Volume 291 — Illinois Reports

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District; — heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. William B. Wright, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit' Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Cir- ■ cuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the First Branch Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. John J. Sullivan, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ'op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Henry Guerin, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>■ 1. Criminal law — what is a sufficient shozving as to organisation of court. The fact that the court was legally constituted or organized sufficiently appears in a criminal case where the record shows that the indictment was returned in open court on one of the days of the term shown by the record to have been opened and properly constituted or organized on a previous day of the term, and it is not necessary, where apt reference is made to said term, that the record show the presence of all the necessary officers of the court on the day the indictment was returned.</p> <p>2. Same — when fact of misjoinder of counts cannot be taken advantage of. Even though counts charging distinct offenses are joined with a count for rape, if the defendant pleads to the indictment without making a motion to quash or to require the State to elect on which count it will proceed, he cannot, after being convicted on the count for rape, take advantage of the misjoinder.</p> <p>3. Same — in absence of a motion the court is not obliged to require State to elect. In the absence of a motion by the defendant the court is not obliged to require the State to elect upon which count of an indictment it will seek a conviction.</p>

<p>1. Disbarment — any offensive conduct toward judges cannot be permitted. While judges are not exempt from just criticism an attorney should submit his grievances to the proper authorities, and unjust criticism, insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted.</p> <p>2. Same — when an attorney will be disbarred for attempting to bring court into disrepute. An attorney who begins an unauthorized and unfounded1 suit for damages against a judge and publishes a sensational story thereof in a newspaper intending to bring the court into disrepute with the public, and who also writes a scurrilous letter to the judge to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of his judicial duties, will be disbarred.</p> <p>Information to disbar. .</p>

<p>Appeal from the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Martin M. GridlEy, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law — when an information charging violation of the Medical Practice act is sufficient. An information charging a violation of the provision of the Medical Practice act requiring a license to treat human ailments without medicine or operative surgery is sufficient which charges the offense substantially in the language of the statute and describes the particular act of the defendant relied upon as constituting such violation, specifying the time, place, name of person treated and the method of treatment.</p> <p>2. Same — when refusal of instructions is not ground for reversal. If the defendant is clearly guilty of the offense charged and no other verdict could properly have been reached under the evidence,- the refusal of certain instructions is not ground for reversal even though they might properly have been given.</p> <p>3. Same — instructions 'not supported by the evidence need not be given. Instructions not supported by the evidence need not be given in a criminal case even though they state correct propositions of law.</p> <p>4. Same — what is not treatment by mental or spiritual means. Treatment by rubbing and manipulating the limbs and body of a patient is not treatment by mental or spiritual means, even though the practitioner claims to heal through the influence of the spirits by laying hands on the patient and asking the Deity to make the patient well. (People v. Gordon, 194 Ill. 560, and People v. Kane, 288 id. 235, followed.)</p>

<p>1. Drainage — amendment of ipi5 to section 37 of Levee act authorizes an assessment for obligations already incurred. The amendment of 1915 to section 37 of the Levee act, providing for the levying of an assessment for the completion of work as originally planned, authorizes an assessment to pay for obligations already incurred.</p> <p>2. Same — dtte process'of law is complied with by public hearing before authorities in charge of assessment. Due process of law does not necessarily mean that the property owner ■ must have a hearing in court, but the constitutional provision for due process of law is complied with in a drainage proceeding if the property owner is allowed a hearing before the public authorities in charge of levying the assessment, even though no hearing is allowed before the courts.</p> <p>3. Same — amendment of ipig to section sf of Levee act is not unconstitutional. The amendment of 1915 to section 37 of the Levee act, authorizing the levying of an additional assessment for-obligations already incurred by a drainage district, is not contrary to the provisions of the State and Federal constitutions as to due process of law.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on writ of error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Robert E. Crowe, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Criminal law- — when verdict of jury will not be disturbed. The verdict of a jury on a question of fact will not be disturbed unless it is palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>2. Same — what testimony as to condition of witnesses at preliminary hearing is improper. Testimony of the police officer who arrested the accused that two of the witnesses who testified for the defendant on the trial were not permitted to testify on the preliminary hearing because they were intoxicated is improper but is not necessarily ground for reversing the judgment of conviction.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Madison county; the Hon. Otto W. LongenECKER, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Specific performance — basis for equitable relief on ground of part performance. To authorize equitable .relief on the ground of part performance of an alleged oral contract to convey land, the acts relied upon as part performance must be such that the alleged promisee would suffer injury amounting to fraud if the Statute of Frauds were allowed to be interposed as a defense to the bill for specific performance.</p> <p>2. Same — proof of alleged contract and of the acts of part performance must be clear. While in the case of an alleged oral contract by a father to convey land to his son, with whom he was residing on the land, it is not necessary to prove exclusive possession by the son or the making of lasting and valuable improvements, yet it is essential that the contract Itself and the acts relied upon as part performance be established by clear and satisfactory evidence, and it is not sufficient to show, merely, that the father intended the son to have the land at the father’s death.</p>

<p>1. Constitutional lav/ — Search and Seizure act not invalid as giving preference to religious denominations. The Search and Seizure act of 1919, (Laws of 1919, p. 930,) by exempting from the prohibition of the act intoxicating liquors used for sacramental purposes, does not violate section 3 of article 2 of the constitution, which prohibits the giving of any preference to any religious denomination or mode of worship.</p> <p>2. Same — due process of lazv requires notice. Due process .of law in the regular course of judicial proceedings requires notice to the defendant as a matter of right before his property can be condemned, and a law which purports to authorize condemnation without notice confers no authority and is no justification for judgment against him, even though he had knowledge of the proceedings.</p> <p>3. Same — when judgment in a summary hearing is not binding. A summary hearing of which no notice is required to be given to a person whose rights are affected, and a judgment upon such hear- . ing, do not constitute due process of law, and the judgment is not binding on the person against whom it is rendered and confers no rights against him or his property.</p> <p>4. Same — when property may be destroyed zvithoict a judicial proceeding. The right of executive officers to destroy property without a judicial proceeding is limited to nuisances per se, or to cases of imminent danger to the public health or safety, or to articles dangerous to public welfare the possession of which is prohibited by law; and the destruction must be limited to the necessity of each case, without wanton or unnecessary destruction. .</p> <p>5. Same — provision of Search and Seizure act for destruction of property is invalid. The provision of the Search and Seizure act authorizing the destruction, by order of the court, of intoxicating liquor and the vehicles used in transporting the same over the public highways, is unconstitutional because the act does not require notice to the owner of such property but only to" the person in whose possession it is found; and the fact that the owners are actually given notice and appear and present their claims does not affect the constitutionality of such provision.</p> <p>Farmer and Duncan, JJ., dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Inheritance tax- — when transfers are within the Inheritance Tax act. Transfers of property which were intended by the parties not to take effect in possession or enjoyment until at or after ■ the death of the grantor are subject to an inheritance tax, even though such intention is not manifested in writing but is established by parol evidence of the acts and conduct of the parties.</p> <p>2. Same — when transfer of life estates is taxable. Where a man conveys a farm to his wife and a year later joins with her ■ in a conveyance of a life estate in the farm to their daughters, the transfer of the life estates is taxable at the death of the father some years later if the evidence warrants the conclusion that the deeds were, in fact, but one transaction and were not intended to take effect until the father’s death.</p>

