Volume 264 — Federal Reporter

J. Cochran, Judge. C. B. Schoborg, Henry Feltman, and J. Henry Kruse were convicted of offenses, and they bring error. In and about Govington, Ky., there is a considerable community of German birth or descent. In 1917 and 1918 it was not uncommonly believed that a portion of this community was disloyal, and upheld and favored the cause of Germany as against the United States, in the pending war, and steps were taken to ascertain whether this belief was well founded.

<p>9. War <&wkey;4— Espionage Act not invalid under constitutional provision as to treason.</p> <p>The provision of Espionase Act June 15, 1917, § 3, as amended by Act May Ifi, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), making it an offense, by word or act, to support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war, or to oppose the cause of the United States, is not, as applied to conduct consisting of words only, unconstitutional as punishing treasonable conduct, without proof of tho overt aet, and without the two witnesses required by the Constitution, as neither words nor intent alone constitutes treason.</p> <p>2. War <&wkey;4 — Acts or words of sc.didoes nature punishabie, notwithstanding constitutional provision.</p> <p>Congress may punish, under the ordinary rules of prosecution and without trenching on the constitutional limitation as to treason, acts or words which are of a seditious nature and tend towards treason, but which are not of the direct character and degree constituting treason.</p> <p>3. Treason &wkey;>6 — Adherence and giving aid both necessary and favoring or supporting insufficient.</p> <p>Under the constitutional definition of “treason” as adhering to the enemies, giving them aid and comfort, both adherence and giving aid are necessary, and to favor or support the enemy is insufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Treason.]</p> <p>4. Criminal law <&wkey;37l(l) — Similar statements admissible to show intent.</p> <p>In a prosecution under Espionage Act June 15, 1917, § 3, as amended by Act May 16, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), for favoring tbo cause of the enemy and opposing that of tho United Slates, statements similar to those alleged in tho indictment, but made about tho same timo and place, were admissible to show intent', and it was immaterial that they were repetitions of those alleged.</p> <p>5. War <&wkey;4 — Language made question for jury as to favoring enemy and oppos-¡ng cause of tbo United States.</p> <p>A defendant charged under the Espionage Act June 35, 1917, § 3, as amended by Act May 16, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Arm. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), with saying that America did not have a chanco to win the ‘war, that the President started the war to protect Wall Street brokers, that the President was a friend of the rich man, and that tho Kaiser was a friend of the poor man, was not entitled to a directed verdict, on the theory that there was no such favoring of the enemy and opposing of the government as tended to a clear and present danger.</p>

<p>1. Criminal lav/ ¡§=>1166(9) — Denial of continuance not prejudicial, unless probably affecting result.</p> <p>The overruling of a motion for a continuance because of the absence of a witness is not prejudicial error, unless there is a strong probability that the absence of the witness substantially affected the result of the trial.</p> <p>2. Criminal law (§=3595(4) — Denial of continuance not abuse of discretion.</p> <p>On a trial under Espionage Act, tit. 1, § 3, as amended by' Act May 16, 1918 (Comp., St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), tire denial of a motion for a continuance because of the absence of a witness, who was abroad with the army, was not an abuse of discretion, where defendant was convicted only of the offenses committed after the witness went abroad.</p> <p>3. Criminal law ¡§=3 1044, 1054(3) — Insufficiency of evidence, not urged below, cannot be considered.</p> <p>Defendant is not entitled to contend that there is no evidence to support a conviction of certain counts, where no motion was made for an instructed verdict, and no exception taken to the charge which submitted such counts.</p> <p>4. Crimina! law (§=3935 (3) — Absence of evidence cannot be first urged in motion for new trial.</p> <p>It is too late to raise for the first time on motion for a new trial the contention that there was no evidence to support a conviction on counts on which defendant was convicted.</p> <p>5. Criminal law ¡@=31036(1), 1054(3) — In absence of objection evidence not reviewed, unless miscarriage of justice appears.</p> <p>In the absence of objection or exception properly raising the contention that there was no evidence to support the conviction, an appellate court will only look into the subject far enough to ascertain whether it is reasonably clear that there has been a miscarriage of justice.</p> <p>6. War (§=>4— Remarks of defendant held prohibited by Espionage Act and within power of Congress to prohibit.</p> <p>Remarks made by a man of means and standing, such as that he would kill his son if he enlisted, that he hoped the transport which took him across would be sunk, that he wanted Germany to win and the United States defeated, and hoped they would come over here and defeat us, that after the war he was going to dispose of everything he had and go to Germany, and help that country, that he would not buy war securities, because he would not give anything against Germany, and that there was no truth in what the papers were publishing about alleged victories over the Germans, must have had the direct harmful influence, which Congress had both the power and intent to prohibit.</p> <p>7. Criminal law ¡@=>1036(1), 1054(1) — Admission of evidence not reviewable without objection or exception.</p> <p>In a prosecution under Espionage Act, tit. 1, § 3, as amended by Act May 16, 1918 (¡Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), defendant could not complain of the admission of testimony that he bought German war bonds in 1916, where no objection was made or exception reserved.</p> <p>8. Constitutional law ¡@=>90 — War ¡@=>4 — Espionage Act not unconstitutional.</p> <p>The provision of Espionage Act, tit. 1, § 3, as amended by Act Mav 16, 1918 (Comp. St, 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), making It an offense by words or acts to support and favor the cause of the enemy and oppose that of the United States, is not unconstitutional, as abridging freedom of speech or extending the crime of treason, especially as applio.d. to an alien, who could not well bo guilty of treason.</p> <p>9. Indictment and information <&wkey;>87(8) — Allegation as to specific date not limited by general reference.</p> <p>Counts of an indictment under Espionage Act, tit. 1, § 3 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), alleging the making of certain statements on or about May 28, .1918, and at divers other dates between June 15, 1917, and October 18, 1918, were sufficient to charge an offense, though the statements were such as would not have constituted an offense prior to the amendment of May 16, 1918, as the general reference did not limit the particular reference.</p> <p>10. Indictment and information &wkey;>l33(7) — 'Failure of indictment to aver date of oflenso was after passage of aet hold not ground for arrest of judgment.</p> <p>The failure of an indictment under Espionage Act, tit. 1, § 3 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 191», § 10212c), to show that ihe statements charged were made after the amendment of May 16, 1918, was at most an irregularity to be taken advantage of by motion to quash, and which did not survive a verdict, so as to be raised by motion in arrest, nartieularlv in view of Rev. St. § 1025 (Comp. St. § 1691), as to defects, and Judicial Codo, § 269 (Comp. St. § 1246), as to now trials.</p>

<p>1. Army and navy <®=»40 — Indictment need not show means of effecting intent to cause insubordination.</p> <p>An indictment setting forth a publication by defendant with intent to cause insubordination, obstruct enlistment, and convey false reports interfering with the success of the United States forces, contrary to Espionage Act, tit. 1, § 3 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), need not aver facts to show by what means or on what persons the publication operated to produce the intended effect.</p> <p>2. Army and navy <§=340 — Publication held to disclose intent to cause insubordination and indictment is sufficient.</p> <p>•An indictment setting forth a publication alleged to have been made with intent to hinder the prosecution of the war, contrary to the Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), is sufficient if the terms of the publication are such that, in the light of the time and circumstances attending its publication, reasonable men could deduce therefrom an intention to cause insubordination; but the indictment is demurrable if the publication is not reasonably susceptible to such «n inference.</p> <p>3. Army ami navy @=40 — Publication held sufficient to sustain indictment for violation of Espionage Act.</p> <p>A publication stating that the government was for the profiteers, and therefore could not also be for the people, and that the writer was for the people, is reasonably susceptible of the inference that it was intended to cause insubordination in the military forces of the government, etc., so that an indictment averring its publication with that intent is sufli-cient.</p> <p>4. Army and navy @=40 — In Espionage Act prosecution, other statements admis-. siEiia to show intent in making particular statement.</p> <p>In a prosecution for publishing a statement with intent to cause insubordination, etc., contrary to the Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-102121i), other similar statements by defendant within 20 days of the publication of the particular statement are admissible to illustrate or prove her intent in making the statement charged.</p> <p>5. Army and navy @=40 — In Espionage Act prosecution, statement that “government” was for profiteers held to refer to administration.</p> <p>A statement, published during the war, that the writer was not for the government, since a government for the profiteers could not be Tor tbe people, and that the government was for the profiteers, uses the word “government” as meaning the body of persons then conducting the war and the' activities of the nation, not the system of polity or body of principles or rules by which the people are lawfully guided under the Constitution; and in the absence of extrinsic evidence to show that the latter meaning was intended, it was error to submit to the jury the question whether the charge that the government as established by the Constitution was for the profiteers was false.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — lfor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Government.]</p> <p>6. Criminal law <2=3823(4)— Submission of correct issue held not to cure submission of Incorrect issue.</p> <p>Error in submitting to the jury whether a charge in a publication which used “government” as referring only to the administration was false, if government referred to the constitutional organization, was not cured by submitting also the question whether the charge that the administration was for profiteers was false, since it could not be determined from tlie general verdict on which finding it was based.</p> <p>7. Criminal law @=l 134(1) — Object of review is to assure fair iría!.</p> <p>The object of the review by appellate courts of criminal trials is to determine whether they were fair and impartial, and if there is a serious doubt to make sure that accused has a fair and impartial trial, and this purpose guides the appellate courts in considering the errors assigned.</p> <p>8. Criminal law @=l114(1) — Fairness of trial is determined from record and surrounding circumstances.</p> <p>The fairness of a criminal trial must be tested by the effect of the action of the court upon the jury, considering the circumstances and atmosphere surrounding the trial, as they are revealed by the record or influenced by facts known to all, and this is especially true in espionage cases.</p> <p>9. Criminal law @=762(2) — Judge may comment on evidence.</p> <p>In a prosecution for a crime in the federal court the trial judge may, and it often is his duty to, comment upon the evidence and express his views upon it; but he must leave the ultimate decision to the .jury, and must not color ins charge so as unfairly to influence the verdict in favor of one of the parties.</p> <p>10. Army and navy @=40 — Charge held not fairly to present issues in prosecution under Espionage Act.</p> <p>in a prosecution for violation of the Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1918, Oomp. St Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), a charge which dwelt at length upon the statements attributed to defendant, the testimony for the United States, and collateral issues thereby raised, but merely referred to defendant’s explanations of the statements, Held unfair to defendant, especially when considered in the light of the patriotic feeling existing at the time and the natural prejudice created by the charge.</p> <p>Carland, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.</p>

, Judge. Action by the Acme Manufacturing Company against the Arminius Chemical Company. From a judgment for a less amount than demanded, plaintiff brings error.

In Error.to the District Court of the United States for the District-of Minnesota; Page Morris, Judge. Action by the Sioux Falls National Bank against E. Klaveness. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of South Dakota; James D. Elliott, Judge.</p> <p>Frank Grubl was convicted of violating the Espionage Act, and he brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; John C. Pollock, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Century Electric Company against the Detroit Copper & Brass Rolling Mills. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>L Descent and distribution &wkey;>7l(6) — Proof that cfiiid held out as natural son was adopted must bo clear.</p> <p>To sustain a finding that a boy who had been for years held out by his family, including parents, grandparents, and other relatives, as the natural -son of his parents, was an adopted son, the fact must be established, not simply by a preponderance of testimony, but by clear, convincing, and indubitable proof.</p> <p>2. Descent and distribution <&wkey;7l (6) — Evidence held not to show that child was adopted.</p> <p>In a suit to quiet title to land claimed by defendant as the natural son of his father, evidence, consisting partly of documents from a foundling asylum and partly of testimony of witnesses and experts who had examined defendant’s mother, held not to sustain a finding by the trial court, contrary to the master’s finding, that defendant was an adopted child.</p> <p>3. Appeal and error &wkey;>1022(4) — That master, whose findings were reversed, saw witnesses, may be considered.</p> <p>That the master, whose findings were set aside by the trial court, heard and saw the witness who testified, cannot be disregarded on appeal from the decree entered by the court on its findings.</p> <p>4. Descent and distribution &wkey;>7l(6) — In determining whether child is natural or adopted, welfare of parties may be given weight.</p> <p>A suit to quiet title, where the parties’ rights depended on whether defendant was the natural or adopted child of his parents, can only he justly decided by giving due weight to the human relations of the parties and their welfare, as well as to the property rights involved.</p> <p>5. Evidence <&wkey;>383(7) — Altered document not entitled to greater weight than oral testimony.</p> <p>While a document relating to a long past event, prepared by parties not affected by it, and not appearing to have been changed, has great probative force, one which shows on its face that it has been altered, and by a party affected thereby, is entitled to no greater weight than the oral testimony relating thereto.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit by Edward B. Boise, as trustee of the estate in bankruptcy of Daly & Schaefer, Incorporated, against J. Frederick Talcott, Grace Van Norden, and Henrietta E. Talcott, as executor and executrices under the last will and testament of James Talcott, deceased. Decree for complainant. Complainant appeals.</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; John C. Rose, Judge. Consolidated suits in admiralty by the United States and others against the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the Raymond Concrete Pile Company, and others. From decree for libelants, defendants appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia, at Lynchburg; Henry Clay McDowell, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Wall Grocer Company, limited, against the Jobbers’ Overall Company, Incorporated. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>1. Army anti navy <&wkey;40 — Persons subject to call constitute part of “military forces” within Espionage Act.</p> <p>Espionage Act June 15, 1917, § 3 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 102J2c), prohibiting attempts to cause disloyalty, insubordination, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military forces of the United States, includes in the term “miliiary forces” persons subject to bo called into active service under Selective Service Act May 18, 191.7 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 2<M4a-2044k), and hence an indictment charging that statements were made to a person subject to the Selective Service Law was sufficient.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Miliiary Forces.]</p> <p>2. Criminal law <3=371(1) — Evidence of similar acts and statements admissible to show intent</p> <p>In a prosecution for attempting to cause disloyalty, etc., in the military forces, statements, and acts similar to and made and done by defendant about the same time as those charged in the indictment, are admissible on the question of his intent in making and doing those charged.</p> <p>3. Army and navy <&wkey;40 — Platform of defendant's party admissible in prosecution under Espionage Act</p> <p>Whore defendant, charged with a violation of the Espionage Act, testified that lie was a Socialist and subscribed to the platform adopted by the Socialist party in April or May, 1017, and to its general outline in September, 1918, though lie later changed his mind regarding its attitude towards the war, such platform was admissible in evidence.</p> <p>4. Criminal law <&wkey;IQ36(8), 1044 — Sufficiency of evidence not reviewable, when not challenged at trial.</p> <p>Tlie sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is not reviewable, when not challenged at the trial by a request for a directed verdict or in any other way presenting that question for decision.</p> <p>5. Criminal law <&wkey;l 134(4) — Order denying new trial not reviewable.</p> <p>An order denying a motion for a new trial is not reviewable in a federal appellate court.</p> <p>6. Army and navy <&wkey;4Q— Evidence sufficient to support conviction under Espionage Act.</p> <p>Evidence held sufficient to support a verdict finding defendant guilty of attempting to cause disloyalty, etc., in the military forces in violation of Espionage Act, § 3 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c).</p> <p>7. Criminal lav/ <&wkey;l 159(5) — Making of statements and intent questions for jury and not reviewable.</p> <p>Whether defendant, charged with a violation of Espionage Act, § 3, made the statements attributed to him by witnesses, and whether he made them with intent to cause disloyalty, etc., in the military forces, were questions for the jury, and not reviewable by a federal appellate court, where there was great conflict in the testimony concerning them.</p> <p>8. Army and navy <&wkey;40 — Intent in making disloyal statements a question for the jury.</p> <p>Statements publicly and repeatedly made by defendant, in the hearing of persons subject to the Selective Service Act, that the President violated the Constitution by drafting people into the armies and sending them to Europe, that he was not only murdering Germans, but the American people as well, that the draft law was unconstitutional, and that the President and Sena tors who voted for it violated their oaths, were so far calculated to cause insubordination, disloyalty, etc., in the military forces, as to make bis intent a question for the jury.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States, for the Western District of Louisiana; George W. Jack, Judge.</p> <p>Libel by the United States against 275 Cases of Mineral Water,; C. L. Bradley, claimant. From a decree in favor of the United States, the claimant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida; Rhydon M. Call, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the First National Bank of Rome, Ga., against the First National Bank of Jasper, Fla. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Call, Judge. Three actions by the First National Bank of Rome, Ga., and by the State Bank of Rome, against the Bank of Jasper, and by the State Bank of Rome, Ga., against the First National Bank of Jasper, Fla. Judgment for defendant in each case, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>1. Appeal and error <&wkey;338(2) — Time for appeal not shortened by later statute referring to Supreme Court.</p> <p>The proviso to Act March 3, 1891, § 11 (Comp. St. § 1647), allowing six months for writ of error to the Circuit Courts of Appeals, that in casos “in which a lesser time is now by law limited” such limits shall apply, does not make applicable, to a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Act Sopt. 0, 1916, § 6 (Comp. St. § 1228a), limiting a writ of error and appeal to the Supreme Court to three months, since the latter act was not in force when the former was passed and expressly relates only to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>2. Carriers &wkey;>247(4) — Passenger alighting is “passenger while being transported.”</p> <p>One who was injured by falling from the car steps while alighting was “passenger white being transported,” within Rev. St. Neb. 1913, § 6052, making a railroad liable for injuries to such passengers, unless arising from the criminal negligence of the person injured or a violation of a rule of the railroad actually brought to the passenger’s notice.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Passenger Being Transported.]</p> <p>3. Carriers <&wkey;347(9) — .Passenger held not criminally negligent in law, so as to bar recovery.</p> <p>Where a passenger, after seeing others alight by means of a stool placed below the ear stop, returned to the car on an errand, and then stepped off without looking again for the stool, which in the meantime had been removed, and was injured by a resulting fall, he was not criminally negligent as a matter of law, so as to lose his right to recover, under Rev. St. Neb. 1913, § 6052, and it was error to direct a verdict for the railroad.</p>

Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota; Page Morris, Judge. In the matter of the bankruptcy of Eli Kangas. E. G. Robie, trustee of the bankrupt’s estate, opposed said bankrupt’s claim to property as a homestead exemption, and action of the referee denying the exemption having been approved by the District Court, the bankrupt petitions to revise that order.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk; Edmund Waddill, Jr., Judge.</p> <p>S. J. Eindsey was convicted of an offense, and he brings error.</p>

<p>Master and servant <§=>286(33) — Negligence as to switchman held question of fact</p> <p>Where an employé in switchyards was ordered over his objection to assume the duties of brakeman in switching operations at night, a work to which he was unaccustomed, and while signaling was struck and killed by a car which was being pushed on another track, so that it obscured the engine headlight, the question of the duty to have a lookout on such car, or to give deceased warning, held not one to be determined as matter of law, but one for the jury.</p>

Suit in equity by the Wightman & Hough Company against Victor Nivois. From an order denying a preliminary injunction, complainant appeals. Tlio notion is to restrain infringement of trade-mark and unfair compel ition. Defendant owned a patent on a cigarette ease.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty by the Martin Cantine Company against Edward Blackford and Anthony Summa, partners as E. Blackford & Co., with the Schoonmaker-Conners Company, Incorporated, impleaded. Decree for respondents, and libelant appeals.</p>

Appeals irom the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; John C. Rose, Judge. Suits by the Naam Looze Yennoot Schap, S. S. Willem Van Driel, Sr., a corporation, owner of the steamship Willem Van Driel, Sr., and by Edwin Dyason, master of the steamship Welbeck Hall and bailee of her cargo, against the Central Elevator Company of Baltimore City and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

<p>1. Patents &wkey;>328 — Claims for ignition system held limited and not infringed.</p> <p>Claims 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the Kettering patent, No. 1,223,180, for an ignition system using a thermal resistance reducing the current on an abnormal flow held not infringed with respect to its function of reducing the current to prevent the depletion of the storage battery when the engine is not running, and also held not broad enough, as limited by the prior art, to cover the function of regulating the flow of the current for variable speeds of the engine under running conditions.</p> <p>2. Patents <&wkey;>I67(l) — Limitation of specifications to be read into claims; “negligible quantity.”</p> <p>Where the specifications of an application for a patent for an ignition system stated that existing systems permitted a continuous flow of current and a consequent partial or complete depletion of the source of electrical energy, that the object of the invention was to permit the normal flow, but on an abnormal or continuous flow to reduce the current to a substantially negligible quantity, and thus conserve the supply, though the main circuit was closed for an extended range of time, and that such continuous flow, if permitted, would materially reduce the supply of current within a short time, the term “negligible quantity” meant something materially less than that which would result in a complete or material partial depletion of the batteries within a comparatively short time, and the claims should be so limited.</p> <p>3. Patents &wkey;>24l — Defendant entitled to use well-known device, if not accomplishing same purpose as that claimed.</p> <p>Whore a thermal resistance was a well-known device in the electrical art prior to a patent for an ignition system using such resistance to cut down an abnormal flow of the current when the engine was not running, defendant had a right to use it for any other purpose than that of the patent, if he did not in effect accomplish the same result or perform the same function as that claimed for the patented apparatus.</p>

<p>1. Patents <&wkey;327— Effect of prior decision on validity of patent stated.</p> <p>Wiu'le a former decision as to the validity of a patent is not res judicata in a subsequent suit against persons not parties to the former suit, it is more than' persuasive. The validity of a patent, once sustained, is not subject to complete re-examination at the instance of each subsequent alleged infringer; but, although new matter, not merely cumulative, will be given full consideration, the determination of the validity of a patent on full hearing on a contested suit will not bo reconsidered, unless clearly shown to be erroneous.</p> <p>2. Patents &wkey;>328 — For electric light infringed.</p> <p>The Guth patent, No. 1,076,418, for an improved electric lamp, held infringed.</p> <p>3. Appeal and error &wkey;j|050(2) — Evidence <&wkey;>43(3), 340(1) — Uncertified copy of record In prior casa Inadmissible; not prejudicial; court judicially knows its records.</p> <p>While plaintiffs uncertified copy of its own record in an earlier patent suit was inadmissible in evidence, no harm resulted from its admission, as it was unnecessary to introduce the record, for the court takes judicial notice of its records for all proper purposes.</p> <p>4. Patents &wkey;j280, 291 — Making defending vendor formal party defendant Sieid improper.</p> <p>in patent suit in federal District Court in Illinois, seeking injunction, damages, and accounting of profit for infringement, where, at the trial, counsel of record for the sole defendant stated, in answer to inquiry, that he had been employed and was compensated by a Missouri company to defend its vendee, defendant, it was improper, over counsel’s objection, to make the Missouri company a defendant and compel it to submit to an accounting in Illinois, where it liad no regular and established place of business, for all infringements committed in the course of its business in Missouri; its employment of counsel for defendant and his frank statement of the facts not being a general appearance by the company as defendant, although as privy it would be bound by the decision as to validity and infringement.</p> <p>5. Patents <?&wkey;323, 324(4) — Decree determining validity “final decree”; appeal not dismissed because patent was surrendered and reissue granted.</p> <p>Since a decree determining validity and infringement of a patent and granting a permanent injunction is final in essence, even though interlocutory in time relation, the cause wherein such a decree has been entered will not be dismissed on appeal therefrom because, after appeal, the original patent was surrendered and a reissue patent granted, for the rights of the parties are determined as of the date of such a decree, and subsequent surrender of the patent does not involve abandonment of such rights.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Final Decree or Judgment.]</p> <p>On Motion for Specific Directions in the Matter of Costs and for Cancellation of Bond.</p> <p>6. Patents <&wkey;3I7 — Bond for stay of inj unction held valid.</p> <p>In patent infringement suit, although defendant’s vendor, defending the suit for defendant, was improperly made defendant, yet in the decree provision for stay of the injunction against both defendants, if the vendor gave a bond for damages and profits “which it may finally be decided plaintiff is entitled to recover from either defendant,” was not erroneous in requiring the bond from the vendor, as, by giving the bond, the vendor secured the desired stay for its vendee, nor was the validity of the bond itself affected by the fact that the injunctional order was void as against the vendor, and a stay as against it therefore unnecessary.</p> <p>7. Patents &wkey;>325 — Costs recoverable by defendant only to extend improper join-der affected appeal.</p> <p>■Where the nonresident vendor, defending suit for patent infringement for defendant, its vendee, was improperly made defendant by the lower court, it can recover of plaintiff only such costs paid by it as were due to its joining in the appeal, and costs which were or would have been necessary if the vendee had been the sole appellant will be taxed against vendee defendant, unsuccessful on appeal.</p>

Suit by S. S. Stafford, Incorporated, against the Thaddeus Davids Ink Company, Incorporated. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Appeal from decree in equity holding valid, and infringed by defendant, claims 2 to 7, inclusive, of Deppermann patent, No. 1,310,405, for which application was tiled November 29, 1913, renewed February 24, 1919 (within the statutory period), and issued July 15, 1919.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Suit by Rosenwasser Bros., Incorporated, against the B. E. Manufacturing Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by J. W. Hurley against the Commission of Fisheries of Virginia and others.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law &wkey;>297 — Act requiring railroad to elevate track unconstitutional, as depriving of property without due process.</p> <p>Sp. Acts Ark. 1919, p. 121, enlarging the Clarendon levee district to include the track of the St. Louis & Southwestern Railway Company and territory beyond, and requiring company to raise its roadbed within the district for the expressed purpose of protecting the city from overflow and the track itself from inundation, in consequence of which, it is recited, “the public traffic tipon said railroad has been interrupted, to tbe great detriment of the public welfare,” held unconstitutional, as depriving the company of its property without due process of law, it appearing that the raising of the track within the district would cost upward of $150,000, and would not aid in preventing interruption of traffic, because the track for three miles beyond was upon a trestle and s abject to the same overflow, nor would it afford any protection to the added portion of the district beyond.</p> <p>2. Statutes <&wkey;181(2) — Determination of constitutionality.</p> <p>In construing a legislative act enacted under the police power of a state, where its validity is attacked as depriving one of constitutional right®, the courts will not be controlled by the form of the statute, but by tlio possible results of its operation.</p> <p>3. Railroads <&wkey;87 — Construction of tracks within police power of states.</p> <p>While under its police power a state may require railroads to change their tracks, when necessary for the protection of life or for the good of the public generally, there must be fair and reasonable ground for it, and tiie acts required to be done must have some effective relation to the end sought to be accomplished.</p> <p>4. Constitutional law &wkey;>241 — Statute singling out one railroad, and requiring elevation of tracks, unconstitutional.</p> <p>A state may not arbitrarily select a particular railroad company, and require it to raise its tracks at a particular place, for the avowed purpose of preventing the obstruction of traffic by overflow, where such track is subject to overflow at the same time at other places, and where other roads through the state are subject to the same obstructions.</p> <p>5. Statutes <&wkey;66 — Validity of class legislation.</p> <p>A state may enact class legislation, but such an act must apply to all •of that class similarly situated, subject 'to reasonable exceptions based on some reasonable grounds, and what is a reasonable exception is a question to be finally determined by the courts.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by Erick Johnsson against Dredge No. IS ; the P. Sanford Ross Company, Incorporated, claimant.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the United States against the United Shoe Machinery Company and others. Decree for plaintiff in conformity with the opinion. The allegations in the complaint, as well as the clauses in the leases claimed to be in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 731, c. 323 [section 8835c, U. S. Comp. St. 1918]), are set out in the former opinion of this court (234 Fed. 127) on the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint.

<p>1. Monopolies <S= 12 (2) — Prohibitions against restraint of trade apply to patented and unpatanied artieies.</p> <p>Articles of commerce, although covered by valid patents, when manufactured, sold, and placed in the ordinary channels o£ trade, become subject to the same limitations and stand on the same footing as un-patented articles, and whatever would be an illegal combination in restraint of trade in the case of unpatented articles will be equally so if the articles are patented.</p> <p>2. Patents G^2fKi--C on tracts field sales and not licenses.</p> <p>Transactions by which the manufacturer delivers patented articles under a so-called license agreement, receiving full payment, except a small part of the price denominated a “royalty,” to be paid when the artieies are resold, with reserved right to retake the articles on violation of the contract and repayment of the sum paid therefor, held not licenses, but sales, which vest title in the purchasers.</p> <p>3. Monopolies <&s»l7(l) — Contract to sell at fixed price held not a “contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade.”</p> <p>A method of doing business by which a manufacturer sells its product to jobbers under written agreements that they shall resell to retailers and consumers only at prices fixed by the manufacturer, hut which contain no restrictions upon the prices at which retailers may sell to consumers, held not to involve a “contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade,” within Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1 (Comp. St. § 8S20).</p> <p>[Ed? Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Restraint of Trade.]</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law &wkey;> 10— Eighteenth Amendment valid.</p> <p>Eighteenth Amendment, with respect to its subject-matter, helef within the power to amend given by article 5, and valid.</p> <p>2. States <&wkey;4 — Amendment of federal Constitution not invalid as diminishing police power of states.</p> <p>Every grant of power to the federal government, whether by the Constitution as originally framed or by subsequent amendment, necessarily diminished tUje powers of the several states, and that an amendment takes away a police power previously in the state does not render it invalid.</p> <p>3. Constitutional law &wkey;>IO — Amendment valid, though provision is not alterable at will of majority of people.</p> <p>That a constitutional amendment is in effect legislation controlling the conduct of private individuals, in that it ordains a final permanent law prohibiting certain acts, not alterable at the will of a majority, does not render it invalid.</p> <p>4. Constitutional law t&wkey; 10— Resolution proposing amendment need not express necessity thereof.</p> <p>The provision of Const, art. 5, authorizing Congress to propose amendments “whenever two-third's of both houses' shall deem it necessary,” does not require that a joint resolution proposing an amendment shall expressly declare that it is deemed necessary.</p> <p>5. Constitutional lav/ <&wkey;70(l) — Form of resolution proposing amendment not subject to judicial review.</p> <p>Congress alone, of all departments of the federal government, is intrusted with the power of* proposing amendments to the Constitution, and the form of resolutions hy which it proposes an amendment is not subject to judicial investigation. t</p> <p>6. Constitutional law <&wkey; 10 — Ratification of amendment not affected by state lav/s providing for referendum; “legislature.”</p> <p>In Const, art. 5, providing that a proposed amendment shall be valid • “when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several states,” when that inode shall be proposed by Congress, the word “Legislature” means the then recognized representative law-making bodies of the states, and the validity of an amendment ratified hy the requisite number of such Legislatures cannot be affected by state laws providing for. or permitting, a referendum vote on legislative acts.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — 'For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series; Legislature.]</p> <p>7. States <S=?4 — Eighteenth Amendment makes congressional legislation paramount without concurrence! by states.</p> <p>Eighteenth Amendment, § 2, providing that “the Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation,” must be construed, in harmony with its purpose, to expressly authorize effective legislation for enforcement of section 1, which excludes a construction making concurrence of the states necessary to the effectiveness of congressional legislation, and such legislation, if enacted, is para- ' mount, and, while it may be supplemented by state legislation, it cannot be defeated by any action or nonaction of tbe states. In the absence of action by Congress, any state inay enact enforcement legislation effective within its borders.</p> <p>8. Intoxicating liquors &wkey;>l7 — Legislativo definition is not arbitrary.</p> <p>National Prohibition Act Oca. 28, 1919, § 1, in providing that “intoxicating liquor,” as used in the act, shall be construed to Include all liquors, liquids, or compounds containing one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume, does not make a definition which may be declared arbitrary and unconstitutional by the courts, but one which It was within the reasonable discretion of Congress to make for the purposes of the act,</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Intoxicating Liquor.]</p> <p>9. Eminent domain <&wkey;2(I) — 'National Prohibition Aet noi Invalid as taking property without compensation.</p> <p>National Prohibition Act Oct. 28, 19.19, held not Invalid, as taking private property for public use without just compensation, in violation of Fifth Amendment, because, as incidental to the exercise of a lawful power, loss may result to certain species of property.</p> <p>10. Constitutional law <&wkey;>IQ — Meaning of “amendment” in Const, art. 5.</p> <p>“Amendment” includes additions to, as well as corrections of, matters already treated, and there is nothing in the context of Const, art. 5, providing that Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments, which suggests that it was used in a restricted sense.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Amendment.]</p>

The Spokane Dry Goods Company, the Hill Bros. Shoe Company, and the Culbertson-Grote-Rankin Company, each a. corporation, were separately indicted for violation of the Food Control and the District of Columbia Rents Act of October 22, 1919. On demurrers to the indictment.

