Volume 28 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Appeal — Dismissal op Appeal — Brief—Suspension.—In disposing of a motion of the attorney for the appellant in this case, who died after the transcript had been filed, the Supreme Court made an order on June 5, 1919, suspending until further order the prosecution of the appieal. The appellees filed a motion on June 5, 1919, for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the succession of the appellant had urged no action nor filed a brief ■ although more than 210 days had elapsed from the date of the said order of June 5, 1919. Held: That the motion of the appellees should be overruled, for although it is true that the succession of the appellant failed to take any action in the case and filed no brief, they were protected by the .order referred to by the appellees which suspended the prosecution of the appeal until further order, and that suspension had not been recalled. ■</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Recor» of Title — Civil Status — Curable Defect. — Failure to state the civil status of the vendor when he acquired the property is a curable defect although "his wife” is a party to the deed.</p> <p>I». — -Area of 'Property. — When there is a discrepancy between the area of a property as stated in the deed and its area according to the registry, the record should mention that fact as a curable defect.</p>

<p>Pleading — Demurrer—Information—Duplicity.—A demurrer pleaded to the information at the trial on the ground that the information charges more than one offense is not privileged hut of a formal nature and comes too late.</p> <p>Id. — Information—Public Justice. — When the information charges a series of closely related acts which lead to the commission of the -principal offense (in this ease one against public justice), although some of these acts separately might constitute an offense, it cannot be maintained that the information charges more than one offense.</p>

<p>Closing Hour of Establishment — Opening I-Tohr — Construction of Law. — As seetion 553 of the Penal Code only fixes the hour when commercial and industrial establishments shall be closed, it is necessary to conclude that it neither forbids nor penalizes the opening- of an establishment at two o’clock in the morning of the following day when that day is not included among those on which the law orders that such establishment shall be closed during the whole day, for if the legislators had intended to fix the hour when establishments may be opened they would have done so clearly as they did with regard to the closing hour.</p> <p>Id. — Natural Day. — When the law speaks of or refers to days in general the legislators had in mind natural days of twenty-four hours beginning at midnight.</p> <p>Construction of Law. — In order that a person may be convicted of the violation of a penal statute it is necessary that the act or omission to be punished be defined clearly by the statute. The meaning- of the law should not be forced by construing it to include an offense that the legislators had not clearly in mind.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record off Title — Appeal—Interruption.—When an instrument is presented in the registry and record thereof is denied, presentation of the same instrument, accompanied by documents that tend to cure the defects assigned, within the twenty days allowed by law for appealing from the decision of the registrar, has the effect of interrupting that period, which, in the event that the registrar ratifies his former decision, shall begin to run from the time that notice is given of the new decision.</p> <p>D>. — Conjugal Partnership Property-Personal Obligations — Consent..—Personal obligations contracted by the' husband do not constitute a lien on the property of the conjugal partnership; therefore the express consent of the wife is not necessary in order that the husband may contract such obligations.</p>

<p>Irrigation — Presumption — Appraisements — Evidence. — The presumption referred to in section 10 of Act No. 128 of August 8, 1913, that the appraise-ments made by the Irrigation Commission in forming the permanent irrigation district shall be considered prima facie true and correct, can not be destroyed by the testimony of a witness who only gives his personal opinion and whose capacity is unknown.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for the Adulteration of Milk.</p> <p>The facts arc stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Weights and Measures — Wrapper—Net Weight op Hams. — The wrapper in which hams are ordinarily shipped by the packer and sold to the retailer is not a “container” within the meaning of section 17 of the Weights and Measures Act; therefore it is not a iiublic offense to sell hams without having their net weights marked upon the wrappers.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>Motion for Eeconsideration.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record the Correction of a Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action to Eecover Professional Fees.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Obligation — Novation—Pleading.—When a matured obligation is substituted by another for a new term under conditions that alter the obligation substantially, the original obligation is extinguished by novation and a complaint filed prior to the maturity of the new obligation is premature and does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution ' ' ■ for Violation of the Weights and Measures Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Annuity — Public Instrument. — Neither the old nor the present system of laws makes it an indispensable requisite for the creation of an annuity that it be granted in a public instrument; therefore the principle of law for determining the existence of an annuity is that “in whatever way it may appear that a person■ wishes to bind himself, he is bound.”</p> <p>Id. — Capacity to Sue — Catholic Bishop. — -The Bishop of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico is the head and representative of that church, with all the necessary authority and powers for its government, and, therefore, with the capacity to sue in its name for the acknowledgment of annuities belonging to it and to recover the interest thereon.</p>

<p>Weights and Measures — Bread — Pleading — Conviction oe a Crime not Charged. — A person accused of violating Aet No. 13 of April 12, 1917, to ” regulate the weight of loaves of bread sold or offered for sale in Porto Eieo, can not be convicted and punished for a violation of section 15 of the Weights and Measures Act (No. 135 of August 18, 1913), and if the evidence does not establish the commission of the crime charged the accused should be acquitted.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Ppssessory Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Execution — Judgment—Pesos—Dollars.—The district court committed no error in ordering a levy on properties of the defendant to the amount of three thousand dollars in execution of the judgment rendered against him by the Supreme Court on appeal for the sum of three thousand pesos, for, according to the opinion of the court on which the judgment was based, the word “pesos” was used as an equivalent of. “dollars.” Besides, if the English word “dollar'’ could be translated into Spanish, the translation would be “peso”, as is frequently the ease.</p>

<p>Costs — Memorandum op Costs — Amendment—Discretion op Court. — The appellant having objected to the memorandum oí costs seasonably filed by the defendant-appellee because of certain defects of form in the affidavit, the appellee filed an amended memorandum of costs, stating that he did so by leave of the court. The lower court having refused to strike out the amended memorandum as moved for by the appellant, it was held on appeal that as it should be presumed that the court in the exercise of its discretion granted the permission asked for by the appellee in filing his amended memorandum, although it was filed after the close of the term it must be understood as filed nunc pro tunc, and the order will not be reversed unless it is shown that the court abused its discretion and unjustly prejudiced the adverse party in permitting the amendment.</p>

<p>Property op Minors — Prescription—Just Title — Good Faith. — Just title and good faith are intimately related and a just title arises generally where the transferee believes that the person from whom he takes is the true owner and there was nothing in the record or in the facts known to him to show the defect or to put him on inquiry. Therefore, the purchaser of 'a property recorded in the names of minors possesses with the just title required by law for prescription if the sale was made by the testamentary guardian by order of the competent district court on the petition of the guardian showing necessity and utility.</p> <p>Id. — -Third Person. — One who purchases from a person whose title is recorded in the registry is protected unless a defect clearly appears in the registry. The words "result” and "appear” as used in article 34 of the Mortgage Law are synonymous for the purposes of the said law.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Defects—Registry of Guardianships. — The fact that the registry does not show that the guardian had duly qualified by. executing his bond, taking his oath and recording his appointment in the registry of guardian-ships, does not show an apparent defect which may serve as notice to a third person, for the law does not require a guardian to state such facts in a deed of conveyance.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Public Instrument — Instrumental Witnesses. — An averment in a complaint of the lack of instrumental witnesses to a deed is unimportant when the plaintiff does not deny the execution of the deed; when the deed must he regarded as a private document in accordance with section 1191 of the Civil Code; when the fact that the deed containing the alleged defeet does not imply the nullity of the obligation itself, or when the just title exists independently of the deed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District ■ Court • of Aguadilla in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Delay op Stenographer — Transcript op Eecord — -Failure to 'Prosecute. — Although Act No. 81 of 1919 provides that the delay of the stenographer in preparing the transcript of the evidence shall not canse a dismissal of the appeal, nevertheless, when neither the stenographer nor the appellant moves for further extension of time this is not a delay on the part of the stenographer, but a failure to prosecute on the part of the appellant and the ease falls within the principles laid down in Mercado et al. v. Succession of Ferreiro, 26 P. E. E. 433.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Burden op Proof — Weight op Evidence. — When the appellee moves for a dismissal of the appeal for failure to file it within the time allowed by law, the burden is on the appellant to show that the delay, if any, was due to the stenographer in preparing the transcript or to the clerk ■ in forwarding the record to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>Appeal — Reconsideration.—An appeal can not be taken from an order refusing a reconsideration and therefore ratifying a former order or judgment. Tire appeal lies from the order or judgment itself.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action to Set Aside a Will.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Transcript op Record — Extension op Time. — Motions for extensions of time necessary for the preparation of the transcript of the record in an appeal taken in accordance with Act No. 27 of November, 1917, can be made either by the stenographer or by the appellant.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Copt to Appellee. — As the amendment to Act No. 27 of 1917 con-' tained in Act No. 81 of 1919 was not in force when the stenographer delivered to the clerk of the district court the transcript of the evidence ordered by the court on motion of the appellant, neither the appellant nor the stenographer was obliged to deliver a copy of said transcript to the adverse party or his attorney.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Foreclosure—Jurisdiction.—If the town in which the mortgaged property is situated is transferred to another judicial district, the court of that district has jurisdiction of foreclosure proceedings against the property, in accordance with subdivision 3 of article 170 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Third Person — Record op Title — Nullity op Title — Junior Instal-ments. — Although the cancelation of the instalments of a mortgage junior to the instalment foreclosed on is null and void because the proceeds of the sale were not prorated among all the unpaid instalments and the proportional part corresponding to said junior instalments had not been deposited, that nullity can not affect a person who purchased after the said cancelation was made when the registry does not show that the proportional part corresponding to the canceled instalments was not deposited or paid. In order that the nullity of the title may prejudice a third person who has recorded his right, the cause of the nullity must appear clearly from the registry.</p>