<p>1. Railroads — bill of lading is construed most strongly against the carrier. In construing a bill of lading, if there be any doubt as to the meaning of the language used it must be construed most strongly against the carrier, for the reason that it is prepared by the officers or agents of the carrier.</p> <p>2. Same — zvhen liability for loss is that of a carrier and not of a zvarehouseman. Under a bill of lading providing that for loss occurring more than forty-eight hours after notice of arrival of the shipment has been given the carrier’s liability shall be that of a warehouseman, only, and that property not removed within forty-eight hours after notice of arrival is given may be kept in the car or depot, subject tó a reasonable charge for storage and to the carrier’s responsibility as a warehouseman, only, the carrier is liable, as a carrier, for loss by theft from a car within such forty-eight hours, though the car had been delivered to the consignee and was being unloaded.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Marcus Kavanagh, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Wayne county; the Hon. Eugene M. Peavier, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>. Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writs op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county and the Circuit Court of Schuyler county; the Hon. George Kersten, Judge, presiding in Nos. 12860 and 12898, the Hon. Robert E. Crowe presiding in No. 12883, the Hon. Theodore Brentano presiding in No. 12908, the Hon. Hugo Pam presiding in No. 12909, and the Hon. Guy R. Williams presiding in No. 12919.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Motor vehicles — when traffic ordinance is not in violation of the Motor Vehicle act of 1917. An ordinance forbidding motor vehicles, on overtaking a street car, to pass on the left side of the car is purely a traffic ordinance, and is not in violation of the provision of the Motor Vehicle act of 1917 that no ordinance shall be passed limiting or restricting the speed of automobiles. (Ayres v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, and People v. Sargent, 254 id. 514, distinguished.)</p> <p>2. Same — when section 16 of Motor Vehicle act does not apply. Section 16 of the Motor Vehicle act, providing that the operator of a motor vehicle overtaking on a public highway any horse or other draft animal or vehicle shall pass on the left side, and the driver of the horse or other vehicle shall, on signal, turn to the right, does not apply to the passing of street cars by motor vehicles.</p>

<p>1. Taxes — statute does not regard administrator as the “owner” of property omitted from assessment in lifetime of his intestate. Section 35 of the act for the assessment of property treats a claim for taxes on property omitted from assessment during the owner’s lifetime as a claim against his estate and not as a claim against the administrator as owner of the property, as in the case of regular taxes assessed after the appointment of the administrator.</p> <p>2. Same — omitted taxes of deceased owner of property are due at the place where he resided. Taxes on property assessed by the board of review as property omitted from assessment by the owner during the last years of his lifetime should be assessed in and collected for the school district in which such owner resided during those years and not in and for the school district where his administrator resides at the time the omitted assessment is made.</p>

<p>1. Eminent domain — time fixed for paying compensation can not be changed after its expiration. Under section 10 of the Eminent Domain act, as amended in 1897, where the time fixed by the judgment for paying compensation has expired without any payment being made, the court has no power to extend the time, and the proviso to said section as to costs and attorney’s fees must be applied although the petitioner’s failure to pay was not due to an intention to abandon the proceeding but to delay in collecting the tax for the improvement.</p> <p>2. Same — proceedings for condemnation for a cemetery must come under Eminent Domain act. The provisions for condemnation in the Local Improvement act do not apply to proceedings to condemn land for a cemetery, but the power of condemnation given by paragraph 5 of the Cemeteries act must be exercised by proceedings under the Eminent Domain act.</p>

<p>1. Practice — matters not properly part of the record cannot be considered though copied therein by the clerk. Motions, appeal bonds and other instruments introduced in evidence and which are not part of the record proper or preserved by any bill of exceptions or certificate of evidence cannot be considered by a court of review though copied in the record by the clerk of the lower court.</p> <p>2. Same — executor who has been removed cannot prosecute a writ of error. An executor who has been removed and is not shown by the record to have been re-instated has no authority to sue out a writ of error in a proceeding against the estate of the deceased.</p> <p>3. Appeals and errors — who may prosecute zvrit of error. No person is entitled to prosecute a writ of error other than one who is a party or privy to the record or one who has been injured by the judgment and will be benefited by its reversal or is competent to release errors.</p>