<p>Criminal law 13 — Statute making it felony to make unreasonable charge in handling necessaries held too indefinite.</p> <p>Lever Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 4, as amended by Act Oct. 22,1919, § 2, malting it felony to make unjust or unnecessary charge in handling or dealing in necessaries, though within the war power of Congress, does not define the offense with sufficient certainty, and is void under Const. Amend. 6, entitling the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation.</p>

<p>injunction <§=>26(4)— Avoidance of multiplicity of suits held not to extend to restraining actions against drainage contractor.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of equity on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits held, not to extend to a.suit by a defaulting contractor to do work for a drainage district, who bad given bond and also a contract to indemnify bis surety, to enjoin tbe district, tbe surety, and creditors, to whom be was indebted for labor and materials, from bringing actions on any claims they might severally have against him, and to require them to submit such claims in that suit.</p>

<p>1. Words and phrases — “Debt.”</p> <p>Tlie word “debt,” in common intent and as used in tlie commercial affairs of the world, means an obligation to pay a sum of money, either fixed or readily calculable.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Debt.]</p> <p>2. Corporations <@=3239 — Stockholders not liable for judgment against corporation for tort.</p> <p>Under Civ. Code S. D. § 441, providing that each stockholder of a corporation shall be individually liable “for the debts of the corporation to the extent of the amount that is unpaid upon stock held by him,” the test of a stockholder’s liability for a claim against the corporation is the nature or character of the original obligation, and a claim for damages sounding in tort is not converted into a “debt,” within the meaning of the statute, by recovery of a judgment thereon against the corporation.</p> <p>3. Corporations <§=>237 — Stockholder liable only on debt for which he is liable by statute.</p> <p>In an action to enforce against a stockholder a judgment against the corporation, defendant is entitled to look behind the judgment to ascertain the nature of the claim on which it rests, and if he is not liable on such claim under the statute, the judgment is not admissible or enforceable against him.</p>

<p>Internal revenue “Income” includes dividends paid from accumulated surplus.</p> <p>Under Income Tax Act Oct. 3, 1913, § 2, the “income” of a stockholder of a corporation includes dividends received by him during a tax year, although declared and paid in whole or in part from the accumulated surplus of prior years.</p> <p>[®d. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Income.]</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Fidelity National Bank & Trust Company of Kansas City against C. F. Enright, Bank Commissioner of the State of Missouri. On motion to strike answer.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <@=293(I) — When trustee can sue in federal court, where no diversity of citizenship involved, stated.</p> <p>Under Bankruptcy Act, § 23 (Comp. St. § 9607), authorizing trustee to sue in federal court only as bankrupt might have done, except with defendant’s consent, or to recover property under sections 60b, 67e, and 70e (Comp. St. §§ 9644, 9651, 9654), a trustee cannot sue in federal court, where there is no diversity of citizenship and no federal question, unless he brings the case within one of the exceptions.</p> <p>2. Courts <@=>23 — Jurisdiction cannot be conferred on federal courts by consent.</p> <p>As a general rule, jurisdiction of the federal courts, as distinguished from venue, cannot he conferred by consent of the parties.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <§=>293(4)— Answer reserving motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction does not consent to jurisdiction.</p> <p>An answer to the merits, accompanied with a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, which motion was expressly reserved in the answer, does not give defendant’s consent to the jurisdiction of court, under Bankruptcy Act, § 23b (Comp. St. § 9607).</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy <@=>293(2) — Court has jurisdiction over suit for property fraudulently transferred by bankrupt.</p> <p>Under Bankruptcy Act, § 23 (Gomp. St. § 9607), the federal court has jurisdiction over a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover property fraudulently transferred by the bankrupt, so that the transfer was void under Bankruptcy Act, §§ 67e and 70e (Comp. St. §§ 9651, 9654).</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy <@=>293(1) — Court has no jurisdiction over suit to invalidate transfer by bankrupt’s mother.</p> <p>The federal court has no jurisdiction, under Bankruptcy Act, § 23 (Gomp. St. § 9607), in the absence of diversity of parties, over a suit by trustee in bankruptcy to invalidate a transfer to bankrupt’s wife, made by his mother, "on the ground of mental incapacity to transfer.</p> <p>6. Bankruptcy <@=>293(2) — Genera! motion to dismiss denied, if court has jurisdiction on ground of fraudulent transfer.</p> <p>Where a trustee in bankruptcy filed a bill to recover property from the bankrupt’s wife, alleging that it either was fraudulently transferred by the bankrupt or was transferred by his mother, who had not capacity to make the transfer, a general motion to dismiss the suit was properly denied, since the court had jurisdiction if the property was fraudulently transferred, and the court could retain the suit until the evidence at final hearing disclosed whether recovery could he allowed on that ground.</p> <p>7. Bankruptcy <@=>293(1) — Suit dismissed when evidence shows only right to recover not dependent on federal action.</p> <p>Where trustee in bankruptcy sued to recover property on two theories, one of which entitled him to sue in federal court, but Ms evidence failed to sustain that theory, the court will not retain jurisdiction to determine his right to recover under the other theory, but will.require him to proceed in a state court having jurisdiction thereof.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Earl H. Kuenster, doing business as the Kuen-ster Live Stock Commission Company, against E. Meredith, Secretary of Agriculture, and others. On motion to dismiss the supplemental bill.

<p>1. Courts <@=>308 — Jurisdiction of class suits limited to cases of diverse citizenship.</p> <p>As the Constitution gives federal courts Jurisdiction over cases involving nonfederal questions only when the parties are of diverse citizenship, their jurisdiction over suits on behalf of a class is limited to cases wherein the parties are purely interstate.</p> <p>2. Courts <@=332 — Equity rule ineffective to confer jurisdiction of class suits without diverse citizenship.</p> <p>If the omission from equity rulo 38 (198 Fed. xxix, 115 C. O. A. xxix), relative to suits on behalf of a class, of the former qualification that in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of absent parties, was intended to remove the interstate limitation of the jurisdiction of federal courts when class suits are the subject-matter, it is ineffective to accomplish such intention, as the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the Constitution and cannot be affected by court rules.</p> <p>3. Courts <§=>308 — Class suit against Indiana corporation is within jurisdiction of federal court, though there are Indiana citizens who are members ef class.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of federal court of a class suit brought by nonresident members of the class against an indiana corporation is not ousted by the fact that there are Indiana citizens who are members of the class, in view of equity rule 39 (198 F'cd. xxix, 115 C. C. A. xxix), providing that when persons cannot he made parties by reason of their being out of the jurisdiction of the court or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction of the court, the court may proceed without them and that decree shall he without prejudice to their rights.</p> <p>4. Courts <@=264(l) — Nonfederal controversy between citizens of same state can be heard only when necessary to administration of res.</p> <p>It is only when a federal court is already properly in possession of a res, and the determination of an intrastate nonfederal controversy is necessary to its just administration, that a federal court may hear and determine a nonfederal controversy between citizens of the same state on an ancillary bill or intervening petition.</p> <p>5. Courts <@=>264(4) — Suit to restrain citizen of same state as plaintiff not ancillary to suit hy noncitizens against plaintiff.</p> <p>Where citizens of other states on behalf of holders of a class of benefit certificates issued by an Indiana corporation brought a suit against it, resuliing in a decree for the corporation, a suit hy the corporation against Indiana citizens holding such certificates to restrain actions by them involving the same question was not an ancillary bill, but an original bill between citizens of Indiana, of which the federal court had no jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against David Masters. On application of Frank Moran, intervener, for return of automobile used in transporting liquor.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by C. W. Whiffin against D. W. Cole. On motion to remand to state court.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Julius Kohn against Jacob & Josef Kohn, Incorporated, and Francis P. Garvan, individually and as Alien Property Custodian. On motion by the Alien Property Custodian to dismiss the bill. Motion by the Alien Property Custodian to dismiss a bill in equity brought against a domestic corporation and the Alien Property Custodian for lack of jurisdiction.

<p>Attachment <©=>249 — Motion to vacate held not sustained by evidence.</p> <p>Evidence held, not to sustain a motion to vacate an attachment of property of a nonresident defendant, on the ground that plaintiffs fraudulently induced him to ship the property into the district for the purpose of attaching it.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecutions by the United States against Frank I. Sears. Judgments of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; Charles A. Woods, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Samuel L. Sneier-son. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

Libel by the Rarn Dine Steamship Company, Limited, against the steamship Claveresk, her engines, etc., claimed by the Sutherland Steamship Company, Limited, with others impleaded. Held: and in legal effect asserted, that the Admiralty requisition did not terminate the contractual relation either between Sutherland and itself, or itself and the subchar-terer.

Dibel by the American Tobacco Company against the steamship Rosalia, her engines, etc.] claimed by the Societa Anónima Di Navi-gazione, Adriatica, in which the Societa Anónima Transporti Mestre was impleaded. From a decree for the libelant, the claimant appeals.

<p>3,Corporations &wkey;>399(4) — ■.Acts of agent and officer within scope of apparent authority bind corporation.</p> <p>The acts of an agent of one corporation and the officer of another, in engaging space on a pier for a ship, were binding on their respective companies, when within the scope of their apparent authority.</p> <p>2. Corporations &wkey;>40S — ■Fixiag price incident to authority to engage space for ship.</p> <p>Where par agent of one corporation and an officer of another had apparent authority to engage space for a ship on a pier the fixing of the price was an incident of such authority.</p> <p>3. Wharves <&wkey;> 17 — Statute prescribing rates does not prevent agreements for greater rates.</p> <p>Greater New York Charter, § 850, prescribing rates that may be charged any vessel using or making fast to any pier, wharf, or bulkhead, etc., and section S63, providing for the recovery of treble damages for receiving rates in excess of those authorized, do not prevent a shipowner and the owner or lessee of a privately owned pier from fixing a higher rate by mutual agreement.</p> <p>4. Wharves <&wkey;i — Privately owned wharf may be reserved for private use.</p> <p>A privately owned wharf may be reserved for the private use of Its owner or lessee, even though it exists on the shore of a navigable river or lake, or in the harbor of a city, from which access is obtained directly to the sea.</p> <p>5. Statutes <&wkey;2l8 — Acquiescence by parties interested strong evidence of interpretation.</p> <p>That owners of vessels have acquiesced in the understanding that a statute prescribing rates chargeable to vessels using or making last to any pier does not prohibit agreements for a higher rate is strong evidence of iis proper interpretation.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the District of Idaho; Frank S. Dietrich, Judge.</p> <p>Eugene Sol Louie was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he brings error.</p>

Trippet, Judge. - Howard J. Proffitt was convicted of offenses, and he brings error. The indictment in this case contains four counts.

Cushman, Judge. Suit by the Monidah Trust against the Arctic Construction Company. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals. The appellant brought a suit in the court below to set aside an appraisal of the value of land under a lease and for a decree of the court to determine the true value of the land. The lease was made in 1908. It was a lease of unimproved city property for a term of 50 years.

<p>1. Time <®=»9(I0), 10(10) — Date of executing contract, and Sunday, excluded in computing term of contract.</p> <p>Under a contract dated April 14th, for sale of standing timber to be removed within 10 years, with right of extension by payment of interest' each year in advance, the time of expiration of- the 10 years is to be computed by excluding the day in which the contract was executed, and a tender of interest for renewal on April 15th, the 14th being Sunday, held in time.</p> <p>2. Trespass 10 — Action for trespass barred by contract.</p> <p>Where defendant, having' the right to remove timber from land within a fixed time, with right of extension as desired on payment of interest in advance each year, tendered interest for a year before expiration of the time fixed, it was not thereafter a trespasser because it demanded an extension for more than the reasonable time to which it was entitled.</p> <p>3. Logs and logging <®=>3( 15)- — Jurisdiction to prevent multiplicity of actions warrants interference with logging contract.</p> <p>A bill to enjoin defendant from interfering with complainant in cutting timber from a number of tracts of land under contracts held to state a case within equitable cognizance to prevent a multiplicity of actions at law.</p>

<p>1. Shipping &wkey;>l79 — Exception in charter of “extraordinary occurrence beyond control of either party.”</p> <p>Detention of a vessel under charter in a San Domingo port, after she was loaded within the lay days allowed and ready to proceed, by refusal of the United States authorities in charge of Dominican customs to grant clearance, held within a mutual exception in the charter party of “any extraordinary occurrence beyond the control of either party,” ana not to render charterer liable for demurrage.</p> <p>[lid. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Extraordinary Occurrence.]</p> <p>2. Shipping &wkey;>6l — Duty of clearing chartered vessel on master.</p> <p>The duty of clearing a vessel, under a charter which is not a demise, rests on the master, and not the charterer, although port charges are for his account.</p> <p>3. Shipping <&wkey;f79 — Charterer not liable for demurrage caused , by vis major.</p> <p>Even under a charter party without exceptions, the charterer is excused from liability for demurrage for delay caused by vis major and extraordinary occurrences beyond his control.</p>

<p>1. Jury &wkey;s92 — Railroad employe not disqualified as empioyé of government.</p> <p>Under the President's proclamation assuming control of the railroads, the Federal Railroad Control Act March 21, 1918 (Comp. St. 1938, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, $ 3115%a-3115% p), and Act July 3, 1918, providing that nothing therein shall bo deemed a recognition of railroad employes as employSs of the United States, a railroad «empioyé was not disqualified as a juror in a criminal case on the ground that he was an employe of the government.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <&wkey;959-~Court held not to have refused to consider motion for new trial.</p> <p>Where the court denied a motion for a new trial, and denied an oral application for leave to file a supplemental motion for newly discovered evidence, but subsequently ordered that the motion might be filed nnne pro tunc, but adhered to his former ruling denying the motion for leave to file such supplemental motion, there was no refusal to consider tho grounds of the supplemental motion, as the court evidently considered them on the oral application, and subsequently ordered the motion filed in order to permit defendant to reduce it to writing and obtain any possible benefit of the additional ground.</p>

Dibel by Reginald Chapman Venning, master of the steamship British Isles,* against the Norwegian bark Bragdo, her tackle, etc., claimed by John G. Carlsen, in which cross-libel was filed. From a decree dismissing both the libel and the cross-libel, the libelant appeals.

In Admiralty. Suit by William Kuhnhold against the Deutsch-Aus-tralische Dampschiffahrts Gesellschaft and the Netherlands-American Steam Navigation Company. Decree for libelant against the Netherlands Company, and it appeals. This suit, for injury to cargo consigned to libelant, was begun in 1916, against not only the present appellant, but the Deutseh-Australisehe Damp-schiff Gesellschaft (hereafter called the German Line).

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the First Division of the Northern District of California; Maurice T. Dooling, Judge.</p> <p>Theodore Kaphan was convicted of offenses, and he brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; Frederic Dodge, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Albert G. Groblewski against the John Chmiell Company. From a decree dismissing the bill in part, plaintiff appeals. On motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>1. Crimina! Saw <§=>¡032(5), !044, i059(2) — Conviction on insufficient indictment cannot be sustained, though not challenged below.</p> <p>A judgment of conviction cannot be sustained, if the indictment fails to state facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged, though there was no demurrer, motion to quash, demand for bill of particulars, motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, and no specific exception to any instruction, and only a general exception to the refusal of instructions.</p> <p>2. Crimina! law ¡§=>304(2) — •Indictment and Information <§=~>61 — Allegation of existence of war unnecessary as such fact will be judicially noticed.</p> <p>An indictment for causing and attempting to cause insubordination, etc., In the military and naval forces, and obstructing the recruiting and enlistment service, need not allege the existence of a state of war, as the courts take judicial notice of that fact.</p> <p>3. Army and navy <§=>40- — Indictment for causing insubordination, eto,, need not allege eligibility for service.</p> <p>An indictment for causing and attempting to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces, etc., by peddling and selling a book containing seditious and inflammatory statements, and obstructing the recruiting and enlistment service by the same acts, was not required to allege that any of the persons to whom the book was sold or offered were in, or eligible to service or duty in, the military or naval forces.</p> <p>4. Criminal law $=>829(1) — Refusal of instructions not error, where charge given fully covered the case.</p> <p>■Where the court’s charge was clear and correct, and fully covered the case, the refusal of requested instructions was not error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Southern District of California; Oscar A. Trippet, Judge.</p> <p>J. Emma Martin was convicted of an offense, and she brings error.</p>

<p>Petition to Review Order of Federal Trade Commission.</p> <p>Proceeding before the Federal Trade Commission against the Ward Baking Company. On petition to review an order of the Federal Trade Commission.</p>

Suit for collision by Robert Bauer, owner of the launch Esther, against the gasoline launch Hicki Hoy; Peter J. Eiseman, claimant* Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals.

Action by Elfrieda Grimstad, administratrix of the estate of An-gelí Grimstad, deceased, against the New York Central Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>Evidence <&wkey;43(2, 3) — Judicial notice of facts shown by records In same case and on other appeals.</p> <p>' On appeal from a final decree, the court takes judicial notice of the records on an appeal, in the same case and other cases involving the same questions, from orders appointing receivers.</p>

Suit by the Estate of P. D1. Beckwith, Incorporated, a Michigan corporation, against the Minnesota Stove Company, a Minnesota corporation, for infringement of a patent. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.

