Volume 27 — United States Reports

Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829), was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held invalid a patent on a method of making hose, because the inventor had commercially exploited the invention for years before filing the patent application. The case has been cited many times for the proposition that the U.S. patent system was not established for the purpose of enriching inventors or their financiers but rather for the purpose of furthering the public interest by stimulating technological progress.

THIS was a wr,it of error to the circuit court of the county of Alexandria in the district of Columbia. The action was brought, originally, by Lawrence & Poindexter, on a policy of insurance for .$¡7000 against fire on a mill.

Held: that under the provisions of the’law of descents of Rhode Island, two-thirds of the estate of Mary C. Gardner descended to Samuel F. Gardner, Eliza Phillips, formerly Eliza Gardner, and Mary Clarke, formerly Mary .Gardner, children of Caleb Gardner by a former marriage; they being brothers and sisters of the half blood of Mary C. Gardner; it being admitted that the remaining one-third, which Mary C. Gardner took by…

Held: that this was sufficient diligence on the part of the holders of the note, to charge the indorser. [100] The generai rule of law applicable to this subject, has long been settled; that to enable the holder of a bill of exchange or promissory note, to charge the in-dorser, it is incumbent on him to prove that timely notice of the dishonour of the bill, or of the non-payment of the note, was given to the indorser; or…

APPEAL' from the circuit court of the United States.for the district of Kentucky. The appellees, at the May term 1822 of the circuit court for the district of Kentucky;-obtained a decree against Venable and'.others, fojr the sum of $4,700 with interest and costs; upon which execution was issued, and levied'by the marshal upon 367 acres of land and sundry slaves and other' property, named in the return, dated.

Held: that this notice was-not sufficient of non-payment of the note, to charge C, with a liability to' pay the note.

THIS cause was brought before the Court by a writ of error to the circuit court of the southern circuit of New York. The description of the parties on the record was “John Twentyman, a subject of the king of Great Britain vs. Daniel ahd Joseph Jackson.” No citizenship of the defendants being argued.

- The plaintiffs in. error instituted their aétion of trespass on the case, in the court below; to recover damages for the removal of certain buildings from- a lot of ground in the city of Washington, the property of the plaintiffs; which had been leased to the defendant by the plaintiffs for a term of years, reserving a rent. The jury gave a verdict in favour of the defendant.

WRIT of error to the circuit court of Kentucky. The case was submitted to the Court, on the part of the counsel for the plaintiff in error, Mr Rowan, upon the following brief.

Held: that a decree in equity, for the sale of lands, to pay debts, .on for distribution, is a *161 proceeding- in rem, and cannot be questioned, 6 Harris & . Johns. 23. The principle of law is, that if the jurisdiction of the court attaches to the subject matter, the proceeding cannot be examined in a collateral manner in another court.

Held: that the protest of a foreign bill is sufficient; but a distinction is taken between'foreign bilk, and those instruments in which a protest is not necessary, and therefore not. the official act of the officers. In cases. of inland bills the protest cannot be read. Chesmer, vs. Noyes, 4 Camp. 129. 2 Barn: & Aid. 696. The supreme court of New York have held such bills as this to be inland bills.

. AN action of debt .upon, a bill of exchange for ¿51250 sterling, was instituted.by the'plaintiffs in erfor, in the circuit court for the county of Alexandria, in the district of Colum* bia, against Jacob Hoffman and George Johnson, alleging them to be partners in trade. B,y the statute of. Virginia, adopted as .the law of the county of Alexandria, this form of action is authorised for the recovery of the such due upon a bill of exchange, and damages for non-payment..

THIS was an appeal from thé circuit court of Kentucky, in which court the appellants had filed a bill against the appellee, claiming from him a conveyance of'the legal title to certain lands in the state of Kentucky, to which the ap-pellee had the legal'title; but by the- appellants it was alleged, that they had a prior equitable title, derived under certain entries made in the land office of that state.

THIS cause came up on a writ of error to the sixth cir suit court of the United States for the district of Georgia, it was tried in Milledgéville at May term 1827. In the course of the trial, a nuiftber, of questions were raised, on some of which, the judges, being divided in opinion, refused to give the jury the instruction prayed by the plaintiff; and a vérdict and judgment were rendered for the defendants.

district of Kentucky. The only question submitted to the court .was, whether the assignee of a chose in action; assigned by an éxecutor in the state where hé had proved the will and taken out letters testamentary, where the debt was contracted, and where'the testator lived and died; could maintain an action in another state, without a new probate and new letters testamentary taken out in the state in which the action was brought.