<p>T. Public utilities — extent to tvhich courts will review exerA cise of rate-making power. The power of rate regulation is essen-i tially legislative, and its exercise will be reviewed by the courts only j to determine whether the rate-making body acted within the scope" of its authority, or the order is without substantial foundation in ! the evidence, or a constitutional right of the utility has been in- \ fringed upon by fixing rates which are confiscatory or insufficient j to pay the cost of operating expenses and give the utility a rea- j sonable return on the present value of its property. j</p> <p>2. Same — when an order of commission fixing rates cannot be set aside. If an order of the Public Utilities Commission fixing . rates does not contravene any constitutional limitation, is within the power of the commission and has a substantial basis in the evidence, it cannot be set aside by the courts at the suit of the utility as being unreasonable.</p> <p>3. Same — rate fixed must be fair both to utility and the public. A public utility is entitled to demand a fate which will yield a fair return on the value of the property used by it for public convenience and not merely a rate which is non-confiscatory; but the public, also, is entitled to demand that the rate be no more than the service rendered is reasonably worth, and hence a rate fixed by the Public Utilities Commission must be fair both to the utility and the public.</p> <p>4. Same — zvhat is a reasonable rate is not a question of legal formula. What is a just and reasonable rate for the service rendered by a public utility is a question of sound business judgment based upon the evidence and is not one of mere legal formula.</p> <p>5- Same — fair present value of property of utility is the basis of rate-making calculations. The basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of the rate to be charged by a public utility is the fair present value of the property used by the utility for the convenience of the public.</p> <p>6. Same — zvhat should be considered in determining fair value of property. In determining the fair value of the property of a public utility, the original cost of construction, the amount expended on permanent improvements, the present cost of construction, probable earning capacity of the property under existing rates and the sum required for operating expenses are all matters for consideration, and the cost of reproduction, less depreciation, is not the only equitable basis for determining such value.</p> <p>7. Same — “going value” of utility should be considered. The Public Utilities Commission, in fixing' a rate to be charged by a public utility for gasj should consider, among other elements, the “going value” of the utility, and though this element is one which cannot be determined with mathematical certainty, it is necessary that the finding show due consideration was given to such element.</p> <p>8. Same — the exchange value of property should not be considered. The exchange value of the property of a public utility is measured by the return and should not be considered by the Public Utilities Commission in determining the value of the property for the purpose of fixing a fair and reasonable rate.</p> <p>9. Same — zvhat is not ground for holding rates unreasonable. If the graduated rates fixed by the Public Utilities Commission for gas will together produce a reasonable return to the company the rates will not- be held to be unreasonable and unfair on the ground that the cost of supplying gas to the small consumer is in excess of the rate fixed therefor and that the burden of producing the return to the company thereby rests on the large consumers.</p> <p>10. Same — zvhen finding should shozv amount allozved for certain item. Where it appears from the finding of the commission in valuing the property of a gas company for rate-making purposes, that only a portion of the value of a large item, such as a million-foot gas holder, was considered by the commission, then the finding . must show what proportion of the whole value of such item, as shown by the evidence, was allowed by the commission.</p> <p>ii. Same — return of seven per cent is not necessarily arbitrary or unreasonable. The question as to what shall be regarded as a reasonable return to a public utility is largely one of fact to be determined by the evidence in each particular case, but a rate of seven per cent fixed by the Public Utilities Commission as a fair ! return on the value of the property of a gas company having a monopoly of the business in a fair-sized city will not be regarded . as arbitrary or unreasonable.</p> <p>12. Same — commission is not bound to accept company’s showing as to operating expenses. In determining the value of the property of a gas company as a basis for fixing rates, the Public Utilities Commission is not bound to accept the figures of the company j as to what portion of the cost of gas is due to operating expenses but may consider evidence as to the average operating expenses of such companies in other cities similarly situated, with other evidence on the subject, and its finding in that respect will not be set aside unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.</p> <p>13. Same — findings of commission should disclose specific valuations of elements considered. To enable the courts intelligently to review the order of the commission in a rate-making case the \ findings of the commission should disclose the ultimate conclusions \ of the commission as to the specific valuations of the elements con- i sidered by it in arriving at the fair present value of the property. I</p> <p>14. Same — when order of commission will not be set aside. If the final order of the commission in a rate-making case is not j against the manifest weight of the evidence it will not be set aside merely on the ground that one or more of the items may be re- : garded as too high or too low, as the court will base its decision ‘ • on the final result of the commission’s findings. i</p>

<p>Practice — defense that writ of error is barred by the Statute of Limitations must be raised by plea. The defense that a writ of error is barred by the Statute of Limitations must be raised by plea and not by a motion.to dismiss the writ. (Peterson v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. 244 Ill. 329, adhered to; contrary expression in People v. Evans, 262 id. 235, following International Bank v. Jenkins, 104 id. 143, overruled.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors — when denial of motion to find for defendant presents question of law for Supreme Court. In suits at law the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming that of the trial court conclusively settles all controverted questions of fact, but 1 where the question whether there is any evidence tending to prove the plaintiff’s case is properly preserved in the trial court by a motion to find for the defendant, a denial of the motion, followed by a judgment for the plaintiff, presents a question of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.</p> <p>2. Same — when the Supreme Court will presume that the Appellate Court considered evidence of title in third person in action of replevin. In an action of replevin under the Municipal Court act, evidence of property in a third person is equivalent to a plea to that effect by the defendant; and the Supreme Court, in determining the correctness of the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff, will presume that the Appellate Court considered all the evidence on the question of the plaintiff’s title, including the evidence tending to show title in the third person.</p> <p>3. Replevin — effect of plea of property in a third person — burden of proof. In an action of replevin a plea of property in a third person does not raise a new issue but is a matter of inducement to the formal traverse of the right of property in the plaintiff, which is the real issue in the suit and which must be proved by plaintiff.</p> <p>4. Same — third person cannot take advantage of judgment for defendant. Where the defendant in a replevin suit pleads property in a third person, the third person, who is neither a party to the • suit nor a privy of the defendant, cannot take advantage of a judgment for the defendant.</p> <p>5. Same — when demand is not necessary. Demand is necessary where the defendant comes into possession of the goods rightfully, but a demand is not necessary where the circumstances show that it would have been unavailing.</p> <p>6. Practice- — the evidence determines the issues in fourth-class action under Municipal Court act. In an action of the fourth class under the Municipal Court act no pleadings are required and the issues must be determined from the evidence submitted at the trial.</p> <p>7. Same — motion to find for defendant amounts to demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence. In an action of the fourth class under" the Municipal Court act, a motion to find for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence amounts to a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence, and raises a question of law whether the evidence for the plaintiff, when considered to be true and with the inferences which may be legitimately drawn therefrom, fairly tends to support the cause of action of the plaintiff.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation — when risk of injury by elements is an incident to employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and are not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded from the Compensation act, but the risk of injury by the elements is an incident to an employment and within the act where the employee’s duties expose him to a greater risk from the elements than the general public or where the employment accentuates the natural hazard.</p> <p>2. Same — injury need not be anticipated. An injury, to come within the .Compensation act, need not be anticipated, nor, in general, need it be peculiar to the particular employment in which the employee is engaged at the time of the injury.</p> <p>3. Same — when injury by a tornado arises out of employment. Compensation may be had for the death of an employee from injuries received when a tornado destroyed the building in which he was working where the employee’s duties took him among steam pipes and ammonia coils, which exposed him to an unusual risk of being injured by fumes and escaping steam should the building be destroyed, and where the evidence shows that the ammonia fumes and' escaping steam contributed most largely to the injuries which caused his death.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Kickham Scanlan, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jersey county; the Hon. Frank W. Burton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law — a deputy sheriff should not testify that defendant “admitted” certain things. A deputy sheriff who examined the accused before the trial should not be permitted to testify thato the accused “admitted” that he did certain things which would implicate him but the officer should state what the defendant said, leaving the court and jury to decide whether or not any admissions or confessions were made.</p> <p>2. Same — defendant’s statement that he had planned to commit another crime is not admissible. In a murder trial a police officer should not be permitted to testify to a statement by the defendant that he had planned, with others, to commit a robbery not connected with the crime charged; nor is such statement admissible to corroborate part of a conversation which one of said other persons has testified he had with such defendant, who does not testify in his own behalf.</p> <p>3. Same — ultimate facts must be alleged and proved. Ultimate facts must be alleged and proved, and the allegations of such facts are the material allegations of an indictment.</p> <p>4. Same — an instruction that every “material fact” need not be proved is not accurate. An instruction that it is not necessary that the jury believe that every “material fact” in evidence has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt if they believe that every material allegation in the indictment has been so proved is not accurate in using the words “material fact” instead of “incriminating fact;” but the giving of such instruction is not ground for reversal.</p> <p>5. Same — verdict of guilty of murder is sufficient without words “in manner and form as charged in the indictment.” A verdict in a murder trial which recites that the jury finds the defendant guilty of murder means that the defendant is found guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment though such words are not. used.</p>