<p>1. Patents &wkey;>290 — Manufacturer may intervene In suit against dealer.</p> <p>Under equity rule 37 (198 Fed. xxviii, 115 O. C. A. xxviii), tlie manufacturer of an article may, subject to the exercise of tlie discretion of the court, be allowed to intervene in a suit against tbe dealer for infringement of patent.</p> <p>2. Patents <&wkey;327 — Judgment held conclusive as to validity of patent.</p> <p>In a previous infringement suit, the intervener made itself a party, and though the patent was declared invalid because of anticipation and prior use, plaintiff took no appeal, held that, where plaintiff thereafter sued another dealer and the intervener was again allowed to become a party, the earlier judgment was a conclusive adjudication against the validity of ihe patent, which plaintiff sought again to assort, for the issues and partios wore the samo, and the question could not be litigated a second, time.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit to restrain infringement of patent by the Troy "Wagon Works Company against the Ohio Trailer Company.</p>

<p>J. Principal and agent <§=>23(I)— Agency not established by hearsay declarations.</p> <p>Agency cannot be established by prooí of hearsay declarations as to agency made by an agent.</p> <p>2. Patents <§=>288— Foreign corporation held not within district, so as to be subject to suit.</p> <p>In a patent infringement suit, begun in the Eastern district of Pennsylvania against a Michigan corporation, under that provision of the Judicial Code declaring that if suit is brought in a district of which defendant is not an inhabitant, but in which defendant has a regular and established place of business, service of process on defendant may be made by service on his agent, proof that the alleged agent merely purchased from the Michigan corporation motor cars for resale under a contract expressly providing that the relation should be that of buyer and seller, and that the -buyer should not be authorized to accept service for the seller, necessitates setting aside of service on the Michigan corporation.</p>

<p>!. Pleading <3^>34(4) — Uncertain pleadings construed against pleader.</p> <p>It is the settled rule in Georgia that, where there is uncertainty as to what cause of action is intended to be set forth by the pleader, the pleadings shall be taken most strongly against him to admit ot: the defenses sought to l)o interposed by defendant.</p> <p>2. Carriers tg=»53 — To constitute contract bill-of lading must be accepted by shipper.</p> <p>Tinder the law of Georgia a bill of lading for an intrastate shipment is not effective as a written contract, in the absence of signature of the shipper or express allegation of his assent thereto.</p> <p>3. Limitation of actions <@s=j24(2) — Action on bill of lading barred in four years,</p> <p>Tinder the statute of limitations of Georgia (Civ. Code 1910, §§ 4359, 4361, 4.382, 4868), an action for damages for broach of the contract made by a bill of lading is barred in four years.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Chandler Schilling and W. R. Roller, trading as the Schilling Construction Company, bankrupts. On review of order of referee.</p>

<p>1. Wills &wkey;>490 — Extrinsic evidence admissible in aid of interpretation.</p> <p>Where a will directed the executors to convert testator’s residuary estate into money and pay it over to a designated trustee “to be held, managed, and disposed of as a part of the principal of the estate and property held by it in trust for my life and the lives of others in the same manner as though the proceeds of such sales had been deposited by me as a part of said trust and property,” extrinsic evidence held admissible to identify the trust, and thus to determine the meaning of the provision.</p> <p>2. Wills <&wkey;67l — Direction of distribution under previously created trust valid.</p> <p>A provision of a will, directing the executors to sell the residuary estate and pay over the proceeds to a designated trustee, to be divided and distributed “to the same persons and in the same proportions as they are entitled to the principal-of my said trust under the terms of said trust,” held certain and valid; it being shown that prior to execution of the will testator had executed a deed to said trustee, creating a trust under which he delivered a large part of his estate, with specific directions as to its disposition both prior to .and after his death.</p> <p>3. Wills <&wkey;669 — Direction of distribution under previously created trust valid.</p> <p>The reservation in a deed creating a trust of the right of revocation . or modification, during the settlors’ life, does not render uncertain or invalidate a bequest by a subsequently executed will of his residuary estate to the trustee to be added to the principal of the trust estate, where the trust was not revoked during testator’s life.</p>

<p>1. Waters and water courses <&wkey;!32— Water may be monopolized only for beneficial use.</p> <p>Under the water statutes of Idaho, the right to the use of water can bo acquired only for beneficial purposes, and one cannot maintain possession or withhold it from another unless he is actually using it or is ready to use it for a beneficial purpose.</p> <p>2. Waters and water courses &wkey;>142— Mere appropriation of water creates no obligation in landowners to use it for irrigation.</p> <p>An inchoate appropriation of water for use in irrigating the land in an irrigation district places neither the district nor landowners under any obligation to purchase from the appropriator,- and they are free to contract with another.</p> <p>3. Waters and water courses <&wkey;222 — Reclamation Service has right to water appropriated so long as applied to beneficial use.</p> <p>Where water brought into a locality through government reclamation project canals and after percolation has been recovered by means of its drainage ditches, the Reclamation Service has the first right to conserve and use it even to provide irrigation to privately owned lands.</p> <p>4. Waters and water courses <&wkey;222 — Reclamation Service may apply waters to use of lands outside project.</p> <p>So long as the Reclamation Service can apply surplus water appropriated for a project to a beneficial use, although on lands outside the project, and thus lessen the cost to lands within the project, it is within the scope of its authority and may acquire rights of way under Act' Aug. 30, 1890, c. 837.</p>

Jack Windham was indicted for violating the provisions for the enforcement of internal revenue taxes upon intoxicating liquors, and he moves to quash the indictment.

<p>Intoxicating liquors &wkey;>210 — 1 ndictment for purchase-to be transported In Interstate commerce charges offense.</p> <p>An indictment charging that defendant purchased intoxicating liquor in one state “to be transported in interstate commerce” for beverage purposes into another state, the laws of which prohibit its manufacture, held to state an offense under Heed Amendment March 3, 1917, § 5 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 8739a).</p>

<p>1. Courts i&wkey;365 — Question of joint liability governed by state law.</p> <p>On a motion to remand, the question whether plaintiffs declaration states a joint liability of the defendants is governed by the state law.</p> <p>2. Removal of causes «&wkey;6l — Declaration alleging doubt as to which defendant was liable did not allege joint tort.</p> <p>In an action for depositing in public water substances injurious to shellfish, a declaration alleging that defendants were joined because plaintiff -was in doubt as to which of them was guilty of the tortious act causing the injury did not allege a joint tort, so a-s to prevent removal, as Gen. Laws R. I. 1909, e. 283, § 20, permitting plaintiff to join two or more defendants when ho is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to recover, does not obviate the rule that the declaration must conform to the rules of correct pleading against joint defendants.</p> <p>3. Fish &wkey;>7(3) — Persons committing separáis acts causing injury to oyster bads not joint tort-feasors.</p> <p>Persons committing separate violations of Laws It. I. 1909-10, c. 577, § 1, prohibiting the depositing in public waters of substances injurious to shellfish are not joint tort-feasors under the rule followed in Rhode Island, though their violations concurred in producing injury to plaintiff’s oyster beds.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey.</p> <p>Action by Matthew J. McKeon, by Patrick McKeon, his next friend, against the Central Stamping Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

In the matter of the bankruptcy of George A. Booser. Petition by E. C. Mullinix, trustee, and another, against the Greif Bros. Cooperage Company. 'The referee denied the petition, and, the referee’s determination having been reversed by the District Court, defendant appeals from the decree.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for 'the Western District of Missouri; Arba S. Van Valkenburg, Judge.</p> <p>Consolidated contempt actions by the United States against O. E-Jennings. From judgments against defendant, he appeals.</p>

Cotteral, Judge. Suit by Mrs. C. M. Phebus and others against W. S. Search, special administrator of the estate of Enos Nichols, deceased, and others. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

Trippet, Judge. Suit by the United States against the Kern River Company and others. From a decree of dismissal, the United States appeals. Section IS 01 tlie Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1095 [Comp.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi; Edwin R. Holmes, Judge.</p> <p>• Suit in equity by Oscar Carr and W. A. Ritchie against J. D. Eul-mer. Decree for defendant, and complainants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Western District of Washington; Jeremiah Neterer, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty by W. R. Grace & Co., a corporation, against Frank Waterhouse & Co., Incorporated. From a decree dismissing the libel, the libelant appeals.</p> <p>The appellant appeals from a decree dismissing its libel in personam to recover damages for injury to merchandise caused by delay in the transportation thereof by the appellee from Hong Kong to San Francisco. The' bills of lading acknowledged receipt of the goods “consigned and destined as indicated below for carriage from Hong Kong by steamship Kaifuku Maru. * * * To be carried by said steamer * * * to the port of San Francisco, * * * with liberty to proceed to stay at any port or ports in accordance with condition II on the back hereof, and to be there delivered at the vessel’s tackles unto order or to his or their assigns (notify Messrs. W. R. Grace & Co.), or at vessel’s tackles to another carrier on the route to destination, if consigned beyond a port of call, and by said connecting carrier, to be transported * * * unto the port of San Francisco.”</p> <p>Condition.il on the back of the bill of lading provides: “The steamers of this line are general traders carrying cargo between western United States ports and places to Chinese * * * and other Far Eastern ports and places, and vice versa, and to and from ports or places within the limits of the said termini, and they have liberty before or after proceeding towards to port of desünation mentioned herein to proceed to and stay at any ports or places within their said trading area in any order or rotation backwards and/or forwards, and notwithstanding that snch ports may be ont of or away from the route to or in a contrary direction to that of the port of discharge, it being agreed that all the before indicated ports or places are within the contemplated voyage, and that proceeding to or staying at or calling there shall under no circumstances be deemed a deviation. * * * On delivery from the ship’s tackles the ship’s responsibility shall cease. The goods may he transshipped at any port or ports, and for the purpose of transshipment may be jput Into or stored in hulk or craft or landed.”</p> <p>The merchandise was carried by tiie steamship from Hong Kong to Seattle, and was there discharged and placed in a warehouse. It was delayed there two months by a stevedores’ strike, and when forwarded by the appellee to destination at San Francisco was found damaged as the result of the delay in Seattle in an amount stipulated to he >;990.77.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia; Beverly D. Evans, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Sewell A. You-mans. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Rufus E. Roster, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company against Clark H. Rice. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Electro Bleaching Gas Company against William G. Miller, and another. On final hearing.</p>

<p>I. Removal of causes <5&wkey;76 — Amount claimed in state court determines federal jurisdiction.</p> <p>The amount claimed by plaintiff in his petition filed in the state court determines whether the amount is within the jurisdiction of the federal court, and after removal plaintiff cannot, by reducing the amount of his claim, divest the federal court of jurisdiction.</p> <p>" 2. Mines and minerals <&wkey;73 — In construing ambiguous oil lease, courts will look to circumstances.</p> <p>In construing an oil and gas lease, which is ambiguous, the court will look to the intent of the parties, the surrounding circumstances, and the condition of the business at that time.</p> <p>3. Mines and minerals <&wkey;79(2) — Oil and gas lessee held entitled to royalty on “casing head gas”; “gas well.”</p> <p>Where an oil and gas lease provided that the lessor should receive one-eighth part of all the oil produced, that the lessee should pay .$200 per annum on each gas-producing well, and that the lessee should have the right to use casing head gas for the purpose of operating the wells, field, that “casing head gas,” which is a component part of oil being produced from wet gas existing only with oil, would not make a well a “gas well,” so as to entitle the lessor' to $200 per annum, but the lessor would be entitled to his one-eighth part of the casing head gas separated from the oil and saved.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First Series, Gas Wells.]</p>

<p>Indictment and information i&wkey;i40(l) — Indictment for food profiteering held not subject to motion to quash.</p> <p>An indictment charging defendant‘with having, while the United States was at war, knowingly sold sugar at retail at 14 cents per pound, at a proSt to himself of 4 cents per pound, in violation of Food Conservation Act, § 4 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Aim. Supp. 1919, § 3115%ff), as amended by Act Oct. 22, 1919, c. 80, § 2, 41 Stat. 298, making it unlawful “to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling, dealing in or with any necessaries,” in the absence of any regulation by the President fixing a reasonable charge or price at which sugar may be sold at retail at the place of the alleged offense, held, to involve the investigation of so many questions of fact to determine a just and reasonable price that it should not be disposed of on motion, but only after full trial.</p>

In Equity. Three bills by C. A. Weed & Co., by the Sultzbach Clothing Company, Incorporated, and by the Antwerp Diamond Company, Incorporated, against Stephen T. Lockwood, as United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, with criminal prosecution by the United States against thet Reliable Credit Clothing Company, Incorporated. On motions in tlie equity suits for preliminary injunctions, and on demurrer to the indictment in the criminal case.

Mandamus proceeding by the United States, on the relation of Elizabeth A. Soeder, against Leo A. Crossen, Supervising Prohibition Agent. On rule to show cause why writ of mandamus should not issue.

Rud-kin, Judge. Action by Thea Sophia Johnson and another against Walker D. Hines, as Director General of Railroads. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.

Trippet, Judge. Action at law by Elizabeth Knudsen against the Domestic Utilities Manufacturing Company, Edwin R. Crooker, Louise E. Crooker, W. P. Ellis, and F. W. Sterling. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.

Amidon, Judge. Bill by the Stondall Land & Investment Company against Charles T. Langley and others. From a decree for complainant, defendants appeal.

<p>Master and servant <3=^330(1) — Chanilour’s act presumed to be within scope of employment.</p> <p>Proof chat an automobile which struck and injured plaintiff was owned or controlled solely by defendant, and was driven by a chauffeur employed by defendant generally for that purpose, held to raise a presumption that the driver was acting within the scope of his employment, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary to warrant an instruction that defendant was liable for his negligence.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi; Edwin R. Holmes, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by R. D. Edwards against J. E. Cobb. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Rincr, Judge. _ , _ Suit by John T. Clarke, individually, etc., and others, against Asmus Bovsen and others. From several orders subsequent to judgment, plaintiff Clarke appeals.

<p>1. Railroads &wkey;>400(l, 8, 15)— Negligence in striking person on track question for jury.</p> <p>An action for the (loath of a person, struck by a train while walking on defendant’s railroad track, held properly submitted to the jury on all counts charging negligent operation of the train, negligence after deceased was seen, and wantonnoss, where the evidence on all such issues was conflicting.</p> <p>2. Railroads c&wkey;377— Engineer may not assume person will leave track whan circumstances negative knowledge of danger.</p> <p>The rule that a railroad engineer may assume that a grown person walking on’file track ahead will gel off, and is under no duty to slow or stop until it is apparent that he will not, does not apply, where the circumstances negative knowledge by such person of his danger, as where he is walking from the train, and the noise of a train passing on another track interferes with his hearing the one approaching from behind.</p>

Iti Error to the District Court of,the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge. Action by A. C. Angle against Walker D. Hines, as Director General of Railroads, operating the Rouisville & Nashville Railroad. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

ín Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge. Action by the Mohawk Mining Company against Harry H. Weiss, Collector of Internal Revenue. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Wade, Judge. Suit by the Des Moines Gas Company against the City of Des Moines, iowa, and others. From an order refusing to dissolve a temporary injunction, defendants appeal.

