Volume 290 — Illinois Reports

<p>1. Trover — trover will lie for conversion of bills, notes and securities. Trover will lie for the wrongful conversion of bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds or other securities for the payment of money.</p> <p>2. Same — what is conversion. Any unauthorized act by which an owner is deprived of his property permanently or indefinitely or the exercise of dominion over property inconsistent with the rights of the owner is a conversion.</p> <p>3. Same — ^what constitutes conversion of securities by bailees. Where a bailor delivers securities to bailees, to be sold or otherwise dealt with as the bailor may direct or to be returned within a time mentioned in receipts given by the bailees, a failure to return the securities and the disposition of them without the authority of the bailor is á wrongful conversion.</p> <p>4. Same — when contracts of intestate are admissible in suit in trover by administrator. Where an administrator is suing for the wrongful conversion of securities of his intestate after he had delivered them to the defendants by way of bailment, contracts of the deceased with the defendants under the terms of which she held the securities are admissible for the purpose of establishing the character and value of the deceased’s interest in the property converted.</p> <p>5. Bailments — bailee’s authority is limited by terms of bailment contract. The authority of a bailee is limited by the terms of the contract by which he acquired the possession of the property, and if he uses the property for a different purpose from that for which he was authorized, or in a different manner or for a longer time, he will be held liable for any loss even through an unavoidable accident.</p> <p>6. Contracts — when contract evidences a.loan and not the purchase of securities. Where a brokerage firm agrees to invest a certain amount of its client’s money for five years, the client agreeing to hold, subject to the full control of the firm, all securities purchased, and the partnership agreeing to pay her ten per cent per year, for the use of the money and to re-pay the money invested upon termination of the agreement, the contract evidences a loan at a usurious rate of interest and not the purchase and sale of securities!</p> <p>7. Executors and administrators — when rule that indebtedness of intestate cannot be set off in action by administrator does not apply. The rule that in an action to recover money accruing to an administrator after the death of an intestate the defendant cannot set off a debt due from the intestate in her lifetime does not apply where the administrator sues to recover the value of the deceased’s interest in securities wrongfully converted by the defendants, and in ascertaining the value of such interest, payments made to the intestate in her lifetime, including usurious interest, are properly taken into consideration.</p> <p>8. Same — administrator may sue for a conversion of securities belonging to his estate — waiver. Where an administrator delivers to bailees securities held by his intestate in her lifetime and the bailees wrongfully convert the securities to their own use the administrator may maintain an action of trover in his name as administrator, and the fact that he has received payments from the bailees according to their contracts with the deceased, by the terms of which she acquired the securities, does not waive the tort or affect the administrator’s right to sue for the conversion.</p> <p>9. Practice — Appellate Court may allow plaintiff to remit part of the verdict and enter final judgment. Where the constitutional right to a jury trial has not been waived, the Appellate Court has no power, on reversing a judgment at law, to determine the cause on the merits and enter final judgment, but where the only ground for a new trial is excessive damages, the plaintiff may be given his election to obviate the objection by remitting a part of the verdict or take a new trial.</p> <p>10. Same — when defendant cannot complain that the Appellate Court entered final judgment. Where the Appellate Court finds that the plaintiff has recovered an excessive verdict and enters a final judgment reducing the amount, the defendant cannot complain that the Appellate Court did not give the plaintiff his election to remit part of the verdict or take a new trial.</p> <p>11. Evidence — what question cannot be asked a witness to impeach defendants’ reputation for truth. In an action of trover a party who is called as a witness to impeach the defendants’ reputation for truth and veracity may be asked on cross-examination if he had had trouble or litigation with the defendants and if he entertained an unfriendly feeling toward them, but he should not be asked to explain the merits or nature of the litigation.</p> <p>12. Same — when admission of improper evidence will not require reversal of judgment. A judgment should not be reversed for an error in the admission of the testimony of a witness to impeach the defendants’ reputation for truth and veracity where there is no apparent reason to expect a different result if a new trial is had excluding such improper evidence.</p>

<p>Writ- or Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. David F. Matchett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. Franklin H. Boggs, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. John H. Marshall, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Negligence — contributory negligence does not bar recovery under Federal Employers’ Liability act. Under the Federal Employers’ Liability act contributory negligence does not bar a recovery but only goes to the amount of damages.</p> <p>2. Same — when contributory negligence is not sole proximate cause. Although the negligence of á locomotive engineer in failing to observe,that there was no light at a closed switch leading to a turn-table may have been a proximate cause of the accident resulting in his death, such negligence is not the sole proximate cause where it is proved that the agents or employees of the railway company failed to perform their accustomed duties of opening the switch and lighting the signal lamp on the switch-stand.</p> <p>3. Same' — under Federal Employers’ Liability act burden is on defendant to prove contributory negligence. The burden of proof' of contributory negligence, under the Federal Employers’ Liability act, is on the defendant.</p> <p>4. Same — when instruction requiring defendant to prove contributory negligence does not coniine it to its own witnesses. The burden is on the defendant railroad company to prove contributory negligence by its employee, and an instruction stating that the burden is on the defendant, to establish the defense of contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence does not confine the defendant to its own witnesses nor mislead the jury into such an understanding.</p> <p>5. Same — rule as to furnishing reasonably safe place to work. The rule requiring the master to furnish the servant a reasonably safe place in which to work has no reference to any other duty than that of keeping the premises physically safe.</p> <p>6. Same — negligent act of defendant need not be sole cause of injury. The negligent act or omission of the- defendant must be one of the essential causes producing the injury but need not be the sole cause nor the last or nearest cause, and where an injury proceeds from two causes operating together, the party putting in motion one of them is liable the same as .though it were the sole cause.</p>

