Volume 3 — Federal Cases

In equity. This is a bill filed by the plaintiff, [Walter B. Beattie,] as assignee in bankruptcy of Daniel Morse, an involuntary bankrupt, to set aside four judgments recovered and docketed against the bankrupt on the 21st day of May, 1868, one of such judgments being in favor of the defendant, Hiram Gardner, and the other three being severally in favor of said Scoville, Harwood and Stone, respectively.

<p>Case No. 1,196.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—Losses in Speculation.</p> <p>Where bankrupts appeared to have lost, in twenty-one months, a capital of $120,000, and were left with debts to the amount of $200,-000, and it appeared that they had trusted their business almost exclusively to an uncle, in whom they had confidence, and who was able to make them believe that they were making large profits in buying and selling ships, and who, by this means, cheated them, leaving them with a claim against him of $640,-000, on which nothing could be realized: Reid, that, on all the facts, it sufficiently appeared that the bankrupts had not been in any complicity with their uncle, in defrauding their creditors, but had been themselves defrauded, and that discharges would be granted to them.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Antisdel, Case No. 490.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,199.</p> <p>Collision off Quarantine — Vessel at Anchor.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel at anchor is struck by one in motion, the presumption of law is, that the collision is caused by the negligence of the latter, unless the former is anchored in an improper place.</p> <p>2. Where a brig came into New York harbor from sea, and anchored, in a strong wind and heavy sea, about 400 feet to windward of another vessel which was already anchored, dropping but one anchor, and was left without a sufficient watch on deck, and, the wind and sea increasing, her chain parted, and she drifted down upon the other vessel, which had paid out all the chain possible, to avoid her as she drifted, and her other anchor was not dropped till after she was afoul of the other vessel: Held, that the brig was in fault in anchoring where she did, under the circumstances, and in not having a proper watch, and in not dropping a second anchor when the wind and sea increased; and that she was liable for the damages.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,200.</p> <p>Pbactioe in Admiralty — Exceptions to Bol-ings op Commissioner.</p> <p>1. Objections taken to the rulings of a commissioner, as to the admission of evidence in the course of a reference to ascertain damages, may be brought up for review on exceptions, after the report is made, or, if necessary, may be brought up on a certificate of the commissioner pending the reference. ,</p> <p>2. The case of The Transit, [Case No. 14,-138,] criticised.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,202.</p> <p>Guaranty — Consideration—Demand—Evidence.</p> <p>1. A guaranty must have a consideration to support it.</p> <p>2. If given at the time the contract, to which it relates, was entered into, the consideration will be found in the contract. But if entered into subsequent to the contract, it must be founded on a valuable consideration.</p> <p>3. A receipt of a warehouse man, that he holds one hundred and fifty barrels of flour, subject to the order of A. B. may be explained and impeached, if A. B. has made no advance, nor incurred any responsibility on account of it.</p> <p>4. To charge a guarantor, on his principal’s failure to deliver flour, &c. a demand of the article when due must be made, and a reasonable notice of failure given to the guarantor.</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by George W. Beavers against the steamboat North America for collision.</p>

In admiralty. Libel by the crew of the British ship Becherdass Ambaidass, alleging that they shipped at Liverpool in November, 1869, for a voyage to the-East Indies, and thence to Boston; that the ship arrived in safety at this port in February, 1871, where the libellants’ services terminated, and they became entitled to their wages as fully stated in their schedule.

[In bankruptcy. In re George H. Bechtel. Application by the wife of the bankrupt to prove a claim against his estate. Hearings on exceptions to the register’s reports.]

[In bankruptcy. In re Charles E. Beck. Heard on the register’s certificate.] A question having arisen as to an execution creditor’s right of priority, which was disputed on the grounds, that his lien was under an execution which, though prior to the proceedings in bankruptcy, was upon a judgment entered on a warrant of attorney given by way of preference, and with intent to defeat and delay the operation of the bankrupt law, and that the bankrupt had procured the execution…

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of C. H. North and others. On the application of H. Becker and others to prove a judgment debt against the bankrupts.

A final decision was rendered by TREAT, District Judge, in the U. S. district- court, E. D. of Missouri, July 21, in the case wherein Frederick Becker refused .to obey the order of U. S. Supervisor Meyer, to produce certain books and papers, and wherein an attachment was asked by the supervisor to compel obedience to his subpoena. * On the third day of July inst. General Meyer, supervisor of internal revenue, issued his summons on Fred.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri.] In bankruptcy. This was an appeal from a judgment of the district court. At the time Beckerford was declared a bankrupt he was the owner of an unexpired term of a leasehold estate. The value thereof, as appeared from a sale made by the assignees, was $1,490.

In bankruptcy. A creditor of the bankrupt applied to the circuit judge, during a vacancy in the office of district judge, for further time to file specifications of his grounds of opposition to the discharge of the bankrupt.

[Motion for a writ of error to the criminal court for the District, of Columbia. [Indictment for larceny against John Beck-ley, Jr. A verdict of guilty was rendered. Defendant moves for writ of error.

[Suit by Rufus K. Beckwith against James T. Easton.] This case came before the court on an appeal from the clerk’s taxation of costs.

[In equity. Bill by. Charles Beckwith against the city of Racine, the town of Mt. Pleasant, and the town of Caledonia, and by Latham Cornell against the same, to recover on certain bonds of the town of Racine. [The town of Mt. Pleasant and the town of Caledonia subsequently appealed to the supreme court, which affirmed the decree in Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514.]