<p>1. Evidence <0=21— Judicial notice taken of business practice to entertain customers and tbeir employes.</p> <p>Tbe court takes .iudicial notice that the practice of entertaining customers and employes of customers by furnishing them liquor, cigars, meals, theater tickets, etc., found by the Federal Trade Commission to be uniair, has been an incident of business from time immemorial, especially as expenditures for such purposes are recognized as a proper deduction by the income tax regulations.</p> <p>2. Master and servant <©=30(4) — Gifts to employe to induce contract is fraud, justifying discharge.</p> <p>The payment of money or the giving of valuable presents to an employ!; to induce him to influence his employer to make a contract of purchase is a fraud, justifying the employe’s discharge within his contract term of service.</p> <p>3. Trade-marks and trade-names ©=80¡/2, New, vol. 8A Key-No. Series — Federal Trade Commission without jurisdiction to regulate entertainment of customer’s employes.</p> <p>The practice oí a company engaged in interstate commerce in entertaining employes of its customers with liquor, cigars, meals, theater tickets, etc., is not a matter so affecting the public as to be within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission.</p>

Foster, Judge. Libel by Hiram N. Stancil and others against Frederick Leyland & Co., Limited, claimant of the steamship Parisian, and others. From a decree awarding less relief than demanded, libelants appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee; Edward T. Sanford, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against John C. Erancis. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

Trip-pet, Judge. Suit in equity by John T. Logan and the National Lumber & Creosoting Company against J. H. Baxter and W. H. Jordan, doing business as Baxter & Jordan. Decree for defendants, and complainants appeal.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Standard Roller Bearing Company and another against the Hess-Bright Manufacturing Company. On final hearing.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Minerals Separation, Limited, against the Miami Copper Company. On motion for leave to file a supplemental bill.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Eugenus H. Bennett, bankrupt. On review of order of referee denying petition of the B. F. Avery & Sons Plow Company to reclaim property.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill in the nature of a bill of review by the West Side Irrigation Company, a corporation, against the United States. On motion to dismiss.</p>

At Law. In the action of Joseph R. Kinney against the Fairbanks Steam Shovel Company, the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation having become garnishee, judgment having been entered against the garnishee, and execution having been levied, the United States filed a claim with the marshal for the goods levied on, whereupon the court, on application of the marshal, made absolute a rule for an interpleader between the United States, claimant, and Joseph R.…

<p>1. Railroads 134(8) — Lessor not necessary party to lessee’s suit to compel removal of structures from right of way.</p> <p>Where a railroad company leased its entire railroad, with all of its franchises, privileges, rights, and property, and complainant had acquired all rights under the lease, the lessor was not a necessary party to complainant’s suit to restrain defendants from hindering' complainant from using its right of way and to compel them to remove buildings, fences, and other structures therefrom. .</p> <p>2. Counts &wkey;>343 — Proper party will not be made party, where it would oust jurisdiction.</p> <p>Under equity rule 39 (198 Fed. xxix, 115 C. C. A. xxix), though a railroad company which leased its road, franchises, etc., would be a proper party to a suit to compel the removal of obstructions from the right of way, it will not be made a party, where to do so would oust the jurisdiction of the federal court.</p> <p>3. Injunction <&wkey;H4(3) — Defendants erecting structures on railroad right of way may be joined in suit for mandatory injunction.</p> <p>In a suit to compel the removal of buildings and structures from land claimed to constitute part of a railroad’s right of way and to enjoin an interference with its use of its right of way, defendants interfering with such use may be joined, though they do not own or claim the land om which they have erected buildings and other structures under a common source of title, have no common interest, and are not acting pursuant to a conspiracy, agreement, or common purpose.</p> <p>4. Courts <&wkey;S28(3) — In a suit to restrain, condemnation of railroad right of way, value of property not test of jurisdiction.</p> <p>In a suit for a mandatory injunction to compel the removal of buildings and structures from land claimed to constitute part of a railroad’s right of way, the value of the property is not the test of a federal court’s jurisdiction, where me obstruction of the right of way will prevent the company from operating trains to and from a new depot, which will cause damage in excess of $3,000.</p> <p>5. Injunction &wkey;>ll4(3) — Necessity of adjusting relief to varying conditions affecting different defendants no1 objection to jurisdiction.</p> <p>In a suit for a mandatory injunction to compel the removal of structures from a railroad right of way, the fact that it may be necessary that the decree be so molded as to meet the varying conditions of the property of different defendants does not oust the jurisdiction.</p> <p>6. Equity <&wkey;l50(l) — -Bill for mandatory injunction against several defendants not multifarious.</p> <p>A bill for a mandatory injunction to compel the removal of structures from a railroad right of way interfering with the railroad’s use thereof is not multifarious, though the different defendants do not claim under a corñmon source of title, have no common interest, and are not acting pursuant to any conspiracy, agreement, or understanding.</p> <p>7. Equity <&wkey;l50(l) — Rule stated as to “multifariousness.”</p> <p>No bill is multifarious that presents a common point of litigation, the decision of which will affect the whole subject-matter and settle the rights of all the parties, and it is not indispensable that all parties should have an interest in all the matters or be interested to the same extent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Multifariousness.]</p> <p>8. Easements ¡&wkey;6l (2)->!!;ji<neii»n proper remedy for invasion of rights in easement.</p> <p>The remedy for the invasion of the right to uso and enjoy an easement is by injunction.</p> <p>9. Railroads &wkey;>6&wkey;Easament acquired by presumed grant of right of way.</p> <p>A railroad company acquired only an easement in the land on which it constructed, its road under a provision of Us charter (Laws N. 0. 1852, c. 186, § 27) providing that, in the absence of any contract with the owner, it shall be presumed that the land on which the road may bo constructed, for 100 ieet on either sido of the center of the road, has been granted to the company, unless the owner within two years applies for an assessment of the value of the land.</p> <p>10. Railroads <&wkey;66 — Company claiming grant by presumption has burden of proving absence of contract for right of way.</p> <p>Cnder a provision of railroad charter that, in the absence of a contract, a grant of 100 feet on each side of the center of the track shall be presumed, the burden rests on ¡ho company elalining such grant by presumption to show the entry and construction of iis road without any contract with the owner, notwithstanding the general rule that a party need not prove a negative and the difficulty of proving the absence of a contract.</p> <p>11. Railroads <&wkey;66 — Evidence held to show absence of contract for right of way, so' as to raise presumption of grant.</p> <p>Evidence held sufficient to show that a railroad was constructed through lauds of an incorporated town without any contract with the town, so as to give rise under its charter to a presumption of a grant of 300 feet on each side of the center of its road.</p> <p>12. Evidence <&wkey;!47, 586(2) — Search of records' hsid competent but not conclu-sivo on question of absence of contract granting right of way.</p> <p>Though the testimony of the chief of the engineering department of a railroad that he had caused a thorough and complete search, under his supervision and direction, of the-records of certain railroads and of the county where land was situated, and had made inquiry among persons who might have knowledge of records or contracts, but that he and those under his direction and supervision had not been able to find any deed or contract relating to the right of way through certain lands, was not sufficient in itself to show that no contract'was executed, it was competent to be considered with other facts and circumstances on that issue.</p> <p>13. Railroads <&wkey;>68 — Presumption of grant of right of way of maximum width is not overcome by evidence of reputation.</p> <p>A general reputation that a railroad company acquired 200 feet for its right of way outside a town and only 50 feet within the town could not repel or overcome the presumption of a grant of 100 feet on each side of the center of the track arising under its charter, in the absence of any contract with the landowner.</p> <p>14. Railroads <&wkey;88 — -8taiiitory presumption of grant of right of way not limited by owner’s use consistent with easement</p> <p>As a railroad company, acquiring a right of way 200 feet wide by statutory presumed grant, acquires only the right to use so much as is necessary for railroad purposes, it cannot prevent the owner from erecting buildings or making any use of the land not interfering with the use of the easement, and its conduct in permitting such use does not affect or limit the presumption of a grant.</p> <p>15. Railroads <&wkey;>68 — Right of way casement acquired, notwithstanding presence of dwelling, where owner acquiesced.</p> <p>Though a railroad charter prohibited the company from invading any dwelling house, yard, or burial ground of any individual without his consent, if the owner acquiesced in the entry and construction of the road, land might be subjected to the easement, notwithstanding.the presence of dwellings thereon.</p> <p>16. Railroads <&wkey;69 — Purchaser of town commons held' to take subject to railroad right of way.</p> <p>Where the board of commissioners of a town passed an order to lay off into- lots and sell land formerly constituting the town commons, and thereafter a railroad, was constructed through the land, and the commissioners directed the intendant to confer with the railroad in relation to the price, appointed a committee to confer regarding ditches, embankments, and bridges, and directed an application for the appointment of a committee to assess damages, one thereafter purchasing from the town took title subject to the company’s right of way.</p> <p>17. Railroads <&wkey;69 — Right of way easement under presumed grant limited to necessity for railroad purposes.</p> <p>The easement acquired by a railroad company under a provision of its charter creating a presumption of a grant, in the absence of any contract with the owners of the land, is restricted in its use to the necessity for railroad purposes.</p> <p>18. Adverse possession i&wkey;85(4)— Railroads &wkey;>82( I) — Railroad right of way not subject to bar nor presumption of abandonment by reason of landowner’s occupation.</p> <p>Under the express provisions of Revisal N. 0,. 1905, § 388, a railroad company was not barred, and no presumption of abandonment or release of its right of way arose, by reason of the occupation or use thereof by the owner of the land.</p> <p>19. Railroads &wkey;>73(l) — Obstructions of right of way will be enjoined, if legal remedy is inadequate.</p> <p>For interference with the enjoyment of a railroad company’s easement in its right of way, an action of trespass may be brought, and, if such remedy is inadequate, equity will enjoin such interference and by mandatory injunction require the removal of obstructions.</p> <p>20. Injunction &wkey;>23 — Will be denied, if injury to defendant disproportionate to that of plaintiff.</p> <p>A mandatory injunction for the removal of obstructions from a railroad right of way will be denied, and plaintiff left to his remedy at law, if the removal of the erection will cause damage to defendant disproportionate to the injury to plaintiff.</p> <p>21. Injunction t&wkey;46— Restraining continuing trespass or requiring restoration of property dependent on equities between the parties.</p> <p>In a suit to prevent a continuing trespass or permanent injury to real estate, the question whether plaintiff shall have a prohibitory injunction, or, if the work affecting the property has been completed, a mandatory injunction, requiring restoration of the estate to its former condition, depends on a consideration of the equities between the parties.</p> <p>22. Injunction <&wkey;5 — When mandatory injunction denied.</p> <p>A mandatory injunction will not be issued, when it will operate inequitably and oppressively, nor when there has been unreasonable delay by the party seeking it, nor when the injury complained of is not serious or substantial, and may. be reasonably compensated in damages, while to restore things as they were before the act-s complained of would subject the other party to great inconvenience and loss.</p> <p>23. Injunction <&wkey;l89 — Decree will be.as moderate as iis consistent with correction of mischief.</p> <p>A decree granting a mandatory injunction will be as ‘moderate as is consistent with effectually correcting the mischief.</p>

<p>1. War &wkey;>4 — Act regulating price of necessaries is within power of Congress.</p> <p>Act Oct. 22, 1919, § 2, amending Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 4, and prohibiting unjust or unreasonable rates or charges for necessaries and prescribing the punishment for violations, is within the constitutional powers of Congress to enact war measures.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <©=>13 — Statute prohibiting unreasonable charges for necessaries held not void for uncertainty.</p> <p>Act Oct. 22, 1919, g 2, amending Act Aug.' 10, 1917, § 4, and prohibiting unjust or unreasonable charges for necessaries, is not void for uncertainty, under Const. Amend. 6, requiring that in all criminal prosecutions accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Herman E. Wright against Cynthia E. Barnard, executrix of the will of Remsen C. Barnard, deceased, William Penne-will, and the S’tetson & Ellison Company. On exceptions to master’s report.

In Equity. Suit by James C. McComb and another, trastees, etc., under the will of Henry S- McComb, and Martha McComb Bush, beneficiary thereunder, against the United States Housing Corporation and another. On motion to quash the order .requiring defendants to appear.

<p>1. Criminal law <&wkey; 103S(8) — Question of sufficiency of evidence not reviewable, unless raised in trial court.</p> <p>Defendant in a criminal case, who did not raise the objection that the evidence was insufficient to justify conviction in the trial court, is not entitled to urge it in the appellate court, but that court may consider the question.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <&wkey;824(6) — Failure to instinct on presumption of mnocene© not error, where not requested and charge on reasonable doubt is given.</p> <p>Failure of the court in a criminal case to explicitly instruct the jury that defendant is presumed to be innocent Held not reversible error, where such instruction was not requested, and the jury wore fully instructed on the subject of reasonable doubt.</p> <p>3. Criminal Ia.w <&wkey;697 — Exception on redirect examination improper, where no objection was made.</p> <p>A defendant is not entitled to take his chances on the answer to a given question, and then on redirect examination except thereto, merely because he is not permitted to go further into the subject.</p> <p>4. Witnesses <§:::;J28S(2) — Extent of redirect examination discretionary with court.</p> <p>The extent to which redirect examination may be carried is subject to the reasonable discretion of the trial judge.</p> <p>5. Criminal law <&wkey;309 — No presumption of defendant’s good ((haracter.</p> <p>In the federal courts there is no presumption that accused is of good character.</p> <p>6. Internal revenue <&wkey;47 — Instructions in prosecution of illicit retail liquor dealer held proper.</p> <p>Instructions on trial of defendant for carrying on the business of a retail liquor dealer without having paid the special tax Held without reversible error.</p> <p>1. Criminal law <&wkey;762(2) — Federal judge may express opinion on facts.</p> <p>A trial judge in the federal court has the right to state to the jury his opinion upon the facts, provided he does so judicially and fairly, and ultimately leaves to the jury the decision of questions of fact.</p>

<p>1. Damages <&wkey;169 — Evidence as to habit of drinking intoxicants is relevant.</p> <p>In an action for personal injuries, cross-examination of plaintiff as to his habit of using intoxicating liquors, which has a bearing on his expectancy of life and might explain some of the symptoms he claimed resulted from the injury, is relevant, and sustaining objections thereto was error.</p> <p>2. Damages &wkey;>154 — Habit of using intoxicants may be shown, though not pleaded in answer.</p> <p>In an action for personal injuries, the defendant can show plaintiff’s habit of using intoxicating liquors, which affected his life expectancy, under the general issue, without specially pleading it.</p> <p>3. Damages &wkey;>216 (2) —Instructions as to injured spine held not authorized by evidence.</p> <p>In an action for personal injuries, a statement in the charge that, if the jury found that an X-ray picture did not show a fracture of a vertebra, as claimed, the question still remained whether the accident caused an injury to plaintiff’s spine, was erroneous, where there was no evidence to show an injury to the spine, except the photograph; plaintiff’s testimony as to pains in his hack not showing an injury to the spine, rather than to nerves or muscles of the back.</p>

Witmer, Judge. Action by Marcel Olivier and others, copartners as Olivier & Co., against the Mt. Union Tanning & Extract Company. Judgment for plaintiffs' for an insufficient amount (253 Fed. 593), and they bring error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Action by the Wabash Railway Company against William ’H. Edwards, Collector of United States Internal Revenue for the Second District o£ the State of New York. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p> <p>This cause comes here on writ oí error to the United States District Court for the Southern District oí New York. The defendant in error is hereinafter called plaintiff, and the plaintiff in error is hereinafter called defendant.</p> <p>The plaintiff sues to recover the amount of stamp taxes demanded under the War Revenue Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 300), which it paid under protest. The plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Indiana. The amount of the original capital stock is fixed at $143,400,000, and the number of shares into which the capital is to be divided is fixed at 1,434,600 shares, of the par value of $100 each. Of such capital stock, 402,000 shares, it is provided in the certificate of incorporation, shall be issued as 5 per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A, 499,700' shares shall be issued as 5 per cent, convertible preferred stock B, and 472,900 shares shall be issued as common stock.</p> <p>The certificate of incorporation also provided that the “five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A shall be entitled to receive preferential dividends in each fiscal year up to the amount of "five per cent, before any dividends shall be paid upon any other stock of this corporation, but such dividends on the five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A shall be noneumulative. After the payment or the sett ing apart in any one fiscal year of five per cent, dividends upon the five per cent, convertible preferred stock B and upon the common stock of this corporation, the five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A shall be entitled to receive additional dividends at the same rate per cent, as any further or additional dividends which may be declared in that year upon such common stock. The five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A shall, at the option of this corporation, be redeemable as an entirety at any time after December 1, 1920, upon twelve weeks’ notice, at the price of one hundred and ten per cent. (110%) of its par value. In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up (whether voluntary or involuntary) of this corporation, the holders of the five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A shall be entitled, to bo paid in full, out of the assets of this corporation, the par amount of their stock and all dividends thereon declared and unpaid, before any amount shall bo paid out of said assets to the holders of any stock of this corporation; but after payment in full to the holders of the five per cent, convertible preferred stock B and common stock of this corporation of the par amount of their stock and all dividends thereon declared and unpaid, holders of all classes of stock of this corporation, without priority or distinction as between the different classes thereof, shall bo entitled to participate pro rata in the remaining assets of this corporation.”</p> <p>“The five per cent, convertible preferred stock B shall be entitled to receive preferential dividends in each fiscal year up to the amount of five por cent, after payment of the full five per cent, dividends on the five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A, but before any dividends shall be paid upon the common stock of this corporation. Said dividends shall be noneumulative, and the five per cent, convertible preferred stock B shall not be entitled to any other or further dividends in any fiscal year. The holders of the five per cent, convertible preferred stock B may at any time after August 1, 1918, and up to thirty days prior to any date fixed for the redemption of the entire issue of live per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A, convert the same into, and exchange the same for, five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and common stock of this corporation. Dor the purpose of such conversion this corporation shall have power, from time to time, to issue such amounts of its five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and common stock in addition to the amounts, hereby specifically authorized as may be necessary. Such conversion shall ho at the rate of fifty dollars ($50) par value of five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and fifty dollars ($50) par value of common stock for each one hundred dollars (8100) par value of five per cent, convertible preferred slock B. with a proper adjustment of declared and unpaid dividends. The five per cent, convertible preferred slock B shall, at the option of this corporation, be redeemable as an entirety at any time after December 1, .1920, upon twelve weeks’ notice, at the price of one hundred and ten (110%) per cent, of its par value. In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up (whether voluntary or involuntary) of this corporation, the holders of the five per cent, convertible preferred stock B shall be entitled to be paid in full, out of the assets of this corporation, the par amount of their stock and all dividends thereon declared and unpaid, before any amount shall be paid out of said assets to the holders of the common stock; but after payment in full to the holders of the common stock of the par amount of their common stock and all dividends thereon declared and unpaid, holders of all classes of stock of this corporation, without priority or distinction as between the different classes thereof, shall be entitled to participate pro rata in the remaining assets of this corporation.”</p> <p>The certificates of stock contained the following: “The holders of the five per cent, convertible preferred stock B fnay at any time after August 1, 1918, and up to thirty days prior to any date fixed for the redemption of the entire issue of five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A, convert the same into and exchange the same for five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and common stock at the rate of fifty dollars ($50) par value of five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and fifty dollars ($50) par value of common stock for each one hundred dollars ($100) par value of five per cent, convertible preferred stock B, with a proper adjustment of declared and unpaid dividends. In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up (whether voluntary or involuntary) of the company: (1) The holders of the five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A shall be entitled to be paid in full out of the assets of the company the par amount of their stock and all dividends thereon declared and unpaid before any amount shall be paid out of said assets to the holders of any other stock of the company; (2) the holders of the five per cení, convertible preferred stock B shall then be entitled to be paid in full out of the assets of the company the par amount of their stock and all dividends thereon declared and unpaid before any amount shall be paid out of said assets to the holders of the common stock; (3) the holders of the common stock shall then be entitled to be paid in full out of the assets of the company the par amount of their stock and all dividends thereon declared and unpaid; and (4) thereafter the holders of all classes of stock of the company, without priority or distinction as between the different classes thereof, shall be entitled to participate pro rata in the remaining assets of the company. Holders of all shares of stock of the company have equal voting rights share for share alike. Reference is hereby made to the certificate of incorporation of the cornpany, to all the provisions of which this certificate and the rights of the holder of stock represented hereby are subject, for a statement of the rights and privileges of and the limitations upon the various classes of the company’s stock and of the obligations of the company with respect thereto and for its provisions generally as if herein set forth in full. The holder hereof by tne acceptance of this certificate assents to all of the provisions of said certificate of incorporation and consents to and authorizes such action as may be necessary to carry the same into effect.”</p> <p>The plaintiff prior to October 3, 1917, issued its capital stock in the par amount of $138,486,312.7Í, of which $46,200,000 was classified as five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A, $4S,725,578.18 was classified as five per cent, convertible preferred stock B, and $43,559,743.43 was classified as common stock. Thereafter and on March 27, 1918, the board of directors adopted the following resolution:</p> <p>“Resolved, that the proper officers of this company be and they are hereby authorized and directed to execute certificates for five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and common stock of this company and to deliver and cause the same to be delivered in proper proportions, with a proper adjustment of declared and unpaid dividends, to holders of certificates for shares of this company’s five per cent, convertible preferred stock B, who, at any time after August 1, 1918, and up to thirty days prior to any date fixed for the redemption of the entire issue of five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A, shall surrender the same for conversion into and exchange for five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and common stock on the terms provided and set forth in this company’s certificate of incorporation and in the certificates for its five per cent, convertible preferred stock B.”</p> <p>The plaintiff, between August 2, 1918, and October 30', 1918, executed and delivered certificates representing 115,389 shares of five per cent, profit-sharing preferred stock A and the same number of common stock, in exchange for and conversion of 231,778 shares of five per cent, convertible preferred stock B.</p> <p>The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the stock issued as stated in the preceding paragraph, by virtue of the right of conversion, was an original issue of stock and taxable as such under the provisions of section 800, schedule A of title VIII of the Act of October 3, 1917 (40 Statutes at Large, 319).</p> <p>The plaintiff paid under protest the tax claimed by the government and this action is brought to recover the amount so paid. The defendant demurred, and the demurrer was overruled. Final judgment was ordered against the defendant for the sum of $11,588.90, that being the amount of the tax paid, with interest thereon from October 30, 1918, amounting to S537.21, together with the sum of $35.60 costs as taxed, in all the sum of $12,161.61.</p>