<p>1. Special taxation — situation of property should be considered in determining zvhether work shall be embraced in one improvement. The situation of the property against which special taxes are levied should be considered in determining whether the work ought to be embraced in a common .scheme as one improvement or should be separated into different improvements.</p> <p>2. Same — what discretion may be exercised by council in providing for local improvement. In passing an ordinance to make local improvements the city council is clothed with discretion to determine what improvement is required, its character, the limits of the districts to be taxed, when the improvement shall be made, and the manner of its construction; and such discretion, when honestly exercised, is not reviewable by the courts.</p> <p>3. Same — application for judgment for delinquent assessment is a collateral proceeding. An application for judgment and order of sale is a proceeding collateral to the judgment of confirmation and also collateral to the judgment confirming the certificate of the board of local improvements of the final completion and acceptance of the work.</p> <p>4. Same — want of jurisdiction must appear upon face of record in collateral proceeding. In a collateral proceeding every presumption is in favor of the validity of the judgment attacked, and want of jurisdiction to enter a judgment in a proceeding for a local improvement must appear on the face of the record when relied on as a defense in a proceeding by the county collector for judgment and order of sale for delinquent assessments.</p> <p>5. Same — question zjvhether or not an improvement should have been divided cannot be raised in collateral proceeding. The question whether, in a special taxation proceeding in which the county court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, an improvement should have been embraced in one common scheme or should have been divided cannot be raised in a collateral proceeding to collect delinquent assessments.</p> <p>6. Same — section 84 of Local Improvement act is not unconstitutional in requiring only substantial compliance with ordinance. Section 84 of the Local Improvement act, in requiring only a substantial' compliance with an ordinance for a local improvement, does not deprive the property owner of due process of law, as a substantial compliance or performance means a compliance with the essential requirements of the ordinance.</p> <p>7. Same — term “lowest responsible bidder” does not mean financial responsibility, alone. The statutory requirement that contracts for public improvements shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder does not require the letting of a contract to the lowest bidder upon the ascertainment of his financial responsibility, only, but the term “responsible" includes the ability to respond by the discharge of the contractor’s obligation under the terms of the contract.</p> <p>8. Same — courts will not interfere -with award of contract ex-. cept for fraud. Where municipal authorities have exercised their discretion in the award of a contract for a public improvement the presumption is that their action was regular and lawful, and the courts will not interfere, in the absence of fraud, with the exercise of official discretion by said authorities in awarding such contract.</p> <p>9. Same — ■cities under commission form must follow Local Improvement act. Except as otherwise provided, a city council acting under the Commission Form of Government act must follow the provisions of the Local Improvement act in making local improvements.</p> <p>10. Same — objections to award of contract should be made at first opportunity. The option to have the bid and contract for a local improvement rejected or declared invalid should be exercised at the earliest possible moment, and property owners who are interested and have knowledge of the facts should not be permitted to withhold their objections to the awarding of the contract until the collector’s application for judgment and after they have secured the benefit of the contractor’s work.</p> <p>11. Same — fact that courts cannot review an award of contract does not render-statute unconstitutional. Construing the provisions of the Local Improvement act as allowing a final determination by municipal authorities of the question whether the contract for an improvement has been let to the lowest responsible bidder does not violate the provisions of the Federal constitution as to due process of law, as that question need not be heard by the courts, on review or otherwise.</p> <p>12. Constitutional law — a statute is not unconstitutional because it denies right of appeal. A statute is not unconstitutional because it denies the right of appeal or writ of error to review the court’s judgment in a statutory proceeding, as the legislature has the right to end such litigation in the trial court.</p> <p>13. Contracts — what is meant by substantial performance of a contract. Substantial performance of a contract means performance in all the essential elements necessary to the accomplishment of the purpose of the contract, as' it is the substance, and not the form, that is sought in the enforcement of contracts, ordinances or agreements of similar nature.</p> <p>14. Words and phrases — definition of word “substantial!’ The word “substantial” means in substance, in the main, essential, or inr eluding material or essential elements.</p> <p>15. Fraud — fraud must be specifically alleged. As the courts will not assume fraud, there must be specific allegations setting out the facts upon which the claim of fraud rests and not merely the conclusions of the pleader.</p> <p>16. Practice — a motion to strike admits only averments well pleaded. A motion to strike objections or pleadings is, in effect, a demurrer, and admits only those averments that are well pleaded.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Charles M. Foell, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error, to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. George F. Barrett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Deeds — there is a strong presumption in favor of delivery in case of voluntary settlement — burden of proof. The law presumes much more in favor of the delivery of a deed of voluntary settlement than of ordinary bargain and sale, especially where the grantee is an infant, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming adversely to show that there was no delivery.</p> <p>2. Same — what constitutes a delivery. A delivery is essential-to the validity of a deed, and to constitute a delivery the grantor must part with control over the deed and retain no right to reclaim or recall it.</p> <p>3. Same — testimony of custodian that he would have returned deed if called for does not defeat delivery. The fact that the custodian of a deed testifies that if the grantor had called for the deed he would have given it to him does not show a non-delivery and raises no presumption as to the intention of the grantor.</p> <p>4. Same — intention of grantor as to delivery is not affected by unauthorized indorsement on envelope containing deed. Where a deed is delivered in escrow the grantor is not responsible for what a third party may write on the envelope containing the deed, and the grantor’s oral instructions at the time the deed was delivered cannot be overcome by the subsequent unauthorized act of another.</p>

