Volume 28 — Illinois Reports

This was an action on the case, brought by Bass ; the declaration was substantially as follows: First count sets out that on 3rd September, 1859, at said county, plaintiff was the owner of 300 bushels of wheat in stacks, on his farm in Berlin township. That defendant was then and there the owner of a railroad leading from Chicago to Burlington and Quincy, and running through-plaintiff’s said farm, and within forty rods of said wheat stacks.

<p>This bill charges that defendants were married in 1838; that on the 20th of July, 1855, defendant Andrew bought, with fraudulent intent, of Thomas Speer, lot one, block ninety, school section addition to Chicago, and paid for it with his own money, but at the time of the purchase and with the fraudulent intent thereafter mentioned, he put forward his wife as the actual vendee, and had the deed taken to her by the name of Ellen Coughlin. Charges on information and belief that defendant Ellen was cognizant of the intended fraud, and co-operated in carrying out the same.</p> <p>Charges that Young had the purchase in that way for the purpose of raising money, he being supposed to be insolvent, and that he did raise money and particul arly on the 14th of May, 1858, on which day said defendant Andrew negotiated a note of $2,700 at Greenbaum Brothers, and said Ellen executed as security a trust deed upon the property aforesaid. That said note and trust deed were purchased by one Coffin S. Brown, and complainant bought of Brown, June 9th, 1859, and paid a good price therefor.</p> <p>That before that, defendant Andrew had borrowed $116 of one Magill, and given a judgment note for that sum, signed by himself and said defendant Ellen, by the name of Ellen Coughlin; that judgment was entered upon said note March 24th, 1857, and execution issued for $128.80. That defendant Andrew paid the amount of the execution, all but $16, and gave the sheriff a receipt which he held of Magill, for $16, and sheriff receipted in full. That in fact, that $16 had already been allowed in taking the judgment. That the sheriff discovered that he had been imposed upon, and made a demand for the balance, and returned the execution only partially satisfied. That an alias issued, and the property aforesaid was sold thereon, November 20, 1857, to Clarkson & Tree, plaintiff’s attorneys, who subsequently obtained a deed therefor, and who conveyed to the complainants.</p> <p>That complainants caused the property to be advertised for sale upon the trust deed; and that said Andrew and Ellen, for the purpose of defrauding complainant, filed a bill in the name of Ellen Coughlin against complainant, the trustee, Ma-gill, Brown and others, setting up an agreement for an extension of the $2,700, on the part of said Brown, and the sale on execution, and that said Ellen was ignorant thereof; which complainant alleges, was in fraud of his rights.</p> <p>That defendant Andrew testified as a witness, in said mentioned suit, and sets out his testimony. Complainant says he was ignorant that said Ellen and Andrew were man and wife at the time said bill was filed. That said bill was subsequently dismissed, the premises sold, and complainant purchased the same.</p> <p>Complainant demanded possession of said Ellen, which she refused; charges that defendants have carried on for years a systematic scheme of fraud.</p> <p>Prayer that the said Andrew H. Young and the said Ellen, his wife, and all persons claiming under them, may be absolutely bound and foreclosed of and from all right and title in and to the premises, and decreed to join in a conveyance of the same to complainant, and to surrender the premises ; and for general relief.</p> <p>Acknowledgment by Henry Greenbaum, that Ellen Coughlin, a widow, “ who is personally known by me to be the same person whose name is subscribed,” etc., etc.</p> <p>The answer of defendants admits the marriage; says that the property purchased in 1855, was with money earned by their joint labors ; that Andrew was a spendthrift, and addicted to drinking, and in order to preserve a homestead to said Ellen and a family of four children, it was agreed the lot should be purchased for said Ellen’s exclusive benefit, and should so become the property of said Ellen, so as to be entirely out of the control of said Andrew.</p> <p>That said Ellen greatly feared that it would otherwise be wasted, and the family left in want and without a homestead ; that the lot was accordingly deeded to Ellen, under her maiden name of Coughlin, there being no concealment from the vendor that she was the wife of said Andrew, and no fraudulent intent, the said defendant supposing that if the deed came to Ellen Young by that name, said Andrew would be able to control the property and sell and squander it; that said Andrew was not in debt at the time of the purchase, to exceed $50. Denies all idea of fraud, and Ellen declares her only intention to have been to preserve said property as a homestead for herself and children.</p> <p>Denies'the raising of money except as follows: that said Andrew by great importunity, drove said Ellen into giving a mortgage to raise $1,200, for the sum of $1,300—the excess of $100 being usurious interest; and afterwards she was induced to mortgage for the sum of $336, afterwards for $250, to pay a bill for liquors for said Andrew, which said Andrew after-wards paid, and for $150 after that. That said Andrew paid large amounts of usurious interest, and that on the 11th of August, 1857, there being $2,000, in all, due upon the various mortgages, including usurious interest on them all, they were united in one for that amount; that in May, 1858, said Ellen was persuaded to give a new trust deed for $2,700 and the old indebtedness was taken up, the $700 being usurious in addition to what had already been included in the $2,000. But said Ellen denies that she had anything to do with the negotiations, and denies that she represented herself to be a widow, and says that although the acknowledgment to the deed does so describe her, yet it was never read to her, nor was she made acquainted with its contents or that of the deed. Denies that Brown purchased the note and deed upon representations as stated. Denies that complainant bought of Brown upon the representations that said Ellen was unmarried, and that complainant paid a good price therefor, but says that complainant purchased as a matter of speculation, and with full knowledge that said Ellen was said Andrew’s wife; that complainant resided within thirty yards of said Ellen, and had for years, and knew the fact, which was notorious, that said Ellen and Andrew were married. Admits that Andrew borrowed $100 of Magill, but denies that any representations were made; but said Ellen declares that said Andrew informed her, said Ellen, that Magill required her to sign the note as security, by the name of Ellen Ooughlin, because the real estate stood in that name, and accordingly a note was given for $116, sixteen dollars being interest. States that $16 was paid and a receipt taken, and $100 remained due. Judgment was afterwards rendered in Magill’s favor, and against said Ellen and said Andrew, for $111.02, but denies that that sum was due, and says the judgment was void as to said Ellen.</p> <p>Andrew denies any fraudulent intention, and declares that he paid the amount of the execution, which was indorsed, satisfied ; but afterwards returned satisfied only in part. Says they had no personal knowledge of the alias or the sale thereon until after the sheriff’s deed was given.</p> <p>Has no knowledge that complainant bought of Clarkson & Tree ; but says that complainant knew at the alleged time ot purchase, that said Andrew and said Ellen were married, and claimed that the judgment and proceedings thereon were fraudulent and void as to said Ellen.</p> <p>Charges that complainant made the purchase on speculation, and with the intention, by threats of a criminal prosecution, to force these defendants to give up this real estate, worth six or seven thousand dollars, for the small sum which said speculation cost said complainant; and said Ellen states that said complainant and his solicitors made various threats against her and caused her arrest on a charge of conspiracy. Answer of Ellen details threats made against said Ellen, and to her face while alone with her little children.</p> <p>Denies knowledge of the sale on execution until after it took place, hut said Ellen saj's that said Andrew stated that said sale was fraudulent; that he paid the judgment; that the sale would he set aside, and afterwards that it had been arranged; and she being ignorant of the forms of law, relying upon said Andrew’s statements, allowed the time for redemption to expire, which otherwise she would not have done.</p> <p>Denies that complainant was ignorant of the relationship of the defendant, and says that he was well aware thereof; and states that no concealment was practiced. Defendants deny knowledge of sale on trust deed, but say if any such took place it was invalid and void. That the deed was void as not being properly acknowledged, and likewise all proceedings thereunder.</p> <p>Deny the fraudulent scheme charged, and any want of knowledge on the part of parties dealing with defendants. Further answering, say that said premises was the only real estate owned by said Ellen, and that the same was put in the maiden name of said Ellen to preserve it as a homestead for herself and children, and with no fraudulent intent, and that there could have been no such intent, as said Andrew was at the time entirely out of debt; that all of the mortgages were subsequently given, and have been paid, except this trust deed, upon which the defendants intend to pay all the money advanced, and legal interest, and that the whole sum due is not equal to one-fourth value of the estate.</p> <p>That the premises were, at the time of the levy of the execution and the giving of the trust deed, ever since have been, and still are, the homestead of the defendants, and the achual home and residence of the defendants and their children.</p> <p>That there is a dwelling-house upon said real estate, which was there at the times aforesaid, and occupied as the family residence. That the money advanced by Magill, and for which this judgment was recovered, and the money named in the trust deed, was not, nor was any part thereof, bestowed upon or incurred for the purchase and improvement of said premises, and that said defendants have never, nor has either of them, released their right to said homestead as exempted from forced sale on execution, and as required by the acts of Assembly, approved February 11, 1851, and the defendants ask the protection of said statutes, etc. u</p> <p>Said Ellen answers and says, that the trust deed was given not of her own free will and accord, but upon compulsion of her husband, said Andrew. That she intended, however, to pay said indebtedness, and supposed and believed that the deed was nothing more than a mere receipt for the payment of the note by way of mortgage; that she executed the same in the name of Ellen Coughlin in good faith, believing it to be necessary, as the property stood in that name.</p> <p>That said Ellen filed the bill in the Circuit Court as Ellen Coughlin, for the same reason that she made the deed, because the property stood in her maiden name, and that if said Andrew testified therein as alleged in this cause, he did it without her knowledge, connivance or consent, and that she never had reason for or practiced any concealment.</p> <p>A replication was filed.</p> <p>The case was heard on bill, answer and proofs, and the following decree was rendered:</p> <p>That on the defendants paying the complainant the sum of $3,000 and costs before the 1st day of November next, then that the complainant do execute and deliver a proper instrument of conveyance and release of said premises to the defendants. But in default of payment, that the defendants do then stand absolutely debarred and foreclosed of, and from all equity of redemption in and to the premises in question ; and that they surrender the possession of said premises to complainant, and in default thereof, that complainant have a writ, of possession.</p> <p>Errors assigned :</p> <p>The bill should have been dismissed.</p> <p>The decree should have been for the defendants.</p> <p>The defendant, Ellen Young, was entitled to twelve months within which to redeem.</p> <p>The amount of redemption money is too large.</p> <p>The property in question is the homestead of the defendants, and as such, is exempted from sale.</p> <p>The court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence.</p> <p>The complainant is entitled to no writ of possession in this cause. ,</p>

