each fifty dollars advanced by the defendant to enable it to carry on its business, and that a compliance with the terms of the agreement by the defendant should operate as a satisfaction of the subsidy contract with Taylor. Judgment went for the plaintiff and defendant appeals. The proposed bill of exceptions was filed by appellant, and respondent’s objections thereto also filed within the time granted by the lower court, and before the first day of the term of the supreme court beginning on the fourth day of March, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but the bill was not settled and allowed by the trial judge until the fifteenth day of March.</p> <p>On the fourth of March the transcript was filed in the supreme court without the bill of exceptions, and respondent moved to dismiss the appeal because the errors assigned in the notice do not appear in the record. Appellant filed a cross-motion for leave to complete the transcript.</p> <p>On Motion to Dismiss.—In the case of Kelly v. Pike, 17 Or. 330, it was decided that the appellate court had no power to enlarge the time for filing a transcript, unless such order was made within the time allowed for such filing, and the principle laid down in that case is applicable not only to the whole transcript, but to any material part thereof, unless it be shown that some portion of the transcript has been omitted by some inadvertence on the part of the clerk of the court below, and thus the transcript as filed is not a transcript of the final roll in the trial court. It can readily be seen that if the doctrine of Kelly v. Pike is departed from as to any material part of the transcript the logical result follows that it can be departed from as to the whole of the transcript, and thus we at once do away with the statutory provision that the transcript on appeal must be filed on or before the second day of a term of this court following the perfection of the appeal. Reference will of course be made to section 542 of volume I of Hill’s Code as to the right and authority of this court at any time to permit the transcript to be completed, upon affidavits setting forth the facts constituting the incompleteness of the transcript, but it is manifest, it seems to us, that this statutory rule is intended to apply only to such portions of the final roll of the lower court as have been unintentionally and by an oversight omitted, thus making the transcript filed not a transcript of that which was on file and of record in the office of the clerk of the lower court. The bill of exceptions now proposed to be filed was not in existence when the transcript was filed, and could not have been omitted.</p> <p>On the Merits.—The case was presented to the trial court on the theory that the contract of February tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, was a contract made for plaintiff’s benefit, and on which he therefore had a right to sue; and further that in paying plaintiff’s claim defendant would simply be paying in a particular way and manner provided for in said contract its own debt incurred by its subscription to the stock of the Boston Shoe and Leather Company, and the court found that such were the facts. This was not a promise by defendant to pay a debt of another, but a promise to pay in a particular way its own debt incurred by its subscription to the stock of the Boston Shoe and Leather Company, and the release from a certain subsidy contract. By the terms of subscription defendant bound itself to pay the debt to a particular class of persons, of whom the plaintiff was one. It is a settled proposition in this state that when A, for a valuable consideration, agrees with B to pay his (A’s) debt to C, the latter can enforce the contract against A: Baker v. Eglin, 11 Or. 333; Hughes v. Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, 11 Or. 437; Schneider v. White, 12 Or. 503; Strong v. Kamm, 13 Or. 172; Sacramento Company v. Wagner, 67 Cal. 293; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Coster v. Mayor, 43 N. Y. 399.</p> <p>[ Decided April 23, 1894.]</p>

H. Burnett, Judge. This is an action brought by the Lewis & Dryden Printing Company against Sophia Reeves in the Justice’s Court for the District of Salem, to recover the amount due upon a promissory note alleged to have been executed and delivered by the defendant to it.

This is an action by H. D. Foste against the Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company, of Detroit, Michigan, to recover money alleged to be due as commissions upon insurance premiums secured by him as such agent.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This is a mandamus proceeding by Patrick Flanagan, T. S. Minot, J. D. Garfield, and the Coos Bay, Roseburg and Eastern Railroad and Navigation Company against R. M. Wieder, who was, at the time oí the filing of the petition for the writ, sheriff of Coos County, Oregon, and was the immediate successor to Z. T. Siglin.