Petition to Revise and Appeal from Order of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. In the matter of Jacob Feder, bankrupt. The order of a referee, recommending discharge be denied, was reversed, and, discharge having been granted, Otto Goetz appeals and petitions to revise.

Whitaker Thompson, Judge. Bill by Andrew Wheeler and others, trading as Morris, Wheeler & Co., against the Badenhausen Company, in which John J. Foulkrod, Jr., was appointed receiver. Thereafter Christopher L. Ward and another, who were appointed receivers of the same corporation by the Delaware courts, petitioned for revocation of the appointment of said Koulkrod. From a decree denying the petition (260 Fed. 991), petitioners appeal. Affirmed.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Southern District of California; Oscar A. Trippet, Judge.</p> <p>... Criminal prosecution by the United States against Henry Ching. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nevada; Edward S. Farrington, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Nevada-California Power Company against Nathaniel K. Franklin, County Treasurer of Nye County, Nev., and others. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; David P. Dyer, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Bart Allen against the American Car & Foundry Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Brown, Judge. Suit in equity by Rensselaer L. Curtis, receiver of the Atlantic National Bank, against John J. Connly and others. From a decree in favor of certain defendants, complainant appeals.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Western District of Washington; Edward E. Cushman, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal-prosecution by the United States against Bruce Richards and August Oess. Judgment of conviction, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia; Beverly D. Evans, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Anthony Phillips. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia; Beverly D. Evans, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Neal Corbin and Will Miller. Judgment of conviction, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia; Beverly D. Evans, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Robert Lamb and Dave Lamb. Judgment of conviction, and defendants bring error.</p>

Dietrich, Judge. Action by John Gooch, Jr., against the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>Petition to Review and Revise Order of, and Appeal from, the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>In the matter of the E. J. Hibner Oil Company, bankrupt; the Central Trust Company of Illinois, trustee. The claim of Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, operating the New York Central Railroad, was awarded priority, and the trustee appeals and brings a petition to review and revise the order.</p>

Sibley, Judge. Habeas corpus by Richard F. Price against Fred G. Zerbst, Warden of the United S'tates penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia. Writ denied, and petitioner appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; John Rellstab, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Electric Boat Company against the Lake Torpedo Boat Company. Decree of dismissal, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Patents <§=>239 — Duplication of material feature of patented device does not avoid infringement.</p> <p>The duplication of a feature of a patented structure, the effect and advantage of which has been shown by the patent, does not in a patentable sense differentiate two structures in any substantial way.</p> <p>2. Patents <§=3178 — Not so strictly construed as to nullify doctrine of mechanical equivalents.</p> <p>The rule that a patentee must be strictly limited to the language of his claims is not to be so strictly applied as to nullify the doctrine of mechanical equivalents.</p> <p>3. Patents <§=3239 — Adding feature which merely complicates structure dees not avoid infringement.</p> <p>The addition of a feature which only complicates and makes more cumbersome the patented structure does not differentiate it in a patentable sense.</p> <p>4. Patents <§=>167(1) — Cuts cannot override plain language of claims.</p> <p>The cuts in a patent cannot be used to contradict the plain language of the claims.</p> <p>5. Patents <§=>328 — For automehiie bed infringed.</p> <p>The McMillan patent, No. 1,136,885, for a support for automobile beds, held infringed by a structure which differs only in the substitution of mechanical equivalents.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Belknap Hardware & Manufacturing Company and others against the Ohio River Contract Company and others. On motion to substitute the United States as plaintiff for the benefit of plaintiffs.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against the Oglesby Grocery Company and another. On demurrer to the indictment.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Charles N. Jenks and Elmer E. Patton. On motions by defendants for new trial and in arrest of judgment.</p>

<p>At law. Action by the National Bank of Ashtabula against Fred A. Bradley.</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana; Rufus E. Foster, Judge. Four suits by Pearl Wight, as receiver of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, against the Police Jury of the Parish of Avoyelles, La., and others, against the Police Jury of the Parish of Natchitoches, La., and others, against the Police Jury of the Parish of Rapides, La., and others, and against the Police Jury of the Parish of St. Landry, La., and others.

In Error io the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri; Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge. Action by George Waverly Briggs, Commissioner of Insurance and Banking of the State of Texas, against Overton Harris. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District ■of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge.</p> <p>Laurie S. Macdonald was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States, and he brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama; William I. Grubb, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Ross Lumber Company against the Hughes Lumber Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Rufus E. Eoster, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by Louise Stone Borst against Camilla Putnam Par-kerson, testamentary executrix of the estate of William S. Parkerson, deceased. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law <©=>335 — Prosecution must prove venue.</p> <p>Under the sixth constitutional amendment, which guarantees to an accused the right to trial by a jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, the venue is as material as any other allegation'in the indictment, and the burden of proving it rests upon the government.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <©=>815(4) — intoxicating liquors <©=>239(I) — Instruction in prosecution for interstate transportation held erroneous.</p> <p>On trial of defendant in a federal court in Tennessee, charged with violation of Reed Amendment March 3, 1917, § 5 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 8739a), by purchasing whisky in Missouri and causing it to be transported into Tennessee, where defendant was arrested in Mississippi with whisky in his possession, an instruction that defendant was guilty if the whisky was purchased by some one in Missouri to be shipped to Tennessee, and after it reached a point in Mississippi defendant was hired to carry it from there to another point in Mississippi and there deliver it to a person from Tennessee, held erroneous, as ignoring the essential element of guilty knowledge of defendant, also as not defining an offense within the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>3. Intoxicating liquors <©=>138 — Transporting into prohibition state defined.</p> <p>The offense .of “causing liquor to be transported” in interstate commerce into a prohibition state, made punishable by Reed Amendment March 3, 1917, § 5 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 8739a), is not committed until the liquor has actually been carried into the latter state.</p> <p>4. Intoxicating liquors <©=>239(2) — Instruction in prosecution for interstate transportation held erroneous.</p> <p>On trial of a defendant in a federal court in Tennessee for violation of Reed Amendment March 3, 1917, § 5 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 8739a), an instruction that he was guilty if he ordered whisky from a place in Missouri to be brought into Tennessee held erroneous, as not limited to an offense committed within the jurisdiction of the court; defendant having been arrested, with whisky in his possession, in another state, and there being no evidence that it was ever in Tennessee.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by E. E. Carpenter, Franklin Reonard, Jr., and Joseph T. McCaddon against Wheeling & Rake Erie Railroad Company and W. H. Duncan, its receiver. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.</p>

<p>1. Courts <@=489(13) — Federal court has jurisdiction to protect rights of nonresident heir to property under administration.</p> <p>Federal courts have jurisdiction of a suit by a nonresident of the state against the resident administrator and heir to recover an interest in the real property and for partition thereof, though that property was under administration in the probate court of the state; but the federal court will not interfere with the proper administration of the estate.</p> <p>2. Courts <@=>262(3) — Federal jurisdiction in equity is that of English chancery in 1783.</p> <p>The jurisdiction in equity of the courts of the United States is like that of the High Court of Chancery of England at the time of the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and includes the adjudication and enforcement of claims of citizens of other states to interests in estates of decedents in the possession of administrators or executors engaged in the administration thereof.</p> <p>3. Courts <@=489(13) — Subjecting Indian lands to probate jurisdiction of Oklahoma courts does not affect federal court’s jurisdiction to partition.</p> <p>Act April 18, 1912, §§ 3, 6, subjecting property of deceased incompetent allottees of Indian lands in probate matters to the jurisdiction of county courts of Oklahoma, and authorizing partition thereof by any court of competent jurisdiction under the laws of Oklahoma, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction to decree partition of such lands at the suit of a nonresident heir before proceedings tlierefor were instituted in the state courts, under Hey. Haws Okl. 1010, §§ 6403, 0464, 0463, 6409.</p> <p>4. Courts <®=>260 — Indians C^SUS) — Inability io enforce judgment does not affect jurisdiction of inferior federal courts.</p> <p>Though the Supreme Court, whose jurisdiction is fixed and limited by the Constitution, has no jurisdiction where its judgments cannot be enforced, since such cases do not involve exercise of the judicial power granted by Const, art. 3, § 1, that restriction does not apply to the other federal courts, whose jurisdiction is defined by acts of Congress, and such couris can entertain a suit for the partition of Indian lands, though decree for partition is subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.</p> <p>5. Descent and distribution <5^3 — Kansas statute disinheriting one convicted of hilling ancestor does net govern inheritance in Oklahoma.</p> <p>Gen. St. Kan. 1915, § 3856, providing that no person convicted of killing another shall inherit from the person killed, is a law of inheritance, not a law fixing the status of persons domiciled within the state, and therefore cannot control inheritance as to lands located in Oklahoma.</p> <p>6. Descent and distribution <8=>63 — Oklahoma statute does not disinherit on conviction of killing ancestor in another state.</p> <p>Laws Okl. 19L5, c. 136, § 1, providing that no person convicted of killing another shall inherit from such person, disqualifies a person from inheriting only on conviction in the courts of the state; so that a wife, convicted in Kansas for killing her husband in that state, can inherit an interest in his lands located in Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas; John C. Pollock, Judge.</p> <p>Action by Van Britt and wife against the United Zinc & Chemical Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma; Joseph W. Woodrough, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the St. Eouis-San Francisco Railway Company against J. E. Bruin and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>1. Municipal corporations <&=»347 (2) —Surety on contractor's bond not liable far nonlienahle items.</p> <p>The ordinary bond given by a public improvement contractor to indemnify the city against lienable items, which would otherwise become a charge against its property, would not ordinarily render the surety liable for claims not lienable.</p> <p>3.Principal and surety <@=>175 — Assignment to surety not effective, where conditions precedent never existed.</p> <p>An assignment by a contractor to its surety of all deferred payments and retained percentages and moneys and properties due or thereafter becoming due never became a subsisting assignment, where the conditions precedent upon which it was predicated never existed.</p> <p>3. Subrogation <@=>36 — Rights of contractor's surety inferior to those of one advancing money to its knowledge.</p> <p>Avnero a contractor’s surety knew that a trust company was financing the enterprise by loaning money to the contractor during the progress of the work, the trust company’s equity to he reimbursed for its advancements, with legal interest, was paramount to that of the surety.</p> <p>4. Usury <@=>26 — Hale of tax bills at «liscount not usurious.</p> <p>Á sale in good faith of tax bills for a public improvement at 10 per cent, discount was not usurious.</p> <p>5. Subrogation <@=>36 — Payment to principal to prejudice of surety held to render party liable to surety.</p> <p>"Where the funds duo a public improvement contractor were insufficient to pay claims arising from the performance of the work and the contractor’s surety had been or would he compelled to pay claims for labor and material, a trust company which made advances to the contractor and took assignments of the tax bills was liable to the surety to the extent of the amount in excess of its claims paid to the principal and not applied on claims for which surety was liable where the trust company had knowledge of the surety's claim.</p> <p>6. Subrogation <@=>7(1) — Surety subrogated to creditor’s rights.</p> <p>A public improvement contractor’s surety, compelled to pay claims for labor and materials, is subrogated, not iiférély to the rights of the contractor in tne fund due under the contract, but to the rights which the creditor might have asserted.</p> <p>7. Appeal and error <@=>1108 (4) — Case remanded for further hearing, where facte not fully developed.</p> <p>In an action by a contractor’s surety against one making advances to the contractor and taking assignments of the tax bills, where the court found for defendant at the conclusion of complainant’s case hut the Circuit Court of Appeals held defendant liable to the extent of the amount paid the principal with knowledge of the surety’s claims, case held to bo remanded for a fuller hearing, as the summary disposition of the case had precluded such development of the facts as would enable the court to render a just decree.</p>

