27 P.R.
Volume 27 — Puerto Rico Reports
345 opinions
- 27 P.R. 1People v. Riera (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 17Morales v. Romeu (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Proceeding: for Designation of Heirs.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 20Rojas, Randall & Co. v. Registrar of Guayama (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of tlie Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 25People v. Acosta (1919)
<p>Sanitation — Adulterated Milk — Evidence—Corroboration—Credibility.—The error alleged is that the judgment is contrary to the evidence, and the appellant insists that it would he dangerous to accept the uncorroborated evidence of an inspector of the Sanitation Department as proof of the sale of the milk, which is conceded to he adulterated. This is not one of the eases in which the law requires corroborative evidence. Whether an official has been induced by his zeal of office to testify falsely is a question of credibility and, according to the repeated decisions of this court, such credibility is a matter for the trial court.</p>
- 27 P.R. 26People v. Rosa (1919)
<p>Evidence — Contradictory Evidence. — The weighing of the evidence by the lower court will not be disturbed on appeal whether the testimony of the witnesses is conflicting or the testimony of one witness is self-contradictory, unless it is 'Shown that the lower court was actuated by passion, prejudice, or similar element.</p>
- 27 P.R. 27Muñiz v. El Zenit (1919)
<p>Judgment by Default — Frivolous Motion. — As a general rule, when a motion not frivolous on its face is pending, a default judgment for the plaintiff cannot be entered; but when the motion appears on its face to be frivolous and it clearly appears that the motion should not be sustained, or when the ruling on the motion in any way could not affect the right of the plaintiff to proceed with the cause, it is not reversible error to enter a judgment by default.</p> <p>I». — Opening Default — Change otf Venue — Pleading.—The refusal of the district court to open the default on the' ground that a motion for change of venue was pending when the judgment was rendered, is not error warranting the reversal of the judgment when it appears that a previous motion to quash the summons had been overruled as frivolous; that the motion for change of venue was not accompanied by an affidavit of merits, and that the defendant at no time suggested to the lower court that it had any defense on the merits. In the circumstances of this case, inadvertence, mistake, or excusable neglect cannot be urged for the first time on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Complaint—Accounting.—The default of a defendant admits all matters well pleaded in the complaint. • After examining the facts stated in the complaint and set forth in the opinion in this ease, it was held that no accounting was necessary, bnt that the facts themselves were sufficient to constitute a cause of action.</p>
- 27 P.R. 32Nido & Co. v. Albir Alicea (1919)
<p>Injunction — Eight op Way — Immemorial Use — Prescription.—In this ease tho plaintiffs, as lessees of a certain rural property, brought proceedings to enjoin the owner of the adjoining tenement from passing over the said property. The defendant answered and the district court dismissed the petition on the ground that the road in dispute is a servitude imposed on the tenement leased by the plaintiffs in favor of the defendant as the owner of the dominant tenement. On appeal from that judgment it was held that this case being governed by the laws in force in Porto Eico prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, defendant was entitled to plead the use of the road from time immemorial to establish his right of way and to prove, as he did, such use by the testimony of witnesses, one of whom is between sixty-five and sixty-seven and the other- between seventy-six and seventy-seven years of ago, and whose testimony covered a period of much more than forty years.</p>
- 27 P.R. 36Trías v. Rossy (1919)
<p>Certiorari — Attachment.'—Although there are obvious defects or irregularities in an interlocutory proceeding in the lower court to obtain and levy an attachment on defendant's property to secure the effectiveness of such final judgment as may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, these cannot be successfully attacked on review by certiorari when, as in this case, the defendant withdrew the objection made thereto in the court below. Courts of review are not required on .certiorari to scrutinize matters expressly acquiesced in by the petitioners in the lower court, with a view to drawing nice distinctions between matters of procedure that may be so waived and jurisdictional defects that- cannot be cured by consent. This principle is equally applicable to general appellate proceedings as well as to proceedings for review by certiorari.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Venue—Transfer and Sale of Property — Notice.—When, as in this case, an attachment is levied on perishable property belonging to the defendant in a district other than' that in which the principal action and the interlocutory proceeding for attachment are prosecuted, and the court sustains a motion that the property be transferred from the district in which it is found to the district in which the action is pending and sold on the ground that it is susceptible of deterioration, the order for the transfer and sale of said attached perishable property is null and' void unless there has been strict compliance with the provisions of section 14 of the act to secure the effectiveness of judgments, which requires that the adverse party shall be notified by summons of all steps taken in the course of the -proceeding for the attachment of defendant’s property for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of such final judgment as may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.</p>
- 27 P.R. 43Barreal v. Labiosa (1919)
<p>Habeas Corpus — Murder—Bail—Capital Punishment. — It being clearly provided by section 2 of the Organic Act, which went into effect on 'March 2, 1917, that all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great, and the petitioner not being accused of an offense punishable by death because such punishment, pursuant to our amended Penal Code, no longer exists, it having been abolished by Act No. 36 of November 30, 1917, of the Legislative Assembly of Porto Rico, until April 30, 1$21, he is entitled to be admitted to bail pending his trial for the crime of murder in the first degree with which he is charged.</p>
- 27 P.R. 45Martínez v. Crosas (1919)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 47García v. Fernández Gómez (1919)
<p>Appeal — Jurisdiction—Amount in Controversy. — In this case, which had its origin in the Municipal Court of Oaguas, the appellees moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the following grounds: (1) That, as alleged by them and found by the lower court, the value of the property affected by the mortgage whose annulment is sought by the plaintiff-appellees is less than $300, therefore this court has no jurisdiction; (2) that the defendants have not prosecuted the appeal with due diligence. Held: That the mortgage having been created to secure a loan of $251 plus $100 for costs in case of foreclosure and the defendant-appellant having acquired the mortgaged property for $355.65, it should be concluded that the amount involved in the action exceeds $300, and' therefore that, pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal; and, further, that dismissal of the appeal is not justified on the ground of failure to prosecute with due diligence because .the appellant acted always with the consent of the lower court and filed the transcript of the record before the hearing on the motion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 50Alfaro v. Alonso (1919)
<p>Injunction to Becover Possession — Joinder of Actions. — Where, as in this case, an action is brought under Act .No. 43 of 1913 for the recovery of the possession of real property, no other action should he joined with it.</p> <p>Id. — Conclusions of Law. — Conclusions of law are permissible in a complaint if the facts on which they are based are alleged also.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.—As the only issue in'this case is whether the plaintiff was deprived of the physical possession of the property by forcible acts of the defendant, it was not necessary to prove the right under which the plaintiff held such physical possession.</p> <p>Id. — -Id.—Contradictory Evidence. — The Supreme Court will not disturb the findings on the evidence made by the lower court unless it be shown that the lower court was influenced by passion, prejudice, or partiality, or that it committed manifest error.</p>
- 27 P.R. 53Harris Co. v. Barbosa (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 55Soto v. Ortiz (1919)
<p>Divorce — Kecokcimation.—In ease of reconciliation tho plaintiff cannot continue exercising the rights which he may have, but is at liberty to file a new suit for causes that have occurred after the reconciliation, and in such case may allege the former eauses to corroborate the new action. Sec. 172, Eev. Civ. Code.</p>
- 27 P.R. 57Sánchez v. Atlas Commercial Co. (1919)
<p>Change of Venue — Convenience of Witnesses — Premature Question. — At tbe time of demurring to the complaint the defendant moved for a change of venue. Plaintiff opposed the motion alleging that the convenience of the witnesses required that the action should be tried in the district where it was brought, and the court sustained the objection on that ground and denied the motion for change of venue. Held: That aeeording to the jurisprudence established in the case of Torres et dl. v. Torres ei dl., 16 P. R. E. 334, the question of the convenience of the witnesses was raised and decided prematurely, because, as the defendant had not answered the complaint, no question of fact had arisen which required the examination of witnesses.</p>
- 27 P.R. 59Salazar v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Denying Admission to Record of a Deed of Sale and Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 64González Franqui v. Brice (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Annulment of a Deed and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 69Ninlliat v. Suriñach (1919)
<p>Bes Judicata. — When there are two or more issues in a ease and all are deeided in favor of the same litigant, the court may rest its decision on them jointly, in which event the judgment is treated as conclusive upon both.</p> <p>Id. — Where some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both actions has been determined in a former suit and the same fact or question is again at issue between the same parties, its adjudication in the first, if properly presented, will be conclusive of the same question in the latter suit, without regard to whether the eause of action is the same or not, or whether the second suit involves the same or a different subjeet-matter, or whether or not it is in the same form of proceeding.</p> <p>Id. — Parties.—1The mere joining, in a second suit, of a .nominal party who is not interested in the subjeet-matter in litigation does not prevent a prior adjudication from being a bar.</p>
- 27 P.R. 74Fernández v. Ruiz Soler (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 78Carrero v. Diez (1919)
<p>Appeal — Workmen's Relief Commission. — The time allowed for appealing to the Supreme Court from judgments of the district courts on appeal from decisions of the Workmen’s Relief Commission is one month, for it should be governed by the provisions of subdivisión 1 of section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the act of March 11, 1908, in connection with Act No. 70 of March 9, 1911.</p>
- 27 P.R. 81Succession of Colón v. Colón (1919)
<p>Unlawful Detainer — Conflict of Titles — Ordinary Action. — Questions of own--ersbip cannot be considered in a summary action of unlawful detainer, but only in the broad latitude of an ordinary action, for an action of unlawful detainer is not available for asserting rights more or less open to controversy. It is a special proceeding whose only purpose is to recover the possession of .real property by ejecting therefrom a person detaining it without title.</p>
- 27 P.R. 83Nazario v. Santos (1919)
<p>Costs in Civil Cases — Public Officials. — Aet No. 17 of 1915, regulating the collection of fees and costs in civil cases in the district and municipal courts, contains no provision exempting or excusing public officials who may be parties to a civil suit from the payment of the fees prescribed.</p> <p>Id. — Certiorari—Appeal—-Dismissal of Appeal. — Under section 6 pf Aet No. 17 of 1935, a notice of appeal in a certiorari proceeding which does not bear internal-revenue stamps showing the payment of the fees prescribed by the act is null and void, and if an appeal is presented on the basis of such notice, a motion of the appellee for dismissal of the appeal on that ground should be sustained.</p>
- 27 P.R. 85Chiqués v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Will.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 87Martínez v. Crosas (1919)
<p>Administration — Adversary Action — Ex Parte Proceeding — Appeal—Procedure. — When opposition is made to a petition for the appointment of an administrator the suit becomes an adversary one and an appeal in such a case should be governed by sections 297 and 298 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See Martines v. Martines, 26 P. R. R. 142.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Id.—Jurisdiction—Stay of Execution. — An appeal to this court from a judgment of a district court in an em parte proceeding which by reason of the opposition of a lawful party has become an adversary action, when, as here, an administrator is appointed and the opposition thereto is overruled, deprives the district court of jurisdiction to take further action in the case until the appeal is disposed of by this court, execution of the judgment appealed from being stayed meanwhile.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Security Bond — Supersedeas.—In an appeal to the Circuit Court ,--.of Appeals from a judgment of this court the appiellant must give bond, and in order that the bond may operate as a supersedeas, it must respond for damages as well as costs.</p> <p>Ip. — Id.—Id.—Certiorari.—When the bond given by an administrator is objected to for the first time in a supplementary brief filed three days before the hearing of the case in this court in a certiorari proceeding, without any . mention of the said bond or its alleged defects in the petition, without any . showing that the affidavit of justification of the sureties did not comply substantially with the statutory requirements and without any showing of prejudice, the objection comes too late and does not demand serious eon- ■ ■ sideration in a certiorari proceeding.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Id.—Matters to be reviewed by certiorari must have been mentioned in the petition, objected to in the lower court and not susceptible of effective review on appeal.</p>
- 27 P.R. 95Monllor v. Acosta (1919)
<p>Absconding Debtor — Arrest in Civil Action — Affidavit.—An affidavit of the plaintiff setting forth that ho knew of his own knowledge, by confession of the defendant as well as from the press, that with intent to defraud the af-fiant the defendant was about to leave the Island of Porto Eico for Cuba, where he intended to reside in the future, without leaving any responsibility in the Island, is sufficient to support a motion for a warrant for the arrest of the defendant as an absconding debtor.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Execution of Warrant — Certiorari.—The refusal of the district court to quash the proceeding on the plea that the warrant of arrest was not executed by the. proper official is no ground for granting a writ of certiorari, for the appellant had other remedies.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Imprisonment for Debt. — Statutes authorizing arrest in civil actions should be strictly construed, but they do not prevent the strong arm of the law from restraining absconding debtors notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt.</p>
