Volume 3 — District of Hawaii

<p>Practice — Pules of Court — Deviation from: A court may overlook deviations from sueli of its rules as are directory in character, when justice does not require strict conformity.</p> <p>Same — Admiralty courts: Admiralty courts are always open for preliminary and mesne proceedings but not for the final disposition of suits.</p> <p>Same — Agency in bringing suits: Authority of agent to bring suit for another must be shown unless he is an attorney-at-law licensed by the court.</p> <p>Same — Allegation of notice: Under section 5281 R. S. U. S., libelant must allege notice to or knowledge on the part of respondent as to character and value of goods shipped.</p> <p>' Same — As to goods being welt and substantially packed — Allegation: Allegation that goods were shipped in good order and condition sufficient as to their being well and sufficiently packed.</p> <p>Same — Contracts of affreightment as maritime contracts: Contractu of affreightment are maritime contracts cognizable in courts of admiralty.</p> <p>Same — Interrogatories—Peference thereto in libel: Negleet of reference not vital where interrogatories are attached to libel and signed by counsel.</p> <p>Same — Exhibit of contract of affreightment: In libel for damages on contract of affreightment, copy of contract should be attached to libel when practicable.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in personam for damage to merchandise.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Exceptions to libel in rem.</p>

<p>Practice — Pleading—Allegation of ignorance: A plea of ignorance, though technically an answer is rather a declaration of inability to answer. In an answer to a libel in admiralty ignorance may be pleaded to several of the articles and allegations of the libel in cno allegation applying to them all.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same-. It is unnecessary to state belief with an allegation of ignorance.</p> <p>Exceptions to answer — Pertinent allegations of libel: Exceptions to answer sustained for failure to answer pertinent allegations of the libel.</p> <p>Same: Exception to answer as a whole overruled, a portion of the specific exceptions being overruled and a portion sustained, and it being clear from the exceptions allowed that the answer is insufficient and requires amendment.</p> <p>Exceptions to interrogatories attached to insufficient answer: Exceptions to interrogatories appended to answer, sustained pro forma, the answer being insufficient and requiring amendment.</p>

<p>Negative proposition — Burden of proof: Under tlie pleadings it became necessary to tlie ease for libelant to prove tlie negative proposition that a cable attached to a buoy was not removed by the libellee, and, being without information, and the claimant from the nature of the ease being-in possession of full information on the subject, it was held that the burden of proof was on the claimant to disprove the proposition.</p> <p>Weight of testimony — Diagram: A diagram drawn by a witness to illustrate his testimony is entitled, to more -weight, other things being-equal, than a diagram by counsel and accepted by a witness.</p> <p>Negligence from sunlcen cable — Liability: One placing cables at or near the bottom of waters used for navigation, so that they obstruct navigation, is liable for such damages as may arise thereby to vessels navigating such waters.</p> <p>Contributory negligence — Responsibility of libelant: If the libelant, by his negligence, increased the amount of injury he received, the libellee cannot be held liable for such additional injury, although responsible for the injuries resulting from the first accident.</p> <p>Apportionment — Contributory negligence: Where the injury caused by libelant’s negligence can be separated from that caused by libellee, apportionment must be made and the libellee held liable only for the portion of the total injury caused by its negligence.</p> <p>Same: Where, in the case of contributory negligence, the proportion of damages caused thereby can be definitely ascertained, and is more or less than one-half of the total damages, — in this ease less, — the decree should be in accordance therewith instead of following the general rule of admiralty in such eases of relieving the libellee of one-half of the damages.</p>

<p>Costs — U. S. Commissioner’s fees: Taking anil certifying a deposition to file is not ‘ ‘ attending to a reference in a litigated matter in pursuance of an order of the court.”</p> <p>Same — Marshal’s charges for keeping personal property attached on mesne process: Charges of a XT. S. Marshal for expenses of keeping personal property attached on mesne process, aggregating more than the statutory fees, may be allowed as costs by the court upon petition tinder oath setting forth the facts.</p> <p>Same — Marshal’s traveling expenses in serving subpoena: A XT. S. Marshal may elect to receive for such services in lieu of mileage his ‘ ‘ actual traveling expenses,” to be proved on Ms oath to the satisfaction of the court.</p> <p>Construction — “Mesne process”: A process of attachment piaycd for in a libel and authorized by the court is mesne process in the meaning of section 829 R. S. XT. S.</p>

<p>Criminal Lato: Question of admission of certain testimony.</p>

<p>Involuntary Bankruptcy: Petition for attorneys’ fees.</p>

<p>Compensation of trustee conducting bankrupt estate as a going concern: The words of section 2, division 5, bankrupt act, allowing trustees "additional compensation” for such service, do not authorize the allowance of other compensation than the fee and commissions provided for compensation of trustees in section 48a of such act. The "additional compensation” for conducting the bankrupt business as a going concern is realized by the allowance of commissions on the disbursements made in such conduct of the bankrupt business as well as on other disbursements.</p> <p>Expenses necessarily incurred by trustee: Motion for approval of additional expenses incurred by trustee allowed, such expenses being satisfactorily shown to be "necessarily incurred” by the trustee in the performance of his duties. Gen. Order 35, sect. 3.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy: Petition of referee for fee as special master.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libel in rem for damages for personal injuries.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. Demurrer to indictment for conspiracy.</p>

<p> Money tendered and paid into court by libellee: </p> <p>When, judgment is rendered libellee for a further sum with costs, any balance of such deposit remaining in court is liable for such costs.</p>

<p>Admiralty Hule 16: This rule applies to a libel for assault and battery within the jurisdiction of an admiralty court, when the treatment complained of is limited to a single occasion and is without the knowledge of the master, and such a suit must be in personam, even though it be brought for breach of the implied contract to treat the libelant humanely as an articled seaman. But where there is a continued course of ill treatment known to and tolerated by the master, the rule does not apply and libels for damages therefor may be brought in rem.</p> <p>Liability of ship for master’s negligence in engaging a mate of Imown brutal disposition, who afterwards assaults a seaman of such ship: Whether a ship may be held liable for assault and battery on a seaman, where the master hires a mate, knowing that he has a brutal disposition, who subsequently assaults and beats the seaman, — quaere.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Exceptions to libel.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Injuries received tlvrough animus or negligence of fellow servants: Injuries received by sailor in the navigation of the ship, due to hostility or negligence of mate, no ground for damages against the ship, the mate being fellow servant to libelant.</p> <p>Same — Liability of vessel for cure and maintenance of sailor injured in its service: Upon arrival in port, a seaman injured in the ship’s service procured medical treatment. Held, the ship to be liable therefor and for maintenance of seaman while recovering, it being the master’s duty to take the initiative in such matters.</p> <p>Same: Failure of injured seaman to take advantage of free treatment in U. S. Marine Hospital does not discharge ship from expenses of medical attendance and maintenance while being cured, obtained elsewhere, as the certificate of the master is a prerequisite for admission into the U. S. Marine Hospital and it was his duty to have attended to it.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libels for shortage and bad quality of provisions.</p>

<p>In Equity: Demurrers to bill for au injunction.</p>

In Bankruptcy: Attorneys’ petition for fees for services to bankrupt and trustee’s petition for allowance of attorneys’ fees for services in administration.

