Volume 265 — Federal Reporter

<p>1. Criminal law <^>31 — Officer buying drugs illegally sold does not incite commission of offense.</p> <p>The fact that government officers furnished marked money, with which morphine and cocaine were bought under their directions, does not bar a prosecution for the sale of such drugs without payment of the tax thereon, since they did not incite or entrap defendant to commit the offense, having had nothing to do with defendant’s possession of the drugs or willingness to sell them.</p> <p>2. Internal revenue <®=^47 — Burden is on seller of drugs to show payment of tax.</p> <p>Under Harrison Narcotic Act, § 8 (Comp. St. § 6287n), making possession or control of drugs presumptive evidence of a violation of section 1 (section 6287g), of the act, the burden is on defendant, shown to have had possession of such drugs, to prove payment of the tax, and the conviction will not be reversed because the government did not prove nonpayment of the tax.</p> <p>sS=>For other oases see samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Appeal fiom the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas; John C. Pollock, Judge. Habeas corpus proceedings by Jack Denver and 'another and by George Esterbrook against August V. Anderson, Warden of the United States Penitentiary, at Eeavenworth, Kan. From final orders in each proceeding, discharging the petitioner from custody, defendant appeals.

■In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York. Action by Walter N. Brand against the Tfitna Eife Insurance Company.

Woodrough, Judge. Action by P. II. Adams and others, a copartnership doing business under the firm name and style of P. H. Adams & Co., against S. W. King and others, a copartnership doing business under the firm name and style of King, Collie Ik Co. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error.

Suit by Charles H. Jockmus against Louis B. London and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. The form of Jockmus’ bill is that of an ordinary action to restrain infringement of certain patents, whereof he was and is the owner of record.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for tire Eastern District of Michigan; Arthur J. Tuttle, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Roland F. Wilson against Nelson J. Quinn and another, doing business as the Perrin Manufacturing Company. From a decree dismissing the bill and counterclaim, plaintiff appeals.</p>

Petitions for writs of habeas corpus, one by William Thomas Colyer .and others, and three by Morris Katzeff, against Henry J. Skeffington, Commissioner of Immigration, to procure the release of 20 aliens held under warrants of arrest or for deportation. Aliens held under warrants for deportation discharged, and those held under warrant of arrest released on bail.

Rudkin, Judge. Action by J. B. McGinn against the Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company. Judgment for defendant notwithstanding verdict for plaintiff, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>1. Bankruptcy @=>303(4) — Trustee in suit by Mm must plead and prove appointment.</p> <p>In a suit in equity, brought by complainant as trustee of an estate in bankruptcy, it is essential that he allege and prove, if denied, that he is such trustee.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy @=>302(4) — Allegation of partnership of bankrupts not sustained.</p> <p>In a suit by a trustee, proof that two persons were adjudicated bankrupts at different times where neither the petitions nor decrees are in evidence, will not sustain an allegation that they were partners.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy @=>165(2) — Fee retained from recovery by attorney not recoverable as preference.</p> <p>Money retained by an attorney as a fee from a fund recovered by him for his client, and on which he had a lien for his services, does not constitute a preferential payment, recoverable by the trustee on the subsequent bankruptcy of the client.</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy @=>314(1) — Estate not liable for debts of another fraudulently in possession of property.</p> <p>The estate of a bankrupt, who was defrauded of a stock of merchandise by another, but afterward recovered it by suit, cannot be held liable for debts contracted by such other while conducting the business in his own name.</p> <p><to>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Appeal' from the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado; John A. Riner, Judge. Suit by'the Wootton Land & Fuel Company and others against J. A. Ownbey. Cross-appeals from decree. These cases present an appeal and a’ cross-appeal from a'decree in a suit for an accounting.

<p>1. Conspiracy <§=>43 (5) — Indictment need not show how overt act would tend to. consummate conspiracy.</p> <p>The overt act alleged in an indictment for conspiracy need not be a crime, but of itself may be innocent, and it is not necessary to allege the exact manner in which it would tend to consummate the conspiracy.</p> <p>2. Conspiracy <§=>47 — To effect exemption from draft shown by evidence.</p> <p>Evidence held sufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to effect the exemption of a draftee from military service by bribing of members of the local board and to establish an overt act by the drawing of money from the bank by another conspirator and its payment to and receipt by defendant for use to effect the object of the conspiracy.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <§=M23 (3) — Admission of conspirator held admissible.</p> <p>In a prosecution for conspiracy to bribe draft officials to secure exemption from military service, a. conversation with a bank cashier relative to borrowing money held admissible as an admission of one of the conspirators during the existence of the conspiracy, where a conspiracy was found to exist.</p> <p>4. Witnesses <§=>287 (1) — Redirect examination in explanation of cross-examination held proper.</p> <p>In a prosecution for conspiracy to secure exemption from military service, the statement of a witness that it was the custom of government agents to give to persons under investigation an opportunity to explain, drawn out on rodiroet examination in explanation oC testimony on cross-examination, was admissible.</p> <p><£=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>5. Criminal law <3=>1130(5) — Where briefs fail, to tompiy with court rules, specifications of error may fee s’isregardei!.</p> <p>A specification oE error relating to a remark of the trial court may be disregarded, whore rule 24, par. 2, subd. 3 (188 Fed. xvi, 100 O. G. A. xvi), requiring a brief of Hie argument to exhibit a clear statement of the points of law or facts, with reference to record pages, and authorities in support of each point, was not complied with.</p> <p>6. Crinii.ua! law <S=>il6S% (12) — Beauwrta of judge held harmless.</p> <p>A remark o£ the trial court that in its opinion a certain item of testimony was immaterial was not subject to objection, whore the testimony was admitted, and the court told the jury that they were to consider the testimony, and not bo bound by the remarks of the court.</p> <p>7. Conspiracy —Isistructioms held sufficient.</p> <p>In a prosecution for conspiracy to secure exemption from military service by means of bribery, an instruction stating that, “in order to prepare for it,” one conspirator drew .out a sum of money, held to refer, not to the formation of the conspiracy, but to the accomplishment of its purpose, and hence -not objectionable.</p> <p><S=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas; John C. Pollock, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Illinois Cudahy Packing Company against the Kansas City Soap Company. Judgment for plaintiff (247 Fed. 556), and defendant brings error.</p>

Pollock, Judge. Action by the Title Guaranty & Surety Company against Mary G. Hannon, now Mary G. Whitaker, executrix of the will of John Han-non, deceased, Prank J. Thomas, administrator of the estate of William E. Thomas, deceased, substituted for said William E. Thomas, and Thomas T. Kelly. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.

Thomas and St. John, Virgin Islands; Thiele, Judge. Action by J. P. Jorgensen against Sophie R. Cien for rent due under lease and for ouster. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

<p>1. Bailroads <8=»32?(12) — Persons riding together on highway equally chargeable with negligence at crossing.</p> <p>Where two persons are traveling together on a matter of mutual concern in an automobile owned and driven by one of them, the other is equally charged with the duty of care for their safety, and any negligence in driving into danger at a railroad crossing without protest on his part is attributable to him.</p> <p>%. Bailroads <@=>328 (4) —Automobile driver’s duty to stop, look, and listen defined.</p> <p>It is the positive duty of an automobile driver, approaching a railroad crossing where there is a restricted vision, to stop, look, and listen at a time and place where stopping, looking, and listening would be effective, and failure to observe this rule is negligence.</p> <p>3. Railroads ®=»331(3) — Duty of traveler, signaled by crossing watchman, defined.</p> <p>While the signal of a crossing watchman to a traveler on the highway to cross does not make the railroad company an insurer of his safety, nor absolve him from the duty of exercising due care, it is a representation that there is no train within striking distance, and the traveler will not be held to the strict rule of constant and extreme vigilance which is enforced. against one who crosses in sole reliance on his own judgment.</p> <p>4. Railroads <=»350(29) — Negligence of automobile driver, signaled by watchman, question for jury.</p> <p>Where the driver of an automobile, on approaching a railroad crossing with which he was unacquainted at night, where at some points near the crossing the view of the tracks was obstructed, stopped 20 or 30 feet from the tracks and looked and listened, without seeing or hearing any train, whether he was chargeable with negligence in proceeding to cross on signal of the watchman without again stopping hold a question for the jury.</p> <p><§xs»For other casos see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; J. Warren Davis, Judge.</p> <p>In the matter of the Star Spring Bed Company, bankrupt. The Union National Bank of Newark, N. J., appeals from an order of the District Court.</p>

<p>1. Master and servant <@=>111(1) — Injury to employe from defective grabix-on requix-ed by federal act lxeld actionable.</p> <p>Under Safety Appliance Act March 2, 1893, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8608), requiring railroad companies to equip their ears with secure grabirons “for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars,” it is not necessary that an employs, to be entitled to recover for an injury resulting from a defective grabiron, should have been coupling or uncoupling cars when so injured.</p> <p>2. Commerce <@=>27 (5) — Foreman of wrecking train held engaged in “interstate commerce.”</p> <p>Foreman of a wrecking train crew employed in connection with interstate commerce, who was required before leaving- his train at night to prepare it for immediate service, held to remain in the interstate employment, within Employers’ Liability Act April 22, 1908 (Comp. St. §§ 8857-8665), until his day’s work was finished by completing such preparation.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Ear other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Interstate Commerce.]</p> <p>3. Master and servant <@=>111(1) — Violation of Safety Appliance Act establishes negligence under Employers’ Liability Act.</p> <p>Federal Employers’ Liability Act April 22, 1908 (Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), exclusively regulating the relations of common carriers and their employes while engaged in interstate commerce, was enacted long after Safety Appliance Act, and the absolute duty to employe's imposed by the latter act must he considered as incorporated in it, and whenever a violation of such duty is the proximate cause of an injury, the negligence of the railroad company is ipso facto established.</p> <p>cg^aFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Equity <@=24, 348 — Forfeiture must be established by strict proof.</p> <p>Forfeitures are not favored in equity, and the burden rests on a party claiming a forfeiture to establish it by full, clear, and strict proof.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error <@=>1011 (1) — Finding of fact on conflicting evidence, supported by credible testimony, conclusive.</p> <p>A finding, by the trial court, on conflicting evidence, but supported by credible testimony, that high explosive mines were on board vessels moored by complainant lessee at defendant’s pier, held conclusive on the appellate court.</p> <p>3. Wharves -<@=>9 — Construction of lease of pier; “premises;”</p> <p>In a provision of a lease of a pier that lessee should not land nor store on said premises any dynamite or high explosive, “said premises,” construed in connection with other provisions, held to mean the pier, and not to include the waters of the adjacent slip. , 1</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Premises.]</p> <p>4. Landlord and tenant <@=>37 — Lease construed most strongly against lessor.</p> <p>A lease is to be construed most strongly against lessor and if there is doubt and uncertainty as to the meaning of a provision it is to be construed in favor of lessee. ,</p> <p>5. Wharves <@=>9 — Breach of lease of pier by violation of explosives ordinance.</p> <p>Lessees of a pier in New York Harbor, under a lease requiring them to observe all rules and regulations prescribed by government or municipality, held to have violated its terms and forfeited their rights thereunder by permitting explosives to remain for more than 48 hours on board vessels lying at' the pier and also by violation of a War Department regulation for loading of explosives.</p> <p>■6. Equity <@=>24 — Whai*ves <@=>9 — Will relieve from forfeiture only when compensation can be decreed.</p> <p>Equity will not relieve against a forfeiture arising from breach of covenant, where there cannot be just compensation decreed for the breach, and this rule applies to breach of a covenant in a lease of a pier by violation of an ordinance prohibiting vessels with explosives on board to ’ remain at piers.</p> <p>7. Injunction <@=199 — Value of use and occupation under wrongful injunction recoverable on counterclaim.</p> <p>Where complainants, lessees of a pier, on notice by lessor of forfeiture of the lease for breach of covenant, brought suit to restrain such forfeiture and were kept in possession by a temporary injunction, held on final hearing to have been wrongfully issued, the court properly awarded defendant on a counterclaim a money judgment for the value of the use and occupation of the pier while so held by complainants.</p> <p>:8. Equity <@=39 (1) — Will retain jurisdiction to determine whole case.</p> <p>When a court of equity acquires jurisdiction for any purpose, it will as a general rule proceed to determine the whole cause, though in so doing it decides questions which, standing alone, would furnish no basis of equitable jurisdiction.</p> <p>^s»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Contracts <@=97 (1) — Right to rescind for fraud waived, if not promptly exercised.</p> <p>A party to a contract, having the right to rescind it on the ground of fraud, must, on discovery of the facts, at once announce his intention and adhere to it, and if he thereafter proceeds under the contract he waives the right of rescission.</p> <p>2. Contracts '<@=97(1) — Right to rescind for fraud held waived.</p> <p>A judgment denying plaintiff! recovery of money paid on a contract for building'a vessel, which he declared rescinded on the ground that it was induced by fraudulent representations by defendant that it had a shipyard fully equipped, held sustained by evidence showing that, shortly after the contract was signed, plaintiff visited the place where defendant was then building its shipyard and continued to make payments on the contract for two months thereafter without objection, during which time defendant entered into contracts and obligations for material for the vessel.</p> <p>3. Witnesses <@=>275(2) — Latitude allowed in cross-examination of party.</p> <p>Permitting questions on cross-examination of a plaintiff, the answers to which showed that prior to coming to this country he had been m business in Germany, held not error; it being usual to allow considerable latitude in cross-examination of a party.</p> <p>4. Appeal and error <@=1031(3) — Admission, of immaterial evidence not presumed prejudicial.</p> <p>■ To justify a reversal because of the admission of immaterial evidence, it should appear that the error was so substantial as to injuriously affect the rights of plaintiff in error, as prejudice will not be presumed.</p> <p>©=?For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Indians ©=>27(1) — United States may maintain action on behalf of Oneida Tribe in New York. ,</p> <p>, The Oneida Indians remaining in New York and occupying the land reserved to them by the treaty with the state of 1842 constitute a distinct tribe or nation, and exclusive jurisdiction over them is vested in the federal government, which may maintain actions in this behalf.</p> <p>2. Indians ®=>2, 15(1) — Tribal status may be terminated only by Congress.</p> <p>It is only where Congress has enacted legislation controlling the disposition of property on Indian reservations that valid conveyances may be made, and it is for Congress to say when the tribal status of Indians shall be deemed to have terminated.</p> <p>3. Indians ©=>15(1) — Mortgage of interest in tribal lands by Oneida Indian void.</p> <p>In the absence of federal legislation authorizing it, a mortgage executed by a member of the Oneida Tribe of Indians in New York on his interest in the tribal lands held invalid, and a decree of a state court foreclosing it and making partition of the lands held null and void.</p> <p>Ward, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p> <p><@=aFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Action by Moore & Tierney, Incorporated, and by the Wm.’ Moore Knitting Company against the Roxford Knitting Company. Judgment for plaintiff in each case, and defendant brings error. The questions of law involved in the two cases are identical. They were argued together and will he decided in one opinion.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United State's for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>Action by Benzion Heller, administrator of the estate of Max Heller, deceased, against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.</p>

Cross-Appeals from the District Court of (he United States for (he Western Division of the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge. Cross-appeals from a decree in equity on petition of the Merchants’ Cotton Press & Storage Company in insolvency proceedings against the Gulf Compress Company; C. C. Hanson, receiver. Cause No. 3321 is an original appeal by tbe Gulf Compress Company, hereinafter called the Gulf Company,' and C. C. Hanson, receiver.

Action by John Armstrong Chaloner against the New York Evening Post Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. This cause comes here on writ of error to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff in error, defendant below, is hereinafter referred to as defendant. The defendant in error, plaintiff below, is hereinafter referred to as plaintiff.

<p>1. Insurance <5=175 — Open policy on cargo “beginning the adventure” does not insure against risk to vessel before loading.</p> <p>A policy insuring a cargo on any vessel by which it may be transported, containing the common “beginning the adventure” clause, covers no risk prior to the loading of insured cargo on board the vessel which was to make the voyage, in the absence of any inconsistent clause in the policy.</p> <p>2. Insurance <5=14!) — Printed clause given eifeot, except as modified by writing.</p> <p>By using a printed form of marine insurance policy, and adding or interpolating typewritten provisions, the parties manifested an intention that the printed provisions have the meaning and effect called for by their language, so far as it is not in conflict with any typewritten provisions.</p> <p>3. Insurance <5=175 — Rider covering risk of craft or loading held not to cover risk of vessel before loading.</p> <p>A clause, attached to a marine insurance policy, covering risk of craft to and from the vessel, merely insures the cargo while in transport to and from the vessel, but does not cover a loss of the cargo due to accidents to the vessel before any of the cargo was loaded, whereby the shipment was delayed and cargo spoiled.</p> <p>4. Insurance <5=175 — Covering loss resulting from delay to the vessel in cargo policy refers only to delay after cargo is on board.</p> <p>A clause of an open policy on a cargo, which named no particular vessel, insuring against delay and consequence of delay from certain accidents to the vessel, refers only to the vessel having the cargo on board, and does not cover delay resulting from an accident to the vessel before any of the cargo was loaded.</p> <p>5. Insurance <5=175 — Beginning adventure clause controls beginning of risk, rather than laden clause.</p> <p>Where a cargo insurance policy describes tile cargo as laden or to be laden, and also contains the common “beginning the adventure” clause, the latter clause is controlling as to the time the risk attaches; the former being merely descriptive of the thing insured.</p> <p>6. Insurance <5=175 — Reference to “vessel or conveyance” in clause held not to cover risks to vessel before loading.</p> <p>In a cargo insurance policy, containing a clause attaching the risk “beginning the adventure” in the “vessel or conveyance as aforesaid,” the vessel or conveyance refers only to the vessel in which the voyage is to be made, not to the craft in which the cargo was conveyed to the vessel, though the risk during such conveyance was covered by a rider attached to the policy.</p> <p>7. Insurance <5=175 — All risks until delivered does not include risk to vessel before loading.</p> <p>A clause covering all risks until delivered into warehouse, in a cargo insurance policy which had specified numerous risks covered by the policy, which clause followed immediately a provision covering risk of craft during loading, covers only similar risks during discharge, and does not make the policy cover a loss duo to delay to the vessel by accident before loading.</p> <p>8. Contracts <5=152 — All provisions to be given express meaning, if possible.</p> <p>All the provisions of a contract are to be given the meaning expressed by their language, unless it plainly appears that only a part of it conveys ail the meaning intended by the parties.</p> <p><©=^For otter eases see same topic & KHY-NUMBilR in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>•9. Insurance <®=»175 — No lighterage clause held not to cover risks to vessel before loading.</p> <p>In a cargo insurance policy, a clause excepting lighterage or craft risk from the interior before the cargo reached port of shipment does not indicate an intention to cover all risks after arrival at the port, so as to cover damage resulting from delay to the vessel intended to take the cargo, because of an accident before any of the cargo was loaded.</p> <p><gr=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the District of Idaho; Frank S. Dietrich, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the New York Canal Company, Limited, against J. B. Bond and Charles F. Weinkauf. Decree for defendants, and complainant-appeals..</p>

Wolverton, Judge. Action by the United States against Willard N. Jones. From the judgment, defendant brings error.

