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28 N.Y. 659

Kerr v. . Mount

New York Court of Appeals

Decided September 5, 1863

New York Court of Appeals · decided 1863-09-05

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Conceding it [the writ] to have been issued by proper authority in respect to jurisdiction, still, it having been set aside as irregular, it afforded no justification afterwards for acts previously done under it by the jiarty in whose favor it was issued. If issued by competent authority and regular upon its face, it might afford protection to the officer for his acts previously done under it, but none whatever to lire party. As to him, it was then as though no process whatever had been issued, and the goods had been taken and detained by his order without any process. Tlie .moment it was set aside the party became a trespasser ab initio.” Chapman v. Dyett, 11 Wend. 31 -33; Otis v. Jones, 21 Wend. 394 ; Hanmer v. Wilsey, 17 Wend. 91 ; Higgins v. Whitney, 24 Wend. 379 ; Lyon v. Yates, 52 Barb. 243 ; Webb v. Bailey, 54 N. Y. 166 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Bryan v. Congdon

Relies on Hanmer v. Wilsey

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1863-09-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently December 1968 · most notably Blossom v. . Estes (1881), Bowman v. Hazen (1904)

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 29 state decisions — followed in 12 states

11018631870188018901900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1The attachment under which the goods in question were taken and held by the sheriff, was set aside by the Superior Court of the city of New York for irregularity. I incline to the opinion that the attachment was a nullity on account of the court, out of which it was issued, having no authority to issue such a process. But I have not examined that question, because, conceding it to have been issued by proper authority in respect to jurisdiction, still it having been set aside as irregular, it afforded no justification afterwards for acts previously done under it, to the party in whose favor it was issued. If issued by competent authority, and regular upon its face, it might afford protection to the officer for his acts previously done under it, but none whatever to the party. As to him, it was then, as though no process whatever had been issued, and the goods had been taken and detained by his order without any process. (Chapman v.Dyett,11 Wend. 31; Smith v. Shaw,12 John. 257; Hayden v. Shad,11 Mass. Rep. 500; Codington v. Lloyd, 8 Adol. Ell. 449; Parsons v. Lloyd,2 Black. 845.) The moment it was set aside, the party became a trespasser ab initio.

¶2The return of the property in such a case only goes in mitigation of damages. It is no answer in bar of the action for the wrong. (Hanmer v. Wilsey,17 Wend. 91.) The officer in such a case is the agent or servant of the party in whose favor the process is issued, and the party is clearly liable for any injury to the goods caused by his negligent or careless acts while such goods are in his possession.

¶3The judgment should therefore be affirmed.

¶4All the Judges concurred.

¶5Judgment affirmed. *667

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