THIS case came before the'Court from the circuit court of western Tennessee, on a certificate of division from the judges of that court. In the court below, the lessor of the plaintiff showed a regular title to the lands in question, under a grant from the state of North Carolina; and proved that the defendant was in possession of the land in dispute".

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the county of Washington; in which court the proceedings of the orphans’ court, of that county, appointing a guardian to the estate of a minor, had been reversed on appeal, and the court had proceeded to pass, such a decree, as it adjudged the orphans’ court should have ■ passed. From this decreé of the circuit court, the appellant came before this Court, and he sought to sustain the decision of the orphans’ fcourt.

Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), was a significant United States Supreme Court case regarding the definition of the Commerce Clause in Article 1 sec. 8, cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution.

Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that held certain treaties ratified by the United States, even if otherwise valid and in force, cannot be given effect domestically without a specific act of Congress. The ruling articulated a more restrictive interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which automatically grants treaties the force of domestic federal law.

<p>ERROR to the circuit court of the district of Kentucky. On the 31st October 1824, the agent of the defendants in error, John ,T. Drake, deposited in the bank of the commonwealth of Kentucky, in the notes of that bank3 the sum of ,$7730.81', and received frorñ the cashier the following memorandum in writing, usually denominated a certificate of deposit.</p> <p>“Frankford, 31st October 1824; — John T. Drake this day deposited to the credit of John Wister, John M. Price and Charles J. Wister, seven thousand seven hundred and thirty dollars arid eighty-one cents, which is subject to their order upon presentation of this certificate. Signed, C. G. Waggo-ner, cashier. — $7730.81.</p> <p>On the 6th of November 1824, Mr Drake presented the certificate to the' bank and demanded payment óf the sum-mentioned in it, in gold or. silver, which was refused by the cashier, who at the same tune offered the. amount in notfes pn the bank, which were rejected by Mr Drake. At the trine the deposit was made the . notes of the bank were of the value of. and current, in the country at half tlifeir nominal amounts .</p> <p>The payment of the amount of the deposit, in-gold or silver having been thus refused, Wister* Price-and Wister brought their action in the circuit court of thé United States fof the district of Kentucky. .The'declaration contained •two counts, the first for money had and.received, the second ,a'special count upon the certificate of deposit.</p> <p>At November tferm. 1826, the'defendants appeared by attorney, and afterwards filed a plea to the jurisdiction; of thé' court under the corporate seal of the bank; The plea states ■“ that the court- ought not to have or take cogtiizance of this action, because the .defendant is a body corporate and politic, created and established by an act of assembly of the commonwealth of Kentucky and constituted by the name and style of ‘ The President, and Directors of the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,’ and that the whole capital stock of the said corporation is exclusively and solely the property of the commonwealth of Kentucky, and that the state of Kentucky in her political sovereign capacity as a state, is the sole, exclusive, and only member of the said corporation.” To this plea the plaintiffs below demurred, and the, circuit court'having sustained the same, the. defendants were ordered to answer over.</p> <p>Upon the trial of the cause, »the plaintiffs proved the facts as stated; and the defendants moved the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiffs had not i lade out a good cause of action, and that, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the nominal amount of the deposit; but tp the value of the notes at the time of the demand.</p> <p>The court overruled these motions, and instructed, the jury that the plaintiffs were entitled to the full sum as expressed in the certificate, with interest thereon, from the. date of the demand, in lawful money of the United States. The defendants excepted to the opinion of the court, upon alb the matters submitted to them, and the case came before this Court upon the bill of exceptions. The facts of the c^se were not controverted.</p> <p>For the plaintiffs in error, Mr .Nicholas maintained,</p> <p>]. That the circuit court had no jurisdiction over the cautfe.</p> <p>2. The'declaration was insufficient.</p> <p>3. The court erred in the instructions given to the jury.