Volume 3 — Federal Reporter

<p>Demurrer to Bill.</p>

<p>1. Practice — Subpcena duces tecum to Produce Personal Property —Contempt of Court. — A subpoena duces tecum can only be used to compel the production of documentary evidence, books, papers, accounts, and the like.</p>

<p>Motion for Injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit to Foreclose Mortgage,</p>

Replevin brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant, who is sheriff of one of the counties of Minnesota, to recover possession of a quantity of wheat which the plaintiffs claim as their property. The defendant justifies the taking as sheriff, and shows that he seized the wheat by virtue of several writs of attachment against one Harris, who, defendant alleges, was the owner.

This was a libel of information for forfeiture against certain casks of distilled spirits found without any mark or stamp on them, and therefore claimed by the government as forfeited under section 3289 of the Revised Statutes.

<p>Motion for New Trial.</p>

<p>In Equity. Infringement of Patent.*</p>

<p>1. Collision at Pier — Vessels Adrift in a Storm. — In the East river, at Brooklyn, during a squall, the bark Gunn attempted to make last at a pier outside of a bark, the O. Rocca, which again was fast outside a ship, the Paulina. Before the moorings could be all made fast the C. Rocca broke loose, and both she and the Gunn were driven against a canal-boat, the William Doran, lying further up in the slip, doing and receiving damage. Suit was brought in this district by the owner of the canal-boat to recover damages against both the other vessels; and suit was also begun in the southern district of New York, by the owner of the O. Rooca, to recover his damages against the Gunn, which, by consent, was tried with the other two actions in this court. Held, that the Gunn, having taken the risk of making fast at such a place in face of a storm, was responsible for damages caused by the accident to the other two vessels, and that the O. Rocca was not liable for damages caused to the canal-boat.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by Pew & Son against Laughlin et al., owners of the bark Kobert Morrison, to recover damages for breach of a charter-party. The case was twice argued. On the first hearing a question arose as to the sufficiency of the proof of the execution of the charter-party, and libellant asked and obtained leave to take additional testimony. On the second bearing the case turned upon the effect of an alteration which bad been made in the charter-party.

In Admiralty. Libel in rem by the owner of the barge Zouave and her cargo against the tug John Markee, Jr., setting forth a contract on the part of the tug to tow the barge from Philadelphia to Salem Creek canal, and place her in the mouth of the canal.

In Admiralty. This was a suit brought by the owners of the barge Boseobel against the owners of the tug Bay City, to recover for the loss of the barge through the alleged negligence of the tug. On the day assigned for trial the case was called and the master of the barge put upon the stand.

<p>1. Town Bonds — Affidavit of Town Assessors. — In an action by a bona fide holder of bonds issued under the act of May 11,1868, (Laws of New Yqjk, 1868, e. 811,) as amended by the act of April 19, 1869, (Laws of New York, 1869, c. 241,) to aid in the construction of the Lake Ontario Shore Railroad Company, the defendant cannot contradict any of the statutory facts sworn to in the affidavit of the town assessors.</p> <p>Phelps v. The Town of Lewiston, 15 Blatchf. C. C. R. 131, followed.</p> <p>Smith v. The Town of Ontario, 15 Blatchf. C. C. R. 267, distinguished.</p> <p>2. Papers Separately Piled at Same Time. — When such affidavit of the assessors, and other papers prescribed by the statute, were filed separately at the same lime, and were attached together when produced on the trial, and wore filed as a whole at one and the same lime, they will be regarded as having been physically attached together as one whole when they were filed.</p> <p>3. Ratification. — Pacts in this ease held to constitute a ratification of the acts of the officers who issued the town bonds.</p>

In Equity.' Bill in equity, praying that the defendant John H. Bacon, as he is trustee under the will of Edward O. Tirrell, may be ordered to convey to the complainants and others, heirs at law of said Edward, one undivided eighth part of the residue of his estate.

<p>Appeal from the district court.</p>

<p>1. Partnership — Estate op Deceased Partner. — Partnership agreement and -will of a deceased partner cqnstruod, and hdd not to render the general assets of the estate of the decedent liable for partnership debts contracted after his death.</p>

<p>1. Nonsuit — Judo west. — An involuntary nonsuit does not constitute a judgment on tlie merits.</p>

<p>1. Wegmgence — Excavation m Dbive-Wat — Poltof. Ofbtceb.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Action by Assignee — Jurisdiction or State Court. A state court lias jurisdiction of an action brought by an assignee in bankruptcy to collect the assets of the bankrupt.</p> <p>Act of June 22, 1874, 5 2, (amendment of the bankrupt law,) construed.</p> <p>Kev. St. § 711, construed.</p> <p>Kidder v. Horrobin, 72 N. Y. 159, followed.</p> <p>Goodrich v. Wilson, 119 Mass. 429, followed.</p>

<p>1. Bankbtiptcy — Assigned—Pbtob Assignment. — An assignee in bank- , ruptcy cannot avoid a voluntary assignment in part only.</p>

<p>1. Patent — Pbactioe—Reak&ument.</p>

<p>1. Receivers — Suits Against. — Property in the hands of a receiver is in custodia legis. His possession is the possession of the court appointing him. Ho suit can be brought against him to disturb his possession, or to charge him with liability for an act done in the performance of his duties as such receiver, without the consent of such court. Any one instituting such a suit without leave may be enjoined or attached for contempt. The proper proceeding is to apply to the court appointing the receiver by petition, setting forth therein the grounds of complaint. Thereupon the court'will direct a trial by a jury, reference to a master, or such other mode of proceeding as, in its discretion, it may deem best.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Constitutional Right of Trial by Jury. — The right of trial by jury in such a proceeding against a receiver, on a commoniaw cause of action, is not an absolute right, but the granting or withholding thereof lies within the sound discretion of the court. Such a proceeding is not a “suit at law” within the provision of the constitution guarantying the right of trial by jury.</p> <p>8. Railroads — Suit Against Receiver — Trial by Jury. — Upon application of bond holders of the Indianapolis, Cincinnati & La Payette Railroad, in a suit to foreclose their security, a receiver was appointed to operate the road. During such operation a train ran over a Mrs. Cork. A petition was filed in the foreclosure proceeding by her husband, as administrator, to recover damages for her death. Held, that petitioner was not entitled to a trial by jury.</p>

<p>In Equity. Motion to dissolve injunction.</p>

Tbe parties to this controversy agreed with each other to submit the same to the court without^ pleadings, and upon the following agreed statement of facts: Henry P. Farrow held the office by appointment of the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, for a term which expired April 19, 1880, during the session of the senate!

Petition for Bern oval. On the second day of July, 1880, an affidavit was made by Mary E. Jones before John B. Sutiles, Jr., a justice of the peace of Campbell county, Georgia, charging that on. June 24th last, at said county, the defendant, A. W. Port, and 12 others, did commit the offence of murder upon the person of William A. Jones. The affiant declared also that her affidavit was made that a warrant might issue for the arrest of the accused persons.

<p>1. Murder — Resistance to Revenue Officers — Power to Arrest— Right of Self-Defence — Arrest Without Warrant.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. Petition to apply certain assets in payment of individual debts.</p>

<p>1. Patent — Assignment—License.—Any assignment of a patent short of the entire and unqualified monopoly is a mere license.</p> <p>8. Licensees — Suuiiendku.—The surrender of a license hy part of tha licensees does not avoid tho license as to the remainder of the licensees.</p> <p>jp. Same — Action on License — Pasties.—The licensees who have been released hy such surrender need not be joined with the remainder ol the licensees in an action on the boons o.</p>

<p>J. 1’ate;nts Ho. 99,032, No. 5,00fi, and Ho. 167,040. — Patents Ho. 99,032, for “ improvement in the eovtarng of harness trimmings; ” Ho. 5,006, for a “new and useful design for harness trimmings; ” and Ho, 167,-040, for “ improvement in harness mountings,” — are infringed where the infringer adopts the melhods and designs of the patents, although he covers the articles with leather rather than rubber.</p>

<p>L Patent — Reissue Ho. 6,036. — The second claim of reissue Ho. 6,038 for improvements in ring-spinning machines held to be infringed by patent Ho. 113,575.</p> <p>% Drawing — Amendment—Rev. St. $ 4916. — Drawings of a machine patent need not be amended by the model in accordance with section 4916 of the Revised Statutes, where such amendment does not alieefc the claims of the patent.</p>

<p>1. Patent Ho. 220,126 — Injunction—License—Estoppel.</p>

<p>1. Bottomry Contract — Maritime Interest. — An agreement for maritime interest is not a necessary element in a contract of bottomry.</p> <p>2. Same — When Loan Due. — A loan payable 10 days after the arrival of a ship at its ports of destination, becomes due and payable when the voyage has been broken up by the negligence and omissions of the master.</p> <p>3. Same — Collision—Maritime Liens. — A claim for damages caused by a collision occurring during the voyage, is entitled to preference over a bottomry loan made upon the ssune voyage, prior to the happening of such collision.</p>

<p>Motion to Restrain Suit.</p>

In Admiralty. On exceptions to clerk’s report classifying claims. The city of Tawas was originally attached upon the libel of Thomas Pitts and John E. Grillett for a towage claim of small amount. Over 30 intervening libols were filed, and the vessel was sold for a sum insufficient to pay the claims against her in full.

On June 11,1879, the St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, its land grant, etc., were sold under a decree of the United States circuit court for Minnesota, entered April 11, 1879, in a suit for foreclosure of a trust mortgage, securing bonds to the-amount of $15,000,000, and were purchased by a corporation organized by the holders of a large majority of the bonds.

<p>In Equity. Bill and cross-bill. Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>1. Moniotpat. Bonds-JSTmgotiability — -LiígisuÁtur®.—II is competent for the legislature to make the negotiability of municipal bonds dependent upon their delivery by the treasurer of state.</p> <p>2. Same — Boísa. Fide Purchaser — Fraud.-— A, purchaser of such bonds, purporting upon their face to have been issued under the provisions of a statute containing such condition, is not a Iona fide purchaser without notice, where such bonds were fraudulently issued, without being delivered by the treasurer of state.</p>

<p>1. Interest — Damages—Trustee Process. — In Massachusetts the intervention of a trustee process will not relieve the defendants from the assessment of interest as damages, where judgment was entered on the debt, after a defence on the merits, during the continuance of the attachment, and no application had been made to continue the action for judgment until the trustee process was disposed of.</p>

<p>1. Judgment — JSstofpel—Same Cause of Action. — Where a question is distinctly put in issue, and tried and decided, the judgment operates as an estoppel as to that question in any subsequent suit between the same parties, whether the second suit be upon the same or some other cause of action.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Pasties.—So, when an issue is made in a case and decided, whether with or without trial, the judgment is conclusive between the same parties in any subsequent action for the same cause, and as to all questions which were, or might have been, raised upon the first trial. *</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Diffekbnt Cause of Action . — But, where a suit is tried and determined, the mere fact that in that suit a question might have been raised, tried, and determined, does not prevent the raising of such question in a suit upon a different cause of action.</p> <p>A. began a suit in Iowa against B., to obtain his possession and quiet Ms title to certain lands standing in A.’s name. Pending this suit A. conveyed a portion of the lands to 0., who intervened as co-plaintiff, and asked that this portion might he sot oil to her. The case was tried and submitted. Before decision A. was adjudicated a bankrupt, and his assignee was substituted as plaintiff, and the lands still standing in A.’s name were set oil to his assignee, but no question was raised as to the validity of the conveyance from A. to C. Subsequently A.’s assignee filed a bill against C. to have the conveyance set aside as a fraud upon A.’s creditors. Held,, that the proceedings in Iowa were not an estoppel. Held, also, upon the facts, that the conveyance was fraudulent and void.</p>

<p>1. Assignee in Bankruptcy — Braud—Statute oe Limitations. — In a suit by an assignee in bankruptcy, to recover possession of certain • bonds fraudulently concealed by the assignor, the. statute, of limitations does not begin to run until the discovery of the fraud.</p>

In Bankruptcy. 'Sur petition of Samuel Rea, administrator cum testamento annexo of William A. Rogers, deceased, for an order on the assignees to pay over to liim certain moneys.