<p>1. Receiving stolen goods <§=>7 (5) — Description of property in indictment sufficient.</p> <p>An indictment charging defendant with feloniously having in his possession stolen property, consisting of “a large quantity of IVayne knit hose, to wit, one case of hose, then and there of the value of, to wit, five hundred and seventy-six dollars,” held sufficient in description of the property.</p> <p>2. Larceny <§=>32 (5) — Indictment for stealing property in interstate transportation sufficient, where alleging qualified ownership of carrier.</p> <p>In an indictment for stealing property from a railroad car while in course of interstate transportation, it is not necessary to allege ownership' of the property, further than the qualified ownership of the carrier.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <^1172 (2) — Harmless error in instructions.</p> <p>In a criminal case, the giving of instructions which were erroneous in respect to proof of certain facts essential to conviction held not reversible error, where such facts were clearly shown by testimony which the jury must have believed to reach a verdict of guilty.</p> <p>4. Receiving stolen goods <S^9(2) — Instruction as to knowledge of defendant held erroneous.</p> <p>On trial of defendant, charged with having possession of stolen property knowing that it was stolen, an instruction that, if he received it under circumstances that would lead a reasonable and prudent man to believe that it was stolen, the jury were justified in finding that he had such knowledge, held erroneous.</p> <p><@^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <S=»165(2) — Retention of money from proceeds of joint enterprise not preferential payment.</p> <p>Evidence held to sustain defendant’s contention that an arrangement by which he advanced money to bankrupt with which to buy scrap iron, to be sold to a rolling mill company of which defendant was president, was a joint enterprise, the profits and losses of which were shared equally between bankrupt and defendant, and under which the retention by defendant of proceeds of sales did not constitute preferential payment of a debt.</p> <p><S=For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes-</p>

Van Valkenburgh, Judge. Voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy by Andrew J. Blackstock. From a decree dismissing the petition, on objection by Minnie Black-stock, the sole creditor, petitioner appeals.

Youmans, Judge. Criminal prosecution by the United States against John Prosser and another, and also information for forfeiture of automobiles. Judgment of conviction and for forfeiture, and defendants bring error.

<p>Acknowledgment @==>39 — Mechanic’s lien based on unauthenticated foreign af- . fidavit invalid.</p> <p>The provision of Comp. Laws Mich. 1915, § 12502, that “in cases where by law the affidavit of any person residing in another state * * * is required, or may be received injudicial proceedings in this state to entitle the same to be read, it must be authenticated,” if taken before a notary public in another state, by the certificate of the clerk of a court of record in the county where taken, under the seal of said court, to the signature of such notary, and that he was such notary public, held to apply, not only to affidavits to be read in judicial proceedings, but to all others required by law, including the statement of demand to initiate a mechanic’s lien, which is required to be verified by affidavit, and a claimed lien, based on an affidavit not so authenticated, held invalid and not enforceable.</p> <p>@^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee; John E. McCall, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Willie Ray. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Louis G. Berman. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma; Joseph W. Woodrough, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the United States against P. H. Harris. From a judgment dismissing the suit, the United States appeals.</p>

Action by James E. Bishop, administrator of the estate of Orville Bordner, deceased, against Frederick A. Delano, William K. Bixby, and Edward B. Pryor, receivers of the Wabash Railroad Company. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska; J. W. Woodrough, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Ike Payne. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Railroads ‘$=254(6) — Evidence excusing violation of federal statute irrelevant.</p> <p>In an action for penalties for moving cuts of cars without having the air brakes coupled and under control of the engine, as required by Safety Appliance Act March 2, 1903, c. 976 (Comp. St. §§ 8613-8615), where un.der the undisputed facts the movements were train movements covered by the act, defendant’s rules showing that it interpreted them as switching movements, and evidence that in the opinion of witnesses it was safer to have air brakes uncoupled, and that to comply with the law would occasion great inconvenience and delay, was irrelevant and immaterial.</p> <p><§r^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>On motion to amend decree.</p>

<p>1. Patents @=’252 — Infringement of design patent depends on impression produced on purchasers.</p> <p>The question of infringement of a design patent for a doll is a question as to the impression produced on would-be purchasers.</p> <p>2. Patents @=>328 — Design for doll valid and infringed.</p> <p>The Pfeifer design patent, No. 51,559, for a doll, Held valid and infringed.</p> <p>3. Paténts @=>252 — Test of infringement of design stated.</p> <p>Infringement of a design patent for a doll turns upon whether there is identity of appearance, whether the effect produced upon the eye is the same, and whether there is substantial identity of design; and the persons to be deceived are not experts, but ordinary observers, giving such attention to the matter as purchasers usually give.</p> <p><§=»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>4. Patents Design patent entitled to equivalents respecting nonessential details.</p> <p>A design patent for a doll entitles the holder to the usual range of equivalents with respect to known prior unessential details, and, though the patent drawings show a doll with a cap, the figure shown is included within the claim of the patent, whether the doll is provided with painted hair, real hair, bathing cap, or military or naval cap, or any other standard form of headdress.</p>

Suit by the Todd Protectograph Company against the PTedman Manufacturing Company and others. Decree for complainant, and defendants appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Cotirt of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.</p> <p>Suit by the Walker Manufacturing Company, Becker Christian Knudsen, and the Vaughn-IIarris Company against the Illinois Brass Manufacturing Company. Decree for defendant, and complainants appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Eastern District of Michigan; Arthur J. Tuttle, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Standard Computing Scale Company against the Detroit Automatic Scale Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Patents @=’178 — Doctrine of equivalents may be invoked, though patent not pioneer one.</p> <p>Though plaintiff’s patent is not a pioneer patent, the doctrine of equivalents may nevertheless be invoked.</p> <p>2. Patents @=328 — Patent for skylight opening automatically not infringed.</p> <p>The Goldman patent, No. 1,009,502, for a skylight with windows hinged at the bottom and slanting outward at a sufficient degree to cause the window to swing open automatically when released, held not infringed by defendant’s skylight, having the windows set perpendicularly, with a bar or rod adapted to force the window open when the retaining rope or chain is released.</p> <p>3. Pátents @=178 — “Equivalents” defined.</p> <p>“Equivalents” in an art or process are such acts as, in accordance with preceding rules, are interchangeable with those which the inventor has himself employed.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Equivalent.]</p> <p>4. Patents @=168(3) — Claims limited to feature introduced after original claims rejected.</p> <p>Where a patentee’s claims for a skylight were all rejected, and canceled by him, and others substituted, by which he limited each claim to a skylight having an inclined jamb, he was limited to a jamb set at a distinct incline.</p> <p>5. Patents @=312(1) — Presumed that patentee does not infringe another patent.</p> <p>A defendant operating under his own patent is presumed prima facie not to infringe.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>(. Patents @=>259 — Contributory infringement not established, in absence of collusion.</p> <p>A glass company, which manufactured and sold to its trade glass blanks for making lamp shades, held not liable for infringement of a patent tor a shade holder, because its blanks were purchased and used by another in the manufacture of the alleged infringing articles, in the absence of proof of collusion.</p> <p>2. Trade-marks and trade-names @=>68 — “Unfair competition” to warrant equitable relief.</p> <p>The essence of “unfair competition” consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another, and if ordinary attention by the purchaser would enable him at once to discriminate the one from the other, equity will not interfere.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Unfair Competition.]</p> <p>8. Trade-marks and trade-names @=>79 — Suits for unfair competition not encouraged.</p> <p>Suits to enjoin competition as unfair are not to be encouraged.</p> <p>4. Patents @=>174 — Improvement patents strictly construed.</p> <p>A patent, which at most can only be construed as disclosing an improved combination of old elements, whereby a new and useful result is attained, amounting to a step in advance, is to be strictly construed.</p> <p>5. Patents @=>26(2) — New combination of old elements must disclose invention.</p> <p>Where a patent monopoly is sought for a combination of old elements, not only a new and useful result must be attained, but it must be one which required discovery or invention, and not merely mechanical skill.</p> <p>6. Patents @=>328 — 979,664, for lamp shade holder, void for lack of invention.</p> <p>The Handel patent, No. 979,664, for holder for lamp shades, held void for lack of invention, in view of the prior art.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Banks and banking @=>354 — Bill by receiver to charge directors of nation al bank held insufficient.</p> <p>A bill by the receiver of a national bank, against persons who were directors at different times, charging liability with respect to many transactions, set out, covering several years, held, too general, in the indiscriminate charging of various kinds of wrongdoing as applicable equally to all defendants.</p> <p>2. Banks and banking @i=>254 — Requirements stated of bill by receiver to charge national bank directors for losses from excessive loans.</p> <p>In a bill by a receiver against directors of a national bank to recover, losses alleged to have been caused by loans to a single person in excess of the 10 per cent, limit imposed by Iiev. St. § 5200, as amended (Comp. St. § 9761), it is material that it be shown whether the indebtedness was created by direct borrowing, or by discount of commercial paper on which the debtor was liable only as indorser, and also that the statute was knowingly violated, to create liability under Eev. St. § 5239 (Comp. St. § 9831).</p> <p><Sr=>iror other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>3. Pleading 3=^48 — Charges must not extend beyond intended proof.</p> <p>No mode of pleading is just to a defendant, which charges him with more than is intended to be proved against him.</p> <p>4. Banks and banking <@=’254 — Requisites stated of bill to charge national bank directors for failure to collect debts.</p> <p>A bill to charge a director of a national bank with losses from failure to collect debts due the bank should allege possession by the particular debtor of assets from which collection could have been made at the time of the alleged negligence.</p> <p>5. Banks and banking <@=»254 — Bill to charge directors of national bank should state nature of liability.</p> <p>In a suit by the receiver of a national bank against a number of defendants, who were directors at different times, to recover losses alleged to have resulted from making loans in excess of the statutory limit, and also from negligence in making improvident loans and renewals and failing to collect, each defendant is entitled to be informed as to the extent of the charge of liability against him with respect to each transaction set out, and whether the liability claimed is under the statute or at common law.</p> <p>6. Banks and banking ®==>254 — Bill to charge directors of national bank for excessive loans should show extent of liability.</p> <p>A bill to charge a director of a national bank, under Eev. St. § 5239 (Comp. St. § 9831), with liability for losses upon loans exceeding the limit fixed by Eev. St. § 5200 (Comp. St. § 9761), should show clearly whether defendant is charged with liability for the whole loan, or only for the excess.</p> <p>7. Banks and banking <S=>254 — In suit against bank directors, not necessary to join all directors.</p> <p>In a suit by the receiver of a national bank against former directors to charge them with personal liability for alleged illegal acts, it is not necessary that all persons who were directors during the time should be joined a§ defendants.</p> <p><@E5>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Franklin Brewing Company, bankrupt. On appeal from an order of the referee allowing a claim in part. Exceptions overruled, and claim allowed at the amount found by the referee.

<p>In Equity. Bill by the State of Missouri, on the relation of J. Edward Brewer, Collector of Revenue of St. Francois County, Mo.,, against the Federal Lead Company. On motion to dismiss tire bill.</p>

In Equity. Bill by the Kinloch Telephone Company and the Kin-loch Long-Distance Telephone Company against Local Union No. 2 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and others. On motion of -plaintiffs for temporary injunction.

<p>At Law. Action by the Keystone Structural Company against the Link-Belt Company.</p>

<p>1. Domicile <§=^4(2) — Intention does not control domicile on erroneous boundary line.</p> <p>Where a change in the marking of the state boundary line showed that the sleeping and eating rooms in defendants’ residence were in a state other than that in which defendants had considered themselves residents for 40 years, the intention does not control as it does in determining which one of several residences is a domicile, but the domicile is in that state in which the living rooms actually were.</p> <p>On Application for Rehearing.</p> <p>2. States <5=^13 — lie-marking established boundary need not be approved by Congress.</p> <p>Where an agreement establishing a boundary between two states had been approved by Congress, as required by Const, art. 1, § 10, cl. 3, subsequent action by a joint commission of the two states re-marking the boundary in accordance with the original agreement need not be approved.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>United States <®=»127 — Procedure in suit under War Risk Insurance Act is that prescribed by Tucker Act.</p> <p>In bringing suit against the United States on a certificate of war risk insurance, as provided in Act Oct. 6, 1917, as amended by Act May 20, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 514kk), the procedure is that prescribed by Tucker Act, §§ 5, 6 (Comp. St. §§ 1575, 1576), by filing verified petition, serving a copy on the district attorney, and mailing a copy to the Attorney General.</p> <p><g^s>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>War <8=>4 — Statute prohibiting prostitution near military camps still in effect.</p> <p>Selective Draft Act May 18, 1917, § 18, ns amended by Act July 9, 1918 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 201.9b), prohibiting “during the present emergency” houses of ill fame within the zone around military camps to be designated by the Secretary of War, hold in effect on September 7, 1919, the date of an offense charged in an indictment.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Action by the United States against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Henry J. Bloemecke, bankrupt. Petition by the bankrupt to restrain Charles B. Applegate from further proceedings to enforce a decree carrying a money judgment against the bankrupt until the question of discharge should be determined.

<p>1. Customs duties ©=>100 — Drawback paid on false statements may be recovered back.</p> <p>Under Act Oct. 1, 1890, § 25, providing for a drawback on exported goods manufactured from imported materials, and providing that the imported materials shall be identified, and their quantity and the amount of duties paid ascertained, etc., the government is not required to keep a customs official in the factory, so as to have the imported material under continuous observation, but may rely upon sworn statements of the exporter, and when, in reliance on false statements, it makes payments, they may be recovered.</p> <p>2. Customs duties ©=>100 — In action to recover back drawback, noncompliance with regulations sufficiently alleged.</p> <p>Where, in an action to recover back drawback paid on exported goods in reliance on false statements, the complaint alleged that the Secretary of llie Treasury promulgated regulations requiring the keeping of accurate and true accounts of all imported materials, and that no true records were kept, there was a sufficient allegation of failure to comply with the regulations.</p> <p>3. Customs duties ©=>100 — Transferee of exporter, assuming latter’s obligations, may be sued by government for drawback.</p> <p>AVhere an exporter, in reliance on whose false statements the government paid a drawback, transferred all of its assets to another company, which assumed its obligations, the government could sue the transferee to recover back the drawback.</p> <p>4. Customs duties ©=100 — Complaint to recover back drawback held not to show estoppel or laches.</p> <p>In an action to recover back drawback paid on exported goods in reliance on false statements as to the use of imported materials, complaint held not to show on its face that the United States was estopped from recovering or guilty of laches.</p> <p>5. Action ©=>50(4) — In action to recover back payment from payee, and his transferee assuming obligations, there was no misjoinder.</p> <p>Under Practice Book Conn. 1908, pp. 32, 34, 35, §§ 613, 618, 622, and pages 238, 245, §§ 120, 150, of the rules therein, there was no misjoinder of causes or parties in an action against an exporter, and a transferee of its assets, who assumed its obligations, to recover back drawback paid in reliance on the exporter’s false statements as to tbe use of imported materials.</p> <p><gr=oFor other eases see samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbereci Digests & Indexes</p> <p>6. Pleading <@=>367 (2) — Information necessary to preparation of defenses should he obtained by bill of particulars.</p> <p>Information necessary to enable defendants to prepare their defenses should be obtained by a bill of particulars, and not by motions to require plaintiff to amend.</p> <p><§z^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Jury <5^19 (11) — Owner entitled to jury trial on question of compensation.</p> <p>Under the provision of Lever Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 10 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115%ii), authorizing the President to requisition storage facilities for supplies for the army and navy, and to ascertain and pay - just compensation therefor, and providing that, if such compensation' is not satisfactory to the owner, he shall be paid 75 per cent. • of the amount and may sue the United States so as to make up just compensation, such a suit is a part of what is in effect a condemnation proceeding, instituted by the requisition and talcing possession of the property, and upon the question of just compensation the owner is entitled of right to trial by jury.</p> <p>2. Eminent domain <@=>1 — Right of “eminent domain” defined.</p> <p>The right of “eminent domain” means the right of the governing body, under the exigencies of the public weaí, to take private property for the public use and for the public benefit.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Pirst and Second Series, Eminent Domain.]</p> <p>3. Courts <§=>41 — Judge and jury as constituting “court.”</p> <p>In common-law actions, the “court” consists, for the determination of a controversy, of a judge and a jury.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Por other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Pirst and Second Series, Court.]</p> <p>' <§z^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Houston Electric. Company against the of Houston.

<p>Action by Paul Jones & Co., a corporation, against T. Scott Mayes,Collector, etc.</p>

In ■ Admiralty. Libel by the Texas Company against the Hogarth Shipping Company, Limited, and another. Final hearing in Admiralty. Action for breach of voyage charter party.

<p>1. Navigable waters @^37(6) — Lease of lidelands for oyster beds subject to state’s control in interest of navigation.</p> <p>Though a lease, under Gen. Laws R. I. 1909, c. 203, providing for leases of tide-covered lands not within any harbor line for oyster fisheries, is in terms appropriate to an irrevocable grant of a lease-hold estate, and reserves no general right of alteration, it is subject to an implied reservation resulting from the nature of the title of tlie state to tide-flowed lands as a trustee for the public, and is subject to the continuous control of the state Legislature, acting in the interests of navigation and commerce; and hence, where the state, by Act April 14, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 1483), established a new harbor line embracing the leased lands, a riparian owner, who, by authority of the harbor commissioners and the Secretary of War, built a wharf over plaintiff’s oyster beds to such harbor line, was not liable in trespass.</p> <p>2. Statutes ‘§=^149 — State cannot make irrepealable law or contract on governmental subjects.</p> <p>There can be no contract or irrepealable law on governmental subjects, as every succeeding Legislature' possesses the same power and jurisdiction as its predecessor.</p> <p>3. Navigable waters <8=»14(1) — Power to establish harbor lines a continuing power.</p> <p>The power of the state, in the interest of commerce and navigation, to establish harbor lines, is a continuing power.</p> <p>4. Navigable waters ®=>16 — Public entitled to use bed for every purpose in aid of navigation.</p> <p>The public right of navigation is the dominant right in navigable waters, and this includes the right to use the bed of the water for every purpose which is an aid to navigation.</p> <p>5. Navigable waters ©=37(1) — Tide-flowed lands subject to legislative regulation as against lessee, licensee, or occupant.</p> <p>Whether one using tide-flowed lands for oyster beds is a lessee, a licensee, or a sole occupant, the lands are subject to a continuous public trust, to be administered by the Legislature in accordance with changing-requirements and conditions.</p> <p>6. Fish <^=>7(2) — Person constructing wharf through oyster grounds liable for negligent performance of work.</p> <p>Though the Legislature adopted a new harbor line, embracing tide-flowed lands on which plaintiff had oyster beds, and defendant, a riparian owner, was authorized by the harbor commissioners to construct a wharf to the new harbor line, it was liable for all damage to the part of the leased lands not occupied by it, caused by its negligent performance of the wort. /</p> <p><5^31'1 or other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Index»</p> <p>7. Wharves <®=>7 — Provision of permit to build wharf not construed to nullify permit.</p> <p>A provision of a permit granted by harbor commissioners for the construction of a wharf to a new harbor line embracing plaintiff’s oyster bods, that nothing therein should be construed to impair the legal rights of any person, could not be interpreted to nullify the'permit or abridge, the paramount right to improve navigation facilities by constructiqn of the wharf.</p> <p>^=oFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes.</p>

<p>1. Mines and minerals <@=>10 (4) — Lease held terminable only at end of 30 days after expiration of yearly period from date, provided yearly payments were less than $250.</p> <p>Under a mining lease, requiring payment of royalty quarterly and providing that it should not be less than $250 per year, and that failure to make payments within 30 days after due should terminate the lease, where during some quarters no mining was done, and hence no royalty due, the lease held terminable only at the end of 30 days after expiration of the yearly period from its date, provided payments during the year were less than $250.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <@=>151 — Trustee takes lease subject to same conditions as held by bankrupt.</p> <p>The trustee of a mining lessee takes the lease subject to the same burdens as rested on the lessee, and may keep it only by complying with its terms and conditions.</p> <p>3. Mines and minerals <@=>10 (4) — Notice and demand by cross-petition in bankruptcy held sufficient to protect lessor’s right to forfeiture.</p> <p>Where at the time the right of lessor to forfeit a mining lease for default accrued, the estate of lessee was in bankruptcy, and a petition by the trustee for sale of the lease was pending, the filing of a cross-petition by lessor for forfeiture, although premature, held sufficient notice and demand to protect the right.</p> <p>4. Bankruptcy €=>255 — Forfeiture will not be enforced against trustee.</p> <p>Where a mining lease held by bankrupt became subject to forfeiture under its terms pending the proceedings, the trustee will be permitted to avoid the forfeiture and retain the lease by paying the royalty in arrears.</p> <p>5. Bankruptcy €=>351 — Mines and minerals <@=>10 (4) —Mining lease subject to sale by trustee.</p> <p>A mining lease purporting to sell and convey all coal and limestone on the premises, with right to mine so long as desired on payment of royalty of not less than $500 per year, or, if less, on payment of the deficiency, with no provision for forfeiture for nonpayment, held in effect a lease from year to year on an annual rental of $500, not terminable for default in payment, and which on bankruptcy of lessee, may be sold as part of the estate on payment of accrued rental.</p> <p><©ss>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Jackson Bight & Traction Company, bankrupt. On review of order of referee denying priority to claim of Dr. C. A. Bee, administrator. The following is the opinion of Referee West: The Jackson Light & Traction Company was adjudged a bankrupt on March 29, 1919, upon a voluntary petition.