<p>In Admiralty: Exception to libel in rem for salvage.</p>

<p>Pleading — Allegation of answer in mitigation of damages — Exception:</p> <p>The answer alleged among other matters that assistance furnished by libelant through its steamship to libellee while in a perilous situation, was understood both by the claimant and its representative and by the libelant to be in the nature of a special and personal favor to the claimant and its representative and not as a rendering of salvage services, and that such matter is pleaded in mitigation of damages. Eeld,, on exception, that such allegation offers no basis for mitigation of damages.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Motion to amend answer.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Salvage—Basis of salvage compensation: Estimate of salvage compensation may be based on time consumed in salvage operations, risk of salving vessel — partially based on her value, value of salvors’ services to claimant — partially based on the salved value of the vessel saved and partially on the danger she was exposed to, and upon the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the salvor by reason of the salvage operations.</p>

<p>Immigration Act: Petition for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy: Petition for confirmation of sale and instructions.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Motion to set aside service of summons.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Eehearing of motion to set aside service of summons.</p>

<p>Effect of a laio upon an earlier one — Repeal: A law general in its "terms does not necessarily repeal an earlier law included within its provisions of a special character and applicable to a particular locality, the presumption being that the special law remains as an exception to the general, unless there are express words of repeal or its provisions are clearly ineonsistent with those of the earlier law, or unless it is repealed by necessary implication.</p> <p>Same: A restatement of the terms of a previous general law, of which such special law is an amendment and to which terms it makes an exception, is not to be taken as expressing an intention to repeal the special law; and where the latter general law merely affirms the previous general law which it repeals, or is cumulative or auxiliary to it, the special law is not thereby repealed.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Practice—Foreign seamen on American ship — Suit in forma pauperis: A foreigner articled as a seaman on an American vessel, who has a cause of action against his ship, is entitled to bring suit in forma pauperis under the provisions of the act of Congress of July 20, 1892, (27 Stat. L. 252).</p> <p>Same — Pleading in forma pauperis: An allegation of the libel in such action that libelant is without property and unable to pay or secure costs, together with affidavit of his proctor, appointed by the court, that there is no one interested in such suit able to pay or secure costs except himself, and that he is entitled to nothing from the case except sueh fee as may be awarded him by the corn't, and that he is in the ease under no contingent fee, is sufficient.</p> <p>Same — Jurisdiction in eases for tort: Admiralty courts of the United States have jurisdiction in rem for matters of tort except in suits for assault, which, by admiralty rule 16, may be in personam only.</p> <p>Same — Pleading—Allegation of libelant’s liability for medical treatment made necessary on account of injuries received in the service of the ship: An allegation of the libelant that in consequence of injuries received by Mm in the service of the vessel, he was compelled to seels: medical treatment and thereby to incur financial obligations, is not improper, inasmuch as a ship is obliged to furnish suitable medical aid to a seaman in such a case.</p> <p>Pleading — Allegation of negligence: An allegation that in unloading a ship an iron plate slipped from its fastenings through the negligence of the ships’ servants, and fell on the libelant injuring him, is sufficient to put libellee bn its defense.</p> <p>Same — Allegation of damages: A general allegation of damages, with a statement of the injuries suffered by libelant in consequence of the alleged negligence of the servants of libellee, is sufficient.</p> <p>Same — Liability of common carriers: To bring a case within the act of Congress of June 11, 1906, “relating to liability of common carriers,” it is necessary to allege the libellee to be a common carrier.</p>

<p>Common carrier — Liability for injury to employee: Common carrier not liable for injury to employee caused by negligence of Ms fellow servants, the act of Congress of June 11, 1906 (34 Stat. L.. chap. 3073, p. 232), to the contrary being repugnant to the Constitution.</p> <p>Same — Liability for costs of cure, maintenance and wages of injured seaman: Libelant having received slight injuries in the employ of libellee, and being given adequate medical treatment, an opportunity of entering a hospital as a patient of the Marine Hospital Service at the request.of libellee, and being promised relief from work on the vessel for the whole of the return voyage if necessary, failed to enter the hospital, engaged his .own physician and left the ship. Seld, that libellee was not liable for expenses of his cure and maintenance while recovering nor for further wages.</p>

<p>Act of navigation — Signalling by a dredger in a 'fixed position: A dredger at work in a fixed position in a ship channel, signals, in answer to the inquiring signal of an approaching tug with its tow, that a certain side of the channel is open for her to pass, the tug attempts the passage and its tow is stranded. Held, that such signalling by the dredger was not an act of navigation that rendered it liable to attachment.</p> <p>Admiralty jurisdiction — Damage received by a ship in charge of a tug: Held, under the circumstances set forth above, followed by a second stranding of the tow while in charge of the tug, that an action lies in admiralty against such tug.</p> <p>Liability of tug for injury to its tow under signal to proceed: Under the first mentioned circumstances, a tug is not relieved of responsibility because of a signal favorable to her proceeding through the passage indicated.</p> <p>Liability for secondary consecjuences of a negligent act — Interruption: Liability for secondary consequences of a negligent act is relieved by the interposition of a second negligent act or overpowering force.</p> <p>■An act of necessity justifiable: A necessary act is not a negligent act unless it is negligently done.</p> <p>General allegation of negligence — Emergency: A. mere general allegation of negligence insufficient where a necessary act is attempted and fails under conditions likely to cause failure, even though proper care and skill is exercised.</p>

<p>Liability of towing vessel for injury to tow: A vessel in tow is stranded through the negligence of the tug; she floats off in such a position in a narrow channel that her rescue is a matter of difficulty but yet practicable with exercise of reasonable care and skill. The same tug attempts the rescue in which attempt she is again stranded. Held, that the tug is liable for second stranding through its failure to exercise sufficient care and skill to save her, and not because of its negligence in causing the first stranding.</p> <p>Same: Had the second stranding been inevitable in consequence of the first stranding, the tug would be liable whether it had attempted to rescue her afterwards or not.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libel in rem for damages for injury to tow.</p>

<p>Immigration Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. L., part 1, page 1213) : Construction of section 24 as to the definition of perjury.</p>

<p>Negligence causing injury to a trespasser: Negligence whereby injury is done, is not excused because the person injured is a trespasser. Richmond v. Bronson, 5 Denio, 55, dissented from.</p> <p>Construction of fishery clause in the organic act: The Hawaiian organic act declared certain sea fisheries, which had previously been free to citizens and residents alike, to be free to citizens of the U. S. Seld, that without further enactment or authoritative notice to the contrary, such fisheries remained free to non-citizen residents as well as to citizens.</p> <p>“Fairway”: “ Fairway” and “midchannel” are used synonymously in 30 Stat. L. 101, and this use is in harmony with Century Dictionary.</p> <p>Failure of anchored boat to show statutory light: Failure of anchored boat to show statutory light does not impair her right to recover for a collision if such failure did not contribute thereto.</p> <p>Obstruction to navigation — Anchored boat: A boat anchored in an open roadstead near the entrance to a harbor where few vessels pass in the night, and fishing with lines, is not an obstruction to navigation.</p> <p>Collision with an anchored boat: A fisherman in an anchored boat which is run down through the negligence of a moving vessel, is not precluded from obtaining damages, because of his failure to move his boat out of the way of the approaching vessel, if he has not otherwise contributed to the collision.</p> <p>Moving vessel colliding with anchored, vessel — Presumption of negligence — Burden of proof: A moving vessel running down an anchored boat is presumed to have been negligent and the burden of proof is upon her to acquit herself of liability.</p>