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Mott Bedell, owner of the schooner A. V. Bedell, against the steamer Potomac, for collision.</p> <p>[This was subsequently reversed by an unreported decree of the circuit court, and the decree of the circuit court affirmed by the supreme court in The Potomac, 8 Wall. (75 ü. S.) 590.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, to recover damages for a collision which occurred between the schooner Mary D. Lane and the steam ferry boat Bedford, in the East river, on the morning of the 17th of December, 1853. The district court pronounced for the libellants, [Lane v. The Bedford, Case No. 8,046,] and the claimants appealed to this court

[At law. Action by William Chadwick, as-signee of John Bedford, against William Hunt and others, for infringement of letters patent. This was an action on the case for the infringement of a patent right. Bedford, [on July 16,] 1806, obtained a patent for a new and useful improvement in the making of boots, bootees, and shoes. He afterwards sold out to different individuals the right to use this patent in particular towns.

[In equity. Bill by Bedilian and wife against Seaton for a discovery, account, etc. Heard on demurrer to the bill. The wife of complainant was a natural daughter of Thomas Seaton, who died in July, 1831, intestate. A few days before his death, Seaton requested two friends of his, Messrs.

[Libel for salvage against The Bee, Wood-worth, master.] This was a ease of salvage.

[Rule upon the Beebees to show cause why the Beebees should not be attached for contempt. By an act of congress, [Act March 2, 1793; 1 Stat. 333, c. 22,] changing the rule of common practice, subpoenas for witnesses may run into districts, other than the one where the court is sitting, provided the witness does not live at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of holding the court.

<p>Case No. 1,220a.</p> <p>Shipping — Charter Party — Breach—Burden of Prooi — Timbers Too Large for Port-Holes.</p> <p>[1. Libellants suing for breach of a charter party are bound to show that there was no default on their part.]</p> <p>[2. A vessel chartered to take a cargo of lumber is not justified in refusing certain pieces of timber merely because they are too large for her port-holes; the charter party being silent as to the size of the'timbers to be laden, and the sticks in question being merchantable, and of a size customarily laden at that port.]</p> <p>[Reversed in Beecher v. Bechtel, Case No. 1,221.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libel by William K. Beecher and others against George J. Bechtel and John H. Dryer, Jr., for breach of a charter-party.] This was a libel in personam, filed in the district court, to recover compensation for the loss and damage sustained by the libellants, as owners of the brig Buenovento, by reason of the non-fulfilment, by the respondents, of a charter-party.

<p>[In equity. Bill by John S. Beecher against Abraham Bininger and others.] This was a motion for a provisional injunction, and a receiver.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,223.</p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyances — From Husband to Wife — Failure to Record Deeds —Intention —Knowledge of Wife — Bankruptcy—Recovery by Assignee — Property not Subject to Creditor’s Lien.</p> <p>1. A voluntary conveyance of real estate by the owner to his wife, by means of a deed from him to a third person, and of a deed from the-latter to the wife, held void, as having been made in fraud of the creditors of the husband.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The circumstance, that the deeds were not recorded until more than 18 months after they were made, and were then recorded the day before the failure in business of the firm of which the husband was a member, having been for sometime previously in his possession, commented on, as a badge of fraud.</p> <p>[Cited in Clark v. Hezekiah, 24 Fed. 666.]</p> <p>3. It is not necessary that the wife should have known of the fraudulent intent of the husband, to make void a voluntary conveyance to her, fraudulent on the part of the husband, as to creditors.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>4. The husband [was] shown to have conveyed, by voluntary conveyances, to his children, for their benefit, and to his agent, for the grantor’s benefit, during a period commencing soon after the deed to the wife was made, and ending immediately before the failure of the firm, real estate worth 860,000, as part of a scheme to set apart property for himself and his family, in fraud of his creditors. The real estate conveyed to the wife was of the value, at the time, of $132,-000. and the husband retained in his hands, (excluding the $60,000 of real estate conveyed to his children and his agent,) property of the net value of only $25,000. He was engaged in a business which he knew to be in an embarrassed condition, when the deed to the wife was made, he lived in the city of New York, he was not in harmony with his partner, and the real estate conveyed to his wife was his most valuable property, and was all he had that was immediately available and unencumbered.</p> <p>[5. Cited in Re Duncan, Case No. 4,131, to the point that the assignee in bankruptcy can recover property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors, even if there was no lien on such property in favor of a creditor when the petition was filed.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.] [NOTE. This case was appealed to the supreme court, which remanded the cause, with instruction to modify the decree. Clark v. Beecher, 24 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. (Lawy. Ed.) 705. Mr. Justice Swayne, in delivering the opinion, said: "We therefore deem it sufficient to say that we are satisfied with the judgment of the circuit court upon the main point brought before it for consideration. We think the conveyance complained of was properly condemned as fraudulent, and therefore held to be void. But it is equally clear that the personal decree against the appellant for the rents, issues, and profits, and the use and occupation of the premises, was erroneous.”]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,224.</p> <p>Wsu — Vested Remainder — Notice or Bankruptcy Proceedings.</p> <p>1.In 1853 the will of T. L. C. was admitted to probate. It made G. executor, and by it all the property of T. L. C. was given to his executor, to be sold and converted into money, and the proceeds invested. The executor was to apply the income to the use of the wife of T. L. C. during her life. On her death, the executor was to stand possessed of $10,000 of the principal, in trust for a niece, and the rest he was to pay over and divide among several persons named (one of whom was A. B. C.), “their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever, in equal shares, as tenants in common, per capi-ta, the issue of any such person named who may be then dead, to take his or her deceased parent’s share.” On December 22d, 1869, A. B. C. was adjudged a bankrupt, and on January 22d, 1870, an assignment in bankruptcy was executed to B. The widow of T. L. C. died in April, 1872, and G.then proceeded to close up his trust, and the share to go to A. B. C., who had survived the widow, was $3,249 27. G. drew his check for that amount, dated May 11th, 1872, in favor of A. B. C., and gave it to his counsel, C„ to give to A. B. C. C. had had actual knowledge of the fact that A. B. C. had been adjudged a bankrupt, and that B. was «his as-signee. He delivered the check to A. B. C., and took from him a release of the executor. On the 17th of May the check was deposited in a savings bank to the credit of the wife of A. B. G., with other moneys. On the 16th of June, the savings bank was notified by B. that he claimed the money, as assignee of A. B. C., and, on the 20th of June, B. filed this bill in equity against all the parties, to recover the money: Held, that, under the will, A. B. G. had a vested interest in the money at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, which was part of his estate, and passed to his assignee, and it made no difference whether G. had any actual notice of the bankruptcy proceedings or not. That G. was chargeable with notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, by reason of the actual knowledge of them by his counsel, C., even though such knowledge did not recur to the mind of C. at the time of the delivery of the check.</p> <p>2. That no title to the money had passed to the wife of A. B. C., or to the savings bank.</p> <p>3. That the bank was entitled to deduct its costs from the fund, and must pay over the remainder, and that B. was entitled to a decree against G. and A. B. C. for the amount of the check, less the amount so paid over by the savings hank.</p>