- 27 P.R. 98Succession of del Rosario v. Rosaly (1919)
<p>Ejectment — -Pleading—Prescription—Hypothesis—Answer.—A plea of prescription may be based on a hypothetical fact, for the evidence may show it to be an absolute and positive fact. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the defendant may set forth by answer as many defenses and counterclaims as he may have, and under such a general statute a hypothetical plea may be set up without being open to the objection that thereby the defendant elects at his pleasure the field of action for the controversy.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Demurrer—Answer.—When the faets alleged in the answer have a prima facie tendency to defeat the action a plea that the answer is not responsive to the complaint will not be sustained.</p> <p>Id- — Id.—Area—Evidence—Possession.-—Where the property sued for is of less area than the property held by the defendant and yet he pleads prescription because the former might be included within the latter, evidence is admissible to prove possession of the larger property.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—General Denial — Evidence.—In an action of ejectment where the complaint is drawn up in the usual form, alleging that the plaintiff is the owner in fee of the property described and that defendant is unlawfully in possession of it, a general denial allows the admission of evidence of all that may tend to destroy the title which the plaintiff is seeking to establish in the action; but when such evidence is prima facie immaterial the court errs in admitting it, unless its materiality is shown by other evidence.</p>
- 27 P.R. 110Franceschi v. Sepúlveda (1919)
<p>Appearance — Summons—Warrantor.—When an attorney appears before the court in behalf of one of the parties and moves that a third person be summoned as warrantor, such appearance is deemed general and equivalent to the personal summoning of the party so appearing. He is then subject to the jurisdiction of the court for all subsequent procedure, but not in such a retroactive manner as to validate previous void procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Default.—The general appearance of a party does not prevent his moving to open a default previously entered; therefore it is premature to plead that because the time for answering the complaint had expired the defendant had lost his right to move that the warrantor be summoned.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—The summoning of the warrantor with notice of the complaint is intended tó produce only tbe effects prescribed by the code as between the defendant and the person from whom he derived his right and does not affect the plaintiff.</p>
- 27 P.R. 114Morell v. Registrar of Arecibo (1919)
<p>Record op Title — Commercial Transactions — Purcfase and Sale op Real Property. — Under article 2 of the Code of Commerce of 1885, now in force in Porto Rico, the purchase and sale of real property may he deemed a commercial transaction, wherefore a contract of this character entered into by the manager of a mercantile partnership who is authorized to sign the firm name and to execute public instruments, as in the present ease, is recordable in the registry of property if it conforms to the formalities prescribed by the Mortgage Law for the recording of contracts.</p>
- 27 P.R. 116People v. Bracero (1919)
<p>Crime Against Public Decenot — House of III Fame. — An information'that fails to allege that the house of ill fame kept by the accused is resorted to for the purposes of prostitution or lewdness is fatally defective beeause it does not fully charge the criminal act defined in section 287 of the Penal Oode.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Information.—Section 287 of the Penal Oode contemplates, two methods of committing the crime whieh it penalizes: (1) keeping a house of ill fame which is resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, and (2) wilfully residing in such house. It was held after an examination of the information that it did not charge said crime in either aspeet.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Construction of Law. — In order that a house may be considered a house of ill fame, it must be resorted to more than once for purposes of prostitution and lewdness by others than the proprietor, but it is not necessary that it be used habitually or for a considerable length of time for sueh purpose. Numerous illicit acts committed with the proprietor do not of themselves convert the house into a house of ill fame.</p>
- 27 P.R. 122Díaz v. Zequeira (1919)
<p>Appeal — Jurisdiction—Default—Writ of Prohibition. — The appeal taken by the plaintiff from the default judgment rendered against defendant does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear and dispose of a motion by the defendant to set aside the default and the judgment entered against him, such motion being equivalent to a motion for a new trial.</p>
- 27 P.R. 125Ortiz v. Texidor (1919)
<p>Cause op Action — Remedies—Pleading.—Causes of action are clearly distinguishable from the remedial rights to which they give rise, and the same cause of action may give rise to several remedial rights. A complaint may, without stating more than one independent cause of action, require a determination of various matters as incidental to the principal relief demanded and will be regarded as stating but one cause of action although it may pray for different and varying forms of relief, where they are all germane to the vindication of a single primary right. Thus, in a suit for specific performance of a contract to convey land the complaint states but a single cause of action, although it seeks both specific performance of the contract and a recovery for rents and profits. ,.. -</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.-—-Parties—Joinder op Causes op Action. — A multiplicatipn of parties does not necessarily increase the number of causes of action,' and a cdrii: plaint may state but a single .cause of .actipn although it affects- ,&s number :u.f persons, either as plaintiffs or as defendants, or may affect distinct parcels of land .separately owned by different persons. This is particularly true in actions of an equitable nature which require a working out and adjustment of the rights and liabilities of a number of persons, and the exercise of different forms of equitable power and the granting of different forms of relief, it being proper in such actions to join as parties all persons interested, and unnecessary that they should be affected in the same manner or to the same extent.</p>
- 27 P.R. 132Díaz v. Balseiro (1919)
<p>Appead from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Nullity, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 138Municipality of Quebradillas v. Executive Secretary (1919)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Mandamus against tlie Executive Secretary of Porto Eico.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 183Portilla v. Garcia (1919)
<p>Compromise — Attorney and Client. — Section 9 of the act of March 8, 1906, regulating the practice of the profession of law in Porto Rico and repealing former statutes governing the same, refers only to the rights of an attorney in relation to proceedings followed in a court of law; and this right does not authorize the attorney to' "bind Ms client by compromise or settlement, or in any other way, in connection with matters independent of such proceedings and which affect the subject-matter of the suit rather than the remedy. Morales v. Oliver, 24 P. R. R. 563.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Judgment.—When a compromise is affected by a condition foreign to the complaint the attorney who agrees to compromise acts beyond his authority as representative or attorney of his client and the judgment entered in such circumstances may be set aside.</p>
- 27 P.R. 188Succession of Medina v. Registrar of Guayama (1918)
<p>Becord op Title — Dominion Title — Conflicting Becords.- — A. dominion title decreed by a court of jurisdiction to a property which is already recorded as belonging to another person is not recordable in the registry of property.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Possessory Title. — Article 393 of the Mortgage Law refers only to possessory title proceedings and there is no provision of law making it extensive to dominion title proceedings.</p>
- 27 P.R. 192Pacheco v. Cuevas Zequeira (1919)
<p>Mandamus — Time Within Which District and Municipal Courts Shall Render Their Judgments or Decisions in All Civil Cases. — According to the jurisprudence established in the ease of Municipality of Quebradillos v. Executive Secretary of Porto Meo, decided March 11, 1919, H. B. 79, entitled "An Act to fix the time within which district and municipal courts shall render their judgments or decisions in all civil eases, and for other purposes,” approved by the House of Representatives and by the Senate of Porto Rico, is a law because it' was not returned by the Governor to the Legislature within the period of ten days, excluding Sundays, prescribed by section 34 of the Organic Act, inasmuch as the Legislature did not adjourn but only took a recess on November 26, 1917, to reconvene on February 4, 1919, the return of the bill by the Governor not having been prevented by such recess.</p> <p>Id. — Adjective Law. — Being a law of procedure, the act in question was applicable to an action previously heard but not yet decided, the court being allowed the full time granted by the act to render judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Absolute Right — Refusal of Court. — When the parties have an absolute right to the rendition of judgment by a court a writ of mandamus will lie, but this writ will not be issued when its effect would be to review or control the discretion of a lower court. Tn order that the wrii may be issued the petitioners must establish a clear right to the remedy. A prior motion must have been made to the court a quo and the said court must have refused to act.</p>
- 27 P.R. 195People v. Oriols (1919)
<p>Assault and Battery — Aggravation.—Where a complaint relates facts which constitute the aggravated circumstance defined in subdivision 8 of section 6 of the Assault and Battery Act, that circumstance may be considered against the defendant although the complaint may state that the aggravated circumstance consists in the fact that the victim was a female and the aggressor an adult male.</p> <p>Id. — Deadly Weapon — Identification.—A deadly weapon may be defined as any instrument that will cause death or grave physical injury when used in the usual manner that its form or construction suggests, and when the weapon with which the battery was committed is identified the determination of whether or not it is a deadly iveapon is a question of law regarding which it is unnessary to introduce evidence, unless the nature of the weapon is doubtful or its deadly character depends on the manner in which it is used, in which event the question becomes one of fact and a matter of evidence which must be left to the consideration of the jury or the court, as the case may be.</p>
- 27 P.R. 199Matta v. People (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of Mr. Justice Hutchison in a Habeas Corpus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 200Bardeguez v. Registrar of Buayama (1919)
<p>Record oe Title — Will—Witnesses.—Failure to state in a will that at least two of the witnesses knew the testatrix does not make the will a mere mil-lity a priori. Such an omission is not a defect preventing the recording of the will, for it may "be considered as supplied by the attestation of the notary that all the legal formalities had been complied with, which include the fact that at least two of the witnesses knew the testatrix, and also because questions regarding the validity of a will must be raised by the interested parties.</p>
- 27 P.R. 203Carlo v. Ferrer (1919)
<p>Pleading — Complaint—Inheritance.—When it is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is the owner hy inheritance of a rural property of seven acres therein described it is sufficient that the plaintiff allege to establish his ownership that of the seven acres his predecessor in title had acquired two acres by inheritance from his mother, four by purchase and one by inheritance from his father.</p> <p>Id. — Parties—Multiplicity oe Actions. — All persons who have an interest in the subject-matter of the suit that may be affected by the judgment are necessary parties. This rule is based on the principle which aims to prevent subsequent litigation and a multiplicity of actions by the determination of all the rights of all the parties who can or may be affected by a judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Joinder.—When several causes of action are closely related among themselves because some depend on others there is no objection to sustaining a joinder of them.</p> <p>Id. — Submission.—The right of a defendant to exact that the causes of action he stated separately must he exercised before answering, for otherwise the defendant submits to a trial under the original form of the complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Amendment — Reconsideration. — T'he trial court does not commit error in entering an order setting aside a previous order requiring the plaintiff to amend his complaint, for it is so authorized by subdivision 3 of section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Continuance—Unpreparedness.—A defendant who does not move for a " continuance before submitting his evidence, notwithstanding the express offer of the court to set the case for another day after the plaintiff had rested in order to give the defendant ample opportunity to prepare his defense, nor moves for such continuance after examining his own evidence, cannot plead nnpreparedness.</p> <p>Id. — Partition—Evidence.—It not having been alleged in the complaint that a deed of partition of the estate had been executed, but only that the estate had heen divided among the heirs, evidence was admissible under that allegation to prove the partition and division of the estate, although such partition did not appear in a private or public document.</p> <p>Id.' — Evidence—Will—Frivolous Pleading. — The right asserted hy the plaintiff’ in the properties left hy his wife being derived from a will, the allegation that the will is not admissible in evidence is frivolous.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Tax Receipt — Prejudice.'—The admission in evidence of a tax receipt that has no relation to the property described in the complaint does not of itself justify a reversal of the judgment, unless it is shown to have been prejudicial to the defendants.</p> <p>Private Instrument — Third Person. — There is no provision of the Civil Code positively requiring that a private instrument be executed before a notary public by the parties to it in order that it may prejudice a third person.</p> <p>Carlo v. Ferrer et al. [Yol. 27, P. K. E.</p> <p>Public Sale — Third Person. — One who purchases a property at public sale knowing beforehand that the property belongs to a person other than the one in whose name the sale is made is not a third person.</p> <p>New T!rial— Evidence — 'Prejudice. — The defendants moved for a new trial, alleging, among other grounds, that the case had not been continued, on account of which, their principal witness not being present when the witnesses for plaintiff testified, they were unable to cross-examine the said witnesses on facts which were best known to the absent witness. Held: That the defendants were under the obligation to state what additional facts they could have produced in evidence by cross-examination or what objection they could have made to the credibility of the plaintiff's witnesses, and their failure to do so left the court without knowledge as to what prejudice was suffered by the defendants, if any.</p> <p>Amendment — Discretion dip Court — Presumption.—The authority of the courts to allow amendments to the pleadings under sections 136, 137 and 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure is discretional and unless an abuse of discretion is shown the presumption is that the discretion was properly exercised.</p>