<p>Arrest without warrant — Legality: An arrest of a sailor on DuarO of Ms ship lying in the port of Honolulu by an offieer without a warrant, in consequence of the request of the chief officer, is illegal under the Hawaiian law and common law.</p> <p>Same: In such a ease, the fact that the chief officer told the policeman that "there is a disturbance aboard” and pointed out libelant as the man making it, does not make the arrest legal, where the policeman neither saw nor heard of the circumstances of the disturbance, but if he had been told of the circumstances of the disturbance, which he had not seen, and from such narration had found reasonable cause to suspect the guilt of libelant and had arrested him because of such suspicion, the arrest would be legal.</p> <p>Same: The right to arrest without a warrant is an exception to the general rule and the conditions under which it is allowed must exist, — and the methods under which it is carried out must be strictly followed to make it legal.</p> <p>First offieer in charge of a vessel — Authority: The first officer was in charge of the ship de facto, the master did not appear in connection with the matters testified to, nor was there any intimation that he was on board Held, that the first officer rightfully represented the owner.</p> <p>Liability of one causing arrest for extension of imprisonment: The arrest being illegal, and the ship going to sea immediately after with the possible witnesses in the ease, leaving libelant in imprisonment, the libellee is liable for extension of the imprisonment, which may have been due to negligence of the police.</p>

<p>Master and servant — Duty of the master as to the safety of the servant — Liability of master: It is the duty of the employer to furnish the employe with a reasonably safe place in which to work, and safe machinery and appliances to work with, and for his failure to do so, whereby the servant is injured, the employer is liable to him in damages.</p> <p>Shipping — Difficulty in procuring safe appliances — Assumption of rislc by master: When the agents of a ship, because of the impossibility of fully equipping her with safe appliances for the use of the crew without serious delay, send her to sea with unsafe and defective appliances, knowing them to be defective, they assume for the ship the risk of all damages that may result from the use of such defective appliances, including damages for injuries to any of the crew who may be injured thereby.</p> <p>Seamen — Injuries at sea — Release of master’s liability: In such a case the ship may be relieved from such liability, First, when, before the beginning of the voyage any of the crew who are afterwards injured in consequence of such defeet, become acquainted with such defect and understand its danger to those who may have to use the appliances in which it exists, and have an opportunity of withdrawing from the service of the ship; second, when a member of the crew who knows of such defect and understands its danger voluntarily or carelessly and recklessly exposes himself to the danger and is injured.</p> <p>Same — Injury in service — Duty of ship to malee most accessible port: When a member of the crew of a vessel is so injured at sea that obviously life or limb is in serious danger without prompt surgical assistance, of which a master is presumed to know, and there is a probability of being able to reach another port in less time than to reach the port for which the ship was cleared, and in time for the relief of the injured seaman, it is the duty of the master to proceed to sueh other port, regardless of considerations of expense to the ship or cargo.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same—Insurance: Insurance on ship and cargo not invalidated by sueh departure from the insured voyage.</p> <p>Same — Incapacitated by ship’s negligence from following the sea— Liability of the ship: A chief officer being incapacitated from following his employment by injuries caused by the negligence of his ship, is entitled to such an amount in damages as will provide him an income for the rest of his life, under the accepted rules of expectation of life, which shall approximately make up his loss of income caused by sueh incapacity.</p>

<p>Evidence — Witness—Privilege: A witness must tell what he knows, except as to privileged communications, which include those made between attorney and client, husband and wife, physician and patient, clergyman and penitent and some others including such privileged communications made in neeessaiy presence of others, such as stenographers or interpreters, and which thereby become privileged as to them.</p> <p>Same: Confessions made to a clergyman are not privileged as to other officials of the ehureh of such clergyman, who may be present for disciplinary purposes.</p>

<p>Adultery — Definition—Legislation: The meaning of the word adultery is fully defined and settled so far as to express an act of sexual intercourse between a married person and another person not his or her husband or wife; and in a statute providing a punishment for adultery it is not necessary to set forth the acts constituting it.</p> <p>Construction of amending statute: An act amending another act may be found to have added to its scope if the words of the amending act show such intention.</p> <p>Exception to a rule: An exception to a rule strengthens the application of the rule to matters not excepted.</p> <p>Grimwndl liability to distinct jurisdiction: A person doing an act which violates both a federal and a state or territorial law, commits two offenses and may be punished for both.</p>

<p>Criminal Laiu: Indictment for adultery.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Subordinate officer — Disrating—Displacing: A subordinate officer of a ship, if unfit for his position through incompetence or negligence, may be displaced by the master but not disrated.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same—Damages: A second mate was disrated to the position of a common seaman and sent to the forecastle. Held, this to be an aggravation of damages if there was insufficient ground for displacing him.</p>

<p>Practice — Sabeas Corpus — Proof of oral decision not entered in the record: A prisoner brings proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus and tbe judge orders his discharge. The respondent gives notice of appeal and the prisoner continues in custody. Long afterwards he brings new proceedings in habeas corpus in another jurisdiction, reciting such former order of discharge. The respondent alleges hearing on appeal of former case and that the order of discharge appealed from was reversed by the court and prisoner remanded, but shows no copy of decision or order or record of any kind, only reciting "as more fully appears on the minutes of" appellate court. Held,, denying prayer for discharge, that evidence of such decision would be received with caution and considered.</p>

<p>Receipt in full — Understanding: A pay roll printed in blank containing in addition to specific words of discharge the words “and in full of all demands of whatsoever kind or nature against the above named vessel, her owners or officers, ” although prima facie a receipt in full, is subject to explanation as to the understanding with which it is signed.</p> <p>Admiralty- — Coasting service, Territory of Hawaii — Contract of service — First Mate — Filot: An engagement of a person holding a license as master and pilot, as first mate of a vessel engaged in the inter-island coasting service of the Territory of Hawaii, does not carry with it an engagement of such a person as pilot also.</p> <p>Same — Question of additional compensation of first mate engaged as pilot subsequent to his engagement as first mate: Sueh person, engaged as first mate on such a vessel, upon being requested after the first voyage out of the port of Honolulu and baek, to perform, the duties of pilot out of and into sueh port thereafter, and consenting to do so, is entitled to reasonable compensation for sueh pilotage service in addition to his pay as first mate.</p> <p>Same — Libel for pilotage — Fstoppel: The libelant presented his bill for services as pilot and afterwards sued for a larger amount. Held, that the amount of the bill may be taken as a reasonable appraisement of the value of the services rendered, there being no allegation of mistake.</p>