Iu May, 1859, Stone and Atwood having certain matters in dispute, submitted them to their respective attorneys, Sherman and Fuller, as arbitrators, for determination. Held: and no opportunity given him to settle with the Millers and the Bowens, which he would otherwise have done.

<p>An appeal will be dismissed if the assignment of errors is not attacked to ikerecord, in compliance with the rule of this court.</p>

The facts of this case are stated in the opinion of the court ¡by Mr. Justice Walker ; the same case was before the court •at a prior time, and will be found reported in volume 25 of .these Reports,; at page 165. The decree appealed from, was rendered by Hollister, Judge, at the October term, 1861, of the Marshall Circuit 'Court

Dibble & Oo. recovered a judgment in the County Court of Grundy county, against Griggs; upon this judgment an execution was issued, which was placed in the hands of the sheriff. A motion was made to set aside the execution and cancel the judgment; which was sustained. Errors were assigned on this judgment, upon the following state of facts: 1.

This was an action of assumpsit, by Munson against the Stockhams. The declaration contains one count on a promissory note, dated October 13, 1856, payable “ on or before one year from the date thereof, with interest at the rate of thirty-six per cent, per annum.” Defendants pleaded, 1st, non-assumpsit; 2nd, usury, as a full defense. September 26, 1859, plaintiff joined issue on the first plea; and at February term, 1860, a demurrer to the second plea was sustained.

The record in this case shows, that on the 20th day of November, 1860, the defendant in error filed in the office of the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of the city of Aurora, his declaration, alleging that the defendants made and delivered to him their certain promissory note, of which the following is a copy: “ $2,0!#. 25. Aukoka, Nov. 20, 1860.

This was an action of debt against Charles P. Smith, at the suit of Coonrod Smith. PTo pleadings in the cause.