<p>1. Mechanics’ liens <8=»168 — Date from beginning of building or improvement.</p> <p>Under L. ,0. L. § 7418, giving a mechanic's or contractor’s lien precedence of a mortgage recorded after the building or improvement was commenced, or the commencement of delivery of materials on tlie ground, tlie mechanic’s or contractor’s lien dates back to the commencement of the work op construction, whether by the lien claimant or another.</p> <p>2. Mechanics’ liens 45^182 — Limited to specific structures enumerated in statute.</p> <p>Under L. O. L. § 7416, giving a lien for labor and materials expended for construction of any ditch, flume, tunnel, or aqueduct, or any structure or superstructure, as construed by the Oregon Supreme Court, the lien is limited to the specific structure on which the work is done, and does not extend to any other, unless both are included in the same contract.</p> <p>3. Mortgages <§=»15l (3) —Mortgage entitled to priority over lien.</p> <p>Tlie lien of a company which contracted to build an irrigation project, comprising dams, reservoirs, canals, etc., claimed on the entire project for work done under the contract, held under L. O. L. §§ 7416, 7418, not to relate back, so as to take precedence of a mortgage which was recorded before work under the contract commenced, because of unrelated work previously done by others, before the contract was made, on certain separate parts of the project.</p> <p><©=»Eor other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by the Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij against the Stevedores’ & Benevolent Society and another.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <§=>346 — Court may determine accuracy or justice of tax due United States.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Act, § 64a (Comp. St. § 9048), providing that, if any question arises as to the amount or legality of a tax, it shall be heard and determined by the court, applies to taxes due the United States, and the trustee may resist such a tax, and have the accuracy or justice of the claim therefor determined by the bankruptcy court, instead of paying the tax and filing claim for refund.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <S=346 — Statute cannot be abrogated by administrative regulations.</p> <p>Regulations made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to Revenue Act Feb. 24, 19.19, § 1316a (Comp. St. Aim. Supp. 1919, § 5944), cannot nullify Bankruptcy Act, § 64a (Comp. St. § 964S), authorizing the bankruptcy court to determine questions as to the amount or legality of any tax due and' owing by the bankrupt.</p> <p><£=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digeste & Indexes</p>

<p>The American Woolen Company and others were indicted for violation of the Lever Act. On motion to quash the indictment.</p>

<p>1. Commerce <S=»8 (10) —Federal Pure Food Act does not prevent similar acts by state.</p> <p>The federal Food and Drug Act (Comp. St. §§ 8717-8728) does not prevent a similar act by the state in respect to intrastate transactions.</p> <p>2. Food <@=2 — Decision of board of health on facts, supported by evidence, is final.</p> <p>Decision of state board of health under a valid pure food act on questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, is final everywhere.</p> <p>■^s>For otHer cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>3. Food <>=13 — Evidence held to sustain finding of misbranding.</p> <p>Where a baking powder company had changed a cream of tartar powder to a less valuable phosphate add‘powder, and changed the brand only by putting the word “cream” in quotation marks, and making other slight substitutions, which would not attract attention without careful inspection, a decision by a state board of health that the article was misbranded, within a state act prohibiting labels misleading in any particular, was supported by evidence.</p> <p>4. Food ©=>15 — Brands to entrap careless and ignorant not permitted.</p> <p>The seller of goods is not permitted to use brands which entrap the ordinary careless and ignorant.</p> <p>5. Food @=>15 — “Cream” in baking powder label not meaningless.</p> <p>The word “cream” in a label of baking powder, is not arbitrary, meaningless, or distinctive.</p> <p>6. Food 0=15 — Intent in misbranding is immaterial.</p> <p>Where there is evidence to support a finding that the brand on baking powder was misleading, the intent or belief of the seller is immaterial.</p> <p><g=s>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Libel by Tjebbe Swart against the barge Baltimore for damages resulting from a collision.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston; Benjamin F. Keller, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against .Rufus Clendennin. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. War <§==>4, 33 — Congress had power to enact amendment to Food Conti’ol Act, state of war still existing.</p> <p>Tile state of war still technically exists, and Congress had power to adopt Act Oct. 22, 1919, amending Act Aug. 10, 1917 (Oomp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115%e-3115%kk, 3115y8i-3115y8r), known as the Lever Act.</p> <p>2. Criminal law '§^16 — Food Control Act not void because of indefiniteness.</p> <p>The amendment of Lever xlct Aug. 10, 1917 (Oomp. St. 191S, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115%e-3115%kk, 3115%i-3115)6r), by Act Oct. 22, 1919, making it unlawful to make an unreasonable charge for necessaries, is not void for indefiniteness because it does not specify the amount of profit allowable.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by Walter C. Baylies and others against the steam towboat Sea King.</p>

<p>1. Seamen <§=>29 (2) — Duty of ship and owners to keep ship and appurtenances seaworthy.</p> <p>It is the duty of the ship and of her owners to employés, not only to furnish a seaworthy ship and appurtenances at the beginning of the voyage, but to exercise due diligence to keep both the ship and her appurtenances in such condition.</p> <p>2. Seamen <§=29 (2) — Ship and owners not insurers of safety.</p> <p>Neither the ship nor her owners are insurers of the seaworthiness of the ship or her appliances, and if they use due diligence to furnish a seaworthy ship and appliances, and either the ship or the appliances are or become unseaworthy, and this condition cannot be discovered by due diligence, neither the ship nor her owners are liable in damages to a seaman injured thereby.</p> <p><£s»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>3. Seamen <3=>2!) (2) —Ship not liable for death where defect not discoverable by careful examination.</p> <p>Where a steamship fireman was killed by the blowing out of a copper steam pipe, which had been in nse for some years and giving satisfactory and safe service, and no latent defect or condition, which the most careful examination would show to be defective, was shown, the owner of tho ship was not liable.</p> <p><S=>For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMB UR in all Key-Numhered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Lester D. Northrup, bankrupt. On petition by bankrupt for injunction restraining prosecution of action in state court. The bankrupt seeks to restrain, one Thomas O. Taylor from the further prosecution of a suit pending in the Supreme Court of the state of New York against him, brought by Taylor prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in rem by Leslie M. Wilson against the motorboat Charles A. Day.</p>

<p>Criminal prosecutions by the United States against Benjamin N. Ford and against the Matthew Addy Company. On demurrers to indictments.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <S=»81(3) — Status of petitioners as creditors sufficiently shown.</p> <p>A petition in involuntary bankruptcy, which sets out contracts between petitioners and bankrupt, and alleges tender of performance by petitioners and refusal by bankrupt, held to sufficiently establish the status of petitioners as creditors.</p> <p>2. Contracts '^9 (3) — Certainty as to time of performance.</p> <p>Contracts made in February and March, 1919, between growers and a 1 canning company, for the growing of beans to be planted between March 10 and May 1, and delivery of the beans grown to the company held not void for uncertainty as to the year, although no year was specified, but to relate to the then current year.</p> <p><g==}For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Maritime liens <§=?2 — Contract for repair of vessel governed by law of state where performance required.</p> <p>A contract for the repair and improvement of a steamer, which was to be performed in the state of Massachusetts, if not made there, is governed by the Massachusetts law.</p> <p>2. Maritime liens ©^17 — State statute giving lien to those repairing vessel valid.</p> <p>Rev. Laws Mass. c. 198, § 14, giving a lion to persons furnishing material for the repair of vessels, is unquestionably valid.</p> <p>3. Maritime liens ©=^17 — Massachusetts statute not repealed, and lien given to repairer of vessel should be recognized.</p> <p>As the lien given by Rev. Laws Mass. e. 198, § 14, to persons performing labor or furnishing material in the construction or repair of vessels, gives a possessory lien, and does not purport to create a right of action to be enforced by proceedings in rem, tbe statute was not repealed by Act June 23, 1910, § 5 (Comp. St. § 7787), and hence, as between the immediate contracting parties, should be enforced.</p> <p>^c^For other cases see same topic & KBY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>4. Maritime liens <©=>54 — Where lienor makes overcharge, owner must make adequate tender.</p> <p>Where defendant had a possessory lien for repairing a vessel, it is en- ' titled to possession until its charges are paid, and, if it makes an overcharge, the owner, as a first step to asserting the right to possession, must make an adequate tender.</p> <p><§x^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Intoxicating liquors @=273 — Evidence of illegal sales of liquor since arrest warrants injunction.</p> <p>Under National Prohibition Act Oct. 28, 1919, which makes a place where liquor is illegally sold a public nuisance, which may be abated as such, a temporary injunction may be issued, where it is shown that the illegal sales have been made at the place complained of as a nuisance, for which defendant is now under arrest, and that such sales had also been made at the same place since the arrest.</p> <p>other cases sec same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Insurance —Consent to repair does not render marine insurer liable for loss from risk not insured against.</p> <p>Under a marine policy insuring against unavoidable dangers of rivers, fires, and jettisons, and providing that it should be void while the vessel was unseaworthy, except while proceeding to port for repairs and during the time of such repairs, notice to the insurer and consent by it to the making of repairs did not render it liable for a loss during repair from a risk not insured against.</p> <p>2. Insurance ®=>404 — Loss during repairs on shipways from breaking of cribbing not from “peril of the river.”</p> <p>Where the cribbing supporting a vessel which had been hauled out on shipways for repair broke away from its fastenings and slid into the river with the vessel, which sank because some of its "planks had been removed in the -process of repair, the loss was not caused by a “peril of the river,” within a marine insurance policy.</p> <p>3. Insurance <®=»402 — Policy does not cover loss ejusdem generis without language so extending it.</p> <p>A marine policy insuring against loss from unavoidable dangers of rivers, fires, and jettisons, with no clause extending the risk to analogous dangers, does not cover a loss caused by a peril ejusdem generis.</p> <p><@rs>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes-</p>

Landlord and tenant proceeding by Curtis C. McDonnell against Hannah T. Willson, instituted in municipal court. From a judgment of tire Supreme Court in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.

<p>1. States <§=>13 — Boundary between Maryland and Virginia fixed at high tide line on Virginia shore.</p> <p>The boundary line between Maryland and Virginia was originally fixed by the Maryland charter of 1632, under the provisions of which Maryland embraced the Potomac River, the soil under it, and the islands therein to the high-water line of tide-water on the Virginia shore.</p> <p>2. Boundaries <§=>14 — Grant of land running “down” a river held not to cover land in the river.</p> <p>A grant of land on the west side of the Potomac river, described as beginning at a certain tree and extending “down” the river various courses to another tree, did not purport to convey land in the river proper.</p> <p>3. Public lands <§=>190 — Virginia Governor in 1669 was without authority to grant title to soil under Potomac river vested in Maryland by charter.</p> <p>The Governor of Virginia could not, by a grant made in 1669, give title to the soil under the Potomac river, which had been vested in the Maryland proprietary 37 years before by the charter of 1632.</p> <p>4. District of Columbia <§=>! — Compact between Maryland and Virginia for fixing boundary also fixes boundary of District.</p> <p>If the compact of 1785 between Maryland and Virginia established the boundary between the two states at low-water mark, it likewise fixed the boundary of the District of Columbia as ceded by Maryland four years later, unless affected by the exercise of political jurisdiction by the United States, since whatever territory and right to the soil under the Potomac was ceded to the United States by Virginia was receded in 1846.</p> <p>5. Public lands <§=>193 — In colonial grant, title to bed of river is in trust for nation, and subject to public use.</p> <p>Under all of the grants along the Atlantic, including the Maryland grant to Lord Baltimore, the sovereign ownership of the bed of a navigable river within the ebb and flow of the tide belongs by virtue of the prerogative of sovereignty, and is held in trust for the nation and subject to public uses.</p> <p>6. Navigable waters <§=>36(1) — Ownership is in the states, subject to rights surrendered to national government.</p> <p>By the Revolution all the rights of the crown and Parliament in the navigable waters and the soil under them became vested in the states, subject to the rights surrendered later to the national government by the commerce clauses of the Constitution.</p> <p>7. Adverse possession <®=>7(2) — Owners of fast lands on west side of Potomac could not acquire title to soil adverse to state or nation.</p> <p>The owners of fast lands on the west side of the Potomac river, adjoining tidewater, could not, by virtue of their title thereto, acquire any title to the soil under the river adverse to that of the state of Maryland, or its successor in interest, the United States.</p> <p>8. District of Columbia <§=>! — Navigable waters <§=>36(I) — Compact between Maryland and Virginia held not to affect jurisdiction over or nation’s title to bed of Potomac.</p> <p>The compact of 1785 between the states of Maryland and Virginia, providing for concurrent jurisdiction on the waters of the Potomac river, did not affect the jurisdiction over the bed of the river of the sovereignty to which it belonged, or the title which the United States, as successor of the state of Maryland, has in the soil beneath such river.</p> <p>^ss>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>9. Navigable waters @=>37(8) — Grant by Congress of power to common council of Alexandria as to navigation, wharves, etc., construed.</p> <p>Act Cong. May 13, 1826, § 2, giving the common council of the city of Alexandria power to preserve navigation, erect wharves, etc., ^extended' only to the exercise of police jurisdiction over the harbor and harbor improvements, and was not a surrender by Congress of its supervision of commerce, even in such harbor, or a surrender of its title in tbe bed of the river.</p> <p>10. Navigable waters @=>39(4) — Riparian rights are subject to commercial necessity.</p> <p>Whatever rights a riparian owner on the banks of a navigable stream may have against individuals or the public, as represented by the government, must yield to commercial necessity for the improvement of navigation.</p> <p>11. Eminent domain @=>85 — Navigable waters @=>44(3) — Riparian owner on improved river held not entitled to compensation or to soil reclaimed by filling.</p> <p>Where the government, in improving the Potomac river, built a riprap wall and filled in the river bed from the wall back to high-water mark on the Virginia shore, a riparian owner was not entitled to compensation by reason of the fact that its access to the river was cut off, and did not acquire title to the reclaimed soil below low-water mark, since, so long as the sovereign remains owner of submerged soil, it .retains the fee of soil reclaimed.</p> <p>12. Ejectment @=8I— Plea of general issue by defendant in possession makes defense for whole land.</p> <p>Where the defendant in ejectment was found in possession of the land, its plea of the general issue must be construed as making defense for the whole of the land.</p> <p>tgs^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Suit by Edmund K. Fox against the Atlas Portland Cement Company and another. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.</p>

Suit by William P. C. Hazen and others against the American Security & Trust Company, as executor and trustee under the last will and testament of Abraham D. Hazen, deceased, and others. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

Suit by William Hollis and another against Charles W. Kutz, Chairman, and others, Commissioners of the District of Columbia, and as such constituting the Public Utilities Commission of such District, and another. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Appeal and error <@=>1207(4) — Decree pursuant to mandate held erroneous in reserving question not passed on by Court of Appeals.</p> <p>In a suit against a fraternal order and others by a grand lodge of the order, where plaintiff challenged an order of suspension and a resolution revoking its charter and collection of a tax, and defendants justified the suspension principally on the ground that plaintiff had circulated an objectionable pamphlet, and alleged the failure to pay such tax as an additional reason, and the Court of Appeals sustained the suspension because of the circulation of the pamphlet, without passing on the legality of the tax, and reversed the decree, with directions to enter one in conformity with its opinion, it was error for the decree to reserve the question of legality of such tax, as the mandate contemplated a decree ending the litigation.</p> <p>©=oFor other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Physicians and surgeons 16 — Parent’s refusal to permit recommended operation relieved physician from liability.</p> <p>Where a physician and surgeon recommended a -proper operation for a disease of the bone of the leg, and, on the refusal of the mother and natural guardian of the patient to permit such operallon, exercised ordinary skill in the treatment of the case in other particulars, the mother’s refusal relieved him from liability for the course pursued.</p> <p><@=z>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Action by Lewis K. Adams and another against Richard H. Creel. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Divorce <§=211 — Award of alimony pendente lite was not an abuse of discretion, where court’s view of ease made by pleadings was not unreasonable.</p> <p>An award of alimony pendente lite to the wife in a husband’s suit for divorce was not an abuse of discretion, where the view taken by the court of the case made by the pleadings was not an unreasonable one, though different from the view taken by plaintiff.</p> <p>2. Divorce <§=286 — Award of alimony pendente lite is reversible only for plain abuse of discretion.</p> <p>To warrant the Court of Appeals in disturbing a decree for temporary alimony, a plain abuse of discretion must appear.</p> <p>3. Divorce <§=286 — Amount of alimony pendente iite will not be held excessive when there is some basis for it.</p> <p>Sums awarded to a wife as temporary alimony and counsel fees cannot be held excessive, when there is some basis for the award.</p> <p><§s»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Proceeding by George Weems Williams and another, trustee, against Dora Thompson. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Patents 13(7) — Concurrent decisions in Patent Office will not hecdisturbed, except for manifest error.</p> <p>Where the Law Examiner, the Examiners in Chief, and the Assistant Commissioner -of Patents all concurred in finding that the senior party to an interference proceeding had a right to make the claims of the issue, manifest error must be made to appear to warrant the Court of Appeals in disturbing the decision of the Patent Office.</p> <p><§s»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Interference proceeding in the Patent Office between James S. Doyle and another and Charles H. Tomlinson. Prom a decision awarding priority of invention to Tomlinson, the other parties appeal.

