Volume 281 — United States Reports

Held: by implication of law, as money had and received to her use. 3. As the basis of the plaintiff’s cause of action was the obligation imposed by law upon the District by reason of the failure of consideration for the assessment of benefits, it was one, we think, of which the Municipal Court had jurisdiction as a claim for debt arising out of an “ implied ” contract, not exceeding $300. 5 4.

Held: in the absence of any legislation by Congress, that where a seaman’s death resulted from a maritime tort on navigable waters within a State whose statutes gave a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts could entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those to whom such right *44 was given.

Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning U.S. Federal income taxation, about a man who reported only half of his earnings for years 1920 and 1921. Guy C. Earl and his wife had entered into a contract that would potentially save a lot of tax. The contract specified that earnings were owned by the couple as joint tenants. It is unlikely that it was tax-motivated, since there was no income tax in 1901 when they executed the contract. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. delivered the Court’s opinion which generally stands for the proposition that income from services is taxed to the party who performed the services. The case is used to support the proposition that the substance of the transaction, rather than the form, is controlling for tax purposes.

Held: beginning at an early day, that, notwithstanding the imperative language of the statute, it was competent for the parties to waive a trial by jury.

Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), was one of the earliest conflict of laws cases in which the United States Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution imposes certain limitations on the ability of states to apply their own law to events occurring in other states.

Held: “The decision of the Court of Appeals under § -9 of the act of 1905 2 is not a judicial judgment. It is a mere administrative decision.

Held: falls within the power of taxation granted to Congress, and the challenge becomes one not to the power, but to an abuse of it. The possibility that a federal statute passed under the taxing power may be so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall before the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment must be conceded — Brushaber v. Union Pac.

Held: on the other hand, that the certification of a definite question of law is not rendered objectionable merely because the answer may be decisive of the case, and also that the importance or controlling character of the question certified, if it be a question of law and suitably specific, affords no ground for declining *578 to accept the certification. United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 66, and cáses cited.

Held: for the purpose of property tax, that the situs of a credit is the domicile of the creditor, . . . . “ If we could apply the same rule to an inheritance tax, we might have less difficulty in disposing of this case. The inheritance tax statute, Article XXI, Ch. 1, R. S. 1919, provides an entirely independent method of ascertaining the property subject to inheritance tax from that applicable for general tax.

Held: notwithstanding a provision in the act of consent purporting to “ except the administration of the criminal laws of the State,” that the purchase operated under the constitutional provision to pass full jurisdiction over the land to the United States and to divest the State of all jurisdiction thereover, criminal as well as civil.

Held: on appeal, that relief from the alleged discriminatory assessment could not be had in any suit at law; that this bill in equity was the appropriate and only remedy, unless relief could have been had by timely application to some administrative board; and that neither of the boards of equalization was charged with the power and duty to grant such relief.