<p>At Lctw: Demurrer to petition.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction of the United States, the States and Territories over the same criminal act: Although the samo act may constitute an offense both against the United States and oue of its States and be punished independently by each government, the same rule does not hold as to an act which is an offense against the United States and one of its Territories, in that the government of a Territory, unlike a State, derives its powers from the United States.</p> <p>Conviction or acquittal in a territorial court as a bar to a trial for the same offense in a federal court: It therefore follows that an acquittal or conviction in a court of the Territory of Hawaii on a charge of adultery, which is an offense in all the Territories of the United States by the federal laws, and in the Territory of Hawaii by the continuance in force of the law of the Republic of Hawaii on the subject by Congress in the organic act, is a bar to a trial of the same charge in the federal court of such Territory; inasmuch as both courts derive their authority from the United States.</p>

<p>Construction of statute: The words, “any . . . corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress,” in the act of Congress of January 26, 1907 (34 Stat. L., part 1, p. 864). do not include a corporation chartered by the government of the Hawaiian monarchy, although the act of Congress creating a territorial government for the Hawaiian Islands provided that the pre-existing Hawaiian statute, under which such corporation was chartered, should “continue in force” subject to repeal or amendment.</p> <p>Same: Such words include a corporation chartered by the territorial government inasmuch as the authority for its incorporation comes primarily from an act of Congress creating such government.</p> <p>Same: Such words include all corporations chartered after the assumption of sovereignty of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States under the provisions of the joint resolution of annexation, with the exception of joint stock companies.</p> <p>Same: An election in a Territory for a delegate to Congress is not an election within the definition of the latter part of the act of Congress of January 26, 1907.</p> <p>Constitutionality of statute: Federal laws, making regulations for the conduct of elections in which federal officers and legislators are voted for and providing punishments for their violation, are not unconstitutional because of the circumstance that state officers and legislators are voted for at the same election.</p> <p>Same: A federal law providing for the punishment of “any eorpora,tion” which may make a money contribution in connection with an election of federal officers and legislators, is not unconstitutional because the words ‘ ‘ any corporation, ’ ’ include state corporations.</p>

<p>Construction of statutes: The United States is a real, rather than a nominal party, to proceedings brought in its name, by creditors of contractors for the construction of public buildings on account of materials or labor furnished to such contractors, under act of Congress of February 24, 1905: 33 Stat. L., part 1, p.. 811.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — TJ. S. Circuit Cowrts: This being so, United States Circuit Courts have jurisdiction of such cases.</p> <p>Same — V. S. District Court, District of Sawain: The U. S. District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, having the powers and jurisdiction of a circuit court, has jurisdiction of such cases.</p> <p>Same — Same—Construction-. The fact that the act of February 24, 1905, was passed after the organic act which gave such powers to the said district court, does not affect the question, for such powers by reasonable construction were intended to include such now powers as subsequent legislation might add to the then existing powers of the circuit courts; but if not, the fact that the act of February 24, 1905. is an amendment and enlargement of the act of August 13, 1894, which, together with the act of August 13, 1888, conferred the same jurisdiction upon the circuit courts as was given by the act of 1905, still supports the jurisdiction of the district court, such act of 1894 antedating the organic act.</p>

<p>Practice under statute for protection of persons furnishing materials and labor for public worlds: In proceedings by materialmen under the legislation “for the protection of public works,” (33 Stat. L. part 1, p. 811), it is not necessary that the complaints shall state the names of other creditors than the plaintiffs.</p> <p>Construction of the statute in relation to the bond prescribed: The bond prescribed by such legislation is two-fold; first, protecting the United States against breaches of the contract, and second, guaranteeing to third parties furnishing materials and labor for performance of such contract, payment of their bills therefor. Much of the law applying to ordinary bonds does not apply to such bond.</p> <p>Practice — Status of materialmen.under a mr-dificatton of the contract: In proceedings by materialmen under such legislation, after the required bond is executed and delivered to the United States, the latter is no longer the representative of the parties who may furnish materials, &e., and they are not prejudiced by its action in agreeing or consenting to a modification of the contract.</p> <p>Same — Status of materialmen causing a delay in the performance or other modification of the contract: Guarantee of such bond as to material-men as affected by their conduct causing a delay in the performance or other modification of the contract, quaere..</p> <p>Same — Notice to surety on bond of modification of contract: Notice to surety on bond of modification of contract not required by the statute.</p> <p>Same — Failure to attach bills of particulars to complaints: Failure to attach bills of particulars to such complaints, not material.-</p>

<p>Practice — Amendments to pleadings — Changes of parties — New cause of action: An amendment to pleadings -which changes a party to a suit involving a change of the cause of action, cannot be made.</p> <p>Same — Same—Changes of parties in actions of contract: A change of parties in actions of contract necessarily changes the cause of action “unless the change be as to representative parties.”</p> <p>Same — Same—Privity: A change of parties is allowable where there is such a privity between the new and the old party, and their relation to the issue is such that no new eause of action is asserted.</p> <p>Same- — Same—Statute of limitations: Whether an amendment is allowable, which changes a party involving a change of the cause of action, where its denial would, through a statute of limitations, leave the moving party without a remedy, quaere.</p>

<p>At Law: Motion to amend complaint.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction — -Admiralty—Shipping Commissioner: In a libel for wages and damages, a court in admiralty is without jurisdiction to compel a shipping commissioner to pay into the registry of the court, moneys received by him from the master on account of the wages of libelants.</p>

<p>Discharge of seamen: Refusal by the crew, without justification, to obey lawful orders of a ship’s officers, is sufficient reason for their discharge.</p> <p>Lawful order under shipping articles: An order by a ship’s officers commanding the erew: to raise the anchor by means of the capstan, in connection with docking the vessel, when there was no steam for the donkey engine, is a lawful order under shipping articles whereby the crew have agreed "to be obedient to the lawful commands. * * * of their superior officers in everything relating to the vessel.’’</p> <p>Same: An order to the crew from the ship’s officers, on reaching port, to put the sail covers on the reefed sails, is also a lawful order under such shipping articles.</p> <p>Seamen refusing duty — Wages: Seamen refusing duty and thereafter discharged are not entitled to pa.y for the time during which they refuse duty.</p>