<p>Involuntary Manslaughter — Pleading—Information — Negligence •— Bill op Particulars. — When negligence is generally alleged and the circumstances under which the negligence happens are set forth, the failure to specify the particular character of the negligence, if a defect, is one of form. If it is no defect and the defendant needs a further specification he should ash for a bill of particulars. If it is a defect of form he should move for dismissal or to quash, but these questions cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Negligence.—The specification of negligence referred to in the Automobiles Act of 1916 and in the jurisprudence laid down in prosecutions for the violation thereof, is not necessary in a case prosecuted under the Penal Code.</p> <p>Gross Negligence — Automobile.—A chauffeur who drives an automobile into a narrow alley, -which is thickly inhabited, without reducing his speed to such an extent that he may stop almost immediately, is guilty of gross negligence.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence—Corpus Delicti. — The defendant waives the necessity for direct evidence of the corpus delicti when he does not object to other testimony at the trial.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Instructions to Jury. — If the defendant is not satisfied with any of the instructions to the jury or desires that a particular instruction be given, it is incumbent upon his attorney to raise such questions in the lower court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 328 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of .Property Refusing to Record a Foreclosure Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record op Title — Municipal Property — Usupruct — Segregation — Ratification — Evidence op Title. — In order, to record in the registry' a usufructu-ary right granted by a municipality to certain city lots segregated from a recorded property of greater area and also to record the segregation, a public deed is not indispensable, but it is sufficient to present in the registry the municipal secretary's certificate of the resolution authorizing the -segregation and grant, or the ratification of the grant, as the case may be.</p> <p>Id. — Civil Status. — For the purpose of adjusting the descriptions of two houses as they appear in the registry to their description after having been rebuilt the husband set out in a deed that both the purchase and the reconstruction of the two houses were made “while married to his wife who is a party to the deed, she being his first wife." The registrar having assigned as a curable defect failure'to show that the husband’s present wife was his wife when he built the house, Meld: That the defect does not exist, for the parties themselves stated in the deed that this is their first marriage.</p>

<p>Purchase and Sale — Lump Sum; — Evidence — Contract.— The purchaser of a property for a lump sum and mot - at a certain sum for a unit of measurement is not obliged to return the excess that may result in the area or to pay its value, and when the contract does not show that the vendee aeknowl-edged any right of the vendor or of any other person, evidence of such acknowledgment is inadmissible, in. accordance with section 25 of the Law of Evidence, unless the contract is shown to be an independent one, and, as a real right is involved, in order to show this, strong and convincing evidence is required.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Adverse Parties — Notice oe Appeal — -Warrantor.—An appeal will not be dismissed because no notice of the appeal was given to the war-rantor when the judgment to be rendered by the Supreme Court will not deprive the purchaser of all or a part of the property purchased. In such cases the warrantors are not adverse parties.</p>

<p>Appeal — Costs-—Judgment.—The Supreme Court of 'Porto Eieo reversed the judgment of the district court. On appeal the Circuit Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Porto Kieo. The question arose as to what law should be applied in interpreting the award of costs in the judgment and it was held that as the original judgment of the district court was finally affirmed, the law applicable was the law in force when that judgment was rendered.</p>

<p>Designation >oe Heirs — Conclusion >oe Law. — The mere allegation in a petition for designation of heirs presented by the legitimate brothers of the deceased that at his death the deceased left his said legitimate brothers, the petitioners, as his sole heirs is a conclusion of law; therefore the petition is defective, for the parties should allege and prove the facts which may lead the court to that conclusion, to wit: that • the deceased died intestate and unmarried; that his ascendants had predoteased him; that he left no natural children, and that his nearest relatives are his legitimate brothers, the petitioners.</p>

<p>Mortgage —■ Foreclosure ■— Partial Payment — Unmatured Instalments. — A having created a mortgage in favor of B on two properties for the sum of $1,700 payable in four instalments in 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, the mortgagee foreclosed for a balance of the first instalment and the whole of the second instalment, with interest and expenses, amounting in all to $793.50. The properties having been sold to the highest bidder, 0, for $875, the marshal paid over the $793.50 claimed by B, retaining the balance of $81.50 subject to an attachment levied by another person, against A. On the motion of C the court ordered the eancelation of the instalments to become due in December of 1917 and 1918 because of the extinction of the mort- • gage. The said order was set aside on appeal for the reason that as the total purchase price had not been delivered to the mortgagee so that all of the instalments might he thus paid in proportion, inasmuch as payment pro rata is superfluous when the same creditor is the owner of the later instal-ments, the debt was not totally extinguished.</p>

<p>Default — Opening Default — Discretion ot Coubt. — A district court has discretion to set aside a default judgment entered by its clerk and, unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown, the Supreme Court will not reverse the action of the said court in such a case.</p>

<p>Assault and Battery — Evidence.—It is not error to permit an expert witness to testify as to the actual state of the wounds inflicted or to the hind of weapon which probably produced them.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Although the prosecuting witness may not have identified the weapon with which the attack was made, if the testimony of other witnesses followed the trail of the weapon up to its presentation at the trial, the court did not err in admitting it in evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court of Arecibo in a Prosecution for Libel.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in a Prosecution for Libel.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeai — Costs—Attorney Pees. — The appellee not having presented his memorandum of costs within ten days after the judgment appealed from was entered and that judgment not having been modified as to the award of costs hy the judgment of the Supreme Court, his right to recover the costs became extinguished, but not so as to his right to recover the attorney fees, because the judgment was modified so as to impose the attorney fees upon the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Judgment.—Although in a ease of damages for libel the law requires that the judgment shall fix the amount of the attorney fees, the fact that this was not done and the ordinary procedure was followed of allowing the ap-pellee to present his memorandum and the adverse party to file his objections before the court ruled, is not an error prejudicial to the appellant.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Foreclosure—Designation of Heirs. — Catalina Prats, widow of Llompart, having been designated as the sole heir of her son, Jaime Llom-part Prats, a certain mortgage created by Juana Borrás in favor of Llompart Prats was recorded in the registry in her name by title of inheritance. Several children of Llompart Prats, who were thereafter adjudged to be his acknowledged illegitimate children, brought an action against the present owner of the mortgaged property to recover the credit originally created in favor of Llompart Prats. On appeal from the judgment for the plaintiffs it was Held: That as the annulment of the designation of Catalina Prats as heir and of the record of the mortgage in her -name in the registry had not been previously obtained, an action for recovery on the mortgage can not be maintained by persons distinct- from Catalina Prats.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Liquidation of Partnership.</p> <p>Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Evidence — Privilege oe Dejendant — Instructions to Jury. — When the court in instructing the jury says that no evidence tas been introduced by the defense, it 'would be the better practice for the- court to instruct the jury at the same time that the fact that the defendant availed himself of his privilege not to testify should aiot he regarded as an incriminating circumstance, the burden being upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without regard to such omission.</p> <p>Id. — CobrobobatioN—Bape.—On a trial for rape, or any of the other crimes to which section 250 of the Oode of Criminal Procedure refers, the jury should be specifically instructed that the defendant can not be convicted on the testimony of the alleged victim unless her testimony is corroborated.</p>