<p>1. Insolvency — Sale of Debt — Set-Oee.—It is not unlawful for tlie creditor of an insolvent to sell liis debt to the debtor of such insolvent, although it be purchased for the purpose of being used in set-off.</p>

<p>1. CoMPosT~rioN Puoo JmcGs-Saiciu1U~D CREDIT0] D~n~iciniccy JUDGMEX-ExEouPro~.-~-~Composition proceedings do not operate to deprive a secured creditor of the right, after exhausting his own security and ascertaining the amount unp~d, to assert against the bankrupt a claim for the deficiency, and such claim may be enforced through the instrumentality of an execution issued against the property of the debtor upon the deficiency judgment.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Petition eor Discharge — Failure to Prosecute.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>In Equity. Demurrer to Bill.</p>

<p>1. Patent — Re-issue No. 5,294 of No. 50,364 Sustained — Monkey-Wrenches — Combination — Addition or Nut to Goes’ Wrench.</p>

In Admiralty. On exceptions to the commissioner’s' report of the classifition of claims. It was referred to the clerk of this court, as commissioner, to classify the claims and report the order in which they should be paid.

<p>1. Classification of Liens — Statutory Liens — Home and Foreign Port. — The General Burnside, ante, 228, followed.</p>

<p>Libel for Possession.</p>

<p>1. Mortgagee — Libel in Rem. — A mortgagee in. possession Ras a right to file a libel in rem for earnings from towage.</p> <p>2. Towage — Contract—Ostensible Owner. — Such libellant is entitled to recover the sum due for such towage service, although the contract was made with the father of the libellant as the ostensible owner of the vessel, and although the respondents had been forbidden by an order of a state court, founded upon supplementary proceedings, to pay over such earnings to the father of the libellant, “or to any one for him, or to any person whatever, until the further order of the said court.”</p> <p>3. Same — Costs.—In such case, however, although the libellant was not a party to the proceedings in the state court, the respondents are not .liable in costs for the nonpayment of such earnings.</p>

In Admiralty. In marshalling claims for payment from the proceeds of sale, salvage is entitled to be paid in preference to prior claims for seaman’s wages. In this case the claims were directed to be paid in the following order: (1) Salvage services; (2) seamen’s wages; (3) claims for towage and materials, those of a later year ranking those of a former; (4) claims under the state law.

<p>1. Coi.t.tsion — Lighted Touch — Rev. St. § 4234. — Tlio showing of a lighted torch by a sailing vessel, upon the approach of a steam vessel during the night, required by seotion 4234 of the Revised Statutes, is not confined merely to those cases whore the steam vessel is approaching a sailing vessel from astern.</p>

<p>Motion for new trial.</p>

<p>1. Statutory Construction — Exemption from Taxation. — The charters of the earlier railroad companies incorporated by the state of Tennessee contained exemptions from taxation; but in later charters the legislature, to save repetition, instead of enumerating all the powers and immunities intended to be granted, was content to refer to some earlier charter, and give to the new company “ all the rights, powers, and privileges” of the old. It is 'clear that the legislature intended to confer thése “ rights, powers, and privileges ” as fully as if specifically repeated in the new charter; and such was the recognized construction of 3uch charters by all the departments of the state government for more than 20 years.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—“Privilege.”—Where one railroad company is incorporated with the “rights, powers, and privileges” of a pre-existing ‘ company, the new company acquires an exemption from taxation guarantied to the former. The word “privilege” includes in its ordinary definition an exemption or immunity from taxation.</p> <p>Cases cited—State v. Betts, 4 Zabriskie, 555-556; Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244; Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217-223; Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 711-712.</p> <p>3. Constitutional Law — Exemption from Taxation. — The legislature of a state may contract in a corporate charter for exemption of the corporate property' from taxation, unless there be some constitutional prohibition. No such prohibition is contained in the Tennessee constitution of 1834.</p> <p>Cases cited—Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460; K. & O. R. Co. v. Hicks, 1 Legal Rep. 343.</p> <p>4. Statutory Construction — When Federal Courts will Follow State Courts. — Ordinarily, the federal courts follow the ruling of the state courts in their interpretation of the constitutions and statutes of their respective states; but where property has been acquired and investments made under statutory contracts, generally recognized and believed to be constitutional, in the absence of adjudications declaring them invalid, the federal courts are not concluded by the construction which the state courts may give to such statutes subsequent to the acquisition of such property rights.</p> <p>Cases cited—Olcott v. Supervisors, 10 Wall. 678; Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666.</p> <p>5. Sami — Exemption erom Taxation. — An exemption from taxation cannot be implied from the apparent spirit or general purpose of a statute. It must bo certain and explicit; every well-founded doubt must be resolved in favor of the state. But this rule does not call for a strained construction, adverse to the real intention of the legislature ; and to ascertain that intention the court will look to the context, as well as to the particular words used, taking into consideration the contemporaneous surroundings, and the purposes which the legislature had in view.</p> <p>6. Same — Usa ov Same Word tn Diekriient Constitutions ok Statutes. — The fact that the comstitutson of a state uses a word (e. g., the word “privilege “) in one sense in one clause, is no evidence that it is used in the same sense in every other clause; and, were it used in but one sense throughout the constitution, it would not follow that the legislature used it in the same sense in statutes subsequently passed. Even in the same statute a word is often used with distinctly different meanings, the courts giving to it in each instance the meaning which the legislature intended it to have in that particular connection.</p> <p>7. Constitutionai, Law — Injunotion-—Taxes.—Whore a state lias, by valid contract, exempted certain property from taxation, it cannot by subsequent legislation subject that property to taxation, nor prohibit the United States courts from using their injunctive powers to protect the contract from violation.</p> <p>8. Injunction — Taxes.'—While the general rule is that courts will not enjoin the collection of taxes upon the mere ground that they are excessive or illegal, yet if their exaction is unconstitutional, and the party assessed has no oilier adequate remedy, or tlieir enforcement will occasion irremediable oppression and produce a multiplicity of expensive suits, an injunction to restrain their collection will be granted.</p>

Upon demurrer to plea in abatement. The defendant was indicted for presenting a false claim against the government. To the indictment he filed a plea in abatement, setting forth the following grounds why it should be quashed: (1.) The venire for the grand jurors was issued from the circuit court, whereas the application for the same was addressed to the judge of another court having jurisdiction thereof.

<p>1. Re-issue No. 8,783 — Re-issue—Rev. St., § 4916. — A re-issue can only be granted for the invention which formed the subject of the original patent.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same.—The specification may be amended so as to make it more clear and distinct; the claim may be modified so as to make it more conformable to the exact rights of the patentee, but the invention must be the same.</p> <p>Powder Co. v. Powder Works, 98 U. S. 126, followed.</p> <p>A re-issue is valid where the specification describes the invention as consisting of two separate and independent features, although it was described in the original specification as consisting of those two features in combination.</p> <p>A claim in a re-issue for a post-office box with a metallic door and frames is void, where the original invention was described as a series of metallic doors and door-frames, with a series of wooden pigeonholes, forming a continuous metallic front.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Disclaimer.—It is proper to disclaim unlawful claims introduced into a re-issue.</p> <p>O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62.</p> <p>Schillinger v. Gunther, 16 O. G. 905,</p>

<p>1. Contempt — Rev. St. § 725. — The meddling with property, constructively attached, does not constitute a contempt under section. 725 of the Revised Statutes.</p>

<p>1. Seamen — Wages—Refusal to Work on Sunday. — A seaman upon a schooner in the harbor of Frankfort, Michigan, where she was towed to receive a cargo of lumber, cannot refuse to work on Sunday, in loading the schooner, where the towing vessel is not able to enter the harbor by reason of an insufficiency of water, and is lying outside in the lake, awaiting the schooner, and is in a place of danger.</p> <p>Where the master of the schooner was of opinion that it was necessary, for the safety of the towing vessel, that the loading of the schooner (begun on Friday) should be completed on Sunday, and ordered the work to be done, it was the duty of the crews to obey,</p> <p>In this case, held, that a seaman refusing to work on Sunday was rightfully expelled from the .schooner, and forfeiled his wages for his disobedience,</p>

<p>1. Notice_Papke Containing Notice. — A person chargeable with the ■ duty of giving a notice does not perform that duty by handing the party entitled to notice a paper containing such notice, especially if the person to whom it is handed is directed to use it in a particular way and for a particular purpose, which does not require him to examine or read it.</p> <p>2. Agency — Payment—Mistake.—It is a general rule that an agent, known and treated with as such, cannot be compelled to pay back money received by him under a mutual mistake of fact, and paid over to his principal.</p> <p>Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 N. Y. 230, and The Kingston Bank v. Ettinge, 40 N. Y. 391, considered.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same—Assistant Treasurer, of tiie United States.— In such case an agent is liable for money received from an assistant , treasurer of the United States upon the redemption of a stolen bond, containing a forged indorsement, although the money has been paid over to the principal, upon the ground that such treasurer had no power to bind the United States by payment of the money, or to consent that such agent should pay the same over to his principal.</p> <p>Cooke v. United States, 91 U. S. 389, followed.</p> <p>4. Practice — Generar and Speciar Verdicts. — Where a special verdict is inconsistent with a general verdict the former controls the Utter, and the court must render judgment accordingly.</p> <p>N, Y. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1188.</p>

<p>1. Wills — Ohio St. Feb. 18,1831. — The twentieth section of the act of February 18,1831, (3 Chase’s Ohio St. 1788,) provides: “That if any person interested shall, within two years after probate had, appear, and by bill in chancery contest the validity of thewill, an issue shall be made up, whether the writing produced be the last will of the testator or testatrix or not, which shall be tried by a jury, whose verdict shall be final between the parties, as in other cases,” etc.</p> <p>a. Proceeding to Set Aside Will — In Rem. — A proceeding to set aside a will, under this.statute, is a proceeding in rcm.</p> <p>b. Same — Parties.—Jn such a proceeding every one interested may become a party to the record, but there are, strictly speaking, no parties. The rights of the parties are not determined. The legal status of the will — whether the instrument is the last will of the testator — is the only question in issue.</p> <p>c. Same — Executors.—It is not necessary that the executors should he made parties. Their title to the qualified fee they hold in trust for tire purposes of the will was held by them virtute officii, and upon the acceptance of their resignations their title became ipso facto divested and passed to the heirs at law; and this although the will provided that in case of their refusal, death, or resignation, the court should fill the vacancy.</p> <p>d. Same — Estoppel by Record. — All persons concerned, whether formally before the court as parties or not, are alike concluded by the verdict.</p> <p>e. Same — Same—Unborn Devisees. — Devisees under the will not then in esse, and of course not parties, are barred as conclusively by such a proceeding as those who are living.</p> <p>/. Same — Bona Eide Purchasers. — As to the rights of bona fide purchasers without notice of any infirmity in such proceeding, quiere.</p> <p>2. Collaterally Impeaching Decree Betting Aside Will. — A decree setting aside a will cannot be impeached collaterally. It must be assailed, if at all, in a proceeding had directly for that purpose.</p> <p>Greignon’s Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319, followed.</p>

