Volume 264 — United States Reports

Held: in Barclay v. Smith, 107 Ill., 349 , that the membership is not property or subject to judicial sale, basing its conclusion on the ground that it can not be acquired except upon a vote of ten Di *9 rectors, and can not be transferred to another unless the transfer is approved by the same vote, and that it can not be subjected to the payment of debts of the holder by legal proceedings.

Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed a decree of the District Court for the plaintiff Kunkel, and the Prairie Oil and Gas Company, made defendant by a cross bill, and against the defendants and cross plaintiffs, Barnett et al., in a suit brought by Kunkel to quiet title to' a piece of land in Oklahoma. Certiorari was refused. 260 U. S. 738. A petition for rehearing was denied.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.</p> <p>Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington which affirmed a judgment of a lower court dismissing the complaint of the Puget Sound Power & Light Company and the cross complaint filed by City of Seattle against its co-defendants, in a suit by the Power & Light Company to enjoin collection of taxes on its street railway property.</p>

Held: a consideration of the point sufficient as a basis for assigning error here. P. 31. 2. The impairment of contract obligation forbidden by Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution, is impairment by legislation. The proposition that judicial impairment is included has been so frequently denied that it can not support a writ of error to a .State Supreme Court. Id. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 . *30 3.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of the United States for Northern Illinois, dismissing five writs of habeas corpus and remanding the appellants, who are aliens, to the custody of the Immigration Inspector at Chicago for deportation, in pursuance to warrants issued by the Secretary of Labor. The cases were consolidated in the court below.

<p>1. The Estate Tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1918, e. 18, 40 Stat. 1096, is not a succession tax upon the benefits received by devisees and legatees, but an excise or death duty upon the transfer of the decedent’s estate. P. 49.</p> <p>2. In providing that bequests to religious and charitable corporations shall be deducted in determining the value of the net estate upon which the tax is imposed, § 403, (3), the act does not undertake to exempt the recipients of such charitable gifts from the burden of the tax if placed upon them by the will. P. -50.</p> <p>3. Hence, where the charitable gifts are residuary, and are duly taken into account in ascertaining the net taxable estate and the amount of the tax, the act offers no obstacle to charging the tax, with other costs and expenses, against the gross estate and satisfying specific devises and bequests in. full, before the charitable gifts are satisfied. Id.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Certiorari to a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed in part a decree of the District Court in a suit brought by Peck to enjoin the Standard Parts Company from infringing his patent and for an accounting, etc. The District Court adjudged the equities in the company’s favor and ordered Peck to assign to it the patent in question and any others, or applications therefor, based on inventions made by him in pursuance of his employment by the company’s predecessor. The Court of Appeals allowed the company only certain rights as licensee.</p> <p>cited and discussed the following cases:</p> <p>Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342; McAleer v. United States, 150 U. S. 424; Gill v. United States, 160 U. S. 426; Blozom v. Elsee, 1 Carr. & Payne, 558; McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202; Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226; Dalsell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315; Air Reduction Co. v. Walker, 195 N. Y. S. 120.</p> <p>Any right of action which petitioner may have must be based upon an implied contract growing out of the employment of Peck by the Pontiac Company. Whether or not a contract may be implied depends upon the intentions of the parties.</p> <p>There was no intention on the part of either Peck or the Pontiac Company that Peck should assign any inventions or patents. The parties did not have in contemplation the making of patentable inventions by Peck in performing the work for which he was employed. Peck’s uncontradicted testimony is that it was not until after the contract had been entered into that any, question arose as to the possibility of any patentable inventions being made by him in building the machines and in developing the processes, for which he was employed.</p> <p>Specific performance will only be granted where it is clearly established by evidence that the party seeking it is entitled to it. Hennessy v. Woolworth, 128 U. S. 438; Colson v. Thompson, 2 Wheat. 336; Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315.</p> <p>A license under a patent will only be implied where the circumstances are such as to estop the patentee from denying the existence of such license. Edison Co. v. Peninsula, 101 Fed. 831. The same rule would seemingly equally apply to an implied agreement to assign a patent to an employer.</p> <p>An employer is not entitled to a patent covering an invention made by an employee, in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, but only to a shop-right, or nonexclusive, nontransferable license thereunder. Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U, S. 226; Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 320; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 128 Fed. 445; Morton v. Andrews Co., 229 Fed. 150; Niagara Co. v. Hibbard, 179 Fed. 845; Burpee v. Guggenheim, 226 Fed. 219; Johnson Co. v. Western Co., 178 Fed. 823; Hildreth v. Duff, 139 Fed. 141; Barber v. National Co., 129 Fed. 372.</p> <p>Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342, did not refer to Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226, doubtless because the title to the patent in suit was not at issue, but merely the right of the United States to a license thereunder. Subsequently, this Court, in Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315, a case in which was directly involved the title of an employer to a patent covering an invention made by an employee, followed Hapgood v. Hewitt, and held that the employer was not entitled tó an assignment of the patent. McAleer v. United States, 150 U. S. 424, and Gill v. United States, 160 U. S. 426, were implied license cases.</p> <p>No decision of a federal court has been found in which, in the absence of an express agreement, an employer has been held entitled to, an assignment of a patent covering §n invention made by an employee regardless of whether the employment was general, or for the special purpose of developing or devising certain specific machines, processes or improvements. Barber v. National Co., 129 Fed. 370; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 137 Fed. 403; Air Reduction Co. v. Walker, 195 N. Y. S. 120.</p> <p>The suit is barred by laches.</p> <p>The consideration which Peck received under his contract was for the work which he did for his employer without regard as to whether or not he might make any patentable inventions. No consideration whatever has passed to him to support the assignment. Dalzell v. Dueber Mfg. Co., 149 U. S. 315.</p> <p>The shop-right of an employer is not transferable. Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226; Boston v. Allen, 91 Fed. 248; Barber v. National Co., 129 Fed. 370; Gill v. United States, 160 U. S. 426; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 137 Fed. 403; Lane Co. v. Locke, 150 U. S. 193; Rowell v. Rowell, 122 Wis. 21; Bowers v. Lake Superior Co., 149 Fed. 983.</p> <p>The procedure adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case would permit the piecemeal trial of cases in disregard of the evident intent of Equity Rule 30.</p>