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Patent Office.</p> <p>Patent application by David P. Moore and another. From a decision of the Patent Office, rejecting certain claims, the applicants appeal.</p>

Interference proceeding in the Patent Office by Albert D. Grover and another against Alfred D. Antoine and another. From a decision in favor of the junior parties, the other parties appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; j. Warren Davis, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty by the Schoonmaker-Connors Company, Incorporated, against John P. White. Decree for libelant, and respondent appeals.</p>

Rudkin, Judge. Action by the Original Sixteen to One Mine against the Twenty-One Mining Company to recover damages for the wrongful taking of ore from the extralateral segment of a vein owned by plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Arizona; William H. Sawtell'e, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Jesse C. Eain. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Libels by Francis P. Garvan, Alien Property Custodian against $20,000, par value, bonds, Central Union Trust Company of New York, Trustee, claimant, against $100,000 bonds, Edwin G. Menil and others, claimants, against $50,000 bonds, J. Markham Marshall, and others, claimants, and against $25,000 bonds, J. Markham Marshall and others, claimants.

Libels by Francis P. Gárvan, Alien Property Custodian, against $100,000, par value, bonds, Metropolitan Trust Company of New York, trustee, claimant, and against $6,000, par value, bonds, Bankers’ Trust Company, trustee, claimant. Decrees for libelant, and claimants appeal.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania ; Charl.es P. Orr, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by Frederic E. Baldwin and the John Simmons Company against the Grier Bros. Company. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law ‘£=>776 (5) — Instruction that evidence of good reputation may create reasonable doubt should bo given, where evidence conflicts.</p> <p>Refusal of a requested instruction that reputation for good character, if established, might alone create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt, held error, where the evidence was conflicting.</p> <p>2. Conspiracy <®=48 — ÍSucstion whether conspiracy is proved one for jury.</p> <p>On trial of defendant, charged with others with conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, the question whether the conspiracy existed was one for the jury, to be determined on all the evidence, regardless of admissions of another defendant used as witness by the government.</p> <p>3. Statutes @=>241(1) — Criminal statutes strictly construed.</p> <p>All of the canons of interpretation that apply to civil statutes apply to criminal statutes, and in addition the canon that they are to be strictly construed.</p> <p>4. Indictment and information <£=>128 — Counts alleging identical facts charge but one offense.</p> <p>If two indictments, or two counts of one indictment, are identical, element for element, in necessary allegation and proof, then the two charges are for but one offense, and defendant cannot be tried thereon for separate offenses under different statutes.</p> <p>5. Statutes @=>225 — Provisions of Selective Draft Act and Espionage Act in pari materia.</p> <p>The provision of Selective Draft Act, § 6 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 20441), making it an offense to aid another to evade the requirements of the act, and the provision of Espionage Act, tit. 1, § 3 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Aim. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), making it an offense to willfully obstruct the recruiting- or enlistment service, to the injury of the service, are in pari materia : the same facts which would constitute an offense under the first provision also constituting an offense under the second, and the first provision being specific and the second general, the first governs, where the facts bring the offense within it.</p> <p>6. Army and navy <S=>41) — Specific offense against Selective Draft Act punishable only under that act. which was not repealed by the Espionage Act.</p> <p>The provision of Selective Draft Act, § 6 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 2044f), making it an offense to aid another to evade the requirements of the act, was not repealed by implication by Espionage Act, fit. 1, | 3 (Comp. St. 1.918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10212c), making it an offense generally to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service, and a defendant charged in two counts, in identical language, with acts which would constitute an offense under either act, held subject to trial only under the Selective Draft Act.</p> <p>Evans. Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p> <p><§s»For other cases seo same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Army and navy ‘©=’44(1) — Jurisdiction of court-martial in cases of assault.</p> <p>Under article 58, Articles of War (Rev. St. § 1342), in force prior to March 1, 1917, authorizing courts-martial in time of war to punish the offenses of “assault and battery with intent to kill” and “wounding by shooting or stabbing with intent to commit murder,” a court-martial held without jurisdiction to impose, imprisonment on a defendant on conviction for assaulting another by cutting him with a knife, without intent to kill, or for assaulting another by shooting at him with a pistol with intent to kill.</p> <p>2. Assault and battery <§=>57 — Application of actual force necessary to constitute “battery.”</p> <p>It is essential to a battery that some force shall be actually applied, not merely threatened or attempted to he applied, to the person of another, and shooting - at another, without hitting him, does not constitute an assault and battery.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.- — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Battery.]</p> <p>3. Assault and battery <©=>48 — “Assault” defined.</p> <p>An “assault” is an attempt, which, if consummated, would result in a battery.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Assault.]</p> <p>Lewis, District Judge, dissenting.</p> <p><©s»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Contracts 27(3) — Eyewitness clause in accident policy valid.</p> <p>A provision of an accident policy that “there shall be no liability * * * for the payment of any sum on account of a bodily injury produced by (1) the discharge of fire arms; (2) poison; (3) or where the body is not recovered" and fully identified, unless the claimant shall establish the accidental character of the injury by a person, other than the member or the claimant, jvho was an eyewitness of all the circumstances of the casualty,” held not contrary to public policy, valid, and to-apply in ease of injuries causing death.</p> <p>2. Contracts <§=’1.01(2) — Public policy affecting validity is that of forum.</p> <p>Whether a provision of a contract is invalid, as contrary to public policy, is to be determined by the public policy in force in the state where the contract is sought to be enforced, either general or established • by its Constitution or statutes, or by the decisions of its highest courts.</p> <p>3. Insurance <§=’395, 559(2) — Right to contest sufficiency of proofs of loss not lost by refusal to pay policy on other ground.</p> <p>Refusal of an accident company to pay a death claim after receipt of proofs, on the ground that “the loss is not covered by the policy,” held not an acceptance of the proofs .as sufiicient, nor a waiver of any defense it might make under the policy, such as that the injury was not established by an eyewitness.</p> <p><§=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Prostitution @=3 — “Purpose” equivalent to “intent” in indictment under White Slave Traffic Aet.</p> <p>An indictment lor violation of Mann Act, § § 2, B (Comp. St. §§ 8813, 8814), by causing a woman to be transported from one state into another “for the purpose of having unlawful sexual intercourse,” held to sufficiently aver intent.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, intent; Purpose.]</p> <p>3. Prostitution @=4 — Conviction for violation of White Slave Traffic Act sustained by evidence.</p> <p>Evidence held to sustain a conviction for violation of Mann Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8813), by transporting a woman in interstate commerce with intent and purpose that she should engage in immoral practice.</p> <p>3. Criminal law @=406(6) — Admissions of relevant facts competent.</p> <p>On trial of defendant for violation of Mann Act (Comp. St. §§ 8812-8819) by persuading and transporting a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of illicit intercourse, subsequent admissions by defendant of the paternity of the woman’s child held admissible in evidence.</p> <p>4. Witnesses <5=352 — Impeaching testimony held inadmissible.</p> <p>A letter to defendant, containing a threat by the attorney for the prosecuting witness in a civil case to institute criminal proceedings, held not admissible to impeach the witness, not shown to have had any knowledge of it.</p> <p>5. Prostitution @=1 — White Slave Traffic Act; illicit intercourse need not be sole purpose of transportation.</p> <p>It is sufficient to warrant conviction for violation of Mann Act (Comp. St. §§ 8812-8819), if one of defendant’s purposes, among others, in transporting a woman in interstate commerce, was to engage in illicit intercourse.</p> <p>6. Criminal law @=855(8) — Statement by juror after close of trial not misconduct.</p> <p>The action of a juror in congratulating the prosecuting witness on the verdict, after the close of the trial and discharge of the jury, held not improper.</p> <p><®=sFor other cases see same topic & KBY-NUMBEIt in ail Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma; J. W. Woodrough, Judge.</p> <p>Information by the United States against one automobile; Edna Townsend, intervener, claimant. From a judgment of forfeiture, claimant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Removal of causes <®=34 — Contested proceeding to confirm road assessment a removable “suit.”</p> <p>A proceeding under the Arkansas Alexander Road Law in the county court for the confirmation of an assessment of benefits, in which the report of commissioners performs the office of a complaint, the notice for appearance that of process, and the objections to assessment that of- an answer, and in which the court can render judgment against all real property, conclusive except by direct attack on appeal, is a “suit” which may be removed to the federal court for diversity of citizenship of the parties.</p> <p>LEd. Note.. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Suit.]</p> <p>2. Appeal and error <©=5'?19(3) — Trial without jury is jurisdictional question, though not assigned.</p> <p>The trial by the court without a jury of a suit in the federal court to recover a sum of money, in which parties were entitled to a jury trial unless they waived it, presented a question of jurisdiction which the Circuit' Court of Appeals must notice, whether assigned as error or not.</p> <p>3. Courts <3=»406(1) — Only record questions reviewable by Circuit Court of Appeals after unauthorized ferial without jury.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. § 649.(Comp. St. § 1587), authorizing trial without a jury when the parties-stipulate in writing, waiving a jury, and section 700 (Comp. St. § 1668), providing for review of certain questions when the case has been tried without a jury in accordance with the former section, the Circuit Court of Appeals, on error in case tried by the court without waiver by the parties of a jury trial, can review only questions arising on the process, pleadings or judgment.</p> <p>^g^jFof other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>4. Jury <©=>12 (3) — Determination as to basis for road assessment held disputed question of fact, requiring jury trial.</p> <p>Whore road commissioners assessed benefits on a percentage and zone system, and a railway company objected thereto on tlie ground that its property received no benefit from the road improvements, and offered evidence in support of its claim, the trial judge, in reducing the assessment by modifying the zones including the railroad, determined a disputed question of fact as to existence of benefits, so that it should not have dismissed the jury because there was no disputed fact in the ease.</p> <p>®z>Fot other cases see same topic & KTQY-NXJMBJSIt in all Key-Numbered Digests & fudges</p>

<p>1. Corporations ©=>116 — Option for sale of stock not subject to rejection or withdrawal.</p> <p>A contract where,by an owner of mining stock, in consideration of §10 and other considerations, agreed to sell it to the other party, or any person such party might demand, on or before a specified date, was not a mere offer or authorization to sell, subject to withdrawal or rejection prior to formal acceptance, but was the grant of an irrevocable and exclusive option, conveying to the optionee a vested and valuable property right, which he was entitled to retain and enjoy during the period of the option.</p> <p>2. Corporations ©=>116 — -Optionee of stock entitled to purchase or sell to others.</p> <p>Under an option by which the optionor agreed to sell mining stock to the optionee or any persons he might demand, the optionee could, either alone dr in association with others, purchase the property or sell the property to others, relying on the option to enable him to fulfill his obligations.</p> <p>3. Corporations ©=> 116 — Optionee selling stoek entitled to difference in price.</p> <p>The holder of an option, selling the property to others at an advance In price, is the absolute owner of the difference between the price specified in the option and the price obtained by him.</p> <p>4. Corporations ©=>121(5) — Optionor has burden of establishing surrender of option to purchase stock.</p> <p>One giving an option to purchase mining stock had the burden of establishing a surrender or relinquishment of the option by the optionee.</p> <p>5. Corporations ©=>121(5) — Evidence insufficient to show abandonment of option by optionee to purchase stock.</p> <p>In an action involving the ownership of the proceeds of a resale of mining stock by an optionee in excess of the price specified in the option, evidence held insufficient to show an abandonment or surrender by the optionee of his rights under the option.</p> <p>or other cases see same topic & KBY-NUMBER in all Kcy-Nuinhorod Digests & Indexes</p> <p>6. Corporations €=>116 — Approval of stock optionee’s contract with third person held not to make optionor a party thereto.</p> <p>Where an optionee of mining stock granted an option to a third party, providing for the deposit of the stock in escrow, accompanied by joint instructions executed by him and the original optionor, the execution by the optionor of a statement at the foot of the contract that he thereby approved it did not make him a party to the sale of the stock to such third person, and as such entitled to the price paid in excess of the price specified in his option, but merely indicated his assent to the provisions respecting the deposit of the stock and the instructions accompanying it.</p> <p>7. Corporations €=>116 — Optionee of stock not required to accept option otherwise than by paying price.</p> <p>Under an option whereby an owner of mining stock agreed to sell it to the optionee, or any persons he might demand, on or before a specified date, for a sum payable in installments, the first of which was payable on the date specified fpr expiration of the option, the optionee was not obliged to do anything to show that he accepted the option, except to pay the price in accordance with its terms.</p> <p>8. Corporations €=116 — Stock optionee’s rights not affected by intent to exercise on contingency.</p> <p>Where an optionee of mining stock granted an option to a third party, his rights under his option were not affected by the fact that he intended to comply therewith if the third party performed its contract, and not to comply therewith if the third party failed to perform, as he was under no liability to take the stock, but had a right to take it, if he so desired.</p> <p>Corporations €=>116 — Validity of stock option not affected by financial condition.</p> <p>The validity of an option for the sale of mining stock is not affected by the fact that the optionee has not the money with which to exercise the option.</p> <p>10. Corporations €=>116 — Stock option not enforceable for illegality or inequity.</p> <p>Where plaintiff, having an option from defendant for the purchase of mining stock, gave an option to a third person, with defendant’s approval, providing for deposit of the stock in escrow, and the third person received the stock and deposited the entire purchase money, which could not be disposed of by either plaintiff or defendant without the consent of the other, there was nothing illegal or inequitable, preventing enforcement of plaintiff’s option, on the theory that defendant had no security for the payment of the installments due it, as the purchase money paid by the third party took the place of the stock, and constituted better security than the stock.</p> <p>11. Corporations €=>116 — Stock optionee within rights in delaying determination to exercise.</p> <p>Under an option for the purchase of stoqk on or before a certain date, with a provision for extension of the time in a certain contingency, the optionee was within his legal rights in putting off his determination to take the stock until the date as so extended.</p> <p>12. Corporations €=>116 — Stock optionee’s profits immaterial.</p> <p>_ That an optionee of mining stock made a large profit on a resale was -. immaterial, in a suit involving the ownership of such profits.</p> <p><@=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge. Separate libels by the Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Company against the T. A. Scott Company, Incorporated, by the Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Company against the White Oak Transportation Company, and by the White Oak Transportation Company against the Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Company. Decree for libelees in each libel, and libelants appeal.