<p>Appeals and errors — executor’s appeal stays enforcement of order for his removal. Where the Supreme Court, on appeal, decides that a certain sum of money Belongs to the estate of a decedent and remands the cause with directions that the money be paid to a named person “as sole executor,” it is not error for the trial court, upon re-instatement of the case, to order the money paid to said executor although an order for his removal and the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed has been entered, from which an appeal is pending in the Appellate Court, as the appeal stays all proceedings to enforce the order, and such person is still the nominal executor though without power to administer the estate before the appeal is determined.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cass county; the Hon. Guy R. Williams, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Randolph county; the'Hon. Louis BernrEuter, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. W. Pinckney, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. Thomas M. Jett, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Robert E. Crowe, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Deeds — old age and disease do not necessarily incapacitate grantor to execute a deed. While age and disease are proper elements to be considered on the question of mental capacity to transact business, the mere circumstance that the mental powers have been impaired by age or disease is not, alone, sufficient to invalidate a deed if the .grantor fully comprehends its meaning and effect and is able to exercise his will in executing it.</p> <p>2. Same — what mental weakness will invalidate a deed. The mental impairment that will render a deed invalid must be to the extent that the grantor is incapable of comprehending what he is doing and of knowing the nature and effect of his act.</p> <p>3. Same — fact that third party suggests making deed does not affect its validity. Where a grantor, in making a deed during his last sickness, carries into effect a purpose he had in mind before he became ill, the fact that the making of the deed is first suggested by a third party does not affect its validity, if the grantor is able to comprehend his property and understand the nature and effect of his act.</p> <p>4. Same — burden is on complainants to establish invalidity of deed. The burden is on the complainants seeking to set aside a deed in a partition suit to prove the allegations in their bill that the grantor was mentally incapable of making the deed.</p>

<p>1. Construction- — words of statute will be construed in ordinarily accepted, meaning. The words of a statute will be construed in their ordinary sense, and when they have a well settled meaning through judicial interpretation they must be given that construction unless a different meaning is unmistakably indicated.</p> <p>2. Same — word "child" in a statute, deed or will means legitimate child unless a contrary intention is manifested. The word “child” or “children,” when used in a statute, will or deed, means legitimate child or children, and will not be extended, by implication, to' embrace illegitimate children unless such construction is necessary to carry into effect the manifest purpose of the legislature or of the testator or grantor.</p> <p>3. Workmen’s compensation — Compensation act of 1915 does not protect illegitimate children of deceased employee. The provision of section 7 of the Compensation act of 1915 providing for compensation in case of the death of an employee leaving a child or children means legitimate children, and there is nothing in the act which indicates the legislature used the word in any other sense.</p> <p>4. Same — right to compensation under section 7 of act of ipi5 depends upon terms of the statute. As the right to compensation is statutory and depends upon conformity with the terms fixed by the legislature, compensation under section 7 of the act of 1915 in case of the death of an employee does not rest upon dependency or support as a member of the family but upon the existence of the relation specified in the statute and the legal obligation to support or of actual contribution.</p>

<p>'Workmen’s compensation — when owner remodeling his dwelling house is not under the Compensation act. One who is merely remodeling his dwelling house is not engaged in the business of maintaining, altering or demolishing structures within the meaning of sub-section 1 of section 3 of the Compensation act, and when he engages an independent contractor to put a concrete foundation under the dwelling house he is not obliged to comply with section 31, regarding contractors’ insurance, in order to avoid liability for an injury to an employee of the contractor.</p>

<p>1. Deeds — rule in Shelley’s case is applied as a rule of law and not of construction. The rule in Shelley’s case is a rule of law"and not of construction, and where a grantor uses technical language which brings the case within the rule, a declaration, however positive, that the rule shall not apply, or that the estate of the ancestor shall not continue beyond the primary express limitation, or that the heirs shall take by purchase and not. by descent, is unavailing to defeat the application of the rule.</p> <p>2. Same — when rule in Shelley’s case applies. Where a grantor conveys land by warranty deed to “the heirs-at-law” of a particular person named, “reserving” and conveying to said named person a life estate, “the said grantees first above named to have and receive said lands at the death of” the intended life tenant, the words “heirs-at-law” are words of limitation of the estate and not words of purchase, and the life tenant takes the fee under the rule in Shelley’s case.</p> <p>3. Same — what is a reservation in a deed. A reservation in a deed is some right in favor of the grantor created out of or retained in the granted premises, and a purported reservation in favor of a third person can only take effect as a grant to him by way of exception to the other grant, and in such case there must be words of conveyance to the third person, except that a grantor may reserve to himself and his wife an estate during their natural lives, which will continue during the life of the survivor.</p> <p>4. Same — conveyance of present estate to heirs of living person is void. A conveyance of a present estate to the heirs of a living person is 'void for uncertainty because those who will take as heirs cannot be known until the person’s death, but future estates may be limited to persons who are not ascertained or even not in existence, provided there is a present particular estate to sustain the remainder and the grantee shall be in existence when the time arrives for the enjoyment of the estate. g</p> <p>5. Same — zvhen word “heirs" is a word of limitation. The word “heirs” is a word of limitation where it is not used to describe individuals but to designate heirs generally or the whole line of heirs in succession, and it is not to be construed as a word of purchase unless there are other controlling words showing such intention by the person using it, and if it is used as a word of limitation its effect is to mark out the estate granted.</p> <p>6. Same — to what extent intention of grantor may be considered in determining the application of rule in Shelley’s case. The desire of the grantor or testator to have the rule in Shelley’s case disregarded in the construction of the instrument cannot be considered in determining the application of the rule, but it is proper to consider whether the grantor or testator used the words of inheritance with a meaning different from- their technical sense.</p> <p>j. Same — when quit-claim deeds by contingent remainder-men do not convey their interests. Where a will creates a contingent remainder in the “heirs-at-law” of the life tenant, quit-claim deeds by the children of the'life tenant'to the purchaser of the life tenant’s interest do not convey the contingent interests, where the deeds are executed during the life of the life tenant and contain no provisions for conveying after-acquired titles.</p> <p>8. Same — when a contingent remainder may be transferred. As a contingent remainder is not an estate but merely the possibility of having one it cannot be subject to legal process or voluntary sale by deed, but where the person is ascertained and the event, only, is uncertain the contingent remainder may be released to the reversioner and is subject to devise and descent, and a \yarranty deed will operate to transfer the title by way of estoppel.</p> <p>g. Same — interest conveyed by a deed must be in existence at time of delivery.. It is essential to a deed not only that there shall be proper parties but that there shall be a thing granted, and a deed is void if the grantor has no existing interest to convey at the time it is delivered.</p> <p>io. Wills — when will creates a contingent remainder in fee to heirs of life tenant. A will' which devises property to the testator’s son, “to have and to hold for and during the term of his natural life and at his death then to the heirs of his body in fee simple,” creates a contingent remainder until it is determined, by the death of the life tenant, who will be his heirs.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors — acts before entry of decree do not release errors. Acts done before the entry of a decree cannot be the basis of a plea of release of errors, but such a plea must state some fact by which the errors were released after they were committed.</p> <p>2. Same — one who accepts benefits of decree releases errors. If a party against whom a decree has been rendered voluntarily accepts the benefits of the decree, such acceptance operates and may be pleaded as a release of errors.</p> <p>3. Wills — acceptance of legacy after decree dismissing bill to contest will is a release of errors. The acceptance of a legacy by an heir after a decree has been entered dismissing his bill to contest the will constitutes a release of errors,'as he has the choice of accepting the legacy or litigating the estate, and he cannot do both. (Ward v. Ward, 134 Ill. 417, distinguished.)</p> <p>4. Same — effect of accepting beneficial provision of will. One who accepts a provision of a will for his benefit is precluded from attacking other lawful provisions of the same will. (Elmore v. Carter, 289 Ill. 560, distinguished.)</p>

