¶1Dissenting Opinion
¶2While I agree with the majority opinion when it states that some offenses punished as theft relate to a person’s propensity to tell the truth and some theft offenses have little or no relevance to credibility, I cannot agree with the majority conclusion. I do not see how we can sanction the admission of admittedly irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence. In Ashton v. Anderson, (1972) 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210, we noted that a witness’ conviction of some crimes “has no bearing whatsoever on his credibility for truth and veracity.” 258 Ind. at 61. On the other hand, if the witness must admit these convictions and he is the accused,
“there is an obvious danger that the jury, despite instructions, will give more heed to the past convictions as evidence that the accused is the kind of man who would commit the crime on charge, or even that he ought to be put away without too much concern with present guilt, than they will to the legitimate bearing of the past convictions on credibility.” McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §43, p. 89 (1972).
¶3The District of Columbia Circuit Court has held that prior convictions are not admissible “where the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility.” Luck v. U.S., (D.C. Cir. 1965) 348 F.2d 763, 768. The nature of the prior offense is one of the factors which the judge considers in deciding admissibility. Our Court, wisely I believe, determined in Ashtonthat admissibility should not be discretionary. However, the opinions of the District of Columbia Circuit are useful, since that Court has developed its law of impeachment by prior convictions most extensively.
¶4*140In Gordon v. U.S., (D.C. Cir. 1967) 383 F.2d 936, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, Judge Burger wrote:
“In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a man’s honesty and integrity. Acts of violence on the other hand, which may result from a short temper, a combative nature, extreme provocation, or other causes, generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.” (Footnotes omitted.) 383 F.2d at 940.
¶5But, the same Court, after quoting the preceding statement, noted:
“The misdemeanor of taking property without right is not, however, to be equated with larceny or other charges of dishonest conduct properly related to credibility. This misdemeanor has been distinguished from larceny, in that ‘proof of a specific criminal intent to deprive an owner of his property permanently is absent.’ It has been held even not to be the act of a ‘thief’ in certain criminal context. While ‘joy-riding’ is conduct that may not be tolerated lightly, it has elements bringing it within the category of ‘impulsive’ crimes and should not be deemed the kind of larcenous act that is routinely considered to reflect on credibility and hence constitutes permissible impeachment.” U.S. v. Carr, (D.C. Cir. 1969) 418 F.2d 1184, 1186, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1030.
¶6Thus, as Weinstein notes, “breaking crimes down into major categories may not always be sufficient. All acts of ‘stealing’ are not the same.” 3 WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 609-68 (1975).
¶7As long as our rule of admissibility is based upon the nature of the prior conviction, we cannot include in the admissible group any category of convictions in which some of the offenses are admittedly irrelevant to the issue of credibility. New crimes are as broadly defined as theft, so that the question will seldom arise. But, a conviction for theft may well be irrelevant to credibility and should not be admitted.
¶8Note. — Reported at 340 N.E.2d 771.