- 27 P.R. 228Aponte v. Atlas Commercial Co. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao' in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 231Contreras v. Registrar of Humacao (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Deed of Partition With Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 232Acosta v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Peed of Purchase and Sale with a Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 234Rodríguez v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing in Part to Record a Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 237Jones v. Caneja (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 243People v. Portela (1919)
<p>New Trial — Former Jeopardy. — In a new trial the accused is estopped from pleading former jeopardy hy reason of a prior conviction when the judgment of conviction has been reversed for error on appeal or writ of error.</p> <p>False Representation — Information.—An information which purports to charge false representation, but does not contain a clear description of the fraudulent pretense and does not allege that by reason of the representations of the accused the witness was induced to part with something of value which came into the possession of the accused, is insufficient.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Intent.—The evidence here showed that the prosecuting witness gave the accused a certificate of deposit for $500 from which to collect a debt of $43 and in exchange received from the accused checks on the Cré-dito y Ahorro Poneeño for $300, $100 and $57. The checks for $300 and $57 were paid, but the check for $300 was not paid, for when it was presented for collection the accused had only $27 in the bank and that had been attached. From December 21, 1917, when the check was drawn, until January 3, 1918, the accused had sufficient money in the bank to meet the cheek, except on December 31, when he had only $242.58 to his credit. Held: That these facts do not show an intent on the part of the defendnat to defraud the prosecuting witness.</p>
- 27 P.R. 246Echevarría v. Registrar of Guayama (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Possessory Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 250Velázquez v. Registrar of Guayama (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Suspending the Entry of a Lis Pendens Notice.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 253Fernández v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Eefus-ing to Eecord a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 254Buonomo v. Succession of Juncos (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 257Mundo v. Agosto (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 259Wolkers v. Masson (1919)
<p>Judgment — Opinion.—Generally the opinion should not he relied on as a part of the judgment, hut the -written document purporting to he the judgment should contain all the awards, without reference to other documents. Hence the awards which appear in the opinion hut are not contained in the judgment are without lawful effect.</p> <p>Divorce — Alimony-—Attorney Dees. — A wife who brings an action for divorce has a right to claim from her husband, in a collateral action for alimony, the payment of attorney fees pendente lite, and the amount thereof is in the sound discretion of the court. Her attorney is entitled to receive pay for his services even if he loses the suit.</p>
- 27 P.R. 261Wolkers v. Texidor (1919)
- 27 P.R. 262Andino v. Canales (1919)
<p>Unlawful Detainee — Title of Ownership. — An action of unlawful detainer is a special proceeding whose only object is to recover the possession of real property by evicting therefrom the person who detains it without title. When the defendant sets up any title for the possession and supports it by any evidence, judgment should not be rendered against him, but the parties should litigate the title in an ordinary action before an aetion of unlawful detainer can be maintained.</p>
- 27 P.R. 266Ortiz v. Alvarado (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 271López v. Central Eureka, Inc. (1919)
<p>Unlawful Detainer.— Lease — Purchase of Leased Property..— If the purchaser of a leased property when the lease is not recorded in the registry of property does not promise to respect the lease, although he may have knowledge of it he is not hound hy the terms of the lease and may bring an action of unlawful detainer against the lessee in case the latter refuses to surrender the property to him.</p>
- 27 P.R. 275Colón v. Pou (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 278Carlo v. Bayaney (1919)
<p>Venue — Change <op Venue — Residence—Convenience op Witnesses. — 'When tie defendant demurs to tie complaint and at tie same time moves for eiange of venue on tie ground of residence, tie plaintiff cannot oppose tie eiange iy setting up tie convenience of iis witnesses, for until an answer is filed no question of fact is before tie court.</p>
- 27 P.R. 281Roig v. Pérez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 284García v. Rodríguez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Petition for a "Writ of Injunction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 288People v. Camuñas (1919)
<p>Pure Food — Adulterated Milk — Information.—It is now a public offense in Porto Rico to adulterate or dilute milk with the intent to offer it for sale, to cause or permit such milk to be offered for sale, or to sell, or offer or keep it for sale; but having such milk with an intent undiscovered by any act jf selling it as pure milk is not an offense.</p>
- 27 P.R. 290Díaz v. Barceló (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Motion by the Appellee for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 292Mejía v. Suárez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama in Injunction Proceedings for the Recovery of Possession.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 296People v. Banks (1919)
<p>Evidence — Incriminating Testimony. — The fact that the testimony of a witness tends to incriminate him does not entitle the parties to object to the evidence so introduced, for the privilege of refusing to testify pertains to the witness and not to the parties, and this rule is not varied by the fact that the witness may have testified under compulsion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 300Nadal v. Miranda (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 305People v. Cordero (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for the Violation of Section 553 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 309People v. Márquez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 310South Porto Rico Sugar Co. v. Sepúlveda (1919)
<p>PetitioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 314De Nadal v. Mari Bros. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.-</p>
- 27 P.R. 315Ex parte Otero v. People (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Designation of Heirs.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 321Laíno v. Blondet (1919)
<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Griayama in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>Motion by the Defendant for Change of Venue.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 325Martínez v. Registrar of Humacao (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing in Part to Record a Dominion Title.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 327Buitrago v. Gilot (1919)
<p>Taxes — Usufruct—Nude Ownership. — When, the nude ownership of a property is in one person and the usufruct in another, it is the duty of the usufructu-ary to pay the annual taxes levied on said property.</p>
- 27 P.R. 333Cabassa v. Reyes (1919)
<p>Unlawful Detainer — Ambiguity.—There is no ambiguity in a complaint in unlawful detainer in which the plaintiff alleges that he is the owner of the property described and that the house occupied by the defendant at sufferance is situated on the said property.</p> <p>Id. — Id. — Demurrer — Description of Property. — A general demurrer on the ground of insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action does not lie against a complaint in unlawful detainer in which, although the house whose possession is sought to be recovered is not described, the land on which the house is situated is described with sufficient clearness as to enable the officer of the court to execute a judgment of unlawful detainer.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Aider—Complaint.—Any defect in a complaint, such as failure to describe clearly the property in litigation, is cured by the answer when it supplies the deficiency in the complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Title—Negative Certificate. — In order to prove his ownership of tlie property in litigation in an action of unlawful detainer the plaintiff need only present a copy of his title recorded in the registry, and it is not necessary for him to present a certificate of the registrar to the effect that there is no entry in the registry journal of the presentation of any deed conveying the property to another person.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Wlien tlie plaintiff not only presents his title deed to the property as recorded in tlie registry but also shows that with his own money and materials he constructed the house occupied and held rent free by the defendant at the sufferance of the plaintiff, this is sufficient evidence to support a judgment of unlawful detainer.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Appeal.—The conflicting evidence as to the terms under which the defendant occupied the house in litigation having been adjusted in favor of the plaintiff, this court will not disturb the judgment of the lower court unless it is shown that its decision was erroneous.</p> <p>Id. — Costs and Attorney Fees — Discretion of Court. — According to section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended on April 12, 1917, as an action of unlawful detainer is a special proceeding the successful litigant is entitled' to costs and, at the discretion of the court, to attorney fees.</p>
- 27 P.R. 337Fajardo Sugar Co. v. Torres (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Unlawful Detainer.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 339Ortiz v. Registrar of Guayama (1919)
<p>Possessory Title — Ad joining .Owners — Summons—Service.—There is no statute requiring that the summons issued by the clerk of the court to the adjoining owners shall be attached to the possessory title proceeding. It is sufficient that the record contain the affidavit or certificate of the process server.</p> <p>Id.- — Return op Service.' — Although in this ease the server of the summons did not state in his return the place, day and hour of service, these are minor defects which, as they were passed over both by the judge and the district attorney, can only be raised in an ordinary suit by some one really interested and who shows that he was prejudiced by such failure of statement.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Affidavits op Witnesses. — In taking evidence in a possessory title proceeding the witnesses should personally appear in the court having jurisdiction of the proceeding. Affidavits made before the clerk of the court are without effect although ratified by the witnesses in open court, as occurred in this ease.</p> <p>Id. — Appearance.—In a possessory title proceeding the district attorney and the adjoining owners should be given a reasonable time to appear before the court, and one day is not a reasonable time.</p> <p>Id. — 'Possession.—As the decision of- the court in a possessory title proceeding is limited to the question of possession, the registrar need not inquire as to the rights of the grandmother and grandchildren among themselves.</p> <p>Id. — "Will.—Whether or not it is proved that a will has been revoked is not an inquiry for a possessory title proceeding. The possessor is not bound to show that the will under whieh he claims has not been revoked or that it was duly executed with all the formalities of law.</p>
- 27 P.R. 342Riefkohl v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Be-fnsing to Becord a Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 346Morales v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record oe Title — Dominion Title — Summons.—When a dominion title judgment gives the names of the persons composing the lawful succession of the former owners of the property claimed by the petitioners under title of inheritance and further states that the former owners of the property wore summoned, the registrar is not justified in denying the record on the grounds that it does not appear from the judgment that the persons from whom the property was acquired were summoned, or that the petitioners arc the sole heirs of the former so as to avoid the necessity of summoning such successors in interest.</p>
- 27 P.R. 347Torres v. Renta (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for the Beeovery of a Condominium.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 354González v. Malgor (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 356Beauchamp v. Registrar of Aguadilla (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing’ to Record a Deed of Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 358Polanco v. Goffinet (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Annulment of Foreclosure Proceedings.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.'</p>
- 27 P.R. 361Martí v. Rivera (1919)
<p>Damages — Seduction—Minor—Consent.—A minor who has attained the age of eighteen years eannot maintain an action to recover damages from the man ■who seduced her with her consent. Only a minor of fourteen years or younger ean maintain such an action, notwithstanding her consent.</p>
- 27 P.R. 363Goble & Jiménez v. Truyol & Co. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guay ama in an Action for Damages for Breach of Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 364González v. Benítez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Nullity of Contract, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 368Somontte v. Mimoso (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Hnmacao in a Petition for a Writ of Injunction to Recover Possession of Real Property.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 373Saint Jean Sugar Co. v. Figuerola (1919)
<p>Injunction — Contract.—When a party, alleging damages by the breach of a verbal agreement for the milling of sugar cane, applies for an order restraining the sale and delivery of sugar cane to a rival mill and compelling the specific enforcement of said agreement, he must shorr a clear right to such extraordinary relief.</p>
- 27 P.R. 375People v. Mallens (1919)