<p>Workmen’s compensation — the same injury does not warrant compensation for disfigurement and for permanent partial loss of earning capacity. Under paragraph (c) of section 8 of the Compensation act, as amended in 1915, providing for compensation for disfigurement of the hand, head or face, an award cannot be made for such disfigurement where compensation is also awarded for permanent partial loss of earning capacity resulting from the same injury. (Wells Bros. Co. v. Industrial Com. 285 Ill. 647, distinguished. )</p>

Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District; — heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Kane county; the Hon. C. F. Irwin, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Criminal law — venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and it is not necessary that someone testify, in terms, to the place where the offense was committed, for the purpose of establishing the venue.</p> <p>2. Same — record need not recite, in terms, that indictment was returned in open court and what officers were present. No set form of words is necessary for the record to show that the indictment was returned into open court, and it is not necessary that the record show the organization of the court by reciting what officers were present, but if the defendant desires to avail himself of the absence of any officer such absence should be made to appear affirmatively by a bill of exceptions. (People v. Dennis, 246 Ill. 559, followed.)</p> <p>3. Same — verdict of guilty of robbery need not fix a definite term of imprisonment. A verdict finding defendants guilty of the crime of robbery is not erroneous because it does not fix a definite term of imprisonment.</p> <p>4. Same — -when abstract must show all instructions given. The refusal to give certain instructions cannot be considered as a matter affecting the judgment, where the abstract does not show that the instructions included therein were all the instructions given.</p> <p>5. Same — when it is not error to strike words “the court instructs the jury,” from instructions given. It is not error to strike the words “the court instructs the jury” from all instructions given after the first, where the jury are instructed to consider all the instructions as one, “the same as if they were written upon one sheet of paper.”</p> <p>6. Same — when weapons taken from defendants’ automobile are admissible. Weapons taken from the defendants’ automobile at the time they were arrested are admissible in evidence on their trial for robbery, where the complaining witness testifies he was held up by a man with a revolver, whom he identifies as one of the defendants and who drove away in an automobile with four other men, and where the police officer testifies there were five men in the ■ automobile at the time he arrested the defendants, whose own testimony indicates that they knew the weapons, or some of them, were in the car.</p>

<p>Appeals and errors — zvhen constitutional question is not involved. In establishing probate .courts the legislature has conferred jurisdiction on them in the language of section 20 of article 6 of the constitution, and the question whether the probate court has jurisdiction to allow a claim by a guardian of the person of a minor for expenditures is one of statutory construction, only, and does not warrant a direct appeal from-the circuit court to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>Appear from the Circuit Court of White county; the Hon. Charles H. Miller, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon, county; the Hon. F. W. Burton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation — the Federal Employers’ Liability act controls compensation where parties are engaged in interstate commerce. In a proceeding to recover for an injury occurring while the employer and employee are engaged in interstate commerce, the Federal Employers’ Liability act alone controls and cannot be pieced out or supplemented by any State statute.</p> <p>2. Same — injury to watchman at railroad' crossing used by interstate trains is within scope of the Federal Employers’ Liability act. Where a watchman at a railroad crossing is employed to guard the crossing for the protection of both intrastate and interstate trains and while in the performance of his duties is struck by an intrastate train the injury is within the scope of the Federal Employers’ Liability act, as the Federal law controls if the particular act in which the injured person is engaged at the time of his injury is in any substantial part within the interstate field. (Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Industrial Com. 288 Ill. 603, followed.)</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. T. M. Harris, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation — meaning of the words "salary” "wages” and "earnings,” in section 10 of Compensation act. The words “salary,” “wages” and “earnings” in section 10 of the Compensation act are all used in referring to the money or other compensation to be paid the employee for his services rendered and are intended to cover any and all terms that various employers and employees might use to designate wages or earnings.</p> <p>2. Same — what sums should not be deducted from miner’s earnings before computing compensation. Amounts which the employer customarily deducts from a miner’s wages to pay for the powder, carbide, blacksmithing and other items used by the miner in his work, and to pay his union dues, fines and assessments, in accordance with an agreement with the miners’ union, should not be deducted from the gross earnings of the.miner in fixing a basis for. compensation as provided by section 10 of the Compensation act, as such deductions are in the nature of payments by the miner to his employer and not sums “which the employer has been accustomed to pay the employee to cover any special expense entailed on him by the nature of his employment.”</p> <p>3. Words and phrases — definition of words “wage,” “salary” and “earnings.” A “wage” is the payment for service rendered by artisans or laborers receiving a fixed sum per day, week or month or for a certain amount of work, and a “salary” is a periodical allowance made as compensation to a person for his official or professional services or for his regular work, while the word “earnings” is the broadest term of the three and means money or other compensation to which one has a claim for services rendered.</p> <p>4. Same — word "earnings” ordinarily does not mean net earnings. The word “earnings,” in its general acceptation, does not mean net earnings unless qualified in some way.</p>