</p> <p>He argued, that upon the decisions of this Court the jurisdiction could not exist in the case. The courts of the United States take jdrisdiction ; 1st, According to the subject matter ; 2d, The character of the parties; 3d, In cases arising under treaties, &.c.</p> <p>In this case the jurisdiction cannot be assumed, as those principles upon which the courts of the United States would have jurisdiction from the character of. the parties; forbid the .same. This Court will look behind the .act of incorporation to ascertain who. are the corporators; and if they find .'they are not such parties as can sue or be sued in the circuit court, they will refuse to acknowledge that the court copjd exercise jurisdiction. Cited, The Bank of the United States vs. The Planters Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheaton, $04.</p> <p>In .this case the state' of Kentucky is the only- stockholder of the bank; and this appearing, the state is the party, and cannot be sued. . It is a sole corporation, using the money of the state, and by'its obligations' binding the state. The interests of the state are alone involved in the suit', and- the judgment of the Court will operate upon .the- state ¡directly.</p> <p>'2. The declaration is insufficient, because, as the real party defendant.is the state of.Kentucky, this action should have, been so brought, and .can only be so sustained.</p> <p>This Court has decided that a corporation can bind itself by a provision, without seal. In.other states'of the union, the same.principle has Been acknowledged; but it .is otherwise in Kentucky. In the supreme court-of that-state, it has béen adjudged,-that unless this.obligation, or promise of a corporation is . under seal,. .it is not binding. 1 Marshall’s Kentucky Reports, 1. This has now become a part of the municipal law of the state ; and. it will-'be regarded in this Court in cases where the decision applies. The certificate of deposit -given by-the bank was not, therefore, legal evidence of the promise.</p> <p>3. In this Court it has been held that bank notes are not money; and this action, which' is for-money had and received, ’ cannot be sustained, as the notes of the bank, only were received.-</p> <p>It may also be urged, that as the notes are payable, to J. T. Pendleton, or bearer, there should, have been an averment that he was a citizen of Kentucky. The action cannot be supported unless the citizenship was stated; this Court not having jurisdiction, unless J. T. Pendleton was a citizen' of Kentucky, and averred so to be in the pleadings.</p> <p>The pléa of the president, directors, and company of the bank of thé commonwealth of Kentucky expressly avers an act of incorporation, constituting them a corporation by that name. That there are no stockholders but the state,' the stock- belonging to the state of Kentucky-only.</p> <p>Thus it appears that the real corporators are the president and directors,, citizens of Kentucky; and this Court lias decided that it'has jurisdiction- in such a case.</p> <p>That-the stock of the bank belongs to the state'of Kentucky, will not prevent this Court from sustaining the, suit.' The- plaintiffs in error are a corporation with all the ordinary powers and incidents of such a body.- Among others to lend money to- the commonwealth of Kentucky. Can it be said th^t such a body.is not suable,'and that it is not the corporation, but the state of.Kentucky who is the plaintiff in error; and that her rights as a sovereign state were violated by the suit in the circuit court 1</p> <p>The plaintiffs in error have a legal entity, independent of fhe state. They exist-under the law, and they pay and receive money, and by themselves make contracts which they must perform. Unless subject to suits upon such contracts, there is- no remedy for those who .have claims,-as no suit can be, brought against the state.</p> <p>The amouht'of the plaintiffs’'claim must be that mentioned in ,the certificate. Had it been" the intention of the-parties to limit the same to what was the current value pf the notes when this deposit was made, this should have been declared. This Court can know no other amount but that mentioned in-the certificate,.or any other money than the.law.ful money of the United States. .</p> <p>In reference to the claim of the counsel of the plaintiffs in error, to apply the decision of the court of Kentucky, to the-contract,of the bank, in opposition to the law of this Court holding corporations liable under obligations not under .seal; it was'argued that this Court will not permit the decisions of a state'court to contra vené the general law, whatever respect it may be disposed to pay to the decisions of such courts upon the statutes or local laws of the,place.</p>

This action was. in all respects similar to that of the pre- . sident, directors and company of the bank of the commonwealth of Kentucky vs. Wister, Prince and Wister, ante page 318, with the exception only, that it was founded on the notes of the bank payable to bearer, and .usually denominated bank notes.