<p>Becoed oe Title — Partnership— Beal Property ioe Partnership — Assignment — Conveyance.—General partners not being joint owners or co-owners of the real property recorded in the name of the partnership, an assignment by two of the partners to another partner of their rights and interests in the partnership cannot be considered as a conveyance of the ownership of said real property, although the assignment may have been made while the partnership was in liquidation.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Dation en Paiement. — A deed whereby the liquidator of a general partnership conveys to one of the partners in partial payment of his partnership interest two town properties belonging to the partnership, is recordable, and it cannot be held that there is a contradiction between the said dation en paiement and a previous assignment by two of the partners of their rights and interests in the partnership to the same partner, for the latter contract, being strictly personal in its nature, need not be previously recorded in order to reeord the dation en paiement.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>The facts aye stated in the opinión.</p>

<p>Costs — Pees oe Witnesses. — The district court is not bound to scrutinize the stenographer's notes, although it may have the power to do so, in order to ascertain the distance traveled by the witnesses of the successful party in attending the trial for the purpose of determining the amount of the fees of the witnesses; but the facts of which the court may take notice for that purpose ought to be spread upon the record. Perhaps it would be the best practice for the party to prove his witnesses’ fees by a specific affidavit attached to or forming- part of his memorandum of costs.</p> <p>Id. — Attorney Rees — Judgment — Discretion of Court. — In accordance with the doctrine laid down in Brae v. Ojeda, 27 P. R. R., p. 605, when costs are awarded they necessarily include some attorney fees, unless such fees are expressly excluded when the judgment is rendered. In other words, if the district court thinks that the prevailing party is not entitled to fees but is entitled to costs, the judgment should expressly so state; and after hav.-ing awarded the costs in the judgment without excluding the fees, the district court, in accordance with the provisions of section 327, still has discretion as to the amount of fees to be awarded the successful party to represent the value of the services of his attorney or a part of ■ such value.</p>

<p>Conjugal Partnership Property — Mortgage—Express Consent. — In a mortgage created by the wife on a property which was recorded in her name but had the legal character of community property it was stated that in order to give full legal effect to the said mortgage the husband “now states that he approves and ratifies it in so far as may be neeessary in law and under the responsibilities of the law.” Eeeord of the contract was denied for lack of the express consent of the husband and it was Held: That the clause quoted shows the express consent required by sections 159 and 1328 of the Civil Code and that the contract should be recorded.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Eefusing to Cancel the Mention of a Credit.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of tbe Registrar of Property Refusing’ to Record a Designation of Heirs..</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Grand Larceny.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Transportation op Merchandise — Railroad—Liability op Carrier. — Article 145 of the Regulations for the Application of the Police Law of Railroads is not applicable to a case where the merchandise delivered for transportation, the value of which is sued for, has been destroyed by fire.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Vis Major — Negligence—Dire.—In accordance with articles 361, 362 and 363 of the Code of Commerce, carriers are liable for the loss of or damage to merchandise delivered to them for railroad transportation, unless they prove that the loss or damage was due to accident, vis major, or to the nature and defectiveness of the merchandise, but the shipper may prove, however, that the causes occurred as a result of the negligence of the carrier or of his failure to take such precautions as a diligent person usually takes; and, according to article 139 of the Regulations of the Police Law of Railroads, in cases of fire the carrier must prove that it was not due to the carelessness or negligence of its employees or to the insufficiency or bad condition of the means of transportation.</p> <p>Id. — Vis Major — Fortuitous Event. — Vis major, or fortuitous event, is an unexpected accident which could not have been foreseen or prevented.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Fire.—Although a fire may be considered a fortuitous event or vis major only fires which could not have been foreseen or prevented have that character. The burning of merchandise delivered to a carrier for transportation by a fire of unknown origin cannot be considered as vis major or a fortuitous event, because it can not be determined whether or not it could have been foreseen or prevented.</p> <p>Id. — Damages—Pleading.—In a suit for the loss of or damage to merchandise delivered for transportation it’ is not necessary to allege that the loss or damage was due to the negligence of the carrier, but only that the merchandise was received and not delivered, or delivered damaged, alleging also its value in order to show a right _to recover the amount.</p> <p>Id. — Regulations op Police Law op Railroads. — Articles 138 and 139 of the Regulations for the Application of the Police Law of Railroads of February 1888 are still in force, for they do not conflict with American institutions and have not been repealed by any law.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Executive Council. — The Foraker Act did not empower the extinct Executive Council of Porto Rico to determine and regulate the liability of carriers for the loss of or damage to merchandise received by them for transportation; therefore article 139 of the Regulations for the Application of the Police Law of Railroads could not be repealed by section 16 of the Regulations approved by the extinct Executive Council of Porto Rico on May 7, 1907.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District. Judge of Humacao in a Foreclosure Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 300 of the Penal Code. ,,.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of the Internal Revenue Law.</p> <p>The facts, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Prosecution for Petty Larceny.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Servitude of Light and View — Ejectment.—The fact that a plaintiff has an action pending before another court to recover a certain strip of land whereon he alleges that the defendant has erected a part of one of the walls of his house, does not preclude him from bringing another action to secure the closing of certain windows opened in one of the walls of the same house of the defendant built on the lot belonging to the defendant.</p>

<p>Tax Sale. — Conspiracy—Evidence.—When a creditor sues for the annulment of certain acts and contracts of the defendants on the ground that they are fraudulent and simulated, being the result of a conspiracy to defraud the plaintiff, the proof of such conspiracy must be clear, strong and convincing, • particularly when the title sought to be annulled was acquired at a sale of the property for the payment of taxes and the plaintiff does not attack the validity of the sale, of which he had previous knowledge.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Presumption.—Where the plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to defraud, until such conspiracy is proved the defendants are subject to no more suspicion than would be any other defendants called as witnesses, and their testimony, although interested, must be presumed to be true until duly discredited.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Consideration..—A sale for taxes is not a transfer within the meaning of section 1264 of the Civil Code which forbids transfers in fraud of' creditors. No conveyance is fraudulent if made for a valuable consideration..</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Fraud.—Fraud is never presumed and cannot be proved by conjectures, and defendants charged with fraud are entitled to the benefit of any reasonable theory consistent with honesty.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Judgment on Pleadings. — A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be made before the case is called for trial. In this ease the answers of the defendants were not sufficiently non-responsive or evasive as to justify a judgment on the pleadings.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Amendment.—A court always has discretion to permit an amendment to a pleading and on appeal the ruling granting an amendment will not be reversed unless the amendment has operated as a surprise to the adverse party.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Costs.—In the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion it cannot be held that the district court erred in awarding costs and attorney fees to the defendants in an action where the plaintiff alleged but did not prove fraud and conspiracy.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of -San Juan in an Action for Collection of Municipal License.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Memorandum oe Costs — Extension oe Time — Objections—Amendment.-—By virtue of their inherent powers and of the authority conferred upon them by section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the district courts may extend the ten days allowed the party cast for objecting to the memorandum of costs by section 339 of the same code, as amended by Act No. 15 of 1917, and may also allow amendments to the objections.</p> <p>Id. — Stenographer's Notes. — An order of the court refusing to approve an item of the memorandum of costs for paying the stenographer for the notes taken at the trial is erroneous although no appeal may have been taken. Fin-lay v. Fabián, 25 P. B. B. 45, 48.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Property op Minors — Jurisdiction.-—A municipal court has no jurisdiction of an action brought against minors and others to compel the execution of a deed to property previously sold by their ancestors in a private contract.</p>