Youmans, Judge. Suit by the Southern Trust Company, as trustee, and others, against W. R. Feiker and J. F. Felker, a copartnership doing business under the firm name of the W. R. Felker Construction Company, and others. From an order dismissing petitions of W. R. Felker and his partners, and their statement of election to stand on their statutory liens as superior to the mortgage, defendants Felker appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of tbe United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas; Jacob Trieber, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Consumers’ Gas Company against the Arkansas Natural Gas Company. Erom a decree for complainant, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Trade-marks and trade-names &wkey;jl3'2 — Essence of unfair competition stated.</p> <p>The essence of unfair competition in connection with the refilling and sale of plaintiff’s acetylene gas tanks consisted in the palming off of defendant’s gas for plaintiff’s.</p> <p>2. Trade-marks and trade-names <&wkey;72 — Refilling and selling complainant’s acetylene tanks without notice to purchaser held unfair competition.</p> <p>Where defendant’s dealers exchanged, for empty acetylene gas tanks put out by 'complainant, tanks of complainant’s manufacture, bearing its trade-mark and label, but refilled by defendant with its gas, without indicating the substitution to the customers, except by a paper label attached to the tank, which many customers did not notice or read, and customers were deceived into thinking they were obtaining plaintiff’s gas, and plaintiff was put to additional loss and expense in refilling and repairing the tanks when returned to it, because of the inferiority of defendant’s gas, defendant was guilty of unfair competition.</p> <p>3. Trade-marks and trade-names <&wkey;89 — Party refilling complainant’s acetylene tanks not relieved of liability for deception by its dealers.</p> <p>Defendant, who refilled with its own gas complainant’s empty acetylene gas tanks, without removing complainant’s trade-mark or label, or indicating the substitution, except by a printed paper label, was not relieved of liability for the acts of its dealers in palming off the refilled tanks as plaintiff’s gas by the rule applicable to one who has not encouraged the fraud of its dealers and has done its full legal duty to prevent deception.</p> <p>4. Trade-marks and trade-names &wkey;'í0 (1) —Imitation misleading casual buyer is unfair competition.</p> <p>To constitute unfair competition, imitation need not be such as to mislead the careful and discriminating purchaser, but is sufficient if it misleads the ordinary and casual buyer.</p> <p>5. Trade-marks and trade-names &wkey;97 — Decree restraining refilling of acetylene gas tanks without certain precautions against deception held justified.</p> <p>Where defendant was refilling plaintiff’s acetylene gas tanks with its own gas, and furnished them to customers with insufficient notice of the substitution, a decree forbidding such refilling without obliterating plaintiff’s name, trade-mark, and labels to the complete extent that either plating or enameling would obliterate them, and without plating or stamping thereon a notice that they had been refilled, was warranted.</p> <p>6. Judgment <&wkey;585(5) — Decree dismissing suit for unfair competition held not to bar subsequent suit, where deception was proved.</p> <p>A decree dismissing a suit for unfair competition in connection with the refilling of plaintiff’s acetylene gas tanks for lack of proof of deception held not to bar a subsequent suit relating to materially changed conditions, in which actual deception and injury to complainant was shown, though defendant’s label and the manner of its attachment to the tank were the same during both periods.</p> <p>7. Judgment &wkey;>739 — Not ordinarily conclusive of rights subsequently accra-</p> <p>Ordinarily a judgment is not conclusive of the rights of the parties which accrued subsequent to its rendition, though upon the same subject-matter.</p> <p>8. ¿tafement &wkey;>634 — Expression of opinion by court not adjudication.</p> <p>In a suit to restrain unfair competition in connection with the refilling of complainant’s acetylene gas tanks, which was dismissed for lack of proof of deception, the expression by the judge of the view that a paper label pasted by defendant on the tank negatived deception was not an adjudication that such pasted label constituted a sufficient means of preventing fraud and deception.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law <&wkey;221 — Exclusion of wage-earners from grand jury must be purposeful, to constitute discrimination.</p> <p>Conceding that the purposeful exclusion from the grand jury which indicted defendant and the jury which convicted him of members of the wage-earning, laboring class, otherwise qualified, merely because they belong to that class, constitutes unlawful discrimination, the exclusion must be intentional and because they were of such class, and the mere fact that there were no wage-earners on the jury does'not support the claim of discrimination.</p> <p>2. Indictment and information <&wkey;149 (2) —Purposeful exclusion of wage-earners from juries a question of fact on motion to quash.</p> <p>As the law of Ohio does not exclude persons of the wage-earning class from jury service, the question whether there was a purposeful exclusion of such persons from the grand and petit juries is a question of fact, on a motion to quash on that ground.</p> <p>3. Indictment and information <&wkey;140(2) — Evidence admissible on motion to quash to show discrimination in selecting juries.</p> <p>Conceding that the purposeful exclusion from grand and petit juries of ■ members of the wage-earning laboring class because belonging to that class, constitutes unlawful discrimination, the rejection of evidence of such purposeful exclusion on motion to quash the indictment would constitute reversible error.</p> <p>4. Indictment and information <&wkey;140(2) — Motion to quash must be supported by evidence aside from the motion.</p> <p>A motion to quash the indictment on the ground that wage-earners had been intentionally excluded from grand and petit juries, though supported by the affidavit of defendant’s attorney, was not evidence of the facts alleged, and where no proof was offered in support of the motion it was properly overruled.</p> <p>5. Imdielmenf and information @=>140(2) — Statement, in motion to quash, of readiness to verify, does not dispense with offa? of proof.</p> <p>A statement, in a motion to quash the indictment for discrimination in the selection of grand and petit juries, of defendant’s readiness to verify the facts alleged, did not dispense with the necessity of the actual presentation or offer of specific proof to support the motion.</p> <p>8. Criminal law <§=5>11¶2(1) — Instruction as to defense that objectionable statements wore made under compulsion held mot prejudicial.</p> <p>Ou a trial for violating the Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Aim. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h)t defended on the ground that defendant, who was in custody for another offense, made the objectionable statements under compulsion of the judge, deputy sheriff, and other officials, an instruction that a threat of future injury would not justify an act otherwise constituting a crime, held not prejudicial.</p> <p>7. Criminal law <&wkey;1122 (5, 8) —Exception to failure to charge ineffective, where request or charge given docs mot appear in record.</p> <p>On a trial for violating the Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), by statements made while defendant was in custody for another offense, an exception to the “failure of the court to charge the jury that if the defendant was under moral compulsion, in that he believed he was required to answer the men who had the authority to question him oil these points, he would not be guilty,” was ineffective, where the record did not show that such request was presented, or what, if anything, the court charged on that proposition.</p> <p>8. Criminal law &wkey;>1123(5) — Failure to charge not reviewable, where record docs not show what was charged or requested.</p> <p>The failure to instruct on defendant’s contention that the violation of Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-1021211) was procured by officers having him in custody, and that he was actually lured into such violation, is not reviewable, where the record does not show what, if anything, the court charged on that subject, or what it was asked to charge.</p>

H. Seward Thomson, Judge. Suit in equity by the Window Glass Machine Company and the American Window Glass Company against the New Bethlehem Window Glass Company. From an order refusing the injunction, complainants appeal.

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;89 (1) — Bankrupt not entitled to fixed term of 20 days to answer involuntary petition.</p> <p>Under Bankruptcy Act, § 18b (Comp. St. § 9602), providing that the subpoena on an involuntary petition shall be returnable within 15 days, unless the court fixes a longer time, and.that the bankrupt or any of his creditors may appear and plead within 5 days after thes return day, the bankrupt is not granted a fixed term of 20 days in which" to answer.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;86 — Subpoena requiring answer by return day irregular, but not subject to be avoided.</p> <p>Though, under Bankruptcy Act, § 18b (Comp. St. § 9602), a subpoena issued September 27, requiring the alleged bankrupt to appear on October 12, with a memorandum stating that the petition would be taken as confessed unless the answer was filed before the return day, was irregular, in that the bankrupt should have 5 days after the return day in which to answer, the irregularity was not ground for an avoidance of the subpoena, where it was served 10 days before the return day, and he had more than 5 days before the return day in which to answer.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <&wkey;81(3) — Involuntary petition field sufficiently to plead claim of petitioner.</p> <p>In an involuntary petition, the claim of one of the petitioners was sufficiently pleaded by alleging that it was for money had and received by the bankrupt on account of a protested check, representing the indebtedness, issued by the bankrupt to the creditor, a copy of which was attached.</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy &wkey;>318(l) — Claim on protested check provable.</p> <p>Where a buyer sent a check to the seller, and also paid a draft drawn on him by the seller, and the seller then gave its check for the overpayment, which was protested, the buyer’s claim constituted a cause of action on contract, and provable in bankruptcy.</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy &wkey;>60 — Receiver held appointed for bankrupt “because of insolvency.”</p> <p>Where suit was brought against a corporation for a receivership on the ground that its property was so mortgaged and pledged that it was insolvent and could not meet its obligations, and that its officers had abandoned its business, and it admitted such averments and joined in the prayer for a receiver, the appointment of the receiver was, “because of insolvency,” within Bankruptcy Act, § 3a (4), Comp. St. § 9587, as to acts of bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Insolvency.]</p>

Youmans, Judge. Action by Elihu Taylor, administrator of the estate of Alice Taylor, deceased, against the Pierce Oil Corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>1. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;233 (2) — Evidence of possession competent on tria! for carrying on business.</p> <p>On a trial for illegally carrying on the business of retail liquor dealer, where witnesses had testified that they bought liquor from defendant, and that on other occasions defendant told them he had whisky for sale, if they wanted any, evidence of defendant’s possession of whisky at a time prior to such sales was competent.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <&wkey;73i)(13) — Where counsel’s argument not sustained by evidence, court should stop him and instruct jury to disregard.</p> <p>Where, on a trial for illegally carrying on the business of retail liquor dealer, there was no evidence of defendant’s arrest for having liquor in his possession, as stated by the prosecuting attorney in his argument, the court should have stopped him and instructed the jury not to consider such remark.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <&wkey;1171(l) — Improper remarks not ground for reversal, unless prejudicial.</p> <p>A conviction will not be reversed, because of the failure of the court to stop the prosecuting attorney and instruct the jury not to consider remarks not sustained by the evidence, unless it be reasonably apparent that defendant was damaged or prejudiced by such remarks.</p> <p>4. Criminal law <&wkey;730(13) — Remark of counsel, not sustained by evidence, held not prejudicial, in view of instructions.</p> <p>On a trial for illegally carrying on the business of retail liquor dealer, the remark of the prosecuting attorney .in his argument that defendant was arrested for having liquor in his possession was not ground for reversal, though there was no evidence of such arrest, where there was evidence of the fact of possession, and on objection the court told the jury that they should judge as to what the evidence showed.</p> <p>-5. Criminal law <&wkey;1134(4) — Denial of new trial not reviewable.</p> <p>The overruling of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case cannot be reviewed.</p>

Woodrough, Judge. Proceeding by Harry Cutler and others to have the Nu-Gold Ring Company adjudicated a bankrupt. From a decree dismissing the petition, petitioners appeal.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the .United States for the Southern. District of New York.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Felix Gouled. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error. Questions certified to Supreme Court.</p> <p>This cause came here on a writ of error to a judgment of conviction entered in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. On the hearing in this court certain questions of law arose, concerning which this court desires the instruction of the Supreme Court in order properly to decide the cause.</p>

<p>Application by the United States for leave to file information against Frank Murphy. Granted.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Detroit Creamery Company and others against John E. Kinnane and others, in which the Michigan Milk Producers’ Association asked leave to intervene. On final hearing. Decree making temporary injunction permanent against the defendant named, and dismissing the bill as to tire other defendants.

<p>At Law. Action by the Centaur Motor Company against Jesse B. Eccleston. On motion to set aside the service of the summons.</p>

<p>1. Admiralty <&wkey;58 — Security not required where so-called cross-libel is not such in fact.</p> <p>Supreme Court rule 53 Í29 Sup. Ct. xiv) only requires security where a cross-libel is filed, and security will not be required where the answer, though called a cross-libel, is not such in form, and is not accompanied by a citation, and cannot afford a basis for affirmative relief.</p> <p>2. Admiralty &wkey;>62 — Answer, though called cross-libel, not entitled to be so treated.</p> <p>Where an answer, though called - a cross-libel and asking affirmative relief, is not in form such, and is accompanied by no citation, it cannot afford a basis for affirmative relief, and can be treated only as a pleading containing allegations of a set-off.</p>

<p>1. Admiralty &wkey;>58 — Security not required on cross-libel in personam.</p> <p>Where one against whom a libel is filed in personam, without attachment, files a cross-libel in personam, and no security has been obtained by the original libelant, the cross-respondent will not be required to give security under Supreme Court rule 53 (29 Sup. Ct. xiv) relative to security on cross-libels.</p> <p>2. Admiralty t&wkey;64 — Interrogatories may_ not call for evidence of antagonist’s case, but may call for particulars.</p> <p>Interrogatories in an answer in admiralty, so far as they call for evidence, must be confined to testimony necessary to the proof of proponent’s case or defense, and evidence of the antagonist’s case may not be obtained, but the proponent may ask for particulars of the matters pleaded.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by David Harper, trustee in bankruptcy of William C. Sanderson, bankrupt, against Agnes E. Sanderson. Bill dismissed.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <&wkey;414(3) — Evidence held to show transfer to wife because of pendency of action.</p> <p>On objections to a bankrupt’s application for discharge, evidence held to show that a transfer of his business to his wife was not, as claimed, in anticipation of his being drafted, but because of the pendency of an action against him, which he feared would result in a judgment, and that no real transfer was intended.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <&wkey;408(4) — Failure to schedule interest in business transferred to wife justifies denial of discharge.</p> <p>Where a bankrupt’s transfer of a business to his wife was not intended as a real transfer, he could have recovered it from her, and should have set forth his interest therein in his schedules, and his failure to do so amounted to the making of a false oath, necessitating the denial of a discharge.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas; William R. Smith, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by John G. Wetsel and others against the Empire Gas & Fuel Company, begun in the state court. From an order denying a motion to remand, after the cause was removed by defendant to the United States court, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>1. War —Sugar a "necessary,” within Food Control Act, as to hoarding.</p> <p>Under Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 6 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115Vsgg), prohibiting the hoarding of necessaries, sugar is a “necessary,” in view of section 1 (section 3115% e), authorizing the President to make such regulations and issue such orders as are essential effectively to. carry out the provisions of that act, under which the President provided for licensing manufacturers and distributors of certain food commodities, including sugar, and declared economy in the use of sugar necessary, and proof that sugar was a necessary was not required.</p> <p>• LEd. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Necessary.]</p> <p>2. Criminal law ©^304 (9) — Judicial notice of war resolution and presidential proclamations taken.</p> <p>The resolution of April, 1917, declaring a state of war, and the proclamations of the President under Act Aug. 10,1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115 % e-3115 % kk, 3115%í-3115%r), are public acts of which the courts take judicial notice.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <^13 — Statute prohibiting hoarding of necessaries not void for uncertainty; “hoarded.”</p> <p>Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 6 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § illisyagg), prohibiting the hoarding of necessaries and providing that necessaries shall be deemed hoarded when held, contracted for, or arranged for by any person in a quantity in excess of his reasonable requirements for use or consumption by himself and dependents for a reasonable time, is not void for indefiniteness and uncertainty as to the meaning of the word “hoarded.”</p> <p>4. War —Reasonable requirements oí defendant and dependents for sugar sufficiently proved.</p> <p>In a prosecution for hoarding sugar, where there was evidence of the number of dependents in defendant’s household and of the customary manner of managing his household affairs, and testimony as to the amount, of sugar purchased during the period included in tlie indictment, in addition to that which he was charged with hoarding, and evidence that the sugar hoarded was not touched during that time, there was sufficient evidence as to his reasonable requirements for sugar for the use of himself and his dependents.</p> <p>. 5. Criminal law <8=304(17) — Judicial notice taken of orders of Food Administration.</p> <p>Judicial notice is taken of the orders of the Food Administration restricting the use of sugar during the war.</p> <p>6. War —Conviction of hoarding sustained by evidence as to purchases authorized by defendant.</p> <p>Evidence that defendant authorized and knew of the purchases and delivery of excessive quantities of sugar at his several places would support a conviction for hoarding.</p> <p>7. Criminal law 'S-=3Í>2 — Procuring another to do criminal act constitutes guilt.</p> <p>Criminal guilt can be fixed where one procures another to do a criminal act.</p> <p>8. Criminal law <&=3’330 — Burden on defendant as to exceptions in criminal statute.</p> <p>In a prosecution for hoarding sugar, it devolved upon defendant to introduce evidence bringing biinseif within the exceptions of the statute negatived in tlie indictment.</p> <p>9. Criminal law <@==>1035 (5) — Overruling of challenge to juror challenged peremptorily not tirejudicial, where defendant did not object to any other juror.</p> <p>The overruling of a challenge to a juror for cause was not prejudicial error, where defendant challenged the juror peremptorily, and, though defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, he did not object to the new juror, or any other juror.</p> <p>10. Criminal law <3=:i703 — Opening argument in prosecution for hoarding sugar not improper.</p> <p>In a prosecution for hoarding sugar, the remarks of the counsel for the government in his opening statement that the jury should consider that at the time of the occurrence alleged the United Slates was at war with the greatest power that ever had been arrayed against civilization in the history of the world, and that defendant, about the time the war came on, said the people ought to accumulate an abundance of food, did not prevent a fair trial.</p> <p>M. War —Evidence relevant on question of intent in prosecution for hoarding sugar.</p> <p>On a trial for hoarding sugar, evidence that a witness heard defendant say there would be a shortage of food, and that people should try to save something in ease there was a shortage, was relevant on the question of intent.</p> <p>12. War <@=>4 — On trial for hoarding sugar, evidence of telephone conversation with defendant’s home admissible to show intent.</p> <p>On a trial for hoarding sugar, evidence concerning a telephone order for sugar from some one at defendant’s home, whom the witness recognized by the voice as one from whom he had previously taken orders for sugar, was admissible as bearing on defendant’s knowledge that those who bought produce for him were inquiring into the price of quantities of sugar.</p> <p>13., Criminal law '^470 — Opinion of expert as to requirements of family for sugar immáterial.</p> <p>On a trial for hoarding sugar, the opinion of a salesman in a grocery store as to what would be the reasonable requirements of a family was properly excluded; it being for the jury to say whether there was a hoarding of sugar in excess of defendant’s reasonable requirements.</p>