In this case, Oscar Gribbin, the plaintiff, was sued by the defendants in error in an action of assumpsit, together with John W. Mathews, Rufus Lenori, and Calvin Terry, as partners trading under the name and firm of J. W. Mathews & Co. Terry and Gribbin were served with process and appeared and pleaded severally to the action, each pleading in abatement, that he was not one of the firm of J. W. Mathews & Co.; and Terry made affidavit for a continuance of the cause for want…

In these cases penalties were sought to be recovered, for the sale of ardent spirits, within the town of Newark, in violation of an ordinance of the town in that behalf.

This was an action on an appeal bond, in the penalty of $120, commenced before a justice of the peace, and taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of Cook county, where the case was submitted to Manierre, Judge, without the intervention of a jury. At February term, 1861, the court found for the plaintiffs below, and rendered a judgment for $65.15, whereupon Snowhook brought the case to this court.

This was a bill in chancery, filed in tbe Mercer Circuit Court, by Hendricks and his wife, for the purpose of procuring a partition of the lands described in the bill, and of extinguishing the right of dower of Jane Francisco in said lands. The amended hill, which contains the whole of the complainant’s case, was filed on the 3rd day of September, 1856.

This was a suit commenced before a justice of the peace by-John P. Reidersdorf against Schlump. Judgment was rendered by the justice of the peace in favor of Reidersdorf, for sixty-two dollars anch twenty eight cents. Schlump appealed to the Circuit Court of Jo Daviess county.

This was a bill filed in the McHenry Circuit Court on the 2nd day of March, 1860, by Richard E. Elee against William Wait, to foreclose a mortgage. Bill in the usual form, except that it recites a mistake in the description of the mortgaged premises.

<p>and to ascertain tlie damages, the cost of furnishing water to the family, having regard to quality and quantity, may be taken into the account in the estimate —also, the difference in value of the property, owing to the erection of gas or other offensive structures in its vicinity.</p> <p>Jurors may be instructed to weigh evidence by the light of their general knowledge and experience as applied to the events and transactions of life, but it is erroneous to instruct them to apply special knowledge or circumstances connected with the case in forming their verdict; unless the jurors shall have been sworn as witnesses.</p> <p>This was an action on the case brought by the plaintiff below against the defendant below for injury to the water of plaintiff’s well, occasioned by defendant having “suffered to flow from its gas works, and to be placed in and around and near the same, certain noxious and offensive substances and materials used in and about the manufacture of gas and coke, and also certain oily, tarry, resinous, gaseous, and deleterious substances and materials so used in said manufacture, which said substances and materials were absorbed by and entered into the earth, and. permeated, passed and flowed along and through the earth and into said well of water of said plaintiff, and mingling with the water with which said well was supplied, spoiled the water of said well.”</p> <p>The plaintiff also complained, in his declaration, of certain smells, smokes, etc., caused by the manufacture of gas, etc.</p> <p>The defendant pleaded the general issue, and a special plea denying that defendant suffered to flow from its gas works and to be deposited on and around the same, certain noxious, tarry, resinous, gaseous substances, and that said substances permeated through the ground into plaintiff’s well.</p> <p>The court instructed the jury, on behalf of the plaintiff, as follows:</p> <p>1. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant erected, or caused to be erected, near the dwelling-house of the plaintiff, situated on lot 3, block 84, in State’s addition to the city of Ottawa, works for the manufacture of gas and coke, and that in carrying on such business by defendant, the air was rendered impure, noxious or disagreeable to plaintiff; and that the plaintiff had on said lot a well of water, and that the defendant placed, or caused to be placed, in and around said works, substances used in or produced by the manufacture of gas and coke, which, when mingled with the water in plaintiff’s well, rendered it nauseous to the taste or otherwise unfit for use; and if said substances, so used or produced, did soak into the ground, and permeate and pass along and through the earth, and mingle with the water of said well, and did render it nauseous to the taste or otherwise unfit for use, the jury should render a verdict for the plaintiff, for such damages as in their best judgment he has sustained thereby, prior to the commencement of this suit.</p> <p>The first instruction of plaintiff is qualified by adding thereto the following: “But such judgment of the jury must be based upon such facts in proof as tend to show the pecuniary extent of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, (if they believe from the evidence that he has sustained any injury); and to enable the jury to arrive at such an estimate, it is not necessary that any witness should have expressed an opinion as to the amount of such pecuniary injury, but the jury may themselves make such an estimate, exercising their own judgment upon the facts in proof by connecting them with their own knowledge and experience.”</p> <p>2. The defendant, upon proof of the facts mentioned in the foregoing instruction, is liable, though it is not guilty of any negligence in the manner of conducting the business. It is a kind of business that the law does not allow to be carried on jn the neighborhood of dwelling-houses, in a city, to the injury of many citizens dwelling therein.</p> <p>The defendant then requested the court to instruct the jury as follows:</p> <p>1. The plaintiff cannot recover damages for injury to his well in this action, unless it is clearly proved that the defendant did wrongfully and negligently deposit upon the lot or premises of said defendant, certain deleterious, tarry, resinous or gaseous substances, and that the said deleterious, tarry, resinous or gaseous substances permeated, flowed or passed through the earth into plaintiff’s well.</p> <p>2. To entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action for injury to his well, it must be clearly proved to the jury, by the evidence in the case, not only that the defendant did wrongfully and negligently deposit on the lot or premises of said defendant certain deleterious, tarry, resinous or gaseous substances; but also, that said deleterious, tarry, resinous or gaseous substances, by reason of being so wrongfully and negligently deposited on defendant’s premises, did permeate, flow or pass through the earth, and mix with the water in plaintiff’s well, and that plaintiff’s well was injured thereby.</p> <p>3. In determining the amount of plaintiff’s damages, for injury to his well, the measure of his damages will be the expense and labor which plaintiff has incurred in and about procuring water for himself and family, from the time the plaintiff’s well first became injured by the defendant, (if the jury shall find that said well was so injured,) until the 26th day of December, A. D. 1860; and unless the defendant shall have proved the actual amount so expended, or such facts as will enable the jury to determine the amount so expended without going outside of the evidence adduced on the trial- of this cause, the plaintiff will be entitled to nominal damages only.</p> <p>4. If the jury should find the issues for the plaintiff, in this action, then, unless the plaintiff has proved the amount of damages he has actually sustained, he will be entitled to-nominal damages only ; and in such case, the jury will assess, the plaintiff’s damages at one cent.</p> <p>5. If the jury shall find the issues for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff must prove the actual amount of damages he has sustained, or such facts as will enable the jury to estimate the amount of his damages without going outside of the evidence adduced on the trial of this cause; otherwise the plaintiff will be entitled to nominal damages.</p> <p>6. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the gas company, in erecting and keeping in operation their gas works, and the manufacturing and keeping of gas, took all reasonable and proper precaution to prevent the water on the plaintiff’s premises from becoming contaminated and unfit for the plaintiff’s use, the gas company are not liable in this action.</p> <p>7. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff’s well was injured and the water thereof rendered unfit for use by reason of deposits of manure and urine, and other deleterious substances from barns, stables and privies standing in the neighborhood of plaintiff’s lot, .and not from the gas works of the defendant, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages in this action, for injury to his well.</p> <p>8. .The plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages in this .action for an injury to his well, or annoyances to himself and family, from defendant’s gas factory, which may have happened after the 26th day of December, 1860.</p> <p>9. The question as to whether the pecuniary value of plaintiff’s house and lot has been lessened or not by reason of ■defendant erecting a gas factory on a lot near to plaintiff’s lot .and manufacturing gas therein, is not before the jury in this .action.</p> <p>The court gave to the jury the seventh, eighth and ninth instructions above asked for on behalf of defendant, but the .court modified the first and second instructions asked for on behalf of the defendant, by striking out the words “ and negligently,” where they occur in each of said first and second instructions as above written.</p> <p>The court also refused to give to the jury the third, fourth ¡and sixth instructions above asked for on behalf of defendant, or either of said instructions; and the court also modified the fifth instruction to the jury asked for as above on behalf of defendant, so as to cause said fifth instruction to read as follows:</p> <p>5. If the jury shall find the issues for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff must prove the amount of damages he has sustained, or such facts as will enable the jury to estimate the amount of his damages without going outside of the evidence adduced on the trial of this cause; but to enable the jury to arrive at such estimate, it is not necessary that any witness should have expressed an opinion as to the pecuniary amount of such damages, but the jury may themselves make such estimate from the facts proved, exercising their judgment upon the facts in proof by connecting them with their own knowledge and experience.</p> <p>To which action of the court, in modifying and qualifying the first, second and fifth instructions, above asked for by the defendant to the jury, and in refusing to give to the jury the third, fourth and sixth instructions above asked for by the defendant, the defendant excepted.</p> <p>The jury found the issue in favor of the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $300.</p> <p>The defendant entered a motion for a new trial; the court overruled said motion, and the defendant excepted.</p>