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Anton T. Zeman, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Boone county; the Hon. Robert K. Welsh, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph B. David, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Deeds — general rule as to when equity will set aside deed given for support of grantor. Where a grantor conveys land in consideration of an agreement by the grantee to support, maintain and care for the grantor during the remainder of the grantor’s life and the grantee neglects or refuses to comply with the contract, the grantor may in equity have a decree rescinding the contract and setting aside the deed.</p> <p>2. Same — when deed given for support of grantor will not be set aside. The intervention of a court of equity to set aside a deed given for the support of the grantor is sanctioned on the theory that the grantee’s failure to comply with his contract raises a presumption that the agreement was fraudulent in its inception, and such a deed will be set aside only when such facts are shown as will warrant the presumption that the contract was entered into and the deed secured by the grantee with a fraudulent intent not to perform the conditions of the contract. ■</p> <p>3. Same — equity zuill not set aside deed executed in moment of indiscretion. Courts cannot arbitrarily grant relief against acts of indiscretion and folly, and a court of equity will not set aside a deed given in consideration 'of the support of the grantor merely because the grantor acted unwisely in executing the deed.</p> <p>4. Same — zvhen a deed from wife to husband does not convey homestead. Where the husband and wife occupy a homestead, a deed of the property by the wife to the husband in which the husband does not join is void where the property is not worth over $1000, and if the property is worth more than $1000 the deed conveys the described premises in excess of that amount but to the extent of $1000 the title is unaffected by the deed.</p>

<p>1. Deeds — what undue influence is necessary to render deed invalid. Undue influence means wrongful influence, and to render a deed invalid the undue influence must be connected with the execution of the instrument and be of a character to make the grantor express the will of another instead of his own.</p> <p>2. Same — influence secured through affection will not invalidate deed. Influence secured through affection is not undue influence which wjll invalidate a deed from the grantee’s parents and which gives to the son more than is given to his brothers and sisters because the grantors believed the grantee deserved it.</p> <p>3. Same — when record does not present question of delivery of deeds. On appeal from a decree dismissing a bill to set aside deeds, where the master makes no report on the question of delivery and no exception or objection is made to the report on that question, and where the bill as abstracted does not contain any allegation that the deeds were not delivered, the record does not present the question of delivery for decision by the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. HosEa W. Wells, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors — replication to plea of release of errors admits facts not denied. The rule of pleading that a fact alleged on one side and not denied by the other is admitted applies.to the replication to a plea of release of errors. ■</p> <p>2. Same — when compliance with judgment or decree does not operate as a release of errors. The voluntary payment, performance or satisfaction of a judgment, order or decree which confers no benefit cannot operate as a release of errors, and obedience to a decree does not affect the, right to a writ of error, but a voluntary acceptance of the benefits conferred by the decree is a release of errors.</p> <p>3. Same — release of errors must be by party entitled to the writ. A release of errors must be by the acts of a party having a right to release errors, and no party can release an error which is personal to another.</p> <p>4. Same — failure to appeal from decree does not constitute release of errors — injunction. Failure to appeal from a decree does not bar the right to prosecute a writ of error within the timé limited by the statute, and the mere obedience to a decree enjoining a county clerk and collector from proceeding to enforce collection of a drainage assessment does not operate as a release of errors.</p> <p>5. Drainage — what act of commissioners does not bar right of county collector to writ of error. Where the county clerk and collector have been enjoined from enforcing the collection of a delinquent assessment because the land owners have appealed from the commissioners’ order of confirmation, the facts'that the commissioners appeared in the county court and defended their classification and that the county clerk attended to his duties in the court during the hearing of the appeal do not bar the right of the clerk and collector to a writ of error to review the injunction decree.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Lee county; the Hon. John B. Crabtree, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline county; the Hon. A. W. Lewis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from, the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. Perry L. Persons, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ op Error to the Appellate Court for the First District; — heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. L. McKinlBy, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Corporations — when a corporation is bound by notice to its agent. To bind a corporation by notice to its agent the nature of the agency must be such that the law will presume that the agent carried the notice to his principal or it must be established as a fact that the agent did communicate the notice to his principal.</p> <p>2. Principal and agent — when notice to an agent is notice to principal. For notice to or knowledge of an agent to be binding on his principal the knowledge must be acquired while the agent is acting within the scope of his authority and must be in reference to a matter over which his authority extends.</p> <p>3. Workmen’s compensation — injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. The Compensation act should receive a liberal construction so that its beneficent purpose may be reasonably accomplished, but its provisions cannot be extended to cover injuries which do not occur in the course of and arise out of the employment, and to sustain an award both of these conditions must be present.</p> <p>4. Same — when injury arises out of employment. The words “arise out of” have reference to the cause or origin of the accident, and for an injury to arise out of the employment it must be an accident resulting from a risk reasonably incidental to the employment or which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person as incidental to it when entering, the employment.</p> <p>5. Same — when a risk is incidental to the employment. A risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service.</p> <p>6. Same — risk incurred by an employee as a volunteer is not incidental to employment. Where an employee engages in a voluntary act not accepted by or known to his employer and outside the duties for which he is employed, or chooses to go to a dangerous place where his employment does not necessarily carry him, his act is not incidental to his employment.</p> <p>7. Same — when injury to employees while going to their work does not arise out of employment. Where a company engaged in construction work on a farm, voluntarily, and not as a part of the contract of hire, arranges to carry its employees from a certain point in a city to the place of employment with its own trucks and drivers, employees who without notice to their employer arrange with one of the truck drivers to haul them direct from their homes in another town to their work act outside of their employment when taking the unauthorized route, and the employer is not liable for their death or that of the driver when the truck is struck by a train.</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation — employer is not a carrier when hauling is a mere incident to his business. Where a corporation is engaged in supplying water to the inhabitants of a city, the hauling of the water to customers in parts of the city not reached by pipe lines is a mere incident to the business and does not constitute the employer a carrier by land within the meaning of the Compensation act.</p> <p>2. Same — when employee is not entitled to compensation. An employee of a water works corporation whose duties are merely to haul water to customers in a tank wagon and are not connected with any part of the business that has to do with the maintenance of the employer’s plant or pipe lines or in which municipal regulations are imposed is not entitled to compensation for an injury received in his usual work, where the employer has not elected to come under the Compensation act.</p> <p>3. Same — effect where part of employer’s business is under the act. Where part of an employer’s business is extra-hazardous or subject to'statutory or municipal regulation but the employer has not elected to come under the Compensation act, it is necessary, in order to entitle an injured employee to compensation, that the injury shall have arisen out of and in the course of that part o.f the business which comes within the terms of the act.</p>