<p>1. Life Insurance — Forfeiture—New Agent. — A life insurance policy, containing a. provision that tlie same should “ cease and determine” if the premium should not be paid when due, is not forfeited by the failure to pay such premium on the day it is due, where the company neglected to inform the assured of a change in the agent authorized to receive the same after they liad adopted a rule to give such notice in all cases, and the assured tendered the premium in due season to the former agent of the company, and was unable to find the new agent after reasonable inquiry.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Reasonable Time. — In such case the assured was entitled to a reasonable time before a forfeiture could bo declared.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same.—The failure to pay such premium for 60 days after it was due was not, under such circumstances, an unreasonable time, where the company luid waived the time of payment in the previous year, and it did not appear at what time, if ever, the assured was informed of the place of payment.</p>

<p>Motion to Eemand.</p>

<p>1. Gen. St. op Minnesota, (1878,po. 75, § 2 — Equity Docket. — A suit brought under the statutes of Minnesota (Gen. St. 1878, o. 75, § 2), by a party in possession of real property, to settle an adverse claim, belongs on the equity docket.</p> <p>Meighen v. Strong, 16 Minn. 177, followed.</p>

<p>£n Equity. Motion for injunction, pendente lite.</p>

<p>1. Design Patent Xo. 7,014 — Peakl Buttons Abkanged by Dozens, on Cabds, in Thbbe Rows of Root — Rev. St. § 4929. — A design for a card of buttons, divided into spaces, covered with foil, by narrow bands, with a dozen of pearl buttons in rows of three by four to each space, is not a “ new, useful and original shape or configuration of an article of manufacture,” within the meaning of section 4929 of the Revised Statutes, relating to the granting of patents.</p> <p>S. Same — Same—Invmntion. — Cards, for buttons, faced with fail and divided into spaoes by bands, were well known and in common use prior to.such design, and there was therefore nothing in this arrangement rising to the level of inventivo skill.</p>

<p>1. Patent No. 63,419 — Patentability.—A bond and coupon register, in the form of a book, is a legal subject for a patent.</p> <p>2. Inmingement — Liability of a City. — A city is liable in its corporate capacity for the infringement of a patent.</p> <p>Allen v. The Mayor, C. C. S. D. N. Y., followed.</p>

<p>1. Bill of Lading — Becital—Stipulation.—A recital in a bill of lading tbat the cargo, when received, consisted of 20,000 bushels, is conclusive, when such bill of lading also contained the stipulation that “all the deficiency in the cargo shall be paid for by the carrier and deducted from the freight, and any excess in the cargo shall be paid for to the carrier by the consignee.”</p> <p>Meyer v. Peck, 28 N. Y. 590, considered.</p> <p>Abbe v. Eaton, 51 N. Y. 410, criticised.</p>

<p>1. Demurrage — Affreightment.—An express stipulation for demurrage, in a contract of affreightment, is not necessary to entitle the owner of a vessel to compensation for his unnecessary or improper detention in loading or unloading.</p> <p>SL Same — Unloading Yessel in its Turn. — If the custom of the port requires that vessels of a certain character should be unloaded in their turn, such vessels must await their turn for a reasonable time, measured by the ordinary volume and exigencies of trade at the place of discharge, and it is not within the province of an owner, of such a vessel, by notice to a consignee, to define an arbitrary period within which the cargo must be discharged.</p> <p>3. Same — Same.—Demurrage is not recoverable from the shipper and consignee of a cargo of wheat, where a vessel was detained four days at the port of Erie, near the close of navigation, while waiting, in accordance with custom, to be unloaded in its turn at an elevator, where there was nothing to indicate that, the number of vessels consigned to the respondent, and in port at the same time, was extraordinary, or that the delay in unloading the vessel was at all unreasonable.</p>

<p>1. Contract in Writing — Master ano Seamen — Rev. St. Title 53.— There is nothing in title 53 oí the Revised Statutes which requires a contract to bo made in writing or in print, between the master of a vessel and the seamen, before the latter are received on board.</p> <p>2. Coasting Voyager — Rev. St. § 4515. — Section 4515 of the Revised Statutes, providing penalties for receiving on board of any merchant vessel any seaman who has been engaged or supplied contrary to the provisions of title 53, has no application to coasting voyages.</p>

<p>1. Master and Servant — JNkgdtgencb.—A master is liablefor negligence iu the use of defective machinery, whereby his servant was injured, although the negligence of a fellow servant contributed to the injury.</p> <p>2. Same — Receiver—Comp. Laws op Kansas, (1879,) o. 84, § 29 — Qucere, whether a receiver, engaged in the operation of a railroad, is a “railroad company” within the meaning of section 29, e. 84, of the Compiled Laws of Kansas, (1879,) which provides that “every railroad company, organized or doing business in this state, shall ho liable for all damages done to any employe of such company in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanagement, of the engineer or other employe, to any person sustaining such damage.”</p>

<p>L Statute — Contract—Constitution, Art. 1, $ 10. — A statute providing in effect for the return, with interest, of all money paid by a purchaser at a tax sale, if by reason of invalidity or irregularity the sale could not be consummated, constitutes, when acted upen, a contract, within the meaning of article 1,’ $ 10, of the constitution.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same.—A subsequent statute, providing in effect that such purchaser should have no right to the return of his money in any case, unless the board of supervisors should see proper to so order, is void, in so far as it purports to apply to pending cases, and to affect existing vested rights.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same.—A subsequent statute, providing in'effect that after the conveyance of the land the money should not he refunded unless the party claiming under the tax deed should deliver a quitclaim deed, “ executed to such person or persons as the commissioner may direct,” is a reasonable and proper exercise of the power of the legislature to modify without impairing the remedy, and is therefore valid.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction — Municipal Bonds — Act of March 3, 1875. — Municipal bonds do not come withiu the prohibition of the act of March 3, 1875, (18 St. 470,) which enacts that “no circuit or district court shall have cognizance of any suit founded on contract, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon, if no assignment had been made, except in cases of promissory notes, negotiable by the law merchant, and bills of exchange.”</p>

<p>1. Mining Claims — Location—Lode.—Where a location has been made upon the top or apex of a lode, the miner may follow it to any depth, although in its downward Course it may enter adjoining land.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same.—No location can he made on the middle part of a lode, or otherwise than at the top or apex, which will enable the locator to go beyond his line.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same__Qucere, whether a location made on the dip of a vein would not be valid as against one of a later date higher up.</p> <p>4 Same — Lode—“ Top or Apex.” — The top or apex of a lode is the end or edge or terminal point of the lode nearest the surface of the earth. It is not required that it shall be on or near or within any given distance of the surface. If found at any depth, and the locator can define on the surface the area which will enclose it, the lode may be held by such location.</p> <p>6. Same — Same—Same.—A lode gains a new end or terminal point by detachment from a larger mass through the disruption and upheaval of the country in which such mass was situated.</p> <p>6. Same — Same—Same—Evidence.—In order to defeat a location upon a valuable part of a lode, in any of the elements which attach to a proper location, by reason of the connection of the lode with adjacent parts which are barren and worthless, the evidence should clearly establish the connection and unity of the several parts.</p>

<p>1. Forgery — Accommodation Note — Innocent Indorsee. — The accommodation note of an individual partner, secured by a mortgage upon the wife’s separate property, and made for the benefit of the firm, is utterly void in the hands of an innocent indorsee, as against the wife of the maker, where the name of the wife was forged, prior to indorsement, as the joint maker of such note, by the payee and managing partner of the firm.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Mortgage.—The mortgage given to secure the note, although duly executed by the husband and wife, is rendered void by such forgery.</p> <p>3. Jurisdiction — Foreclosure—Assignor and Assignee. — In such case a federal court could not assume jurisdiction of a suit by the assignee upon the mortgage alone, when the assignor and the mortgagor are both citizens of the same state.</p> <p>Sheldon v. Sell, 8 How. 441, followed.</p>

<p>1. JSvidenoe — Record of Former Suit — Identity of Controversy.— Where the question in controversy relates to the identity of certain land, record evidence is admissible to show that the same controversy has been litigated between the defendant and' the plaintiff’s grantor, and determined by the state court.</p> <p>2. Same — Grantor and Grantee — Adverse Possession. — The adverse holding of a grantor who has given a warranty deed, must be established by clear and undoubted testimony, showing a change in the relations of the parties towards the land.</p>

<p>In Equity. Demurrer to Bill.</p>

<p>Bill of Beview.</p>

<p>1. Chattel Mortgage — Filing—Bankruptcy.—The failure to file a chattel mortgage pursuant to the statute of the state of Mew York does not, p&r se, avoid the mortgage in favor of an assignee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Stewart v. Platt, 19 N. B. R. 347.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Negligence—Tug.—A tug having a steamer on her port hand, so that if they both kept on they would pass at a safe distanee, at flood tide, at a point where the peculiarities of navigation made it difficult to pass each other at that time, has no right, at the distance of a quarter of a mile or less, to attempt to cross the bow of the si earner, without receiving a concurring signal in reply to her two whistles, indicating a change of course.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Steamer.—It was negligence upon the part of the steamer not to have noticed the whistles of the tug.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Bum®n op Proof. — Where a vessel has violated a known rule of navigation, and that violation of duty may have contributed to the disaster, the burden is on her to prove that the fault did not contribute to the collision.</p> <p>4. Same — Same—Innocent Third Party'. — -In such case an innocent third party has the right to recover his damages against either of the offending vessels, however unequal their respective faults may have been.</p> <p>The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302.</p>

<p>1. Negligence — Pilot of Tug. — The pilot of a tug shows want of ordinary care in attempting to cross the hay of New York with a boat in tow, while the hatches of such boat are uncovered, and the wind is blowing from the west to the north-west at the rate of about 21 miles an hour.</p> <p>■2. Same — Same—Custom.—The existence of a custom of thus using a boat with uncovered hatches, when loaded with coal, in order to save expense in trimming, will not relieve the tug from liability.</p> <p>.3. Same — Same—TJnseaworthinbss.—The want of such hatch covers was an obvious defect, and will not, therefore, relieve the tug from liability upon the ground of unseaworthiness, where the boat was lost in direct consequence of such defect.</p> <p>4. Contributory Nbo-tjgbxou — Master or tub Boat. — In such case the acquiescence of the master of the boat, who had liada long experience as a boatman in crossing the bay at all seasons, constituted contributory negligence.</p> <p>White v. The Steam-tug .Lavergne, 2 Fed. Rep. 788, distinguished.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction — Domestic Vesseu — Repairs.—A suit in personam for repairs furnished to a domestic vessel is within the jurisdiction of the admiralty.</p> <p>2. Maritime Contract — Scow—Repairs.—A contract for the repair of a scow, used in carrying ballast to or from vessels, and propelled by steam-tugs, and having neither steam-power, nor sails, nor rudder, is maritime.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Burden oe Proof not Sustained by Libellant.</p>