<p>Homicide — Murder—Trial—Verdict: Under the act of Congress of January 15, 1897, empowering the jury to qualify the verdict of guilty by adding the words ' ‘ without capital punishment, ’ ’ their authority is not limited to cases of palliating or mitigating circumstances, but extends to every case in which, upon a view of the whole evidence, they are of opinion that it would not be wise or just to impose capital punishment.</p> <p>Same — Murder — Manslaughter — Malice: Murder, manslaughter, malice: defined.</p> <p>Same — Intent—Evidence: A man’s act is evidence of his intent, as a rule; evidence of intent discussed.</p> <p>Same — Criminal responsibility — Intoxication, or insanity, of defendant: In case of homicide where the actor was in such condition, by reason of voluntary intoxication, as to be incapable of specific intent to kill, or of understanding the nature of his act, the grade of his crime is reduced to manslaughter.</p> <p>Evidence — Weight and ■ sufficiency — Credibility of witnesses: The jury are to consider the credibility of witnesses by their manner of testifying, the consistency of their testimony, their means of information and opportunity of knowledge, and their interest in the result of the trial.</p> <p>Same — Credibility—Positive, and negative, testimony: The testimony of a man who says that he knows a thing, is better than that of another who, though having some opportunity to know, says that he does not know it, or who has a doubt of the matter. Positive, and negative, testimony discussed.</p> <p>Criminal law — Evidence—Presumption of innocence — Seasonable doubt: That the defendant is charged with an offense and under indictment, is not evidence against him; the presumption of innocence prevails, notwithstanding. Reasonable doubt defined.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Presumption of innocence — Burden of proof: The fact that the defendant does not take the stand in his own defense is not a circumstance that can be used against him.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Presumptions and burden of proof — Motive: The prosecution is not bound to directly establish an adequate or any motive for the alleged crime.</p> <p>Sa/nie — Evidence—Presumption of innocence: Suspicions and probabilities, and personal opinions of the jurors not formed upon the testimony, are to be given no weight.</p> <p>Same — Evidence, circumstantial — Presumption of innocence: In order to convict the defendant upon evidence of circumstances, it is necessary, not only that all of the circumstances concur to show that he committed the crime charged, but also that the circumstances are inconsistent with any other rational conclusion.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Statements against interest — Self-serving statements: Defendant's statements against interest are entitled to great weight; but what he said for himself, the jury are not bound to believe because said in a statement proved by the prosecution.</p> <p>Same — Evidence—Weight and sufficiency — Verdict: A criminal ease involving much testimony and many facts should not be decided upon the probability or improbability of any one point singled out of the evidence, unless the settlement of such point is decisive of the whole issue, but a safe decision requires due consideration of all the evidence.</p> <p>Criminal law — Homicide—Intoxication, or insanity, as defense — Burden of proof: Under an indictment for murder, intoxication is no defense or palliation, unless the defendant was thereby rendered incapable of malicious intent, or of forming a design, or of understanding or remembering the lawless nature of the aet. — When the defense is intoxication, the burden is on the prosecution to establish the mental soundness of the defendant at the time of the homicide.</p> <p>Same — Trial—Jury—Verdict: It is proper for the jury in their deliberations to apply to the testimony their general knowledge and judgment derived from experience, observation and reflection, their knowledge of human nature and the customs of society; provided the verdict is based on due consideration of all the evidence.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libel in rem for salvage.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libel in rem for salvage.</p>

Criminal Law: Motion, for discharge of defendant Hayashi on the ground that he has not been afforded a speedy trial as prescribed by the 6th Amendment to the Constitution.

<p>Perjury: Ground of demurrer that “indictment does not aver that the court was acting in an official or judicial capacity,” considered.</p> <p>Same: Ground of demurrer that the “indictment is ambiguous,” considered.</p> <p>Same — Averment as to Vie administration of the oath: An averment of an indictment for perjury, setting forth the court or officer before whom the oath under which the alleged false statement charged as constituting perjury, was taken, and that such court or officer had competent authority to administer the same, without stating whether the oath was administered by such court or officer directly or through an interpreter, is sufficient.</p> <p>Same — Material information: Under an averment of an indictment for perjury, stating that under an investigation of the grand jury of an alleged violation of the laws of the United States, it was a material inquiry whether certain knives of foreign manufacture had been obtained from a party who had paid the duties due thereon or from a party who had not paid the duties due thereon, or whether or not they had been smuggled into the country, an averment that a witness falsely stated under oath in such investigation that he did not know whether or not the said knives had been smuggled, that he had found them, and that he had obtained them from a man at one of the wharves in Honolulu, whose name was to him unknown, all of which he knew was false, avers matter material and pertinent to the investigation then being conducted by the grand jury.</p>

<p>In Equity: Demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Motion objecting to a witness convicted of an infamous crime.</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.</p>

<p>Court — Adjournment, efeet of — Power to convene before adjourned day: The court, having adjourned to a day certain, may convene before that day for the transaction of business in open court, provided such action does not operate to the prejudice of any party.</p>

<p>Territorial courts of Hawaii — Relation of Hawaiian Federal court tor The status of the Hawaiian territorial courts and the relation between them and the Federal court in Hawaii is analogous to the status and relation of state courts to Federal district and circuit courts within the same-territorial limits.</p> <p>Habeas corpus — Jurisdiction of Federal court: The Federal district and circuit courts have undoubted jurisdiction to summarily entertain petitions for the unit of habeas corpus in connection with persons alleged to be restrained of their liberty by the judgment of state or territorial courts or the action of state or territorial officials contrary to the rights of such persons under the Constitution and laws of the United States.</p> <p>Habeas corpus — Limitation of jurisdiction under established Supreme Court decisions: While such jurisdiction undoubtedly exists, the Supreme Court has strongly admonished inferior Federal courts that they must not interfere with the administration of justice in the state courts except in eases of "peculiar urgency.”</p> <p>Habeas corpus — “Peculiar urgency’’: Cases of "peculiar urgency” justifying the interference of Federal courts by writs of habeas corpus with the administration of justice in the state courts (including territorial courts when the latter are, as in Hawaii, in the same position as state courts) are probably those cases, and only those cases, which involve, to the extent of prevention, embarrassment or retardation, the authority and operations of the general government, or its obligations and relations to foreign nations.</p> <p>Habeas corpus — Non-interference with administration of justice in state courts: By granting to the Federal courts power to act summarily upon the petitions for writs of habeas corpus, Congress did not intend that the Federal courts should by such action draw to themselves in the first instance the control of all criminal actions commenced in state courts where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States, thus clogging the calendars of the Federal courts to an intolerable extent in an attempt to do work which can be done better by the state courts.</p> <p>Same: State courts are in duty bound, equally with the courts of the Union, to maintain the Constitution of the United States and it must be presumed that they are equally able and willing to support the Constitution.</p> <p>Same: The forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction administered under a single system exercise towards each other, whereby conflicts are avoided by non-interference with the process of each other, is always a principle of comity, but between state courts and those of the United States it is something more. It is a principle of right and of law, and therefore of necessity.</p> <p>Same: The correction of mistakes, if any, made by the state courts should be through writ of error and not by writ of habeas corpus, because otherwise one Federal judge might presume or feel in duty bound to reverse the decision of the highest court of a State; and thus, because the discharge of a prisoner in habeas corpus proceedings must be peremptory, would leave theoretically no method for the State to enforce its further or other legal remedy against the alleged wrongdoer, whereas the judgment upon a writ of error may, and should always, look toward such further proceedings in the lower courts as may be legally proper.</p> <p>Habeas corpus — Insane persons: A person adjudged insane is not confined in an ayslmn as a matter of punishment, but for his own good and protection as much as for that of the State. Wherefore, in such cases, a Federal court should have still more hesitation about interfering with state officials than in case of persons charged with crime.</p> <p>Habeas corpus• — Stale civil officers: Comity between state and Federal courts most strongly demands that the latter shall finder no circumstances look into the conduct of state civil officials either as to their motives or their official actions.</p>