Held: as a matter of statutory construction, that the Arbitration Law does not extend to controversies which are within the admiralty jurisdiction; and that the substantive claim sought to be enforced is so cognizable. The claim to recover an amount paid under a charter party as charter hire is within the admiralty jurisdiction. Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How. 491 .

Held: not violative of the retailers’ rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 139. 282 Fed. 253 , affirmed. Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed a decree of the District Court dismissing the bill in a suit to enjoin enforcement of an Arkansas law taxing gasoline.

Held: Not in violation of equal protection of the laws, either because it applies only in cities of the first class, or because it does not apply to persons operating motor vehicles for their own private ends, or because it does not apply to street cars and omnibuses, which are regulated under another law. P. 143.

Held: that no taking could be implied, and the United States was not liable ex contractu. P. 148. 55 Ct. Clms. 107, affirmed, Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing a petition. Mr. Benjamin Carter, with whom Mr. F. Carter Pope was on the brief, for appellant. Mr. Solicitor General Beck appeared for the United States.

Held: however, that inasmuch as Class B complainants were engaged in intrastate business they were subject to the tax, and none the less because they were also engaged in interstate business. With this conclusion we fully agree.

Held: that the requirement was not arbitrary, but reasonable, and consistent with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 180. 183 N. C. 338 , affirmed.

Held: in a case in which it was sought to compel an employer of stevedores to contribute to an accident fund, as provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Washington; (b) in a case involving the power of a commission of California to award compensation for the death of a workman killed while engaged at maritime work, under maritime contract, upon a vessel moored at dock and discharging her cargo. Id. 3.

Held: that access is confined to such documents as are relevant as evidence to the inquiry or complaint before the commission, and that their disclosure cannot be compelled without some evidence of their relevancy and upon a reasonable demand. Id. 283 Fed. 999 , affirmed.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP LOUISIANA.</p> <p>On motion to affirm a decree of the District Court, dismissing a bill for want of jurisdiction.</p>

Held: that the quoted provision (construed with Jud. Code, §§ 24 and 51,) relates only to venue, conferring a personal privilege which a defendant may waive, if he enters a general appearance before or without claiming it. Id. 3.

Held: that determination of that issue was for the court where the indictment was found and was not open for decision in another district in habeas corpus. P. 402. 291 Fed. 311 , reversed. *400 Ceetiorari to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed a judgment of the District Court dismissing a writ of habeas corpus, and ordered the prisoner discharged.

Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924), was a Supreme Court case. In line with the plain meaning rule, the Court determined that a native-born citizen of the United States was not automatically entitled to rights granted by a statute for naturalized citizens, despite the doctrine of absurdity.

Held: that timbered lands were not intended to be excluded from assignment. Id. 3. The General Indian Allotment Act should be construed when possible in harmony with previous Indian treaties. Id. 4.

Held: That the flat increase made by the Tax Commission was in strict conformity with the state statutes; (b) That this action being approved by the State Board of Equalization constituted a final assessment; (c) That under the statute the plaintiff was bound to know the authority of these taxing agencies in the premises and that they were required to meet at certain places, on certain days, and complete their labors…

Held: that tracts allotted and deeded as surplus were not made taxable within the three year period, by the death of the allottees, where this occurred before the allotments had been completed and approved. P. 487. 4.

Held: That § 8 of the Bankruptcy Act, providing that the death óf a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, was inapplicable to so much of the petition as sought the bankruptcy of the firm and the other partners, they not consenting to such adjudications. P. 502.

Held: That, in the circumstances, the provision .that average weights shall not exceed these maxima is not necessary to protect purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights, and not calculated to effectuate that purpose; and that it subjects bakers and sellers of bread to restrictions essentially unreasonable and arbitrary; and is therefore repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 514. 108 Neb. 674 , reversed.

Held: A law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change. P. 547.

Held: and were holding, that the legal title was vested in the trustee, that the plaintiff was excluded by his father’s will “ from ever taking,” which holdings by the state courts are repeated and emphasized in the opinion of the case of Lindsey v. Bose, 175 S. W. 832 , it became necessary for the federal court to assume such authority and control over the trustee and his disposition of the property after the termination…

Held: that the error, if any, did not go to the jurisdiction of the court, or render the judgment void, and that review should have been sought by writ of error. P. 564. Reversed. Appeal from an order of the District Court discharging the appellee from custody, in a habeas corpus proceeding. Mr. George Boss Hull, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, for the United States. Mr. Abner Sieged, for appellee, submitted.

<p>Order that reports by commissioners, with accompanying maps, respecting the running, etc., of the boundary line along the Big Bend Area, and of part of the medial line in the river bed, be received and filed, and limiting the time for objections or exceptions.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland.</p>