<p>In Equity. Motion to Dissolve Injunction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Demurrer to Amended Bill.</p>

<p>1. Illegal Contract — Remedy—Injunction.—A court of equity will enjoin the seizure of property and the ejectment of the possessor, although the same may have been acquired under an illegal contract, until an application has been made for the cancellation of such contract, and a full and fair settlement of all accounts growing out of its execution in the past.</p> <p>2. Corporation — Ratification.—A corporation, like an. individual, may ratify by its acts the terms of a contract by which it would not, without such ratification, be bound.</p> <p>3. Contract — Specific Performance — Injunction.—Although specific performance of a contract requiring the performance of continuous duties will not be enforced, a court of equity will, nevertheless, enjoin its violation.</p>

<p>Demurrer to Declaration.</p>

<p>1. Voluntary Conveyance — Parent and Child — Fraud.—A voluntary conveyance from a parent to his children, by way of settlement, while solvent and free from debt, and not disproportionate to his means, will be sustained, as against subsequent creditors, in the absence of fraud.</p> <p>2. Same — Subsequent Improvements — Fraud.—Subsequent contribubutions of money, for the purpose of paying oil encumbrances and improving the property, will not render such conveyance void.</p> <p>3. Same — Presumption of Acceptance. — In the absence of direct testimony the acceptance of the grant will be presumed, after the expiration of four years, where the grantees held, owned, controlled, and managed the property from the time of the conveyance, and the only occupancy had been by their tenants, and for their sole and exclusive use.</p>

<p>1. JuBTsnxc.TroN- — Idbstitjl’V o® Oouthqversy. — A suit, for the strict foreclosure of a contract relating to real estate, A eld, under Hie circumstances of this case, to involve a ilifi'erent controversy from a suit to foreclose certain liens upon a part of such property.</p> <p>% Baam — State akd Federad Court. — In sucli case the institution of the suit to foreclose the contract in a state court would Dot subsequently deprive a federal court of jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose the liens upon a part of the property.</p>

In Bankruptcy. Hearing upon exceptions to register’s report. Hollister, the bankrupt, was a member of the firm of Hollister, Jones & Co. This firm did business in Cincinnati, and when Hollister went into bankruptcy it took the benefit of the Ohio insolvent law. It was indebted to the Northern Bank of Kentucky upon a claim upon which William H. Leathers was surety. Mrs. Bettie Fisher was the holder of a note made by Hollister as principal, and Leathers as surety, for 09,000.

In Equity. Hearing on pleadings and evidence. Suit for infringement of letters patent No. 87,359, dated March 2, ■1869, issued to Henry S. Palmer, for an improvement in lining paper board; and re-issue No. 7,517, dated February 20, 1877.

<p>1. Admiralty Jurisdiction — Maritime Contract — Common-Law Remedy. — A suit ?-o enforce a maritime contract is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty, “ saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy, where the common-law is competent to give it.” 1 St. 77, § 9.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Equitable Remedy. — The reservation of the act of congress relates to well-known forms of actions and remedies, distinguished alike from tiiose presented in rern in courts of admiralty, and from those that are peculiar to courts of equity.</p> <p>3. Same- — Same—Common-Law Lien — Equitable Remedy. — A statutory remedy in the nature of a hill in equity to foreclose a mortgage, for the enforcement of a common-law lien founded upon a maritime contract, is not within the reservation of the act of congress limiting the admiralty jurisdiction.</p> <p>4. Contract — Limn.—A lien is not a collateral contract; it is a right in, or claim against, some interest in the subject of the contract, created by the law as an incident of the contract itself.</p>

<p>1. Receiver — Non-Resident—Officer of Foreign State — Party to Suit — Bond—Non-Resident Sureties. — A public officer of the state of Missouri was authorized, in his official capacity, to wind up an insolvent corporation located in said state, and doing business in the state of Tennessee and some thirty other different states. Suoli officer was appointed receiver of the corporation by the proper court in Missouri, with instructions to collect the assets of the corporation throughout ail the states, and hold the same for distribution, subject to the instructions of the court. Held, that the circuit court for the western district of Tennessee could appoint such officer receiver of thq assets of the corporation situated within the state of Tennessee, upon condition that he should pay the funds into the registry of the court, although he had been made a party defendant to a general creditors’ bill removed from the state court for the purpose of winding up the corporation under the insolvent laws of the state of Tennessee. Held, further, that the bond of such receiver was sufficient, although the sureties were resident in the state of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Equity. Demurrer to Bill.</p>

Hearing before Commissioner. Upon complaint made by tbe agents of tbe New York & Greenwood Lake Railroad Company defendant was arrested upon tbe charge of obstructing tbe passage of the United States mails carried on a train of tbe said company.

<p>1. Mailing Obscene Letter — Rev. St. § 3893 — Act July 12, 1876, (19 St. 90.) — Section 3893 oí the Revised Statutes, as amended by section 1 of the act of July 12, 1876, (19 St. 90,) provides as follows: “ .Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character, * * * and every letter upon the envelope of which, or postal card upon which, indecent, lewd, obscene, * * * terms or language may be written or printed, are hereby declared to be non-mailable matter. * * * And any person who shall, knowingly, deposit, or cause to be deposited, for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be non-mailable matter, * * * shall be deemed guilty,” etc. Held, that written communications of a private, personal nature, emanating from a single person, and exhibiting no purpose of going beyond the one directly addressed, are not within the purview of the statute. Held, further, that the prohibition of the statute was cunflned to that class of letters wherein the indecent matter is exposed to the inspection of others than the person directly addressed.</p> <p>2. Evidence — Deposit in Mail — Postmark.—A postmark upon the en- , velope of a letter affords presumptive proof that such letter has been deposited in the mail.*</p>

<p>Demurrer to Indictment.</p>

<p>1. Usury — Equitable Adjustment. — Whenever the parties to an usurious loan are obliged to resort to a court of equity for relief for the foreclosure of securities, or for their redemption, they are forced to submit to an equitable adjustment of the debt, which is held to he the payment of the loan, with lawful interest. All payments of interest in excess of this are held to be under duress, and not voluntary payments of interest, and are applied in liquidation of the principal.</p> <p>Tiffany v. Boatman’s Institution, 18 Wall. 375, 385.</p> <p>Wheelock v. Lee, 64 N. Y. 242, 245.</p> <p>Beach v. Fulton Bank, 3 Wend. 573, 585.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Assignee in Bankruptcy. — An assignee in bankruptcy cannot give up the benefit of these equitable principles in the adjustment of an unpaid usurious loan.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same.—Qucere, whether an assignee in bankruptcy is bound to set up usury as a defence to a claim made against the estate for the purpose of avoiding what is, in other respects, a valid and meritorious claim.</p> <p>Beach v. Fulton, 3 Wend. 573.</p> <p>4. Order of Court — Misrepresentation. — A bankruptcy court has power to vacate an order authorizing the surrender of certain life insurance policies to a creditor, to whom they had been pledged, upon the release of the debt which they had been given to secure, where such order was procured by a material misrepresentation of the facts, although the misrepresentations were not necessarily fraudulent, where the court would not have originally made such order if the real facts had been known.</p> <p>6. Bankruptcy — Compromise—General Order 20. — Under General Order 20, a bankruptcy court cannot authorize a compromise except upon testimony, and upon a petition “ clearly and distinctly ” setting forth “the subject-matter of the controversy, and the reasons why the assignee thinks it proper, and most for the interest of the creditors, that it should be settled.”</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Yotajntaby Conveyances — Fraud — Conveyances made by a bankrupt to bis sons, more than eight months prior to the filing o£ his petition, sustained, under the circumstances of this caso, although tho creditors were probably not barred by the lapse of time, and the transaction, without the testimony of the bankrupt, might have been taken as an attempt to hinder and delay creditors.</p> <p>í. Same — Proper Books of Account — Burden of Proof. — In this case the burden of showing to the court that the bankrupt’s books of account were not properly kept lay upon the creditors, who alleged it in their specifications, when it appeared that full sets of books were kept by regular book-keepers, hired and kept for that purpose; that such books were all regularly turned over by the bankrupt, with the other property, to the assignee in bankruptcy, and kept by him, in his office, all during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, subject to examination and inspection by the creditors; and that when the proceedings in bankruptcy were closed, and the property all sold to one purchaser, under an order of the court, the said books were turned over to such purchaser, together with the other property.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Omission of Entries. — The omission of the bankrupt to enter upon the books of the firm certain accommodation notes, given as an individual partner, would not, under the circumstances of this case, defeat his right to a discharge.</p> <p>i. Same — Same—Same.—The receipt by the bankrupt of money from an agent of the firm, and expended by himself personally in the business, and not entered upon the regular account books kept by the bookkeeper, but entered on a separate book kept by the bankrupt, would not, under the circumstances of this case, defeat his right to a discharge. 4</p>

The petitioner in this case presented, by its solicitors, to the circuit judge, at Boston, the following petition: “To the Hon. John Lowell, Circuit Judge of said Court, at Boston : “Bespeetfully represents unto your honor the said Goodyear Dental Yulcanite Company, that on the seventeenth day of July, 1880, your petitioner filed its bills of complaint in said court against the said defendants, charging them with infringement of certain letters patent of the United States,…

<p>Motion to grant a Certificate under section 989 of the Revised Statutes.</p>

<p>1. Patents Nos. 43,371 and 42,351 — Improvement in the Manufacture of Tin Cans. — Tlie improvement in the manufacture of tin cans for •which letters patent No. 43,371, dated June 28, 1864, were issued to Banker & Carpen!er, assignees ol' George W. Prince, was not described and shown in letters patent No. 42,351, dated April 19, 1864, issued to Edward Q. Coveil, nor was such improvement known to or used by him.</p>

In Equity. The defendants filed a demurrer, and, among other causes, alleged that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. The patent was dated December 1, 1857, and extended seven years. In 1866 a partial account of damages •was rendered to the complainant; the question being whether the suit could he maintained after the expiration of the patent.