<p>Criminal law — Postal offenses — Outside cover or ivrapper: A string or cord or any other attenuated material in the nature of a string or cord, wrapped around papers or other mailable matter to hold it together for the purpose of mailing, together with any convenient arrangement, as for example a tag attached thereto for the purpose of affixation of postage stamps or writing of address, constitutes an “outside wrapper” in the meaning of section 3 of the postal law of June 18, 1888.</p> <p>Same: And “any delineations, epithets, terms or language” forbidden by section 3 of the act of June 18, 1888, written upon such a tag, is written upon the “outside wrapper” within the meaning of the statute.</p>

<p>Final hearing — Section 8S4 S. S. U. S.: Counsel filed a stipulation that the decision in another case should, when made, be the decision in these cases. 3eld, that the decision in such other case being made, a final hearing in these cases had taken place.</p> <p>Doelcet fees: Counsel represented three similar cases bearing on the same subject-matter, and which might have been joined in one libel. 3eld, that he is entitled to but one docket fee.</p> <p>Interest on decrees: Section 966 E. S. U. S., providing for interest on judgments, does not apply to deerees. When no interest is allowed in a decree in admiralty, nor in the appellate court on appeal, the inferior court to which the mandate of the appellate court is directed, may not add an allowance of interest.</p>

<p>Federal courts — Practice—Reversal of earlier decisions: When one member of a Federal court has ruled upon a point of law after full consideration, his ruling should be allowed to stand until reversed by a higher court or until exceptionally strong occasion for reconsidering it has been adduced; otherwise the people and attorneys practicing before the bar would be in a continual state of uncertainty concerning the law.</p> <p>Criminal law — Conspiracy—Indictment when alleged offense is misdemeanor: The fact that a conspiracy under section 5440 and the crime of adultery are both misdemeanors, would’ not per se prevent an indictment for an alleged conspiracy to commit the crime of adultery.</p> <p>Criminal law — Conspiracy—Indictment—Sufficiency of charge: When it is charged in an indictment that certain persons conspired “to have the crime of adultery committed, ’ ’ this charge is substantially synonymous with the words 1 ‘ to commit the crime of adultery, ’ ’ provided that persons of ordinary knowledge of tlie conditions alleged in the indictment, and especially provided that the defendants themselves, would be reasonably supposed to know thé meaning of the charge.</p> <p>Same: When the words “did deliver” are used to indicate the alleged overt act of a conspiracy, whereby a woman, not charged as one of the conspirators, was said to have been delivered to one of the conspirators by the other two, as a definite act toward the commission of the adultery, and when the context shows clearly that it is charged that such delivery was a wrongful act intended to lead to an offense against the United States, the defendants are sufficiently informed concerning the overt act, in view of the fact that it is an indictment for conspiracy and in view of the express direction of Congress in E. S. 3025.</p> <p>Same: If it is a matter of knowledge to the court and of common knowledge in the community that in many instances Japanese women are in effect deliverable chattels in the hands either of their husbands, or of some other persons who completely control their actions, and particularly if it is known to the court that Japanese residents within its jurisdiction are affected peculiarly with this common knowledge, a decision concerning alleged uncertainty of charges made in an indictment against such Japanese defendants might take that common knowledge into account' to determine whether the alleged, or possible, uncertainty tends to the prejudice of the 'defendants.</p> <p>Criminal law — Conspiracy—Indictment: Even though the overt act should be in itself a crime against Federal or local law, the fact that the conspiracy necessarily involved the intention to perform such unlawful overt act, does not prevent an indictment for conspiracy when there is evidence of a conspiracy to commit, through said overt act, an offense against the United States; and this would be true even though subsequent to the overt act, through some unforeseen circumstance the offense aimed at by the conspiracy cannot be committed.</p>

<p>Admiralty —Evidence—Admissibility of, relating to compensation of other vessels performing similar service: In a claim for quantum meruit compensation for assistance to a stranded vessel by means of a small steamer, evidence of the remuneration which other vessels received for assisting the same vessel on a quantum meruit basis may be received on the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to pay beyond regular rates on the ground of peril to its vessel in the service rendered.</p> <p>Same — Same—Admissibility of, pertaining to negotiations for engagement of plaintiff’s vessel after previous services had been terminated: After the termination of services of plaintiff's vessel, plaintiff, on request, made a proposition for an engagement of its vessel for the continuance of its service. Seld, that evidence of sueh proposition was inadmissible, as the information which had so far been acquired as to the character of the service in regard to danger, made a different status from that which existed at the inception of the work.</p> <p>Same — Evidence as to matters not alleged in the libel: The bill was for emergency service, and contained no allegation of salvage service. Evidence was introduced which tended to support a claim for salvage compensation, had allegations therefor been made. 'Held, that no question of salvage compensation can bo considered.</p> <p>Same — Question of compensation for an attempt to assist stranded vessel, which failed: Under a bill for quantum meruit compensation, in an attempt to go to the assistance of a stranded vessel at the request of the owner, which failed by reason of the boisterous condition of the sea around the stranded vessel, the owner of the vessel making the attempt is entitled to some compensation.</p> <p>Same — Compensation for quantum meruit services in assisting a stranded vessel involving hazard to the assisting vessel: Services of -a vessel on a quantum meruit basis, involving danger to it, are entitled to extra compensation, over regular rates.</p> <p>Same — Question of compensation for services whereby owner of stranded vessel is able to carry out its contract for the transportation of passengers and their baggage: A vessel assisting a stranded vessel on a quantum meruit basis, and performing services whereby the owner of the stranded vessel is enabled to carry out its contract witi’- the passengers for the transportation of themselves and their baggage, is entitled to compensation therefor.</p> <p>Evidence — Weight of testimony of witness who remembers and acts on what he remembers, and of witness who does not remember: Testimony of a witness who remembers an incident and acts on it, has more weight than that of a witness w»ho does not remember the incident.</p> <p>Admiralty — Evidence—Conditions affecting a stranded vessel, as relating to the question of emergency service of an assisting vessel: Kvidence of conditions affecting a stranded vessel, significant of danger to it, or in the minds of its officers, creating an emergency, to be considered on the question of extraordinary services of a vessel assisting it on a quantum meruit basis.</p> <p>Same — Marine insurance — Deviation allotved but extra premium to be reached by negotiations in case of loss: Marine insurance covering a deviation with extra premium to be found through negotiations in case of loss, not to be considered in estimating compensation where there was a deviation but no loss.</p>

