508
Submitted May 31, 2019, on respondent’s amended motion to dismiss filed
August 20; appeal dismissed September 18, 2019
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT R. GENTLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lake County Circuit Court
17CR84978; A166969
Robert F. Nichols, Jr, Judge.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Rond Chananudech, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge,
and Shorr, Judge.
PER CURIAM
Appeal dismissed.
Cite as
299 Or App 508
(2019) 509
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals a judgment in which the court
imposed a sentence of probation. He assigns error to six special conditions of probation, contending that the sentencing
court erred by imposing the conditions because they were
not announced in defendant’s presence before they appeared
in the judgment. We dismiss the appeal as moot.
While this appeal was pending, defendant’s 18-month
probation term expired. We asked the parties to notify this
court of their positions on whether the appeal should be dismissed as moot. Defendant responded that four of his six
assignments of error “are probably moot” due to the expiration of his term of probation, but that his first two assignments of error had not become moot because the challenged
judgment provisions could have collateral effects. The state
contends that the appeal is moot, and it moves to dismiss
the appeal under ORAP 8.45.
Defendant’s first two assignments of error challenge
the following provisions of the judgment, which are identified as special conditions of probation:
“Defendant shall:
“…
“Defendant stipulates [sic] to pay restitution to all
victims.
“Stipulate to destruction or forfeiture of any seized
property.”
Defendant argues that, “[b]ecause the judgment states
that defendant stipulates to restitution and to destruction
or forfeiture of any seized property, it will adversely affect
defendant should the victim file a civil tort claim against
him or [should] defendant file a civil claim for return of the
seized property.”1 He contends that “the presumption would
1
The phrasing of the first provision could resemble a factual finding—a
construction which defendant’s argument seems to require—but we construe it,
consistently with its inclusion in a list expressly identified as special conditions
of probation, as a probation condition. Our construction matches the way that
defendant identified this term in his first assignment of error in his opening
brief. He referred to it as a probation condition requiring him to “ ‘stipulate[ ] to
pay restitution to all victims.’ ” (Alteration in defendant’s brief.)
510 State v. Gentle
be that defendant did, in fact, stipulate in open court to pay
restitution and to forfeit his rights to any seized property,”
and that, therefore, his first two assignments of error are
not moot. The state argues that the judgment provisions at
issue are all probation conditions that have no prospective
application now that the probation term has expired.
We agree with the state. The judgment that defendant appeals did not impose any restitution, and defendant does not contend that any restitution proceeding has
occurred in which he was required by the conditions of his
probation to stipulate to the restitution. Similarly, defendant
does not contend that any of his property has been seized,
nor that he was required, during the term of his probation,
to stipulate to the destruction of that property, or to forfeit
any property. As conditions of a now-expired term of probation, the terms have no further, prospective effect. State
v. Miller,