Held: to be fatal to the recovery of the assignee against his assignor in that country, cannot be doubted. .'This case, it must be recollected,. comes within-the fifth section; of the'act ofJanuary-6th, 1800, entitled “-Am act for the relief of persons imprisoned for debt.5’ The second, third arid fourth sections of that act make, provision for the ’discharge of persons confined under execution, and. the fifth section…

, The matters in. controversy in this, cáse arose out of proceedings in the circuit court, under the mandate of this Court issued at February term 1815, in the case of Pratt and others vs. Campbel} and others, reportéd 9 Cranch, 456., .

American Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358 (1829), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the American Fur Company agent's acts and statements bound the company; that all goods were subject to seizure and forfeiture; but that the instructions on where in Indian territory the seizure could be made was in error to the point that a new trial was required.

<p>The testatrix directed that the interest of certain -funds should be applied “ to the proper education’’ pf certain persons her nephews, “ so that they may be severally fitted and accomplished in some useful trafie and gave to each of thein “ jvho should live to finish his education or reach the age of twenty-one years of age, one hundred' pounds- to sel him up in his trade.” She also gave the whole of her estates of -every description, to.be equally divided among certain persons, who should be living when the interest applicable to the education oí-her nephews should cease to be required, they being some of the persons among' whom i'ne same was to be divider]; and she directed that-so long as any one of the. three nephews who should live, had not finished his education, or arrived at the age Qf twenty.-oúo 'yéars, the division of the property so-devised and given,-should be deferred, and no longer. •</p> <p>Abill was filed, by the appellant, one Of the nephews of the testatrix, chargingthat •the executors had not paid the several sums,of money bequeathed to him, and praying that they may be decreed to pay the, same. ' No other persons were made parties to the proceeding but the executors;, and after a report of the master, the cause came on to a hearing, and the circuit court dismissed the bill for want of proper parties. The defendants at the argument insisted that not-only the two. nephews, whose education .was provided for by the • testatrix, should have been made parlies, but also all the’ residuary legatees.</p> <p>So far as the hill sought to obtain such a portion of the fund as was by a fair construction of the will applicable to the -education of the nephews of the testatrix, they alone were required to-be parties, and the court reversed.the decree of fiáe circuit court which dismissed the bilí-, for the purpose of enabling the com- . plainant to make the other two nephews of the- testatrix parlies.</p> <p>The-Court did not consider it necessary to make the residuary legatee's parties, in a proceeding the sole object of which was to ascertain and distribute,among the nephews of the testatrix, the amount to which they were .entitled" for the-expenses of education. The residuary legatees have undoubtedly an interest in reducing every demand on the estate. Whatever- remains, sinks into the residuum ; and that residuum is -diminished as well by the élaims of creditors and specific-legatees, as by this. In all such cases the-executors represent the residuary legatees, and guard their -interests. It is a pari of that duty which re-, quires them to protect the interests of the estate. In such suits, the residuary legatees are never made parties. To require it would be an intolerable burden, on thoso who have claims on an estate in the hands of executors. [377]</p> <p>The Court do not think that in ascertaining the.amount applicable to the education of the appellant, one of the learned professions may be takenas the standard, with as much propriety as the trade or art of a mechanic. The distinction between a profession and a trade is well understood; and they are seldom, if ever, confounded with each other in ordinary language. If the testatrix had contemplated what in the common intercourse of society is denominated a profession ; she would scarcely have -used a term, which -is1 generally received as denoting a mechanical art.</p> <p>But the bequest is not confined to the expense of acquiring the trade, so as. to be enabled to exercise it in the common .way. The testatrix intendéd such an education as would fit her relations to hold a distinguished place in that line of life'in which she designed them to move. -The sum allowed for the object ought to be liberal, such as would accomplish it, if the fund from which it ■ was to be drawn would permit it. [377]</p>

Held: that an improvement made under a Connecticut title was an object of purchase, arid they affirmed the obligation of the mortgagor, who' had made the. purchase. • These views 'show conclusively that the . court thought the Supreme court in 1.825 was mistaken; arid.that the law was not as they declared it. Until the decision of the supreme court of Pennsylvania is overruled, it will be respected, by this Court.

Held: that' is, shall in future be considered and held as the *435 true western boundary of that reserve. That this was the understanding of the legislature,'is rendered the more probable from the clause which relates to patents. It does not annul patents, already issued, but declares that no patent shall be granted on any location and survey that has. been or may be made west of this line.

