Âś1Opinion
Âś2The principal issue in this appeal is whether the defendantâs federal due process right to a fair trial was violated as a result of numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and in the questioning of witnesses. The defendant, Manuel Ceballos, appeals
Âś3The record reveals that the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant had resided in the New Haven home of his cousin, T, and her husband, since June, 1996. The victim, S,
Âś4In May, 2000, S was seven years old. She testified that, on May 9, 2000, she was in her room with her younger brothers watching cartoons on television.
Âś5S testified that the defendant had touched her in a similar manner on several occasions before May 9,2000, and that these incidents always had occurred on the third floor of the house. She testified that she could not recall the specific dates, but that all of the incidents had occurred in April and May, 2000.
Âś6S testified that on May 10, 2000, the day after one of the alleged incidents with the defendant, she had suffered from pain in the âprivate partâ that was â[bjetween [her] legs.â S told K about her pain during the early evening of that day. At that time K also had observed S scratching and âpulling onâ her vaginal area. K examined the area and instructed S to put diaper rash cream on it to reheve the irritation. K then asked S whether anyone had touched her in that area.
Âś7Subsequently, on the evening of May 10, K brought S to the Fair Haven Clinic (clinic) for medical evaluation. At the clinic, Laurel Shader, a pediatrician, had conducted a physical examination of S, including her vaginal and rectal areas, and also interviewed her.
Âś8*371Later on the evening of May 10, Jeff Hoffman, a New Haven police officer, responded to the clinic to conduct a preliminary investigation, and he spoke to K, S and Shader. Hoffman was met shortly thereafter by Edwin Rodriguez, a New Haven police detective. K told the police officers where they could find the defendant.
Âś9Thereafter, on May 12, S and K discussed the incident again. S testified that she had told K that the defendant had put her hand onto his genitals, and had slightly penetrated her vagina with his penis.
Âś10Subsequently, on May 15, Ruth McGraw, Sâs regular pediatrician, examined and interviewed her at the clinic. In light of Sâs additional disclosures, McGraw, with the assistance of Sandra Flatow, a sexual abuse expert, examined S, including her vaginal and rectal areas, and did not note any physical abnormalities. McGraw also took cultures from the vagina, rectum and throat to check for gonorrhea and chlamydia. These cultures returned negative after a laboratory analysis. Like Shader, McGraw also testified that her negative findings did not mean that S had not been sexually abused.
Âś11The defendant, T and A, Kâs half-brother, testified for the defense. T testified that when she came home from work on May 10, 2000, K told her that the defendant had sexually abused S. She testified that she only had spoken with K about Sâs allegations,
Âś12A, who in addition to being Kâs half-brother, is a cousin and friend of the defendant. A testified that in May, 2000, he lived in the bedroom that was located between Kâs room and the defendantâs room. At that time, he had worked on varying days between 8:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. as a senior citizensâ driver. A testified that, to his knowledge, the defendant usually worked approximately from 10 p.m. until 7 a.m. When the defendant was in his room, A testified that the door was always closed. A testified that he was present in the house on the day and evening of May 9, 2000, but that he had gone to church for part of the evening. He also testified that the police did not question him about whether he was present in the house at the time of the alleged incident. A testified that he never had seen S go into the defendantâs room.
Âś13The defendant also testified in his own defense. He described the interior of his room as containing a bed, three bureaus, family photographs and a television. He testified that the room had one window and a solid white door with a lock. The defendant testified that in May, 2000, he usually worked on Monday through Friday from 10 p.m. until 7:30 a.m. stocking at a discount store. He also testified that on May 10, 2000, he fell asleep after coming home from work and watching television, and awoke to the early evening confrontation with K at approximately 6 p.m. He testified that K was swearing at him and threatening him. He had told K to bring S in and ask her for the truth. S subsequently entered the room and accused the defendant of abuse, and he told her to âstop lying.â The defendant told K to take S to the doctor and come back after an examination. Subsequently, S and K left the room, and the defen*374dant then went back to sleep. Thereafter, he awoke again and was arrested by the police.
Âś14The defendant denied ever kissing S or touching any part of her body. He also denied that she had ever touched his penis. He testified that he did not know why S had made the allegations against him. The defendant also denied that S had ever been in his room, or that he had been in her room.
œ15Subsequently, the jury convicted the defendant of one count each of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2), and risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). The trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment for sexual assault, and five years imprisonment for risk of injury to a child, to be served concurrently for a total term of ten years imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Âś16I
Âś17PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIMS
Âś18The defendantâs first claim on appeal is that deliberate and pervasive prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his federal due process right to a fair trial. Specifically, the defendant claims that the stateâs attorney committed misconduct when he: (1) asked the defendant to comment on Sâs veracity during cross-examination and used that line of questioning during his summation; (2) made a religiously charged statement during closing arguments; (3) injected extraneous matters into the case and appealed to the jurorsâ emotions and sympathies for S during closing arguments; (4) bolstered Sâs credibility by asking her on direct examination whether *375her testimony was the truth; (5) argued facts not in evidence in a deliberate attempt to influence the jurors against the defendant; and (6) violated the trial courtâs orders on three different occasions during the trial.
Âś19We note that the defendantâs claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the present case are similar to those that we recently addressed in State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 793 A.2d 226 (2002), because, as in that case, the defendant here contends that the cumulative effect of all the stateâs attorneyâs improprieties during questioning and closing arguments sufficiently had infected the proceedings, and thereby rendered the conviction a denial of due process. Accordingly, pursuant to Singh, we will âaddress each [claim] in turn to determine whether the particular conduct was improper before determining whether the impropriety, if any, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.â Id., 702.
Âś20Moreover, this caseâs similarity to Singhdoes not end with the nature of the misconduct alleged. Just as in State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 699, the defendant in the present case did not raise at trial all of his complaints of prosecutorial misconduct. He only objected to two of the misconduct claims that arose from the stateâs attorneyâs closing argument.
Âś21Prior to analyzing the defendantâs specific claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we set forth the well established principles that guide our inquiry as to all of his claims. âTo prove prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must demonstrate substantial prejudice. ... In order to demonstrate this, the defendant must establish that the trial as a whole was fundamentally unfair and that the misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. . . .
Âś22âProsecutorial misconduct may occur in the course of cross-examination of witnesses . . . and may be so clearly inflammatory as to be incapable of correction by action of the court. ... In such instances there is a reasonable possibility that the improprieties in the cross-examination either contributed to the juryâs verdict of guilty or, negatively, foreclosed the jury from ever considering the possibility of acquittal. . . . Moreover, prosecutorial misconduct of constitutional proportions may arise during the course of closing argument, thereby implicating the fundamental fairness of the trial itself . . . .â (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 699-700.
Âś23â[I]t is not the prosecutorâs conduct alone that guides our inquiry, but, rather, the fairness of the trial as a whole. . . . We are mindful throughout this inquiry, however, of the unique responsibilities of the prosecutor in our judicial system. A prosecutor is not only an officer of the court, like every other attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people of the State, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent. ... By reason of his [or her] office, [the prosecutor] usually exercises great *377influence upon jurors. [The prosecutorâs] conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human life or liberty are at stake should be forceful, but fair, because he [or she] represents the public interest, which demands no victim and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice or resentment. If the accused be guilty, he [or she] should none the less be convicted only after a fair trial, conducted strictly according to the sound and well-established rules which the laws prescribe.â (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 701.
Âś24A
Âś25Whether the Stateâs Attorney Improperly Questioned the Defendant about the Veracity of S
Âś26The defendantâs first claim of misconduct is that, during cross-examination, the stateâs attorney improperly had asked him, in violation of our recent decision in State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 712, whether S was lying, and why she would make up allegations of sexual abuse.
Âś27In State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 706, we addressed, as an issue of first impression in Connecticut, the âwell established evidentiary rule that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on another witnessâ veracity.â We adopted this rule, noting that: (1) âquestions that ask a defendant to comment on another witnessâ veracity invade the province of the jury,â which includes the determination of witness credibility; id., 707; and (2) âquestions of this sort also create the risk that the jury may conclude that, in order to acquit the defendant, it must find that the witness has lied.â
Âś28The record reveals that the stateâs attorney questioned the defendant repeatedly about whether S was lying, and about any possible motives that she might have for making her allegations of sexual abuse. See footnote 26 of this opinion. Moreover, the state made use of this cross-examination in its closing argument. See footnote 27 of this opinion. We conclude, as the state conceded in its brief, that the stateâs attorneyâs actions with respect to asking the defendant whether S was lying violated the rule articulated in Singhand, therefore, were improper. We also conclude, however, that the stateâs attorneyâs questions and subsequent arguments about Sâs possible motives for the allegations of sexual abuse were not improper. See, e.g., State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 170, 778 A.2d 955 (2001) (âthe state may properly argue that the witnesses had no apparent motive to lieâ).
Âś29Relying on this courtâs decisions in State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 562-64, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985), and State v. Hafner, 168 Conn. 230, 246-54, 362 A.2d 925, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 851, 96 S. Ct. 95, 46 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1975), the state claims that the violation of Singhby the stateâs attorney does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct because it was neither deliberately undertaken in bad faith, nor seriously egregious. We disagree. The stateâs argument fails to acknowledge that â[t]he standard that we follow in analyzing constitutional due process claims that allege prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial rather than the culpability of the prosecutorâs conduct.â
Âś30B
Âś31Whether the Stateâs Attorney Made a Religiously Charged Statement during Summations
Âś32The defendant also contends that the stateâs attorney made an improper religiously charged statement in his rebuttal argument during summations. Specifically, the defendant contends that the stateâs attorney, after referencing Sâs statement that she believed âGod will punishâ people who tell lies; see footnote 40 of this opinion; improperly argued that: âI would submit that the defendant is not concerned about what God is going to do to him, not now anyways. Heâs worried about what you people are going to do, and thatâs why he had to say what he said yesterday.â
Âś33As an initial matter, we are mindful of the fact that the statements made by the stateâs attorney during his summation not only directly invoke religious characters, including âGodâ and âSatan,â but also impliedly reference notions of divine punishment for worldly transgressions. The extent to which prosecutors may employ religious references during argument presents an issue of first impression for this court.