<p>Information — Misdemeanor—Commitment.—Pursuant to the act of May 30, .1901, amending section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the fact that a justice of the peace had not committed the accused before the information for a misdemeanor ivas filed is no ground for quashing- the information on the defendant's motion.</p> <p>Dismissal of Prosecution.. — When the cause is set for trial within the 120 days referred to in subdivision 2 of section 448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but is continued on the defendant’s motion and the trial is held after the expiration of the period, the defendant is not entitled to a dismissal.</p> <p>Libel.. — The defendant in this case was charged with having published the fallowing, among other things, in a jn-inted handbill: “* * * two unfortunate laborers were also victims of the horrible massacre perpetrated by the heroes in the service of the interests protected by the Governor’’; and “* * * that the Governor allows his myrmidons to perform their work of extermination on a defenseless people”; and “once more the tyramiy of capitalism receives the decided support of the Governor and the prolcr tarian victims are driven to suicide, slaughtered hy the .police, tortured and annihilated without pity. The Governor- has promised and ‘given his protection to the steamship companies and to the Chamber of Commerce so tifft they might reduce the striking laborers to impotence. Prom that monipqt the plot against the strikers acquired sufficient strength " and as a final sequenee there the trails of horrible crimes are fuming.’-’ Held: That-tbfe expressions quoted ascribe acts to the Governor of this Island-.which tend to impugn his integrity and honesty, exposing him to public contempt.</p> <p>Id. — Complaint.—It is not necessary to .transcribe into an ,information all of flig -handbill, book, or newspaper containing-the libelous matter:.-1 It-'as suffieite'nt to copy therein that part upon which, the information is bated: . l</p> <p>Id. — Pleading.—The prosecution 'is not obliged to allege or prove that the libelous words had been held to be sneli by the judgment of any court.</p>
- 27 P.R. 378People v. Turner (1919)
<p>Daylight Saving — Closing Law — Federal Law. — The "Act to save daylight and to provide standard time for the United States, ’ ’ enacted by the • Congress of the United States on March 19, 1.918, is not applicable to Porto Rieo, for although section 2 of said act refers to any other insular possession of the United States, it is only for the purpose of explaining that the law is applicable to public carriers doing business between the various States or between a State and any of the Territories of the United States or between a State or the Territory of Alaska and any of the insular possessions of the United States or any foreign country. Therefore, the ax^pellee did not violate section 553 of the Penal Code of Porto Meo in having Ms establishment open at. 6.35 p. m. on the day referred to in the complaint according to the said federal statute,, or at 5.35 p. m. according to the time of the sixtieth meridian.</p>
- 27 P.R. 381Nin v. Registrar of San German (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property Be-fusing to Becord a Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The respondent appeared by brief.</p>
- 27 P.R. 383Royal Bank of Canada v. McCormick (1919)
<p>Appeal — Transcript of Record — Brief.—If the transcript is not clearly written and tlie brief of the appellant does not contain a specific assignment of errors separate from the discussion, the Supreme Court, in accordance with Buie 43, will consider only the most important matters in order to show that they are not errors or are not fundamental.</p> <p>Debtor — Surety—Éxcussion.—The allegation of a complaint that the debtor had no property from a time previous to the maturity of the nole is a sufficient compliance with the rule that the surety cannot be sued until all the remedies against the debtor have been exhausted, especially as the surety is under the obligation to point out the realizable property of the debtor.</p> <p>Foreign Corporation — Promissory Note — Evidence.—As the Treasurer of Porto Bico issues licenses to foreign corporations, his certificate is admissible in evidence to show that a foreign corporation has authority to do business, albeit the lack of a license would not prevent a foreign bank from suing on a promissory note.</p> <p>Promissory Note — Identification—Evidence.—After an expert has identified a promissory note, without objection to his testimony, .the said promissory note cannot be attacked on the ground of its not having been identified.</p> <p>Id. — PiVRT Payment — Remission—Evidence.—If an action is brought for less than the face of a note no objection can be made to a remission and no proof of remission is necessary. Moreover the presentation of a note in the hands of any holder puts the burden on the defendant to show that the note has been paid.</p>
- 27 P.R. 386Catinchi v. Catinchi (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>Tbe. faets are stated in tbe opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 393Alomar v. Bou (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for Nullity of a Deed, etc. (Change of venue.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 395Körber & Co., Inc. v. Aboy, Vidal & Co., Inc. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Damages for Breach of Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 404Palou v. Aspurúa (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for an Accounting.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 410Bravo v. Bravo (1919)
<p>Accounting — Guardian—Pleading.—In an action for an accounting it is not enough tliat tho plaintiff allege only the failure to render an accounting, hut if the guardian refuses to render such accounting tho plaintiff must prove that the guardian took possession of the patrimony or negligently failed to do so.</p> <p>Id.- — Td.—Malice or Fraud — Care and Diligence. — Tho judgment in an action of this kind is always compensatory and never exemplary, unless malice or fraud is alleged. The duty of a guardian regarding the property of his wards is to employ the same care and diligence that any prudent man would employ in his own business.</p> <p>Td. — Id.—Judgment on Pleadings.- — -Although in an action for an accounting the answer may bo defective and the complaint may set forth all the truth, in accordance with section 194, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure a trial is always necessary in order to investigate the accounts; therefore, the court- does not err in refusing to strike out the answer and render judgment on the pleadings.</p> <p>Td. — Td.—Negligence—Productiveness of Property. — The exclusion of evidence tending to show that certain properties could have been more productive involves no error in the absence of any showing that it was the intention to prove that tho failure to produce was due to the negligence of the guardian, and the unproductiveness of certain properties is no evidence of negligence, unless it is shown that it was his duty to make them productive.</p> <p>Td. — Id.-—Partnership—Parties.-—The fact that the guardian is a member of a partnership in which the appellants have an interest does not allow an unlimited investigation of the affairs of said partnership when it is not a party to the action for an accounting.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence—Self-serving Declaration. — The testimony of the defendant that he had had no complaints from the tenants does not constitute a self-serving declaration, for this is a statement of fact and not merely hearsay evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Payments.—It was unprejudicial error, if any, to permit the defendant to submit in the lump the receipts for the payments made, for the fact that they were in his custody was evidence of their authenticity and his sworn statement that the payments were made is prima faoie evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Erutos por Pensión.- — In testamentary guardianships a frutos por pen-sión the guardian is generally relieved of the obligation to render accounts of the administration or of the use of the products of the properties subject to the guardianship, and this rule applies both to annual and final accounts, for the products of the properties are his own and he would be rendering accounts to himself.</p>
- 27 P.R. 421Fernández v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Enter a Marginal Note of Payment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 425Successors of Sobrino, Fernández & Co. v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Attorney in Fact — Partnership—Liquidator..—When an attorney in fact is authorized to appoint a liquidator of the partnerships of which the principal is a member, with power to dispose of the properties of the said partnerships, he acts within the powers conferred upon him in authorizing the liquidator to sell the real property and rights of one of the said partnerships."</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Subdivision 2 of section 1362 of the Civil Code refers to an agent who purchases for himself; therefore it is not applicable to one who buys for a mercantile partnership of which he is a member.</p>
- 27 P.R. 427González v. Alvarez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 433Carrero v. Diez & Pérez, Ltd. (1919)
<p>Workmen’s Relief — Appeal—Decision op Workmen’s Relief Commission.— The decisions of the Workmen’s Relief Commission rendered in accordance with paragraph 5 of section 23 of the Workmen’s Relief Act of 1916, as said section was amended hy Act No. 9 of 1917, are not appealable, for according to paragraph 8 of section 12 of the act of 1916, appeals will he allowed from the decisions of the commission only to employers who have been assessed for premiums under the provisions of the act, and the first-mentioned decisions refer to employers who have failed to comply with' the provisions of the act in regard to the filing of reports and the payment of premiums.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Constitutional Law. — Where an appeal is dismissed because the decision from which it was taken is not appealable, the constitutionality of the law which makes the decision unappealable cannot be considered in the same appeal.</p>
- 27 P.R. 439Rivera v. Martínez (1919)
<p>Appeal — Transcript.—When the appellee alleges that the transcript does not contain all the necessary elements for a consideration of the appeal, he must state what matters were omitted so that the court may he in a position to decide whether any material fact is lacking.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Although it may not appear from the transcript that a copy was delivered to the adverse party, it is sufficient if that fact appears from the record by means of an affidavit.</p> <p>Id. — Special Order. — After the expiration of the ten days fixed by law within which to appeal from a special order entered after final judgment no appeal can be taken, and an appeal so taken should be dismissed on motion of the interested party.</p> <p>Id. — Appealable Order — Title oe Motion. — In order to determine whether or not an order is appealable it is necessary to consider its nature and scope and not solely the title of the motion which originated it. Therefore, it is immaterial that a motion be styled a motion for "reconsideration,” for if it is really a motion to quash a writ of execution it will be considered as such and the ruling thereon will be appealable.</p> <p>Id. — Motion—Reconsideration.—Although a motion may be styled a motion for reconsideration, it will not be so considered if by it an issue is raised for the first time (like the jurisdiction of the lower court) and it does not ask for the review of some ruling made at the instance of the mover. On the contrary, it would be a motion for the annulment of some procedure (like that of the writ of execution herein) obtained by the adverse party and wdthout hearing the party making the so-called motion for reconsideration.</p> <p>Id. — Stay of Execution. — An appeal which does not come within any of the cases referred to in Section 298 of the Code of Civil Procedure has the effect of staying the execution of the judgment until the appeal is disposed of.</p> <p>Id. — Cross-appeal.—An appeal which has the effect of staying the execution of judgment pursuant to Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure is in no way affected by the mere fact that the Supreme Court had disposed of a cross-appeal taken by the adverse party, without considering questions that could only be discussed under the other appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction—Stay of Execution. — It is improper to order the execution of a judgment affirmed or modified by this court on appeal when a cross-appeal taken therefrom by the adverse party is still pending in this court, and a court which orders the execution of the judgment in such a ease does so without jurisdiction and on motion of a lawful party should order that the execution be stayed.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—A district court has no jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal from its own judgment; therefore it is not justified in considering an appeal as dismissed because it has not been promptly and duly prosecuted, this being a question for the Supreme Court and not for the lower court to decide.</p> <p>Id. — Execution.—The execution of a judgment ordered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and when so adjudged the status of the case is the same as before the execution was ordered.</p>
- 27 P.R. 445Succession of del Toro v. Zambrana (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Restitution of Property and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 456Bestard v. Serrallés (1919)
<p>MORTGAGE — Foreclosure—Ordinary Action — Complaint—Parties.—There are facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in a complaint which alleges that the defendant collected a second mortgage in a foreclosure proceeding brought against a property which the plaintiff had acquired by title derived from a person to whom it had been conveyed in payment of a first mortgage, for those facts establish the nullity of the said foreclosure proceeding. It is unnecessary that the complaint should allege that the .second mortgagee had been made a party defendant in the proceeding brought for the collection of the first mortgage, because for the very reason that he was not so made a party it is necessary to bring the ordinary action for the eaneelation of the second mortgage, as otherwise the second mortgage could be canceled without ' bringing such action.</p>
- 27 P.R. 462Succession of Orcasitas v. A. M. Somoza & Co. (1919)
<p>Intervention — Interest of Intervenor. — As a general rule the direct and immediate interest of an intervenor in the subject-matter must be such that if the original action had never been commenced, and he-had first brought it as the sole plaintiff, he would have, been entitled to recover in his own name to the extent at least of a part of the relief sought; or if the action had first been brought against him as the defendant, he would have been able to defeat the recovery in part at least.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—When the facts alleged and taken as true in order to determine the interest of an intervenor in an action not only would have constituted a good defense if the action had first been brought against the intervenor, but conclusively show that, in the circumstances alleged, the intervenor is indeed the only true defendant, it must be concluded that such intervenor has the direet and immediate interest to which the authorities refer.</p>