<p>1. Collision — Pleading—Affirmative Damages. — In a libel for collision the respondent cannot obtain a decree for damages in excess of those sustained by the libellant, unless he has filed a cross libel.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Recoupment.—Where, however, such libel for collision has been filed, and the answer alleges injuries sustained, with an appropriate prayer for relief, the respondent has the right, without the filing of a cross-bill, to show damages by way of recoupment, in the reduction or extinguishment of the-libellants’ claim.</p>

<p>1. yessei, — Part Owner — Wages—Lien Creditors. — Apart owner of a vessel condemned and sold in admiralty, wlio has a claim against the vessel for his wages as engineer, will not he permitted to assert his claim in opposition to creditors, who, by a stale statute, have liens against llie vessel for debts for which sueli owner is personally liable jointly with the other owners.</p> <p>2. Fund in Registry- — Claimant.—Any person having an interest in a fund in the registry of a court of admiralty may apply by petition to have his claim satisfied out of the fund, although he may not he entitled to prosecute a suit in admiralty to enforce his claim.</p> <p>3. Maritime Lien — Statutory Lien. — A party to a suit in admiralty, whose lien is not a maritime one, but exists by virtue of a state statute, cannot object to a claim made a lien by the same statute, upon the ground that the latter grows out of a contract which is not maritime.</p> <p>4. State Statute — Material Man — Lien.—Under the Pennsylvania statute of April 20, 1858, relating to vessels navigating the rivers Allegheny, Monongabela, and Ohio, a contractor who builds the hull of a steam-boat, and furnishes the materials therefor, has a lien.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Appeal from district court.</p>

<p>1. Removal — “ Suit * * Arising Under the Constitution or Laws ob the United States” — Act ob March 3,1875, § 2 — Constitution, Art. 3, § 2. — A case arises, “under tlie constitution or laws of 1he United States,” whenever, upon the whole record, there is a controversy involving the construction of either.</p> <p>Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.</p> <p>Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247.</p> <p>Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 275.</p> <p>2. Same — Trial Term. — Where a state statute did not fix the timé within which the pleadings should be filed, it was the duty of the slate court, upon the application of the parties, to fix a time, and, having done so, the cause was not triable until issue could be joined in pursuance oí the court’s order.</p> <p>3. Same — Bond—Sureties.—A federal court will not, upon motion to remand, enter upon inquiry as to the sufficiency of the sureties on a bond, conditioned as required by the removal act, and approved by the state court.</p>

<p>1. Mississippi River — Logs—Injuries.—The use of the Mississippi river as a highway to run logs down to market is a right common to all, but there is no immunity to individuals for injuries committed while using such right.</p> <p>2. Same — Falls of St. Anthony — Public Improvements. — An act authorizing the construction of an apron of planked timber over the crest of the falls of St. Anthony, in the Mississippi river, under the direction of the secretary of war, to protect the rock and prevent the washing away of the underlying soft sand-stone, is within the constitutional jurisdiction of congress.</p> <p>S. Navigable River — Public Improvements — Injuries—Injunction. Where a right common to all is abused, or so used as to cause damage, the injured party must seek redress by an action at law; but where congress has assumed jurisdiction of a river in the interest of commerce, the equitable arm of the court can furnish relief against any-threatened injury to any improvements made under its authority.</p>

<p>1. Writ of Entry — Mesne Profits. — Where judgment has been recovered under a writ of entry, the demandants are entitled to mesne profits from the date of the tenant’s entry, where it had been expressly stipulated that the transfer of the property should not prejudice or impair the right of the demandants in and to the title and possession of the property, and the tenants claimed title adverse to the demand-ants from the date of their entry.</p>

<p>1. Receiver — Compensation—Jurisdiction—Res Adjudicata — State and Federal Courts. — A. was appointed a receiver of a railroad: first, under a suit instituted by the stockholders; and, second, under a suit brought by the bond holders of a railroad company in a state court. The bond holders’ suit was subsequently removed to the federal court, where certain questions connected with the compensation of the receiver were referred to a special master, who found a balance due from the receiver, which he was ordered to pay. Upon appeal this order was affirmed by the United States supreme court. Thereupon the stockholders’ suit, which had been stricken from the docket of the state court, was re-instated, and the question of the compensation of the receiver referred to a master by the state court, who found a large amount due to the receiver for compensation and necessary expenditures. The bond holders took no part, however, in these proceedings in the state court. Held, under the circumstances of this case, that, where the receiver had paid into the federal court the amount decreed as due from him in the bond holders’ suit, he could not, upon petition to the federal court, have such amount appropriated in part payment of what had been found due to him in the stockholders’ suit by the state court.</p>

<p>1. Fire Insurance — Contracts—Construction. — Contracts of insurance are to be construed as other contracts. All parts of the contract are to be taken together; they are to be liberally construed, and such meaning to be given to them as will carry out and effectuate to the fullest extent the. intention of the parties, and no portion of it will receive such a construction as will tend to defeat the obvious general ' purpose of the parties entering into the contract.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same.-—A policy of insurance provided tliat the same should he void “ if the, above-mentioned promises shall he occupied or used so as to increase the risk; •» * * * or if the risk he increased by erection of or occupation of neighboring buildings; or if by any means whatever within the control of the assured, without the consent of the company indorsed hereon.” Held, that the terms “increase the risk,” must he construed as meaning an essential increase of the risk.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same.—Such policy also provided that “the insured has permission to make alterations and repairs incidental to the business.” Held, that this clause must be understood as embracing such alterations in relation to tire carrying on of the business of the insured as would not essential, y and materially increase the liability of the property to be destroyed by fire.</p> <p>4. Agency — Notice.—After such policy had been issued and delivered by the regular agent, of the company, the company was not chargeable with knowledge subsequently acquired by the insurance agent who placed the insurance in the company.</p>

<p>X. Indictment — Civil Rights — Act of March 1,1875, (18 St. at Large, 336.) — An indictment under the “ Civil Rights Act ” of March 1,1875, (18 SI. at Large, 336,) is insufficient, which does not allege the citizenship of the person injured by the violation of such statute.</p>

<p>1. Patent — Profits.—The profits of a patented invention consist of the difference between cost and yield.</p> <p>Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Infringement.—The infringer of a patented invention is liable to account for profits, although he might have employed some other contrivance to nearly or quite the same profit.</p> <p>Elizabeth v. The Pavement Co. 97 U. S. 126.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Product.,—Where the subject of the invention is a product, the profits upon such product will be allowed.</p> <p>4c. Same — Same.—Where no profits have accrued by the use of such product, no profits will be decreed upon account of such infringement.</p> <p>6. Same — Same—Damages—Rev. St. $ 4921. — In such case damages may be had under section 4921 of the Revised Statutes, where sufficient basis can be furnished upon which to find such damages.</p> <p>6. Antedated Patent — Profits—Act of March 2, 1861, § 16 — Act of July 4, 1836, § 8. — The act of March 2, 1861, § 16, providing that all patents should remain in force for the term of 17 years from the date of issue, is subject to the provisions of the act of July 4,1836, providing that the applicant for a patent could have it take date from the time of filing the specification and drawings, but not more than six months prior to the actual issue; therefore, where a patent was issued under the act of 1861, but antedated in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1836, an infringer of such patent is liable to account for all profits actually received from the use of the invention after the túne to which the patent was antedated.</p> <p>7. Infringement — Mistake.—An infringement will be treated as deliberate and intentional where the infringer knew of the patent infringed, but erroneously supposed that another patent owned by the infringer covered the right to use the invention.</p> <p>8. Same — Profits—Interest.—Profits derived from the infringement of a patent bear interest from the time they were wrongfully detained.</p>

<p>1. Overcrowding Steamer — Penalty—Libel—Rev. St. § 4465. — Section 4465 of the Revised Statutes provides that ‘ ‘ it shall not be lawful to take on board of any steamer a greater number of passengers than is stated in the certificate of inspection, and for every violation of this provision the master or owner shall bo liable, to any person suing for the same, to forfeit the amount' of passage money, and $10 for each passenger beyond the number allowed.” Held, that the United States was not a necessary party to a suit instituted under this statute.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same—Same.—Held, further, that the libel need not allege that the libellant was a passenger on such steamer.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same—Same.—Held, further, that the libel need not allege that tlie libellant was an informer, or that he sued as an informer, nor set out the names of tlie passengers taken on board.</p> <p>4. Same — Same—Same—Same.—Held, further, that the statute gives a separate penalty for every violation of the act.</p> <p>5. Same — Same—Lien—Admiralty Jurisdiction — Rev. St. § 4469.— Section 4469 of the Revised Statutes provides that the penalty imposed by section 4465 “ shall bo a lien upon the vessel in each case, but a bond may, as provided in other cases, he given to secure tlie satisfaction of the judgment.” Held, that this language gave a direct remedy against the vessel in admiralty for the recovery of the penalty.</p> <p>The Missouri, 3 Ben. 508; 9 Blatchf. 433.</p> <p>The Queen, 4 Ben. 237; 11 Blatchf. 416.</p> <p>6. Same — Lien —Admiralty Jurisdiction. — Rev. St. § 4469. — Held, further, that any court, within whose territorial jurisdiction the vessel might be at the time of the commencement of the suit and the attachment of the vessel by tlie marshal, had jurisdiction of the cause.</p>

<p>1. Extra “Wages — Lien—17 and 18 Yict. e. 104, § 187. — Section 187 of the British Merchant Shipping Act (17 and 18 Yict. a. 104) provides that when a master or owner, without sufficient cause, refuses or neglects to pay the wages of seamen within the time fixed by statute, he shall pay them a sum not exceeding the amount of two days’ pay for each of the days, not exceeding ten days, during which payment is so delayed. Held, that such extra pay is to be treated as wages, for which the seamen have a lien in all respects like that for their stipulated wages.</p> <p>2. Master — Wages—Lien—17 and 18 Vrcr. a. 304, § 197. — Section 197 of the British Merchant Shipping Act (17 and 18 Yict. e. 104) provides that “ the master of every ship shall, so far as the case permits, have the same rights, liens, and remedies for the recovery of his wages which, by this act, or by any law or custom, any seaman not being a master has for the recovery of his wages.” Held, that this statute gives the master a lien on the vessel for his wages enforceable in the admiralty courts of this country, although, by the maratime law, the master has no lien, and although the lion is given by a foreign statute.</p> <p>The Havana, 1 Sprague, 402.</p> <p>The Enterprise, 1 Law. 455.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same.—He may, however, have waived or subordinated his lien by contracts with material men or parties furnishing supplies, and it does not, therefore, necessarily follow, as in the case of the seamen, that his lien will have priority over that which may be established by other claimants.</p> <p>The Selah, 4 Sawy. 40.</p> <p>4. Jurisdiction — Foreign Seamen — Foreign Yessel. — Although it is discretionary with the court to entertain jurisdiction of a claim of foreign seamen against a foreign vessel, it cannot refuse, where it has seized and sold such vessel under its process, to distribute the proceeds according to the rights of the respective parties who appear to claim them.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Damages—French Fishing Brig. — The measure of damages for the loss, by collision, of a French fishing brig, is her regular building and market price in Franco, with interest from the date of the collision.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Cost of Outfit. — One-fourth of tho cost of the outfit of those tilings required for tho business of fishing and the provisioning of the crew, which are consumed every season, will be allowed in damages where snch brig had been engaged three-fourths of the season for which she was equipped at the lime of the collision.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Custom Charges. — In such case custom-house charges, etc., may properly be treated as part of the cost of sending out tho vessel for the whole season’s fishing, and one-fourth of them can therefore be properly allowed in damages under the head of “ outfits.”</p> <p>4. Same — Same—Cargo.—It is now well established that the value of a cargo lost by collision is to ho ascertained by taking the cost of the cargo at the place of shipment, and adding the cost of loading it on board, and the cost of navigating the vessel to tho place of collision.</p> <p>5. Same — Same—Same.—In such case the market price at the port of des1 ination is not allowed to enter into tho estimate of the value, and all profits or probable benefits which would have resulted from the termination of a voyage almost completed, are rigorously excluded.</p> <p>The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 456.</p> <p>The Lively, 1 Gull. 314.</p> <p>Smith v. Coudry, 1 How. 28.</p> <p>The Vaughn and The Telegraph, 14 Wall. 258, 267.</p> <p>The Aleppo, 7 Ben. 120, 124.</p> <p>6. Same — Same—Same.—Whore the cargo consisted of fish taken from the sea at the place of collision, audit was therefore impracticable to apply literally the rule allowing only the prime cost of the cargo at the place of shipment; and where it further appeared that the ship was a French vessel, and that the collision took place near a French port, and that such port was a market for such fish, and could have boon reached without appreciable expense, — the court fixed the value of the cargo at the market price of such fish in the said adjacent port.</p> <p>7. Same — Same—Probable Earnings. — Probable earnings will not be allowed in a case of total loss by collision, but interest from the date of destruction is given in lieu of the profit which might have been gained by the owner by the subsequent use of his vessel.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in case of collision.</p>

In Chancery. Rule to show cause why certain parties should not be attached for contempt of an interlocutory order of injunction.