<p>Criminal law — Embezzlement—Indictment based on suspicious circumstances: The prosecution may base an indictment for embezzlement, not on specific, identifiable items of embezzlement, but on suspicions circumstances such as shortages evidenced by false official statements and entries.</p> <p>Same: All evidence tending to show a system of embezzlement based on suspicious circumstances may be admitted.</p> <p>Same — Burden of proof: If the jury are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence of prosecution admitted, that an actual shortage has existed in the accounts of an. agent accused of embezzlement, the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant to show that the shortage or shortages were not as a matter of faet caused by conversion of the trust funds to his own use.</p> <p>Same — Embezzlement—Former jeopardy: K, a postmaster, was indicted, tried and acquitted for embezzling money order funds. The indictment was based entirely on prima facie showing of a shortage as of November 27th, 1907, through a false statement in an official paper of defendant. At the trial, evidence was admitted showing the official conduct of K's money order business from August 11th, 1905, to December 13th, 1907, at which date he resigned without a shortage then existing in his accounts. This evidence showed at least eleven other interrelated prima facie shortages, through false official statements or gross delays in remitting. For six of these other indictments had been returned against the same defendant, among them one for an alleged shortage of $1,865 on November 8th, 1907. Many times more evidence of this $1,865 shortage was admitted on the former tidal than of the November 27th shortage. The record evidence made part of the special plea of former acquittal shows that all the alleged shortages are inextricably interdependent on each other and that there is no evidence of even one identifiable item of embezzlement. Held, on demurrer to the special plea, that a system of shortages inextricably interdependent on each other wherein no identifiable items of embezzlement are shown, constitutes for the purposes of trial a continuing ofConse, and a trial on an indictment based on one of the prima facie instances of shortage constitutes jeopardy as to all other alleged shortages in the same system.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus-. Question of bail.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus: Petition for writ.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus: Petition for writ.</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Demurrer to indictment.</p> <p>Indictment under act of Congress of February 9, 1909. (35 Stat. L. 614.)</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Motion to quash indictment.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Demurrer to indictment. (Indictment under sec. 3, act of March 3, 1887.)</p>

<p>Duties — Miso — Unenumeraled articles — Preserved vegetables — A sauce: A Japanese product made from beans and rice by processes of cooking and fermentation which change their taste and flavor though not entirely destroying their forms, Avhieh has keeping qualities to a moderate extent, known commercially as miso, and generally used for making soup, is properly chargeable with a duty of twenty per cent, ad valorem, see. 6, ancl not witli a duty of forty per cent, as “preserved vegetables” or “a sauce,” par. 241.</p> <p>Same — Similitude: Because an unenumerated article is dutiable as being substantially similar to an enumerated article, it does not follow that another unenumerated article which is somewhat similar to the first, or is produced by a similar process, is dutiable as similar to the second.</p>

<p>In Admiralty: Libel in rem and in personam for damages for causing the death of a horse.</p>

<p>Equitable assignment — Notice: Any writing or act which shows an intention to transfer a specific fund in the hands of another is an equitable assignment, and is complete when notice is given to the fund holder.</p> <p>Same — Validity thereof — Notice: An assignment of a debt requires for its validity as to third parties notice to the debtor, but not acceptance by him.</p> <p>Preference — Transfer of property: A transfer of property by a person who later becomes bankrupt, is complete in relation to the question of preference (Bankr. act, see. 60a), when made, and is not affected by want of notice.</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Demurrer to indictment. Indictment under section 84 of the Criminal Code of the United States (35 Stat. 1104).</p>

<p>Crimvinal Law: Demurrer to indictment, and motion to compel election between counts. Indictment- under act of Congress passed February 9, 1909 (35 Stat. L. 614).</p>

<p>Chinese exclusion — Deportation proceeding not ermiinal cause: A proceeding for tbe deportation of a Chinese laborer is not a criminal cause ■within meaning of. see. 1020 of the Bevised Statutes.</p> <p>Final judgment — Order forfeiting penalty of recognizance: An order forfeiting the penalty of a recognizance given on appeal to the district court from an order of a United States commissioner, because of the nonappearance of the defendant, is a final judgment, and it cannot be vacated or reopened at a term of court subsequent to that at which it was made.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy: Demurrer to bill of complaint.</p>

<p>Insolvency — Voidable preference: Where a preference is given, the transaction is voidable by the trustee, if there are sufficient facts and circumstances having significance in reference to the debtor’s financial condition, brought home to the preferred creditor or which ho must or ought to have seen or known, to put him on inquiry which, followed up, would inform him of the insolvency. B. A. sec. 60b.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Transfer of property by debtor with intent to defraud: The payment oí a note by one within four months of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him and who is thereupon adjudged a bankrupt, with the intent to defraud other creditors, such note being dated more than four months before the beginning of such proceedings, is null and void as against such creditors, the payee not being a purchaser "in good faith and for a present fair consideration.” B. A. sec. 67e.</p> <p>Same — Same—Debtor’s insolvency: Under the allegation that such payment was made with intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of the one making it, proof of his insolvency at the time of the payment is not essential.</p> <p>Same — Intent to defraud — Transfer of property creating insolvency: Any payment which creates insolvency in the payor, if made within four months of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against Mm, which is followed by adjudication, except to a purchaser "in good faith and for a present fair consideration,” would appear to be within B. A. sec. 67e.</p>

<p>Supreme Court, Territory of Hawaii — Construction of laws — Federal court of Hawaii: The federal court in Hawaii will follow the construction of the laws of the Territory made by its highest court.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same: A suggestion of a probable construction of municipal law by the highest court of the Territory of Hawaii, not adopted by the court making it, is not binding on the federal court of such Territory.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii over reserved questions from judge: The Supreme Court of Hawaii has no jurisdiction of questions reserved to it by the circuit judge sitting in equity at chambers and a decision of such questions by the Supreme Court is void.</p> <p>Same — Decree: The decision of such reserved questions by the Supreme Court is without legal effect, unless it is made the basis of a decree by the judge reserving them.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of subject matter — of the person: Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent or waiver, but jurisdiction of the person may.</p> <p>Waiver by minors: Minors may waive objection to errors apparent on the record that do not involve jurisdiction of the subject matter.</p> <p>Decree on demurrer — 'Res adjudicata: If a suit is dismissed on demurrer on the ground of defective pleadings or any ground which does not go to its merits, the decree or judgment will be no bar to another suit.</p> <p>Same — Issue: Where a decree "refers to the opinion of the trial judge in terms that make it clear that the object was to refer to it to explain what was determined, and the reasons therefor, then such opinion becomes a part of the record, and must be looked to to explain what was in issue and what was determined by the * * * decree in question. ’ ’</p> <p>Same — Same—Opinion affirming: The opinion of the court affirming such decree is inadmissible to show that the question determined was different from that in the record.</p> <p>Minors as parlies — Representation—Jurisdiction: Where minors are alleged plaintiffs in a suit in equity and the bill is signed by their next friends, who also are parties plaintiff, with their own names only, and the names of counsel are typewritten, no jurisdiction is acquired over them; and such a bill is good only as the bill of such next friends.</p> <p>Same — Representation of hostile interests by same counsel and next friends: Where minors and their mother were represented by the same counsel and next friends in proceedings that resulted in the consideration of an issue not intended to be raised by the bill, and yet probably within its seope, in which issue such minors and their mother had hostile interests, and which was decided in favor of the mother; held, that the minors were not represented in the trial of such issue and did not have their day in court.</p> <p>Devise of fee — Of life interest — Contingent devise: Where the terms of a devise, with a devise over, contingent on the death of the first devisee without issue, show an intention that the first devisee shall take a fee upon the death of the testator, the contingency is the death of the first devisee, without issue, during the life of the testator, but, surviving the testator, he takes an absolute estate in fee simple. But where the terms of the first devise are indefinite and not inconsistent with a construction by which only a life interest is given, it creates a life interest only, there being no obstacle to carrying out the contingent devise.</p> <p>Hule in Shelley case: The rule in Shelley’s ease will not be allowed to defeat the clear intention of a testator.</p> <p>Hide of property — Stare decisis: There being no construction of statutes or findings establishing business methods, and no series of decisions settling any legal principle relating to property, no rule of property has been created and the rule of stare decisis cannot be said to apply.</p> <p>Estoppel: Estoppel will only apply against one where there has been some act by him which has induced a change of position of those who allege the estoppel, or their privies in accordance with his real or apparent intention.</p> <p>Estoppel against minors: Estoppel does not run strictly or at all against minors.</p> <p>Translation — Discrepancy: A translation of a clause that removes a discrepancy is preferred to one that fails to do so, if it is reasonably within the bounds of grammatical and etymological interpretation.</p> <p>Status of transactions entered into in good faith, under decisions in the first and second eases, considered.</p>