Âś34In contrast to the majority approach, other jurisdictions permit, but do not encourage, the use of religious references as an oratorical device. See State v. Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 26-27, 510 S.E.2d 626 (prosecutorâs discussion of biblical passages supporting imposition of death penalty not âgrossly improper,â but âdiscour*387age[d]â; court âcautionfed] all counsel that they should base their jury arguments solely upon the secular law and the factsâ), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880, 120 S. Ct. 193, 145 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1999).
Âś35Finally, we note the per se reversible error approach adopted by Pennsylvania as to reliance on religious writings by prosecutors in death penalty cases. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 586, 599 A.2d 630 (1991) (âIn the past we have narrowly tolerated references to the Bible and have characterized such references as on the limits of âoratorical flairâ and have cautioned that such references are a dangerous practice which we strongly discourage. . . . We now admonish all prosecutors that reliance in any manner upon the Bible or any other religious writing in support of the imposition of a penalty of death is reversible error per se and may subject violators to disciplinary action.â [Citations omitted.]), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 946, 112 S. Ct. 2290, 119 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1992). This approach subsequently has been modified. See Commonwealth *388v. Cook, 544 Pa. 361, 384, 676 A.2d 639 (1996) (religious references by prosecutor âwere a fair response to the evidence presented by the defense and did not violate the per se rule of Chambersâ); Commonwealth v. Smith, 544 Pa. 219, 241-42, 675 A.2d 1221 (1996) (concluding that rule of Chambers did not apply to âtangentialâ references to God).
Âś36We also note that the commentators, like the courts, are divided with respect to the degree and type of religious references that should be permitted during trials. Compare J. Blume & S. Johnson, âDonât Take His Eye, Donât Take His Tooth, and Donât Cast the First Stone: Limiting Religious Arguments in Capital Cases,â 9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 61, 94â97 (2000) (endorsing Pennsylvaniaâs automatic reversal rule for prosecutorial religious references, except for those that are âsingleâ or âin passing,â and providing definition of âreligious argumentâ) with E. Brooks, note, âThou Shalt Not Quote the Bible: Determining the Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious Philosophy and Themes in Oral Arguments,â 33 Ga. L. Rev. 1113, 1174-80 (1999) (The commentator criticized the Pennsylvania per se reversible error rule and argued that âcourts that evaluate whether religious arguments constitute error should be careful not to label all religious arguments as improper. Determination of propriety of religious statements should not look to the religious origins of the argument, but instead should compare religious arguments to other improper arguments to see if they rise to the same level of impropriety.â).
Âś37*389Having reviewed these persuasive authorities, we see no reason to depart, in the context of statements made by stateâs attorneys that reference or invoke religious characters or beliefs, from our well settled standard by which we evaluate any other prosecutorial statement that is challenged as constituting misconduct rising to the level of a due process violation. See footnote 29 of this opinion. Accordingly, in the determination as to whether prosecutorial misconduct constituting a denial of due process has occurred, argument by the prosecution that invokes or references religion or religious beliefs is to be evaluated under a two step progression. First, a threshold inquiry is to be performed as to whether the challenged statements pass the threshold of impropriety in that they are inflammatory, unduly evoke the passions or prejudices of the jurors, or improperly invade the province of the jury.
Âś38As to the first stage in this process, a prosecutorial statement that references religion and is alleged to constitute misconduct can be evaluated, just as any other statement made by a prosecutor, on an individual basis to determine if the statement is improper. The best approach is to view the statement of the prosecutor in the context and in the manner in which it was made; to evaluate whether the statement improperly invaded the province of the jury as to the assessment of evidence or the finding of fact; and to determine if the statement had the inflammatory impact of infusing passion, prejudice, or resentment into the minds of the jurors on a case-by-case basis. If misconduct is found as a threshold matter, then the prosecutorial statement, viewed in the collective with all other statements found to be improper, will be measured within the second stage of the analysis: whether the statements were substantially prejudicial such that the fundamental fairness of the trial was adversely impacted.
Âś39The sum and substance of our analysis into allegations of prosecutorial misconduct when religious references are made is, therefore, in harmony with the analytical construct of the majority of jurisdictions. As already noted, in those jurisdictions prosecutorial impropriety does not necessarily equate to reversible prosecutorial misconduct; rather, a further showing of actual prejudice must be made in order for prosecu-torial misconduct to warrant reversal. This subsequent *391demonstration of prejudice is identical to the second step of our progression: whether prejudice has been visited upon a criminal defendant as a result of established misconduct.
Âś40Turning to the statements made by the stateâs attorney in his summation in the present case, we conclude that the stateâs attorney committed prosecutorial misconduct when he remarked: âI would submit that the defendant is not concerned about what God is going to do to him, not now anyways. Heâs worried about what you people are going to do, and thatâs why he had to say what he said yesterday.â This statement, particularly in light of his further reference to âSatanâs daughter,â far overstepped the bounds of appropriate prosecutorial argument or permissible oratorical flair. We are persuaded that the context of the statements, the manner in which they were delivered, and the substance of the remarks constituted inappropriate statements under our well established standard regarding prosecutorial misconduct. In our view, the stateâs attorneyâs separate direct invocations of religious characters served solely as an inflammatory emotional appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury, and bore no reasoned connection to the juryâs determination as to the ultimate issue before them, namely, the defendantâs guilt or innocence.
Âś41Moreover, we are markedly troubled by the stateâs attorneyâs reference to the possible divine consequences that await the defendant as a result of his actions. As mentioned, the state contends that this statement was relevant to the determination of the defendantâs credibility because it was intended to contrast S, who âseemingly due to her youth, believed God would punish her if she lied, with the defendant, who likely was more concerned about the juryâs immediate verdict.â We reject the stateâs assertion that this statement was not inflammatory and provided meaningful guidance to the jury as it undertook its credibility determinations. Rather, we view this statement as an indication to the trier of fact, the jury, that another trier of fact, a divine one nonetheless, awaited the defendant to punish him for his lack of veracity. By raising the inference that the defendant already had been adjudged guilty by an omnipotent other, the statement impermissibly invaded the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the respective witnesses. In addition, we are not convinced that this was the only inference that may have been planted in the minds of jurors; a statement referencing possible punishment by a divine being for wrongs allegedly peipetrated by the defendant, within *393the context of summations in a criminal trial, also may have served to cast doubt upon the ultimate issue before the jury: the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs remark about the defendantâs concern with the jury, as opposed to God, was inflammatory, impermissibly invaded the province of the jury, and was improper.
Âś42C
Âś43Whether the Stateâs Attorney Improperly Appealed to the Juryâs Sympathy for S and Improperly Injected Extraneous Matters into the Trial
Âś44The defendant next claims that, during the stateâs attorneyâs initial closing argument, he had: (1) injected extraneous matters into the trial; and (2) appealed to the juryâs emotions to evoke sympathy for S. Specifically, the defendant contends that the following comments during closing argument constituted an improper appeal to the juryâs emotions: (1) the stateâs attorneyâs descriptions of Sâs difficult childhood and poor living conditions; (2) statements of how courageous S was by testifying; and (3) the statement that S âdid her part last Friday. With all due respect, ladies and gentlemen, itâs now time for you to do your part.â
Âś45We begin with the well established proposition that â[a] prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the jurors. . . . When the prosecutor appeals to emotions, he invites the jury to decide the case, not according to a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful and irrelevant factors which are likely to skew that appraisal. . . . Therefore, a prosecutor may argue the stateâs case forcefully, [but] such argument must be fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.â (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 719; accord State v. Alexander, 254 Conn. 290, 307, 755 A.2d 868 (2000); State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 546.
Âś46We begin by concluding that the stateâs attorneyâs comments about S being the âperfect victimâ because *395of her difficult childhood and poor living conditions were not improper appeals to the juryâs emotions. Although the stateâs attorney elected to make an opportunity argument in a manner that cast S in an undoubtedly sympathetic light because of her disadvantageous family situation, this did not detract from the main point of the argument, namely, that the defendant had ample opportunity to abuse S. We, therefore, agree with the stateâs contention that these remarks constituted a proper argument that the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crimes alleged.
Âś47We also conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs comment that â[S] did her part last Friday . . . [w]ith all due respect, ladies and gentlemen, itâs now time for you to do your part,â was improper. We base this conclusion on our recent decision in State v. Whipper, supra,258 Conn. 271-72. In Whipper, the prosecutor had stated to the juiy: â âNow youâre here as members of the community. You represent what your community is going to be. Not me. I did my part. The police did their job ....ââ Id., 271 n.19. In Whipper, we concluded that this comment was âclearly . . . improperâ because, in suggesting âthat the juiy had a duty, as members of the community, to convict the defendant ... it asked [the] jurors to consider matters not in evidence when deliberating the defendantâs guilt.â Id., 271. We also concluded, however, that these remarks did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial because the defendantâs counsel had objected and the trial court had given an adequate curative instruction. Id., 272.
Âś48In our view, the stateâs attorneyâs comment in the present case to the jury to âdo your partâ was as inappropriate as the prosecutorâs statement in Whipper. We are not persuaded by the stateâs contention that this argument was proper because it did not predict the negative effects of a not guilty verdict, but merely stated that the matter was now in the juryâs hands for delibera*396tion. These arguments, taken in context, suggested that the mere fact that S came forward to testify obligated the members of the jury to âdo your partâ and convict the defendant. Indeed, we note particularly that this statement was made in the sole context of the stateâs attorneyâs discussion of Sâs courage. Accordingly, we conclude that this comment was improper. Moreover, we conclude similarly that the stateâs attorneyâs comments about how courageous S was by coming forward with her allegations and testifying in court also constituted an inappropriate appeal to the jurorsâ emotions.
Âś49D
Âś50Whether the Stateâs Attorney Improperly Bolstered Sâs Credibility
Âś51The defendant next claims that the stateâs attorney improperly bolstered Sâs credibility by, in essence, rehabilitating her testimony before she was ever impeached. Specifically, the defendant, relying on People v. Loggins, 257 Ill. App. 3d 475, 488, 629 N.E.2d 137 (1993), claims that the stateâs attorney improperly had questioned S at the conclusion of direct examination about whether her testimony was truthful; this, therefore, invaded the province of the jury because she had testified as to the ultimate issue in the case, which was her truthfulness, and permitted S to âlift herself by [her] own bootstraps . . . .â
Âś52We begin our analysis of the defendantâs claim by exploring the reasoning of People v. Loggins, supra,257 Ill. App. 3d 475, the case on which he relies. In Loggins, the defendant claimed that certain questions by the prosecutor on redirect examination were improper attempts to rehabilitate the witness. Id., 484-88. The court concluded that most of the questions were permis*398sible, but ruled improper the question to a witness on redirect: â âCan. you take a look at them [the jury] and tell them if you told them the truth?â â Id., 488. The court stated that the question was âan improper attempt to rehabilitate the witness as to her veracity. The witness cannot lift herself by her own bootstraps.â Id. The Illinois court concluded, however, that while the question improperly invaded the juryâs function of determining the credibility of a witness and the weight afforded his or her testimony, the error was harmless in light of the âoverwhelmingâ evidence against the defendant. Id.