<p>Appeal — Diligence and Good Faith. — When the appellant shows that his failure to present the amended hill of exceptions and statement of the case according to the order .of the court is due to the fact that the, court had not ruled on a motion closely connected with the preparation of the said documents, it cannot he held that the appellant failed to prosecute his appeal with due diligence or in good faith, and, therefore, the appeal will not he dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Mandamus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Ejectment. — Motion to Amend the Record.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-nayama in an Action for Annulment of .Acknowledgment of Paternity and . Denial of Support.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Unlawful Detainer — Certiorari..—An. appeal from a judgment in unlawful detainer without the previous deposit of the rent due and to become due during the prosecution of the appeal will be dismissed for that reason, and a petition for a writ of certiorari is not affected by the fact that it was presented after judgment had been entered by the district court reversing that of the municipal court, for although the latter judgment was erroneous, the plaintiff had the right that it should not be reviewed on appeal unless the defendant-appellant complied with the statutory requirements.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The fact that the defendant in an action of unlawful detainer for failure to pay the rent set up the defense that payment had not been demanded does not excuse him from depositing the rent due and to become due during the prosecution of an appeal taken by him.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Proceeding for Raising a Verbal Will to a Public Instrument.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Appeal.—Inasmuch, as the provision of Act No. 70 of 1911, that the time -within which an appeal may be taken shall begin to run from the date of the filing of notice of the judgment to the losing party, is limited to the eases referred to in section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, among which appeals from judgments in actions of unlawful de-tainer are not included, when in a ease of unlawful detainer the appeal is taken more than five days after the date of the judgment the appeal will be dismissed for failure to comply with section 11 of the Unlawful Detainer Act, particularly when it does not appear that the bond required by section 12 of the said act was given within the five days allowed for an appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Breach of Peace — Complaint.—A complaint for a breach of the peace against several defendants, which does not specify the words uttered by each individual defendant, but charges them all with scandalous behavior in abusing each other and uttering certain words clearly indecent within the hearing of women and children, is sufficient. If the defendants had any right it was to move that the complaint be made more specific and the exercise of that right for the first time on appeal is too late. People v. Paris, 25 P. R. R. 103.</p> <p>Id. — Discretion of Court — Appeal.—When several defendants are convicted and the court, in the exercise of its discretion, sentences some of them to a more severe punishment than the others, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment unless a clear abuse of discretion by the lower court is shown.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of • San Juan in an Action of Unlawful Detainer on Appeal.</p> <p>The facts.are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Ejectment and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Aggrieved Party. — Where the plaintiff obtains a judgment "without costs” and appeals therefrom the appeal will not be dismissed on the ground that the appellant was not an aggrieved party and that the appeal was taken from the whole judgment. In every appeal it is understood that the appeal is from that part of the judgment that prejudices the appellant.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Administration.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in a Prosecution for Violation of the Automobiles Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Breach ojp Contract — Warranty—Damages.—The seller of a refrigerating plant is not obliged to verify the needs of the buyer in order to furnish a plant that will supply his needs, and no damages can be recovered unless the needs of the buyer were made .known to the seller who expressly or impliedly agreed to supply them.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—When a refrigerating plant is sold to preserve six to eight hundred pounds of fish and it preserves the minimum amoupt at least, or a little more, it cannot be maintained that the plant does not come up to the agreement, and if in the absence of an agreement as to the time of preservation it is not sufficient to supply the wants of the buyer, the burden is on him to show that the plant was incapable of preserving such amount for a reasonable length of time, according to the general custom of the business.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in a Mandamus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humaeao in an Action for Preference of Credits.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contract — Diseased Animals — Pleading.—In a complaint based on section 1397 of the Civil Code it is not sufficient to allege that the animals sold became affected with glanders three or four days after the contract was entered into, but it is necessary to allege that the animals had that contagious disease when the sale was made.</p>

<p>Appeal — Transcript of Record. — The Supreme Court will not interfere with the weighing of the evidence by the lower court when the transcript of the record does not contain or is not accompanied by the evidence examined at the trial.</p>

<p>Filiation' — Evidence.—In this case an eighth-grade school diploma in the name of Estehania Ferrer, the plaintiff, was admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant for the purpose of showing that the defendant had authorized the plaintiff to use his surname. Held: That althoiigh the admission of the diploma for that purpose was erroneous, the error could no't he considered as prejudicial and, therefore, is not a ground for the reversal of the judgment. .</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Reputation.—In actions of filiation evidence of the reputation of the mother of the alleged natural child is pertinent.</p> <p>Id. — Pleading—Denial.—The mere statement that the defendant has not sufficient information as to a certain fact alleged under oath in the complaint is not a formal denial of that fact.</p> <p>New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence. — It is not error for a court to overrule a motion for a new trial when there is no showing that it was impossible sooner to discover the new evidence on which the motion is based and when such evidence refers to matters already brought out at the trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gsiayama in a Habeas Corpus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Revocation of License and for an Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Change of Venue — Jurisdiction.—A motion for change of venue made on the day of the trial and after the party had submitted to the jurisdiction of the district court comes too late.</p> <p>Oath to Complaint — Objection.—An objection to the oath to the complaint made during the trial comes too late.</p> <p>Injunction to Becover Possession — Unlawful Detainer — Conflict of Titles. — In an action for an injunction to recover possession, as in an action of unlawful detainer, no conflict of titles can he considered, for only the immediate right of possession is- involved.</p>

<p>Indictment — Grand Jury. — A person charged with a felony, although committed prior to the promulgation of Aet No. '58 of June 18, 1919, has a right to demand that the indictment he found by a grand jury.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in Administration Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Professional Services — Pleading — Parties. — A a action may be maintained against a succession for tlie recovery of unpaid professional fees for services rendered by the plaintiff to the ancestor of the succession -without previous agreement as to amount.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Acceptance of Inheritance. — In an action against a succession it is unnecessary to allege that the defendant heirs accepted the inheritance simply or under benefit of inventory, for it falls on the defendants to allege that defense if they should be so advised.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence.—The principle laid down in Wilcox v. Axtmayer et at, 23 P. R. R., 319, that under the Act of March -10, 1904, p. 121, a party to an action brought against the heirs of a deceased person based on transactions had with the latter cannot testify as a witness without first being called by the adverse party, is not applicable to a case like the present in which,, independently of his own testimony, the plaintiff made out his case by documentary evidence and also by the testimony of one of the defendants.</p>