<p>Chinese exclusion law — Finding of Department of Commerce and Labor on question of citizenship conclusive when: The decision of an inspector, affirmed on appeal by the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor, on a question of citizenship, after a fair hearing, is conclusive in the absence of any showing of abuse of authority or mistake of law.</p>

<p>Assault and battery — Self-defense—Words and blows: Words do not justify blows. Neither does the use of insulting language deprive the user -of the right to use force to meet force in self-defense.</p> <p>Same — Right of captain of vessel to use force when attached by seaman: The master of a vessel while in port, on being insulted and forcibly attacked by a seaman, is justified in using necessary force to maintain discipline and in self-defense.</p>

<p>Criminal Law: Motion to quash indictment. (Indictment under secs. 316 and 318 of the criminal code.)</p>

<p> Habeas Corpus. </p>

<p>Indictment — Statutory crimes: The general rule is that it is sufficient for an indictment to charge a statutory offense in the language of the statute, where, by so doing, the accused is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the accusation against him. But to this rule there is the qualification that if, the language so followed does not fully and without uncertainty and ambiguity describe the offense charged so as to enable the accused to prepare his defense and to plead the judgment in bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense, additional particulars must be alleged.</p> <p>Same — Sufficiency of allegations: In an indictment for feloniously depositing in the mails of the "United States non-mailable matter consisting of a newspaper, while it is not necessary to set forth the language which is alleged to be too obscene or indecent to be spread on the records of the court, it is necessary to describe the newspaper and identify the obscene matter sufficiently to apprise the accused of what particular paper or article therein is intended.</p>

<p>Removal of cause from territorial court — Revenue law — Act of February 9, 1909: The act of Congress of February 9, 1909, entitled, “An act to prohibit the importation and use of opium for other than medicinal purposes,” is not, except possibly, as to the proviso contained in the first section, a revenue law, actions arising out of the enforcement of which may be removed from a court of the Territory of Hawaii to this court under section 643, Eev. Stat.</p> <p>Same: Whether acts done with reference to said proviso could be regarded as having been done by authority or under color of a revenue law, not necessary to decide in this ease.</p> <p>Same — Record on removal must affirmatively show jurisdiction of federal court: This court will not retain jurisdiction of a cause improperly removed under section 643, Eev. Stat., on the ground that it is a case arising under the laws of the United States and is one removable under the act of August 13, 1888, where jurisdictional facts do not appear on the face of plaintiff’s declaration as filed in the territorial court.</p> <p>Same — Remanding cause: Even where the jurisdiction of the federal court of a cause removed from a state or territorial court is only doubtful the proper course is to remand the ease.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy: Demurrer to petition against the approval of the trustee’s accounts.</p>

<p>Banlcruptcy — Sale of property — Inadequacy of price — Appraisal, necessity of — Disposition of property on setting aside sale: While the want of an appraisal does not necessarily invalidate a sale by a trustee of property of a bankrupt’s estate, and a sale for a reasonable price, without appraisal may be confirmed, a private sale without appraisal for one hundred dollars, though ordered by the referee, of property which was worth five hundred dollars and which would probably have brought that, sum at public auction, not allowed to stand unless the purchaser pays to the trustee the difference in value, with interest.</p> <p>As the alternative, the purchaser may return the property and have back the purchase price with interest, the property to be sold by the trustee at public auction after due advertisement; provided, that if the funds of the estate shall be sufficient to pay the claims allowed and proper costs and expenses of administration, the property to be returned to the bankrupt.</p> <p>Same — Sale of property — Notice to creditors:. Under the law requiring that notices to creditors “ shall be addressed as specified in the proof of debt,” notice sent to a creditor whose name and address appear in the bankrupt’s schedule of liabilities, is not notice to an assignee of the creditor, whose proof of claim, containing his address, was duly filed with the referee; unless the notice sent to the assignor reaches the assignee.</p> <p>Same — Administration of estate — Collection of assets — Trustee’s duty: The trustee’s failure to use proper efforts to realize upon collectable debts due the estate, subjects him to the risk of being surcharged to the extent of their value less reasonable costs and expenses of collection.</p> <p>Same — Administration of estate — Payment of taxes — Trustee’s duty: The trustee’s failure to pay taxes, when having in hand sufficient funds, by reason whereof the estate is subjected to interest and penalties, renders him liable to be surcharged to the extent of such interest and penalties.</p>

<p>Eminent Domain: Demurrer to petition.</p>

<p>In Equity: Motion to reopen case.</p>

<p>Monopolies — Combinations, contracts in restraint of trade: Bill for injunction, to restrain dealers in lumber from combining to arbitrarily maintain high and oppressive prices in violation of 26 Stat. L. 209 (“Sherman Act”), dismissed for failure of proof.</p> <p>Same: Where an equilibrium of prices is reached by suspicious watchfulness of each other’s dealings on the part of competing merchants, or by a friendly exchange of information and views as to the state of the market, with an expectation, more or less definite, that all will approximate to the same standards, there is no violation of the statute; unless there also exists an agreement or understanding to fix prices with the object of control and monopoly.</p> <p>Same — Transportation—Freight rates: Under the circumstances of this case, there was no violation of the statute in the acceptance by several competing merchants of the proposition of a transportation company to pool their orders for a certain commodity to be shipped over its line, in order to obtain lower freight rates offered for large shipments.</p>

<p>Banhntpley — Attorney’s fees — Finding of referee — Appeal: On appeal, tlie court will not disturb the referee's findings of fact as to attorney's fees, except for manifest error.</p>