Âś53We conclude that the reasoning of Logginsis inappo-site in the present case, wherein the witness is a young child such as S. Although Sâs awareness of the difference between the truth and a lie already had been established in the preliminary examination by the stateâs attorney; see footnote 40 of this opinion; this brief line of confirmatory questioning at the conclusion of her testimony did not improperly bolster her credibility in the absence of attack. The stateâs attorneyâs followup questions were not extrinsic evidence; they merely served to confirm a young childâs awareness of the significance of the oath that she had taken previously. We, therefore, conclude that the follow-up questions did not constitute improper bolstering of Sâs credibility.
Âś55Whether the Stateâs Attorney Improperly Commented on Facts Not in Evidence
Âś56The defendant next claims that, during his initial closing argument, the stateâs attorney twice improperly had commented on facts that had not been admitted into evidence. Specifically, the defendant claims that the following comments were improper: (1) stating, during his discussion of the testimony of Shader, that S suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome, when Shader had in fact testified that S never had been diagnosed with this syndrome;
Âś57It is well established that a âprosecutor, in fulfilling his duties, must confine himself to the evidence in the record. ... [A] lawyer shall not . . . [a]ssert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when testifying as a witness. . . . Statements as to facts that have not been proven amount to unsworn testimony, which is not the subject of proper closing argument. . . . [T]he state may [however] properly respond to inferences raised by the defendantâs closing argument.â (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 717.
Âś58âA prosecutor may invite the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence; however, he or she may not invite sheer speculation unconnected to evidence. . . . Moreover, when a prosecutor suggests a fact not in evidence, there is a risk that the jury may conclude that he or she has independent knowledge of facts that could not be presented to the jury.â (Citations omitted.) Id., 718.
Âś59We conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs comment about S having suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome was not improper because it was an argument *401in support of an inference that could be drawn from evidence in the record, namely, Shaderâs testimony. Our review of the record indicates that although Shader testified that S never had been diagnosed formally with delayed disclosure syndrome, the timing of Sâs allegations, coupled with Shaderâs general testimony about the occurrence of this syndrome in child victims of sexual abuse, would permit the jury reasonably to infer that S had suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome. See footnote 20 of this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs remark about S suffering from delayed disclosure syndrome was a proper argument in support of an inference that permissibly could be drawn from the evidence in the record.
Âś60Moreover, although the more artful way to phrase the argument probably would have been for the stateâs attorney to state that, âyou can infer that S suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome,â any impropriety stemming from this remark was cured by the trial court. We note that the defendant had objected to this comment. The trial court sustained the defendantâs objection and instructed the jurors to disregard that portion of the stateâs attorneyâs argument that specifically related S to delayed disclosure syndrome.
Âś61We also conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs remarks about the mental trauma alleged to have been suffered by S were proper, despite the lack of evidence in the record about the psychological effects of child sexual abuse. âIn deciding cases . . . [j]urors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and correct conclusion. . . . Therefore, it is entirely proper for counsel to appeal to a juryâs common sense in closing remarks.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutorâs remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurorsâ common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that â âgasoline is heavier than airâ â not improper because âmost people would knowâ that fact). In our view, it is axiomatic that child sexual abuse has mental and emotional repercussions for the victim. Thus, the stateâs attorneyâs comments about the psychological effects of the sexual acts alleged to have been committed against S were proper.
Âś62F
Âś63Whether the Stateâs Attorney Improperly Violated the Trial Courtâs Orders
Âś64The defendant next claims that the stateâs attorney deliberately and improperly had defied the orders of the trial court when he: (1) questioned Shader about *403delayed disclosure syndrome without giving defense counsel advance notice of such testimony; (2) argued during summation that S suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome, despite the trial courtâs order that Shader was not allowed to testify about whether S actually had the syndrome; and (3) discussed Sâs testimony in front of K while arguing for the admission of constancy of accusation testimony, despite the trial courtâs having entered a sequestration order. The state claims in response that: (1) the stateâs attorney did not violate a court order with respect to Shaderâs testimony because there was no court order but, rather, merely an agreement between the parties that the state thought had been abrogated implicitly by the defendantâs cross-examination of Shader; (2) although Shader did not say that S had suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome, there was sufficient evidence introduced to permit the jury to infer that fact; and (3) the defendant failed to object to the sequestration order issue in a timely manner, and the trial court had authorized the stateâs attorney to put Sâs testimony on record in front of K. We conclude that the stateâs attorney neither improperly questioned Shader about delayed disclosure syndrome, nor violated the trial courtâs sequestration order.
Âś65Whether a prosecutorâs improper conduct was a deliberate circumvention of the trial courtâs express rulings is significant because we apply a different standard as such misconduct involves prejudice to the entire judicial system, in addition to prejudice to the defendant. State v. Whipper, supra,258 Conn. 269; State v. Ubaldi, supra,190 Conn. 575. In Ubaldi, this court concluded that â[w]here a prosecutor in argument . . . interjects remarks deliberately intended to undermine the rulings of the trial court to the prejudice of the defendant, his conduct is so offensive to the sound administration of justice that only a new trial can effectively prevent such assaults on the integrity of the tribu*404nal.â State v. Ubaldi, supra, 575. This is distinct from misconduct that does not involve âpurposeful disregard of a ruling, which requires the defendant to prove that he was deprived of a fair trial as the result of the misconduct . . . .â Id. In contrast, a new trial ordered because of a prosecutorâs deliberate violation of trial court rulings is ordered pursuant to this courtâs supervisory powers, rather than to remedy the violation of the defendantâs due process rights. Id., 570. We emphasize, however, that this remedy is not automatic even in cases of deliberate defiance. This court will take a âcautious approachâ and balance other interests and practical considerations, such as the trauma caused to the victim who must testify again, prior to ordering a new trial pursuant to its supervisory powers. Id., 572. Indeed, we will evaluate whether the violation of the trial courtâs ruling âwas so unduly offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that reversal of the defendantâs conviction is necessary.â State v. Whipper, supra, 269.
Âś66We first address the defendantâs claim that the stateâs attorney had violated the courtâs orders by questioning Shader about delayed disclosure syndrome without first giving defense counsel advance notice of such testimony. We set forth the following additional facts and procedural history necessary for resolution of this claim. The defendant had filed a motion for disclosure of any expert opinion testimony to be proffered by the state. The court granted the motion after the stateâs attorney agreed to alert defense counsel, outside the presence of the jury, of any intention to introduce expert testimony about the victimâs delayed reporting of child sexual abuse. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Shader about the allegations that S had not disclosed initially. Subsequently, the stateâs attorney attempted to question Shader on redirect examination about delayed disclosure in child sexual abuse cases, but did not first notify the defendant of *405this line of questioning. The defendant then objected to these questions, claiming that they were beyond the scope of cross-examination, and that they violated the agreement that such questions would be asked outside the juryâs presence. The trial court permitted Shader to testily, and concluded that this testimony was responsive to the cross-examination about the lack of certain disclosures. After voir dire by both parties, the trial court ruled that Shader was qualified to testily generally about delayed disclosure in child sexual abuse victims, but could not offer an opinion about S in particular. Shader then testified before the jury about delayed disclosure syndrome. See footnote 20 of this opinion.
Âś67We conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs questioning of Shader about delayed disclosure, without first notifying defense counsel, was not âso unduly offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that reversal of the defendantâs conviction is necessary.â State v. Whipper, supra,258 Conn. 269. Although the better practice would have been to give the requisite notice to defense counsel, we are persuaded by the stateâs contention that Shaderâs testimony was found relevant and admissible by the trial court, which led to those questions being asked in front of the jury. We also note that the stateâs questions occurred on redirect examination, after the defendant already had questioned Shader about the inconsistent and delayed disclosures as reflected in Sâs medical records. Cf. State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 13, 509 A.2d 493 (1986) (âThe party who initiates discussion on the issue is said to have opened the door to rebuttal by the opposing party. Even though the rebuttal evidence would ordinarily be inadmissible on other grounds, the court may, in its discretion, allow it where the party initiating inquiry has made unfair use of the evidence. . . . The doctrine of opening the door cannot, of course, be subverted *406into ĂĄrale for injection ofprejudice.â [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]).
Âś68We next turn to the defendantâs claim that the stateâs attorney had violated the courtâs express orders when he had argued that S suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome. We already have concluded in part I E of this opinion that this argument was proper because it referred to an inference that reasonably could be drawn from evidence in the record. We note, however, that the defendant objected to these comments during summations, and that the trial court sustained the objection and gave a curative instruction to the jury. See footnote 44 of this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that, even if we were to assume that the comment was improper, its effects were mitigated by the trial court, and the comment, by itself, does not rise to the level of disobedience that requires reversal. See State v. Whipper, supra,258 Conn. 258 (value of curative instruction); State v. Ubaldi, supra,190 Conn. 563 (same).
Âś69Finally, we address the defendantâs claim that the stateâs attorney violated the trial courtâs sequestration order when he had discussed Sâs testimony in front of K while arguing for the admission of constancy of accusation testimony. The defendant had filed a pretrial motion requesting the trial court, pursuant to Practice Book § 42-36, to direct the stateâs attorney to: (1) sequester each of its witnesses during the evidentiary portion of the jury trial; and (2) warn each of his witnesses not to discuss the contents of his or her testimony with any other witness. The trial court granted this motion applicable to the witnesses for both parties. During his direct examination of K, the stateâs attorney indicated that he wished to introduce constancy of accusation evidence pursuant to State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 304-305, 677 A.2d 917 (1996). While K was seated on the witness stand, the stateâs attorney stated that he wished to put on the record the accusations *407that S had testified to previously. The trial court granted this request. The stateâs attorney then discussed the specific accusations that S had testified that she had told K At this point, the defendant objected to this being done in front of K. The trial court sustained the defendantâs objection and excused K from the courtroom. The stateâs attorney then continued his recitation prior to resuming his questioning of K.