This- was an action of assumpsit on an indorsed note-. The defendant below moved to continue the cause, because the note was indorsed by the firm name of the payees, the indorsement not being preceded by a full or regular/assignment, which motion was overruled. The defendant then pleaded to the jurisdiction, which plea the- eourt ordered stricken from the files.

<p>The facts of this case are fully stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant-in error, upon a promissory note. The declaration contained a special count upon the note, and the common counts.

The facts of this case are fully stated in the opinion of the court, by Mr. Justice Walker. The finding and judgment of the court below, were in favor of the defendant in error.

Defendants in error, by bill filed on the chancery side of the cour-t below, July 6, 1860, state, that Elisha Bailey, August 21, 1848, was seized of one-half acre of land, described by metes and bounds, and made his agreement in writing to sell and convey said premises to David Rattray, (since deceased,) thereby covenanting and agreeing to and with the said Rattray, “his heirs, executors, administrators and assignees,” that upon condition said Rattray, his executors or…

<p>This case, and that preceding it, were submitted on the same argument; and the facts correspond.</p>

The affidavit of Philo E. Reed, filed December 24, 1859, states that he is the agent of plaintiffs, partners under the name and style of Pullian, Wills, Rankin & Co., and makes this affidavit in their behalf: that he is informed and believes that George W. Kelson is indebted to said firm of Pullian, Wills, Rankin & Co. in the sum of $124.63 for goods, wares and merchandise, which sum of money is still unpaid.

This was an application by the appellant for a rule upon the clerk of the Second Grand Division to show cause why he should not issue his fee-bill for the costs of this court, against David A. Smith, who had become “ security for costs ” in the Circuit Court, under the statute. The appellees, who were complainants in the court below, were non-residents at the time of the commencement of the suit in that court.

The property of the plaintiff, Eowe, was attached by the sheriff of Iroquois county, as the property of other parties. The plaintiff made a demand of the sheriff in writing, for a trial of right of property in said property attached, and gave security for costs, as required by the statute. A trial of right of property was had before the sheriff, and the verdict of the jury, filed September 3,1859, gave a larger portion of the property to the plaintiff.

This was a bill in chancery to enjoin Hurd from enforcing two judgments in bis favor against his co-defendants below, upon property owned by Robert L. Dunlap at the time of the judgments, and subsequently sold to Blaney, and by him conveyed to Susan B. Eaton. Bill alleges that, on the 6th of December, 1856, Robert L. Dunlap was owner of block forty-seven of Evanston, and on that day deeded same to Blaney, by warranty deed, for $3,000.

This was an action of ejectment brought by plaintifis in error against defendants, in the Putnam Circuit Court. Defendants pleaded not guilty. That they were not in actual occupancy of the premises when suit was brought. That the plaintiffs were not and are not a corporation in manner and form as set forth in the declaration. Plaintiffs joined in issue to the country. There was a trial, and verdict and judgment for the defendants.

This is a suit brought by appellants to recover the proceeds of a sale of a raft of lumber in logs, made by appellee, as sheriff of said county, under the color of process. Declarations contains only the common counts. First plea, the general issue and similiter. Second plea, set-off in the form of common counts, with replications, (common traverse) and issue.

At August term, 1861, of Bureau Circuit Court, defendant filed in said court his petition for a certiorari against the plaintiffs as highway commissioners and town clerk of Westfield township. To certify up to said court the record and proceedings of a certain highway, laid out by three supervisors, and about to be opened by plaintiffs as such commissioners in said town through lands of defendant.

