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261 N.C. 612

135 S.E.2d 554

Jones v. Jones

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Decided April 8, 1964

Supreme Court of North Carolina · decided 1964-04-08

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““When a husband and wife execute a valid deed of separation and thereafter live apart, such separation exists by mutual consent from the date of the execution of the instrument. Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705 , 127 S.E. 2d 525 . As long as the deed stands unimpeached, neither party can attack the legality of the separation on account of the misconduct of the other prior to its execution.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including 11 N.C. App. 631 - Bass v. Mooresville Mills

Relies on Kiger v. Kiger · Richardson v. Richardson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1964-04-08

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently July 1989

8 state decisions

40196419701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Per Curiam.

¶1 When a husband and wife execute a valid deed of separation and thereafter live apart, such separation exists by mutual consent from the date of the execution of the instrument. Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E. 2d 525. As long as the deed stands unimpeached, neither party can attack the legality of the separation on account of the misconduct of the other prior to its execution. Kiger v. Kiger, 258 N.C. 126, 128 S.E. 2d 235.

¶2 Recognizing this rule, defendant attempted to avoid the deed of separation on the ground that it was obtained by duress. However, neither the facts alleged nor the proffered proof are sufficient to invalidate the contract which was not executed until nine months after the parties had separated. Plaintiff’s duty to support his children was an obligation which defendant could have forced him to perform under both the criminal and the civil law. “A threat to withhold from a party a legal right which he has an adequate remedy to enforce will not constitute duress . . .” 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 172. Defendant has acquiesced for over seven years in the deed of separation which she would now avoid. She has shown no ground for rescission.

¶3 In the trial below we find

¶4 No error.

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