Âś70In our view, the stateâs attorneyâs statements in the presence of K arguably may have contravened the spirit and purpose of the sequestration order. The defendant, however, did not object immediately, despite the fact that the stateâs attorney clearly had prefaced his comment with a statement of his intent to put the accusations of S on the record. Indeed, the defendant did not object until after the stateâs attorney already had begun his recitation. Accordingly, we conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs discussion of Sâs testimony in front of K did not rise to the level of deliberate flouting of a trial court order as contemplated by State v. Ubaldi, supra,190 Conn. 575. See also State v. Whipper, supra,258 Conn. 269.
Âś71G
Âś72Whether the Prosecutorial Improprieties Deprived the Defendant of His Right to a Fair Trial
Âś73Having reviewed the defendantâs claims of prosecu-torial improprieties, we now turn to the âultimate ques*408tion,â which is âwhether the trial as a whole was fundamentally unfair and that the misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 723; accord State v. Alexander, supra,254 Conn. 303. The defendant contends that, viewed in light of the factors for determining the seriousness of misconduct, as set forth in State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 540, the stateâs attorneyâs improprieties in the present case amounted to a due process violation because they were: (1) uninvited by the defense; (2) pervasive throughout the trial; (3) directed at the central issue in the case, which was the credibility of S and the defendant; and (4) made in the context of a weak stateâs case. The state contends in response that the defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutorial improprieties because many of the stateâs questions and comments were invited by defense counselâs arguments: (1) in support of the defense theory that S had fabricated her allegations, including counselâs comments on the lack of physical injury; (2) intended to generate sympathy for the defendant; and (3) expressing personal comments about the quality of the police investigation. The state also contends that: (1) curative measures taken by the court, and by the stateâs attorney during argument, mitigated any harm suffered as a result of these comments; and (2) the lack of conclusive physical evidence did not necessarily make the stateâs case against the defendant weak. We conclude that, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, the prosecutorial misconduct deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.
Âś74It is well established that â[i]n determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was so serious as to amount to a denial of due process, this court, in conformity with courts in other jurisdictions, has focused on several factors. Among them are the extent to which the mis*409conduct was invited by defense conduct or argument . . . the severity of the misconduct . . . the frequency of the misconduct . . . the centrality of the misconduct to the critical issues in the case . . . the strength of the curative measures adopted . . . and the strength ofthe stateâs case.â (Citations omitted.) Id.; accord State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 723; State v. Alexander, supra,254 Conn. 304.
Âś751
Âś76Whether the Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Invited by the Defense
Âś77Much of the stateâs argument focuses on the first Williams factor, which is the degree to which the prose-cutorial improprieties were invited by defense counsel. Specifically, the state contends that the stateâs attorneyâs violations of State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 706-707, during questioning and argument; see part I A of this opinion; were invited by the â âonly possibleâ â defense theory that S had fabricated her claims. We disagree with the state because we reject the notion that, standing alone, a legitimate defense theory can be viewed as inviting improper conduct on the part of the stateâs attorney. Accordingly, we conclude that the violation of Singhby the stateâs attorney was not invited by the defendant or his attorney.
Âś78As for the remaining improprieties, we conclude that the stateâs attorneyâs improper comments during summation, were not invited by the arguments of defense counsel. Specifically, we disagree with the stateâs claim that the stateâs attorneyâs comments that implored the members of the jury to âdo your partâ; see part IC of this opinion; were invited by defense counselâs depiction, during his summation, of the defendant as a good person who had emigrated to the United States in search *410of a better life.
Âś792
Âś80Whether the Prosecutorâs Misconduct Was Severe and Frequent
Âś81We next turn to the severity and frequency of the misconduct in this case. The defendant contends that *411the misconduct was both frequent and severe because it had occurred during both cross-examination and summations. The state contends that the misconduct was not frequent and severe because most of the defendantâs claims did not constitute misconduct, and what misconduct there was had been neither purposeful nor blatant. Our analysis, however, reveals that the prosecutorial improprieties that occurred in the present case were not just isolated instances. Indeed, they occurred during both the questioning of witnesses and during argument.
Âś82Moreover, we conclude that the prosecutorial misconduct present in this case was severe in nature. In particular, we note that the seriously inflammatory comments made by the stateâs attorney referencing religious entities and divine consequences; see part I B of this opinion; tainted the trial with fundamental unfairness. Although we decline, at this time, to adopt aper se rule that all prosecutorial references to religious beliefs or entities are improper, we are nevertheless mindful that religion, perhaps more so than any other subject, evokes intensely personal, and deeply held, feelings. Accordingly, when prosecutorial statements challenged as misconduct involve references to religion, courts are to scrutinize carefully the content, context, spirit and import of the remark, while affording due weight to the often deeply inflammatory nature of such statements. In this instance, we conclude that the remarks of the stateâs attorney were singularly inflammatory and prejudicial. Having determined that these statements were frequent and severe, we, therefore, must weigh them in the context of the remaining Williams factors: the existence of curative measures taken by the court; their relation to the caseâs central issue; and the strength of the stateâs case.
Âś84Whether Sufficient Curative Measures Were Taken
Âś85We next must determine whether the effect of the prosecutorial misconduct was mitigated by curative measures taken by the trial court. The record reveals that the trial court addressed specifically the objections of defense counsel to the stateâs attorneyâs comments: (1) claiming that S suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome;
Âś86The defendant contends that, taken in the context of the other Williams factors, these general instructions *413failed to remove the prejudice to the defendant that stemmed from the stateâs attorneyâs misconduct. The state claims in response that the jury is presumed to have followed these instructions, and with no evidence to the contrary, any harm to the defendant therefore was obviated.
Âś87â[W]e have previously recognized that a prompt cautionary instruction to the jury regarding improper prosecutorial remarks or questions can obviate any possible harm to the defendant.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Satchwell, 244 Conn. 547, 569, 710 A.2d 1348 (1998); State v. Cruz, 212 Conn. 351, 365, 562 A.2d 1071 (1989); State v. Ubaldi, supra,190 Conn. 563. Moreover, â[i]n the absence of an indication to the contrary, the juiy is presumed to have followed [the trial courtâs] curative instructions.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Whipper, supra,258 Conn. 258. We note, however, that a general instruction does not have the same curative effect as a charge directed at a specific impropriety, particularly when the misconduct has been more than an isolated occurrence. See, e.g., State v. Wickes, 72 Conn. App. 380, 399-400, 805 A.2d 142 (trial court gave general instruction on how to evaluate witness credibility, and that counselâs statements or arguments were not evidence; âprosecutorâs single comment about a witnessâ lack of credibility was not egregious enough such that the courtâs instruction could not have cured the impropriety,â especially in light of strong state case), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 914, 811 A.2d 1294 (2002).
Âś88Bearing in mind these standards, we now turn to the misconduct at issue in the present case. The record reveals that the prejudicial effect of the stateâs attorneyâs comments on delayed disclosure syndrome, and his having called the defendant a âliar,â was mitigated by the specific, direct and immediate instruction by the trial court. Indeed, we note that the defendant did not *414object to the content of this curative instruction. See also part I E of this opinion. The record reveals, however, that the other instances of misconduct, namely, the violations of Singhand the inflammatory religiously charged arguments, were not addressed specifically by the trial court, either sua sponte or upon objection.
Âś89Before addressing the import of the uncured improper arguments, we note that the defendant, by failing to bring them to the attention of the trial court, bears much of the responsibility for the fact that these claimed improprieties went uncured. We emphasize the responsibility of defense counsel, at the very least, to object to perceived prosecutorial improprieties as they occur at trial, and we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that âdefense counselâs failure to object to the prosecutorâs argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was unfair in light of the record of the case at the time.â State v. Andrews, 248 Conn. 1, 19-20, 726 A.2d 104 (1999). Moreover, as the Appellate Court has observed, defense counsel may elect not to object to arguments that he or she deems âmarginally objectionableâ for tactical reasons, namely, âbecause he or she does not want to draw the juryâs attention to it or because he or she wants to later refute that argument.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dillard, 66 Conn. App. 238, 249, 784 A.2d 387, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 943, 786 A.2d 431 (2001). Accordingly, we emphasize that counselâs failure to object at trial, while not by itself fatal to a defendantâs claim, frequently will indicate on appellate review that the challenged comments do not rise to the magnitude of constitutional error contemplated by the third prong of State v. Golding, supra,213 Conn. 240, namely, that âthe alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial . . . .â Put differently, Goldingreview of prosecutorial misconduct claims is not *415intended to provide an avenue for the tactical sandbagging of our trial courts, but rather, to address gross prosecutorial improprieties that clearly have deprived a criminal defendant of his right to a fair trial.
Âś90We conclude, however, that the prosecutorial misconduct in the present case, namely, the violation of Singhand the inflammatory religious argument, was sufficiently egregious to overcome the suggestion that defense counsel did not think it was unfair at the time. Although we deem trial counselâs failure to object to these blatant improprieties inexplicable, we nevertheless conclude that the curative measures were not, by themselves, sufficiently strong to cure the prejudice caused to the defendant by the stateâs attorneyâs improprieties. Therefore, we will continue our review of the defendantâs claims under the other factors set forth in State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 540, in order to determine if the prosecutorial misconduct ultimately violated the defendantâs right to a fair trial.
Âś914
Âś92Whether the Misconduct Was Central to the Critical Issues in the Case, Particularly in Comparison to the Strength of the Stateâs Case against the Defendant
Âś93The final two Williams factors are the centrality of the prosecutorial misconduct to the critical issues of the case, and the strength of the stateâs case. Id. We deem it appropriate in the present case to review these factors together. The defendant claims that the stateâs case was not particularly strong because: (1) there was *416no conclusive physical evidence of sexual abuse; and (2) the case rested on Sâs testimony, which largely consisted of answers to leading questions. The defendant also claims that as a result of the nature of the stateâs case, the sole issue at trial was the credibility of S and the defendant. The state contends in response that: (1) the lack of physical evidence did not automatically render its case weak; (2) witness credibility is an issue in virtually every case; and (3) the leading questioning aided S in testifying more fully, and that the defendant had the opportunity to attack her testimony on cross-examination. We conclude that these factors weigh firmly in the defendantâs favor.