At law. On motion to remand the cause to the state court. This is an action of re-plevin, commenced originally in one of the state courts. The plaintiffs in the action are Beecher & Toneray. The defendant in the petition in replevin was one A. J. Arnold, sheriff of Platte county. The goods sought were taken on the writ of replevin by the coroner and delivered to the plaintiffs.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of the determination of the homestead interest of Freedom D. Beede, a bankrupt, in the proceeds of a sale by the assignee of land, subject to a mortgage.

<p>Case No. 1,228.</p> <p>Negotiable Instruments — Place of Payment.</p> <p>A note made “negotiable” at the Bank of Washington is not a note “payable” at that bank, and it is not necessary to demand payment there, in order to charge the indorser.</p>

[At law. Action of debt by Joseph D. Beers, William L. Booth, and Isaac R. St. John against Richard Haughton on the recognizance of special bail. Plaintiffs demur to a plea of defendant. Subsequently affirmed by the supreme court in Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. (34 U. S.) 329.]

[In admiralty. Libel by Joseph Beers and others, as assignees of the firm of Crawford & Terry, against the steamboat John Adams, for work done and materials supplied in the construction of the steamboat, (the People’s Ferry Company, claimant.) On the 28th of January, 1854, a contract was entered into between John Crawford, shipbuilder of Keyport, N. J., and William Small, of New York city, by which it was agreed that Crawford should build for and deliver to Small three ferry…

[In equity. Suit by Lewis F. Beers and E'rancis H. Nash, as assignees of the Al-lerton Iron Works Manufacturing Company, bankrupts, against Burr Knapp and Henry B. Pitch, to set aside a mechanic’s lien.]

At law. Action [by Godlove O. Behm against the Western Union Telegraph Company] for alleged damages caused by delay in transmitting a telegram from Monticello to Lafayette, Indiana.

<p>Case No. 1,235.</p> <p>Voluntary Assignment — Execution — Lien — Former Judgment — Title oe Assignee in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>B. made a voluntary assignment to C., for the benefit of his creditors. After that an execution was levied on the property assigned. Subsequently a petition in bankruptcy was filed against B. Thereafter C. sued the sheriff in trespass, because of the levy. B. was after-wards adjudged a bankrupt. The goods were then sold, and the assignee in bankruptcy held the proceeds subject to the lien of the execution if any. The suit of C. against the sheriff was then tried, and in it the sheriff set up that the assignment from B. to C. was fraudulent and void as to creditors, and had a verdict and a judgment in his favor. The assignee in bankruptcy had, in a suit against C., set aside the assignment from B. to C., as being in violation of the bankrupt law. The sheriff then applied to the bankruptcy court to pay him, on the execution, the proceeds of the sale: Held, that the assignee in bankruptcy derived his title through C., and was estopped by the judgment; that the lien of the execution was valid, and that the sheriff was entitled to be paid the proceeds of the sale to the extent of the lien.</p> <p>[Cited in Linder v. Lewis, 4 Fed. 328, (see, also, Case No. 8,362,) and in Re Beisenthal, Id. 1,236.]</p>

[On appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of New York. [In bankruptcy. Application by the judgment creditors of Solomon Beisenthal and Henry Henschel, bankrupts, for the review of an order (unreported) directing the sheriff to pay the proceeds of an execution sale to the assignee in bankruptcy. Bor subsequent opinion directing the return of the proceeds to the sheriff, see In re Beisenthal, Case No. 1,235.]