This was an application to amend an execution issued from this court. The affidavit in support of the motion states : that at the December term, 1837, of this court, one William Dougherty recovered a judgment against Oliver Lindley, and Irvin B. Doolittle, for the sum of $3,441.41. That an execution was issued on the judgment on the 26th of December, 1837, which was returned unsatisfied.

In September, 1848, B. Gaffney purchased from the canal trustees, sub-lots 4 and 5, in lot 2, block 48, Chicago, on the usual terms,… Held: deemed and regarded as mortgagee of the said Bernard Gaffney, deceased, of the premises in controversy, as described in the complainant’s bill and amended bill, and that the complainants be and they are allowed to redeem by paying said James P. Brown all moneys advanced upon the faith of that security and mortgage, with interest…

This bill in chancery alleges, that complainants are ■ seized in fee simple as tenants in common of the undivided one-third of the undivided ten-sixteenth parts of a part of north half of west half of south-east quarter of Sec. 18, Town. 33, Range 5, describing the lands by metes and bounds. That said land is covered with timber and contains a valuable coal mine. The defendants, except James, claim some interest in the land.

The appellee sued the appellant before a justice of the peace, to recover pay upon an alleged contract to build a partition fence between the farms of the parties. The case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Warren, county, and, upon a trial before a jury, a verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff below for $26.25 and costs.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiffs in error, in the Stephenson Circuit Court, to recover the amount of two promissory notes, executed by defendants in error. The declaration was in the usual form; the notes declared on were as follows: “$1,000. Freeport, III., May 30, 18S9. Thirty days after date, for value received, we promise to pay James Mitchell & Co., or order, one thousand dollars, with ten per cent, interest after due, for money loaned.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace, by Stanford against the plaintiff in error. On the trial before the justice the plaintiff obtained judgment, and the defendant appealed to the. Superior Court of Chicago, where the case was. tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and Stanford again had judgment against the plaintiff in error.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error, and Samuel T. Went-worth, jointly. The declaration contains three counts. The first for use and occupation. The second is upon the letting of certain tenements, etc., by the plaintiff to the defendants.

This was a complaint for forcible detainer, brought by ap pellant before a justice in Tazewell county, for lots five and six in the division of the estate of Isaac Perkins, deceased, in the west half of Section 1, Town 28 north, of Range 5 west of third principal meridian, in said county, and taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of Tazewell, and at the February term, 1862, tried before Harriott, Judge, without a jury, and a judgment rendered for appellee.

This was an action of assumpsit. The declaration contains a special count on a certificate of deposit payable in “ currency.” The defendant below, appellant here, pleaded, first, the general issue. 3rd.

The corporation, the defendant in error, was indebted to Sears for services as a teacher. Sears got from the secretary of the corporation a statement of the indebtedness in writing. Sears, under his own hand, assigned this debt to Shaffer, and guaranteed the payment of the amount to him, and Shaffer assigned this to Goodloe, Twyman & Hoskins, the beneficial plaintiffs below; and they in the name of Sears, for their use, sue the corporation for the amount.

This case comes before the court at this time, on a petition for a re-hearing. The former decision of the court is to be found in volume twenty-two of the Illinois Reports, page 539.

This was an action of assumpsit, commenced by the defendant in error against the plain till' in error, in the Superior Court of Chicago. Damages laid at $500.

This case is stated in the opinion. There was a trial by the court, on the circuit, and a judgment was rendered for the appellee, the plaintiff there. The defendants below appealed. The appeal is from the Ogle Circuit Court.

This is an action of assumpsit by appellee, for the use of Claudius Jones, George A. Morse, Olof Johnson and Wheeler B. Sweet, receivers, etc., and originally commenced by attachment to the March term of the Henry Circuit Court. Declaration. Eirst count, on account stated November 13, 1857, for $118.46. Second count, on account stated November 26, 1857, for $20. Third count, on account stated April 14, 1858, for $110.03.

This case is stated sufficiently, in the opinion of -the court. The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted, at the February term, 1862, of the LaSalle Circuit Court, for continuing an obstruction in a highway.

This action was assumpsit brought to the April term, 1859, of the Cook County Court of Common Pleas. The plaintiff’s declaration was filed on the 4th of March, 1859, containing three special counts, based upon three several promissory notes. The first count describes a note for one hundred dollars, payable in three months. The other two respectively describe a note for fifty-seven dollars, payable, one in. six, and the other in nine months.

This was an action of assumpsit. The first count is against Diversy as survivor, upon a promissory note given by Johnson & Diversy as a firm, under the name, style and firm of Johnson & Diversy, dated 22nd June, 1860, payable six months after date, for the sum of $407.48. The second count is against Diversy as a surviving partner, for goods, wares, etc. Common count, purchased 20th May, 1860.

This was an action of ejectment for the north-east fractional quarter of Section 2, in Township 28, Eange 1 west of 4th principal meridian, in Jo Daviess county, Illinois. The general issue was pleaded. Yerdict and judgment for defendant. The declaration in ejectment was filed in the Circuit Court, on the 27th day of August, 1861, and a rule entered against defendant to plead in twenty days. No plea was filed under the rule.

This was an action of assumpsit, commenced by appellant against appellees, in the June special term of the Henry Circuit Court, upon a… Held: which is as follows: ‘$546.72. Wethersfield, III., Nov. 27, 1856. ‘ Nine months after date, for value rec’d, we, (Zerah Chapin and J. R. Chapin,) jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of Z. & J. R. Chapin, Five Hundred Forty-six and Seventy-two One-hundredths Dollars, at the Banking House of Preston, Bowers & Co., of…

The statement of the case, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Breese, will fully elucidate the points in controversy in this case. The demurrer in this case was sustained, at the March term, 1860, of the Peoria Circuit Court.

This action was for an alleged forcible detainer by Taylor against Windett. Yerdict before the justice, “ not guilty.” Appeal and bond to Superior Court. Jury sworn, and trial in Superior Court. Verdict, “guilty;” motion for new trial, and overruled. Judgment on the verdict for possession.