WRIT of error to the circuit court of the southern district of New York. This suit was commenced, originally, by the postmaster general, in the district court of the northern district of New York, in May 1822, against Solomon Southwick and his co-defendants, who were, his sureties; to recover six thousand dollars, the penalty of a bond given by them for the faithful discharge of his duties as postmaster of the city of Albany.

Held: that the question decided by the consti- . tutional court, was the very question on which the revising power of this Court is to he exercised. [464] A writ of error to this Court may be prosecuted, where by the judgment of the highest court of the state of South Carolina a prohibition, issued in a stale court, to prevent the levying of a tax which was imposed .by a law repugnant to the constitution of the United…

IN this case, which, had been, argued on a. previous day of the terna, and the..opinion of the Court deli vered.in fav.our of the. appellant?, (See ante, page 331) Mr Bibb having informed. the . Court that , the defendant, Weisiger, had died since the commencement of the term; stated that he had been of counsel with, the respondent, but. he considered that hfB authority had expired by his death- He objected to the entry of a decree. moved the.

THIS was an appeal from the decree of the circuit court of the United States for the county of Alexandria, in the district of Columbia..

Held: that the sale was void-. The power of the inferior court of a state to make an order at one term as of another, is of a character so peculiarly local, a proceeding so necessarily dependent on the judgment of the revising tribunal, that the judgment of the same is considered .authority, and. this Court is disposed to conform to it. [622] That a court of record, whose proceedings are to be proved by the record alone,…

Held: that the contract was usurious, and void; and that the bank could not recover of any of the parties to the discounted . note.-.

ERR.OR to the circuit court of Ohio. , ,This suit was originally brought against William Steele,. William Lytle, and Thomas D. Carneal. The .plaintiffs counted in assumpsit for money lent and advanced, under a provision of the statute of the state of Ohio, authorising a joint suit against all the parties to a promissory note. The original process Was served upon William Steele and IVilliam Lytle.

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States, for the district of Kentucky, in which court the appellants were complainants, and the appellees were defend-;. ants.

THIS case came before the Court from the circuit court of the United States for the Maryland district* The action was instituted in the circuit court* on a bill of exchange, . drawn on the 16th of March. 181,9,. by the defendants, at -Baltimore, on Stephen De ver at New Orleans, in favour of Rose-well L. Colt or order, of Baltimore; and by him indorsed,, for value received,totheplaintiff, adtizen ofNew York. - A judgment was confessed by the defendants for $2,100, subject to…

The appellee in these cases, is the widow of Henry Fváx-all: and the appellants in the first case, are the trustee's named in a marriage settlement, executed by Henry FoXall at the time .of his marriage .with the appellee j' and in the second, they are the trustees, executors and legatees named in the will.

Held: that the wliole volume was not in.evidence'; and if-the defendant meant.to use' any plot in the same, it was,hie duty to establish"' •it by competent proof of its particular authenticity. .[619] ”.

Held: that the act of the legislature of Rhodé Island, which-Confirmed the title .of the purchasers, was valid. The legislative and judicial authority of New Hampshire were bounded by the territory of that state, and Could nqt be-rightfully exercised to pass estates lying in another state.

Held: that' his mahumission by will was valid. The court .of appeals nf Maryland, has decided that a devise of property real or personal by a master tó his Slave, entitles the slave to his freedom by necessary implication. This Court' entertains the same opinion, [670] APPEAL from tHe circuit court of the United States, for the district of Maryland.

<p>The act of the. legislature of Maryland of 1793,'incorporating the bank of Colum- ■ bia, one of the sections of which gives to the bank a summary proceeding agaihst-debtors to the bank, did not intend to. interfere with any legal defence against the-claim, of the bank the party might have. It does not prescribe the nature of that defence, or deprive him of any which might have been used, had ,the action been-commenced in the usual way.</p>

The. original process in this case was founded- on the sta- ‘ tute of Massachusetts; passed 28th of February 1-795, entitled “ an-aet to enable creditors to receive their just demands out of the goods, effects, and credits of their, debtors, when the same cannot :be attached, by the ordinary process of law.” In said process it is alleged that Loud and Hunt, being indebted to.