In bankruptcy. A petition was presented to the register, in this case, by Harris C. Fahnestock, a member of the firm of Jay Cooke & Co., creditors of [William Belden and George W. Hooker,] bankrupts, setting forth that the bankrupts, by collusion with some of their creditors, and by wrongfully protesting against the claims of others, including that of the petitioner’s firm, had procured the election of an assignee who, also, was in collusion with them; that the schedules…

<p>Case No. 1,237.</p> <p>Bankruptcy—Original Jurisdiction—Place op Filing Petition.</p> <p>Where a merchant, who has resided in New York city for more than twenty years, failed in business, sold his residence in that city, and removed his family to New Jersey, and they thereafter resided there upon some property belonging to his wife, while he engaged as a clerk with his successors in business, and continued so till the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, two years after: Meld, that his petition was properly filed in the southern district of New York.</p> <p>[See In re Little, Case No. 8,391; In re Watson, Id. 17,272.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. Application of L. Marcotte & Co., creditors of William Belden and George W. Hooker, bankrupts, to discharge an order of stay for unreasonable delay by the bankrupts in endeavoring to obtain a discharge.

In bankruptcy. I, John Fitch, one of the registers of this court, before whom the proceedings in' the matter [of William Belden and George W. Hooker, bankrupts] are now pending, do hereby certify that on the 16th day of June, 1870, at 12 o’clock m., personally appeared at my office, No. 44 Wall street, in the city of New York, Josiah H.

<p>Case No. 1,242.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Voluntary Assignment — Title op Assignee in Bankruptcy — Lien op Former Judgment — Cloud on Title.</p> <p>1. A judgment recovered after the making of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, without preferences, and valid by the laws of the state where it is made, creates no cloud upon the title to property transferred by the assignment, although such assignment be subsequently set aside upon the application of an assignee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Welil v. Wald, 3 Fed. 93. See, also, In re Beisenthal, Case No. 1,236.]</p> <p>2. Until a general assignment for the benefit of creditors has been set aside, the title to property embraced in it remains in the assignee; it does not vest in the assignee in bankruptcy by the mere force of an adjudication and his appointment as assignee.</p>

[In equity. Motion by Milo M. Belding and others for a provisional injunction to restrain Phineas W. Turner from infringing letters patent No. 42,153, granted April 5; 1864, to Goodrich Holland and J. E. Atwood, for an “improvement in the manufacture of sewing silk.”

[In admiralty. Libel by the owner of a ballast lighter against the steam-tug Belknap for collision. The libellant was owner of a small ballast lighter, which was made fast alongside the ship Archer in the dock of a wharf in Boston, on the 23d February, 1873, when the steam-tug Belknap came into the dock to tow the ship Nonantum, which was lying on the opposite side from the Archer and a little higher up the dock, round to a dry dock for repairs.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Bell and others against the sloop Ann for salvage.</p>

In equity. This was a bill [by James C. Bell and others against John A. Cunningham and William J. Loring] for an injunction to a judgment at law in this court between the same parties, and for other relief. [Granted.] The case is reported.in 5 Mason, 161, [Case No. 3,479;] and, having been carried by writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, will be found still more fully reported in [Bell v. Cunningham,] 3 Pet. [28 U. S.] 69.

At law. This was an action on the case, [by Martin Bell against Hiram G. Daniels and Cyrus Newkirk,] tried by the court and a jury, to recover damages for the alleged infringement of letters patent [No. 1,630] for an “improvement in the mode of applying the waste heat of blast furnaces to steam boilers,” granted to plaintiff, June 10, 1840.

At law. Action [by John Bell and others against Nathan Davidson] on fourteen bills of exchange, amounting to £9918.' 16s. lOd. sterling, drawn on the plaintiffs by the defendant, in favour of different persons, and paid by the plaintiffs for account of the defendant, in 1809.

[At law. Application for a writ of habeas corpus to compel James English to bring up Andrew Bell. The return of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring up a colored boy, was, that he was bound as apprentice to Mr. English, by the orphans’ court of Alexandria county, to learn the business of a house-servant. The evidence of this binding was a copy of the record of the orphans’ court, in these words:— “Orphans’ Court, Alexandria County, October Term, 1S32.

[Appeal from the commissioner of patents. [Application by William Bell for an improvement in lamp caps. James Seneca Hill interferes, and claims prior invention. From a decision of the commissioner in favor of Hill, the applicant appeals.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libel by Thomas Bell against Thomas Hunt for services in raising and removing the steamboat Cricket. Prom an unreported decree for respondent, dismissing the libel, the libellant appeals.

At law. This was an action on the «ease, tried by the court and a jury. The suit was brought [by Martin Bell against Addison McCullough, James Lampton, William H. Lampton, and others] to recover damages for the infringement of the patent of Martin Bell, more particularly referred to in the report of the case of Bell v. Daniels, [Case No. 1,247.] The defendants insisted that the plaintiff could not recover: 1. Because the defendants did not infringe the plaintiff’s patent. 2.