<p>Pleadestg — Change of Venue — Affidavit of Merits. — -The ends of justice and the object of section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure in requiring an affi--davit of merits to accompany a motion for a change of venue are both fulfilled when such affidavit is presented, although it may be embodied in the motion for change of venue.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Annulment, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Remand—Discretion op Court. — The remand of a ease by the Supreme Court to the lower court for further proceedings does not necessarily mean that the case shall be reopened. The court below should exercise a certain amount of discretion.</p> <p>Id. — When a case is appealed again the appellate court may always interpret its own mandate.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Injunction Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appear from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Cancel a Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judg’e of the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Party.—The Supreme Court will not review proceedings by .a writ of certiorari when the petition is made by a person who was not a party to the suit unless the facts of the case should be very extraordinary, and in this ease they are not.</p> <p>Id.- — Receivership—Stranger.—If a receivership interferes with the rights of a stranger he may apply to the court to be heard pro interesse suo, and his rights will be protected against any inequitable interference.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Nullity of Contract, Etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Injunction Proceeding to Retain Possession.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Habeas Corpus Proceeding’.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judgment — Compromise.—A judgment approving a compromise cannot be set aside as to certain parties to the compromise without hearing them all, especially when the parties stipulated that the compromise should be void if it were ineffective as to any of them and when the compromise was set out in a public instrument, whieh fact precludes application of section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure whieh applies only to judgments, orders or proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in Injunction Procee'dings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Default — Clerk of Court — Appeal.—While the action of the clerk in entering a default or judgment may be reviewable on appeal, the refusal of the clerk to act.is not reviewable and in such a ease the proper remedy would be to ask the court to compel the clerk to act.</p> <p>Id. — Answer.—If defendants do not answer after demurrer overruled, within the time allowed, and present other motions instead, from the overruling of the demurrer the time runs against them and if it expires they are technically in default.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Proof of Damages. — The court was right in refusing to enter a default judgment in an action for negligence when there had been no trial for proving the damages, apart from the fact that the court had a right to examine the complaint in order to determine whether it stated a cause of action.</p> <p>Id. — Opening Default — Discretion op Court. — The power to open a default in inherent in a court and does not depend alone upon section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even if so, that section is broad enough to give the court wide discretion in a matter of this nature.</p> <p>Ib. — Id.—Id.—Although the appellants had a technical right to the default the facts in this ease do not show an abuse of discretion on the part of the court below in opening the default.</p> <p>Damages — Injury to Wipe — Community Property — Cause op Action. — Inasmuch as in defining what is the separate property of the spouses section 1314 of the Civil Code does not include a right of aetion for injuries, that right is necessarily community property; therefore a complaint in an action to recover such damages brought by the wife alone and not by the conjugal partnership does not state a cause of action and the rule is not changed by the fact that the husband was joined as a party.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of the Excise Tax Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of tlie Registrar of Property Refusing to Cancel a Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>AdminiseratioN — Filiation—Heirs.—The mere bringing of an action for acknowledgment as natural child does not carry with it the presumption that the plaintiff is actually such child and hence an heir and gives no right to petition for the administration of the estate left by the alleged natural father, or to be made a party, or to intervene as such heir in the said proceedings.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Malicious Prosecution — Probable Cause — Evidence. —■ In this action for damages for malicious prosecution the defendant-appellant assigns as error - the finding of the court that there was no probable cause for prosecuting the plaintiff under the complaint which brought about his imprisonment. Held: That there being a conflict in the evidence as to whether the defendant knew at the time of making the complaint that the plaintiff had appropriated the oxen, which was the act charged, and the trial judge not having believed the evidence for the defendant, the weighing of the evidence by the court below must be sustained.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Dismissal—Discharge.'—If in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff proves that as a result of an investigation of the crime with which the defendant charged him the complaint was dismissed at the instance of the district attorney, this amounts to an acquittal, for our system of criminal procedure being purely accusatory, when the district attorney decides that there are not sufficient grounds for the charge and files his recommendation that tlio accused he discharged, the matter is thus terminated favorably to the accused without the necessity of' any order of the court, ac-' cording to section 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. i</p> <p>Id.- — Damages—Special Damages — General Damages. — In accordance with the; doctrine laid down in Torres v. Ramírez, 22 P. E. E. 419, to the effect that only special damages must be particularly pleaded and also that section 1803 of the Civil Code authorizes a court to award damages that naturally flow from the injury caused, it is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the evidence showed special damages, because the appellant was adjudged to pay only the amount claimed as general damages caused the apppellee by his imprisonment, which was a natural consequence of the complaint against him.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Confession — Evidence.—The voluntary confession of a defendant is sufficient proof to support a judgment of conviction and 'when there is sufficient proof that the defendant’s confession was voluntary and the trial court so finds from contradictory evidence, the judgment will be sustained on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—In the absence of a statutory regulation any voluntary confession is admissible even if the defendant is not advised that the confession will be used against him.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action to Annul a Partition. Change of Yenue.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Change >oe Venue — WARRANTY—Appearance—Judicial Notice. — If the defendants in warranty are entitled to a change of venue, the defendant who summoned them in warranty is entitled to the benefit of such change although he had appeared in order to move for the summons and to give bond for a release from attachment, and in so holding the appellate court may take .judicial notice of another reeord submitted at the same time.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Joinder -of Appeals. — A motion asking the Supreme Court to join two appeals taken by the plaintiff-appellant is premature when one of the appeals is being prosecuted and the other is still pending the filing of the transcript of the record.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action ;■ for the Delivery of Personal Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record op Title — Possessory Title — Separate Property — Community Property — Consolidation.—Although the original petition in a possessory title proceeding may allege that' the wife, who had been a widow, acquired half of the property involved in the proceeding as her share of the community property at the death of her former husband, it cannot be concluded that the said half is her separate property, for the question of ownership was not and could not be submitted to the municipal judge, who considered only the question of possession; therefore the property is presumably ganancial and the jurisprudence forbidding the consolidation of properties of a different legal nature is not applicable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Filiation.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mavagüez in a Mandamus Proceeding.</p> <p>Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Mandamus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Corporations — Directors.—In the absence of a previous agreement it is presumed that the directors of corporations discharge their duties and render their services without any compensation, unless compensation is allowed by the by-laws, or by some rule, regulation or resolution adopted or consented to by the corporation.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Right of Way and Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Nullity of Sale, Etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Nonsuit. — In Porto Rico, as in California, in considering a motion for nonsuit the court will consider merely whether the evidence introduced by the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case.</p> <p>Id. — Exception—Appeal.—A. judgment of nonsuit is a final decision within the meaning of section 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure; therefore in order to be appealable such judgment need not be excepted to, for it is deemed to have been excepted to by operation of law.</p> <p>Evidence. — Although it is required to produce the best evidence to prove the facts at issue, the meaning of that rule is that while the original evidence can be obtained substitutionary evidence will not be admitted, but the rule is not infringed when the party selects equivalent or weaker evidence when he could have obtained stronger evidence, or omits to supply all the proofs capable of being produced.</p> <p>Id. — Presumption op Continuity. — Evidence of having been the owner of stock at a time in the past justifies the application of the rule of continuity of ownership contained in subdivision 31 of section 102 of the Law of Evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Ojbection.—Any probative fact is admissible as proof until due objection is made.</p> <p>Estoppel. — A person is not estopped from recovering from another by casual or incidental statements made in acts or contracts, or even in actions with third persons, unless his statements or acts had misled the other person.</p>

<p>UNi/AWOL Detainer — Lease—Jurisdiction-.—A lessee who continues in possession of the leased property after the contract has expired cannot allege that-his possession was precarious, and if the annual rent is one thousand dollars or less a municipal court has jurisdiction. Otherwise municipal courts would he deprived of their jurisdiction at the will of a lessee.</p>

<p>COMPROMISE — Jurisdiction—Survey.—In an. action to compel the performance of a compromise agreement ivhereby the parties undertook to fix the boundary line between their adjoining properties and the defendant agreed to deliver to the plaintiff four of the eight acres of land which, according to the allegation of plaintiff, the defendant was holding without title, the jurisdictional amount in controversy is not the value of the four aeres of land, but the value of the properties to be surveyed.</p> <p>Id. — Parties.—In an action for specific performance all the parties to the contract are necessary parties to the action.</p> <p>Id. — Joinder.—The expense incurred in making a contract may be claimed in an action by the person suing for its performance.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Conjugal Partnership — Liquidation—Mortgage.—A. property having been first recorded in the registry as conjugal partnership property and afterwards in the names of the widower and children by reason of the death of the wife, a mortgage' created by the widower on his half of the community property is recordable, but .subject to the result of a liquidation! of the conjugal partnership.</p>

<p>New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence — Diligence—Discretion oe Court.— The suspicion with which an application for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is regarded requires a strong showing of diligence in order that the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, grant the new trial, and in the absence of such a showing the motion will he denied.</p>

<p>Acknowledgment — Natural Child — Birth Certieicate •— Estoppel. — A birth certificate from the civil registry is prima facie evidence of the ackowledgment of a child by its natural mother although she did not appear personally in the registry, and the filing by her of an action of filiation in the name of the ehild wsp also an, acknowledgment which would estop her from denying it.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Guardian—-Fraud.—The child having been acknowledged by its natural mother, unless she die or become incapacitated a guardian ad, litem can not file a suit in behalf of the child, and if it is sought to annul the proceedings in an action of filiation brought by the mother in behalf of her child, fraud must be alleged and proved.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Intervention — Compromise.-—It is not error for a court to overrule a motion by a third person asking permission to intervene in an action when at the bearing on the motion the plaintiffs prove that the action had been compromised.</p>

<p>Lease — Unlawful Detainer — Deposit of Rent. — -The defendant having shown that although the contract stated that the rent was to he paid at the residence of the lessor, that clause was tacitly modified by the parties to the effect that payment would be made at the residence of the lessee; and it having been shown also that the defendant did all in its power to pay the rent at the time and place agreed upon by the parties afid, being unable to make payment, deposited the amount in the court at the disposal of the interested persons; and considering other circumstances of the ease, which are stated in the opinion; Held,: That the lower court did' not err in dismissing the action of unlawful detainer.</p>

<p>.Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 338 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in thq opinion.</p>

<p>Public Health — Evidence.—The fact that a person may have adulterated milk in his dwelling-house is not a crime unless it were shown that ho offered or kept it for sale.</p>

<p>Libel — Evidence.—The fact that in an action for damages for libel several of the ■witnesses for the plaintiffs testified that from reading the articles published they concluded that they referred to an assignation house is not binding upon the court. It had the power to weigh such testimony itself in connection with the context of the publications, giving them such credit and extent as in justice they had, and unless it be shown that the court erred in the exercise of that power its conclusion will be upheld by the appellate court.</p>

<p>Libel — ’Costs.—Section 7 of the Act of February 19, 1902, authorizing civil actions to recover damages for libel and slander was not repealed by section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 38 of 'April 12, 1917, to regulate the allowance of costs and disbursements.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Cause oe Action. — The dismissal of an action to recover damages for libel does not necessarily imply that there was absolutely no reason for bringing the action.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—In order that the Supreme Court may hold that the lower court erred or abused its discretion in not allowing costs to the defendant in an action for damages for libel where the complaint was dismissed but the court did not find that the action was brought without any justifiable cause, it is necessary to submit to its consideration the evidence examined at the trial, for the complaint, the answer and the judgment are not sufficient for that purpose.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Security.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Discharge.—A claim which is not included in the schedule referred to in subdivision 8 of section 7 of the bankruptcy law is not affected by the discharge mentioned in section 17 of the said law, unless it is shown that the creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Id. — A claim established by a jugdment is something tangible in business and. can be negotiated.</p> <p>Partnership — Liability oe Partners. — Tlie fact that a mercantile partnership goes out of existence, or in some manner closes its business, does not imply of itself the termination of the personal subsidiary liability of its members.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Negligence — Damages—Automobile—Driver.—The fact that the owner of a private automobile employs a “driver” instead of a “chauffeur” to operate his vehicle for pay does not make him liable for the negligence of the driver if the owner was not in the vehicle at the time.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Conflict of Titles.' — Unlawful detainer is not the appropriate action in which to consider a conflict of titles to the ownership of real property.</p>