Âś94While the state correctly notes that the absence of conclusive physical evidence of sexual abuse does not automatically render its case weak, that same absence surely does not strengthen the stateâs case against the defendant. In our view, the defendantâs assessment of this case as entirely a credibility contest between S and the defendant is correct. Indeed, as we noted in State v. Alexander, supra,254 Conn. 308, a child sexual abuse case lacking conclusive physical evidence, when the prosecutionâs case rests on the credibility of the victim, it is ânot particularly strong . . . .â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 724 (âthe stateâs evidence, while sufficient to result in a conviction, was not particularly strongâ). Also, as in Singhand Alexander, âall of the improprieties were connected directly to the critical issue, indeed the only disputed issue at trial . . . .â Id.; see also State v. Alexander, supra, 308 (âimproper comments directly addressed the critical issue in this case, the credibility of the victim and the defendantâ [internal quotation marks omitted]). In our view, without independent physical evidence to prove that the defendant had sexually assaulted S, or even that S had been sexually *417assaulted at all, the significance of the stateâs attorneyâs improper conduct increases considerably.
Âś95Accordingly, we conclude that, in light of the factors set forth in State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 540, the stateâs attorneyâs misconduct in the present case deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial because the prosecutorial improprieties, namely, the violations of Singh, the âdo your partâ exhortation, and the inflammatory religious arguments, were pervasive and directed at the critical evidentiary issue, which was the credibility of both S and the defendant. We also note the general lack of curative measures. Indeed, we cannot conclude that, in the absence of other independent evidence to prove that the defendant had sexually assaulted S, the jury would have concluded that the evidence proved the defendantâs guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 725. Accordingly, the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial, and we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
Âś96II
Âś97WHETHER A SPECIFIC UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION WAS WARRANTED
Âś98Although the prosecutorial misconduct issue is dis-positive, and we remand this matter for a new trial, we will address two of the defendantâs remaining three claims because the issues that they present are likely to arise again on remand.
Âś99The defendant did not preserve this claim at trial and seeks to prevail pursuant to State v. Golding, supra,213 Conn. 239-40.
Âś100In charging the jury, the trial court first explained in detail the elements of each of the two charges, sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child. This charge instructed the jury that the state must prove each element of each count beyond a reasonable doubt. After explaining the charges, the trial court then instructed the jury that â[w]hen you reach a verdict, it must be unanimous as to each count charged.â
Âś101*419Subsequently, after one day of deliberations, the jury reached a guilty verdict on the risk of injury charge, but not the sexual assault charge. The jury had indicated that this verdict was unanimous, and the trial court accepted it. The trial court then gave the jury additional time to deliberate on the sexual assault charge. Before the jury returned to deliberations, however, the court had emphasized three times that its verdict on this charge must be unanimous. Subsequently, after an additional day of deliberations, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on the sexual assault charge.
Âś102In State v. Famiglietti, supra,219 Conn. 619-20, this court articulated the general principles governing specific unanimity charges. â[W]e have not required a specific unanimity charge to be given in every case in which criminal liability may be premised on the violation of one of several alternative subsections of a statute. We have instead invoked a multipartite test to review a trial courtâs omission of such an instruction. We first review the instruction that was given to determine whether the trial court has sanctioned a nonunanimous verdict. If such an instruction has not been given, that ends the matter. Even if the instructions at trial can be read to have sanctioned such a nonunanimous verdict, however, we will remand for a new trial only if (1) there is a conceptual distinction between the alternative acts with which the defendant has been charged, and (2) the state has presented evidence to support each alternative act with which the defendant has been charged.â (Emphasis added.) Id.
Âś103With respect to the first prong of Famiglietti, namely, whether the trial courtâs jury instructions have sanctioned a nonunanimous verdict, it is well established that âthe absence of language expressly sanctioning a nonunanimous verdict means that the defendant has not met the first part of the Famigliettitest. â (Emphasis added.) State v. Reddick, 224 Conn. 445, 454, 619 A.2d *420453 (1993); State v. Dyson, 238 Conn. 784, 793, 680 A.2d 1306 (1996). Indeed, if âthe trial court did not sanction a nonunanimous verdict we need not address the other parts of the Famigliettitest.â State v. Reddick, supra, 454.
Âś104Our review of the trial courtâs charges to the jury in the present case reveals a distinct absence of any language that couldâlead the jury to believe that a non-unanimous verdict was in any way permissible. We, therefore, do not reach the remainder of the Famigliettitest. In our view, the trial court took pains to emphasize the requirement that the juryâs verdict be unanimous as to each count charged. Indeed, in State v. Senquiz, 68 Conn. App. 571, 590, 793 A.2d 1095, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923, 797 A.2d 519 (2002), a case in which the defendant was charged with and convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child arising out of multiple occasions, the Appellate Court upheld instructions similar to those given in the present case
Âś106WHETHER A CHILD CREDIBILITY INSTRUCTION WAS WARRANTED
Âś107The defendantâs final claim in this appeal is that the trial court improperly refused to give the child credibility instruction that he had requested. The state claims in response that the trial court properly refused to give the defendantâs requested charge because it contravened the rationale and ruling of the controlling case, State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 570-71, 560 A.2d 426 (1989). We conclude that the trial court properly refused to give the child credibility instruction requested by the defendant.
Âś108We set forth the following additional facts and procedural history necessary for the resolution of this claim. The defendant had requested that the trial court instruct the jury that: âYou should bear in mind that in certain aspects a young child is more apt to err than an older person; he or she is apt to be more amenable to any influence or suggestion which may be made to them by older persons, and the sanctity of the oath and solemnity of legal proceedings may affect them less than an adult. These are some factors which you may consider *422when assessing the credibility of the children who testified in this case.â Although the trial court refused to give the special child credibility instruction, it did charge the jury in accordance with the first part of the defendantâs request to charge. The court instructed the jury only that it was solely responsible for assessing the credibility of S, and that it could consider her age, demeanor, capacity to understand and answer questions intelligently, and ability to observe and recollect facts.
Âś109We begin our analysis by noting the applicable standard of review. We review a trial courtâs refusal to give a child credibility instruction for abuse of discretion because that instruction is ânot for the statement of any rule of law but for a cautionary comment upon the evidence.â State v. James, supra, 211 Conn. 571; State v. Angell, 237 Conn. 321, 330, 677 A.2d 912 (1996).
Âś110In State v. James, supra, 211 Conn. 570, this court overruled its earlier decision in State v. Anderson, 152 Conn. 196, 198, 205 A.2d 488 (1964), and concluded that it is not âessential to grant a requested charge that denigrates a child as usually less worthy of belief than an adult, especially when it treats all children uniformly regardless of differences in age or intelligence and also omits any reference to factors commonly recognized as enhancing the credibility of a child.â In so concluding, this court considered the great weight of authority from both the courts of our sister states, and the scientific *423community, and noted that â[authorities, more qualified than judges in regard to child behavior, question the conventional wisdom that children are less likely to be truthful on the witness stand than adults and, at least with regard to children as old as [the twelve year old complainants], that they are less capable of distinguishing the real from the imaginary.â State v. James, supra, 568. This court concluded that the child credibility instruction is ânot for the statement of any rule of law but ... a cautionary comment upon the evidence,â which lies in the âbroad discretion of [the] trial court . . . .â Id., 571.
Âś111A court considering whether to give a special child credibility instruction considers factors that include, but are not necessarily limited to, the childâs age, corroboration of the accusations, the childâs ability to recall and discuss events in the past, and the childâs understanding of the concept of truthfulness. See, e.g., State v. Angell, supra,237 Conn. 331 n.11 (where victim was nine years old when incident occurred and thirteen years old when she testified at trial, instruction remains in discretion of trial court even when only corroboration evidence is constancy of accusation); State v. Nguyen, 52 Conn. App. 85, 96, 726 A.2d 119 (1999) (âDuring questioning by the court, [eight year old complainant, who was five years old when incident occurred] demonstrated an understanding of the importance of being truthful and an ability to recall events several years in the past. On direct examination, she was cogent and coherent. We find nothing to suggest that the trial courtâs refusal to char ge on child credibility was unreasonable.â), aff'd, 253 Conn. 639, 756 A.2d 833 (2000).
Âś112Under the facts of the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give the requested child credibility instruction. S was seven years old at the time of the allegation and eight years old when she testified at trial. We note *424that it was established during preliminary questioning prior to her direct examination that S understood the concept of truthfulness. See footnote 40 of this opinion. Moreover, the lack of corroboration, beyond constancy of accusation evidence, is not dispositive. State v. Angell, supra,237 Conn. 331 n.11. We also note that the trial court gave the jury the general credibility instruction, which also had been requested by the defendant. See footnote 56 of this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give the child credibility instruction.
Âś113The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Âś114In this opinion BORDEN, PALMER and PELLE-GRINO, Js., concurred.
œ115 The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
Âś116 General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-70 (a) provides in relevant part: âA person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person ... (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such person . . . .â
Âś117 General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: âAny person who ... (2) has contact with the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent maimer likely to impair the health or morals of such child . . . shall be guilty of a class C felony.â
Âś118 The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution, § 1, provides in relevant part: âNo State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law . . . .â
Âś119The defendant also claims that his state due process right; Conn. Const., art. I, § 8; to a fair trial was violated by the misconduct of the stateâs attorney. âAlthough the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.â State v. Smith, 255 Conn. 830, 835 n.12, 769 A.2d 698 (2001).
Âś120 Accordingly, we need not reach the defendantâs alternate request that we exercise our supervisory powers to reverse his conviction âto redress repeated and deliberate misconduct by a prosecutor seeking to increase the likelihood of conviction even though that conduct does not necessarily require reversal as a due process violation.â State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 451-52, 797 A.2d 1088 (2002).
Âś121 We need not, however, reach the defendantâs constancy of accusation claims.
œ122 In accordance with General Statutes § 54-86e, and the court policy of protecting the privacy of victims in sexual abuse matters, we decline to use the names of individuals involved in this appeal.
Âś123 S testified that she could not remember if this had occurred after school.
Âś124 K did testify that, although she ordinarily would not leave the children alone, she occasionally had left the younger children in the care of S when she had to go to a nearby store, or to the kitchen located on the first floor of the house in order to cook the family's meals. Indeed, we note that S testified that the May 9 incident had occurred while K had gone to the store.