- 27 P.R. 469Pescay v. Fernández (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Eescission of Contract and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 472People v. Avilés (1919)
<p>Dismissal — Speedy Trial. — On appeal the district court, as had been done by the municipal court, overruled a motion by the defendant for the dismissal of the action on the ground, supported by a certificate, that the trial was held in the municipal court after the expiration of the 120 days referred to in subdivision 2 of section 44-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the defendant not having asked for a continuance. The district court based its ruling on the fact that it had not before it the necessary information as to whether or not there was good cause in the lower court for not bringing the defendant to trial within the period fixed by law, and that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it had to presume that the proper procedure had been followed and that there was good cause for the delay. The ruling was excepted to and on appeal this court held that it was incumbent upon the district attorney, and not upon the defendant, to show the existence of good cause for the delay if any there were.</p>
- 27 P.R. 476Agostini v. Agostini (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for • Support in an Action for Divorce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 479Sánchez v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Record op Title — Dominion Title — Description op Property. — A dominion title judgment which describes the town property involved in the proceeding by the cardinal points of the compass, stating as to the eastern boundary that it is “bounded by the public road from Bayamón to Comerlo,” cannot be charged with the defect of not specifying the name of the street or place where the property is situated, as required by subdivision 3 of article 63 of the Mortgage Law Regulations, particularly when the judgment was accompanied by a certified copy of the testimony of the witnesses in the proceeding to the effect that the property was situated ‘ ‘ on the outskirts of the town of Comerlo. ”</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Separate Property — Conjugal Partnership Property. — The doctrine laid down in 20 P. R. R. 138, and 25 P. R. R. 786, wherein the consolidation of several lots or properties belonging to different owners rvas involved, is not in point, for it is not sought to record a consolidation of the house and lot referred to in the decision appealed from, they being parts of a property physically united as a whole although the lot should he deemed conjugal partnership property and the house the separate property of the husband. There is no prejudice to third persons nor infringement of the law in recording the house and lot as one property, for the record must show clearly that the house belonging exclusively to the husband was erected on a lot which is presumed to be conjugal partnership property because it was acquired for a valuable consideration and there is no showing as to the civil status of the husband at the time of its acquisition.</p>
- 27 P.R. 482Morales v. Dessús (1919)
<p>Will — -Heir—Payment oe Services. — The fact that a testator names a stranger as heir to one-third of Ms estate does not prevent the same testator from transferring a certain credit to the said stranger in another document in payment of services rendered to him by the stranger.</p> <p>.Id. — Id.—Id.—Assignment—Administrator.—A, being a bachelor without heirs-at-law, was the possessor of considerable wealth, a substantial portion of which he left to his nephews. Por fifty years B had been in his service without receiving a salary. Pinally A decided to settle the account and assigned •to B a credit for thirty thousand dollars. B accepted it and collected the amount of the credit. A having died, the administrator of his estate attacked the assignment. The evidence proved the actual rendition of the services and it was held that the assignment was valid.</p> <p>Natural Child — Acknowledgment—Intervention.—The mere fact that a per'son brings an'action to be acknowledged as the natural child of another does not authorize the plaintiff to intervene as such child in another action brought by the administrator appointed upon the death of the alleged father, for his status as natural child does not yet appear to have been acknowledged in an authentic and valid manner.</p>
- 27 P.R. 486Catholic Church of Manatí v. Arroyo (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 488Alvarez v. Successors of Fantauzzi (1919)
<p>appeal — Notice op Appeal — Documents Sent by Mail. — The notice of appeai in this ease was received and filed by the clerk of the lower court after the expiration -of the ten days allowed the appellant for taking his appeal. Section 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to documents or pleadings of the parties sent to the clerk’s office of a court to be filed therein, and such documents are effective only from the time they are received by the clerk and filed, whether the delivery be made by mail or personally; therefore the act of mailing them is not equivalent to their being filed in the clerk’s office, nor can the effect of the filing be antedated to the date of the mailing. Hence the appeal will be dismissed when the notice of appeal • is filed after the expiration of the legal period.</p>
- 27 P.R. 490People v. Aquino (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in a Prosecution for False Representation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 492People v. Marini (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in a Prosecution for Aggravated Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The, facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 495Ríos v. Rosaly (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Administration.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 502Delgado v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Possessory Title with Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 503Successors of Sanders, Philippi & Co. v. Delgado (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 505Pagán v. Franco (1919)
<p>Injunction — Possession—Limitation.—It appearing that the act whereby the plaintiff was deprived of the possession which he seeks to recover occurred on August 9, 1917, and that the complaint was filed on February 21, 1918, it is necessary to conclude that the action was barred by the expiration of the period of four months prescribed by the act which authorizes it.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Construction.—Act No. 11 of 1917, which extended to one year the period oí four months fixed by Act No. 43 of 1913 to recover the possession of real property by injunction, cannot be applied to this ease, because the time fixed by Act No. 43 had already expired when Act No. 11 went into effect.</p> <p>Id.- — -Id.—The provisions of the code fixing the period of one year for the recovery of the possession of real property are not applicable to this case, because the question here is not whether the plaintiff had or had not a right to the possession, but whether or not he had a right, in order to obtain such possession, to invoke the special proceeding of injunction created by Aet No. 43 of 1913.</p>
- 27 P.R. 507Carrera v. Marrero (1919)
<p>Contract — Debt—Dation en Paiement — Extinction op Obligation. — When a creditor receives from his debtor a dation en paiement under a certain condition, it is necessary that the condition be fulfilled before the dation can have the effect of extinguishing the original obligation.</p> <p>Id.- — Id.—Id.-—Impossible Condition — Perfection op Contract. — In order that a contract of dation en paiement made subject to a certain condition may - become perfected it is necessary that the condition be fulfilled; therefore, if the condition is impossible, as -where it consists in conveying a property duly recorded in the registry and the property given in payment of the debt does not belong wholly to the debtor, who is only a joint owner, it cannot be said that the contract was perfected, or that the original debt was extinguished; consequently the creditor may sue for payment.</p>
- 27 P.R. 509Rivera v. Martínez (1919)
<p>Appeal — Statement of Case — Bill of Exceptions — Negligence.—The appellant moved to be allowed to present an amended statement of the ease and bill of exceptions after the expiration of more than a year from the date when the court ordered the original statement of the ease to be reformed and granted the appellant ten days for presenting a new one. Seld: That the appellant was negligent in the prosecution of his appeal and was not excused by the fact that he expected to be heard in the appeal taken at the same time by his adversary to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Id. — Transcript.—When the transcript of the reeord is not filed in due time the appeal will be dismissed.</p>
- 27 P.R. 511Nieva v. Guánica Centrale (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Performance of Contract.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 519Colón v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Possessory Title.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 522Sánchez v. Atlas Commercial Co. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action for Damages. (Change of Venue.)</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 523People v. Mercado (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Petty Larceny.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 525Succession of Quiñones v. Ana María Sugar Co. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Eestitution.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 529Román v. Agosto (1919)
<p>Notaries — Certified Copt of Part of Will — Acknowledgment of Natural Child by Will — Registry of Acknowledgment ■— Civil Registry — Interested Party. — On receipt of his fees a notary public is obliged to issue, a certified copy of the clause of a will containing the acknowledgment of a natural child, for the child is entitled to have it registered in the civil' registry even before the death of the testator, and for the purposes of tion 25 of the Notarial Law as amended on March 12, 1914, not only fije-child but either of its parents shall be considered an interested party entitled to such copy.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Intention of Testator. — The acknowledgment of a natural child in ■ a will being irrevocably effective from the moment the will is made, ah' ac, tion for acknowledgment is not necessary to obtain what has: already, bé'dn, obtained by a solemnly expressed intention of the testator, and if it had been the intention of the testator that the acknowledgment should remain unrevealed in the notary's protocol, he would have made a closed will.</p> <p>Id. — Protocol—Evidence.—It is not error for a court to order a notary to exhibit his protocol, especially in a case like this in which the order tended to determine whether or not the acknowledgment had been made.</p>
- 27 P.R. 537Díaz v. Arkadia Sugar Co. (1919)
<p>Damages — Employee—Employer—Limitation—Notice—Employers ’ Liability Act. — When an action is based on section 1803 of the Civil Code and not on the Employers’ Liability Act of 1901, an employee who sues his employer for damages is not obliged to notify the employer of the accident within the period of thirty days fixed by the said act, nor is the action barred by limitation because the complaint was filed more than six months after the accident, which is the limitation fixed by the said aet.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Scaffolds and Bailings. — Aet No. 30 of 1913 provides that any person who intends to construct or repair a building shall construct a scaffold, platform, or other similar contrivance for the benefit and safety of the carpenters, masons, or other employees which “shall be, if possible, at least two feet wide and shall have a safety railing around the same.” The words “if possible” refer to the width of the scaffold. The statute clearly provides that the scaffold shall be surrounded by a railing.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Defect—Notice.—When the defect consists in the employer’s having failed to comply with any of the obligations of the aet it is unnecessary to allege and prove that the employee notified the employer of the existence of the defect in order to conclude that the employer had knowledge of it, for it is to be presumed that the employer necessarily had knowledge of his own acts.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Assumption -of Risk. — According to the weight of authority, the theory of assumption of risk does not apply to a ease where the employer fails to comply with a duty imposed by law.</p>
- 27 P.R. 544Morales v. Caraballo (1919)
<p>Damages — Poblio-service Truck. — The owner of a public-service truck is the owner of an enterprise within the meaning of section 1804 of the Civil Code and by the terms of that section is made liable for the damages caused by his employees when acting within the scope of their employment.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Negligence—Evidence.-—The fact that prior to the accident the truck did not respond readily to the steering wheel was pertinent to the issue of negligence as a matter necessarily within the knowledge of the defendant’s chauffeur and imposing upon him the obligation to exercise a great degree of care.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Measure of Damages. — Although the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in hiring other trucks on account of the damage suffered by his own from the accident and the garage charges for the storage of his truck do not constitute a proper measure of damages, nevertheless, as no objection was made-in the lower court to ;fche averments of the complaint in this regard, or to the evidence offered in support thereof, or to the findings of the court thereon, and, on the other hand, it having been shown that the truck was worth $1,200 at the time of the collision 'and that two or three hundred dollars would have been a fair price for the remains, it would not he proper to reduce on appeal the amount of $800 allowed in the judgment for damages.</p> <p>Discretion oe Court — Costs.—The question of costs, disbursements and attorney-fees is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling thereon will not be' disturbed by the appellate court unless abuse is shown.</p>
- 27 P.R. 549Fuentes v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property Refusing in Part to Record a Declaration of Ownership.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 551Successors of M. Lamadrid & Co. v. Martorell (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Debt. (Proceedings to Dissolve Attachment).</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 557Santalis v. El Zenit (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>Motion for change of venne.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 558Betancourt v. Larregui (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an Action' for Temporary Support.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 559Fajardo v. American Railroad (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 567People v. Subirá (1919)
<p>License — Municipal License — Agent—Steamship Company — Constitution.— An agency for a steamship company carrying freight and passengers between Porto Eico and the United States and also between ports of the Island must pay to the municipality the license imposed upon an “agent with permanent office,” under group C, section 2 of Act No. 26 of 1914. Such an agency in itself is an independent business. Furthermore, as the said statute makes no unlawful distinctions, but is uniform and general, it is not contrary to Article T, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Federal Constitution.</p>