<p>Public Health — Evidence.—When flour intended for making bread for sale to the public is full of worms and weevils and the bags in which it is contained are perforated so that one may see with the naked eye the excretions of the worms, a person of average intelligence may testify to that fact and the court may conclude from that testimony that the flour was at least dirty within the meaning of article 16 of Sanitation Bulletin No. 30, it not being necessary to have a chemist analyze the flour.</p> <p>Id.- — -Jurisdiction—Appeal.-—A complaint in which it is alleged that the offense was committed “in Arroyo, P. B., of the municipal judicial district of Arroyo” is sufficient to determine the jurisdiction of the District Court of G-uayama of the case on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—-Amendment—Appeal.—Whenever an error is not prejudicial to the accused the judgment may be amended by the appellate court.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction — Ejectment.—In an action of ejectment for the recovery of a property whose value exceeds five hundred dollars the jurisdiction of the district court is clear, and such jurisdiction is not affected by the facts that the •property came into the possession of the defendant by virtue of two actions, the amount of each of which was less than five hundred dollars, and that the nullity of the proceedings in both suits is alleged.</p>

<p>Last Olea® Chance.' — The rule of the last clear chance is not applicable to a case in which, according to the weighing of the evidence by the lower court, not the motorman of the street car in which the appellant was traveling, but the driver of the truck, had the last chance of avoiding the accident.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Simulated Sale — Tax Sale. — The heirs of a grantee in a simulated conveyance, without a consideration, of a property of which the grantor continued in possession and ■which, was thereafter sold at public auction for the payment of taxes, have no cause of action to recover the property from the purchaser at a tax sale on the ground of nullity of the tax sale for irregularities.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Private Document — Evidence.—In this ease it was held that according to subdivisions 2 and 4 of section 35 of the Law of Evidence a private document in which the grantee of the property acknowledged on the day after the transfer that the same was simulated and without consideration, and that in the event that such statement might not be sufficient in law he reconveyed the property to its real owner, the grantor, was admissible in evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Notice by Mail — Residence oe Attorney. — The attorney for the plaintiffs herein being the acting registrar of property of Caguas and therefore not allowed to leave the town without the permission of the district judge, the notice which the defendants mailed to him, addressed to Oaguas, stating the date on which the deposition would be taken in Huinacao, was well addressed and the court did not err in admitting the deposition in evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Workmen's Remej? Commission — Damages.—In accordance with section 9 of Act No. 10 of 1918, a decision of the Workmen’s Relief Commission to the effect that the claimant is not entitled to damages because he did not exclusively depend upon his son, the victim of an accident, is not appealable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for the Administration of Community Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Personal Obligation — Security—Insolvency.—Section 1096 of the Civil Coda does not impose upon the debtor the obligation to give security for the ful-filment of a personal obligation when the debtor becomes insolvent or the securities previously given have diminished or disappeared, but confers upon him the right to give security in such a ease in order to avoid that the obligation become actionable before maturity. Section 1088 of the same code, conferring upon the creditor the right to demand security, refers to conditional and not to absolute obligations.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Warranty.—Certiorari is not a writ of right and when the Supreme Court is convinced that the ends of justice will be better served by allowing the case to proceed in order that the question involved may be considered on appeal, that question should not be decided in certiorari proceedings. Applying that principle, although the question of warranty was examined in the opinion it was not finally decided.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for a Crime Against Public Health.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>CoMmunitt Property — Separate Property — Presumption.—No authentie document having been presented to show when and how the wife acquired the • money invested in the purchase of the property, or that it was her marriage portion, and the mere statements made in the deed by the parties them- ' selves, or by third persons, not being sufficient for that purpose, the presumption is that the property is community property, according to section 1322 of the Civil Code.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Subrogation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Evidence. — A book stowing that tbe defendant on a certain day employed in his tobacco stripping establishment a certain number of employees is admissible in evidence although it may appear to have been changed, unless the defendant proves that the change was not made by him.</p> <p>Id. — License—Internal Bevenue. — If by the testimony of one of the witnesses for the defendant it is shown that he only had an internal revenue license for employing less than fifty persons in his establishment and it was proved that he employed fifty-two, the defendant cannot allege that the court erred in permitting it to be proved by oral evidence that he had not the corresponding license.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Nullity of Records, Etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Notice. — It is conclusively presumed that the parties are before the court and the only exceptions that should be taken into account in regard to notice are those referred to in the Acts of March 9, 1911, and March 11, 1915. Insurance Policy — Beneficiary—Heirs.—The policy issued by a mutual accident insurance company is the law of the contract and if it does not appear from the policy that the beneficiary designated by the insured to the company’s agent and named in the application for insurance was accepted by the company, only the lawful heirs of the deceased member have a right to collect the insurance, according to the by-laws of the company.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court of Mayagfiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Surety Bond — Summons of Defendant — Pleading—Conclusion of Law. — According to the Bond in this ease it was necessary that the defendant he summoned to appear before the court in order to hold the sureties liable, and it not having been alleged that he was so summoned, the complaint was fatally defective. Such allegation was not supplied by the statement that "inasmuch as Hernán Castés has not appeared in response to the lawful call of the court, the said bond has become good,” for .that statement is a conclusion of law whieh does not establish the fact as to the summons.</p> <p>Id. — Horkeituee of Bond — Pleading.—The allegations that the court ordered that the defendant slionld give a bond in the sum of $800 to remain temporarily at liberty; that the bond was given by the defendants, and that on account of the defendant’s failure to appear to answer the information the bond was declared forfeited, do not supply the essential allegation that the defendant was released by virtue of the bond given by the defendants.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Violation of the Scaffolds Act.</p> <p>Evidence — Scaffolds—Building.—The evidence was examined and held sufficient to prove the violation with which the defendant was charged, consisting in the failure to provide a scaffold on a certain building which he was erecting, as provided by Act- No. 46 of 1917.</p>

<p>Contract — Breach oe Contract — Vis Major. — In this ease it was held that the fact that the stoei of coffee which the defendants hah in their warehouses was destroyed hy vis major did not release them from their obligation to deliver to the plaintiff on the agreed day the 300 quintals of coffee as agreed upon, for in such a case subdivision 1 of section 334= of the Code of Commerce is applicable and not sections 1072 and 1150 of the Civil Code.</p>

<p>Illiterate Parties — Instrumental Witness — Public Instrument. — The law ■expressly provides that when the parties to a public instrument, or some of them, can not or do not know how to sign the notary shall so state and one of the witnesses shall sign for them, setting forth in his own handwriting before signing that he signs as a witness and also in the name of the party ■who can not or does not know how to sign; therefore a registrar is right in refusing to record a deed in which the said provision has not been complied with.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Injunction — Irreparable Damage — Title—Discretion of Court. — When it ia sought to prevent such irreparable damage as would in certain cases be considered the destruction of a house, although the mere fact that the title to the property is in dispute is not of itself sufficient ground for denying an injunction, yet when, as here, it is not a mere conflict, but the evidence furnished the court with a sufficient basis for arriving at a conclusion and it is not shown that in so concluding it abused its discretional power, the appellate court will not reverse the action of the district court.</p> <p>Xd. — Id.—Destruction of House. — It having been shown that the building in question in this case is a small, ordinary frame house rented as a shop and without any sentimental value or any peculiar or noteworthy character, and It having also been shown that the defendant is solvent, the destruction of She house is not an irreparable damage.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Débt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Damages. — Motion for a New Trial.</p> <p>'Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Performance of Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Ejectment with Damages.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in Injunction-Proceedings.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in 'the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Adulteration of Milk.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Agnadilla in a Prosecution for Attempted False Representation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Consolidation op Properties — Separate Property — Community Property. — Although the established rule is that two distinct entities can not consolidate adjoining properties, if the properties arc sold to a single purchaser they may be consolidated in the same deed of sale and recorded by the vendee as a single property. • .</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Mandamus Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated-in the opinion.</p>