<p>Appear from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. Emery C. Graves, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Corporations — rights and privileges of foreign corporation. A foreign corporation legally doing business in Illinois has all the rights and privileges of a similar domestic corporation.</p> <p>2. Charities — charity, in law, is not confined to the relief of poverty. Charity, in the legal sense, is not confined to the relief of poverty and distress but has a wider signification, and embraces the improvement and promotes the welfare of man.</p> <p>3. Same — what are the distinctive features of a charitable organisation.. The principal and distinctive features of a charitable organization are that it has no capital stock and makes no provision for dividends 'or profits but derives its funds mainly, from public and private charity and holds them in trust for the charitable purposes expressed in its charter.</p> <p>4. ' Same — an institution may be charitable although it charges those who are able to pay for its benefits. An institution does not lose its charitable character by reason of the fact that those- recipients of its benefits who are able to pay are required to do so, where no profit is made by the institution and the amounts so received are applied in furthering its charitable purposes and its benefits are refused to none on account of inability to pay therefor.</p> <p>5. Taxes — -when a religious publishing society is exempt from personal property tax. A religious publishing society which is engaged in the publication and circulation of moral books and religious tracts and books for use in Sunday schools and sells the same to any who wish to buy them is exempt from a personal property tax on such books and supplies, where the primary purpose of the business is that of religious instruction and where the profits from the business are used for that purpose.</p> <p>6. Same — exemption statutes will be strictly construed — charities. Whether property is exempt from taxation must be determined by statutory provisions, and those provisions wifi be strictly construed against the exemption and in favor of the State; but as charities relieve the burdens of government and are favored in the law, a charitable institution will be exempt from taxation if it comes fairly within the terms of the exemption provisions.</p> <p>Dunn, C. J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the County Court of Douglas county; the Hon. D. H. WamslFy, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston county; the Hon. G. W. Patton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Hugh J. Kearns, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Wells M. Cooic, Judge, présiding.</p>

<p>1. Telegraph companies — telegraph company cannot limit its liability for negligence in transmission of message. A telegraph company cannot limit its liability for negligence in the transmission of a telegram by requiring a patron to write his message upon a blank bearing a condition exonerating the company from liability for an incorrect transmission unless the message is repeated at an additional cost to the sender or unless it is insured at an impossible rate, but such restrictions must be confined to mistakes due to infirmities of telegraphy which are unavoidable.</p> <p>2. Same — burden is on company to show how mistake in transmission occurred. In an action against a telegraph company for damages caused by the erroneous transmission of a telegram, if the plaintiff has proved the inaccuracy of the message the burden is on the company to show how the mistake occurred.</p> <p>3. Same — company must transmit message as delivered to it. A telegraph company is a public institution and is bound by law to serve all who apply, and when it receives a message upon which the tariff has been paid by the sender it is the duty of the company to transmit the message as delivered to it.</p> <p>4. Same — the Carmack amendment does not apply to telegraph' companies. The Carmack amendment to the Inter-State Commerce act, concerning the liability of inter-State carriers for negligence, deals only with the shipment of property and does not apply to the transmission of messages by telegraph.</p> <p>5. Same — amendment of ipio to Inter-State Commerce act does not affect liability of telegraph companies for negligence in sending messages. The amendment of 1910 to section 1 of the Inter-State Commerce act, including telegraph and telephone companies within the provisions of the act and allowing different rates for different classes of service, deals purely with rate-making, and makes no provision with respect to the liability of such carriers for their own negligence in the transmission' of messages.</p> <p>6. Same — liability of company for negligence in transmission of inter-State telegram is a question of State law. Neither the commerce clause of the Federal constitution nor the Inter-State Commerce act renders inoperative the common law or State statutory regulations which are in aid of inter-State -commerce and not in interference therewith, and as Congress has not legislated in regard to the liability of telegraph companies for their negligence in the delivery of inter-State telegrams, such liability is controlled by the common or statute law of the State in which the service is rendered.</p>

<p>Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. Charles V. Miles, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Husband and wipe — a widow who abandons her homestead has only right to have dower assigned. A widow who has lost her homestead by acquiring a new home has no estate in the homestead property but a mere right to have her dower assigned in the whole premises, and where she retains possession through a tenant her right to have dower assigned continues while possession is so held.</p> <p>2. Same — widow acquires no title by paying off husband’s mortgage. A widow acquires no title to her husband’s property by paying off a mortgage with her own money, but such payment is necessary to the preservation of her estate of homestead and the interests of the heirs, and she thereby acquires a lien on the interests of the heirs for their shares of the incumbrance.</p> <p>3. Mortgages — mortgagee has only a qualified title during existence of debt. While a mortgage conveys the title as between the mortgagor and mortgagee such title is only a qualified one, as security for the creditor during the existence of the debt, and when the debt is paid both the title and right of possession of the mortgagee are at an end.</p> <p>4. Limitations — when possession of one heir cannot be tacked to possession of zvidow. Where a widow abandon's her homestead estate but continues in possession through one of the heirs as tenant, such tenant cannot, as against the other heirs, tack his possession onto the widow’s after her death, as her rights in the premises pass to all her heirs and not alone to the one who is tenant.</p> <p>5. Same — evidence of adverse possession must be clear and positive. All presumptions are in favor of the true owner, and to prove adverse possession the evidence must be clear that the possession is hostile, actual, visible and exclusive and that it has been continuous for twenty years or more without any recognition of the title of the true owner.</p> <p>Stone, J., dissenting.