- 27 P.R. 571People v. Turull (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in a Prosecution for an Offense against the Public Health.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated iu tbe opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 572People v. Martínez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in a Prosecution for False Representation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 575García v. Registrar of Guayama (1919)
<p>Record oe Title — Conjugal Partnership — Heirs—Hereditary Eights. — The father or the mother having died, the ganancial property may he recorded directly in the names of the heirs -without violating the provisions of. article 20 of the Mortgage Law. The General Directorate of Registries of Spain goes too far in its decision of January 26, 1906, in which, it holds that "in order to record a simple hereditary right it is sufficient to present the will or the order of designation of heirs . . . where the ancestor may have died single or a widower." The rule has been 'applied also to eases where the ancestor died while married and there is no good reason for changing it.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Liquidation.—Although the best practice is to liquidate the conjugal partnership as soon as possible after its dissolution, it cannot be maintained that such liquidation is an indispensable requisite for recording pro indiviso in the names of the surviving spouse and the children the ganancial property previously recorded in the name of the deceased spouse, and to do this it is sufficient to present in the registry the will accompanied by a certificate of the death of the testator, or the designátion of heirs.</p>
- 27 P.R. 578Laborde v. Registrqar of Humacao (1919)
<p>Record oe Tj-ti,e — Consolidation oe Properties — Double Records. — A registrar correctly refuses to record conveyances of properties when, although they appear recorded us independent properties in the names of the ancestors of the heirs who petition for the transfer under a partition of inheritance, they are the same properties -which by consolidation were later recorded as a single property under a possessory title proceeding in favor of a third person, and aie actually recorded in the names of different owners. The fact that paragraph one of article 392 of the Mortgage Law provides that record of possession is made without prejudice to third persons, does not, authorise the registrar in the present case to record the conveyances, for this would amount to a decision by him that the record of possession of the consolidated property had no effect against the appellants' a question which must be decided by the courts.</p>
- 27 P.R. 582Municipality of Vega Baja v. Smith (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Jnan in an Action to Abate a Nuisance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 598Cádiz v. Jiménez (1919)
<p>Partition — Liquidation—Conjugal Partnership — Separate Property — Oommu-nity Property — Construction.—The “cai>ital” referred to in section 1334 of the Civil Code is the separate property of the respective spouses in so fin-as the same can he identified, traced, or satisfactorily shown to'have been blended with the common assets. Nothing is said about reimbursement of either spouse for separate property owned at the time of marriage and subsequently lost through mismanagement by the owner, or otherwise, regardless of whether or no.t the same had been mingled with the common fund. Beyond the mere identification, inventory and allotment of separate property, the law does not contemplate liquidation and settlement of capital that has never figured in the business of the conjugal 'partnership. The mere disapjiearaneo of the separate property of the husband, coupled with the subsequent acquisition of other property does not warrant the. conclusion that the separate property had been converted into common. To assume this would nullify the presumption that all property acquired by either of the spouses during marriage is community property.</p>
- 27 P.R. 605Brac v. Ojeda (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Joan, Section 1, in an : Action for the Rescission of a Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 607Vidal v. Antique (1919)
<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Guayama in an Action to Becover a Mortgage Credit and to Annul a Deed.</p>
- 27 P.R. 609Cayey-Caguas Tobacco Co. v. Ramírez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action ' for Acknowledgment of a Bight of Way.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 614Ex parte Nadal (1919)
<p>Appeal — Assignment ©e EeroEs. — When the judgment of a court in. a partition proceeding is appealed from by a party who considers himself prejudiced thereby and on appeal it appears from an arithmetical calculation that the said party lias not suffered the prejudice alleged, the appeal is frivolous and the judgment appealed from vill be affirmed without considering other errors assigned, especially when no separate assignment has been filed as required by Rules 41 and 42.</p>
- 27 P.R. 616Avilés v. Sons of Rafael Toro, Ltd. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>•The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 628Centrale v. Colberg (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Performance of Contract and Injunction.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 631Guerra v. Acha (1919)
<p>Appeal — Statement of Case — Bill of Exception's — Bindings of Trial Court.— The findings of the trial court are not sufficient, on appeal to substitute the statement of the ease duly certified. TTence, when the judgment is based on questions of fact, which have not been duly certified to by means of a statement of the ease or bill of exceptions, the judgment will be affirmed.</p>
- 27 P.R. 633Boneta v. Boneta (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo in an Action for the Execution of a deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 644Fulladosa v. Castro (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of ITnmacao in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 649Marrero v. Fordham (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Filiation and to Eecover Inheritance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 656Capó v. Fernández (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District (hurt of Guay ama in an Action for Acknowledgment of Condominium and for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 668González v. Cabrera (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Areeibo in an Action for the Annulment of a Dominion Title Proceeding and of its Record in the Registry.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 673Guilbe v. American Railroad (1919)
<p>Pleading- — Jurisdiction — Amendment — Extension of Time — Discretion of Court. — On motion of the defendant certain paragraphs were stricken from the original complaint with leave to amend within five days, which term was later extended to ten days. One month and seven days after the expiration of said period the plaintiff obtained permission to Sle the amended complaint which accompanied his motion! JTeld: That as the time granted the plaintiff for filing an amended complaint was not jurisdictional, the court had discre-tional power to allow the filing of the amended complaint after the expiration of the period previously granted.</p> <p>Evidence — Weighing of Evidence — Prejudice, Partiality or Manifest Error.— When the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment and it does not appear that the lower court was influenced by prejudice or partiality or committed a manifest error, its weighing of the evidence will not be interfered with on appeal; and the fact that one of -the grounds upon which the judgment is based may be erroneous will not justify a reversal if the judgment could be sustained on the other grounds.</p>
- 27 P.R. 678Vázquez v. Rocco (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for the Annulment of a Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 681López v. Succession of Candelario (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez’in an Action for Division of Community Property.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 685Colón v. Pérez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 687Dessús v. Ricci (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for the Protocolization of a Holographic Will.</p> <p>Motion for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 688People v. Pérez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Conspiracy.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 691López v. Lizardi (1919)
<p>Pi’rchase and Sale — Delivery—Presumption.—When a deed of purchase and sale has been executed there is a presumption juris tantum that the property sold has been delivered. Generally, this presumption is a fact, but if in practice the contrary is found to be the ease, the symbolic delivery recognized by Section 1365 of the Civil Code does not finally decide the question.</p> <p>Id. — Rescissory Action — Sale to Leased Property. — When the vendor of a leased property does not bind himself to evict the lessee, the fact that the lessee refuses to surrender the property does not of itself entitle the vendee to sue for a rescission of the contract, for the vendee, having become the owner, has in law the necessary means to evict him.</p>
- 27 P.R. 695Porto Rico Fruit Exchange v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Record of Title — Conflicting Titles — Lease — Liquidator— Partnership.— A deed whereby a person, as liquidator of a partnership, leases a certain property conflicts with another deed wherein it appears that the said person is the sole owner of the property by having acquired the interests of the other partners, and the latter deed being a title sufficient to convey the ownership, it may be recorded and must be previously recorded in order to record the lease made jointly with the wife.</p>
- 27 P.R. 698A. Gelabert & Co. v. Sepúlveda (1919)
<p>Pleading — Supplementary Complaint — Discretion on Court. — A court does not abuse its discretion in ordering the elimination oí a supplementary complaint filed by leave of the court in an action in which the original complaint was to obtain a mortgage guaranty of an immature obligation and' the supplementary complaint demanded payment of the said obligation as having matured.</p> <p>Id. — Id. •— Demurrer — Academic Question. — The original complaint and the amended complaint in an action to obtain the guaranty of an immature obligation, were demurred to as not stating facts sufficient, to constitute a cause of action. Later, on motion of the defendant, the. court ordered the elimination of a supplementary complaint wherein the plaintiff demanded payment of the obligation because it had matured. Held: That to rule 'now on the demurrer to the original and amended complaints would he to dispose of an academic question having no practical purpose, for the object of the said complaint being to obtain the guaranty of an immature obligation which for that reason could not be collected, and it appearing now from the complaint itself that the obligation has matured, nothing would be accomplished by ruling now on the sufficiency of that complaint, which has become useless by reason of the maturity of the obligation; therefore, the order holding that the decision of the demurrer would serve no practical purpose must be sustained.</p>
- 27 P.R. 701Manrique v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Agricultural Loan Contract — Record otp Contract. — The mere fact tliat the crops given in guaranty of the agricultural loan sought to he recorded in the Registry of Contracts for Agricultural Purposes are subject to a previous lien does not prevent the record sought, whether the previous lien is recorded or not, and in the latter ease the first encumbrance should be mentioned as it appears from the documents presented.</p>
- 27 P.R. 703Sánchez v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 704Morales v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. (1919)
<p>Damages — Negligence—Speed—Urban Zone — Intertjrban Zone. — There is no rule of law making it negligence per se for a trolley company to run its ears rapidly in a suburban district, and the decisions point to the contrary. The conclusion of the authorities is that while a street railway company must be exceedingly careful of the speed of its cars within an urban zone, in interurban or country zones it is more like a railroad, and the rule is that a person seeking to recover damages for injury in such zones must show that the speed was unreasonable under the circumstances.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Joint Enterprise. — T'o stop, look and listen is a duty that falls upon the driver of a vehicle who wants to cross a street railway whose cars are propelled by electricity, and in a joint enterprise this duty is extended to all of the occupants of the vehicle.</p>
- 27 P.R. 709People v. Casablanca (1919)
<p>Falsifying Evidence. — False Exhibit. — It being alleged in the information that in a divorce suit brought by Min the defendant exhibited for the purpose of having it filed as a part of the record a summons whose return he knew to be false and that he tricked the municipal judge into signing the said summons, the district judge did not err in instructing the jury that the act fell within section 128 of the Penal Code which makes it a felony for any person to prepare any false or antedated book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with the intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry whatever, authorized by law.</p>
- 27 P.R. 713People v. Brau (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Libel.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 719People v. Roldán (1919)
<p>Evidence — Expert Testimony. — Generally, the examination of an expert witness should be limited to appearances and opinions and he should not be asked to state facts, for the jury might be misled by his conclusions stated as facts.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to Jury — Premeditation.—When there is evidence which might reduce a homicide to less than murder the court errs in refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter, and this error is rendered more prejudicial to the defendant when the court commits another error by defining murder in the second degree so as to exclude the element of premeditation common to all murders.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Improper remarks to the jury by the prosecuting attorney, such as . criticizing the action of the defendant in not taking the witness stand, cannot be cured by the court's instructions.</p>
- 27 P.R. 723Alvarez v. Successors of Narciso Vilaró, Ltd. (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action of Intervention in Ownership.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 726Goldsmith v. Villari (1919)
<p>Summons — Service bt Publication — Jurisdiction—Default Judgment. — When the affidavit required hy Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order that service of a summons may he made by publication sets forth conclusions and not facts, the court is not in a position to order the service by publication; and if it does so order and the summons is published and a default judgment is entered, sueh judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction and should be set aside on motion of the defendant in the same action although more than one year may have elapsed.</p>
- 27 P.R. 735Ríos v. Amorós (1919)