<p>Recobd oe Title — Lease—Community Property. — A lease of community property made by the husband after being divorced is recordable when ratified by the divorced wife of the lessor in a deed in which' for a certain consideration she conveyed to her divorced husband her share of the assets of the community, it not being necessary to record previously the leased property in the name of the grantee.</p> <p>Id. — Principal—Accessory.—When a property containing a house is leased it is not necessary first to record the house, for it is presumed that the accessory, the house, belongs to the owner of the principal, the land.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Third Person. — It not appearing from the record of the property sought to be recovered that when the plaintiff's ancestor acquired it he was married, the fact that the record of a mortgage created in the year following the acquisition shows that the ancestor was married is not sufficient notice to third persons that he was married at the time of acquisition. The present possessor and his predecessor purchased the property from a person who, according to the registry, had capacity to sell it, and if, on account of, failure to join as a defendant the succession of the wife of the first purchaser, the purchase at public auction by the predecessor of the present owner is null and void, as sueh nullity does not clearly appear from the registry it cannot affect the present owner, who is a third person.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Summons.—Por the mere reason that the record of a forced sale does not show that the defendant owner of, the property was duly summoned it can not be held that the third person knew that he was not summoned, for he may have been summoned although the record does not show it. Article 34 of the Mortgage Law categorically provides that the causes of nullity shall clearly appear from the registry; therefore the facts from which the nullity results must appear from the registry clearly and affirmatively.</p> <p>Id. — Record or Title — Civil Status — Curable Defect. — The civil status of the vendor or vendee is ¡not among the requisites which, according to article 9 of the Mortgage Law, every record must contain; therefore the omission of that fact in tho document does not prevent its record, for it is only a curable defect.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Levy.—The fact that the property sold at public auction had not been previously levied on does not produce the nullity of the sale. The entry of a levy in the registry is not a legal obligation, but a right that creditors may exercise at will.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Carrying Arms.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Public Health — Adtjltebaeed Milk — Evidence.—In this case the milk -which was found to he adulterated having been sold or offered for sale in the defendant's milk-stall, the presumption is that it belonged to the defendant, although he was not present. This presumption could have been destroyed by the testimony of the elerk who stated that the milk did not belong to the defendant but to her; but as the court did not believe her testimony and as it was not shown that it committed a manifest error, the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action , for Acknowledgment of Servitude and Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Messrs. M. and J. Tous Soto and J. C. Ramos for the-appellant.</p>

<p>Judgment on Pleadings — Final Judgment — Demurrer—Discretion of Court.— When a demurrer is overruled and time allowed to answer, if the defendant fails to answer and moves for judgment the judgment then entered is final, although the defendant may have moved for sueh judgment without prejudice to answering if the order overruling the demurrer should he affirmed on appeal. The court did not err in overruling the motion for permission to answer the complaint after the case had gone off on the pleadings of the plaintiff at the instance of the defendant himself, and if the court had discretion to admit the answer the circumstances of the case do not show an abuse of sueh discretion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Redemption — Adjoining Ownek — Rural Property. — If a parcel of land ia principally used for agricultural purposes and is not within the limits of an ' urban district, it does not lose the character of rural property merely because a railroad track has been laid thereon for the transportation of stone; and the defendant not coming' under subdivision 2 of section 1426 of the Civil Code, he cannot oppose an action for the redemption of said parcel of land, whose area does not exceed one hectare, brought by an adjoining owner, although, as he alleges, the property had been sold to him in order that he might continue the business of transporting stone.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Larceny.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Intervention — Community Property — Seiarate Property — Attachment. —> Property acquired' for a valuable consideration during wedlock is presumed to be community property. To destroy this presumption strong and convincing evidence is required. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support the allegation that certain real properties attached as belonging to the community were the separate property of the wife and, therefore, the-attachment was properly dissolved; but it was insufficient with regard to-certain personal property also attached and, therefore, tfae attachment should hold as to it.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action of Intervention.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in Mandamus Proceedings.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Divorce — Gruel Treatment and Grave Injury — Intent.—The evidence produced herein having been examined, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court went too far in considering the gravity of the injuries inflicted upon the husband by the wife, and held that, considering all the circumstances surrounding the case, which are mentioned in the opinion, such injuries do not constitute the “cruel treatment” or the “grave injuries” which, according to the law as construed by the courts, are grounds for divorce.</p>

<p>Action — Limitation—Execution op Deed — Interruption op Limitation. — As an action to compel the execution of a deed is a personal action for which no special period of limitation is prescribed, and such period begins to run. fecvn tlie date on which the action could have been brought, that is, from the day on which, after consent and the other requirements necessary for its validity, the contract was entered into, such an action brought after the expiration of fifteen years is barred by limitation, and an action in which the execution of said deed was not sought does not interrupt the running of the period of limitation.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action to Recover Possession.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Possessory Title — Summoning People op Porto Eioo — Adjoining Owner.— When The People of Porto Rico are to he summoned in a possessory title proceeding as adjoining owners, the summons must he served on the Governor of the Island, and if the proceeding is prosecuted and judgment entered without summoning the Governor the registrar is justified in refusing to record the judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 2 of the Jones Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Acknowledgment of Servitude.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Quo Warranto. — In Porto Eieo proceedings in the nature of quo warranto can he instituted only by the Attorney General or by a district attorney, acting on his own initiative or at the instance of a person who has an interest in the 'question to he considered greater than the interest of a mere citizen as distinguished from a citizen and tax-payer.</p>

<p>Appeal — Assignment op Error — Brief.—When the appellant’s brief does not contain the assignment of errors required by sections 42 and 43 of the Buies of the Supreme Court the appeal will be dismissed.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Discretion op Court. — Although the Supreme Court has discretion to consider any fundamental error not assigned by the appellant, it is not bound to scrutinize a rambling complaint and an incomplete brief in order to find such fundamental error.</p> <p>Attorney in Bact — Quaere. — Whether, an allegation in a complaint that the plaintiff is an attorney in fact is sufficient to authorize him to bring an action, and whether an attorney in fact would have a cause of action in his own name.</p>

<p>Pkomssional Services — Reasonable Value of Services. — A complaint in an action to recover fees for professional services wherein it is not alleged that the amount was previously agreed upon, hut wherein the plaintiff fixes the amount of his professional services at a certain itemized sum which he alleged was owing to him, is not fatally defective because it fails to state that the sum claimed is the reasonable value of the services, for if it were not'reasonable it would not be owed. If the amount was not reasonable the defendant could defend on that ground and could also move for a more detailed specification of the items of the account.</p> <p>Id. — Default Judgment — Money Contract. — In this case the default judgment entered by the clerk is attacked for failure to take evidence in regard to the account in accordance with subdivision 2 of section 194 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that subdivision is not applicable. Subdivision 1 of the said section is applicable, inasmuch as this is a money daim originating from a contract for the hire Of professional services, which was a contract although there was no previous agreement as to the amount.</p>

<p>COMPROMISE — Filiation—Inheritance—Consideration.—A compromise approved by the court in an action of filiation, .whereby the defendants paid to the minor plaintiff a certain sum of money and the latter, by her legal representative, agreed to abandon her claim, is null and void because it affects the civil status of the plaintiff, and it can not be held valid as to the inheritance claimed, for the compromise does not contain independent stipulations, but is an indivisible whole. When a contract contains several independent stipulations, those having valuable considerations will be valid, otherwise none will be valid on account "of their mutual subordinate relations.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Collation—The plaintiff being a minor when, represented by her mother, she settled the action of filiation by a compromise which was declared null and void, the judgment sustaining her complaint for acknowledgment as natural daughter and adjudging that the sum received in the settlement be collated as a "part of her inheritance, is erroneous because the defendants did not prove that the minor was enriched by that sum.</p> <p>Id. — Id,—Id.—A natural child has a right to inherit from its father from the moment of his deaths and a judgment decreeing the acknowledgment should be retroactive as from that date.</p>