Van Fleet and Frank H. Rudkin, Judges. Suit in-equit}' by the Tw«nty-One Mining Company against Original Sixteen to One Mine. Decree for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Receivers —Intervener without right to challenge jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where a receiver was appointed for a railroad company on a bill alleging its inability to meet its obligations, which was admitted by the answer, an intervener, who came in four years afterward, held to have no standing to challenge the jurisdiction of the court to appoint the receiver or to authorize him to issue certificates of indebtedness.</p> <p>2. Receivers —Bondholders estopped by acquiescence of mortgage trustee to deny validity of receiver's certificates.</p> <p>Where a lumber company, which held notes of an affiliated railroad company secured by trust deed, pledged such notes with a trustee to secure an issue of its own notes, and at the request of such trustee the mortgage trustee intervened in a receiver’s suit against the railroad company and foreclosed its trust deed, such mortgage trustee held to represent the note holders of the lumber company, who were bound by its knowledge and acquiescence in the issuance of receiver’s certificates in the suit, and not entitled to subsequently intervene and attack the validity of such certificates.</p> <p>3. Receivers <^129 — Transferee of bonds estopped to question validity of receiver’s certificates.</p> <p>Where holders of notes secured by trust deed on the property of a railroad company, which was in process of foreclosure by intervention in a creditors’ suit, had knowledge of, and in some cases expressly assented to, the issuance of receiver’s certificates in the suit, believed to be for their own benefit, a subsequent nominal transferee of the notes held estopped to question the validity of the certificates.</p> <p>other cases seo same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Release <@=24 (1) — Validity may be contested in suit at law.</p> <p>In view of Judicial Code, § 274b, as amended March 3, 1915 (Comp. St. § 1251b), providing for equitable defenses at law, a release invalid for fraud and incapacity is not a bar to an action for damages until set aside in equity.</p> <p>2. Appeal and error <@=1033(5) — Instructions as to proving invalidity of release held favorable to defendant.</p> <p>instructions that the burden was on plaintiff to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the signer of a release was not conscious of what he was doing are, if anything, too favorable to defendant, and he cannot complain thereof.</p> <p>3. Master and servant <@=278(19) — Evidence of violation of rale held to warrant a finding of negligence.</p> <p>Evidence of violation of a street railway rule requiring cars to slow down and sound gong when passing another car which was running slowly is suiiicient to warrant a finding of negligence in an action for the death of an employé, who had just stepped from behind a car which slowed down to permit him to alight.</p> <p>4. Master and servant <@=289 (4) — Contributory negligence held for jury.</p> <p>An employé can rely on a rule requiring a passing car to slow down, so that the question of his contributory negligence in stepping from behind one car in front of another is for the jury, especially under a state Erri]foyers’ Liability Act, placing the burden of proving contributory negligence on the employé.</p> <p>5. Master and servant <@=375 (2) — Injury to street car motorman going to dinner “arises out of and in the course of his employment,” within Compensation Act.</p> <p>Where a street car employé, who was injured by a car just as lie was alighting from the one on which he was riding home to dinner, between his morning and afternoon hours of duty, his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, within Employers’ Liability Act N. H. §§ 1, 2.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Course of Employment.]</p> <p>6. Master and servant <@=348 — Stats Compensation Act should be liberally const raed.</p> <p>The New Hampshire Employers’ Liability Act, like compensation acts generally, is a remedial act, and is to ho liberally construed; its underlying policy being that some fair part of the economic loss caused by industrial accidents shall be borne by the industry.</p> <p><@5»For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; Charles P. Orr, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Goodman Manufacturing Company against the Pittsburgh-Buffalo Company. The Union Trust Company of Pittsburgh, as trustee and individually, appeals from decree.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of. the United States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania; Charles B. Witmer, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the. Coal & Delivery Company, Inc., against H. W. Howard and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Judgment <@=^948 (2) — Defense of former adjudication cannot be raised by motion to dismiss.</p> <p>The defense of former adjudication cannot properly be raised or determined on a motion to dismiss, unless the bill on its face presents fully the récord of the former case.</p> <p>2. Judges <@==>51 (3) — Statute permitting affidavit of prejudice strictly construed.</p> <p>Judicial Code, 21 (Comp. St. § 988), permitting the filing of an affidavit of personal bias or prejudice of a judge, is to be strictly construed, and an affidavit wliieh does not conform to its requirements, bnt was filed during term wliile matters were pending for decision before the District Judge, and stated no facts, bnt contained only irrelevant and scandalous charges reflecting on the judge and others, has no legal effect upon his right to continue in the case and will, moreover, be stricken from the records of the appellate court on its own motion.</p> <p>*<g=x»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United. States for the District of Massachusetts; George Ii. Bingham, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the United States against the Boston & Maine Railroad. Judgment for the United States, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law <S=»1168(1) — Error in refusing instructed verdict as to one count harmless, where sentence for less than maximum under other count.</p> <p>Where the sentence is general, and for a less term than the maximum which might have been imposed under either count, if there is evidence to sustain a conviction under either, error in refusing an instructed verdict as to the other is immaterial.</p> <p>2. War <3=^>4 — Competent evidence of one witness sufficient, without corroboration, in Espionage Act prosecution.</p> <p>On a trial under the Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 102!2a-10212h) for supporting the cause of the German government and opposing that of the United States, the evidence of one witness, if competent, is sufficient for a conviction, without corroboration.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <S=1159(3) — Appellate court cannot weigh conflicting testimony.</p> <p>The Circuit Court of Appeals can merely determine in a criminal case whether there was some competent and substantial evidence tending to sustain the verdict, and cannot weigh conflicting testimony.</p> <p>4. War <§=^4 — Finding of intent warranted in prosecution under Espionage Act.</p> <p>On a trial under the Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h) for favoring the cause of the German government and opposing that of the United Stab's, defendant’s intent might be deduced from circumstances, and the jury were justified in finding a wrongful intent on evidence that he stated to one expecting to be called into military service that he was a fool for fighting a rich man’s war and for the rich man's troubles, that the government could not pay 2 per cent. on the debt it was contracting, etc., and that the United States had no business to go into the war, and should have kept her ships at home, and there would have been no trouble and no war. ■</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBDR in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>5. Indictment and information @=87(4) — Date alleged immaterial, if prior to indictment and within period of limitations.</p> <p>On a trial under tbe Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), tbe precise date alleged is not material, so long as it is shown that tbe offense was committed before the finding of tbe indictment and within the period of limitations.</p> <p>6. Criminal law @=371(1) — Evidence of other utterances admissible to show intent on trial under Espionage Act.</p> <p>On a trial under the Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), evidence of utterances of defendant of similar import to those charged, made at times other than those alleged, some prior to our entry to the war, and some subsequently, but before the indictment, was admissible on the question of defendant’s state of mind and intent in the particular utterances charged. .</p> <p>7. Criminal law @=673(5) — Limiting evidence by charge sufficient.</p> <p>Where, on a trial under the Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), the court admitted utterances of similar import to those charged, as bearing on defendant’s state of mind and intent, it was sufficient to confine them to that purpose by the charge, without limiting the purpose for which they were admitted while, the witness was on the stand.</p> <p>8. Criminal law @=696(3) — Direction of verdict on one count does not require striking out of evidence relevant to other counts.</p> <p>On a trial under the Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212a-10212hL the refusal to strike out evidence was not error, though a directed verdict was granted as to the count under which it was offered, where it was admissible on the question of intent under other counts.</p> <p><@ss>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Army and navy ©=>40 — Indictment for attempting to cause insubordination and obstructing recruiting sufficient; “publicly.”</p> <p>An indictment for causing or attempting to cause disloyalty, insubor- ' dlnation, etc., in the military forces, and obstructing the recruiting and enlistment service, alleging that the objectionable utterance was made publicly to certain persons and other persons unknown, sufficiently showed that it was so made as calculated to reach persons in the military service, or who might become recruits, as “publicly” means in public, well known, open, notorious, common, or general, as opposed to private, secluded, or secret.</p> <p><@z3>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>2. Army and navy <®=49--Wliether dciendani’s language could cause insubordination or obstructing recruiting a question for the jury.</p> <p>It was at least a question' lor the jury whether deiendant’s statement that, if lie were of conscription age and had no dependents and was drafted, he would refuse to serve, and that they could shoot him, but could not make him light, would have the effect of causing disloyalty, insubordination, etc., in the military forces, or obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service.</p> <p>3. Army and navy >3=>4ft — “Military forces,” within Espionage Act, defined.</p> <p>The term “military forces” in Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1918, Oomp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212;i-l0212h), includes all persons designated by statute and subject to be called into active service under it.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Military Forces.]</p> <p>4. Army and navy <5=>40 — “Recruiting” and “enlistment,” within Espionage Act, defined.</p> <p>Within the Espionage Act (Oomp. St. 1.918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp: 1919, §§ 10212a-10212h), relative to obstructing the recruiting and enlistment service, “recruiting” comprehends the gaining of fresh supplies for the forces, as well by draft as otherwise, and “enlistment” comprehends all males of the legal ages of enlistment, as well as all of the governmental machinery to secure enlistments.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Enlistment.]</p> <p>5. Army and navy <§=>40 — Whether objectionable utterance was merely angry outburst a question for the jury.</p> <p>On a trial for causing or attempting to cause disloyalty, insubordination, etc., in the military forces, and obstructing the recruiting and enlistment service, whether the objectionable utterance was merely an angry outburst of a man goaded into resentment was a question for the jury, and its finding could not be disturbed, where such conclusion was not the only one which reasonable men, considering all of the surrounding circumstances, might have reached.</p> <p><§=cFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Criminal law '§=>1090 (8, 14) — Instructions and rulings on evidence not reviewable without bill of exceptions.</p> <p>On writ of error to a judgment of conviction, instructions and rulings on admission of evidence -are not reviewable, where the recox*d consists of the judgment roll alone without a bill of exceptions.</p> <p>2. Conspiracy <§=>43(6) — Indictment need not allege object more specifically than for substantive offense.</p> <p>An indictment for conspiracy to transport intoxicating liquor to a state for use contrary to law need not state the offense which is the object of the conspiracy more specifically than would be required in an indictment charging it as a substantive offense.</p> <p>3. Indictment and information ‘§=>111(1) — Indictment for conspiracy to transport liquor into state need not negative exceptions.</p> <p>An indictment for transporting intoxicating liquor into a state need not negative the exceptions in the statute of liquor intended for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, and therefore an indictment for conspiracy to commit that offense need not negative the exceptions.</p> <p>’ 4. Conspiracy @=>43 (6) —Allegation that transportation of liquor was unlawful and felonious is sufficient.</p> <p>In an indictment for conspiracy to violate the Reed Amendment (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 8739a, 10387a-10387c), a charge that the purpose of defendants was to wrongfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport the liquor is sufficient to import an unlawful motive.</p> <p>5. Conspiracy <®=>43(6) — Indictment for conspiracy to transport liquor into state need not allege the place of origin.</p> <p>An indictment for conspiracy to transport intoxicating liquors into; a dry state need not allegfe the place from which the liquors wore to have been transported, since that need not have been agreed upon, but the purpose may have been to transport thorn into the state from any place where they could be procured.</p> <p>^3x^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge.</p> <p>Action by the Worcester Post Company against the W. H. Parsons Company. Judgment for defendant (257 Fed. 774), and plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>1. Appeal and error @==>181 — Power to notice errors not properly preserved is discretionary, and exercised only for obvious errors.</p> <p>The exercise of the power given the Circuit Court of Appeals, under rule 11 (188 Fed. ix, 109 C. C. A. ix), to notice errors not properly preserved, is purely discretionary, and such discretion should not be exercised, unless it is obvious that substantial error exists.</p> <p>2. Fires <®^7 — If statute imposes liability irrespective of negligence, petition alleging negligence not based on statute.</p> <p>If Rev. St. Colo. 1908, § 2070, making any person setting on fire any woods or prairie liable to make satisfaction for any damage, imposes liability independent of negligence, then a petition based on negligence is not founded on the statute.</p> <p>3. Trial <§=^214 — Failure to give charge based on statute not error, when statute not called to court’s attention.</p> <p>In an action for damages from fire, the failure to charge that the leaving of an unextinguished fire authorized recovery, irrespective, of negligence, was not error, assuming that Rev. St. Colo. 1908, § 2070, made a violation thereof negligence per se, where the statute was not called to the trial court’s attention.</p> <p>4. Evidence <§=¿>52 — Judicial notice does not dispense with necessity of calling statute to court’s attention.</p> <p>The rule that federal courts take judicial notice of state statutes means that the federal court will apply the statute, without formal proof of its existence and contents, and does not mean that the court must know and apply at all times every statute of the state, without having the existence and contents of the statute brought to its attention at the proper time.</p> <p>5. Appeal and error <@=3!K)7 (1) — Presumption hot indulged that statute was called to court’s attention.</p> <p>Where the record does not show that a statute relied on as showing error was brought to the court’s attention, it cannot be concluded that the court knew of and rejected the application of the statute, as this would be presuming error without basis in the record.</p> <p><§=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Bankruptcy <@=154 — Petitioner, by obtaining order for his benefit, submits to summary jurisdiction for its enforcement.</p> <p>Where at the time of its bankruptcy a corporation was engaged in manufacturing' certain articles under a contract, the other party to the contract, by presenting a petition in the proceedings, alleging that it would suffer serious loss by delay, and obtaining an order permit ting it to take possession of the completed articles and materials on hand, on condition that it pay for the work done as soon as the amount could be ascertained, thereby submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court to enforce such condition by summary order, and could not insist on a plenary action, in which it could litigate a counterclaim.</p> <p><©=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the First Division of the Northern District of California; Maurice T. Dooling, Judge.</p> <p>Habeas corpus by Fong Gin Gee against Edward White, as Commissioner of Immigration of the Port of San Francisco. From a judgment ordering the discharge of the petitioner, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Indians ®=>15(1) — Equitable interest in lands held in trust may be conveyed, when no restrictions are imposed.</p> <p>The equitable interest in allotted lands of Indians held in trust by the government may be conveyed, where no restriction on alienation is imposed.</p> <p>2. Indians <^>15 ( I ) — White wife of Indian may convey interest as heir, when alienation not expressly prohibited.</p> <p>Under Act Feb. 13, 1891, ratifying an agreement with the Sac and Fox Nation of Indians, providing for allotments of land to be held in trust by the government for specified periods, but not expressly restraining alienation, an allottee’s wife, a white woman of no Indian blood, conld convey her interest as heir, and, under her warranty deed, her title under a patent subsequently issued inured to the benefit oC her grantee.</p> <p><©Z5>For other casos see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Koy-Nutnbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Criminal law <®=>655(5) — Remarks of judge as to counsel’s argument held not error.</p> <p>A remark by the judge to counsel for defendant, when he was making his argument to the jury, that it was unfair to attack a witness for the government on the ground that he was a bootlegger, when according to defendant’s own testimony witness delivered the liquor as his agent, held not error.</p> <p>2. Criminal law <S=s>lI37 (3), 1172(7) — Reference to witness in instructions not prejudicial error.</p> <p>A reference in instructions to a witness for the government as “This lowly creature, who is not to be believed,” held not prejudicial error, since, if such characterization was that of defendant’s counsel, he invited the error, and if that of the court, it might be to defendant’s advantage.</p> <p><§z;s>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Master and servant 'S^Ui — Hours of Service Act applies to employes moving cars in yards; “movement of trains.”</p> <p>The purpose of Hours of Service xlct March 4, 1907 (Comp. St. §§ 8677-8080), is to promote the safety of employes as well as passengers, and an employe assisting in moving cars in yards, sometimes as many as 15 at one time, is engaged in the movement of trains, within the meaning of section 1 (section 8677), and is subject to the provisions of the act.</p> <p>@=>For other cases seo samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

.Appeal from the District Cpurt of the United States for the First Í)ivision of the Northern District of California; Maurice T. Dooling, udge. . In Admiralty. • Libel by the Overseas Shipping Company against átruthersil& Dixon, a copartnership, to recover damage for alleged breach of. contract. Decree for respondent, and plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey; Charles F. Lynch, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in admiralty by John Killeen against Thomas Hogan & Sons, Incorporated. Decree for libelant, and respondent appeals.</p>

<p>In -Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri; Jacob Trieber, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against Joseph Eleck and others. Judgment of conviction, and defendants bring error.</p>

<p>Principal and agent —Termination of exclusive agency contract by failure to exercise option for further purchases.</p> <p>Tinder a contract for sale of 200 barrels of whisky, buyer to have sole agency for sale of the branch in a city for two years, with an option to buy an additional “200 barrels or part” within a stated time, in which event the agency was extended for one year, and a further option to buy “an equal number of barrels” in each of the three succeeding years, with like extension of the agency, the exercise of the first option held necessary to fix the quantity which might be bought in the following years, and the failure to exercise it held to extinguish'the right to make further purchases thereunder, and to limit the agency to two years.</p> <p>(®^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes-</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the'United States for the Southern Division of the Southern District of California; Oscar A. Trip-pet,-judge. _ -</p> <p>_ Suit by.William B. Edwards against Patrick II. Bodkin.- From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Indians 2=35 — Statute against possession of liquor applies in Indian country in Minnesota.</p> <p>Act May 25, 1918, § 1 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4137aa), making it an offense to have possession of intoxicating liquors in the Indian country, where the introduction is prohibited by treaty or federal statute, held valid and applicable in the territory in Minnesota included in the Chippewa treaty of February 22, 1855.</p> <p>2. Indians 2=35 — Treaty making applicable subsequent prohibition laws.</p> <p>A provision of an Indian treaty that laws then in force or thereafter enacted prohibiting the introduction, manufacture, or traffic in intoxicating liquors in the Indian country should be in force within the territory covered by the treaty, includes a law making it unlawful to have possession of liquor in Indian country.</p> <p>3. Criminal law 2=369(6) — Evidence of prior offense admissible in prosecution for having liquor in possession.</p> <p>In a prosecution for having liquor in possession in Indian country, evidence that defendant unlawfully introduced liquor into the same territory a few days before the offense charged, and before the law went into effect, held admissible.</p> <p><g^5>ITor other eases see same topic & KRY-NUMBER in all Key-Numhered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma; John H. Cotteral, Judge.</p> <p>George AVilliams was convicted of violating the White Slave Traffic Act, and he brings error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma; John C. Pollock, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Window Glass Machine Company and others against the Okmulgee Window Glass Company. Decree for complainants, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>1. Appeal and error >©=’1011(1) — Findings on conflicting evidence should be sustained.</p> <p>Where the testimony of the parties was in direct conflict, and each was somewhat corroborated, the court’s finding on the issue, amply supported by the record, should, be sustained.</p> <p>2. Partnership >©=’121 — Evidence held to sustain finding that dissolution ot partnership did not affect defendant’s rights in patent.</p> <p>Where two parties form a partnership for the manufacture and sale of a patented machine, and the patent is assigned to them jointly as such partners, in a suit for infringement of patent, brought by one joint assignee against the other, evidence held to sustain the trial court’s finding that the rights of defendant assignee in the patent were not extinguished by the agreement for dissolution of the partnership, no final disposition of the partnership assets having been made, so that defendant assignee and his licensees could not be sued for infringement.</p> <p>«gibaFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Patents '©=>174 — Claims for wireless improvement held not entitled to broad construction as pioneer.</p> <p>Claims, for improvement, in wireless apparatus, consisting chiefly of , means for securing electrical resonance between the circuits in both the receiving and transmitting sets, is not, in view of the prior patents of the same inventor and disclosures by him and others, entitled to_ broad construction and a wide range of equivalents as a pioneer invention.</p> <p>2. Patents <§=>248 — Infringement of expired patent cannot infringe subsequent patent, unless containing element not in former.</p> <p>A device which admittedly infringed an expired patent cannot infringe a subsequent patent, unless it contains some element covered by the subsequent patent, which was not included in the expired patent.</p> <p>3. Patents <©=>328 — 763,772 for resonant oscillation in wireless apparatus, held not infringed.</p> <p>The claims of the Marconi patent, No. 763,772, for wireless transmitting and receiving sets, each having primary and secondary circuits, which can be adjusted to oscillate in resonance with the other circuit in the same instrument and with the circuits in the other instrument, held not infringed by the Simps on and Thompson transmitters and the standard receiver, which can only be adjusted to secure resouan.ee between the antennae circuits of the two instruments.</p> <p><§Z5>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Bledsoe, Judge. Suit by Elihu C. Wilson against the Union Tool Company. In contempt proceedings, charging violation of the injunction previously issued against infringement of a patent, the defendant was purged of contempt by the sale of parts of the infringing machine, and plaintiff brings error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas; John C. Pollock, Judge.</p> <p>Suit by the Wire Rope Appliance Company of Tulsa, Okl., against the Eureka Tool Company of Kansas. From a judgment for contempt, defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit to restrain infringement of patent by William Barber against the Otis Motor Sales Company.</p> <p>This is an action in equity to restrain alleged infringement of United States letters patent No. 781,802, dated February 7, 1005, for “valves and valve gear for explosive engines,” and which patent was applied for February 24, 1902. The case originally came on for final hearing on pleadings and proof on November 18, 1915, and this court, after consideration of the proofs and of the prior art, reached the conclusion that the Barber patent was valid and infringed by the defendant. 231 Fed. 755. On appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the conclusions of this court were affirmed, and a petition for rehearing denied. 240 Fed. 723, 729, 153 C. C. A. 521. Thereafter accounting proceedings were inaugurated under the decree and the mandate of the Court of Appeals. Subsequently the Barber patent here in suit came before Judge Hazel in the case of Barber v. Reo Motor Car Sales Co., in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, upon additional prior art patents, which were not before and were not considered by this court in its original consideration of this suit. Judge Hazel reached the conclusion that the Barber patent must be limited by the new prior art set up, and when so limited was not infringed by the defendant. 245 Fed. 938. Thereafter motion was made for the court to request the recall of the mandate of the Court of Appeals, in order that jurisdiction might be restored to this court to hear and consider a motion to suspend the accounting and a rehearing or retrial of this case on the new prior art patents set up before and considered by Judge Hazel in Barber v. Reo Motor Car Sales Co. These motions were granted, and the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals has been recalled. The case now comes before this court for final determination on proofs submitted by both parties, based on the alleged new prior art patents referred to.</p>

In Equity. Suit by Edwin M. Rosenbluth against ,the Hudson Motor Car Company and others. On complainant’s motion to vacate order setting aside service, and defendants’ motion to set aside service.