<p>1. Homestead — a homestead becomes a life estate after assignment. After assignment of a homestead the estate becomes a life estate, and it is not essential to its continuance that the widow shall continue to reside upon the premises but she may occupy them by a tenant or convey them by a deed.</p> <p>2. Same — when words in description may be rejected as surplusage. Where the words “to the south line of said lot,” in the description of a boundary in the commissioners’ report setting off a homestead, are without meaning because of an error in writing the word “south” instead of the word “west,” the words “to the south line of said lot” may be rejected as surplusage if a complete and accurate description of the property remains.</p> <p>3. Limitations — statute does not run against remainder-man or reversioner until after life estate. The Statute of Limitations does not run against the remainder-man or reversioner until after the life estate falls in, and it is only after that event that'the possession will be adverse, as all statutes of limitation are based on the theory of laches, and no laches can be imputed to one who has no remedy or right of action.</p> <p>4. Same — when possession of grantees of mortgagee of homestead becomes adverse to remainder-men. The owner of an assigned homestead estate who mortgages the premises mortgages her life estate, only, notwithstanding the mortgage states that she warrants the title; and parties who are in possession by mesne conveyances from the assignee of the mortgagee after foreclosure have color of title, but their possession does not become adverse to the remainder-men until after the death of the mortgagor.</p>

<p>Writ op.Error to the Appellate Court for the Third District; — heard in that court on appeal from the City Court of Litchfield; the Hon. Harry C. Stuttle, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. Henry Mayo, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Jo Daviess county; the Hon. F. J. Campbell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills — will must be' considered as a whole to determine testator’s intention. The object in construing a will is to give "effect to the testator’s intention, and in determining the intention every part of the will must be considered in connection with every other part, and punctuation or paragraphing will ordinarily not be permitted to control the meaning of the instrument.</p> <p>2. Same — when the will will be given effect as testator intended, notwithstanding misdescription. Where a will contains a residuary clause showing that the testator intended to devise all his own land, clauses in the will devising land which the testator did not own and omitting land which he did own, because of misdescription in writing the west half instead of the north half of a lot and writing the wrong section number, will be construed to devise the land of the testator which he intended to devise. (Stevenson v. Stevenson, 285 Ill. 486, distinguished.)</p> <p>3. Same — life tenants cannot effect parol partition to terminate trusts where there are contingent interests. Where a testator has divided his land among his three children, each in trust for the other, and provides that the share of each devisee at his or her death shall vest in the heirs of the body of the devisee, the three children cannot, by taking possession of their respective lands, effect a parol partition and terminate the trusts.</p>

<p>1. " Workmen’s compensation. — compensation not authorized for injury while employee is acting as a volunteer. Compensation may be had for an injury received while an employee is doing recklessly or negligently something which he is employed to do but not for an injury received while he is voluntarily doing something unconnected with his employment.</p> <p>2. Same — an employer’s liability for injury to volunteer depends upon knowledge or acquiescence. _ Whether an employer is liable in compensation for an injury received by an employee while doing a work different from that which he was originally hired to perforin depends upon the employees acquiescence in the voluntary act or his knowledge of the existence of a custom or practice of the employee to do such work.</p> <p>3. Same — it is a question of fact whether employer has knowledge of act of volunteer. Where an employee hired to work in a mine.as a trapper is killed while acting as a mule driver, the question whether or not the employer or his agents in charge of the work knew of the practice of the trappers to exchange work with the mule drivers is a question of fact, and the finding of the Industrial Commission on this question is final if there is any evidence to Support it.</p>

<p>1. Drainage — effect of .striking objections from files. Striking the objections from the files on the hearing of a drainage assessment amounts to a holding that the facts stated in them constitute no legal objection to the confirmation of the assessment.</p> <p>2. Same — one land owner cannot object that property of another is misdescribed in notice. The object of the notice required to be published before the hearing of a' drainage assessment is to inform the land owners of the amount of the proposed assessment upon all the lands, the amount of the individual’s assessment and the time and place of the hearing, and one land ownér cannot object that the land of another is misdescribed in the notice.</p> <p>3. Same — what determines whether one land owner is assessed more than his proportionate share. The question whether one land owner is assessed more than his proportionate amount of a drainage assessment is to be determined by inquiring what proportion his assessment bears to the whole amount assessed on all the lands and not by comparing it with the amount of the assessment of any particular tract.</p> <p>4. Same — court cannot make assessment payable as of a date prior to confirmation. Under section 5' of the act for the assessment of lands, railroads, highways and municipal corporations which have been benefited by a drainage improvement, (Hurd’s Stat. 1917,' p. 1012,) the first installment of the assessment may be paid, without interest, thirty days after the confirmation, and 'the court confirming the assessment is not authorized to declare it payable as of a date prior to the confirmation.</p>

<p>Workmen’s compensation — when injury to an intoxicated employee does not arise out of his employment. A chauffeur for a motor livery company who is sent away from his employer’s garage because he is too intoxicated to do his work'ceases to be in the employ of the company, regardless of whether or not he was permanently discharged when sent away, and his subsequent unwitnessed injury from falling down an elevator shaft in the garage about half an hour after he had been sent away does not arise out of his employment, even though he may have returned to the garage to use a wash-room near the elevator.</p>

<p>Criminal law — when evidence is not sufficient to sustain conviction for practicing medicine without license. Under an information charging the defendant with practicing medicine and surgery without “being then and there licensed to practice medicine and surgery in all their branches,” evidence that the defendant treated his patient as a chiropractor and used no drugs or medicine and performed no surgical operation is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Gallatin county; the Hon. W. S. Sanders, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeals and errors — party obtaining affirmative relief in equity must preserve the evidence. In order to maintain a decree granting affirmative relief in equity the party in whose favor the decree is entered must preserve the evidence by a .certificate of evidence or the decree must find specific facts that were proved on the hearing.</p>

<p>1. Wills — what is a fee tail at common law. A fee tail at common law is an estate of inheritance which, instead of descending to heirs generally, descends to the heirs of the donee’s body or some class of such heirs and through them to like heirs in a regular order of descent so long as such heirs exist, and upon the extinction of the specified issue the estate determines.</p> <p>2. Same — effect of section 6 of Conveyances act on a devise in fee tail. By section 6 of the Conveyances act a devise which would have created a fee tail at common -law creates an estate for the life of the donee with remainder in fee simple absolute to the heirs of the donee, to whom, according to the course of the common law, the estate tail would at her death first pass, the same as though the donor had in specific words devised a life estate with such a remainder.</p> <p>3. Same — when a remainder is vested in interest although not in possession. Whenever there is one in being capable of taking the remainder at the termination of a life estate, the remainder is vested in interest although it must wait the termination of the life estate before it can vest in possession.</p> <p>4. Same — there can' be no remainder if the devise is of a fee simple. A devise of a fee simple precludes any remainder, and a limitation over can only take effect as a-n executory devise.</p> <p>5. Same — what is an executory devise. An executory devise is a future estate which is to arise on some specified contingency and does not depend upon the determination of any prior estate of freehold but comes into existence on the happening of the condition or event upon which it is limited and takes effect in abridgment or derogation of the prior estate.</p> <p>6. Same — meaning of the words "heirs of the body” and "children.” The words “heirs of the body” mean issue or descendants, and the same meaning may be given to the word “children” when used in that sense by the testator.</p> <p>7. Same — when devise over after devise to donee and heirs of her body is indestructible. A devise to the testator’s daughter and the heirs of her body and in case of her death without heirs of the body to his other children or to their children if the parents be dead, creates, under the-statute, an estate for the life of the daughter with a remainder in fee to her children, but the remainder in fee is subject to the executory devise over, which cannot be destroyed by a deed from the daughter and her children. (Kolmer v. Miles, 270 Ill. 20, distinguished.)</p>

