¶1DISSENTING OPINION
¶2— This conviction should be reversed on authority of Faretta v. California, (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. In that case the United States Supreme Court held that:
“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” 422 U.S. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533.
¶3In so holding the court required a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel and an advisement of dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. It is generally accepted that the accused may before trial elect to conduct his own defense. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, (2d Cir. 1965) 348 F.2d 12; Minor v. U.S., (8th Cir. 1967) 375 F.2d 170; Johnson v. U.S., (8th Cir. 1963) 318 F.2d 855; People v. Holcomb, (1975) 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343; Barnes v. State, (1975) 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370. In Maldonado, supra,a ease central in this area, as it was relied upon by the Supreme Court *66in Faretta, the Court of Appeals gave consideration to the timing of motions for authority to conduct one’s own defense, saying:
“Once the trial has begun with the defendant represented by counsel, however, his right thereafter to discharge his lawyer and to represent himself is sharply curtailed. There must be a showing that the prejudice to the legitimate interests of the defendant overbalances the potential disruption of proceedings already in progress, with considerable weight being given to the trial judge’s assessment of this balance.” (Emphasis added.) 348 F.2d at 15.
¶4This case and others go on further than to establish that the lateness of a motion effectuates a curtailment of the right and triggers the authority of the judge to deny the request after balancing the competing interests involved and making an individualized assessment. In the case before us the accused, prior to the commencement of the jury selection process asked the judge for permission to personally conduct his defense. The trial judge simply denied the motion saying that the request came too late. The majority approves of this arbitrary response, and in so doing has sanctioned constitutional error.
¶5DISSENTING OPINION
¶6— Implicit in our opinion of German v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 67, 373 N.E.2d 880, is the right to at least a brief hearing when a request for self-representation is made prior to trial but on the date of trial. I feel that this does not seriously inconvenience the court or the state’s case and would be better than an arbitrary rule set up by judicial decree sans a written rule covering this situation. Of course, after the hearing, the granting of the request would still be at the discretion of the trial court.
¶7Note — Reported at 383 N.E.2d 309.