<p>Contract — Consideration—Borden op Proop. — When a notarial deed exists the evidence most be strong to overcome the recital therein of a consideration, for the court must have before it a legal certainty that such consideration did not exist; but supposing that the consideration mentioned in the deed ivas false, if at the trial a different and licit consideration is shown, this will be sufficient to establish the validity of the contract, in accordance with section-1243 of the Civil Code; aside from the fact that the burden of proof rests on him who alleges lack of consideration.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Evidence.—The lower court did not err in refusing lo admit in evidence a letter written by the notary before whom the deed was executed in Spain tending to show tl;at the contract contained in said deed was simulated.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—A letter written by the vendor of the properties, the ancestor of the plaintiffs, tending to prove the validity of such sale, was admissible in evidence, it being an admission against himself.</p>
- 27 P.R. 739Valentín v. Torres (1919)
<p>Conveyance — Mental Incapacity. — A conveyance made fey a person who at the time is so drunk and idiotic that he is mentally incapable of making a deed is null and void. .</p> <p>Td. — Consideration.—The person who attacks a public deed of conveyance has the burden of proving lack of consideration.</p> <p>Id. — Witness.—A brother-in-law of the wife of the notary before whom a deed of conveyance is executed may be a witness to the act.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Impeachment.—A witness who has been allowed to testify without objection or cross-examination can not be impeached on, rebuttal for mental incapacity.</p>
- 27 P.R. 742Santos v. Colón (1919)
<p>Dominion Title — Evidence.—When the contestant in a dominion title proceeding bases her opposition on the claim that she is the owner of the property, she must first show her title before she can attack that of the petitioner. And in the absence of evidence of a better title, the mere statements made by contestant’s husband, and denied by the petitioner, that the latter had on a certain occasion admitted that he held the property as usufructuary, are too vague to destroy the prima facie title shorn! by the petitioner or his predecessors, who, on the other hand, had held possession of the property as owners for more than thirty years.</p> <p>Appeal — Statement oe Case — Bill oe Exceptions.- — An appeal will not be dismissed on the ground that the judge did not approve the statement of the case when, although the judge did not use the word “approve’’ he certified that he was the judge who sat in the case referred to in the antecedent statement of the case and bill of exceptions; that they contained a true and faithful copy of all the evidence offered by the parties and of the exceptions taken at the trial, and that for the purposes of the appeal he presented the same with Ms signature and the seal of the court.</p>
- 27 P.R. 746Santini v. Díaz San Miguel (1919)
<p>Inheritance.— Heir — Community Property — Liquidation oe Conjugal Partnership. — The heirs of either of the spouses become vested with title to their shares in the community property from the moment of the death of the spouse, and although they receive their shares subject to the payment of the community debts, they need not wait until the conjugal partnership is liquidated before bringing an action to. recover such shares.</p>
- 27 P.R. 750Cerecedo v. Medina (1919)
<p>Appeal from thq District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action to Annul a Sale of Real Property, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 753Aponte v. Aponte (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action of Ejectment, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 757Cubarons v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 758Lavergne v. Insular Police Commission (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 764Vázquez v. Freiría (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for Cancelation and Delivery of Notes.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 767People v. Cuadrado (1919)
<p>ilALE 03? Milk — Judicial Notice.- — This was a. prosecution for selling milk at a. price in excess of that fixed by section 40 of the Buies of the Pood Commission. Held: That as the section supposed to have been violated was not copied into the information, nor offered in evidence, and the courts can not take judicial notice of the Buies of the Eood Commission, the lower court was without adequate proof to convict the defendant. '</p>
- 27 P.R. 768Martínez v. Registrar of Arecibo (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Partition.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 770Becerra v. Registrar of Guayama (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of' the Registrar of Property of Gi-uayama Refusing to Record a Mortgage Deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 771Rodríguez v. Crosas (1919)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the Judge of the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Homicide.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 774Colón v. Schluter & Co. (1919)
<p>Principal and Agent — Purchase and Sale — Burden op Proop. — In an action for the specific performance of a contract of sale of merchandise made by a supposed agent of the vendor the burden is on the plaintiff! to prove not only that the sale was made but also the authority of the agent to make it in the name of his principal, or the relationship of principal and agent.</p>
- 27 P.R. 778Santos v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record of Title — Building Erected on Another’s Land — -Previous Record of Building. — When the land belongs to one person and the building to another, record of a conveyance of the latter is governed by article 20 of the Mortgage Law which requires a previous record of the property in the name of the grantor in order that it may be recorded in the name of the grantee, for such previous and special record of the building is unnecessary only when it belongs to the owner of the land.</p>
- 27 P.R. 779Fernández, Liquidator of Fernandez & Co. v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Power of Attorney — Ratification of Previous Acts — Retroactive Effect. — A power of attorney is effective from the date of its execution. .In order that the attorney in fact may ratify previous acts it is necessary that such authority be given in the power of attorney or that the same be given retroactive effect. Powers of attorney must be construed strictly.</p> <p>Instruments Executed in Eoreign Countries. — Instruments executed in foreign countries must be properly attested in order that they may be recorded in the registries of property of Porto Rico.</p>
- 27 P.R. 781Sotomayor v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Recording a Contract of Purchase and Sale with a Curable Defect.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 783López v. Succession of Quiñones (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez in an Action for Nullity of Deed, etc.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 787People v. Millán (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San -Juan in a Prosecution for Seduction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 788Ex parte Napoleoni (1919)
<p>Habeas Corpus' — Probable Cause — Appeal—Information.—When a person petitions for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that there was no probable cause for his imprisonment and later appeals from a decision adverse to him, the fact that after such decision the district attorney filed an information against such person for the same offense does not affect the appeal, for the question involved in the appeal is -¡whether or not there was probable cause for the imprisonment and the filing of the information does not settle that question, it being one to be decided by the court.</p>
- 27 P.R. 789Catholic Church v. Municipality of Bayamón (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Ejectment.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 793Vázquez v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record of Title — Dominion Title — Hearing of District Attorney — Review by Registrar. — T'he registrar refused to record a decree of the district court ordering the record of a dominion title to a certain property, “because it does not appear from the deeree that the district attorney was heard in compliance with subdivision 3 of article 395 of the Morgtage Law.” On appeal from that decision it was Held: That such failure to hear the district; attorney is not a substantial defect, .which voids the proceeding'or justifies the action of the registrar whose authority to review the decree should be limited to considering whether the judge had jurisdiction .to make it; whether it was made in a proper proceeding; whether the parties required to be summoned were summoned, and whether the deeree contains all the data that should appear in the record, furthermore, as the district attorney did not complain of not having been heard or appeal for the purpose of correcting such error, the said defect was cured.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Area of Property — Civil Status. — It is a curable defect not to set out in a dominion title deeree the area of the property according to the metric system; also the failure to state the civil status of the petitioner at the time he acquired the property.</p>
- 27 P.R. 796Torres v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record of Title — Purchase and Sale — Deferred Payment — Extent of Right to be Recorded. — This ease refers to a deed of purchase and sale of a property executed on Apiil 39, 1860, wherein it was stated that the sale was made, “but the vendor reserves to himself the direct ownership of the property until the total price is paid and the vendee, who forthwith takes charge thereof, agrees to allow Leopoldo Pérez to remain on the property until the end of May next.” An appeal being taken from the decision- of the registrar refusing to record the deed because in his opinion it does not conclusively show the extent of the right sought to be recorded. Held: that the clause transcribed whereby the vendor reserved the ownership of the property until the total payment of the price, is valid in law and does not void the contract although it might, in a certain event,.give rise to itá rescission; and that the clause stating that the vendee takes charge of the property determines the delivery thereof by the vendor, thus complying with an obligation resulting from the contract.</p> <p>Id. — Civil Status op Parties — Curable Defect. — The fact that the civil status of the vendee was not stated in the deed constitutes a curable defect.</p>
- 27 P.R. 799Rivera v. Lloreda (1919)
<p>Appeal — Extension ot Time — Discretion oe Court. — The consideration of the facts for the purposes of allowing or denying extensions of time rests in the sound discretion of the courts, therefore. their rulings will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.</p>
- 27 P.R. 800Delgado v. Cruz (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Proceeding to Enjoin the Partition of an Inheritance.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 804People v. Salgado (1919)
<p>Automobiles' — Oomplaint.—-In a complaint made under section 12 of the Automobiles Act it is not sufficient to allege generally that the chauffeur failed to take reasonable precautions to guarantee the personal safety of the victim, but it is necessary to specify besides that he committed an act in violation of one or more of the several special provisions of the said section.</p>
- 27 P.R. 805Rojas v. Colón (1919)
<p>Appeal from the. District Court of San Juan in a Habeas Corpus Proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 810People v. Bocanegra (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 813Flesh v. Texidor (1919)
<p>Jurisdiction — As a necessary consequence of tlie provision of section 4 of the act reorganizing the judiciary of Porto Eico to the effect that municipal judges shall have jurisdiction in all civil matters in their districts to the amount of five hundred dollars, including interest, the district courts have jurisdiction when the amount, including interest, exceeds five hundred dollars.</p> <p>Id. — Interest After Demand — Attachment.—'When in an action to recover on a note for $500 without interest it is alleged that it was not paid at maturity although payment was demanded of the debtor and the creditor also claims interest after such demand, the district court has jurisdiction to issue an attachment to secure the effectiveness of the judgment, for the debtor being under obligation, according to section 1067 of the Civil Code, to pay interest from the time the creditor demands the fulfillment of the obligation, judicially or extra judicially, it follows that the amount in controversy exceeds $500.</p>
- 27 P.R. 815Aponte v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record oe Title — Notarial Law — Signatures op Illiterates. — The registrar refused to record a deed of purchase and sale "because the said document is not signed in accordance -with section 14 of the Notarial Law, for the notary states that the yendors did not know how to sign and that the instrumental witness Onofre Aponte signed in their names, but in so signing the witness failed to state the names and surnames of the vendors in whose names he ^ signed, which is not a fulfillment of the requirements of the statute. * * * ” Reid: That such omission constitutes no defect. The vendors specified in the deed being only two and neither of them knowing how to sign, there is no ambiguity.</p>
- 27 P.R. 817People v. Falcón (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Jnan in a Prosecution for Violation of Sanitation Bulletin No. 28.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 818People v. Cuevas (1919)
<p>Adultery- — Evidence.—The fact that the defendant lived in the house of the co-defendant, who was separated from her husband, and that he entered the house day and night, in the absence of evidence of other circumstances justifying the inference that the defendants were inclined to have carnal intercourse and that they availed themselves of that opportunity, is not sufficient evidence of adultery.</p>
- 27 P.R. 821Berríos v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record of Title — Consolidation of Properties. — A surviving spouse consolidated several adjoining properties and sought to have them recorded in his name in the registry of property as a single property. The properties had been acquired while the said person was married. Held: That the registrar was right in refusing to record the deed.</p>
- 27 P.R. 823Franceschi v. Rodríguez (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action for Reduction of Purchase Price of Properties.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 828Castrillón v. Castejón (1919)
<p>Appeal — Premature Appeal. — An appeal taken from a judgment before the same is entered in the judgment docket is premature and will be dismissed.</p>
- 27 P.R. 829Soto v. Martínez (1919)
<p>Appeal — FBrvOLOtrs Appeal. — In order that an appeal may be dismissed under Rule 59 of the Supreme Court it is necessary to make a satisfactory showing that the appellant has not prosecuted his appeal with due diligence or in good faith, or that the appeal is frivolous, and when such facts do not clearly appear this court will not exercise its discretion to that effect.</p>
- 27 P.R. 831Figueroa v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 835Reboira v. Lloreda (1919)