<p>Excussion — Partnership — Private Property of Partners- — Attachment — Execution. — A member of a mercantile partnership is considered, for all practical purposes, as a joint debtor with the partnership, and may therefore be included as a defendant in an action of debt against the partnership; and in order to reserve his right to excussion granted by section 237 of the Code of Commerce, it will be sufficient if the judgment provide that the private property of the defendant partner shall be levied on and sold in execution of the judgment only in the event that the marshal returns the writ stating that no property of the partnership had been found or that the property levied upon was not sufficient to satisfy the judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal — Frivolous Appeal — Memorandum op Costs — Attorney Fees. — The sole ground alleged in support of the appeal being that the district court can not of itself, acting as an expert, estimate whether or not the amount of attorney fees in a memorandum of eosts is reasonable and tlie Supreme Court having decided the question in several eases, among them González v. Collazo, 25 P. R. R. '146, the appeal is frivolous and will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal — Tbanscbipt oe Recced. — The transcript of the record in this case having been filed after the time allowed and after the appellant had been served with, notice of a motion for dismissal of tlie appeal, and it appearing also that the appellant had two months within which to file the transcript, there is no basis for the exercise by the Supreme Court of its discretion in favor of the appellant; therefore the appeal will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeai, from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>License Tax — Commission Merchant — Municipal Taxes. — The defendant admitted that he was the agent of Aboy, Hernandez & Co. of New York, in whose name he sold provisions to the merchants of Ponce, sending their orders to the said firm who shipped the provisions to the defendant, with the corresponding invoices, for delivery to the purchasers, and the defendant so delivered them without storing them in any warehouse or in his office, receiving a certain percentage as commission. Seld: That the defendant is under the obligation to pay to the municipality of Ponce the corresponding license tax, for the business _ described is included among those subject to the payment of a municipal license tax under group C of section 2 of Act No. 26 of March 28, 1914.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Identity ot Properties. — The identity between a recorded property and another property sought to be recorded is not established by the identity of the boundaries alone, but may be deduced also from other facts, as in this case, in which, the appellant admitting that one of the parcels which constitute the property situated in the ward of Rio of Na-guabo, the ownership of which is sought to be recorded, was acquired by his vendor, Felipe Rivera, from Ramón Miranda Barrantes, who had purchased it in 1890 from the Countess de Gálvaz at.a tax sale, and it appearing from the record in the registry in the name of Felipe Rivera that he acquired 70 acres of land in the same ward of Rio from the said countess and in the same year at a tax sale, it is necessary to conclude that there is identity between the recorded property of 70 acres and one of the parcels which constitute the property whose ownership is sought to be recorded.</p> <p>Id. — Possessory Title — Dominios Title. — The possessory title tó a property being recorded in the name of one person-, the ownership thereof established by a different person can not be recorded,' although from the dominion title proceeding it appears that the person in whose name the possessory title was recorded was summoned in the proceeding. In order to record the ownership title in this ease it is necessary that the person in whose name the possessory title is recorded should consent expressly to the record of the ownership title, or that he be heard and defeated in the corresponding action.</p>

<p>Appeal — Costs.—An order refusing to strike out a memorandum of costs moved for on the ground that it was filed out of time, having been appealed from, Held: That such an order might he reviewed in an appeal from an order adjudging the payment of costs and fees, hut that such order of itself is not among those which are appealable according to subdivision 3 of section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Dominion Title — Former Owners. — In an order establishing the dominion title to a property composed of several parcels, one of whieh the petitioner claimed to have acquired by inheritance from his father, it is not sufficient to state that the former owners of the several parcels were summoned in the proceeding. If the order does not state that the successors of the person from whom the petitioner acquired the said parcel by inheritance were summoned also, the registrar acts correctly in refusing to record the dominion title.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Powers of Registrars.- — Although the registrars are not authorized to look into the grounds on which judicial orders are based, nor to take as a basis their opinions regarding the legality of such grounds in refusing to record said orders in the registry, yet this does not mean that registrars have, no power to refuse to record when the said orders do not show that all the requirements of law have been complied with.</p>

<p>Complaint — Affidavit—Objections.—Objections to the form of the affidavit in a complaint or to supposed defects in the signature of the illiterate complainant come too late when made for the first time in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Adultery — Excessive Penalty.' — It having been proved that the adultery was committed in the home of the offending husband in the immediate presence of the wife, and it appearing that the defendants continued to live in the house after the departure therefrom of the wife and her children, the Supreme Court will not reduce the sentence of the defendants to imprisonment for one year as excessive.</p>

<p>Personal Representation — Attorney. — In all judicial proceedings the party really interested may proseeute his action personally before the. court without being represented by counsel. Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable when the interested party wishes to be represented by another " person.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Adulteration of'Milk.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Extension oe Time — Jurisdiction. — When one month and thirteen days after the filing of the notice of appeal the court granted the appellant an extension of time for filing the statement of the case, the appeal will be dismissed. Such an extension is null and void and the fact that the appellee did not raise the question of jurisdiction in the district court in order to object to the granting of the extension is no defense for the appellant.</p> <p>Id.- — Service by Publication. — The period of ten days allowed the appellant by the Code of Civil Procedure for filing the statement of the ease can not be considered as automatically extended by the fact that at the appellant’s ■instance the notice of appeal was served on one of the defendants by publication.</p>

<p>Bbeach of Peace — Information.—In an information for breach, of peace it is not sufficient to allege that the defendant used threatening language or assumed an aggressive attitude if it is not alleged that such language or attitude had the actual effect of disturbing the peace of one or several particular persons, for such disturbance is what constitutes the criminal offense.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Beiee.—When the appellant does not prove the reasonable excuse pleaded for not filing his brief in time, a motion of the appellee for dismissal of the appeal will be sustained even though the brief was filed before the hearing on the motion, particularly when the brief shows that the appellant has not a good cause of action.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Minimum Wages — Constitutional Law. — Following the doctrine laid down in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Stettler v. 0 ’Sara, 69 Ore. 519, affirmed by the Supreme Court of .the United States by a tie vote, the Supreme Court of Porto Eico holds that the Minimum Wages Act of the Insular Legislature of June 9, 1919, is constitutional.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The fact that the said Minimum Wages Act gives no opportunity to the employer and the employee to be heard before the minimum wages is fixed does not necessarily make it unconstitutional, and in the absence of proof that a minimum wage is unreasonable or confiscatory of the employer !s property it must be presumed that the legislature investigated the conditions and determined for itself what is a reasonable minimum wage.</p> <p>Id. — The word “salario” used in the Minimum Wages Act corresponds to the word “wages” in English, meaning the stipend obtained by a workman, whether his output is measured by the. time or the amount of work.</p> <p>Id. — Considering the wording of the Minimum Wages Act it is necessary to conclude that the intention of the legislature was that working-women should have as near to living wages as possible; therefore the act is applicable whether the women work by the piece or by time.</p> <p>Id. — Industry.—The conversion of tobacco into cigars and other things is necessarily an industry and not an agricultural occupation.</p>

<p>Appeal from-a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Dominion Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Inheritance Tax — Exemption—Possessory Title. — In order to record a possessory title to a property acquired by paternal inheritance prior to the approval of Aet No. 62 of 1916, it is not necessary to exhibit a certificate of exemption from inheritance taxes, for the law in force at that time excepted from such taxes property passing to a child by inheritance.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Violation of the Minimum Wages Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Violation of the Motor Vehicles Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Violation of the Internal Revenue Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record of Title — Cautionary Notice — Prohibition to Alienate — Jurisdiction. — An order for the entry in a registry of a cautionary notice prohibiting the alienation of real property or real rights should be issued by the court of the district in which the registry is situated, at the instance of the interested party, although the prohibition to alienate may have been ordered by another eourt. This is required by article 97 of the Mortgage Law Regulations which has not been repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Curable Defect. — When a complaint is the basis for the entry in a registry of a notice prohibiting alienation, failure to copy the complaint literally into the order directed to the registrar is a curable defect.</p>

<p>Akpeai — BKrEE—Discretion oe Court. — When the Supreme Court finds that the ■ ■ questions discussed in a brief filed out of time are important and worthy of consideration it may, in the excereise of its discretion, admit the brief and overrule a motion to dismiss the appeal made by the appellee.</p>

<p>Automobile — Evidence.—It is very difficult for experienced persons to determine the speed of an automobile in miles or kilometers and more so for persons who, like the plaintiff and his witnesses in this ease, clearly were, not experienced, but a person of average intelligence may estimate and testify as to whether an automobile was running at “great speed” or at'“very great speed” and his testimony may give the court a basis upon which to reach a conclusion on that point.</p> <p>Id. — Negligence—Damages.—The owner of any motor vehicle is responsible for damages caused by the negligence of the driver or chauffeur while the owner is in the vehicle. This special case is governed by section 17 of Act No. 75 of 1916 and not by section 1804 of the Bevised Civil Cbde.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 519 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Divorce — Cruel Treatment — Condoned Cruelty. — A complaint from which it appears that the only acts of cruelty not condoned by the plaintiff were that while he was more or less indisposed his wife failed to lavish attentions upon him and to give him his medicine does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for divorce on the grounds of cruel treatment and grave injury.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—It is almost unanimously held that to constitute a revival of condoned cruelty it is not necessary that the words or conduct occurring afterward, independently of the previous ill-treatment, should constitute a cause for divorce, or entitle the petitioner to a decree of separation. The subsequent misconduct may be of slighter nature than that which would constitute original cruelty, since the apprehension of danger will be more justly excited. But, on the other hand, the same considerations which support the doctrine that condonation is less readily presumed against the wife than against the husband, have caused it to be held that a revival of condoned eruelty is less readily presumed against her than against him.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Tas Sale Deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court-of San Juan in a Prosecution for Violation of the Motor Vehicles Act.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Judge of Mayagiiez in a Foreclosure Proceeding.</p>