<p>1. Corporations <§=>153 — Informal distribution of profits not recoverable.</p> <p>Wliere two persons owned all tlie stock of the corporation, except one share, the beneficial interest in which was in one of them, and the corporation was solvent, dividends paid to them without any vote of the directors authorizing the payment could not be recovered.</p> <p>2. Courts <©=>365 — Question of pledge a local question.</p> <p>The extent and validity of a pledge are local questions.</p> <p>3. Pledges <©=>11 — Acceptance of order by warehouseman a sufficient delivery.</p> <p>In Massachusetts, acceptance of an order on a warehouseman is a sufficient delivery of goods in pledge to the holder of the order, and the warehouseman may become the bailee or custodian for the pledgee.</p> <p>4. Pledges <©=>11 — Designation or identification of property necessary.</p> <p>Where, as security for a loan, the debtor gave an order on a storage company to place 50 cars of the lumber which it had on storage subject to the creditor’s order, with the right to the debtor to use any lumber so long as it substituted other cars, so that there would always be 50 cars subject to the creditor's order, there was no valid pledge, without some designation or identification of the lumber held for the creditor.</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy <©=>161(2) — Delayed designation of property pledged sufficient..</p> <p>Where, to secure a loan, a debtor gave a creditor an order on a storage company, requiring it to hold 50 cars of the lumber stored with it for the creditor, and the storage company accepted the order, a delay of over two. years, and until shortly before the debtor’s bankruptcy, in designating the lumber held for the creditor did not prevent the pledge becoming-effectual as to the lumber designated, there being no fraud in the transaction, as the designation related back to the date of the order.</p> <p>6. Pledges <@=>11 — Order on bailee to set apart 50 carloads of lumber did not prevent designation of lumber not in carload lots.</p> <p>Where, to secure a loan, a debtor gave a creditor an order on a storage company, directing it to place 50 cars of the lumber stored with if subject to the order of the creditor and hold it for him, and to keep a sufficient number of cars at a specified average value to equal the loan, the term “carload lots” was a mere matter of form, and did not prevent the setting apart for the creditor of lumber not separated into carload lots.</p> <p>7. Bankruptcy <5^188(1) — Designation of property by bailee ratified by debt- or and creditor.</p> <p>Where a debtor gave a creditor an order on a storage company to place a specified quantity of the lumber stored with it to the order of the creditor and hold it as security for him, both parties hela to have ratified and approved the designation by the storage company of lumber held for the creditor prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the debtor.</p>

<p>Trade-marks and trade-names New, vol. 8A Key-No. Series — Manufacturer held not subject to order of Federal Trade Commission; “unfair method of competition.”</p> <p>That a manufacturer of products sold in interstate commerce to jobbers and wholesale dealers, who in turn sell to other jobbers and wholesale and retail dealers, issues circulars to its trade suggesting prices for resale, both at wholesale and retail, and refuses to continue to sell to any dealer who fails to maintain such prices, or who sells to another dealer failing to maintain them, in the absence of contracts requiring adherence to such prices, held not to constitute an “unfair method of competition,” in violation of Federal Trade Commission Act Sept. 26, 1914 (Comp. St. § 8836e).</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John K. McCall, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by Gladys Weathersby Tate against J. O. Baugh, Sheriff of Coahoma County, Miss. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Bourquin, Judge. Suit in equity by the United States against the Northern Pacific Railway Company. 'Decree for defendant, and the United States appeals. This suit was brought by the government to procure the cancellation of a patent theretofore issued to the defendant to the suit for 5,681.7(5 acres of land situate in Gallatin county, Mont., resulting in a dismissal of the bill, from which judgment the present appeal was taken.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Second Division of the Northern District of California; William C. Van Fleet, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the E. Clemens Horst Company against the Pabst Brewing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.</p>

Cushman, Judge. In the matter of Peter Thompson, bankrupt. From an order of the District. Court, allowing the claim of D. H. Macomber, receiver of the Peter Thompson Company, a corporation, R. D. Simpson, as trustee of the estate of Peter Thompson, bankrupt, appeals and petitions for review. . Motions to dismiss the appeal and the petition for review granted.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii; Horace W. Vaughan, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the United States against Úrank H. Schumann. From a decree canceling a certificate of naturalization, defendant appeals.</p>

Cushman, Judge. Information by the United States against the Kar-Ru Chemical Company. Judgment for the United States, and' defendant brings error. The United States by information charges the defendant wilh a violation of sections 2 and 8 of the Act of Congress of June 30, 1906, known as the Food and Drug Act (34 Stat. 768 [Comp. St. §§ 8718, 8724]), as amended by the Act of August 23, 1912 (3'7 Stat. 416 [Comp. St § 8724]).___

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the First Division of the Northern District of California; Maurice T. Dooling, Judge.</p> <p>Libel by J. Lucas against the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. From a-decree for libelant, respondent appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon; Charles E. Wolverton, Judge.</p> <p>_ Harry Nudelman was convicted of larceny from an interstate car-_ rier, and he brings, error.</p>

T. Dooling, Judge. Joshua Sykes and others were convicted of conspiracy to hinder the enforcement of the war acts, and they bring error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio; D. C. Westenhaver, Judge.</p> <p>Action at law by Erank Caldwell against the Erie Railroad Company and Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law <§=409, 535(1) — Uncorroborated extrajudicial admissions and confessions will not sustain conviction.</p> <p>, Extrajudicial confessions or admissions are not sufficient to authorize a conviction of crime, unless corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <§=517 (2), 535(1) — Plea of guilty in state court is extrajudicial confession, admissible in federal court, but requires corroboration.</p> <p>A plea of guilty in the state court to a charge of transporting intoxicating liquor in the state is an extrajudicial confession, admissible on a trial in the federal court for transporting intoxicating liquor from a point out of the state into the state, but not sufficient to sustain a conviction, without corroborating evidence of the corpus delicti.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <§=535 (2) — Finding liquor in home not corroboration of confession of transporting it:</p> <p>Proof that a large quantity of intoxicating liquor was found in defendant’s residence is not proof of the corpus delicti of transporting liquor from a point outside the state into the state, so it is not sufficient to corroborate extrajudicial confessions.</p>

<p>1. Subrogation <&wkey;22 — Manufacturer, canceling lien, held subrogated to mortgagee’s rights against agents.</p> <p>Where sales agents had a lien on automobiles consigned to them for payments advanced, and gave to a bank a chattel mortgage covering their lien, the manufacturer, on canceling such lien by repaying the advances, and on paying the mortgage to release the automobiles from the lien thereof, was subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee against such agents; payment of the mortgage being made in good faith under circumstances justifying it.</p> <p>2. Judgment <&wkey;622 (2) —Replevin not conclusive against right to money paid on property, which was not counterclaimed.</p> <p>Judgment in replevin is not conclusive against the right of a party to recover amounts paid to release the property from chattel mortgages, for which no counterclaim was filed in the replevin suit, since in the absence of statute the right to sue on counterclaim as an independent cause of action is not impaired by a judgment against the claimant, unless the counterclaim was pleaded.</p> <p>3. Appeal and error <&wkey;1005(2) — Finding by trial court supported by direct testimony is binding.</p> <p>Finding by tlie trial court, supported by direct testimony credited by the court below, is binding on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Southern District of California; R. S. Bean, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the United States against the Dominion Oil Company and others. Decree for defendants, and the United States appeals.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <&wkey;407(5) — “Obtaining money on credit upon fafce stetesneEit”' bars discharge.</p> <p>The making by bankrupt of a written statement of the financial condition of the firm of which ho was a member to a bank, for the expressed purpose of obtaining a loan of money to the firm, and upon which such loan was obtained, from which stai ement he omitted items of indebtedness to his wife and sister aggregating 810,000, shown on the books of the firm, held, to constitute the obtaining of money on credit by means of a materially false statement, which under 'Bankruptcy Act, § lib (3), Comp. Si. § 9598, warranted refusal of his discharge.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Obtaining Credit on Ealse Statement.!</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; John Rellstab, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Essanay Film Manufacturing Company against William R. Kane. From a decree dismissing its bill (256 Fed. 271), complainant appeals.</p>

Dooling, Judge. Habeas corpus by Dee Wing Wah and another against F,dward White, Commissioner of Immigration for the Port of San Francisco. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the petition, the petitioners appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri; Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by William M. Corbett, as General Manager, Kansas Terminal Railway, against Ross Crawshaw and others. From a decree granting the injunction prayed for, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee; Edward T. Sanford, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the J. H. Day Company against the Mountain City Mill Company and another. From a decree dismissing the bill (257 Fed. 561), plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Patents <§=>328 — For inner sole for shoes void for lack of invention.</p> <p>The Nathan patent, No. 873,775, for an inner sole for shoes having variously located pockets for the insertion of filling to correct abnormal tendencies of the foot, held void for lack of invention and anticipation in the prior art.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Southern District of California; Oscar A. Trip-pet, Judge.___</p> <p>. Suit by the W. F. Schultheiss Company and another against Lucius Ernest Phillips and others, copartners doing business as the Phillips Iron Works. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>Patents <&wkey;328 — For wind shield valid and infringed.</p> <p>Tlie Nisbet patent, No. 1,238,803, for a wind shield for protecting the tonneau seats in passenger cars, held not anticipated, valid, and infringed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court o£ the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan; Arthur J. Tuttle, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the American Can Company against the Mulkey Salt Company. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Bayley & Sons, Incorporated, against Harry Krich, trading as the Krich Light Company. Decree for plaintiff.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by A. J. Lindemann & Hoverson Company, Incorporated, against J. Rose & Co., Incorporated. Decree for complainant.</p>

<p>1. Shipping <&wkey;3%, New, vol. 8A Key-No. Series — Director General of Railroads entitled to limitation of 'Ability as charterer.</p> <p>The Director General of Railroads, with respect to ships taken over and operated as a part of the property of a railroad company, field in effect a charterer, and entitled to limitation of liability, under Rev. St. §§ 4282, 4283 (Comp. St. §§ 8020, 8021), to the same extent as a private charterer.</p> <p>2. Strpping <&wkey;203 — ¡Liability for death or injury of passengers not subject to limitation.</p> <p>The operation of Rev. St. § 4493 (Comp. St. § 8269), which makes the owner of a vessel liable for loss of life or property of a passenger through any neglect or failure to comply with statutory requirements, or through known defects or imperfections of steaming apparatus or hull, is not restricted by anything in section 4283 (section 8021) limiting liability.</p> <p>3. Shipping &wkey;>208 — Mere negligence does not necessarily establish “privity and knowledge.”</p> <p>Mere negligence, pure and simple, in and of itself does not necessarily establish the existence on the part of the owner of a vessel of “privity and knowledge,”' within the meaning of Rev. St. § 4283 (Comp. St. § 8021) ; but there may be negligence which will.</p> <p>4. Shipping <&wkey;20'7 — Owner entitled to limit liability as to fire loss of cargo, but not as to passengers.</p> <p>Owner of a steamship, which burned, causing loss of cargo, loss of life, injuries to passengers, and loss of their property, which was contributed to by neglect of the owner and its representatives to keep the fire-fighting equipment and boats of the vessel in effective condition and to maintain the fire drills, all of which were required by statute or regulation, and also by- default of the officers and crew in failing to use the means available and to efficiently handle the boats, field entitled to limit its liability as to cargo loss, but not as to death and injuries and loss of property of passengers.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry Company against the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Hudson for an injunction. Preliminary injunction made permanent.</p>

<p>1. Kailroads <@=>51á, New, vol. 6A Key-No. Series — Carrier under federal control not proper paiiy to suit against Director General.</p> <p>Under Federal Itailway Control Act, § 8 (Oomp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 19.19, § 3115%Ii), authorizing the President to execute the powers thereby conferred through such agencies as he may determine, the presidential proclamation of January .10, 3019, appointing a .Director General of Kailroads, with authority to malm all necessary orders, and General Order 50a of the Director General, requiring that actions for injuries from negligence of employes shall be brought against the Director General, and not otherwise, the provision of section 10 of the act (section 3115'1.3) that actions shall be brought against the carrier is abrogated and the carrier is not a proper party, as this provision was to be effective only if not inconsistent with any order of the President.</p> <p>2. Kailroads <@=>514, New, rol. (¡A Key-No. Series — Director General, not individual, named defendant..</p> <p>General Order No. 50a of the Director General of Kailroads, providing that certain actions “shall be brought against the Director General of Kailroads and not otherwise,” requires that the defendant shall be the official, and not the Individual who happens to be in office at the time; but the insertion of the Director General’s name is harmless surplusage.</p> <p>3. Courts —Diverse citizenship between plaintiff and Director General of Railroads does not give federal jurisdiction.</p> <p>Under General Order No. 50a of the Director General of Kailroads, diverse citizenship between the Director General and the plaintiff in an action against him does not give jurisdiction to a federal court, as under such order it is not the individual holding the office of Director General, but an artificial being without citizenship, that is the defendant.</p> <p>4. Courts <@=>314 — Citizenship of railroad company not controlling in action against Director General of Railroads.</p> <p>Under General Order No. 50a of the Director General of Railroads, requiring certain actions to be brought against the Director General and not otherwise, the citizenship of the railroad company out of the operation of whoso road an action arises is not controlling on the question of federal jurisdiction of actions against the Director General.</p> <p>5. Courts <@=>296 — diction against Director General of Kailroads is action “arising under law of United States.”</p> <p>An action against the Director General of Railroads for the negligence of his employe's in the operation of a. train is within the jurisdiction of. a federal court as a case “arising under a law of the United States.”</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Arise; Arising.)</p>

<p>1. Courts @=>266 — Discontinuance of gas supply restrained temporarily, though affecting property outside state.</p> <p>In a suit to restrain a gas company from discontinuing the furnishing of gas to a city in violation of its duties under a franchise, the court may grant a temporary injunction restraining the company from stopping the flow of natural gas into the city and to its inhabitants, though it will, to a certain extent, affect property in another state, where the company's gas fields are located.</p> <p>2. Corporations <S=>857(1) — Persons contracting with foreign corporations are ordinarily bound by charter powers.</p> <p>The home of a corporation is in the state of its creation, and general’y, when it engages in business in another state, those entering into contracts with knowledge of the limitations imposed by its charter do so subject thereto.</p> <p>3. Injunction <S£=>137(2) — Burdens imposed not ground for denying temporary injunction.</p> <p>A temporary injunction, restraining a gas company from discontinuing the furnishing of gas to a city and its inhabitants in violation of its franchise duties, will not be denied on the grtfund that it will be required to build new gas wells, keep a large compressing station in continuous operation, and perform other services to produce the required supply of gas, as this is what it contracted to do.</p> <p>4. Injunction <&wkey;137 (1) — Duties of gas company to other cities not ground for denying temporary injunction against discontinuance of service.</p> <p>A temporary injunction, restraining a. gas company from discontinuing furnishing gas to a city and its inhabitants, will not be denied on the ground that by its charter it is primarily required to supply gas to certain other cities, where the bill alleges that a corporation owning a majority of the gas company’s stock is influencing the discontinuance of the supply, to enable it to supply more favored localities, and that it owns gas fields adequate for supplying gas in needed quantities, as these are questions of fact, to be disposed of on final hearing.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit for collision by R. Erickson, master of the steamship Stortind against the steamship War Pointer, with cross-libel by Arthur W. Melling, master of the War Pointer.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against M. Swedlow. On demurrer to the indictment.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court of tbe United' States for tbe Southern District of New York. Suit by tbe Lebigb & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company against the steam tug Agnes Moran, her engines, etc.; tbe Moran Towing & Transportation Company, claimant. Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals.</p>

<p>xVppeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

, Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision by William C. Réid, managing owner of the schooner Dorothy, against the British steamship Elm Branch and others. Decree for libelant, and respondents appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Hiram W. Currey, of Joplin, Mo., and Arthur S. Thompson, of Miami, Okl., for appellants. Paul A. Ewert, of Joplin, Mo., pro se.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

, Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision by E. J. Leseman, master of the schooner Melbourn P. Smith, against the sloamsliip Ontario, with cross-libel. Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Utah.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Utah.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Iowa.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Libel by Viele, Blackwell & Buck against the Otrophon Steamship Corporation. Decree for the libelants, and respondent appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa. Otto Raymond Barnett, of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Bert Grantier, bankrupt. On review of order of referee directing delivery of certain personal property to the trustee or to his vendee.