Âś125 We note that K had been hospitalized for a surgical procedure for three days in April, 2000.
Âś126 K frequently had asked S, on many different occasions, whether she had been touched inappropriately. S testified that K had asked her â[l]ike a thousand timesâ in the past whether anyone had touched her.
Âś127 K had called ahead to Ruth McGraw, Sâs regular pediatrician, at the clinic before bringing her there. McGraw was unable to be present for the examination and treatment of S. Accordingly, McGraw briefed Shader, who covered for her, on this matter.
Âś128 Shader noted on cross-examination that S had been treated in February, 2000, for vaginal discharge and âcontact dermatitis,â or skin irritation, on the outer labia. Shader testified that this irritation would cause a child to itch or scratch at the area. A, who is Sâs uncle and lived in the house with K and her children, testified that, to his knowledge, K only bathed her children approximately once every four days, and that he had made comments to K about this practice.
Âś129 Indeed, Shader testified that examination of Sâs hymen revealed no abnormalities. She testified that the tissue could be moved in for as much as one centimeter without tearing. Shader testified that this flexibility allowed S to feel like she had been penetrated, while at the same time explaining the lack of physical evidence of penetration.
Âś130 Shader also noted that she would not expect to, and did not find, any physical evidence of the alleged kissing or chest touching.
Âś131 After she physically examined S, Shader had interviewed her using anatomically correct dolls of a man and a girl. Shader stated that S demonstrated the man dollâs hand entering the clothing of the girl doll and touching the girl dollâs genital area This interview took place outside the presence of K, which Shader explained is the preferred practice because children often will be more forthcoming when their parents are not present.
Âś132 Subsequently, the police, including Rodriguez and Hoffman, arrested the defendant in his room at the house.
Âś133 On cross-examination, Rodriguez testified that he was the lead investigator on the case. He testified that photographs were not taken of the defendantâs bedroom and that he never asked S about the furnishings in or other descriptions of the room. Rodriguez also testified that they did not take a formal statement from K, and that when police subsequently went to the house to speak with her, she refused to talk to them. The police also did not take statements from any of the other relatives who lived in the house, including Kâs brother, who also had a bedroom on the third floor.
Âś134 K testified that, on this date, S provided information to her about the alleged sexual assaults that was different from what she was told on May 10.
Âś135 During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Shader, the pediatrician who had examined S on May 10, about these subsequent disclosures. *372Shader subsequently testified on redirect examination about delayed disclosure syndrome, a condition that causes younger children, out of concern about adultsâ responses, to âtest the watersâ by giving limited information about their abuse initially, and then providing more information over time. She stated that it was ânot unusualâ for child victims of sexual abuse to present this syndrome. Shader did testify, however, that she never had diagnosed S as suffering from this syndrome.
Âś136 Specifically, McGraw noted: âItâs common in sexual abuse cases to have no findings. . . . Itâs possible to do a lot of digital or even touching private to private without there being any evidence. If evidence being notching of the hymen or disruptionâorâsome kind of very large hymenal orifice or something, thinning of the rim, that kind of thing, comes with usually tremendous amount of force, and that doesnât have to take place for there to be sexual abuse.â
Âś137 On cross-examination, T stated that she did not discuss the specific allegations of abuse with K.
Âś138 On cross-examination, the defendant denied that he was ever asked to watch S or her brothers. He also stated that he only spoke to S at family gatherings such as birthdays or Christmas, despite the fact that they had lived in such close proximity within (he house.
Âś139 Specifically, the defendant objected to the portions of the closing argument wherein the stateâs attorney: (1) indicated that S suffered from delayed disclosure syndrome, a fact not in evidence; and (2) referred to the defendant as a âliar.â In response to these objections, the trial court gave curative instructions to the jury.
Âś140 In State v. Golding, supra,213 Conn. 239-40, this court held that âa defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to *376demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.â
Âś141 We set forth the following exchange between the stateâs attorney and the defendant that occurred during cross-examination. We have italicized those questions, and their accompanying answers, which we conclude were improper.
Âś142âQ. Now, you testified before lunch . . . that you had heard [S] testify in here last Friday as to what you had done to her, right?
Âś143âA. Yes, sir.
Âś144âQ. And [defense counsel] asked had you ever kissed [S[; right?
Âś145âA. Yes, sir.
Âś146âQ. And she testified to that; right?
Âś147âA. Yes, sir.
Âś148âQ. And you said, no, youâd never kissed [S[?
Âś149âA. Yes, sir.
Âś150âQ. Never kissed her on her mouth.
Âś151âA. No.
Âś152âQ. Never touched her body?
Âś153âA. No.
Âś154âQ. So, [S] must have been very angry at you for something to come in here and say that she had been kissed by you?
Âś155âA. I donât know.
Âś156âQ. You donât know? You heard [S] testify that you had touched her on *378her chest with your hand?
Âś157âA. Yes.
Âś158âQ. And youâre claiming now that you never did that; right?
Âś159âA. Yes.
Âś160âQ. So, you mustâve done something mean to the child to make her come in here and testify that you did that to her?
Âś161âA. No.
Âś162âQ. Never did anything mean to the child?
Âś163âA. No.
Âś164âQ. Well, you heard [S] last Friday testify that you put your finger in that little girlâs vagina. Do you remember hearing that?
Âś165âA. Yes.
Âś166âQ. And youâre claiming that just never happened?
Âś167âA. Yes.
Âś168âQ. So, [S], in order to come in here and say that, must have something against you personally?
Âś169âA. I donât know.
Âś170âQ. You donât know if she has anything against you?
Âś171âA. I donât know, sir.
Âś172âQ. Did you ever get mad at the child?
Âś173âA. I never ha[d] a relationship with her.
Âś174âQ. Well, you heard her last Friday come in here and testily that you had put your finger into her rectum. Remember her testifying to that?
Âś175âA. Yes, sir.
Âś176âQ. And youâre claiming that didnât happen either?
Âś177âA. Yes, sir.
Âś178âQ. Now, the child, again, must have something against you to come in here and tell these strangers that?
Âś179âA. I donât know, sir.
Âś180âQ. Well, why would that child come in here and testily to that?
Âś181âA. I donât know.
Âś182âQ. Did you ever have any disagreement with the child?
Âś183âA. No.
Âś184âQ. Ever reprimand the child?
Âś185âA. No.
Âś186âQ. Ever hit the child?
Âś187âA. No.
Âś188âQ. Ever tell her she was making too much noise up on the third floor?
Âś189âA. No.
Âś190âQ. Ever reprimand her brothers?
Âś191âA. No.
Âś192âQ. Never told the brothers they were making'â
Âś193âA. No.
Âś194âQ. âtoo much noise? Never told the brothers they were fighting?
Âś195âA. No, sir.
Âś196*379âQ. Did she ever ask you for something and you didnât give it to her?
Âś197âA. No.
Âś198âQ. So, that little girl had no reason to be angry at you?
Âś199âA. I donât know.
Âś200âQ. Well, do you know of any reason why sheâd be angry at you?
Âś201âA. I donât know.
Âś202âQ. So, she came in here and told us that you had touched your private to her private and sheâs got nothing against you?
Âś203âA. I donât know, sir.
Âś204âQ. But that was a lie on her part, right?
Âś205âA. I donât know.
Âś206âQ. You donât know if that was a lie on her part?
Âś207âA. I donât know.
Âś208âQ. You donât know whether or not when she said, you touched her private with your private that was a lie?
Âś209âA. No. I donât know about that.
Âś210âQ. So, when she said that you touched your private to her private, that couldâve happened?
Âś211âA. No.
Âś212âQ. When she told us that she hadâthat you had had her touch your private with her hand she was just making that up?
Âś213âA. I donât know, sir.
Âś214âQ. You donât know where that came from?
Âś215âA. I donât know.
Âś216âQ. You canât give us any reason why [S] would come in here on Friday and testify as [to] the things she told us about you doing to her body?
Âś217âA. I donât have [any] idea.
Âś218âQ. Never mean to her?
Âś219âA. No.
Âś220âQ. Mean to the other kids?
Âś221âA. No.
Âś222âQ. Mean to her mother?
Âś223âA. No.
Âś224âQ. You never were in that room; right? Their room?
Âś225âA. No.
Âś226âQ. And [S] never once ever stepped inside your room?
Âś227âA. No.
Âś228âQ. That just never happened; right?
Âś229âA. Yes.â (Emphasis added.)
Âś230 During closing arguments, the stateâs attorney stated: âNow, I also asked the defendant why would [S] come in here and say that you kissed her if it wasnât true. I donât know. I have no idea. Why would [S] say you touched her chest, put your finger in her vagina, put your finger in her rectum, touched her privates, touched her privates with your privates, put her hand on your privates? I donât know. I donât know. I donât know. Has no idea. Doesnât it make youâDoesnât it take you back here and you just want to scratch your head, because I gave him every reason in the book. I said, *380there mustâve been a time when you were mean to the kid, mean to mom. Did you hit the kid? Did you deprive the kid of something, didnât give her some food? Did youâDid you hit the mom, mean to the brothers? You know, he couldnât give us a reason. He couldnât give us a reason why that kid would lie, and why is that? Because there isnât one; thatâs why. You know, I guess he wants you to believe that pure evil, Satanâs daughter, appeared here on Friday morning in this courtroom; that the child just one . . . day decided to tell her mother, some police officers, some doctors, and eight strangers in a courtroom one big fat lie, and for what? What has that kid gained; the acceptance of her mother?â (Emphasis added.)
Âś231 Indeed, we noted that âcourts have long admonished prosecutors to avoid statements to the effect that if the defendant is innocent, the jury must conclude that witnesses have lied.â State v. Singh, supra,259 Conn. 709.
Âś232 Moreover, the two step analytical process that this court undertakes in evaluating prosecutorial misconduct claims reflects this distinction. The two steps are separate and distinct: (1) whether misconduct occurred in the first instance; and (2) whether that misconduct deprived a defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. Put differently, misconduct is misconduct, *382regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial; whether that misconduct caused or contributed to a due process violation is a separate and distinct question that may only be resolved in the context of the entire trial, an inquiry that in the present case necessarily will require evaluation of the defendantâs other misconduct claims. See, e.g., State v. Whipper, supra,258 Conn. 267; State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 540; see also part I G of this opinion.