<p>Case No. 1,257.</p> <p>Arrest — Supreme Court Rule — Discharge — Foreign attachment — Bond to Discharge.</p> <p>[1. A person arrested subsequent to the supreme court rule abolishing imprisonment for debt, but prior to its publication, is entitled to be discharged from arrest.]</p> <p>[2. Where a defendant is not found, a foreign attachment remains in full force against all his property found within the district; and, to discharge it, defendant must furnish a bond to satisfy the full decree.]</p> <p>[For subsequent proceedings in this matter, see Nelson v. Bell, Case No. 10,101a.]</p>

In equity. On the 10th of October, 1858, Bell and Grant filed in the clerk’s office of this court, a bill against the Ohio Life and Trust Company, then- assignees and others, upon which a subpoena was issued and served the same day upon five of the members of the company.

<p>[At law. Motion by plaintiff Bell, to reject depositions taken by defendant Nimmon.</p>

[At law. Action by the assignee of Bell against Nimmo and others upon a bond given to the assignor. Plaintiff demurred to defendants’ plea.

[In equity-. Bill by Bell and Grant against the Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Company and others for the appointment of a receiver, and for an injunction. An injunction was granted in a former proceeding. Order for the appointment of a receiver. [For proceedings to punish the sheriff, as receiver of the state court, for contempt, see Bell v. Ohio Life & Trust Co., Case No. 1,-260.]

[In equity. Bill of discovery by Bell and others against Pomeroy in aid of a defense at law in an action between the same parties. Defendant pleads that the facts sought to be discovered may be proven by another person.

<p>Case No. 1,262.</p> <p>[See Bell v. Daniels, Case No. 1,247.]</p>

[At law. Petition for freedom by Moses Bell against James Rhdties. Judgment for petitioner. For the special verdict and opinion of the court, see Rhodes v. Bell, 2 How. (43 U. S.) 397.] The petitioner claims Ms freedom, and prays that a subpoena may issue to the defendant.

[In bankruptcy. Certificate by Isaiah T. Williams, register in bankruptcy, for a decision on questions arising on the petition of John Bellamy, a bankrupt. [For subsequent proceedings in this matter, see Cases Nos. 1,207 and 1,2GS.]

In bankruptcy. In this case application was made to the register, [Isaiah T. Williams, by John Bellamy, a bankrupt,] upon a petition in due form, for an order to show cause why the bankrupt should not be discharged from his debts.

In bankruptcy. After the rendering of the decision in this case, heretofore reported, [In re Bellamy, Case No. 1,266,] the register [Isaiah T. Williams] to whom the case was referred requested the court to reconsider that opinion.

[In admiralty. Libel by the Pacific Mutual Insurance Company against the brig Belle. The facts of this case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Case No. 1,270.</p> <p>Admiraltt — Stipulation por Value — Interest —Rules of Court.</p> <p>1. A stipulation for value was given, on the discharge of a vessel from custody, fixing her value at $1,750, and containing an agreement that, “in case of default or contumacy on the part of the claimant or his surety, execution for the above amount may issue, &c.” The stipulation bore a heading, that it was “entered into pursuant to the rules and practice of the court.” A decree being afterwards entered against the vessel for $8,767 29, the libellant claimed to be entitled to recover interest on the $1,750, at the rate of 6 per cent., from the date of the stipulation: Held, that the terms of the stipulation made the rules of the court a part of the contract; and that, under the provisions of rule 71, interest on its amount from its date must be paid, in addition to the $1,-750.</p> <p>[Cited in The Maggie M., 33 Fed. 591; The Sydney, 47 Fed. 262.]</p> <p>2. This rule, and the fact that it is made a part of the stipulation, is not noticed in the case of The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall. [69 U. S.] 53S, which would seem to hold the contrary view.</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel by John Armstrong for seaman's wages. The libel alleged that Armstrong shipped as mate on the vessel, and signed articles for a specified voyage at $50 a month, and served on board from January 7th, 1872, to June 3d, 1872, when he was discharged, and there was due him from the vessel $195, payment of which had been demanded and refused. The answer admitted these allegations, except that it denied that anything was due to the libel-lant.

<p>Case No. 1,273.</p> <p>Prize — Violation op Blockade — Condemnation.</p> <p>Vessel and cargo condemned for an attempt to violate the blockade.</p>

In bankruptcy. The attorney for the as-signee in this cause applied before me for the usual order and subpoena for Mrs. Elizabeth R. Milligan, wife of James Milligan, one of the petitioners. The affidavit sets forth the facts, and is sufficient both in form and substance, is duly verified, and upon it the assignee is, by law, entitled to the order and subpoena asked for. In re Julius L.

<p>Case No. 1,277.</p> <p>Carriers — Delivery or Cargo — Bill op Lading —Exception.</p> <p>Raisins were shipped on a vessel, under a bill of lading which contained a clause exempting the vessel from damage caused by “any act, neglect, or default of the pilot, master, or mariners,” or from damage “resulting from stowage or contact with other goods, for leakage, breakage, damage caused by heavy weather, or pitching or rolling of the vessel, or defective packages,” or for damage “arising through insufficiency of strength .of packages.” Part of the raisins came out in bad order, the tops and bottoms of the boxes being crushed by other cargo. They were re-coopered before "being delivered. In each box were layers of raisins, with paper between. When they were ■delivered, raisins were missing from every box, and the papers in many of them were torn and soiled by finger marks: Held, that, notwithstanding the exceptions in the bill of iading, the vessel was liable for the value of the raisins not delivered, no account being given as to how the missing raisins disappeared.</p> <p>[See Lyon v. Nine Hundred and Twenty-Bight Barrels of Salt, Case No. 8,648; The David and Caroline, Id. 3,598; The Santee, Id. 12,328; The Delhi, Id. 3,770; Carey v. Atkins, Id. 2,399; Willis v. The City of Austin, 2 Fed. 412.]</p>

[Certificate from the district court of the United States for the district of New Hampshire.] This was a case in bankruptcy, certified by the district judge to this court, under the bankrupt act of [August 19,] 1841, [5 Staff 442,] c. 9, for a final decision.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] At law. This was a writ of error upon a judgment of the district court of Maine, in an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff to recover of the defendants the amount of certain promissory notes issued by the Hallowell & Augusta Bank. The facts appear from the following special verdict, given in the district court, [unreported,] upon which judgment was rendered for the defendants.