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Henry Guerin, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph Sabath, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; — heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Edgar Eldredge, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Charities — what is a charitable trust. A charitable trust is a trust created for the purpose of carrying out one or more of the objects of a gift to charitable uses.</p> <p>2. Same — when a conveyance between charitable corporations does not give rise to enforcible charitable trust. Where one charitable corporation makes a conveyance to another for the sole purpose of better' enabling the donor to carry out one of its corporate purposes, the mere fact that both corporations are charitable does not give rise to such a charitable trust as a court of chancery will enforce, and where the deed contains conditions subsequent a court of chancery will not enforce a forfeiture for their breach.</p> <p>3. Same — charitable corporation cannot donate its funds except to carry out purpose for which it was created. A charitable corporation is created by law for' a definite purpose, and it cannot donate its funds to another corporation organized for a similar or other purpose, except to aid in carrying out the purpose for which the donor corporation was created.</p> <p>4. Same — gift does not revert to donor for abuse of trust except by express condition. If the trustees of a charity abuse the trust, mis-employ the charity fund or commit a breach of the trust, the property does not revert to the donor or his heirs or legal representative unless there is an express condition of the gift that it shall so revert. '</p> <p>5. Same — when equity will enforce obligations of gift to charitable corporation. Where a gift is made to a charitable corporation imposing obligations upon the donee without any condition of reverter, equity has jurisdiction to enforce the continuing obligation ; and where there is a gift to one charitable corporation imposing conditions for the benefit of another similar corporation, equity will enforce the mutual obligations, at the suit of either party, in accordance with the terms of the trust.</p> <p>6. Same — when Attorney General is not a necessary party. In a suit to enforce the obligations o-f a charitable tr'ust which is public in its nature the Attorney General is a necessary party, where the parties having charge of the fund unite in abuses of their trust and there is no one who has a right to sue in his own name, but not where the gift is to one of two charitable corporations for the benefit of the other, which is to a certain extent charged with the administration of the trust and is seeking by its bill to be allowed to discharge the duties imposed upon it as well as to enforce the obligations of the donee.</p> <p>7. Deeds — when provision in deed is a condition subsequent and not a covenant. In case of doubt as to whether a certain provision in a deed is a condition or a covenant it will be construed to be a covenant to prevent the destruction of the estate, but where the deed expressly provides for a reverter upon failure to comply with the condition, the conveyance is one upon condition subsequent.</p> <p>8. Same — equity will enforce a covenant though it will not declare a forfeiture for breach of condition. A covenant differs from a condition in that in a proper case a court of chancery may enforce the specific performance of the former where it would not enforce the latter because to do so would work a forfeiture of the estate.</p> <p>9. .Same — provision in deed for appointing medical staff of hospital construed. In a deed from an educational corporation to a hospital corporation, a provision that the “staff of the hospital” shall be drawn from the faculty of the grantor’s medical school is mandatory and not optional and means the entire hospital staff.</p> <p>10. Pleading — whether bill is multifarious depends on circumstances. There is no inflexible rule for determining whether or not a bill is multifarious and each case must be determined largely upon its own facts.</p> <p>11. Same — several matters may be joined in one bill to prevent multiplicity of suits. A court of equity will allow great latitude in joining several matters in one bill when all grow out of the same transaction and all parties are interested alike in' the same right and seek .the same character of relief, and the mere fact that two or more matters are joined in one bill to prevent a multiplicity of suits does not render the bill multifarious.</p>

<p>Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard S. TuthilL, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Livingston county; the Hon. G. W. Patton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Disbarment — fact that tine has been assessed against attorney is not, alone, ground for disbarment. The fact that a fine has been assessed against an attorney or evidence that he has visited disorderly houses will not, alone, warrant his disbarment, but such evidence may be considered in connection with other evidence in determining whether he is a proper person to hold a license to practice law.</p> <p>2. Same — where attorney’s acts constitute a crime it is not necessary that he be convicted before he can be disbarred. It is not essential that a conviction of an attorney for a crime committed by him be had as a basis of disbarment on account of the acts constituting the crime.</p> <p>3. Same — attorney should make remittance of collection as soon as possible. It is the absolute duty of an attorney to forthwith notify his client of a collection made and to make remittance, less the attorney’s proper charges, as soon as he can reasonably do so, and the practice of retaining money collected for clients for an indefinite period deserves the severest reprobation.</p> <p>4. Same — leave to amend count to correspond to proof must be obtained from Supreme C.ourt. In a disbarment proceeding, if the evidence does not fully correspond with the charge as laid- in a certain count in the information the action of "the commissioner in refusing to permit the relators to amend their count is proper, as leave to amend must be had from the Supreme Court.</p> <p>5. Same — an attorney may be disbarred for converting client’s property to his own use. Conversion of the property of his client by an attorney to his own use is an offense that cannot in any degree be countenanced, and when a lawyer so conducts himself that confidence can no longer be placed in him with safety he should be disbarred from practice.</p>