Mrs. Oliver owned, and, with her husband, lived upon, certain lands, which were her separate property and estate under the statute. Oliver, her husband, conveyed these lands to a trustee to secure a debt due from him to the plaintiffs. His wife signed this conveyance, but her acknowledgment was defective. The trustee in the deed sold the lands under the deed of trust to the plaintiffs, and executed to them a deed therefor.

<p>1. Equity — State and Federal Courts. — In the determination of a question of equity law, the federal and state courts appeal to the same sources of information on equity jurisprudence, and the decisions of either are not binding on the other.</p> <p>2. Same — Vendor’s Lien — Foreclosure—Statutory Bar. — In Arkansas there is no statutory bar to a suit in equity to foreclose a vendor’s lien for the purchase money of real estate, where the vendor has not parted with the legal title.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same—Reasonable Tlwe. — In such case the lien must be enforced within a reasonable time, and the federal courts hold that that reasonable time is not less than 20 years.</p> <p>4. Same — Legal Title — Bona Fide Purchase — Notice.—The protection extended by a court of equity to a bona fide purchaser belongs only to the purchaser of the legal title without notice of an outstanding equity. He who purchases no legal title is not protected, even though without actual notice.</p>

<p>Demurrer to complaint.</p>

<p>1. Municipal Bonds — Funded Bonds — Act of the Leghslatube of Illinois. — Aa act of the legislature of the state of Illinois authorized all municipal corporations to take up and cancel outstanding bonds and other evidences of indebtedness, issued for the benefit of a certain railroad, under a prior act of the legislature, and fund the same. Held, that where a funded bond was regularly issued, and performance of all the essential conditions alleged in the bond, payment could not be refused a bona fide holder upon the ground that the original bond was issued by the county supervisors, instead of the county-court, contrary to the terms of the original act.</p>

<p>1. Internar Revenue — Stamps—Frio-hon Matches — Member or Manufacturing Firm — Rev. St. j 3425. — Section 3425 of tlie Revised Statutes provides, in effect., that the commissioner of internal revenue may, from timo to time, deliver to any manufacturer of friction matches a suitable quantity of adhesive stamps, such aa are required in that business by law, without requiring prepayment therefor, on a credit of 60 days, upon such security as he may deem sufficient. Held, that a person who is a member of a firm engaged in the manufacture of fruition matches, is a manufacturer of friction matches, with whom the government, may deal as such.</p> <p>2. Sami; — Revenue Agent — Evidence.—Evidence in this cas (¡held insufficient to establish the fact that the stamps were furnished such person as an internal revenue agent.</p>

<p>1. Lien — Second Execution — Laws of Indiana. — Under the laws of Indiana the “timely” issue of a second execution does not continue the lien of the first execution, in the absence of a levy under such first execution.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. Appeal from the district court.</p>

<p>1. Patent — “ Improvement rs Cheese Hoops.” — Letters patent granted to William Steinbergh, March 21,1871, and re-issued August 5, 1879, for an “ improvement in cheese hoops,” sustained.</p> <p>2. Ke-Issue — Construction.—The claim of a re-issue will not be enlarged by construction.'</p>

<p>1. Patent — P uf.su MertoN of Peiomty. — A patent raises a presumption. of priority of invention, wliicli can only be overcome by clear and satisfactory proof.</p> <p>2. Infringement — Evidence.—Evidence held insufficient in this case to establish an infringement</p>

<p>1. Patent No.-10,497, for a design of a street lamp, held void, upon the ground that such design had been in public use for more than two years when such patent was applied for.</p>

<p>1. Regligexoe — Pilot of Tug — Master of Boat is Tow. — It is negligence in both the pilot of a tug and the master of an open loaded boat to attempt to tow such boat across the bay of New York in a gale of wind.</p> <p>Mason v. The Steam-tug William, Murtaugh, ante, 404, followed.</p>

<p>1. Seamen — Wages —Steam-Tug Service — Usage. — An established usage of a certain port, by which hands employed in the steam-tug service, at a certain rate of wages per month, are authorized to leave at any time, and their employers are permitted to discharge them at any time, and who, in either case, are paid up to the time of their leaving or their discharge, is neither injurious to the interests of commerce, unreasonable, nor contrary to the positive rule of law.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction — Foreign Vessel — Nationality oe Crew. — The nationality of a foreign vessel, and not that of the crew, should regulate the action of a court of admiralty in assuming jurisdiction over a controversy between the officers and seamen of such vessel.</p> <p>The Nina, 2 L. R. P. C. 39.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Wages.—The district court, unless restricted by some treaty stipulation, may, in the exercise of its discretion, assume jurisdiction of a claim for wages against a foreign vessel.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Foreign Crew — Treaty with Sweden — 8 U. S. St. 352. — The thirteenth article of the treaty between Sweden and the United States, of July 4,1827, (8 U. S. St. 346, 352,) provides “ that each country shall have the right to appoint consuls, vice consuls, etc., iu the commercial ports and places of the other country,” and that such consuls, etc., “ shall have the right, as such, to sit as judges and arbiters in such differences as may arise between the captain and crews of the vessel belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities.” Reid, that the district court was not thereby debarred from exercising its authority in a case within the terms of such treaty, where there was no consul, or other officer of Sweden, within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>4. Seamen — Cruelty oe Master — -Wages—Discharge.—The master of a Swedish bark sailed from Gibraltar for Portland with an inadequate supply of provisions, whereby the laws of Sweden were violated, and the crew of the vessel compelled to endure great hardships an<j sickness for want of sufficient food. Held, that the crew were entitled to their discharge at Portland, before the expiration of the voyage for which they had shipped, and to the payment of the wages due them at the time of leaving the ship.</p> <p>5. Same — Same—Damages.—Held, further, that the seamen were entitled to one month’s extra pay, by way of indemnity for the injuries they had sustained.</p>

<p>1. Cargo — Unloadin'g—-Customs op Bout. — Tlie owner of a vessel is bound by tbe customs ol' a port to which be contracts to carry a cargo, where tbe charter provides that “the cargo is to bo brought alongside the vessel and taken away at tlie expense and risk of the charterers, according to the use and customs of the place of loading and discharging.”</p> <p>2. Cur-row op Port — Unloading Cargo — Brimstone.—The custom of a port to stop discharging cargoes of brimstone when there is a high wind, is not unreasonable.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Customary Dispatch. — A charter provided “ for prompt loading, without loss of time, weather permitting, and customary lay days for discharging.” Held, under all the circumstances attending the discharge of the cargo, that the vessel had customary dispatch, and a libel for demurrage should be dismissed.</p>

<p>1. Supplies — Loots.—Held, under the circumstances of these cases, that the libellants had no lions for supplies furnished a foreign vessel</p>

<p>1. Libel for Possession — Transfer of Shares Pending Suit — Amendment — Agreement—Estoppel—Bev. St. § 4250 — Charter Party— Demand.</p>

<p>1. Collision — O anal-13 oat in Tow of Tug — Negligence of Captain of Boat. — The owner of a tug, originally built for a pleasure boat, sent her to tow a canal-boat., loaded with ioe which he had bought, through New York harbor. The tug being very small, and the boat large and heavy, a man was put at the helm of the boat by her captain to steer. On the way down the bay a collision occurred, in which the boat was injured, and her master libelled the tug for damages. Held, that upon the evidence the captain of the canal-boat must be held responsible for the steering of his boat, and therefore the tug was not responsible for the collision that ensued.</p>

In Equity. Some of these suits are pending in the eastern, some in the middle, and others in the western district of Tennessee.

<p>1. Judicial Sale — Advance Bid — Payment Into Court. — In an application to sot aside a judicial sale upon the ground of gross inadequacy of price, it is not essential that the amount of the advance bid should be actually paid into court.</p> <p>%. Same — Same.—It is essential, however, that such advance bid should be absolute and unconditional.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Equity Rule 19. — Under equity rule 19, adopting the practice of England so far as it is consistent with “our local circumstances and conveniences,” a third person can intervene and have a sale set aside, upon offering a sufficient advance in price and paying all the expenses incurred by the previous purchaser. '</p> <p>4. Same — Same.—It would seem, however, 1 hat such advance bid should be sufficient to afford substantial evidence that for some, perhaps unknown, reason the property has been greatly undersold; so much so that the purchaser has not simply a bargain, with a fair margin for profit, but an unconscionable advantage of the parties for whoso benefit the sale was made.</p> <p>5. Same — Same—Personal Property.— A sale of personal property, under a decree of foreclosure, may bo set aside for an advance of price, before the same is confirmed.</p> <p>6. Same — Same—Costs.—The costs and expenses to be paid by the advance bidder cannot be fixed for all cases, but must depend in each case on its own circumstances.</p> <p>7. Same — Same—Resale.—In seems that the resale should conform to the method of the original sale, upon such notice as the court may prescribe, having in view to advertise the fact that the former bids have not been accepted, and that a resale will be had, commencing at the amount of the advance bid offered.</p> <p>8. Same — Resale—First Purchaser. — The first purchaser is entitled to increase his bid in open court to the amount of the advance bid, and claim a preference, but this preference cannot be extended upon a still further advance of the bids.</p> <p>Morton v. Sloan, 11 Humph. 278.</p>

<p>1. Eminent Domain — Northern Pacific Railroad Company — State Statute. — The charter of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, obtained- from the general government, does not exempt its right of way from the operation of the laws of the state of Minnesota, and forbid a railroad company organized under the general law of the state to exercise the right of eminent domain.</p> <p>2. Same — Rev. St. of State of Minnesota, a. 34, $$ 13-23. — In Minnesota a railway corporation can only take possession of lands under the power of eminent domain after the compensation for the property to be taken is assessed and paid, or on appeal from the award of commissioners by executing a bond conditioned to pay the award.</p> <p>Harrington v. St. P. & S. C. R. Co. 17 Minn. 215, and Lohman v. St. P., S. & T. F. R. Co. 18 Minn. 174, distinguished.</p>

<p>1. Title —Pkiiia Facie Evidence — Tax Deed — Recital.— In Minnesota a tax deed is not prima faeie evidence of title, unless it be first shown that the county auditor had authority to make the deed; and a mere reeital in such deed that the state auditor directed the sale, will not be sufficient.</p> <p>Madland v. Benland, 24 Minn. 372.</p>

<p>Motion to Remand.</p>

Bill for infringement of a patent for an apparatus for hydrating gas. The claim was for a combination of several elements, one of which was a water-sealing or trapping device. It was shown, that respondents had contracted to construct an apparatus which contained all the elements of the combination except the water-sealing device; and that they did construct such apparatus, and delivered it to the purchasers before the filing of the bill.