<p>1. Criminal law <@=>13 — Criminal statute must be clear and definite.</p> <p>In general, a criminal statute, to be valid, must be so clearly and definitely expressed that an ordinary man can determine in advance whether his contemplated act is within or without the law, and, if deviation from a standard is prohibited, the standard must be definitely fixed.</p> <p>2. Criminal law ‘§=>13 — Section 9 of the Federal Control Act not fatally indefinite.</p> <p>Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 9 (Comp. St. 191.8, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 311f)%i), providing that any person who conspires, etc., to limit the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, or dealing in necessaries, or to restrict the supply or distribution of necessaries, or to prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture and production of necessaries to enhance the price, shall be punished, is not invalid for indefiniteness and uncertainty.</p> <p>3. Constitutional law <@=>251 — “Due process of law” means the same in different amendments.</p> <p>The words “due process of law” have the same meaning in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.</p> <p>LEd. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Due Process of Daw.j</p> <p>4. Constitutional law <@=>257 — Due process requires valid statute defining crime.</p> <p>The due process clause of Const. Amend. 5, requires that no person shall be deprived of his liberty as punishment for crime, but by virtue of a valid constitutional statute defining the crime, as the statute upon which a person is deprived of his liberty is a part of the process of law used against him.</p> <p>5. Constitutional law '©=>257 — Arbitrary classification in criminal statute denies due process.</p> <p>An arbitrary classification by Congress in a criminal statute violates the due process clause of Const. Amend. 5.</p> <p>6. Constitutional law <@=>257 — Classification in criminal statute must not be arbitrary.</p> <p>Undér Const. Amend. 5, the classification in a criminal statute must rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to-the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without such basis.</p> <p><g=»I'or other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>7. Constitutional law @=*258 — Certain sections of Food Control Act held to deny due process.</p> <p>Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 4 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115%ff), as amended by Act Oct. 22, 1919, making it unlawful to destroy necessaries, commit waste, hoard or monopolize necessaries, or make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge, etc., and section 26 (section 3115%qq), prohibiting the destruction of necessaries by persons carrying on or employed in interstate or foreign commerce, violate Const. Amend. 5, as to due process, because of the provisos therein exempting farmers, gardeners, co-operative societies, etc., from their provisions, as such classification is arbitrary, and not natural or reasonable.</p> <p>8. War ®=s4 — Original section 4 of Food Control Act cannot be basis of criminal prosecution.</p> <p>Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 4 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115%ff), as originally enacted, making it unlawful to destroy necessaries, commit waste, hoard, or monopolize necessaries, or make unjust or unreasonable rates or charges, etc., is insufficient on which to found a criminal charge, as it provides no penalty, and the statute contains no general penalty clause.</p> <p>9. War <8=>4 — Congress may within reasonable limits prescribe duration of ' war legislation.</p> <p>If, under the war power, Congress had power to pass Act Aug. 10, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115%e-3115%kk, 3115%i-3115%r), it had within reasonable limits the power to provide when it should cease to be in force.</p> <p>10. War —Recital that state of war exists fixes existence, so far as Congress may do so.</p> <p>So far as a state of war may be fixed by act of Congress such state existed at least until October 22, 1910, in view of the recital of the existence of a state of war in the act of that date amending Act Aug. 10. 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115%e-3115%kk, 3115%«-3115%r).</p> <p>11. War <S=:,4 — Termination of Food Control Act does not affect previous violations.</p> <p>’ Assuming that a state of war ceased to exist when the armistice was signed and announced to Congress by the President, the termination thereby of Act Aug. 10, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115%e-3115%kk, 3115%<-3115%r), does not affect offenses committed prior to that time, in view of section 24 (section 3115%pp), providing that • offenses committed, and penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred, prior to the termination of such act, may be prosecuted or punished as if the act had not been terminated.</p> <p>12. Conspiracy <S^2S — Indictment for conspiracy to commit offense consisting of conspiracy will be quashed.</p> <p>A count in an indictment charging a conspiracy under Criminal Code, § 37 (Comp. St. § 10201), to violate Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 9 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115-Ksi), will be quashed, as it charges a conspiracy to commit the offense of conspiracy.</p> <p><S=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Army and navy 3=44(2) — Inactive member of naval reserve is not subject to court-martial.</p> <p>Under Act Aug. 29, 1896, c. 417, 39 Stat. 587, subjecting the naval reserve force to laws governing the navy only during such time as they may by law be required to serve in the navy, the time they may be required is not the full period of enlistment, but only iho time they are actually in service during an emergency; so that a member of such force cannot be tried by court-martial after release from active service, even tor an offense committed while in active service.</p> <p>2. Army and navy 3=36 — Na val officer, after discharge, can be tried for crime in service.</p> <p>A person discharged from the naval service can be prosecuted under the criminal laws of the United States for any act during the period of his active duty made a crime under the general laws of tlio United States, unless he has been previously placed in jeopardy.</p> <p>3. Habeas corpus 3=16 — Can release naval reserve officer wrongfully recalled into service.</p> <p>While ordinarily habeas corpus is not available to inquire into the motive for regular orders by which a man became subject to military discipline, the court can determine in such proceeding’s that the release of an officer of naval reserve force from active duty through the termination of any war necessity relieved him from such duty, unless a new national emergency arose, though the United States was still technically at war.</p> <p>4. Army and navy 3=44(1) — Court-martial has jurisdiction over bribery by naval officer.</p> <p>Though a specification that a member of the navy attempted to bribe a petty officer in the navy to obtain the transfer of a seaman to shore duty, without alleging that it was a fraud on the United States, does not bring the charge within Act July 17, 1802, c. 204, art. 7, subd. 6, 12 Stat. 600, subjecting to court-martial any person in the navy who shall attempt a fraud against United States, or any of the other subdivisions of that article, as article 8 of the same chapter providing that offenses by persons in the navy not specified in other articles shall be punished as a court-martial shall direct, is broad enough to give the court-martial jurisdiction.</p> <p>(gzz^For other casos see saíne topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Nuinbercd Digests & indexes</p>

<p>1. Shipping @=166(1) — Steamer at fault in injuries to passenger caused by swinging of gang plank.</p> <p>Where a steamer passenger, sitting near the gangplank, had his leg broken by the swinging of the plank, due to the motion of the steamer when the captain swung the wheel preparatory to leaving a landing, the steamer held at fault, in that a deck hand, after calling, “All right!” and a few seconds later, “Hold her!” shoved out the gangplank to the wharf, withouc waiting to see whether the captain understood the last signal.</p> <p>3. Shipping @=166(1) — Persons in charge of passenger steamer bound to exercise utmost care.</p> <p>Those in charge of a passenger steamer are not insurers of the safety of the passengers, but are bound to use the utmost care consistent with the nature and extent of the business in which they are engaged, in providing a reasonably safe steamer, and in its management.</p> <p>3. Shipping @=166(3) — Carrier entitled to assume passenger will exercise care.</p> <p>Carriers of passengers by sea have a right to assume that passengers will exercise the care of reasonably prudent men.</p> <p>4. Shipping @=166(3) — Passenger, struck by gangplank, held at fault in not getting out of way.</p> <p>A steamship passenger, sitting on a bench near the gangplank, who at several landings had received a general warning to look out for the gangplank, and who might have seen that his feet were within the- reach of the gangplank, if it should swing to the fullest possible extent, and must have seen the exposed character of a landing, held at fault in failing to get out of the way before his leg was struck by the swinging of the gangplank.</p> <p>5. Shipping @=166(3) — Passenger, struck by gangplank, held not to assume risk, or guilty of inexcusable fault.</p> <p>A steamship passenger, sitting on a bench near the gangplank, who heard no specific warning that he was sitting in a dangerous place, uiough warned generally to look out for the gangplank, did not assume the risk of injury from the plank swinging against his leg, and was not guilty of willful,'gross, and inexcusable fault.</p> <p>6. Negligence @=97 — Steamer liable for part of injured passenger’s damages, if passenger’s fault not inexcusable.</p> <p>The public good is best promoted by holding vessels liable to bear some part of the actual pecuniary loss to an injured passenger, where their fault is clear, and the passenger’s fault is neither willful, gross, nor inexcusable.</p> <p>7. Damages @=131(3) — Negligence @=101 — Injured steamship passenger’s damages held $1,400, of which steamer should bear one-half.</p> <p>Where a steamship passenger sustained a Potts’ fracture of the leg wnen struck by the swinging of the gangplank, and he was 57 years old and not in perfect health, and 5 months after the injury was able-to work to a certain extent, and at the end of a year would have what the doctors called a functional foot and be able to work, $1,400 held full damages, of which the steamer should bear one-half, where both were at fault.</p> <p><gzs>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Trade-marks and trade-names <§=>7- — '“Tabasco” valid trade-mark for pepper-sauce.</p> <p>Complainant’s predecessors held to liave acquired a valid trade-mark in tlm word “Tabasco,” as applied to pepper-sauce, which right continued in his successors in business; the trade-mark also held infringed.</p> <p>2. Trade-inarks and trade-names ®=»11 — Trade-mark right not extinguished by expiration of patent.</p> <p>AVhese the manufacturer of a pepper-sauce, after using the name “Tabasco” as a trade-mark for some years, patented a process for making his pepper-sauce, but after four years abandoned its use, and adopted a new formula, but continued the use of the trade-mark for Ms product, with which it was identified, and the trade-mark and not the process gave commercial value to the article, the expiration of the patent held not to have divested him of his right in the trade-mark.</p> <p>S. Trade-marks and trade-names <§=3'74(4) — Unfair eompelMñm to dress of product.</p> <p>Defendant held chargeable with unfair competition in the dressing of pepper-sauce made and sold by Mm, in copying on the labels reading matter from complainant’s labels and in making the bottles, labels, and cartons so similar to complainant’s, which have been long in the market, as to be likely to, and apparently intended to, deceive ordinary pur* chasers.</p> <p>©sssFor other oases seo some topic & KBY-NUMBBlt in ail Key-Numbered Digests & 'ndexes</p>

<p>At Law. Action by J. S. Earles against the Germain Company. On motion to remand to the state court.</p>

<p>Removal of causes <©^10 — Jurisdiction not acquired by removal where state court was without jurisdiction.</p> <p>Under the Constitution and statutes of Alabama, as construed by its Supreme Court, the co'urts of the state are without jurisdiction of a suit against a foreign corporation on a cause of action which arose outside the state, and á federal court acquires no jurisdiction by removal.</p> <p><®=»For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Collision <S=83 (2) — Moving vessel in fault for collision with anchored vessel in fog.</p> <p>Under the rule that a steam vessel in fog must limit herself to a speed so slow that she can be stopped within the distance at which another vessel can be seen, a steamer which navigated Chesapeake Bay in a dense fog <5,t a speed of 3 or 4 miles an hour held in fault for collision with a steamship anchored on the anchorage grounds in Baltimore harbor, although extending somewhat into the channel, where her fog signal was being sounded and was heard by the approaching vessel and several hundred feet in width of the channel was unobstructed.</p> <p>2. Collision <@=569 — 'Steamship not in fault for place and manner of anchorage.</p> <p>A large steamship held not in fault for a collision, while she was anchored bn the anchorage grounds in Baltimore harbor, because of her plaice and manner of anchorage, where on loading and moving into the channel on the afternoon before it was not safe to proceed, because of fog and floating ice, and she was taken to the anchorage ground by her pilot, nor because on á change of wind during the night she did not move, nor put out both bow and stern anchors, which was not customary for such vessels.</p> <p><gss»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Injunction <§=>114(1) — Intervention to enjoin ordinance by one without special right will be denied.</p> <p>A petition to intervene in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance regulating jitney busses, by a resident who lived on the bus line, and who alleged he purchased his property on the faith that the busses would continue to operate and that the street cars gave inadequate service, does not disclose any vested interest or right not shared by the general.public, and permission to file the petition will be withheld. ...</p> <p>2. Municipal corporations <§=>106(3) — Rules of procedure are directory, and may be suspended by council.</p> <p>The rules of procedure for the passage of municipal ordinances are directory, and can be suspended by the council acting as a legislative body.</p> <p>3. Injunction <§=>85 (1) — Petitions by citizens against ordinance cannot be considered by courts.</p> <p>A petition filed by many citizens, protesting against an ordinance regulating jitney busses, cannot be considered by the courts in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance, since the court cannot review the legislative acts of the council within its constitutional limitations, nor inquire into its motives.</p> <p>4. Courts <§=>366(8) — Decision of state Supreme Court construing municipal ordinance is controlling.</p> <p>Decisions of the state Supreme Court construing municipal ordinances are binding on the United States District Court.</p> <p>5. Municipal corporations <§=>661(1) — City of Seattle has control of its. streets, and can legislate as to use in reasonable manner.</p> <p>Under Const. Wash. art. 11, § 11, Rem. & Bal. Code Wash. § 7507, subd. 7, and Seattle City Charter, art. 4, § 18, subd. 7, the city has control of its streets, and- can legislate with relation to their use in a reasonable manner.</p> <p>6. Municipal corporations <§=>661(1) — Operation of jitney busses on streets. can be denied or restricted.</p> <p>The right to use the public streets of a city for the operation of jitney busses thereon as a private business is a matter of privilege, not of right, and can be prohibited by the city, or permitted under such terms, including the regulation of fares, as the city may prescribe.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY^NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes-</p> <p>7. Municipal corporations <§=661 (1) — Municipal ownership of. street railroads does not prevent regulation of jitney busses.</p> <p>Ihe fact that the city owns the street railroad system does not deprive it of its power in its legislative capacity to regulate the operation of jitney busses, which compete with the city street railroads.</p> <p>8. Municipal corporations <§=061 (2) —Ordinance regulating jitney busses held not to give arbitrary power to superintendent of public utilities.</p> <p>An ordinance regulating the operation of jitney busses on city streets, which required the superintendent of public utilities to investigate applications for permits to operate such busses, and to report all facts, with his recommendations, to the council, which had final power to determine the application, is not invalid, as giving arbitrary powers to the superintendent.</p> <p>9. Municipal corporations <§=661 (1) — Ordinances within police powers presumed valid.</p> <p>An ordinance regulating the operation of jitney busses on city streets is within the police power of the city, and is presumed to be valid, unless no state of facts could exist which would warrant its passage.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER In ail Key-Nuinbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>_ Af Law. Action by Mulcahy & Gibson, Incorporated, to use of tbe Nam. vil Sarecy A. ay, against Joseph A. Richman. On motions for nt-,,: Nial and lot judgment for defendant on point reserved.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. Petition against the Okmulgee Producing & Refining Company. On motion to dismiss petition to transfer the proceeding to the District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of George L. Flaherty and Clara R-Carter, alleged partners doing business in Montana under the firm name of George R. Flaherty, bankrupt.

<p>1. Mines and minerals Pickett Ad for withdrawal of oil lands is remedial.</p> <p>Tiie Pickett Act (Comp. St. §§ 4523-4525), authorizing the withdrawal of oil-bearing lands from entry, Imt saving the rights of parties in diligent prosecution of work leading to the discovery of oil or gas, is a remedial statute, and should be construed to effectuate its purpose.</p> <p>2. Mines and minerals i=s>38(20) — Evidence held to show development of oil claim in good faith.</p> <p>In a suit to restrain waste and depletion of oil on a tract withdrawn from entry under the Pickett Act (Comp. St. §§ 4523-4525), evidence hold to show that the defendant was in good faith developing the group of several contiguous claims owned by it as a group or unity, in a practical, businesslike, and economical way.</p> <p>3. Mines and minerals <§=^>36 — Development of one claim for benefit of group is sufficient.</p> <p>The development by the owner of a group of oil claims on one or more of the claims, which would be for tile beneficial and economical development of the entire group, is sufficient to protect the rights of the claimant under the Pickett Act (Comp. St. §§ 4523 — 4525) to one claim of the group, although no work was being done on that particular claim.</p> <p>4. Mines and minerals 'S^Díi — Contract reserving right to delay drilling held not to negative development in good faith.</p> <p>The fact that an oil claimant, under its contract with the original locator of a group of claims, reserved the right to delay drilling on one claim until oil had been discovered on another, does not defeat its rights under the saving clause of the Pickett Act (Comp. St. §§ 4523-4525), where it did develop all claims in good faith.</p> <p><§5»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Habeas corpus <®=379 — Return imports verity until impeached.</p> <p>In the federal courts, a return to a writ of habeas corpus is deemed to import verity until impeached.</p> <p>2. Army and navy <8*=>2 — Congress authorized to provide for punishment of military and naval offenses.</p> <p>Under Const, art. 1, § 8, els. 11-14, 18, Congress may provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in like manner with the practice in force in civilized countries, and the power to do so is independent of the judicial power, defined in article 3.</p> <p>3. Army and navy <3=>49 — Proceedings of courts-martial cannot be revised, altered, or controlled.</p> <p>Cqurts-martial form no part of the judicial system of the United States, and the proceedings therein, if confined within the limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be revised, altered, or controlled by the civil courts.</p> <p>4. Army and navy '3=^3 — Civil courts may have jurisdiction of offense concurrent with courts-martial.</p> <p>The civil courts may have jurisdiction of offensive conduct, which constitutes a crime under the civil or statutory law, which may be concurrent with the jurisdiction of courts-martial for the offense, which would be triable before a court-martial.</p> <p><®cs>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes .</p> <p>5. Habeas corpus ©=>17, 94 — Jurisdiction only question, where relator restrained by court-martial.</p> <p>Where the relator, brought before a civil court by writ of habeas corpus, is restrained of his liberty by a court-martial proceeding, the sole inquiry is whether the court-martial has jurisdiction to try him, and a relator regularly in custody, awaiting trial by court-martial, is not entitled to relief.</p> <p>6. Habeas corpus ©=>27 — Person not amenable to jurisdiction of court-martial may be discharged.</p> <p>The civil courts may discharge a person from sentence of a court-martial on habeas corpus, if, ho was not amenable to its jurisdiction.</p> <p>7. Army and navy <@=>44 (1) — Jurisdiction of courts-martial is complete and plenary over military offenses.</p> <p>Courts-martial possess the same full, complete, and plenary jurisdiction over offenses against military law as civil courts over controversies within their cognizance, and are supreme while acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.</p> <p>8. Army and navy ©=>44(1) — Jurisdiction of courts-martial limited and special.</p> <p>The jurisdiction of-courts-martial is limited and special.</p> <p>9. Army and navy ©=>43 — Court-martial ceases to exist when purpose is accomplished.</p> <p>A court-martial being called into existence for a temporary and special purpose,-and to perforin a special duty, when the object of its creation is accomplished, it ceases to exist.</p> <p>10. War ©=>32 — Statute regarding spies applies, regardless of citizenship.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 1343, art. 82, as amended (Comp. St. § 2308a), providing, that any person, who in time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or about fortifications, etc., shall be tried by court-martial or military commission, and on conviction suffer death, being general in its terms, is applicable to all persons acting as sjfies, whether citizens or not.</p> <p>11. Army and navy ©=>2 — War ©=>31 — “Military law” and “martial law” distinguished.</p> <p>Military is distinct from martial law, in that it applies only to persons in the military or naval service of the government; whereas, martial law, when once established, applies alike to citizens and soldiers.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Martial Law; Military Law.]</p> <p>12. Army and navy ©=>2 — War ©=>31 — “Military law” and “martial law” defined.</p> <p>"Martial law” is the will of the commanding officer of an armed force or geographical military department, which, in time of war, may be expressed within the limits of his particular military jurisdiction, and may he enlarged or restrained by Ills military chief or supreme executive; while “military law” consists of the rules and regulations made by the legislative power for the government of the land and naval forces.</p> <p>13. Constitutional law ©=>82 — Constitutional guaranties do mot apply to offense of being a spy; “crime.”</p> <p>The guaranties of the Constitution (Const. Amends. E5, 6) apply only where a crime is charged, and a “crime” means an offense against the government, as understood when the Constitution was adopted, and does not include the offense of being a spy.</p> <p>[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Crime.]</p> <p><®=sFor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>14. War <$^11 — Spying not offense under international law, unless spy captured in act.</p> <p>Under international law, spying is not a crime, and the offense against the laws oí war consists of being found during the war in the capacity of a- spy.</p> <p>15. War <S=>32 — Naval court-martial has jurisdiction to try spy arrested in New York City.</p> <p>Under article 5 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy, providing that all persons who in time of war come or are found in the capacity of spies, or bring or deal in seditious letters or messages from any enemy, etc., shall suffer death or other punishment, as a court-martial may adjudge, the jurisdiction of a naval court-martial to punish a German spy, who entered the United States under a false name and on a forged passport, and who was arrested in New York City, cannot be denied on the ground that the port of New York was outside the field of'active operations and outside the theater of war.</p> <p><§s»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & lodexei</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Meridian Light & Railway Company against the City of Meridian and others.</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the Matter of John M. Cross, bankrupt. On review of report and decision of a special master. Review of that part of report and decision of Hon. Chas.