Âś233 The stateâs attorney had argued during summation as follows: âI asked [S] whatâwhat happens when you tell a lie? I just didnât ask her about, you know, the color of my suit was or the shirt or whatever it was, I asked what happens when you tell a lie? The clerk just told you something. Now, whatâs going to happen if you tell a lie? God punishes you. Well, I would submit that the defendant is not concerned about what God is going to do to him, not now anyways. Heâs worried about what you people are going to do, and thatâs why he had to say what he said yesterday. I rarely saw the kid, only at Christmas parties. Ask yourselves, before you come out of *383that deliberating room, whoâs got the greatest interest in this case to deceive yon? Whoâs got a motive not to tell the truth here? I submit itâs the defendant whoâs got the greatest interest here to lie to you.
Âś234âJudge Devlin will tell you that you can take into consideration the defendantâs interest in this case when youâre thinking about his credibility. On the other hand, if [S] has fabricated this, lied, manipulated you, before you come out of that deliberating room, youâve got to ask yourselves what, for what? What has she gotten out of this? The opportunity to come in here and be vilified? The opportunity to tell you what happened to the intimate parts of her body? Some opportunity, huh? The opportunity to be examined by some doctors? The opportunity to meet with Detective Rodriguez until late at night telling him what happened? Thatâs an opportunity Iâd really like to live through.â (Emphasis added.)
Âś235 We note that the defendant relies on the Appellate Courtâs recent decision in State v. Thompson, 69 Conn. App. 299, 797 A.2d 539 (2002), in support of his claim. In Thompson, the Appellate Court concluded that â[t]he prosecutorâs statements in this case exceeded all bounds of acceptable *384conduct by indicating that witnesses âhave reserved a place in hell for themselves.â â (Emphasis added.) Id., 307. The court reviewed federal and sister state case law addressing the issue and stated that â[i]t is highly improper in a jury trial for a prosecutor to express an opinion suggesting to those jurors who believe in heaven and hell as an article of their religious faith that witnessesâ trial testimony should result in the witnesses going to a place of eternal damnation after their own deaths. Regardless of whether the appeal to religious imagery was meant literally, in our pluralistic society there is no place for such religious appeals in a criminal trial. The case must be decided by the evidence or lack of it.â (Emphasis added.) Id., 308.
Âś236Thereafter, we granted the stateâs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Courtâs decision in State v. Thompson, supra,69 Conn. App. 299, limited to the following issues: â1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the prosecutorâs three improper remarks in rebuttal argument required reversal of the judgment of conviction?â and â2. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (a) the trial court improperly permitted one witness to testify as to the credibility of another; and (b) that ruling constituted harmful error?â State v. Thompson, 260 Conn. 936, 802 A.2d 90 (2002). Although we endorse generally herein the legal principle articulated by the Appellate Court in its approach to the use of religious references during argument, this opinion shall not be construed as any comment on the specific merits of the Thompson case, which is pending before this court.
Âś237 Our review of the authorities indicates that the majority of the case law on this issue has developed within the context of prosecutorial religious references made during the sentencing phases of death penalty trials. These holdings, however, certainly are not inapplicable in a trial for the purpose of determining the defendantâs guilt, especially when the stateâs case is not particularly strong. See United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 133-34 (1st Cir.) (noncapital case), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S. Ct. 162, 98 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1987); cf. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 776, 779 (9th Cir.) (noting that prosecutorâs religious argument during penalty phase of capital trial was âimproper and highly prejudicial,â especially because â[t]his is not a case where the evidence overwhelmingly supported the juryâs verdict . . . [the] issue was life or death and the jury was sharply dividedâ), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 847, 122 S. Ct. 112, 151 L. Ed. 2d 69, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 943, 122 S. Ct. 322, 151 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2001).
Âś238 See also Bennett v. Angelone, supra,92 F.3d 1345-47 (religious references to Noahâs â âsword of justiceâ â and Jesus and Romans âhighly improper and deserve strong condemnation,â but did not render sentencing hearing âfundamentally unfairâ because of curative instruction, âvileâ nature of underlying offense and defendantâs own religiously-oriented summation); Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006, 1019-20 (11th Cir. 1991) (prosecutorâs comparison of defendant to Judas Iscariot during penalty phase of capital trial was improper appeal to jurorsâ passions and prejudices; court did not reach issue of whether argument had prejudiced defendant); Long v. State, 883 P.2d 167, 177 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (prosecutorâs penalty phase use of Biblical quotation that â â[wjhosoever shall harm one of these little ones who believeth in me, it is better that a millstone be hanged about his neck, and he be drowned in the depth of the oceanâ â was ârank misconductâ but harmless because âevidence is undisputedâ that defendant fatally shot and stabbed victim in order to avoid arrest and prosecution).
Âś239 Cf. Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 F.3d 322, 324 (8th Cir. 1994) (defense attorneyâs failure to object to prosecutorâs quote from Proverbs 28:1 was not unreasonable; that passage is âmore poetic versionâ of inference that flight is consciousness of guilt and "prosecutor did not use the Bible to invoke the wrath of God against [the petitioner] or to suggest that the jury apply divine law as an alternative to the law of Arkansasâ).
Âś240 See also G. Simson & S. Garvey, âKnockinâ on Heavenâs Door: Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases,â 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1090, 1119-20 (2001) (endorsing Pennsylvaniaâs automatic reversal rule because âappeals to religion in closing argument almost always violate the Establishment Clauseâ and âa bright-line rule would save trial and appellate courts valuable time and resources and help ensure greater uniformity and evenhandedness in decisionmakingâ); B. Duffy, note, âBarring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se Reversible-Error Rule for Prosecutorsâ Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases,â 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1335, 1383 (1997) *389(endorsing Pennsylvaniaâs automatic reversal rule in sentencing phase of capital trials because âcontextual factors should not outweigh the prejudicial effect of these religious argumentsâ).
Âś241 We recognize that there may be instances in which prosecutorial religious references are necessary and appropriate as a âdiscussion of evidence presented at the trial concerning the specific religious beliefs or activities of the defendants) or victim(s)â when such beliefs or activities are âdirectly . . . relevant for the resolution of the matter at issue.â J. Blume & S. Johnson, supra, 9 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 94-95.
Âś242We strongly caution counsel, however, against making unnecessary religious references during trial. As one court has stated: âJury arguments based on any of the religions of the world inevitably pose a danger of distracting the jury from its sole and exclusive duty of applying secular law and unnecessarily risk reversal of otherwise error-free trials.â State v. Williams, supra, 350 N.C. 27. Further, we are mindful that religious references during trial are fraught with possible establishment clause complications. See, e.g., G. Simson & S. Garvey, âKnockinâ on Heavenâs Door: Rethinking the Role of Religion in Death Penalty Cases,â 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1090, 1113 (2001) (âFor the endorsement test to apply there must be governmental action of some sort that may be understood as sending a message of government endorsement of religion. When the prosecutor, a governmental actor, makes religiously based closing arguments, this requirement is obviously met.â).
Âś243 We acknowledge the dissentâs concern that âwords and phrases traditionally viewed as religious in nature or derived from religious sources have become, over time, an integral part of the English language, and no longer may be recognized by either prosecutors or jurors as having purely religious connotations or derivations,â and the attendant assertion that the remarks made by this stateâs attorney are not religious in nature. Our guidance on this issue is provided by the âabiding principle of jurisprudence that common sense does not take flight when one enters a courtroom.â (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 266, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). We fail to see how the stateâs attorneyâs use of the phrase âSatanâs daughterâ puts it into the category of an otherwise common phrase with religious origins, especially when it is taken in context with the immediately subsequent remarks contrasting the respective concerns of S and the defendant about God. Moreover, the dissent is incorrect in its claim that the use of *392the word âSatanâ in the religious sense is obsolete. In fact, under the same entry set forth in Websterâs Third New International Dictionary as cited by the dissent, the first definition provided is a direct cross reference with the word âdevil.â âDevilâ is defined by Websterâs Third New International Dictionary as âthe personal supreme spirit of evil and unrighteousness in Jewish and Christian theology: the tempter and spiritual enemy of mankind who is the adversary of God although subordinate to him and able to act only by his sufferance and is represented frequently as the leader or prince of all apostate angels and as ruler of hell . . . .â Thus, at least our scrutiny of such an authority as Websterâs Third New International Dictionary reveals that the dissentâs assertion that the word âSatanâ has shed its religious implications is without foundation.
Âś244 The staleâs attorney also had argued: âI said before that [S] was . . . a perfect victim. Sheâs a little girl. She lives in one room with her three little brothers and her mom. You know, you heard that she cares for those three brothers; that she changes their diapers; that the seven year old is given adult responsibilities. You know, the fatherâs out of the picture, mom doesnât spend as much time with her as she wanted. She talked to you about that, and you know, youâve got poor [K]; sheâs got four kids; sheâs working full time. You know, they live, they eat, they sleep in one room, no bathroom facilities, no kitchen facilities. The only way out of that little island theyâve got up there on the third floor is right by his room. Thatâs why I call her the perfect victim, his perfect victim. He could choose her, he could choose the time, he could choose the place, and he was taking a chance that it would never get this far, but I would submit, ladies and gentlemen, because sheâbecause [S] had the courage to tell us what happened, tell us about that monstrous crime that was inflicted upon her body and her mind. Through her courage, coming in here, I hope youâve developed a respect for how difficult it is to bring this kind of case to trial, how difficult it is to bring *394the [defendant] to justice. Through her courage, I submit, ladies and gentlemen, and through her courage alone, she came in here and told you how that man violated her and how [the defendant] should be brought to justice and accountability. [S], she did her part last Friday. With all due respect, ladies and gentlemen, itâs now time for you to do your part.â
Âś245 The defendant cites specifically this line of questioning of S by the stateâs attorney, -which occurred at the end of direct examination:
âQ. [Sj?
âA. Yes.
âQ. This is a very important question, okay?
âA. Okay.
âQ. Remember the clerk asked you to tell the truth?
âA. Yes.
âQ. Okay. Is what youâve told us been the truth here?
âA. Say it again, please.
âQ. Has what youâve told us here the last [forty-five] minutes or so been the truth?
âA. Yes.â
Âś246 The stateâs attorney had conducted a preliminary questioning of S during direct examination. After he ascertained her age, date of birth and the school that she attends, he asked the following questions:
âQ. Now, the clerk just asked you to tell the truth here on the stand, right?
âA. Yes.
âQ. Okay. Do you know the difference between the truth and a lie?