Writ oE Error to the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Martin M. GridlEy, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Criminal law — jury is not bound to believe defendant’s testimony. Where the defendant is the only person to testify to the actual facts of the homicide with which he is charged, the fact that he has not been contradicted by anyone does not necessarily require the jury to believe his testimony, as his story may be so improbable as to justify the jury in disregarding it or it may be contradicted by the facts and circumstantial evidence.</p> <p>2. Same — affidavit of a juror cannot be received to set aside his verdict. The affidavit of a juror cannot be received to impeach or set aside his verdict and is not properly admissible in support of a motion for a new trial and to set aside the verdict for the misconduct of the jurors.</p> <p>3. Same — fact that jury passed by the place of the crime does not vitiate their verdict. The fact that the jury, contrary to the directions of the court to the bailiffs, were taken past the building where the crime was committed, while they were out for an auto^ mobile ride, is not ground for setting aside their verdict.</p> <p>4. Same — misconduct of jurors, if prejudicial, is gound for new trial. Misconduct on the part of the jury which is clearly prejudicial to the accused or which improperly influences the jury and is not caused or waived by the accused is ground for setting aside a conviction and granting a new trial.</p> <p>5. Same — whether misconduct of jurors was prejudicial must be determined largely by trial court. On a motion for new trial because of the misconduct of the jurors during the trial of a criminal case, the question whether the misconduct was prejudicial to the accused must be determined largely by the trial court.</p> <p>6. Same — evidence tending to show motive is admissible. In a trial for murder, evidence which tends in any way to show motive on the part of the accused or will fairly tend to explain his actions should be admitted.</p> <p>7. Same — when evidence is not relevant to the issue: On the trial of a person for an unwitnessed homicide, which he claims he committed in self-defense after he had accused the other party of certain improper business transactions, letters and papers which the accused claims are sufficient to substantiate the justice of his accusation are not admissible, as they would tend merely to raise collateral issues.</p> <p>8. Same — theory of self-defense should not he ignored in instructions. Where the defendant in a murder trial rests his case solely on the theory of self-defense, instructions should not be given which might lead the jury to believe that they may ignore the theory of -self-defense in arriving at their verdict.</p> <p>g. Same — when instruction defining malice aforethought is misleading. In a murder trial where self-defense is relied upon, an instruction is misleading which states that “the deliberate intention called malice aforethought need only be such deliberation and thought as enables a person to appreciate and understand, at the time the act was committed, the nature of his act and its probable result.”</p> <p>io. Same — giving a correct instruction does not cure error of an incorrect one. It is sufficient if all the instructions given, considered together, fully and fairly announce the rules of law applicable to the theory of the prosecution and of the defense, but it does not follow that the giving of a correct instruction cures the error of an incorrect one, as it is impossible to tell which the jury will follow.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. Thomas M. Jett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Edgar county; the' Hon. Dan V. Dayton, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ OE Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jessé A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Madison county; the Hon. Otto W. LongenEckER, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. Perry L. Persons, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeals and errors — when a freehold is not involved. Where creditors of the owner of a life estate have purchased the life tenant’s interest at a judicial sale and one creditor has taken the sheriff’s deed as trustee, no freehold is involved in an action of forcible detainer brought by said trustee against the life tenant’s lessee, where the only issues are as to possession and payment of rent.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law- — title of act need contain only general expression of subject. While the constitution does not require the subject of an act to be specifically and accurately expressed in the title but permits a general expression of the subject, the title must be specific enough to accomplish the purpose for which the subject is required to be expressed therein.</p> <p>2. Same — purpose of requiring subject of act to be expressed in the title. The purpose of the constitutional provision requiring the subject of an act to be expressed in the title is to inform the people, through the usual publication of legislative proceedings, of the subject of the legislation which is being considered, and to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by inserting provisions into the bill of which the title gives no intimation and which provisions might thereby be unintentionally adopted.</p> <p>3. Same — constitutionality of acts does not rest upon basis of their wisdom. The courts cannot decide the constitutionality of statutes on the basis of the wisdom, or lack thereof, shown in any such legislative enactments but their validity must be decided by the provisions of the constitution, although the result may be to defeat worthy legislation.</p> <p>4. Same — what provisions may be included in act having general title. If the title is general any number of provisions may be contained in the act, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and may be considered in furtherance of such subject.</p> <p>5. Same — legislature may decide whether title shall be general or specific. Whether or not the subject expressed in the title of an act shall be general or specific is a matter which rests in the discretion of the legislature, and where the title has not been made broad enough to include certain provisions in the act those provisions must be held invalid, although they would have been properly included if the title had been more general.</p> <p>6. Same — when provisions for levy of a tax to maintain parks and boulevards are invalid. The acts of 1891, 1895 and 1897 were enacted for thg special purpose, as expressed in their titles, of authorizing the issue of bonds for the improvement of parks and boulevards and the levy of a tax to pay the same; and the provisions contained therein for the levy of a tax to maintain and manage the parks and boulevards are invalid, as not being expressed in the titles.</p> <p>7. Same — when tax-payer is not estopped to assert invalidity of act. A tax-payer is not estopped to assert the invalidity of an act under which a tax is levied merely because he has for many years paid taxes levied under the same act.</p> <p>8. Same — what determines whether title of an act expresses a double purpose. In determining whether the title of an act expresses a double purpose, in contravention of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, the test is whether, in all of the provisions of the act and its title, there is a tendency to promote a single object, which is expressed in the title.</p> <p>9. Estoppel — doctrine of estoppel in pais is based on fraudulent purpose. The doctrine of estoppel in pais is based on a fraudulent purpose, and before it can be invoked in aid of a litigant it must appear that the person against whom it is invoked has by his words or conduct caused such litigant to believe in the existence of a certain state of things and induced him to act upon that belief.</p> <p>10. Same — acting in good faith under mistake of law will not give■ rise to estoppel in pais. If both parties are equally cognizant of the facts and one has acted under a mistake of law, the other party cannot say that he has been deceived by such acts or that he is entitled to an application of the rule of estoppel in pais, but he will be considered as having acted on his own judgment, solely.</p> <p>11. Statutes — language permissive in form may be consumed as imperative. As the object of the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, language permissive in form will be construed as imperative where a consideration of the whole statute indicates sqch intention.