[Error to the district court-of the United States for the southern district of New York.] At law. This was a writ of error to the district court. [William] Tyson brought a suit in that court against [August] Belmont, who was consul of the emperor of Austria, to recover damages for the breach of a charter-party, made at New York, January 31st, 1848, by which the ship Probus was chartered by Tyson to Belmont, for a voyage from New York to Apalachicola, and thence to Liverpool.

At law. This was a suit commenced in the supreme court of New York, [by August Belmont against Cornelius W. Lawrence,] and removed into this court by certiorari, to recover back an excess of duties exacted by the defendant, as collector of the port of New York. The plaintiff, in November, 1846, imported from London 500 bottles of quicksilver, invoiced there September 18th, 1845, at 3s. 6%d. per pound.

At law. Assumpsit [by James Belt against the executors of Thomas Cook] for extra work done upon two houses, under a written contract under seal.

Action on the case, [by Beltzhoover & Co. against Stockton & Stokes,] for negligence of the defendants’ driver in running against the plaintiffs’ stage-coach. The driver of the plaintiffs’ stage-coach was called as a witness for the plaintiffs. objected that he was interested, because it is yet to be ascertained which driver was in fault; and if it was the fault of the witness, the plaintiffs have a right of action against him for his negligence.

[At law. Habeas corpus by the negro Ben for discharge from the custody of the marshal of the District of Columbia. Prisoner discharged.] Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. The mittimus returned, was in the following form, viz.: “District of Columbia. County of Washington, ss.

[Petition for freedom by the negro Ben against Sabret Scott. Application for continuance. [For prior proceedings in this litigation, and subsequent disposition of the case, see Oases Nos. 1,286 and 1,288.]

Petition for freedom [by the negro Ben against Sabret Scott.] The cause being called for trial, and no issue made up, Mr. Jones and Mr. Morsell, for the defendant, asked for time to put in a plea denying the facts in the petition, which were stated as the ground of the right to freedom. The petition contained also a general allegation that the defendant unjustly held the petitioner in slavery.

<p>Case No. 1,289.</p> <p>Shipping — Bill op Lading — Delivery—Marks and Numbers.</p> <p>Where flour was shipped on board of a vessel at New Orleans, bound for New York, by two different shippers, the flour being all branded, “Nonpareil Hills,” but the two different lots haying also other brands by which they were easily distinguishable, and, for one lot of 1,000 barrels, being of a better quality and a higher value than the other, which was shipped first, a bill of lading was given, in which the flour was stated to be “marked and numbered as in the margin,” the entry in the margin being simply “1,000 bbls. ‘ Nonpareil Hills,’ ” and on the arrival of the ship at New York, only 439 barrels of the 1,000 were delivered to the consignee, but, all the flour marked “Nonpareil Hills” having been discharged on the dock, a portion of the 1,000 barrels was taken away by the consignee of the other lot of flour, who was allowed to take it by the delivery clerk having charge of the delivery of the cargo: Held, that the consignee of the 1,000 barrels was entitled to a delivery of the identical barrels shipped, and was entitled to a decree against the ship for the damages occasioned by the nondelivery to him of the whole number of barrels shipped to him, less the freight and primage.</p> <p>[Cited in The Santee, Case No. 12,328.]</p>

[At law. Applications for certiorari to remove from a state court to the United States court actions by William Benchley against William W. Gilbert, Albion D. Curtice against William C. Storrs, and William W. Hill against the same defendant.

<p>Case No. 1,292.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Return — Discharge op Prisoner — Power op Judge at Chambers — Prisoner beyond Jurisdiction — Disobedience op Marshal — Punishment por Contempt — Power op Court.</p> <p>1. The construction and effect of the two orders of the war department, of the 8th of August, 1862, relative to the arrest of disloyal persons and of persons liable to draft, about to leave the United States, considered and discussed.</p> <p>[Cited in Ex parte Field, Case No-. 4.761.)</p> <p>2. The president of the United States is not vested by the constitution of the United States with power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, at any time, without the authority of an act of congress.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Ex parte-Field, Case No. 4.761. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 2.)</p> <p>[3. A statement by a- United States marshal, on the return to a writ of habeas corpus, that he had disobeyed the writ, and deported the prisoner in accordance with instructions from the secretary of war, is a sufficient return.)</p> <p>[4. At common law a judge at chambers has no power'to order the discharge of a prisoner on habeas corpus.]</p> <p>[5. Where the prisoner is beyond the jurisdiction, and an order for his discharge on ha-beas corpus would be ineffectual, it should not be granted.]</p> <p>[6. As the marshal would have been exposed to injurious consequences for disobedience to the order of the secretary, he should not be punished for contempt of court when it appears that he can be punished criminally under the state laws, and that the prisoner has an adequate civil remedy against him.]</p> <p>[7. Section 28 of the judiciary act, providing that, in all cases wherein the marshal is a party, the writs and precepts therein shall be directed to a disinterested person, who shall execute the same, is not applicable to an attachment against the marshal for a contempt.]</p> <p>[8. Consequently, as process committing the marshal for a contempt would run to him in his official capacity, the issue of such process will be refused as impracticable.]</p>

[At law. Action by Benedict and others against the administrators of Davis to charge the intestate as a member of the firm of Allison & Co. There was a judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs moved for a new trial.