The plaintiffs in error commenced a suit against the defendants in error in the Circuit Court of Cook county, on the 27th of April, 1860, upon an injunction bond. The defendant demurred to the declaration ; after the argument, a nolle prosequi was entered by plaintiffs as to the first count, and the court sustained the general demurrer to the second count, whereupon judgment was rendered against the plaintiffs for costs, at the March term, 1861, by Maeiebre, Judge.

This was an action commenced before a justice of the peace in Henry county, and taken by appeal to the Circuit Court. The plaintiff below sought to recover on quantum , meruit for work and labor. The defendant below, appellant here, claimed that what services had been rendered, were so rendered under a contract made by appellee to work for several months at fifteen dollars per month, but he had quit work before the expiration of the time agreed upon.

By its policy of insurance, dated August 14, 1860, the appellant, the Hartford Insurance Company, insured Mr. Had- (den, for two years, against loss by fire, in the sum of $1,500, on his mortgage interest in two wooden dwelling-houses, owned by JD. W. Young, of Aurora, Illinois, situated on lots one and three of the original town of Aurora. On the 5th of November following, one of the houses in question, worth $2,400, was burnt; the other, worth $600, was not injured.

This was an action in assumpsit, commenced before a justice of the peace in Peoria county, and a judgment rendered for the defendant, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed to the County Court of Peoria county, where the cause was tried, and judgment rendered against the defendant below for the sum of fifty dollars and costs, from which judgment the defendant appeals to this court.

This was an action of ejectment brought by Heaton against Durham and Ellis. Declaration in the usual form. The land in controversy is the east half of the south-east half of the south-west quarter of Section 34, Township 18, Range 10 east of the fourth principal meridian. Plea, general issue. Trial by the court, and verdict for plaintiff: Bill of exceptions shows that the following evidence was offered for plaintiff.

This bill was filed in the Ogle Circuit Court by appellant against appellees. Bill states, that complainant borrowed of Jacob P. Shaver, who is his father, and resides in the State of New York, $141.50, and to secure the payment, gave said Jacob P. Shaver a mortgage on fractions one and two of the north-east quarter of Section 3, Township 73, Range 7 east of the 1th principal meridian.

This was an action on the case, brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error, in the LaSalle Circuit Court. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict for the defendant below. The plaintiff below brought error The facts and pleadings are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice. The cause was heard before Hollister, Judge, in the Circuit Court.

This was an action of debt, commenced in the Circuit Court of Stephenson county, by one Daniel W. 'Appleby, against the Galena and Chicago Union Railroad Company, to recover certain alleged penalties which said company incurred under the statute, for not blowing a steam whistle or ringing a bell, in the neighborhood of a public highway. The venue was afterwards changed to Ogle county.

The bill of complaint of Swartwout sets forth and avers, that on the 81st of October, 1855, he, Swartwout, became the owner, and held a certificate duly made and issued by the board of trustees of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, of a purchase of a lot of land, viz., South half south of canal, Section 23, Township 38 north, of Range 12 east of third principal meridian, containing 300 acres.

This was an action on the case by Buckner against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, brought to the Iroquois Circuit Court. The jury found the defendant below guilty, and assessed Buckner’s damages at $2,500. Motion for a new trial overruled. Buckner had his arm broken, and was otherwise injured ; his horse was killed, and his wagon destroyed.

This was an action in assumpsit on two notes of hand, with common counts. Plea, general issue, with an agreement signed by attorneys for both parties, that the defense relied on is a failure of consideration of the notes, and that any matter may be given in evidence under the plea of the general issue, that could be given under any special plea, well pleaded. Trial, and verdict for defendants. Judgment, and order allowing appeal. Cause remanded by Supreme Court for new trial.

The plaintiff in error filed this bill, in the Kane Circuit Court, to set aside the will of Gilbert Benton, deceased, under the sixth section of the Statute of Wills. The opinion of the Court furnishes a statement of the case.

Myebs sued Schoonover in case for a malicious prosecution, the latter having caused Myers and two of his infant children to be arrested for having stolen a bee-hive, worth ten dollars, and causing the children to be confined for five days. Myers was ill, at the time the officer came to arrest him, but he subsequently appeared before the examining magistrate, waived an examination, and gave bail for his appearance at the Circuit Court.

This was an action of assumpsit agáinst the guarantor of a promissory note, brought in the Superior Court of Chicago, by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error. The plaintiff in error pleaded the general issue, with five special pleas. The plaintiff in error also ashed permission to file additional pleas, setting forth that the note sued on had been discounted at a usurious rate of interest. The court refused leave to file additional pleas.

This was an action of trover, for a promissory note. The declaration also charged a conversion of banh notes and coin. The general issue was pleaded. Also, a special plea, that the note, which was payable to the plaintiff below, was only nominally hers, but really the property of the defendant. With a notice that the defendant below would give in evidence on the trial, under the general issue, a judgment before Justice Parks, in his favor, against the plaintiff below.

This action was commenced June 2, A. D. 1868, in the Circuit Court of Cook county. The precipe and declaration are entitled of October term,, A. D. 1858. The summons was dated June 2,1858, and was in assumpsit, and Returnable on the fourth Monday of June,. 1858. The precipe, summons, and declaration, are all in favor of Eobert Dewes, plaintiff, against Daniel T. Elston, William H. Davis, Orrin J. Eose and Otho Klemm, as joint defendants.

This bill of complaint, filed October 15,1857, by the complainants against Stephenson alone, prays to set aside a conveyance made by Gorham, one of the complainants, to said Stephenson, of certain lands in Kaneville, Kane county, on the ground of fraud, or fraudulent representations, on the part of Stephenson, in obtaining such deed; and that the title to said lands may become again vested in the complainants.

The complainants are the executor and devisees of Jesse 0. Smith, deceased, and file their bill, alleging, that a patent for the premises in controversy was issued, by the United States, to John Reynolds, John Claypool and Samuel B. Chandler.

Defendant in error, on the 6th day of July, A. D. 1859, filed his bill in equity in the Henry Circuit Court, against plaintiff in error and others, with an order indorsed by the judge of the 23rd Judicial Circuit for the-writ of injunction.