</p> <p>12. Same — what must be considered in ascertaining intention of the legislature. In ascertaining the intention of the legislature in adopting a statute the whole act must be given consideration, together with the state of the law prior to its adoption, any changes made by the act and the apparent motive for them.</p> <p>13. Sanitary districts — when, only, are earnings from water pozoer and docks required to be applied to payment of bonds. Under the proviso to section 10 of the Sanitary District act of 1889 it is only when the earnings from water power and docks are not required for other corporate purposes that such earnings are to be applied to the payment of the interest and principal^of the bonded indebtedness.</p> <p>14. Taxes — objector must prove item for loss and cost is unreasonable or fraudulent. The burden of proving the invalidity of a tax levy rests upon the objector, and in the absence of proof showing the inclusion of illegal items in the amount levied for loss and cost of collection, or that the levy is unreasonable or fraudulent, the presumption of the validity of such levy obtains.</p> <p>15. Same — objector to sanitary district tax for building sewers must prove that the sewers are local improvements. Whether a sewer is a local improvement or an adjunct or addition which a sanitary district may construct is a question of fact to be determined in each case, and the objector to a sanitary district tax for building sewers must prove that the improvement, when constructed, will, in fact, be a local improvement which the district has no power to make.</p> <p>16. Same — purpose of the constitutional provision for direct annual tax. The purpose of the constitutional provision requiring a municipal corporation, at the time of incurring an indebtedness, to provide for a direct annual tax sufficient to pay accruing interest and to pay the principal within twenty years, was to make the payment of the indebtedness certain within twenty years, and hence a municipal corporation is not authorized to remit such tax except to the extent it has money on hand applicable to the debt and has so applied it.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Edgar county; the Hon. Dan V. Dayton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Williamson county; the Hon. B. W. Pope, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith:, Judge, presiding. 11</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hardin county; the Hon. J. C. EaglETOn, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes — when bill to enjoin collection of taxes is a proper remedy — burden of proof. Taxing authorities cannot arbitrarily assess a person on property he does not own, and the proper remedy to prevent the collection of a tax levied on such an assessment is in equity by a bill for an injunction; but in such case the presumption is that the tax is just and lawful, and the objector has the burden of proving the tax invalid.</p> <p>2. Same — when court cannot disregard uncontradicted testimony. Uncontradicted testimony by a witness in a chancery case cannot be disregarded by the court where there is no inherent improbability in such testimony nor anything incredible in his statements and where there are no facts or circumstances in evidence inconsistent therewith.</p> <p>3. Same — valid portion of tax should be sustained if separable from invalid portion. Upon a bill to enjoin the collection of a tax assessed upon shares of stock alleged to be owned by the complainant in various corporations, the 1;ax should be sustained as to such shares as the complainant admits he owns or fails to disprove ownership of, provided the valid portion of the tax can be separated from the invalid portion; but if such separation is impossible on the record presented, granting the injunction as prayed will not preclude a subsequent assessment of such shares as omitted property.</p>

<p>Appear from the County Court of Pike county; the Hon. Burr Swan, Judge, presiding. "</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pope county; the Hon. A. W. Lewis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Negligence — grantor is not bound to see that premises remain in safe.condition. One who has conveyed premises and ceased to have any connection therewith owes no duty to any person to see that such premises are maintained in safe condition.</p> <p>2. Same — when former ozvner of premises is not liable for injury due to defective appliance. A former owner of premises who before conveying the same had installed a gas heater for water can not be held liable for an injury from escaping gas due to a defective condition of the exhaust pipe of the heater, where there is no proof that he knew of the dangerous condition at the time he sold the premises nor that the dangerous condition existed at that time.</p> <p>3. Practice — overruling demurrer does not preclude directing verdict. The fact that a demurrer to the declaration has been overruled and a plea of the general issue filed does not preclude the court from granting a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, as the demurrer and the motion do not present the same question.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. T. N. Green, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Robert E. Crow'E, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. Louis M. Reckhow, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Merritt W. Pinckney, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills — on appeal to circuit court proponents are not bound by testimony of subscribing witnesses. Under section 13 of the Wills act, on appeal to the circuit court from an order of probate the proponents of the will may support the same by any evidence competent to establish a will in chancery, and they are neither limited nor bound by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses.</p> <p>2. Same — on appeal from order of probate, contestants of will are confined to the-testimony of subscribing witnesses and to cross-examination. On appeal to the circuit court from an order of probate the contestants of the will are confined to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses and to the cross-examination of other witnesses offered by the proponents on the question of the mental condition of the testator.</p> <p>3. Same — subscribing witnesses are not expert witnesses on the question of mental capacity. The subscribing witnesses to a will are not expert witnesses as to the mental capacity of the testator at the time of the execution. of the will, and their opinions are not entitled to any more consideration than those of other witnesses merely because they are attesting witnesses.</p> <p>4. Same — capacity to transact business is best evidence of sound mind and memory. The best evidence of a testator’s soundness of mind and memory is positive testimony that he always transacted his ordinary business intelligently.</p> <p>5. Same — what proof of mental capacity is- sufficient to entitle will to probate. To entitle a will to probate on the issue of mental capacity of the testator it is sufficient to prove that at the time he executed the will he had sufficient mind to understand the particu-</p> <p>lar business in which he was engaged, to remember the natural objects of his bounty, to recall to mind his property and to make disposition of it understanding^, according to some purpose in his mind.