<p>1. Re-issued Patent, No. 7,920, for an improvement in constructing water-proof cellars, cisterns, etc., held void for want of novelty.</p>

<p>1. Charter-Party — Demurrage.—A charter-party stipulated: “The cargo to be loaded and discharged with all quick dispatch, as fast as the captain can receive and deliver.” IMA, that the charterers were liable for demurrage where the vessel was, from the crowded condition of the port, delayed in procuring a berth.</p>

<p>1. Negligence — Canal-Boat in Tow of Tug — Measure of Damages. A canal-boat, while in the tow of a tug, was negligently ran upon a sunken wreck, without any fault upon the part oí the canal-boat. Eeld, that the liability of the tug was limited to the cost of pumping the canal-boat from the time of the accident till she was taken to the dry dock, the value of any personal property on board the boat, and belonging to the libellant, that was destroyed by the accident, and demurrage for the boat from the time of the accident till the time she was let off the ways, after being repaired, at the rate of four dollars a day.</p>

<p>1. “ Pacuno Railroad Acts " — Obligation to Construct and Operate a Line of Telegraph. — On the face of the acts of congress of 1862 and 1804. called the “ Pacific Railroad Acts,” the obligation of the Union Pacific Railroad Company and. its branches, to build and operate for the public a telegraph line along its right of way, was an obligation which they cannot abandon.</p> <p>2. Act of July 2, 1804. — By the provisions of the fourth section of the act of July 2,1864, entitled “An act for increasing the facilities of telegraph communication between the Atlantic and Pacific states, and the territory of Idaho,” the Union Pacific Railroad Company and its branches were authorized to devolve the duty of constructing and operating- the contemplated line of telegraph upon the United States Telegraph Company, and thereby to relieve themselves from that duty.</p> <p>3. Corporation — Recognition by Congress of an Imperfect or Incomplete Organization. — If tlio United Slates Telegraph Company was not regularly and completely organized at the time of the passage of the last-named act, the congress of the United States could adopt this imperfect or inchoate organization; and, if it was the purpose'of congress to do so, confer upon it all the powers specified in said act.</p> <p>4. Injunction — Motion to Dissolve.--Without finally deciding, upon tliis hearing, whether the power to make the contract, in question can bo derived from the act of July 2, 1864, it is held, in view of the vast interests involved, and the serious consequences to follow a dissolution of the injunction, that for the purposes of this motion there is suiiieieut evidence of such authority under that act.</p> <p>5. Acceptance of Pacific Railroad Acts by State Corporations.— State corporations accepting the provisions of the Pacific Railroad acts are subject to all the provisions thereof. Following the Sinking Fund Gases, (99 U. S. 700.)</p> <p>6. Contract — Directors—Personal Benefit or Advantage Secured to Officers of Corporation Contracting. — As a general proposition, where one of a body of individuals jointly interested in a matter consents to take a special advantage to himself, and receives a special consideration for using his efforts to procure an agreement of the whole for the benefit of a third party, if such receipt of special advantage, whether of money or property, be kept secret from his copartners, or joint stockholders, or those interested, and they act upon tlie belief that he is governed by no other interest than that which is common to them all, the contract is void. But there arc circumstances in connection with the contract in question in this case which may cr may not take it out of this principle. There was, for example, no attempt at concealment; the benefits secured did not flow to the individual, hut to the office; and there is no evidence that it amounted, in point of fact, to a pecuniary sum whose influence would be at all appreciable.</p> <p>7. Questions of Doubt Postponed Until Pinal Hearing. — A contract will not be set aside on preliminary hearing on the ground of its invalidity, except in a clear case; and since the objections to the contract in question may be removed on final hearing, they will not, at present, be regarded as fatal to it.</p>

<p>1. Stockholders — Individual Liability — Constitution of Kansas, Art. 13, § 3. — Section 2, art. 13, of the constitution of the state of Kansas, provides that dues from corporations shall be secured by individual liability of the stockholders to an additional amount equal to the stock owned by each stockholder, and such other moans as shall be provided by law.</p> <p>.Held, that suit could not be maintained by virtue of this constitutional provision, without reference to the statutes of the state passed in fulfilment of the constitutional mandate.</p> <p>2. Same — Same — Statutes of Kansas — Bankruptcy — Dissolution of Corporation. — A statute of the state of Kansas provides that if a corporation bo dissolved, leaving debts unpaid, suits may be brought against any person or persons who were stockholders at the time of such dissolution, without joining the corporation in sucli suit; and if execution issue, and judgment bo satisfied by the parties sued, then those parties may sue all who wore stockholders at the timo of such dissolution for the recovery of the portion of such debt for 'which they were liable. It further provides that no stockholder shall bo liable to pay the debts of the corporation beyond the amount due on his stock, and an additional amount equal to the stock owned by him. Held, that a corporation is not dissolved, within the meaning of such statute, by bankruptcy, and a failure to hold meetings, elect officers, or do business.</p> <p>8. Same — Same—Common-Law Action. — Held, further, that the liability imposed by this statute must he enforced by action at law, and not by suit in equity.</p>

<p>1. Collector’s Bond — Copy—Authentication.—The copy of a collect- or’s bond is sufficiently authenticated by the certificate of the secretary of the treasury, in a suit upon the bond, where the original was in the custody of that department, and was wholly disconnected from the transcript certified by the register of the treasury.</p> <p>2. Same — Condition not Speoinied in Aot on Congress. — The addition of a condition, not specifically named in the act of Congress, that the obligors shall not be liable if each and every deputy appointed by the collector shall truly and faithfully execute and discharge all the duties of such deputy collector according to law, does not relieve the sureties from liability.</p> <p>3. Samé — Transcript on Account — Evidence.—A certified transcript of the account of the collector is admissible in evidence in a separate action against the sureties.</p> <p>4. Same — Sureties—Subsequent Legislation. — Sureties upon a collect- or’s bond are liable for charges for unaccounted stamps, although the collector was not liable to account for such stamps at the date of the bond.</p> <p>5. Same — Quarterly Return — Authentication—Assistant Secretary on the Treasury. — Au assistant secretary of the treasury is duly authorized to authenticate one of the quarterly returns"of a collector of internal revenue.</p> <p>6. Same — Evidence.—Evidence is admissible, in a suit upon the bond, to show that the collector received money to await the result of an attempt to compromise, and that the same was retained by him.</p> <p>7. Same — Same—Printed Regulations. — In such suit the printed regulations of the treasury, in the form of a circular, were admissible in evidence, when it was shown that a duplicate copy of the same was found in a book kept by the collector, in which a large number of treasury circulars from the commissioner were pasted.</p> <p>8. Same — Same—Public Money, — The sufficiency of evidence, to establish the fact that money received by the collector had become public money, must be determined by the jury and not by the court.</p> <p>9. Same — Same—Additional Bond. — 'The question whether an additional bond, executed by the collector at the request of the commissioner, is a substitute or strengthening bond, should properly he left to the jury-</p> <p>10. Same — Same—Letter to Commissioner. — ’The contents- of a letter from the collector to the commissioner can only be proved by a copy of the same, duly certified from the treasury department.</p> <p>11. Same — Same—Notice to Pkoiwoe Lettkii. — When a letter is in court, and in the possession of the opposite party, the notice to produce may be given at the trial, and, if so given, is in season to allow parol evidence of Us contents.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction — TToreign Corporation — Service oi? Process — Gen. St. Vt. e. 28, § 118. — Section 118, c. 28, of llio General Statutes of Vermont, provided that tlie lessee of a railroad within tlie state, residing out of the state, should appoint one person resident in the state, upon whom service o£ every kind of process known to fholaws of tlie state might at any time bo made; and that all such service upon the person so appointed should he a legal service upon the lessee. Held, that service upon the agent of the non-resident lessee oí a railroad within tlie state, appointed in accordance with the terms of this section, and served in the manner provided by the laws of tlie state for the service of such process, would suffice to vest the circuit court for the district of Vermont with jurisdiction of an action against such non-resident lessee.</p> <p>Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. followed.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same—Same—Stipulation.—It was not necessary, under the terms of this section, that the non-resident lessee should first file an express stipulation agreeing that service within the state should be good, in order to vest such court with jurisdiction.</p>

<p>1. Corporation — Subscription—Payment.—A corporation, whose charter and by-laws require each subscriber to its capital stock to pay a given per centage of his subscription in cash at the time of subscribing, cannot enforce payment of a subscription where the required cash payment has not been made.</p>

<p>1. Common Carrier — Liability Beyond Route. — In tbe absence of a special contract tbe liability of a common carrier does not extend beyond the terminus of his own route.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Evidence.—Such contract is not established, however, by proof that the carrier accepted the goods with knowledge of their destination, and named the through rate for the same.</p>

<p>Motion to vacate service of process.</p>

<p>1. Rati/road — Dhlivkev—lif.TuwcTion.—Complainants bought a lot contiguous to defendant’s depot, in Nashville, and fitted up a stock yard thereon, at considerable expense. There was no express contract between complainants and the defendant in relation to the matter, but it was clear that such yard was a convenience to the defendant’s business. By tho permission or acquiescence of defendant, complainants’ yard was connected with defendant’s road by appropriate stock gaps and pens. After the same had been in use by both parties for more than 12 years the defendant entered into a contract with the Union StockYard Company for tho erection of a stock yard in the city of Nashville, outside the city limits, and more than a mile distant from complainant’s yard; and said defendant, among' other things, agreed that it would establish no other stock-yard in Nashville, and that it would deliver, and cause to be delivered, to the said Onion Stock-Yard Company, all live stock shipped over its road, and consigned to the city of Nashville; and that it would make tho stock yard of the said company its stock depot for said city, and would not deliver at any other point or points of the city, but agreed to deliver all stock shipped to the city of Nashville at the yards of the said Union Stock-Yard Company. Complainants, having been accordingly notified that no more stock would be delivered to them at their yard after a specified dale, filed their bill, in which they prayed for an injunction to restrain “ defendant’s agents and officers and servants from interfering with or in any manner disturbing the enjoyment and facilities now afforded to complainants by said defendant upon its lines of railway, for the transaction of business now carried on by the complainants, and especially from excluding or inhibiting persons from consigning stock to complainants, and from refusing to receive and transport stock from complainants’ yard, and from interfering with or in any way disturbing the business of the complainants, and from refusing to permit the complainants to continue their business on the same terms as heretofore.”</p> <p>Held, that the complainants were entitled, preliminarily, to the relief prayed for.</p>

<p>1. Equity Jurisdiction — Mortgage Foreclosure — Personal Liability of Mortgagor’s Grantee. — The graiitee of a mortgagor assumed the mortgage debt, but it did doc appear that such assumption was a part of the consideration for the conveyance. A bill was subsequently filed to foreclose the mortgage, and obtain a decree for any deficiency against the grantee of the moregagor. Pending this suit the mortgaged property was sold under a prior mortgage, and no redemption was made from such sale. Held, the court still had jurisdiction to pass upon the question of the personal liability of the grantee of the mortgagor.</p> <p>2. Mortgage — Mistake—Purchaser.—The grantee of a mortgagor cannot set up a mistake as against the bona fide purchaser of the mortgage notes before maturity.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction — Service of Process. — Suit was brought and process served upon a defendant in one county, and additional process issued and served upon another defendant in another county, under the laws of the state of Illinois. Held, that it could not be objected, after judgment, that the defendant first served did not reside within the county in which suit was brought.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy — Preference—Judgment and Execution. — It is competent for a creditor to institute a suit against a bankrupt, and obtain judgment by default, and issue execution, and unless the bankrupt does some act by which he has participated in some way in the act of the creditor, the preference thereby acquired is a valid preference as against other creditors.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same—Evidence.—It will be sufficient to defeat this preference if there has been but a slight participation by the bankrupt in the act of the creditor, but the evidence of such participation must be sufficient to bring conviction to the mind.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Mortgage — Burden oe Proof. — In order to defeat the claims of a mortgagee to the proceeds of the mortgaged real estate of a bankrupt mortgagor, the assignee must establish by a preponderance of evidence (I) that the mortgagor was insolvent at the time of the execution and delivery of the mortgage, (2) that the mortgagee had reasonable cause to believe that such mortgagor was insolvent when he accepted the mortgage, and (3) that such mortgagee knew that said mortgage was made in fraud of the bankrupt law.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Preference—Fraud.—Under the amended sections of the bankrupt act a creditor may prove his whole debt, even after a recovery has been had against him for a preference, in the absence of actual fraud.</p>

<p>1. Patext No. 177,466, dated May ]6, 1876, ior an improvement in the method of utilizing the leather of old card clothing, from which the teeth have been removed, not sustained.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by owners of steam-ship Netley Abbey against charterers for damages resulting from refusal to load steamer.