This bill was filed by complainants, Akin and Boyden, who were complainants in the court below, to quiet and perfect their title to the south-west quarter Section 17, Township 15 north, Range 7 east of the 4th principal meridian, by removing therefrom a cloud, which is a pretended conveyance to the defendant, Lloyd, by the supposed heirs of Washington Hall, Sr., he having previously conveyed the land to the complainant, Akin, by his duly authorized agent, and to have Akin’s…

This was an action of assumpsit on a check drawn by the ■defendant, .in favor of the plaintiffs, on the Bank of Galena, hereafter set out in the plaintiffs’ evidence. Also, on an account for insurance. The general issue was pleaded. Yerdict, motion for a new trial, and judgment for plaintiffs for $288.75, and plaintiffs appealed. The plaintiffs read in evidence the following check: No. 2113. Galena, May 15, 1861.

James McKindley, George Church, Jr., and Charles W. Church, the plaintiffs in the above case, filed their praecipe in the Superior Court of Chicago, and caused a summons in an action of debt to be issued October 24, 1860, by the clerk of said court to the sheriff of Winnebago county, against Henry T. Mesler, and Nathaniel Rising, which summons was returned served on said Rising, October 27, 1860.

Hopkins, on. the 22nd day of June, 1860, filed his declaration in the Kane Circuit Court, counting on a note, bearing date May 13, 1859, due in one year, for $843, payable to O. D. Day, and by him assigned to plaintiff, with interest, at ten per cent., and common covenants. On the same day he filed the note for $843, due in one year, bearing date May 13, 1859, payable to O. D. Day, and by him assigned to Hopkins.

Appellees filed their bill of complaint in Marshall Circuit Court, alleging thereby that said Samuel Thompson, on November 1, 1858, was indebted to Harmon, Aiken & Gale, in the sum of $733.28, upon a note of that date, and to Wads-worth & Wells in the sum of $355.01, and gave to James E. Aiken a note for that amount. To secure the payment of said two notes, said Thompson gave to said Aiken, a trust deed upon real estate.

The facts of this case are stated in the opinion. The appellee recovered a judgment against the appellant for $1,927.25, upon the basis stated in the opinion.

The facts necessary to a full understanding of this case, will be found in the opinion of the Court. The Circuit Court of Knox, Lawrence, Judge, presiding, rendered a judgment for defendant, and the plaintiffs in that court bring the case to this.

This was an action of ejectment, brought by appellee, in the Circuit Court of Kane county. Declaration and plea in usual form. Venue changed from Kane to Kendall Circuit Court. A jury was waived, and the cause tried by the court, and judgment was rendered for Curtis. A new trial was granted to Root, under the statute. The cause was again tried by court and jury. Verdict and judgment for Root. A new trial was granted to Curtis.

Brown and Hollingsworth sued Walker in assumpsit. The declaration contained the common counts only. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict was rendered against Walker for the sum of one thousand eight hundred and forty dollars, which was followed by a judgment. A motion for a new trial was denied.

Hay^s was in quiet possession of certain premises, under a lease. The property had been sold by forced sale, and the purchaser sought to obtain possession. Hays did not eat or sleep on the premises, but occupied them with his effects. Baker clandestinely took possession. Hays then commenced proceedings by forcible entry, etc., and recovered a judgment, whereupon Baker appealed.

This was an action of assumpsit, begun in the 'LaSalle County Court. The declaration contained a special count upon the following instrument, a copy of which is set out in the body of the count: “Exchange for $305.21. . Peru, III., May 16, 1861. No. 14416.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the appellee against the appellant in the Superior Court of Chicago, upon the following promissory note, to wit: “$2,'700. Chicago, April 18th, 1860. “ One year after date, I promise to pay to the order of John H. Dunham, two thousand seven hundred dollars, at the banking office of the Merchants’ Savings, Loan and Trust Co., value received, with interest at ten per cent.

This was an action of trespass, brought before a justice of the peace to recover damages for the wrongful taking of a mare from the possession of plaintiff in error, and taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of Lee county. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict and judgment for the defendant below.

• The defendant in error brought his action against the plaintiffs in error in the Supreme Court of Chicago, and filed his declaration, containing three counts.

This was a petition filed 14th of April, 1862, in the Circuit-Court of Cook county, which sets forth that the petitioner is illegally and wrongfully deprived of his liberty by Anthony C. Hessing, who keeps him in his custody, confined in the common jail of Cook county, upon a pretended charge of burglary. Prays for writ of habeas corpus, and to be released and discharged from said confinement.

The facts of this case are stated in the opinion of the Court. ‘The cause was tried before Hollistee, Judge, at June term, 1860, of the -LaSalle Circuit Court.

The defendant in error, as the judgment creditor of James S. Simpson, Timón Minnehan, and Sagar Wild, sued out garnishee process against the plaintiff in error, alleging said garnishee to be the debtor of said Simpson, one of the defendants in the judgment.

This suit was commenced before a justice of the peace, by the plaintiffs in error, who sued by the name of Robinson, Dunham & Co., for the use of Jonathan K. Cooper. A judgment was rendered against them, and they took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Woodford county. In this court there was a trial by jury, and a like result. This writ of error is sued out in the names of William E. Robinson and Columbus Dunham.

Moore sued Mayo in assumpsit, upon an assigned note, onade payable to one Stevens. It appeared that Moore loaned Stevens money, for the re-payment of which Stevens indorsed .this note. Stevens by misrepresentation induced Mayo to pay him the amount of the note. The note was assigned to Moore .before it became due. The court below gave judgment for the amount due from Stevens to Moore, and Mayo appealed.

This was an action of debt, brought by the appellee against the appellant, upon a judgment record of a judgment recovered by Warner against the appellant, in the County Court' of Milwaukee, in the State of Wisconsin.

This action was commenced before a justice of the peace, and taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of Iroquois county. A trial was had in that court, and a verdict was found in favor of appellee for twenty dollars, from which an appeal was taken to this court. The appellant directed a boy about thirteen years old then living with him, to go through his field, and if he saw any cattle in it, to drive them out.

This was an action of assumpsit in the Circuit Court of Cook county, brought by the defendant in error, Dewes, against Daniel T. Elston, Orin J. Rose, William H. Davis and Otho Klemrn, as copartners, under the firm name of “D. Elston & Co.” The precipe and declaration were filed, and the summons issued on the 16th day of June, A. D. 1858.

