¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶2Although I concur fully in the affirmance of Carruthers’ conviction of malice murder, I believe that the reversal of the death sentence in this case constitutes an unjustified deviation from controlling precedent. The trial court properly relied upon the previous pronouncements of this Court, the established legal principles of which the majority now implicitly disavows while ostensibly purporting to apply. In my opinion, either Carruthers’ death sentence should be affirmed or the precedent which compels that result should be overruled. Because the majority does neither, I respectfully dissent to the reversal of the sentence.
¶3Regardless of the rule in other jurisdictions, “[i]t is not and has never been the law of this state that religion may play no part in the sentencing phase of a death-penalty trial.” Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 449 (26) (469 SE2d 129) (1996), reversed on other grounds, 519 U. S. 145 (117 SC 578, 136 LE2d 507) (1996). Nothing in the Eighth Amendment or OCGA § 17-10-35 (c)
forbids a death penalty based in part on an emotional response to factors in evidence which implicate valid penological justifications for the imposition of the death penalty. Perforce, argument by the prosecutor which “dramatically appeals” to such legitimate emotional response is not “constitutionally intolerable.”
¶4Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 122 (5) (303 SE2d 266) (1983). See also Greene v. State, supra at 450 (26). According to the majority, “[i]t is difficult to draw a precise line between religious arguments that are acceptable and those that are objectionable . . . To the contrary, I submit that the dividing line has long been recognized in this state, and heretofore applied with little or no difficulty. In Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 46 (19) (427 SE2d 770) (1993), this Court clearly held that, in Georgia, while it is improper to urge imposition of the death penalty based upon the defendant’s religious beliefs or to argue that the teachings of a particular religion mandate the imposition of that sentence, the prosecutor nevertheless “ ‘ “may allude to such principles of divine law relating to transactions of men as may be appropriate to the case.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” See also Greene v. State, supra at 450 (26); *319Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 593 (18) (d) (458 SE2d 799) (1995); Conner v. State, supra at 122 (6).
¶5It is true that, in our previous decisions applying this clear-cut distinction between proper and improper religious argument, the defendant did not object to the State’s Biblical references. It is clear, however, that this lack of objection was, in each case, cited as an alternative basis for the ultimate conclusion that the trial court did not err in allowing the argument. In all of those opinions, this Court recognized the validity of the State’s argument as the primary ground for concluding that there was no error. Thus, the prosecutor’s closing argument in this case was not objectionable and prejudicial if it did not urge that Carruthers receive the death sentence because of his religious beliefs or in accordance with the mandate of any religious teachings, but merely cited Biblical authority to illustrate the secular justification for the death penalty as the appropriate punishment under the circumstances shown by the evidence.
¶6The portions of the State’s closing argument quoted by the majority clearly show that the prosecutor did not make any prejudicial reference to the Bible as a separate and independent source of authority for returning a death sentence against Carruthers. In fact, the assistant district attorney prefaced the argument by noting that the citation to Biblical references was for the sole purpose of assisting the jury in understanding “why deterrence is appropriate.” “The State’s role in the sentencing phase is to convince a jury that a particular defendant deserves the harshest punishment. [Cit.]” Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547, 558 (8) (b) (480 SE2d 583) (1997). At least until today’s decision, deterrence has always been a legitimate justification for imposition of the death penalty and, for that reason, a topic which prosecutors have been allowed to argue with considerable latitude in the sentencing phase of a capital case.
[I]n most murder cases, considerations of neither general deterrence nor retribution will demand the imposition of the death penalty. . . . But that is not to say that a prosecutor may not urge vigorously that a death sentence is appropriate punishment in the case at hand, or that in so doing he may not remind the jury of the retributive and general deterrent functions of its verdict.
¶7(Emphasis in original.) Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 159 (14) (327 SE2d 475) (1985). Because deterrence is a legitimate topic for argument and the State is authorized to illustrate that concept by allusions to divine law, the prosecutor’s argument couched in terms of Biblical references “suggest [ing] to us why deterrence is appropriate” was entirely proper. “It is just this type of argument that was found *320to be authorized in Hilland Crowe” Greene v. State, supra at 450 (26).
¶8This Court must determine whether a death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, but “the ‘passion’ proscribed by our law does not encompass all emotion, but only that engendered by prejudice, particularly racial prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. [Cits.]” Conner v. State, supra at 121 (5). Simply put, the majority reverses Carruthers’ death penalty because the Assistant District Attorney made a passionate, but proper, argument and was successful in obtaining the maximum punishment for the murder of which Carruthers was convicted in this case. A reversal of the death sentence on this basis runs counter to the long-standing principle that
“[t]he range of discussion (during closing argument) is wide — very wide. . . . [The prosecutor’s] illustrations may be as various as are the resources of his genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his learning can make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit, or wing to his imagination.” [Cit.] “Counsel may bring to his use in the discussion of the case well-established historical facts and may allude to such principles of divine law relating to transactions of men as may be appropriate to the case.” [Cit.] Counsel for the [S]tate may forcibly or even extravagantly attempt to impress upon the jury “the enormity of the offense and the solemnity of their duty in relation thereto.” [Cit.]
¶9Conner v. State, supra at 122-123 (6). Here, the prosecutor used Biblical references only to illustrate the historical and moral underpinnings of deterrence as a justifying factor for imposing the death penalty. He did not improperly argue that Carruthers deserved to die for any reason other than that authorized under the secular law of this state. Instead, he made only an emotional exhortation that our contemporary reliance upon the deterrent effect of capital punishment has its roots in religious teachings. In the State’s argument, the Bible did not supplant applicable statutes, but rather explicated those enactments. Compare Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879, 886-887 (8) (c) (452 SE2d 745) (1995) (argument that the defendant “violated the law of God”).
¶10In Division 3, the majority discusses additional aspects of the closing argument during the penalty phase, and concludes that Carruthers’ objections have merit. I disagree. There was no error in the prosecutor’s emotional but proper remarks. With regard to the argument of the defense counsel, the trial court properly allowed relevant argument concerning Easter’s involvement in the crime, but also correctly disallowed argument that Carruthers should not receive the *321death penalty because Easter did not. Carruthers’ sentence is to reflect his own culpability, and the sentence imposed upon Easter, who did not commit the murder and who pled guilty to a lesser offense, is not a factor to be considered in the determination of the penalty that should be imposed on Carruthers.
¶11In Conner v. State, supra at 122 (5), this Court noted that it had never “invalidate [d] a death penalty simply because the prosecutor made an impassioned argument to the jury during the sentencing phase of the trial.” With today’s opinion, that is no longer true. Henceforth, death sentences are subject to reversal if an emotional argument by the State does not satisfy the sensibilities of a majority of the Justices on this Court. I would continue to adhere to controlling precedent, which compels the conclusion that there was no error in the sentencing phase of this case. The Court should not reverse the death sentence which the jury imposed upon Carruthers.