</p> <p>6. Same — proof of mental condition before and after making will is competent.’ Proof of the mental condition of the testator prior and subsequent to the making of the will is competent for the purpose of establishing his mental capacity at the time the will was executed. • . .</p> <p>7. Same — proof of old age and childishness does not establish a want of testamentary capacity. Proof that the testator was enfeebled from the usual infirmities of old age and that he was childish does not, of itself, establish a want of testamentary capacity.</p> <p>8. Same — when opinion of lay witness on question of sanity is entitled to but little weight. The opinion of a witness who is not an expert that a person is of unsound mind is entitled to but little weight if it is not based upon circumstances stated by him which induce a reasonable belief of insanity.</p> <p>9. Same — proponents are not compelled to produce other than attesting witnesses. On appeal to the circuit court the statute gives the proponents the privilege of introducing witnesses other than the subscribing witnesses; but the fact that certain other persons who were present when the will was attested are not called by the proponents to testify raises no presumption that they would have corroborated the mere unsupported opinions of the attesting witnesses that the testator was of unsound mind.</p> <p>10. Same — attesting witnesses need not sign in presence of pach other. There is no requirement in the Wills act that the two attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of each other.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Harry Olson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Massac county; the Hon. D. T. Hartwell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ OE Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cass county; the Hon. C. A. E. Martin, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes- — tax-payer has no vested right under statutes fixing assessed, value. A tax-payer has no vested right under statutes fixing a certain portion of the actual value of property as the basis for an assessment for taxation, and such basis may be changed by the legislature at any time.</p> <p>2. Same — amount of taxes and rate of taxation are within control of legislature. The power to levy taxes is a necessary incident of- sovereignty and is possessed by the State without being conferred by the -people, and in Illinois the power to tax and to determine the amount of taxes and rate of taxation rests exclusively in the General Assembly, subject only to constitutional limitations.</p> <p>3. Same — power of taxing is not limited to July 1. The power of the General Assembly to levy taxes or increase taxes is not limited by the constitution or by statute to July 1, and if an assessment for taxation is completed before that time the taxing authorities may thereafter levy such an amount of tax as may then be authorized by law.</p> <p>4: Same — act of ipip increasing assessed value applies to taxes for ipip and is valid. The amendment of 1919 to sections 17 and 18 of the act for the assessment of property, .(Laws of 1919, p. 727,) by which the assessed value of property is fixed at one-half the actual value, applies to taxes for the year 1919 and is a valid law.</p> <p>Farmer, Duncan and Thompson, JJ., dissenting.</p>

<p>Appear from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. R. K. Welsh, Judge, presiding. .</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane county; the .Hon. C. F. Irwin, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Lake county; the Hon.,Perry.L. Persons, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional law — political and civil rights defined. A political right is a right exercisable in the administration of government, while a civil right is a right accorded to every member of a distinct community or nation.</p> <p>2. Equity — equity has no jurisdiction over political matters unless property rights are involved. The jurisdiction of a court of equity pertains only to the maintenance of civil, personal and property rights, and equity has no jurisdiction over matters of a political nature unless civil property rights are involved.</p> <p>3. Elections — equity cannot issue injunction to restrain holding of election. A court of equity cannot issue an injunction for the purpose of restraining the holding of an election or in any manner directing the mode in which the same shall be conducted, whether it is contended that the election is without authority of 'law or otherwise, as an election is purely a political matter.</p> <p>4. Same — tax-payer has no right to inj%mction to prevent holding an election because of its expense. The fact that the cost of an election will have to be borne by the State, and indirectly by the tax-payers, is not ground for an injunction, at the relation of a tax-payer, to prevent the Secretary of State from certifying' proposed public policy questions to be voted upon at such election, even though it is contended that they are not proper questions to be submitted.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Christian county;the Hon. Thomas M. Jett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. TorrIson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills — when rule that the last clause should prevail over prior inconsistent clause does not apply. The rule that where there are two inconsistent clauses in a will the last one shall prevail is only applicable where the real intention of the testator cannot be discovered and where the two clauses are so inconsistent that they cannot both coincide with the general intention of the testator.</p> <p>2. Same — law favors vesting of estates. The law favors the vesting of estates, and where a will is susceptible of two constructions the law is inclined to adopt the construction most favorable to the devisee rather than the construction which would be against his interest.</p> <p>3. Same — when the devisees take a vested interest at majority. Where a certain portion of the estate of the testatrix is devised in trust, share and share alike, for the children of a living daughter who are living when the youngest shall have attained majority, it being the declared intention of the testatrix that such portion shall go to the children of the daughter who attain their majority, each child .upon attaining majority has a vested equitable interest in his share, subject to its being increased in case any of the other children die- during minority or to its being decreased in case other children are born to such daughter and attain their majority.</p> <p>4. Trusts — when a trustee is not bound to hold accumulations. Though $e corpus of a trust estate must be kept invested until the death of the mother of the beneficiaries and until the youngest of them shall attain majority, the trustee is not bound to hold accumulations but may pay over to each child attaining majority its share of the income, and if other children are born to their mother and attain majority, the shares of the income to which they may be entitled may be paid out of the corpus of the estate.</p> <p>5. Partition — when a trust fund takes the place of interest in land. In a proceeding to partition land, where a one-fifth interest therein has been devised to such of the children of a certain living daughter as shall attain their majority, the interest of such beneficiaries in the land itself ceases at the sale and is transferred to their share of the fund realized from the sale, and, under the doctrine of representation, after-born children of the daughter will be bound by the partition proceeding.</p>