This is an action entitled, “ of a plea of trespass on the case,” wherein Julia Farrell is plaintiff, and Frederick A. Cadwell is defendant, commenced and tried in the Superior Court of Chicago. Plea, general issue.

<p>An injunction to prevent the sale of mortgaged premises will be made perpetual, where it appears that the party executing the mortgage was rendered imbecile by habitual drunkenness, and reduced to a condition verging upon insanity, by the mortgagee, who had obtained complete power over the mortgagor; the mortgagee not being able to show that he had given any valid consideration for the mortgage.</p>

The bill in this case was filed Dec. 27, 1856, to compel Allen Loomis, the defendant, to convey to complainant an undivided one-quarter of lots 13, 14, 15, 16,17, 18 and 19, in block 4, Fort Dearborn Addition to Chicago.

This was a petition for a mechanics’ lien, filed by appellees ' against the appellants, founded upon a contract to furnish certain iron castings, for a grist mill at Marseilles, in the county of LaSalle. The petition also alleges, that Cogswell and Cushman had furnished a large amount of extra work and materials for said mill, which appellants had promised to pay for at their value. Cogswell, and Cogswell and Cushman, prayed for a lien for the amounts due to them separately.

On the 3rd day of May, 1861, the appellees, doing business in the city of Mew York, sent for collection by mail to the appellant, at Chicago, five certificates of deposit, payable in Illinois currency, each dated April 19, 1861, and made by F. Granger Adams, of Chicago, by whom they were made payable.

In this case the action at Jaw was in ejectment, commenced in 1855, by the plaintiffs in error against the defendants in error, to recover about half an acre of land. It is alleged that an agreement was made, soon after the suit was commenced, between the attorneys of the parties, that the case should not be tried without notice from each to the other. It appears that the attorney for plaintiffs left the State, and another was employed in his stead.

This bill of complaint in chancery was filed April 5, 1858. It states that on the seventh of August, 1857, the defendant Young applied to the defendants Kitchel & Layton, then bankers at Rockford, for the loan of $200. They agreed to lend him the money, deducting their usual rate of interest, upon his getting a surety.

This was an action of trespass, brought by Nichols against Foote, for an assault and battery. The jury found a verdict against Foote for $683. A new trial was denied, and Foote appealed.

The action named in the summons is, “ An action of debt for obstructing a certain public road in said county.” Claim was for ten dollars, penalty given by the statute for obstructing a public road running through the town of Florid. Appealed by Leech to Circuit Court of Putnam county. Cause tried in Circuit Court; verdict of jury for defendant in error; motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment entered, and overruled, and judgment against plaintiff in error for costs.

The declaration contains only the common counts in assumpsit. The action is for work, labor and materials.

The plaintiff in error commenced this action against the defendants in error, in trespass, to recover damages for taking goods and merchandise from the plaintiff by virtue of a writ of attachment, issued to Seth Smith, one of the defendants, sheriff of Warren county, from the Circuit Court of that county, at the suit of Archibald Young, and others, against George W. Nelson, on the 16th December, 1859.

The petition in this case avers that Thomas (complainant below) made a certain contract with Kinzey, the plaintiff in error, whereby Thomas, in consideration of certain stipulations of Kinsey, agreed to furnish him certain building and fencing materials, to be used in erecting a dwelling-house and appurtenances thereof, on a certain tract of land described in the petition ; and that Kinzey, on his part, in consideration thereof, agreed, within a reasonable time after being…

The plaintiff’s declaration contains a single count in assumpsit, in the usual form, on a promissory note, as follows: $300.00. Chicago, Feb’y 22nd, 1860. Five months after date we promise to pay to the order of J. E. Conklan Three Hundred Dollars, at our office, value received, with interest at ten per cent. WALKER & CUTTING. Indorsed, J. E. Conklin. Defendant Walker was not served, and did not plead below.

This case is fully stated in the opinion of the Court. (The General Assembly, at its session in 1863, has changed the law, in regard to the collection of taxes, authorizing them to be paid in the currency issued by authority of Congress.)

It appeared from the testimony of appellee’s witnesses, that the train struck some colts on a crossing; three of them were struck by the train and killed. The colts ran some distance near the track, and the three that were killed wheeled upon the track. The colts were feeding near the crossing, but in the highway. The witnesses either called it a freight train, or thought it to be so.

This was an indictment for obstructing a highway, leading from Vincennes, in the State of Indiana, to Chicago, in the State of Illinois, found and tried in the Circuit Court of Kankakee county. The plaintiff in error was found guilty. The opinion of the Court fully explains all there is in the case.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by Hill against Tompkins, to recover a sum of money which Hall alleged he paid to satisfy a note given by him to Tompkins, to release a trust deed which the latter held on the property of the former, to secure the payment of said note. A demurrer was filed to the declaration, which the court overruled, and the defendant standing by his demurrer, the damages were assessed at two hundred and seventy dollars.

<p>This case is stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This petition for a mechanics’ lien sets out, that on the' 1st of October, 1858, defendants entered into a contract with petitioner to build a certain house on a certain lot, the property of defendants, for $1,200. The petition sets out particularly the work to be done.

This was an action of debt, commenced in the Circuit Court of Peoria county, upon a bail bond, which said bond is as follows; “ Know all Men by these Presents, that we, Richard P. Morgan, ■“The condition .of this bond is such, that whereas James Neil has lately sued out of the Circuit Court of Peoria county a certain writ of capias ad respondendum, in a certain plea of trespass on the case on promises, against Richard P. Morgan, returnable to the next term of the said court,…

This was a bill in chancery to enjoin ejectment suits, and set aside patents to certain lands, in Livingston county. The hill sets' forth that on the 4th day of January, 1858, McDowell, by his agent, Campbell, applied tó the register and receiver of the United States Land Office, at Danville, to enter certain tracts of land then being subject to private entry with land warrants.

This action was brought by the County of Cook against John O’Leary, to recover the penalty prescribed by the second section of an act of the legislature of the State of Illinois, approved February 14, 1855, entitled “ An Act to amend an act entitled ‘An Act to incorporate the North-Western University,’” approved January 28, 1851, for selling liquor within four miles of the location of the North-Western University, in violation of the said section.