<p>1. Offices — position in county hospital is not a constitutional office. The fact that a position in a county hospital is filled by appointment of the president of the board of county commissioners does not render it a constitutional office. (Shea v. Sweitzer, 285 Ill. 465, followed.)</p> <p>2. Same — office created by legislature is subject to its control. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, which may change the length of term, the mode of appointment or abolish the office.</p> <p>3. Constitutional law — the County Pension Fund act of 1915 does not violate property rights. The right of a person to the prospective salary of an office or position is not a property right, and the County Pension Fund act of 1915, in reducing the compensation of employees in offices which are not provided for in the constitution, does not invade any property rights of the employees affected. (Helliwell v. Sweitzer, 278 Ill. 248, followed.)</p> <p>4. Same — courts cannot declare law 'unconstitutional because it is unreasonable. If a law enacted, by the legislature is unreasonable it can be corrected only by repeal or amendment by that body, and the courts have no power to say that an act is void merely because it is unreasonable.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Coles county; the Hon. John H. Marshall, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon, county; the Hon. Frank W. Burton, Judge, presiding. _</p>

<p>Criminal law — Parole law applies though minimum term is one year or less. The Parole act of 1917, providing for indeterminate sentences, applies to crimes though the minimum term therefor is one year or less. (People v. Doras, 290 Ill. 188, and People v. Connors, post, p. 614, followed.)</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph Sabath, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of McHenry county; the Hon. Claire C. Edwards, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wills — when rights of partner are governed by his deceased partner’s will and not by contract. Where two equal partners enter into a contract for the execution of mutual wills providing that the interest of a deceased partner shall pass to the survivor, with the intention that the mutual wills shall be the joint will of the partners, the rights of one partner upon the death of the other are derived wholly through the deceased partner’s will, and no right of survivorship passes upon the execution of the agreement.</p> <p>2. Same — deceased partner’s will cannot deprive widow of her rights in his estate. A husband cannot by will deprive his widow of her rights in his estate, and as the interest of a deceased partner in a partnership business is the property of his estate, his widow may renounce a will giving his interest to his surviving partner and may take her rights under the law.</p> <p>3. Same — when widow renouncing deceased partner’s will must give up insurance. Where two equal partners enter into a contract for the execution of mutual wills giving to the survivor the entire partnership business and providing for the taking out of a joint insurance policy on the lives of both for the benefit of the widow of the partner who does not survive, if the widow of the partner who dies first'renounces said mutual will and elects to take under the statute she is not entitled to proceeds of the insurance policy.</p>

<p>1. Dram-shops — section 10 of Dram-shop act is not unconstitutional. Section 10 of the Dram-shop act is not unconstitutional upon the alleged ground that it deprives a defendant to a proceeding thereunder of the right of trial by jury, as the constitutional guaranty does not apply to such proceeding.</p> <p>2. Same — equity has jurisdiction to enforce a lien under section 10 of Dram-shop act. A court of equity has jurisdiction of a proceeding under section 10 of the Dram-shop act, as the action is for the enforcement of a lien which a court of equity has jurisdiction to decree.</p> <p>3. Same — when husband of owner of premises may testify in a proceeding under section 10 of Dram-shop act. In a proceeding under section 10 of the Dram-shop act against the owner of premises used for saloon purposes, the husband of the owner, who acted as her agent in the renting of the property, may testify, under section 5 of the Evidence act, concerning the renting and the 'collec-. tion of rent.</p> <p>4. Same — when allegations of bill to enforce a lien under section 10 of Dram-shop act are sufficient. The allegations of a bill to enforce a lien under section 10 of the Dram-shop act are sufficient where the bill sets out the securing of the judgment against the proprietor of the saloon, the ownership of the property by the defendant, the fact of leasing the premises to said proprietor and the defendant’s knowledge of its use for saloon purposes.</p> <p>5. Same — provisions of section 10 of the Dram-shop act are included in title. The provisions of section 10 of the Dram-shop act are directed against the evils in the sale of intoxicating liquors and are included within the title of the act.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. Joseph B. Messick, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Pike county; the Hon. Harry HigbeE, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Criminal law — an indeterminate sentence is for the maximum, term fixed by law. An indeterminate sentence “for a term of years, not to exceed the maximum term fixed by law” for the crime of which the defendant is convicted, is a definite sentence for the maximum term provided by law.</p> <p>2. Same — legislature has power to fix punishment for a crime. The only constitutional limitation on the power of the legislature to fix penalties for crimes is that all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense, and no one convicted of crime and given an indeterminate sentence can be discharged before the expiration of the maximum term except through the action of the executive department of the State.</p> <p>3. Same — the Parole law does not violate constitutional rights. The Parole law does not violate any right of a citizen guaranteed by the Federal or State constitution and does not increase, the term of imprisonment fixed by law for the crime of which a defendant is convicted. (People v. Doras, 290 Ill. 188, followed.)</p>

<p>1. Workmen’s compensation — employee’s wife cannot testify to his statement as to cause of injury resulting in death. In a proceeding for compensation for the death of an employee the employee’s wife cannot testify to what her husband told her concerning the cause of the injury, which finally resulted in his death.</p> <p>2. Same — token infection with anthrax is an accident arising out of the employment. Where an employee dies as a result of an infection with anthrax bacilli, evidence that he scratched a pimple on his neck while in the course of his employment as foreman in a tannery department, that in the ordinary period of inoculation the neck Pegan to swell until death resulted, and that he was not at any place where he was likely to come in contact with anthrax except at the tannery, is sufficient to sustain a finding of the Industrial Commission that the employee contracted the disease by an accident arising out of his employment.</p> <p>3. Same — when notice of accident is sufficient. Where an employee in a tanning factory dies as a result of an infection with anthrax bacilli, a statement by the employee’s wife to the employer on the day of the funeral, and within a week after the disease began, that her husband died of an infection from a poisoned hide, is sufficient notice of the accident under section 24 of the Compensation act.</p>