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes — when objection to tax for salary of State’s attorney should be sustained. Where the total expenses of the State’s attorney’s office are about $5000 for the year and he has collected and turned into the county treasury some $4080, a levy of $4300 for the salary of the State’s attorney and his assistant is not justified and an objection thereto should be sustained.</p> <p>2. Same — county tax item of $400 “for educational purposes” not sufficiently definite. An item of the county tax levy of $400 for “educational purposes” is not sufficiently definite to sustain the tax.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. C. V. Miles, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Words and phrases — ordinary meaning of the word “accident.” The word “accident” is not a technical legal term with a clearly defined meaning, but in its popular acceptation it means anything that happens without design or any event which is unforeseen by the person to whom it happens.</p> <p>2. Workmen’s compensation — what injuries are covered by Compensation act. The Compensation act includes every injury suffered in the course of employment for which there was an existing right of action at the time the act was passed, and it extends the liability of the employer to make compensation for injuries for which he was not previously liable and limits' such compensation.</p> <p>3. Same — when an injury is accidental. Where an injury can be traced to a definite time, place and cause and occurs in the course of the employment the injury is accidental within the meaning of the Compensation act and the obligation to pay compensation arises.</p> <p>4. Same — when injury from over-exertion is accidental. Where an employee who was in good health dies from hemorrhages, due to the tearing of an artery while engaged in vigorous muscular exertion in the manner habitual to his employment, the injury is accidental within the meaning of the Compensation act. (Jakub v. Industrial Com. 288 Ill. 87, distinguished.)</p> <p>5. Same — when the Supreme Court must sustain award. The Supreme Court must sustain the award of the Industrial Commission, which has .been confirmed by the circuit court, if there is competent evidence in the record to support it.</p> <p>6. Same — on a review of azvard the circuit court cannot enter judgment and, order execution. On a review of an award by certiorari the circuit court must either confirm the findings and award of the Industrial Commission or set aside the same and enter such a decision as is justified by law or remand. the cause for further proceedings, and the court cannot enter judgment for the payment of the award and order execution thereon.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Criminal la“w- — testimony of an accomplice should be received with caution. While the testimony of an accomplice is legal testimony and a conviction may be founded thereon, alone, such evidence is open to grave suspicion and should be acted upon with the utmost caution.</p>

<p>Taxes — when assessment for omitted credits will be sustained. An assessment by a board of review for credits omitted in previous years will be sustained notwithstanding the local assessor made an assessment for credits in such years and the taxes extended thereon were paid, where such assessments by the assessor were so grossly out of proportion to the true value of the credits as to show they were not made in the exercise of honest judgment, but, in effect, constituted a fraud upon the State and were no assessments at all. (Warner v. Campbell, 238 Ill. 630, explained.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. Sain Welty, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. Perry L. Persons, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Original petition for habeas corpus.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors — what is the ultimate fact which Appellate Court must find under section 120 of Practice act. Under section 120 of the Practice act the duty of the Appellate Court to make a finding of facts in its judgment implies the drawing of a conclusion of fact from all the evidentiary facts bearing on the issue, and the conclusion so drawn is the ultimate fact or facts upon which the case depends and which it is the duty of the Appellate Court to find if it reverses without remanding.</p> <p>2. Same — vahen finding by the Appellate Court is conclusive. Where the only issue tried in an action of assumpsit is on a plea of payment, a finding by the Appellate Court, on reversing a judgment .in favor of the defendants, that the checks sent by the' defendants to the plaintiff were not accepted by the plaintiff as payment of the indebtedness sued on is a finding of the ultimate fact in issue and is conclusive.</p> <p>3. Same — finding by Appellate Court on mixed questions of law and fact is binding. In an action at law a finding by the Appellate Court on mixed questions of law and’ fact is binding on the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation — decision of commission should be according to preponderance of evidence. The Industrial Commission should render its decision in accordance with the preponderance of all the evidence given on the hearing and not make an award merely because there is some evidence which tends to sustain it nor speculate upon a state of facts which does not reasonably appear from the evidence to exist, but if there is any competent evidence to justify the award the Supreme Court cannot set it aside as unsupported by the evidence.</p> <p>2. Same — circuit court has no power to direct payment of the award and order execution. If the circuit court, in reviewing an award of the Industrial Commission, is of opinion the award should be sustained, its only authority is to confirm the award, and it can not direct payment of the award and order an execution.</p> <p>3. Practice — plaintiff in error should file brief as well as argument. Under the rules of the Supreme Court the plaintiff in error should file a brief containing points and authorities relied upon for a reversal of the judgment and not merely an argument, and under the rules the judgment may be affirmed if no such brief is filed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ ob Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. J. F, Gillham, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law — the distinction between robbery and larceny. Robbery is the felonious and violent taking of money, goods or other valuable' thing from the person of another by force or intimidation, which is the gist of the offense, but private stealing from the person is declared by the statute to be larceny; and it is the duty of the courts to enforce this distinction.</p> <p>2. Same — what does not constitute robbery. Robbery is not committed by the taking of a pocket-book from the pocket of a drunken man, where the accused used no violence until after the theft had been accomplished, when he struck his victim for accusing him of the theft.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County .Court óf Cook county; the Hon. John H. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the County Court of DuPage county; the Hon. Frank E. S ho pen, Judge, presiding.</p>