<p>1. Sales <S=2a3(3) — Keliasice on seller presumed in absence of opportunity to inspect.</p> <p>Under Sales Aet Pa. 1915 (P. L. 517) § 15, subpars. 1, 2, which was a re-enactment of the existing common law, there is an implied warranty of fitness for use whore the seller knew the goods were ordered for a particular purpose, and the buyer relied on the seller, and reliance by the buyer may be presumed from absence of opportunity to inspect before delivery of the goods, so that a seller of coal delivered in a ship’s hunkers for steam purposes impliedly warrants it fit for that purpose.</p> <p>3, Sales <S=»37" (1) — lieliaucc on seller must be shown.</p> <p>To establish an implied warranty of fitness for purpose, the fact of reliance by the buyer on the seller must he shown, either by proof of the actual fact or by proof of facts from which it may be presumed.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & K FAY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Petition for writ of habeas corpus by the United States, on the relation of Michael V. Santantonio, against the Warden or Keeper of the Naval Prison in the Navy Yard at Brooklyn, N. Y.</p> <p>This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed in behalf of the relator, made returnable November 11, 1919, and by adjournment continued for hearing until November 20, 1919. The return to said writ was made and filed November 13, 1919, by John D. MacDonald, Rear Admiral of the United States Navy, who is the commandant of the Navy Yard, and in whoso custody the relator was at 1he time the writ was issued. The traverse to the return was filed No\ ember 19, 1919, and on November 20th the facts were stipulated. In view of the stipulation, it is not necessary to set forth the pleadings. The stipulation is as follows:</p> <p>First. Michael V. Santantonio enlisted in the Naval Coast Defense Reserve, .United States Naval Reserve Force, as chief boatswain’s mate, on May 19, 1917, at New York Cty, N. Y., for a term of your years from that date. The original enlistment and record of Michael V. Santantonio is offered in evidence and received as Government’s Exhibit No. 1.</p> <p>Second. The said Michael V. Santantonio was confined to the prison barracks of the Navy Yard from October 31, 1918, to January 14, 1919, pending an investigation. Certified copy of record of confinement and release, and letter ordering release, entered in record and marked Relator’s Exhibit D1 and D2„</p> <p>Third. Between March 31, 1919, and April 9, 1919, the said Michael Y. Santantonio was ordered to and did perform active duty on the TT. S. S. America, a transport under the control and operation of the United States Navy.</p> <p>Fourth. The said Michael V. Santantonio was placed on the inactive list on April 9, 1919. The orders placing him on the inactive list are offered in evidence, and received and marked Relator’s Exhibit A. The certificate of faithful discharge of duty is offered in evidence, and received and marked Relator’s Exhioit B.</p> <p>Fifth. On October 25, 1919, Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy of the United States of America, sent a ietter relative to Michael V. Santantonio, which is offered in evidence, received and marked Relator’s Exhibit C.</p> <p>Sixth. On the 4th day of November, 1919, Michael V. Santantonio was arrested by the authority of the United States Navy and removed to the prison barracks in the Navy Yard, where he still is, and on the 4th day of November, 1919, he was served with a copy of the specifications setting out the crime which the naval authorities alleged Michael V. Santantonio had committed. The said specifications are offered and received in evidence as Government’s Exhibit No. 2.</p> <p>Relator makes no point that return to writ should have been verified and waives such verification on return.</p>

<p>1. Receivers ©=72 — ('ours ran exercise summary powers only as to property within its possession.</p> <p>A court appointing a receiver can exercise summary powers against those not partes to the action only with respect to property which comes into its possession, either actual or constructive, and as to other rights and property its receiver must proceed hy plenary process, subject to restrictions governing other litigants.</p> <p>2. Receivers ©=i>7 — Receiver of consignee has possession of goods stared in warehouse.</p> <p>Goods consigned to the corporation for which a receiver was appointed, and stored in a warehouse, are in the possession of the receiver, and the court appointing him can protect such possession by summary proceedings against the warehouseman, though it could have, under the statute, no jurisdiction of an action by the receiver against the warehouseman.</p> <p>3. Courts ©=347 — Separate rights of different individuals cannot bo enforced in bill.</p> <p>Though equity rule 26 (201 Fed. v, 118 O. O. A. v) permits independent causes of action to be joined in one bill of complaint, different persons, having separate and different claims aganst one defendant, cannot join in a bill to enforce them.</p> <p>4. Receivers ©=72 — Ancillary MR by receiver held not to seek enforcement of rights of iudividiials.</p> <p>An ancillary bill of complaint by a receiver, which alleged that all tlie title to the goods claimed had vested in the receiver, is not objectionable as seeking to enforce the righis of separate individuals, though prior statements of the bill as to the history of the goods suggested an interest by another therein.</p> <p><£^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUiViBISR in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the Oriental Textile Mills against the Thompson Worsted Company. On motion by defendant for new trial.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus by Antonio Teregno against Elmer E. Shattuck,Warden of State Prison.</p>

<p>1. Master and servant <®=^13 — Telegraph station operated during daytime and substantial portion of night continuously operated within Hours of Service Act.</p> <p>Under Act March 4,1907, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8678), prohibiting the keeping of telegraph operators on duty more than 9 hours in 24 at stations continuously operated night and day, or for more than 13 hours at stations operated only during the daytime, a station operated during the daytime and a substantial portion of the night is regarded as continuously operated night and day, though closed part of the night.</p> <p>2. Master and servant <§=»13 — Keeping telegraph station open during evening does not make it oonfinuousiy operated within act.</p> <p>The mere keeping open of a railroad station after 6 p. m. does not bring it within the 9-hour class under Hours of Service Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8678).</p> <p>3. Master and servant —Night operation of telegraph office within Hours of Service Act is a question of fact.</p> <p>What constitutes night operation, under Hours of Service Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 867S), as to telegraph operators, is a question of fact.</p> <p>4. Master and servant <@=>13 — Whether telegraph station kept open hi evening is continuously operated within Hours of Service Act depends on purpose.</p> <p>Whether a railroad station kept open until 9 o’clock in the evening is continuously operated night and day, within Hours of Service Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8678), as to telegraph operators, depends on whether it is kept open primarily for the accommodation of the public or for purposes connected with the running of trains.</p> <p>5. Master and servant <§=»13 — “Operated,” in Hours of Service Act, defined.</p> <p>Under Hours of Service Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8678), limiting the hours of service of telegraph operators at stations continuously operated night and day and stations operated only during the daytime, “operated” means more than “kept open.”</p> <p><§=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>6. Master and servant ‘S=>17 — Government, alleging violation of Hours of Service Act, has burden of showing purpose for which station was kept open.</p> <p>In an action for penalties for violations of Hours of Service Act, § 2 (Comp. St. § 8078), by keeping telegraph operators on duty more than 9 hours at stations kept open until 9 o’clock in the evening, it devolved on the government to establish the facts essential to recovery, and in the absence of evidence as to the purpose for which the stations were kept open, or the sort of work done, defendant is entitled to judgment.</p> <p>®S>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by one Cook, master of the steamship Boxleaf, against the sailing ship Mearim, in which a cross-libel was filed.

In Admiralty. Libel by William Kuhnhold against (lie Deutsch ■ Australische Dampfschiffs Gesellschaft and the Nether lands-American Steam Navigation Company. Libel against the Deutsch-Australische Dampfschiffs Gesellschaft dismissed,- and decree for libel-ant against the Netherlands-American Steam Navigation Company.

In Equity. Suit by Benjamin C. Allen, on behalf of himself and other bondholders of the United Traction Company of Pittsburgh against the Philadelphia Company, the Pittsburgh Railways Company, and the United Traction Company of Pittsburgh. Plearing on points of law.

Orr, J udge. Suit in equity by Benjamin C. Allen, on behalf of himself and other bondholders of the United Traction Company of Pittsburgh, against the Philadelphia Company, the Pittsburgh Railways Company, and the United Traction Company of Pittsburgh. Decree for defendants (265 Fed. 807), and complainant appeals.

Campbell, Judge. Suit by Carrie Bluejacket and others against Paul A. Ewert. Decree for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. The appellants (hereinafter called plaintiffs) brought suit to cancel a conveyance of land in Ottawa, Okl., made by Uiem to appellee (hereinafter called defendant). From a decree dismissing the bill this appeal is prosecuted.

Dayton, Judge. Suit in equity by James Henaghan and B. I. Hanlon, partners as Henaghan & Hanlon, and B. E. Roush, against Walker D. Hines, Di ■ rector General of Railroads, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, and Charles W. Van Horn, Superintendent. From an order granting preliminary injunction, defendants appeal. This suit was instituted in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg; Alston G. Dayton, Judge.</p> <p>Suit in equity by the Atlantic Refining Company against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, and J. W. Root, Superintendent. From an order granting a preliminary injunction, defendants appeal.</p>

<p>An information was filed against Frank Michalski for a violation of the National Prohibition Act. On application by the United States District Attorney for bench warrant.</p>

<p>At Taw. Action by the Maryland Dredging & Contracting Company against the Coplay Cement Manufacturing Company. On motions by defendant for new trial and in arrest of judgment.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy <§=184 (8) — Unrecorded contract giving title to shipbuilding material not valid against trustee.</p> <p>The provision of an unrecorded contract that all materials for construction of the vessels contracted for should be tile property of the vessel owner gives no title to materials not actually upon the boats as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the construction company, who occupies position of execution creditor.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy <§=184 (I) — Validity of contract for title not governed by laws where made.</p> <p>The status of material for construction of vessels as between the vessel owner and the trustee in bankruptcy of the construction company is not governed by the laws of the state where the contract was made, but by the laws where the boats were being constructed.</p> <p>3. Bankruptcy <§=184 (2) — Without act of Congress Fleet Corporation cantío! make valid junrecorded contract giving title.</p> <p>Even though me Emergency Fleet Corporation has the rights of a government agent, it cannot, without authority of Congress, which had not been given, make a contract for construction of vessels giving it title to material not yet on board the vessels, which would be valid against the trustee in bankruptcy of the construction company, though not recorded as required by state law.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBEK in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Towage <3=11 (1) —Tag bound to exercise care to avoid danger from ice.</p> <p>Dangers to a towed vessel from ice are regarded like other dangers to navigation, and the tug is bound to exercise due care to avoid injury to the tow therefrom.</p> <p>2. Towage <3=12 (2) —Direction of dangerous course by tow defeats recovery, and assent limits recovery.</p> <p>If the tow directs a dangerous course or movement, she cannot recover; while, if she assents with knowledge of the danger, and is injured, the damages are divided, on the theory that the resulting accident was caused by the fault of both vessels.</p> <p>3. Towage <3=11(1) — Tug responsible for accident from faulty navigation or attempt to do something dangerous.</p> <p>If an accident to a barge under the control of a tug was the result either of faulty navigation or of an attempt to do something inherently dangerous, the tug was to blame.</p> <p>(< — >!’or other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p> <p>4. Towage '@=^11(2) — Where barge under charter to owner of tug owner and master of barge held not at fault.</p> <p>Where a barge was under a day by day charter to the same company that owned a tug, and her movements were entirely under the control of the charterer, though her master was appointed and paid by her owner, and the crew was hired and discharged by him, the owner hold not chargeable with the master’s failure to forbid the movement of the barge stern foremost through a channel full of floating ice, and the master not negligent in failing to apply preventers to protect the rudder on his own motion.</p> <p>5. Towage «^lld) — Tug at fault in towing barge through channel filled with ice in manuer adopted.</p> <p>A tug hold at fault in attempting to tow a barge stern foremost through a channel filled with floating ice, with the two vessels fastened together, so that the stern of the barge projected ahead of the tug, instead of breaking the ice and turning the barge, or sending another tug ahead to push the ice out of the path of the barge’s rudder.</p> <p><&=>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Salvage ‘§==’7 — Lashing colliding vessels together to prevent bumping not salvage service.</p> <p>Where vessels at anchor in the harbor collided during a strong wind, and were lashed together to prevent bumping or dragging, the steamer at fault was liable for the damage done, but not for salvage services, where neither steamer had a fire under her main boilers, enabling her to gél under way, as the injured steamer could not, with safety to herself, have done anything else.</p> <p>2. Collision <2=^114 — Allowance to charterer not recoverable, unless compellable.</p> <p>Though the owner of a steamship under a time charter providing for the suspension of payment of hire during breakdowns, etc., causing loss, of time, makes an allowance to the charterer for the time required for repairs due to a collision, it cannot recover such allowance from the vessel responsible for the collision, unless the charterer could have compelled such allowance.</p> <p>3. Shipping <2^49(3) — Breakdown clause suspends hire during period of unseaworthiness for present purpose.</p> <p>A clause in a charter providing that in case of loss of time from breakdown or other causes preventing the full working of the vessel, the payment of hire shall cease for the time lost suspends the hire whenever the charterer loses time in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, but not where the ship is fit for the only use to which the charterer has present occasion to put her, though temporarily unseaworthy for other purposes.</p> <p>1 4. Collision ‘2=^112 — Allowance to charterer for time of repairs not recoverable, in view of embargo.</p> <p>Where a steamer, injured in a collision, whs at the time in harbor awaiting a cargo of coal, which, because of an embargo, she did not obtain for two months after repairs were completed, the charterer was not entitled to an allowance for the time lost in making repairs under a breakdown clause in the charter, and the owner could not recover the amount auowed from the vessel at fault.</p> <p><gz=^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Army and navy <§=>44 (1) — Draft evader may be tried by court-martial without preliminary investigation by draft board.</p> <p>A drafted man, ordered to report for military service under Selective Service Act May 18, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 2044a-2044k), but remaining in hiding until after the draft boards were abolished, may be tried by court-martial for desertion without a preliminary investigation before the draft board, as such investigation under a presidential order was a mere procedural step, the abolition <Jf which does the drafted man no harm.</p> <p>*§=x>For other oases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Asa K. Silverthorne and others were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States. On motion to quash the indictment and for inspection of the minutes of the grand jury.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law ©=280 (1) — Pleas in abatement must aver facts.</p> <p>I’leas in abatement must aver the facts relied on, not conclusions of law, nor the evidence of such facts.</p> <p>2. Criminal law ©=280(1) — Pleas in abatement must be strictly construed.</p> <p>Since pleas in abatement are in the nature o£ confession and avoidance of an indictment, because of new matter or matter not of record, they are given strict construction by the courts.</p> <p>3. Criminal law ©=278(2) — Sufficiency or competency of grand jury evidence not decided on plea in abatement.</p> <p>Decision whether the evidence before the grand jury was competent or sufficient in its entirety to justify the indictment is not required on a plea in abatement, though, under special circumstances, the court may inquire into the proceedings, where mistake or irregularity is charged.</p> <p>4. Criminal law ©=282 — Reply to plea in abatement unnecessary as to matters inferable from plea.</p> <p>Where it was fairly inferable from the plea in abatement that the person from whom books and papers exhibited to the grand jury were seized voluntarily testified before the grand jury without objecting to the seizure, a reply alleging such facts is unnecessary, though the plea in abatement charged that the seizure was illegal.</p> <p>5. Criminal law ©=278(1) — Plea in abatement reaches only defects not apparent from record.</p> <p>A plea in abatement is the proper remedy for objections to the indictment not apparent on the face thereof, but is not limited to the conduct of the grand jury or the sufficiency and competency of the proofs before it.</p> <p>6. Criminal law ©=280(2) — Plea in abatement, stating evidence was secured from unlawful seizure, held sufficient.</p> <p>A plea iu abatement, which alleged that the evidence presented to the grand jury was procured by clues and leads furnished by books and papers of defendants, which wore unlawfully seized, is sufficient; it being impossible to be more specific and definite as to the nature of the clues.</p> <p>7. Criminal law ©=278(2) — Protection at trial from illegally seized evidence does not justify denial of plea.</p> <p>Where an indictment was procured by evidence ascertained from books and papers seized in violation of defendants’ constitutional rights, the fact that defendants would be protected at the trial from the evidence illegaly acquired does not justify overruling the plea.</p> <p>8. Criminal law ©=278(2) — Plea in abatement, alleging conspiracy to procure indictment, is bad.</p> <p>a plea in abatement, alleging a conspiracy between various officers and attorneys to destroy the business of defendants, where it does not appear that the grand jury knew of the conspiracy, or was prejudiced by the activities o£ the conspirators, raises a collateral issue, and will not be sustained.</p> <p>9. Criminal law ©=280(2) — -Plea must show extra person in grand jury room was not attorney conducting proceedings.</p> <p>A plea in abatement because of the presence of a stenograjfficr in the grand jury room during the taking of testimony, without alleging that the stenographer was not appointed an attorney to conduct the proceeding before the grand jury, as authorized by Act June 80, 1906 (Oomp. St. § 534), is insufficient.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Sales <§=>296 — Property subject to stoppage in transitu until reaching final destination.</p> <p>Merchandise ordered by bankrupt for export to the Virgin Islands, and by its direction shipped by the seller to a forwarding carrier in New York, while in possession of such carrier awaiting further shipment, held subject to stoppage in transitu by the seller.</p> <p>4§7^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER, in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Henry Malkan, bankrupt. On motion to vacate an order allowing creditors to file claims within one year from November 29, 1919. On December 24, 1918, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against Henry Malkan, and on January 7, 1919, said Malkan was adjudicated a bankrupt.

<p>•In Bankruptcy. In the matter of the Prudential Lithograph Company, Incorporated, bankrupt. On motion by receiver for order confirming sale of bankrupt’s interest in lease.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit by William Stevens against the Cunard Steamship Company, Limited.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme'Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Action by Charles T. Wright against the Globe Furniture Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Suit by the W. R. Speare Company against Virginia L. Speare and others. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>1. Mines and minerals <§=>38(18) — Evidence in suit to restrain removal of ore held to show single lode bisected by side limes.</p> <p>In a suit to restrain defendant from removing from beneatli the surface of complainant’s claims ore- which defendant asserted was in a lode which apexed on his claim, evidence held to show that the lode from which the ore was taken was a single broad lode, bisected by the side lines dividing complainant’s and defendant’s claims.</p> <p>2. Mines and minerals <§=>31 (1) — Lode bisected by side lines belongs to prior locator.</p> <p>A broad lode, bisected by the division side lines between two claims, belongs to the claim having a prior loca lion, under Rev. St. § 2322 (Comp. St. § 4618), giving extralaleral rights to lodes.</p> <p>3. Mines and minerals <§=>43 — Failure to adverse patent application for eon- , dieting snrfaee does not determine priority as to lode.</p> <p>The failure to file adverse proceedings against an applicaiion for patent for a lode mining claim by the possessor of another claim, which conflicted with the surface of the former, creates no presumption as to priority of discovery, either under Rev. St. § 2332 (Comp. St. § 4631), or otherwise, so that the issuance of patent does not determine the priority of rights to the lode.</p> <p>4. Mines and minerals <§=>43 — Patent relates to relocation, not to original location.</p> <p>A patent for lode mining claim, which had been relocated by the. samo parties who originally located, relates back only to its relocation.</p> <p><gz^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Suit by William M. Kohn against August Eimer and another. From a final decree dismissing the bill of complaint, with costs, plaintiff appeals. The invention related to small electric furnaces, and was aimed at providing a furnace consisting of separate heating units, such that, if any one of them should become defective, it might be replaced by a standard form.