âA. Yes.
âQ. Can you tell us what a lie is?
âA. A lie is when somebody tells somebody a secret and somebody liesâ and somebody doesnât tell it.
âQ. Let me ask you this. If I told you that I was wearing a red suit right now, would that be a truth or a lie?
âA. A lie.
âQ. Okay. Why?
âA. Because youâre not even wearing one.
âQ. Iâm not wearing a suit?
âA. Yes, you are, but not what you said.
âQ. A red suit?
âA. A red suit.
âQ. Okay. What happens to you if you tell a lie?
âA. God will punish you.â
Âś247 We do, however, reject the stateâs contention that this court implicitly rejected the âbootstrapsâ rationale of Logginsin State v. Silveira, supra,198 Conn. 476, wherein we concluded that â[t]here is no rule in this jurisdiction which prevents a witness from testifying to relevant facts within his personal knowledge merely because his testimony may be self-serving.â In Silveira, the defendant had been charged with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. Id., 455. This court concluded that the trial court improperly had excluded as self-serving the defendantâs testimony about his state of mind at the time that he had fired the fatal gunshot because âmental condition is a fact, and, where relevant to an issue in the case, the witness concerned may testify directly to it.â Id., 476.
Âś248The evidentiary context of State v. Silveira, supra,198 Conn. 474-76, renders it distinguishable from the present case because of the nature of the testimony at issue. In Silveira, the defendant sought to testify about a *399fact, central to the case, that happened to be self-serving. Id., 476-76. In contrast, in the present case, ssmLoggins, the stateâs attorney already had elicited testimony from S about the facts relevant to the case against the defendant. The questioning at issue, therefore, dealt solely with her credibility and the weight that the jury should place on her testimony, not the facts at issue. Accordingly, we conclude that Silveiraneither informs our decision in the present case, nor constitutes a rejection of the rationale in Loggvns.
Âś249 After describing the testimony of Shader about how the allegations of S were not inconsistent with a lack of injury or physical injury, the stateâs attorney stated: âShe also told you what [S] didnât tell us and why [S] didnât give us all the details. [S] told her that what she had told her mom that day initially, the initial disclosure, the kissing, the touching of the chest, the digital penetration of the rectum and the vagina. And . . . Shader testified, as a pediatrician, they are trained, they know this, this is common inâin child sexual abuse victims. There is a syndrome that children, when they have been sexually abused as children, that they just donât blurt out every single thing that happened to them. It isâIt is a common syndrome among child sexual abuse, victims and [S] is no different from that. In fact, she suffered from that." (Emphasis added.)
Âś250 The defendant specifically claims that the following comments by the stateâs attorney with respect to emotional trauma suffered by S were improper. The stateâs attorney introduced his discussion of the testimony of S by stating: âNow, ladies and gentlemen, I submit that the child was abused physically, sexually, and also mentally by that man sitting over at that table.â The defendant also claims that the following comment, made in the context of the discussion about Sâs delayed disclosure, was improper: âSexual assault, like any assault, is traumatic, but sexual assault on a womanâon a little girl, not only of the body but of the mind.â
Âś251 Specifically, the trial court stated that âthere may have been a reference or there was some reference to this so-called syndrome that . . . Shader testified about concerning the way in which some victims of child abuse relate information in sort of stages. She gave testimony about that, and that was referenced in theâin the argument. Whether or not that applies to [S], there was no testimony specifically relating her to that syndrome by . . . Shader. To the extent that may have been mentioned to that extent in the argument, you should disregard that part, of the argument.â
Âś252 Specifically, the following colloquy occurred between the parties and the court:
â â[Stateâs Attorney]: ... I donât think Trouperestricts me. If I can just put on the record what ... Iâd like to bring out.
âThe Court: Okay. Sure.
â[Stateâs Attorney]: As Your Honorâs heard [S] testify that on May 10th she told her mother that she had been kissed, touched in the chest area, a finger had been inserted in her vagina and in her buttocks.
â[Defense Attorney]: Well, Your Honor, I object to this being done in front of the witness.
âThe Court: Okay. Witness can be excused. (Whereupon the witness leaves the courtroom.)â
Âś253 The defense counsel had argued during his summation: âNow, [the defendant] didnât come to this country to be categorized as a pervert or a sex offender. He came here to better himself. He came here to further educate himself. He came here to work, and you heard that he did that. None of that was rebutted, none of that was contested. Thatâs what he did. He listed the places that heâs been. He was working at the time of his arrest. Heâd been at X-Pect Discount working a night shift there for five months. He pretty much stayed to himself or went out with his friends. He came out to the witness stand and subjected himself to cross-examination. He firmly looked at you when asked a question about whether he did this. When he was asked direct questions, Did he touch the child, did he kiss [S], did he put his hands on her genital area, or in her butt? No. When he was asked whether she was ever in his room, no. Whether he was ever in their room, no. And the only time that he answers questions I donât know is in that series on cross-examination when the questions started out is why would [S] say this about you? I donât know. Well, she says this happened, is she lying? I donât know. Well you might wonder why is he saying I donât know to that? Well, heâs notâYou saw his character and his persona up there. Heâs not going to call an eightâan eight year old a liar; thatâs just not in his nature. You saw how he answered the questions, how heâs conducted himself during the course of the trial. Itâs not in his nature to do that. Any time heâs asked a specific direct question about this, his answers are firmly no, and thatâs because it never happened.â
Âś254 In a similar vein, we note that the state claims that defense counsel committed numerous improprieties during his summation, such as making disparaging comments about the lack of evidence of physical injury, as well as the quality of the police investigation in the case, and that these improprieties invited or counterbalanced any prosecutorial misconduct. We decline to discuss these claims because the comments challenged by the defendant occurred primarily during the initial summation, and therefore *411could not have been invited by any improprieties committed during summation by the defense counsel.
Âś255 See footnote 44 of this opinion for the trial courtâs curative instruction with respect to the stateâs attorneyâs delayed disclosure syndrome comments. We reiterate, however, that the stateâs attorneyâs comments about S suffering from delayed disclosure syndrome were not improper. See part I E of this opinion.
Âś256 During his rebuttal argument, the stateâs attorney referred to an inconsistency in the defendantâs testimony about the last time he had consumed an alcoholic beverage, before remarking: âBut you heard him start to backpedal. You know, he was caught in a lie . . . and Iâm not saying because he drinks, because he had a pitcher of beer on April 1 or at any other time he necessarily sexually assaulted [S]. What Iâm saying is, heâs a liar and anything he says is suspect. If heâs going to lie about thatâthe drinking thing, the so what thing, whatâwhat else is [he] gonna tell us? Is he gonna tell us that he sexually assaulted that Md? Heâs not gonna tell us that.â (Emphasis added.)
Âś257With respect to those comments during the rebuttal argument wherein the stateâs attorney called the defendant a âliar,â the trial court instructed the jury: âAlso, the term âliarâ was used during aportion of the stateâs rebuttal argument. Obviously, the credibility of all the witnesses is in your hands and you should consider all of the testimony and evidence about that in assessing credibility, but the use of the term âliarâ should be avoided in court and you should disregard that term that was addressed in the arguments of theâof the state in his rebuttal.â
Âś258 Cf. State v. Safford, 22 Conn. App. 531, 537, 578 A.2d 152 (â[ejxcept in the most extraordinary circumstances, however; see State v. Evans, [165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973)]; appellate claims must be the product of trial counselâs efforts, not those of appellate counsel sifting through the record after the fact, trawling for issues undreamt of at trialâ), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 823, 581 A.2d 1057 (1990).
Âś259 Because we reverse the defendantâs conviction as a result of his due process claim, we need not; reach his request that we exercise our supervisory powers to reverse his conviction. See also footnote 5 of this opinion.
Âś260 We do not consider it likely that the defendantâs evidentiary claim with respect to the admission of constancy of accusation testimony will arise on remand. Accordingly, we will not address this claim.
Âś261 See footnote 25 of this opinion.
Âś262 The trial court instructions in State v. Senquiz, supra,68 Conn. App. 588, provided as follows: â â[I]f you find that the state has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, any one of the elements of a crime, you must then find the defendant not guilty of that crime.â The court urged the jury to â[rjemember, there are three counts in this case. . . . You must consider each count separately and render a verdict of guilty or not guilty on that count, depending upon your findings concerning the elements of that count.â Finally, the court stated to the jury that the verdict âhas to be unanimous on each count.â â
Âś263 The defendant cites a variety of sister state authority in support of his claim that the trial courtâs charge sanctioned a nonunanimous verdict because the court did not explain expressly that the jurors had to agree on *421the underlying act when determining if he was guilty of each count charged. See Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188, 191-92 (Colo. 1991); Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 420 Mass. 508, 514, 650 N.E.2d 1268 (1995); State v. Weaver, 290 Mont. 58, 70, 964 P.2d 713 (1998); State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 968 (Utah 1999); State v. Kitchen, 46 Wash. App. 232, 235-36, 730 P.2d 103 (1986), aff'd, 110 Wash. 2d 403, 406, 756 P.2d 105 (1988). We reject the defendantâs contention because it is incompatible with the review process that we undertake pursuant to State v. Famiglietti, supra,219 Conn. 619-20, and State v. Reddick, supra,224 Conn. 454. Under these well established precedents, we first, must find language in the charge âexpressly sanctioning a nonunanimous verdict . . . .â State v. Reddick, supra, 454; State v. Famiglietti, supra, 619-20. The defendant failed to cite, and our independent review fails to reveal, any express language in the trial courtâs charge that sanctioned a nonunanimous verdict. Accordingly, our inquiry ends at that point, and we reject his contention.
Âś264 Specifically, the trial court had instructed the jury: âAs with all other witnesses you are the sole judge of assessing the credibility of a child witness who testifies at trial. You may consider not only the age of the child, but also the demeanor while testifying, the capacity to observe facts and to recollect them, the ability to understand questions put to him or her, and the ability to answer them intelligently. In this regard there was evidence that [S] is now eight years old, and was seven years old at the time she alleges the events . . . took place.â
Âś265 We reject the defendantâs contention that the instruction was warranted because S was not cogent and coherent on direct examination, and that her testimony was âmarred by ambivalence and leading questions . . . .â Our review of the record indicates that the defendant did not object to most of the leading questions. Moreover, we note from our review of the record, that S answered questions responsively and appropriately on both direct examination and cross-examination.