<p>[At law. Action by Lewis Benedict & Co. against William S. Maynard & Co. on a promissory note.</p>

[At law. Action by Lewis Benedict against Maynard and Morgan on an instrument of guaranty. Defendants demur to the declaration. For verdict on trial of the action, see Case No. 1,296.]

<p>Case No. 1,296.</p> <p>Pleading — Verification—Amendment — Proof.</p> <p>1. Under a rule of court, if the signature of the parts to the instrument on which the action is brought, is denied by plea, the plea must be sworn to, or the signature is admitted.</p> <p>2. A motion to make the affidavit, when the cause is called for trial, refused.</p> <p>3. The affidavit should be made at the time the plea is filed.</p> <p>4. The instrument being admitted, by the pleading, it may be read, as it appears upon its face.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by the owners of the schooner Susan Wright against the steamship Benefactor (the New York & Wilmington Steamship Company, claimants) for collision. A separate libel was filed by the crew of the schooner for the loss of personal effects, and a petition of intervention by the owners of the schooner’s cargo to recover value of the same.

<p>Case No. 1,298.</p> <p>Collision — Steamer and Schooner — Dangerous Proximitt — Failure to Change Course.</p> <p>A collision took place between a steamer and a schooner on the open sea, in clear weather, in broad daylight, the vessels seeing each other at a distance of seven or eight miles and for twenty minutes or half an hour. ' The schooner did not change her helm except in the moment of peril, when her master attempted to port, but did not succeed, and was compelled to abandon his wheel: Held, that the steamer was in fault in attempting to pass the schooner at too short a distance off, and that the schooner was free from fault.</p> <p>[Cited in The Raritan, 32 Fed. 848; The Beta, 40 Fed. 900.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. On appeal by the claimants, the judgment of the circuit court in this case was affirmed by the supreme court, on the ground that it was the imperative duty of the steamer to keep out of the way of the schooner: and, although there was no special finding that the steamer saw the schooner, it would have been a gross fault on her part if she did not.' In' delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Chief Justice Waite, remarked that, “as the responsibility of avoiding the collision was on the steamer, it was a fault in her to get so close that a slight change in the course of the schooner, in the midst of what seemed to be' imminent peril, would bring the vessels together. It is clear that those on board the steamer were deceived as to the movements of the schooner by the leeway they themselves were making, and that they expected to pass to the windward, when they should have shaped their course to go to the leeward.” The Benefactor, 102 U. S. 214]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Stephen Morgan against the schooner Ben Flint for expenses of curing libellant of injuries received in service of the vessel.] [This schooner was employed in transporting lumber from ports on Lake Michigan, in the state of Michigan, to the port of Chicago, in the state of Illinois. Libellant was a seaman on board during the summer of 1866, but contracted before departure on each voyage at the rate of the then current wages.

In equity. Heard on demurrer to the bill. The case made by the bill was substantially as follow's: The Louisiana Cotton Manufactory, a body corporate of the state of Louisiana, executed certain bonds with interest coupons attached, and to secure the payment thereof at maturity, granted a mortgage by authentic act before a notary public.

<p>Case No. 1,301.</p> <p>Bankhuptct — Accounting to Assignee.</p> <p>The defendant in an equity suit, must account, before a master, for property received by him. Orders of reference to a master will be settled on notice.</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by Edward Benjamin against Julius Hart. Erom a decree for complainant, defendant appeals, and presents his bond on appeal for approval.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,304.</p> <p>Negotiable Instruments — Acceptance—Evidence — '-‘Value Received.”</p> <p>1. The acceptance of a bill is evidence against .the acceptor, in behalf of the drawer, of so much money, under the money counts.</p> <p>[See Frazer v. Carpenter, Case No. 5,069; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Bet. (29 U. S.) 111.]</p> <p>2. In a bill of exchange, or other negotiable instrument, the wordB “value received” are not necessary.</p>

In admiralty. Wages. Libel by a boy of sixteen years old for services as cook on board the schooner Benjamin English, at twenty dollars a month.