At Law. Action by the Exporters of Manufacturers’ Products against the Butterworth-Judson Corporation. On motion oE plaintiff to extend term for purpose of settling and filing bill of exceptions.

<p>At Law. Action by S. S. Amerson against the Western Union Telegraph Company. On motion of defendant for leave to amend petition for removal, motion by plaintiff to remand, and demurrer to answer.</p>

At Taw. Matt Sohm and Mary Sohm were indicted for unlawfully making a mash fit for the production of spirits, etc., for failing to register a still, and for unlawfully carrying on the business of distilling without having given bond. On demurrer and motion to quash.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota; Wilbur F. Booth, Judge.</p> <p>Actions at law by D. Darnell and others against Fred B. Eynch. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina, at Charleston; Heniy A. Middleton Smith, Judge.</p> <p>Criminal prosecution by the United States against M. Sharfsin.. Judgment of conviction, and defendant brings error.</p>

Action by Clara E. Platt, administratrix of Frederick S. Platt, deceased, against the Director General of Railroads. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Writ o£ error to judgment entered on verdict in the District Court of Vermont. Action to recover for death by wrongful act, pursuant to General Laws of Vermont, §§ 3814 and 3315.

, Judge. Suit in admiralty for collision between the United States steamship Aretbusa and the steamship Hésperos. Decree finding the Arethusa solely in fault, and the United States appeals.

Apiieals from the District Court of the United States for ihe District of Rhode Island; Arthur D. Brown, Judge. Suit by the American Optical Company and others against the Universal Optical Corporation and by Stevens & Co., Incorporated, against Clarence D. Holmes and others. Decree for defendant in each case, and complainants appeal.

<p>In Equity. Suit by John A. Anderson and others against the American Smelting & Refining Company and the United States Smelting Company.</p>

<p>1. Injunction <S3:3105 (3) — Enforcement of void criminal statute which destroys property restrained.</p> <p>Equity can interfere by injunction to prevent criminal proceedings under a void law which would destroj property rights.</p> <p>2. Criminal law —Statute concerning common-law offense not void, because jury must determine degree.</p> <p>A statute relating to an offense known at the common law is not void for uncertainty, because under it the matter of degree is left to the determination of the jury.</p> <p>3. Criminal law <§=13 — Act preventing unreasonable charges for necessaries is unconstitutional.</p> <p>Act Aug. 10, 1917, § 4, as amended by Act Oct. 22, 1919, § 2, punishing unreasonable charges for necessaries which relates to no offense known at the common law, and prescribes no test for determining the unreasonableness of the charge, but leaves that matter entirely to the jury, does not inform the accused of the nature of the accusation of the act against him, as required by Const. Amend. 6, and is invalid.</p> <p>other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus. Two proceedings, one by E. H. Ramsey and others, and the other by Cecil C. Stewart and others.</p>

<p>1. United States <§=>125 — Suit against Emergency Fleet Corporation not one against United States.</p> <p>Act Sept. 7, 1910 (Comp. St. § 8310a et sea.), establishing the United Slates Shipping Board and specifying its powers and duties, and authorizing it, in carrying out the provisions oí that act, to form corporations for the purchase, construction, and operation of merchant vessels, and to subscribe for stock therein on behalf of United States, does not make a corporation so formed an instrumentality of the United States; nor is it made such by Urgent Deficiencies Appropriation Act Juno 15, 1917, or the presidential orders thereunder, and a suit against it is not one against the United States, and need not be brought in the Court of Claims.</p> <p>2. United States <3=125 — Ownership oí stock of corporation does not prevent suits against corporation.</p> <p>Ownership by the government of all the stock of a corporation does not affect its liability to suit the same as other corporations.</p> <p><£=»For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Habeas corpus <S=>45(2) — Regularity of state extradition proceedings not subject to review by federal court.</p> <p>The regularity of extradition proceedings, by which a person in custody of state authorities was brought into the jurisdiction, may not be inquired into by a federal court on habeas corpus.</p> <p>2. Habeas corpus <3=»4 — Writ cannot be used as writ of error or appeal.</p> <p>The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the office of a writ of error or appeal.</p> <p>3. Habeas corpus <S=>45 (5) — Federal courts will anticipate action by state courts only in exceptional cases. ></p> <p>Only in exceptional cases of great urgency will a federal court intervene by writ of habeas corpus to discharge a prisoner held by state authority, in advance of final action by the highest court of the state.</p> <p>4. Habeas corpus <§=^45 (5) — Federal court will not interfere pending similar proceeding in state court.</p> <p>A federal court will not grant a writ of habeas corpus for release of a state prisoner, pending appeal from the decision of a state court in a similar proceeding.</p> <p>^s5>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Damages <©^23 — Contemplated by parties are recoverable for breach of contract.</p> <p>í'nder Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 1395, the underlying principle in fixing damages for a breach of contract is compensation to the injured party, and the damages recoverable are such as arise naturally and according to the usual course of tilings, and such as the parties contemplated when the contract was made as the probable result of its breach.</p> <p>2. Eashoads <&=>72 (9) —Measure of damages for breach of covenant for openings ia elevated superstructure stated.</p> <p>According to the rule of damages in Georgia, a landowner’s measure of damage for a railroad company’s breach of its covenant to provide openings in the superstructure for its track, so as not to injure his land, Is the difference in the value of the land before and after the breach.</p> <p><gr»For other cases see same topic & KB3Y-NUMBBR in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexc-s</p>

<p>1. District of Columbia <©=o 14 — Statute requiring contractor’s bond inapplicable to construction of building in which district lias no interest.</p> <p>Act Feb. 28, 1899, requiring- persons contracting with the District of Columbia for public buildings or public works to give a bond to secure payment for labor and malcriáis, and authorizing persons furnishing work and material to sue thereon, had no application to the construction of a plant by one contracting to remove refuse to a plant provided by him, where it does not appear that the District had any interest in the building or the property on which it was erected.</p> <p>2. District of Columbia <§==>!4 — Contractor’s bead, declared on as statutory bond, cannot be recovered on as voluntary bond.</p> <p>In an action on a bond given to secure performance of a contract with the District of Columbia for the collection and disposal of refuse, the bond cannot be treated as a voluntary bond, where the declaration counts specifically on a statutory bond.</p> <p>3. District of Columbia <S= (<4 — Contractor’s bom! cannot be seed on as voluntary bond in name of United States.</p> <p>• A bond given to secure performance of a contract with the District of Columbia for the collection and disposal of refuse cannot be sued on as a voluntary bond in the name of the United States.</p> <p><§=>For other eases see samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>1. Railroads ©=99 (2) — -Statute requiring railroad to pay for lighting streets under viaducts is valid.</p> <p>The xirovision of Act May 26, 1008, requiring the Washington Terminal Company to pay for lighting streets under the viaducts of the company, is a valid exercise of the police power, where it appeared that the viaducts covered a considerable area of the streets, and were supported by columns placed within the streets, so that more lighting was required than would have been necessary in the absence of the viaducts.</p> <p>2. Railroads ©=99(2)- — -Police power authorizes requiring railroad to pay lor entire lighting cost unidor viaduct.</p> <p>Where the construction of a railroad viaduct required more light for the streets thereunder than would have been necessary in the absence of the viaduct, it was not an abuse of the police power to require the railroads to pay the entire cost of lighting the streets under the viaduct, not merely the cost of the excess lighting required by the viaduct.</p> <p>3. Railroads ©=99(2) — Regulation requiring lighting streets adjacent to tracks held invalid.</p> <p>Act May 26, 1908, in so far as It requires the railroad to light streets adjacent to its tracks, is invalid as applied to streets along the private right of way of the railroad, in the absence of any showing that the presence of the railroad required a dditional lighting for the streets.</p> <p>4. Statutes ©=>04(4) — Lighting adjacent streets by railroads held separable * from requirement of lighting under viaducts.</p> <p>The invalid provision of Act May 26, 1908, requiring the Washington Terminal Company to light streets adjacent to its tracks, is separable from the other requirement of the act that company light streets under its viaducts.</p> <p>5. Interest ©=>13- — Allowable on liquidated sum for which statute creates liability.</p> <p>In an action by the District of Columbia to recover from a terminal company the cost of lighting si reels under viaducts, as authorized by Act May 26, 1908, the liability is fixed by statute, and the action is for a liquidated sum, so that interest was properly allowed.</p> <p><3=>For other cases see samo topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numberefl Digests & Indexes</p> <p>Smyth, Chief Justice, dissenting in part.</p>

<p>1. Trusts '@=316 (1) — Trastee may be allowed commission on principal of estate.</p> <p>In a proper ease, commission to a trustee may be allowed on tbe principal, as well as on tbe income, of tbe estate.</p> <p>2. Trusts @=316(1) — Trustee allowed commission on principal only for unusual services.</p> <p>A trustee will be allowed a commission on the principal of tbe estate, in addition to bis commission on tbe income, only for unusual services rendered by him, which are not compensated by bis commissions on tbe income.</p> <p>3. Trusts @=315(3) — Allowing commission to trustee on principal as matter of law is erroneous.</p> <p>Where petition for commission to a trustee from tbe principal of tbe estate referred tbe court to proceedings and entries in tbe case, and asked permission to produce evidence as to tbe services rendered, tbe court should have required production of such evidence to determine whether the.services were not fully compensated by an allowance of tbe maximum commission on tbe income, for tbe stated reason that it was based on the character of the trust and tbe services and responsibility imposed, and it was error to direct payment of commission from tbe principal, on consideration of tbe petition and answer alone.</p> <p>4. Trusts @=315(3) — Commission to deceased trustee may be allowed on petition of administratrix before final distribution.</p> <p>If the services of a trustee before his death entitled him to a commission on tbe principal of the estate, such commission may be allowed on tbe petition of bis administratrix before tbe final distribution of the trust estate.</p> <p>5. Trusts @=315(3) — Commission on principal properly referred to auditor.</p> <p>On petition by administratrix of deceased trustee for commission on the principal of tbe estate, it was proper for tbe court, after passing on tbe issues made by tbe pleadings and tbe principles on which tbe account was to be taken, to refer tbe matter to tbe auditor to determine tne amount of commission.</p> <p>For other cases see same topic & ICEY-NUMBER. in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Habeas corpus proceedings by Anna Eluda Heavrin against Anna ,F. Spicer, to regain possession of a child. From a judgment awarding custody of child to petitioner, respondent appeals.

<p>Appeal from Assistant Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Two interference proceedings between Charles F. Cox and Benjamin T. Headley and another, and between Charles F. Cox, Benjamin T. Headley and another, and Francis W. Pawling. From a decision awarding priority to Headley, Charles F. Cox appeals.</p>

<p>1. District of Columbia Credit allowed for value of laud dedicated at time of future ((oudejiratailom.</p> <p>Under Code of Law D. C. 1901, | 491g, requiring the jury, in assessing benefits to a tract of land 1'rom opening a street, to consider the value of any part thereof previously dedicated by the owner, the valuation of the dedicated part is to be determined as of the date of the subsequent condemnation, not the date of dedication; otherwise the owner would be chargeable with the increased valuation of the part not dedicated, without receiving credit for a similar Increase in value of the part dedicated.</p> <p>2. District of Columbia EvMeiiee of topographical situation of proposed street should b© introduced.</p> <p>Under Code of Law D. O. 1901, § 491g, requiring the jury, in assessing benefits for a street extension, to consider the respective topographical conditions, evidence should bo inti’odueed in proceedings to condemn land for a street extension to show the proposed grade of the street and tlio other topographical conditions.</p> <p>3. District of Columbia <8=»J 2 — Commissioners have discretion to make authorized street extension at an angle.</p> <p>The commissioners have discretion, in making the street extension authorized by Act Sept. 1, 1916, c. 433, 39 Stat. 688, to make the extension at an angle with the line of the existing street between the designated terminal streets; it not being necessary that the extension continue the existing street in a straight line.</p> <p>4. District of Columbia ®=»16 — Jury may be allowed second view after evidence.</p> <p>The view by the jury in condemnation proceedings allowed by Code of Law D. O. 1901, § 491 e, is to enable them to exercise their own judgment, derived from personal knowledge, as well as from the opinion evidence, and it was not error to permit a second view of the premises by the jury, after hearing the evidence, when they could better apply the evidence to the facts.</p> <p><®=»For other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

Suit by William J. Dante, as collector of the estate of Stilson Hutch-ins, deceased, against .Rose Keeling Hutchins. From a decree dismissing bill because of adequate remedy at law, plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Homicide (2-) — Similar accidents at same place inadmissible on issue of reckless driving.</p> <p>In a prosecution for manslaughter, by recklessly driving an automobile so as to throw deceased therefrom, it was not error to exclude testimony that similar accidents had occurred at the same place, since those accidents may have been the result of recklessness; but evidence as to the condition of the street and that there was a “right mean turn” there was properly admitted.</p> <p>2. Criminal law @^829(3) — Charge requiring finding .of reckless or gross negligence held to cover request.</p> <p>A requested charge that accused could not he convicted of manslaughter, unless the death was the result of excessive speed, recklessness, and gross negligence in driving the automobile, was substantially covered by a charge that before the jury could convict they must find defendant guilty of gross negligence or reckless negligence, so that the refusal of the request was not error, even if it was correct.</p> <p>3. Homicide <§=»125 — Breaking of steering wheel held defense, if not caused by defendant’s carelessness.</p> <p>Though a requested charge, directing acquittal if the proximate cause of the death was the breaking of the steering wheel of the automobile, was properly refused, because omitting the element of defendant’s carelessness as a cause of the breaking, it was error to refuse a requested charge directing acquittal, if the death was due to breaking of wheel and Uto break was not caused by any unlawful act of defendant.</p> <p>4. Criminal iaw @=>814(1) — Charge should limit negligence sustaining conviction of homicide to that alleged.</p> <p>In a prosecution for manslaughter, resulting from unlawful speeding and reckless driving of an automobile, a charge authorizing conviction ii the jury were satisfied death resulted from any negligent act or omission of the defendant was erroneous, as not limiting the jury to the acts of negligence alleged.</p> <p>*@zs>jETor other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the. Assistant Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Interference proceedings between Ralph B. Hartsough and William R. Gile. Prom a decision awarding priority to Gile, the junior party, Hartsough appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Assistant Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Interference proceeding in the Patent Office between Charles J. Pembroke and Albert F. Sulzer. From a decision of an Assistant Commissioner of Patents, awarding priority to Sulzer, Pembroke appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from.the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Petition by the United States, on the relation of Robert A. Widenmann, for writ of mandamus against Robert Eansing, as Secretary of State of the United States. Rule denied, and petition dismissed, and relator appeals. Pending the appeal, Bainbridge Colby succeeded to the office of Secretary of State, and the case was revived against him.</p>

' In the matter of the application of Alexander. E. Sorum for the allowance of a patent. From a Patent Office decision, rejecting claims 5 to 21; inclusive^ the applicant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Action by the Second National Bank against Joseph A. Prowinsky. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court oí the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Action in replevin by Robert L. Dorsey against the District of Columbia anil Edwin B. Hesse. From a judgment sustaining defendants’ motion for the restoration of property, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Replevin by George J. Young against the District of Columbia and Edwin B. Hesse. From a judgment restoring property to defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to Police Court of District of Columbia.</p> <p>George Bell was convicted of carrying concealed a weapon, and he brings error.</p>

<p>1. Patents <£=>91 (1) — Junior applicant has borden of proof in interference proceedings.</p> <p>In interference proceedings, the junior applicant for patent has the burden of proving his claim to priority.</p> <p>3. Patents <£=>113 (?) — Decision by three tribunals of Patent Office against junior applicant not disturbed, unless clearly wrong.</p> <p>Where the three tribunals of the Patent Office united in holding against the junior applicant in interference proceedings, their decision will not be disturbed, unless clearly wrong.</p> <p><§z=x>For other cases see same topic & KE Y-NUMBEK in all Key-Numbered Digests & indexes</p>

Application by the Christian Moerlein' Brewing Company for the registration of a trade-mark, opposed by the Christo Manufacturing Company. From a decision overruling thé objection opposer appeals.

<p>Patents <&=>90(5) — Senior applicant held entitled to priority.</p> <p>Where the senior applicant for the patent was the first to conceive the invention, and his application was filed before the junior applicant reduced his invention to practice, either actually "or constructively, the senior applicant is entitled to priority.</p> <p><g^>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBHR in all Key-Numbered Digests & indexes</p>

<p>Appeal from the Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Application by Harry E. Duncan for patent. Application rejected, and applicant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Application by the French Battery & Carbon Company for registra! ioii of a trade-mark, opposed by the Prest-O-Lite Company, Incorporated. From a decision denying registration of the mark in con; nection with storage batteries, but permitting it as to electric lamps, both parties appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Application by Marvin Smithey for a patent. From a decision of the Commissioner, rejecting three claims, applicant appeals.</p>

Suit for divorce by Mamie P. Jenkins against George W. Jenkins. From a decree granting the divorce, with alimony and counsel fees, defendant appeals.

<p>Appeal from the Commissioner of Patents.</p> <p>Application by the United States Rubber Company for registration of trade-mark. Application denied, and applicant appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.</p>

<p>Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio.</p>

<p>Petition to Revise Order of the District Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. Suit in</p> <p>admiralty by Bartle Daly against the Director General of Railroads, operating the Pennsylvania Railroad. Decree for libelant, and respondent appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of West Virginia at Clarksburg; Alston G. Dayton, Judge. Suit in equity by Jacob Doll & Sons, a corporation, against Cloyd H. Duncan. Decree for complainant, and defendant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Ohio.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore; John C. Rose, Judge. Suit in equity by the E. W. Bliss Company against the Southern Can Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.</p>

Lynch, Judge. In Admiralty. Suit for collision by George W. Scott and another against the steam tug Louise Rugge, Tice Tugging Line, claimant, and the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Middlesex County, New Jersey. Decree for libelants against the Louise Rugge, and claimant appeals.

Connor, Judge. Suit in equity by the Bank of Commerce & Trusts of Richmond, Va., and others, against D. L. McBryde and others. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal.

<p>Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to Require Hon. James E. B.oyd, United States District Judge for the Western District of North 'Carolina, to Sign Bill of Exceptions, etc., in case of H. C. McCrary v. Linvillo River Ry. Co.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the AVestern District of North Carolina, at Ashe-ville.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Appeals from the District Court of the United States for tin; Eastern District of New York. Suit in admiralty by the Tobo Yacht Basin Company^ against the schooner Mommie T., M. Stanley Tweedie, claimant, with cross-libel. Decree for libelant, and claimant appeals.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United Slates for the Northern District of Ohio.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of South Carolina, at Greenville.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the Unitea States for the Eastern District of South Carolina, at Charleston.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

Actions at law by Charles S. Aronstam against the Union of Siberian Co-operative Unions, Incorporated, and against the Union of Siberian Creamery Associations, Incorporated. Judgments for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Commissioner of Patents. Interference proceeding in the Patent Office between Richard Ruppel and John A. Bogart. From a decision by the Commissioner of Patents in favor of Bogart, Ruppel appeals.</p>