<p>Pleading — Appearance—Summons—Default.—When after a complaint has been filed an attorney enters appearance and files a demurrer signed by him as attorney for the defendants, although all of them had not been summoned, such voluntary appearance is equivalent to personal service of the summons, according to section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and if thereafter the complaint is amended and á copy of the amended complaint is delivered to the said attorney and the defendants fiail to plead to it within the time allowed by law, default should be entered against such defendants.</p>
- 27 P.R. 838People v. Matienzo (1919)
<p>Automobiles Act — Complaint.—A complaint made under section 12 of Act No. 75 of April 13, 1916, is insufficient if it does not charge the defendant vith the violation of one or more of the specific provisions contained in said section.</p>
- 27 P.R. 839Benítez v. Portela (1919)
<p>Injunction — Jurisdiction.—The only court with jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction to stay the execution of a judgment or decree is the court before which the proceeding sought to be stayed is being prosecuted.</p>
- 27 P.R. 843Mangual v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Dominion title Judgment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 844People v. Astacio (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Assault and Battery.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 846Torres v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record -of Title — Consolidation of Properties — Separate Property — Conjugal Partnership Property. — Tn accordance with article 61 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law, a dominion title judgment ordering the record in the name of the petitioner of a property formed by the consolidation of two parcels of land, one of them being his separate property and the other belonging to the conjugal partnership, cannot be recorded for the reason that the two properties are not similar and cannot be consolidated.</p>
- 27 P.R. 848Vilá v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Consolidation and Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 850Goitía v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from Decisions of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Purchase and Sale.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 853People v. Soto (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla in a Prosecution for Breach of Peace.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 855Carballo v. Rossy (1919)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Divorce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 857Cabassa v. Bravo (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action Concerning the Exercise of Patria Potestas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 865People v. Sierra (1919)
<p>Obscenity — Information—Motive.—When an information found under section 283 of the Penal Code seta forth verbatim a writing whose tendency is to corrupt the morals or suggest lascivious thoughts, it is error to sustain a demurrer alleging want of facts sufficient to determine a public offense ou the ground that the language used urns not obscene. The motive and purpose of the writer are not involved in the issue.</p>
- 27 P.R. 868Escudero v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
<p>Partition — Conflicting Interests — Guardian.—A partition of an estate wherein one of tho heirs appears for himself and also on behalf of his minor brother, as his guardian appointed by the. district court, is not recordable, for there are conflicting interests between the two heirs.</p>
- 27 P.R. 872People v. Romero (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in in a Prosecution for Murder in the Second Degree.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 874La Plata Tobacco Co. v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Becokd oi’ Title — Corporation — ’Certificate op Resolution — Public Document — Affidavit.—A certificate under the seal of a corporation, wherein the secretary of the corporation transcribed a resolution of the directors authorizing the vice-president of the1 corporation to execute a deed of sale in its name, accompanied the deed of sale so executed and into which the said resolution was not copied. The said certificate was sworn to by the secretary before the same notary who attested the deed and the notary identified the secretary. It was held that the said certificate cannot be considered as an affidavit, but as a public document for the purposes of the registry and the Mortgage Law and that the. fact that the secretary acknowledged his signature before the notary does not deprive the certificate of its character as a public document.</p>
- 27 P.R. 876Jesús v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 877Blanco v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property Befusing to Becord a Deed of Partition.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 887Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Record of Title — Corporation — Certificate of Resolution — Public Document.— The certificate of the secretary of a corporation to a resolution adopted by it and omitted in an original deed may be legalDed before a different notary from the one who attested the original deed, in accordance with the doctrine established by this court in La Plata Tobacco Com-partí/ v. Registrar of Caguas, ante, p. 874.</p>
- 27 P.R. 888Mimoso v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
<p>Appear from a Decisic® of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Deed of Dation en Paiement.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 890Ex parte Suau (1919)
<p>Executor — Will—Salic op Property — Administrator.—When it does not ap-X>ear clearly from a will that the testator' authorised the executor to sed property for the payment of debts, if the executor wishes to exercise such ■authority he should bring himself within the scope-of a judicial administrator by taking the steps required by the law.</p>
- 27 P.R. 891Montalvo v. American Railroad (1919)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mavagiiez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 27 P.R. 893Polo v. Fernández (1919)
<p>Tdextity op Properties — Area—Description—Evidence.—The fact that there is a difference of 1.69 acres in the area and a discrepancy as to one of the boundaries between the description of a property recorded under the nos-sessory title sought to be annulled and the description given in the dominion title judgment on which the action is based, is not .sufficient proof that in fact two different porpcrties are referred to.</p> <p>Id. — Possessory Title — Dominion Title. — The record of possession of a property prevents the dominion title of the same property from being recorded in the name of a different person, but does not malee the dominion title null aud void.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—To.—Conflicting Titles — Preference.—A possessory title can have no preference over a dominion title, although the former is recorded and the latter is not, for the former is recorded without, prejudice to the better rights of third persons and the preference derivable from the record •• exists only in ease of a conflict between two dominion titles.</p> <p>Ejectment — Intervention.—The fact that the other joint-owners of the property had knowledge that one of them had mortgaged the whole property and that the mortgagee had brought proceedings for the collection of the debt, without their having brought an action in intervention, does not deprive ■ them of their right to recover the property, for the action of intervention is a remedy that the law gives to the owner of a property to prevent momentary damages and the failure to exercise such remedy does not deprive him of whatever action he may thereafter have to recover what is his and of which he has been unduly dispossessed.</p>
- 27 P.R. 903Olivo v. Muriel (1919)
- 27 P.R. 903People v. Ramos (1919)
- 27 P.R. 903People v. Rodríguez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 903Rivera v. Martínez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 903People v. Pérez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 904Central Machete Sugar Co. v. Richardson (1919)
- 27 P.R. 904El Ejemplo Sugar Co. v. Rivera (1919)
- 27 P.R. 904Muratti v. Foote (1919)
- 27 P.R. 904People v. Jiménez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 904Rodríguez v. Nogueras (1919)
- 27 P.R. 904People v. Carreras (1919)
- 27 P.R. 904Soler v. People (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905Church v. Municipality of Bayamón (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905Martínez v. Crosas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905People v. Pérez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905People v. Rubio (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905Succession of León Paz v. Sepulveda (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905Gely v. Riefkohl (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905Franceschi v. López Acosta (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905People v. Barbosa (1919)
- 27 P.R. 905People v. Orta (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906Brakle v. Bonnin (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906Cruz v. Registrar of San Juan (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906Franceschi v. Arjona (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906Martínez v. Crosas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906Nazario v. Santos (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906Palou v. Aspurúa (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906People v. Gonzalez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906People v. Marcano (1919)
- 27 P.R. 906Rivera v. Sepúlveda (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907Llompart v. Cuevas Zequeira (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907Llompart v. Díaz (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907People v. Arnau (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907People v. López (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907People v. Rovira (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907Ramírez v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907People v. Méndez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907Sobrino v. De Jesús (1919)
- 27 P.R. 907Wolkers v. Masson (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908People v. Carattini (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908People v. Cordova (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908People v. Molina (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908García v. Capella (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908Padilla v. American Railroad (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908Pérez Acosta v. Rivero (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908Pacheco v. Zaldcondo (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908People v. Jefferson (1919)
- 27 P.R. 908People v. Nieves (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Beauchamp v. Registrar of Aguadilla (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Goble v. Truyol (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Homar, Colón & Co., Ltd. v. Sepúlveda (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Laborde v. Surillo (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Martínez v. Crosas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909People v. Suárez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Rodríguez v. Castillo (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Gregori v. Luccioni (1919)
- 27 P.R. 909Robledo v. Central Aguirre Co. (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910Alvarez v. Alvarez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910Brugman v. Succession of Sama (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910Fernández v. Marrero (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910Morales v. Succession of Ruiz (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910Ortiz v. Succession of Sama (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910People v. Calero (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910People v. Castro (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910People v. Reyes (1919)
- 27 P.R. 910Santiago v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911Abad v. Succession of de la Cruz (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911Bocanegra v. Bocanegra (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911Carrera v. Marrero (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911Delgado v. Cuevas Zequeira (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911People v. Figueroa (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911People v. García (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911People v. Sierra (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911Polá v. Luna (1919)
- 27 P.R. 911United States Paper Goods Co. v. Martínez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912Cividanes v. López Acosta (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912Coan v. Moral & Co., Ltd. (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912Díaz Molinaris v. Cividanes (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912Marrero v. Carrero (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912Martínez v. Crosas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912Mundo v. Franco (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912People v. Canisal (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912People v. López (1919)
- 27 P.R. 912Rosario v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913Delgado v. Sánchez Delgado (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913Fábregas v. Maldonado (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913People v. Ponce & Guayama Railroad (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913Porto Rico Coal Co. v. Benedicto (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913Gutiérrez del Arroyo v. Heirs of Gutiérrez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913Rivera v. Foote (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913Godreau Co. v. McCormick (1919)
- 27 P.R. 913People v. Cabezas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 914Martínez v. Crosas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 914Negrón v. Maldonado (1919)
- 27 P.R. 914People v. Serrano (1919)
- 27 P.R. 914People v. Vincenty (1919)
- 27 P.R. 914Robledo v. Vizcarrondo (1919)
- 27 P.R. 914Alemán v. Texidor (1919)
- 27 P.R. 914Llull v. Nadal (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915Canino v. American Railroad (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915People v. Cosme (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915People v. Rodríguez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915Burgos v. Santini (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915People v. Sánchez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915Alvarez v. Díaz (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915Guzmán v. Crosas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915People v. Cruz (1919)
- 27 P.R. 915People v. Falcón (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916Colón v. Registrar of Caguas (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916Flores (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916People v. Jiménez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916People v. Montaño (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916People v. Montero (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916People v. Rivera (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916People v. Santiago (1919)
- 27 P.R. 916Cayey-Caguas Tobacco Co. v. Ramírez (1919)
- 27 P.R. 917Márquez v. Ramos (1919)
- 27 P.R. 917Rivera v. García (1919)