: Michael G. Munly, Judge. The defendant, Herman Rinehart, was tried, convicted, and by the judgment of the court sentenced to the penitentiary, for the crime of larceny by embezzlement, from which judgment he brings this appeal.

D. Shattuck, Judge. This is an action by J. L. Sperry against John A. Wesco to recover the possession of certain real property.

This is an action by John Kiernan against Joseph Terry commenced in a justice’s court to recover one hundred and eighty dollars, as rent for the use and occupation of certain property described as “the premises known as the northeast corner of Ross Island, situated in the county of Multnomah, State of Oregon, ” which it is alleged plaintiff leased and let unto the defendant August first, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, “for a floating-house or beer garden.” It is further…

C. Fullerton, Judge. The plaintiff Charles Booth prays a writ of mandamus founded upon the following state of facts, which appear from the alternative writ: The relator is a resident, voter, and taxpayer, and has been for ninety days last past, the duly appointed, qualified, and acting superintendent of common schools for Lincoln County, Oregon.

Stearns, Judge. This is a suit commenced by T. Patterson November twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, against the Bank of British Columbia, the Portland Smelting and Refining Works, and twenty other defendants, who are styled “note makers,” to obtain an accounting between the plaintiff and defendant the Bank of British Columbia, and to compel said bank to surrender to plaintiff a certain promissory note given by him February eighth, eighteen hundred and…

Stearns, Judge. The. plaintiff was incorporated on March twenty-first, eighteen hundred and ninety-one, and is engaged in the business of lithographing, engraving, printing, and publishing journals, newspapers, etc. The Multnomah Typographical Union is an unincorporated voluntary association, of which the defendant George Howell is president.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This is an action by William Deering and Company against the partnership of Creighton & Quivey, and comes here on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Benton County vacating a judgment of that court, and permitting the defendants to file an answer.

C. Fullerton, Judge. Action by L. Vanbebber against James and Asbnab Plunkett as for an account stated. At the trial in the court below, when plaintiff had rested his case, upon motion of defendant Ashnah Plunkett a judgment of nonsuit was rendered in her favor from which the plaintiff appeals.

A. Stephens, Judge. J. Carroll McCaffrey was convicted of uttering and publishing a check bearing ,a forged indorsement, and sentenced to two years in the state penitentiary.

This is a proceeding instituted by the state upon the relation of Cicero M. Idleman, John Catlin, Milton W. Smith, William R. Willis, and J. Couch Flanders, constituting the Grievance Committee of the Oregon State Bar Association, to disbar one Thomas F. Cowing, an attorney of this court residing in Oregon City, for a violation of the provisions of subdivision 1 of section 1031 of Hill’s Code.

H. Burnett, Judge. Action by R. N. Morris against G. W. Rodgers, commenced in justice’s court, and taken on appeal to the circuit court, where there was a -judgment for defendant. From a judgment sustaining a motion by plaintiff to retax costs, defendant appeals.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This is an appeal from a judgment substaining objections to and rejecting the several offsets claimed by the appellants against their several debts due the firm of Hamilton, Job & Company.

H. Burnett, Judge. This is an appeal from an order denying a preliminary injunction.

C. Fullerton, Judge. This is a suit by Morris Allen to set aside and cancel a deed from the plaintiff to one John L. Ayer, and also a deed from Ayer to defendant Long.

<p>Sufficiency of Notice of Appeal.—A notice of appeal which, contains no other description of the judgment appealed from than that it was rendered for costs and disbursements in an action between certain parties at a specified term of the circuit court is too indefinite and uncertain, and the appeal will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from Clatsop: Thos. A. McBride, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from"Clatsop: Frank J. Taylor, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Marion: Geo. H. Burnett, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Clatsop: Thos. A. McBride, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Multnomah: Loyal B. Stearns, Judge.</p> <p>Plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Multnomah; Loyal B. Stearns, Judge.</p> <p>Plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Curry: J. C. Fullerton, Judge.</p>