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28 Ill. 337

McKindley v. Rising

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided April 15, 1862

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1862-04-15

James McKindley, George Church, Jr., and Charles W. Church, the plaintiffs in the above case, filed their praecipe in the Superior Court of Chicago, and caused a summons in an action of debt to be issued October 24, 1860, by the clerk of said court to the sheriff of Winnebago county, against Henry T. Mesler, and Nathaniel Rising, which summons was returned served on said Rising, October 27, 1860.

Relies on People ex rel. Brennan v. Cotton

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1862-04-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently November 1955

5 state decisions

101862187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Catón, C. J.

¶1This was an action on the case for a tort, and that provision of the constitution which exempts debtors from imprisonment, has no application. That applies only to cases of contract, express or implied. People v. Cotton, 14 Ill. 414. In a case like this, the statute must receive its natural construction, without the restraining influence of the constitution, which has been applied to it in cases ex contractu. When tested by the standard of the statute alone, this affidavit was sufficient. It set forth the cause of action clearly and distinctly, so that the clerk could judge of what amount of bail should be required, and stated the danger of losing the benefit of the judgment, in the language of the statute. The affidavit is set out in the sixth plea, to which the court overruled the demurrer, so that it is referred to the court to judge, whether it was sufficient to authorize the clerk to make the order for special bail. So the averments in the plea, that the order was made without authority, stand for nothing when the court can see, from the balance of the plea, that the affidavit was sufficient, and authorized the- clerk to make the order. The demurrer to the sixth plea should have been sustained.

¶2The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

¶3Judgment reversed.

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