<p>1. Overcrowding Steamer — Penalty—Prosecutor—Rev. St. §$ 4465, 4469. — Section 4465 of the Revised Statutes enacts that “ it shall not be lawful to take on board of any steamer a greater number of passengers than is stated in the certificate of inspection, and for every violation of this provision the master or owner shall be liable, to any person suing for the same, to forfeit h e amount of passage money and $10 for each passenger beyond the number allowed.” Section 4469 of the Revised Statutes further enacts that the penalty imposed by section 4465 “shall be a lien upon the vessel in each case.” Held, that a suit in admiralty to enforce the lien given by section 4469 need not be prosecuted in the name of the United States.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Action oe Debt — Lien.—Held, further, that the bring- ' ing of an action of debt against the master and owners of the boat, and prosecuting the same to judgment, did not release the statutory lien.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Lien—Bona Fide Purchaser. — Held, further, that such lien was not divested by a sale to a bona, fide purchaser.</p> <p>4. Same — Same—Laches.—Held, further, that the fact that the libellant did not proceed against the vessel until the recovery of the judgment, in the personal action against the master and owners, did not constitute laches.</p> <p>5. Same — Same—Attachment.—Held, further, that it was not necessary that the vessel should have been attached, before the filing of the libel, to enforce the statutory lien.</p> <p>A Same — Same—Clerical Error — Jurisdiction.—Held, further, that a mere clerical error in docketing the case would not oust the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

<p>1. Salvase — Award—Fund rs Uegistry.</p>

<p>1 Negligence — Shhinkage of Cutch — Stowage'and Hoisting. — 2,502 bags of cutch were received on board a vessel at Calcutta, during the months of January and February, for shipment to Boston, and bills of lading were delivered for the same, containing the usual exception of the perils of the sea, and the memorandum, “weights and contents unknown.” The cutch, when received, had become somewhat softened by a voyage, from Singapore, of 1,500 miles, and was therefore rebagged at Calcutta. It was stowed in the customary manner on the bottom of the ship’s hold, but piled in tiers somewhat higher than usual. The ship sailed from Calcutta in March, and reached Boston in July. Every precaution was taken during the voyage to „ diminish the heat of the hold by ventilation, and, upon reaching Boston, the bags were hoisted out of the hold and delivered on the wharf, in the usual manner, by means of slings. Meld, under the circumstances of the case, that a shrinkage of about 5 per cent, of the weight of the cutch was owing to the inherent nature and quality of the article itself, and not to any negligence of the owners of the ship.</p>

<p>In Equity. Demurrer to the Bill.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy, under the act of congress passed Angust 19, 1841.</p>

<p>1. Promissory Note — Contract—Discharge of Indorser —The maker oi an overdue note transferred his interest in a firm to an accommodation indorser, to secure the latter against loss. The indorsor thereupon agreed in writing;, by an instrument bearing the same date, to hold the maker of the note harmless against any and all claims of the holder. Held, that such agreement was a full discharge of the maker and an intervening indorser.</p>

Eule to show cause why attachment should not issue against respondent for contempt in not obeying a preliminary injunction restraining him from manufacturing and selling articles infringing complainant’s patents.

In Admiralty. Libel by the master of the schooner Margaret against the steamer G. Whiting, to recover damages for loss by collision. The'facts were as follows: Between 4 and 5 o’clock on the morning of November 2,1877, the schooner was beating down the Delaware river against the wind and with the flood tide just making. The wind was blowing a whole-sail breeze, there was a drizzling rain, and it was commencing to storm.

<p>1. Pilot — Liability.—A. pilot is responsible to the owner of a vessel for negligence or default in the performance of his duty.</p> <p>2. Same — Duty.—When a pilot takes charge of a vessel at sea, to bring her into port, his duty is to stay by her, unless discharged, till she roaches her destination or some place of safety.</p> <p>3. Same — Discharge.—A. discharge, however, will not avail him, when the same has been procured by an untrue statement, though with no wrongful intent, in respect to a matter touching the safety of the ship, on which the master had a right to rely.</p> <p>4. Same — Jurisdiction.—'When damage results from such omission of duty, the pilot is guilty of a marine tort, and is subject for the same to the jurisdiction oí a court of admiralty.</p>

<p>3. Collision — Canal—Green Light. — The rules of the Delaware & Raritan Canal require canal-boats in motion to carry a small green light over the stem. Held, that a globe lantern, with a piece of green glass inserted on the outside between the glass of the lantern and the wire fender, of an oval shape, about four and a half inches long up and down, and three and a half inches wide in the center, and so arranged, with reference to the flame, that the green rays extended 40 degrees on each side of the line on which the boat was moving, was a small green light within the rule.</p>

<p>1. Agency — Implied Authority — Evidence.—Tlie implication ought to he clear where a party relies upon an implied authority i'rom his principal to sell real property.</p> <p>2. Admissions — Evidence.—Admissions are not only competent, but may control the conclusion, where there is a conflict in the evidence, and they concern the subject-matter about which that conflict arises.</p> <p>3. Agency — Presumed Authority — Bona Fide Purchaser. — When property has been purchased of an agent in good faith, and the money paid, under the supposition that the agent was duly authorized to make the sale, a court of equity will protect the purchaser, if it can do so consistently with principles of law.</p>

<p>Motion to Remand.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Bankrupts in Representative Capacity — Proof op Debt. — A court of bankruptcy may permit tlie bankrupts themselves, acting in a representative capacity as the administrators of an estate, to prove an equitable debt, arising from a loan of funds borrowed from the estate of their intestate, whether such loan was lawful or not.</p> <p>2. Same — Same — Same — Ascertainment op Amount. — In such case, however, the amount for which the administrators are liable should be first ascertained in the court of probate.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Discharge—Estoppel.—Tlie acceptance of a dividend under an unlawful assignment does not estop a creditor from objecting to the discharge of the assignor under subsequent proceedings in bankruptcy, whére such creditor had no power to dissent from, repudiate, or avoid such assignment.</p>

The Boston, Hartford & Erie Bailroad Company and the Adams Express Company entered into an arrangement for the conduct of the express business over the line of the railroad, by which the express company had a valuable monopoly’ granted them; and in consideration thereof lent the railroad company $200,000, which were secured by two notes of that company, and by a pledge of 10,000 shares of its stock, with the right also on the part of the express company to apply to the debt,…

<p>1. Patent Right — Sale—Implied Warranty. — The sale of a paten* right creates an implied warranty as to title.</p> <p>2. Same — Same—Same.—Such warranty grows out of the sale, and not out of the form of the conveyance.</p> <p>3. Same — Same—Same—After-Acquired Title. — In such case the warranty draws to it any after-acquired right or title of the warrantor.</p>

<p>1. Jurtsdtction — Suit for Possession of Ships. — There is nothing in the laws ol the United States impairing the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over suits for the possession of ships, where the title of the defendant was derived under a marshal’s deed.</p> <p>2. Same — Justice of the Peace — Affidavit of Yalub. — A New York statute provides that justices of the peace shall have civil jurisdiction in certain cases, including “an action to recover the possession of , personal property claimed, the value of which, as stated in the affidavit of the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney, shall not exceed the sum of $200.” It is further provided in the same statute that, before any process shall issue, the plaintiff, his agent, or attorney shall make proof, by affidavit, showing among other things the “actual value” of the property claimed. Held, that such affidavit is an essential prerequisite to the attaching of the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>Denis v. Crittenden, 42 N. Y. 542.</p> <p>S. Same, — Samis—Same—Proof.—The mere fact' that the justice went on and took jurisdiction, and the defendant appeared and pleaded and raised no objection, joined to the want of affirmative proof that there was no affidavit, will create no presumption in support of a judgment, nor be sufficient to prove that the necessary affidavit was made.</p> <p>4. Sale in Admiralty — Title of Purchaser. — A purchaser in good faith under a marshal’s sale, upon a decree of a court of admiralty, will be protected in his title if the court had jurisdiction to decree the sale.</p> <p>5. Same — Jurisdiction — Notice. — In such case jurisdiction over the vessel is acquired by its seizure by the marshal under the process of the court, and this seizure and possession by the marshal are, in view of the law, notice to all persons interested of the pendency of the proceedings, and of their right to intervene and protect their interests.</p> <p>6. Same — Same—Notice by Publication. — The rules and practico of the court require notice by publication, hut they have not the force of statutory requirements, nor do they prescribe such publication as an absolutely essential prerequisite, either to the assumption of jurisdiction, or to the exercise of the power of the court to condemn and soli a vessel to satisfy a maritime lien.</p> <p>7. Same — Same—Same.—The want of notice by publication will furnish ground for opening the decree, hut does not render the proceedings void.</p> <p>8. Same — Matters of Account. — A court of admiralty will take no jurisdiction of matters of account, in a suit for possession, between strangers to the suit, and the respondent who has been in possession.</p>

<p>1. Mariner — Implied Contract. — In the absence of shipping articles, there is an implied contract that the mariner will be returned to the port of shipment.</p> <p>2. Same — Internal Navigation — -Return by Rail. — A mariner will not be justified in waiting until spring for a vessel to take him hack to the . port of shipment, where internal navigation has been closed by ice, and he has been discharged at ». port whence he could return by rail.</p> <p>3. Same — Compensation.—In such case, where the mariner has not been employed for a specific period of time, he is entitled, by way of compensation, to the amount of his necessary transportation and expenses, together with his rate of wages from the date of his discharge to the date of his arrival at the port of shipment.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Vessel in Tow of Tug — Failure to Answer Steamer’s Whistles. — A steamer crossing tlie bows of a towed schooner at flood tide, at Ilell (late, just helow Flood rock, and midway between Flood rock and Long Island shore, is justified in assuming that the schooner is proceeding under wind and tide alone, when the tug is not visible, and has failed to respond to the steamer’s whistles.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Negligence.</p>