<p>Case No. 1,305.</p> <p>Salvage — Purchase by Salvor.</p> <p>[Note. This case is nowhere more fully reported. The opinion, if one was written, is not now accessible.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,307.</p> <p>Customs Duties — Action to Recover Excessive Duties — Evidence—Reference — Freight and Transportation Charges — Commissions — Fixing Costs and Charges — Protest—Appeal to Treasury Department — Duress — Compulsory Exaction — Responsibility of Collector for Act of Entry Clerk.</p> <p>[1. In an action to recover excessive duties claimed to have been illegally exacted by a collector of customs, where the claim embraces items of account too numerous for the consideration of the court and jury, a reference will be made to an officer of the court to adjust the same.]</p> <p>[Followed in Crookes v. Maxwell, Case No. 3,415.]</p> <p>[2. Such illegal exaction cannot be proved by the testimony of a customs official that he had adjusted the amount of overpaid duties from papers on file, together with a statement of the same, where he produces but a part of the entries, and no proof of payment of the alleged excessive charges is made by plaintiff.]</p> <p>[3. In such a case, proof by a customs official of the practice of the government in respect to appeals to the secretary of the treasury, and the refunding of duties, is admissible in evidence as bearing on the construction of the law.]</p> <p>[4. A report made at the request of customs officials, without express instructions from1 the treasury department generally as to what charges were properly exacted, based upon information obtained from merchants and others, is inadmissible in evidence as not forming a proper standard by which to determine what charges were properly made in the case in hand.]</p> <p>[5. Freight and transportation from the port of shipment is not a dutiable charge, under the customs act of March 3, 1851.]</p> <p>[6. Commissions on importations from continental Europe cannot be charged for, in excess of 2 per cent., except that commissions on importations from Paris may be charged at the rate of 3 per cent.]</p> <p>[See Munsell v. Maxwell, Case No. 9,932.]</p> <p>[7. Costs and charges actually paid should be added to the invoice, and not arbitrarily fixed by the customs officials.]</p> <p>[8. Act March 3, 1857, requiring a protest by the importer within 10 days of the time of entry of the goods, does not require a protest to be attached to each particular entry, but allows them to be prospective and continuous. Bruñe v. Marriott, Case No. 2,052, followed.]</p> <p>[9. A failure to appeal from the decision of the collector as to the rate or amount of the duty does not bar a recovery against the collector for the refunding of the excess of duty exacted, as Act March 3, 1857, providing that the collector’s decision shall be final and conclusive “as to the liability of the importation to duty or exemption,” unless an appeal is taken, etc., refers to the liability of the importation to duty, and not to the rate or amount of duty imposed.]</p> <p>[10. When charges are added to the entry by the importer, under protest, and by reason of a refusal of the entry clerk to receive such entry unless such additions are made, and for the purpose of obtaining possession of the imported goods, the additions so made are not voluntary, so as to preclude the importer from recovery of the excess exacted.]</p> <p>[11. The exactions being compulsory, the collector cannot insist that the appraisement was conclusive.]</p> <p>[12. The act of the entry clerk in compelling the addition to the entry was official, notwithstanding that the collector gave no instructions to him, other than to make entries according to law and the treasury regulations.]</p> <p>[NOTE. A reference was ordered to adjust the amount of recovery, and judgment was thereafter entered for plaintiffs. Pending writ of error to the supreme court, the parties agreed •to set aside the proceedings, that a new trial should be had. For such new trial, see Hutton v. Schell, Case No. 6,961.]</p>

In equity. This is a suit in equity [by Walter Benn and others] to restrain the defendants [Carlotta Leelercq and Arthur Cheney] from the infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyright by representing a play called “The New Magdalen.” The title of the play copyrighted by the plaintiffs was in these words: “The New Magdalen, a drama in a prologue and three acts, adapted from Wilkie Collins’ celebrated novel of the above title, by Walter Benn, author of sundry dramatic works, and…

In bankruptcy. On the 29th March, 1842, Bennet filed his petition for the benefit of the bankrupt act, but before time enough had passed to obtain a decree of bankruptcy, one of his creditors issued a fi. fa. and levied on certain personal chattels returned and specified in Bennet’s petition: and the property was just about to be sold by the sheriff.

At .law. Upon the return of the habeas corpus, in behalf of N. V. H. Bennett, it appeared that he was committed by virtue of the following warrant: “District of Columbia, Washington County, ss.

<p>Case No. 1,312.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition Proceedings — Assent op Creditor Procured by Extra Percentage-Knowledge by Bankrupt — Refusal to Confirm the Composition.</p> <p>1. Where an offer of money was made by the bookkeeper of the bankrupt, but without his actual knowledge, to induce a creditor to assent to a proposal for composition, who nevertheless refused to assent, and a payment of money to another creditor, who did assent, was shown, made also by the bookkeeper, and of which no explanation was given but the bare denial by the bookkeeper that it had any relation to the matter of composition: Brld, that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the inference that unfair advantage had been offered to induce some of the creditors to assent to the composition, and that the whole proceeding was thereby vitiated, and the composition must fail.</p> <p>2. That, the bookkeeper being the person actually employed to obtain the assent of creditors, the bankrupt was chargeable with what he did in the matter, without having actual knowledge thereof.</p> <p>3. That it made no difference, that the offer made was refused and that the requisite proportion of the creditors had signed without counting the debí of the one to whom the payment was made.</p>

[Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina. [In bankruptcy. Petition by Mrs. Bennett, mortgagee of real estate of I. S. K. Bennett, a bankrupt, claiming the rents and profits after the adjudication of bankruptcy. Prom a decree of the district court sustaining exceptions by the assignees to a master’s report, the mortgagee appeals.

In bankruptcy. Bankruptcy of partners. Bennett petitioned for adjudication against himself and his late partner, Amos. It appeared in evidence that the firm was dissolved in December, that Bennett received a conveyance of all Amos’s interest in the joint property, and undertook to pay all the joint debts, and that Bennett gave a bond to Amos, with one Haynes as surety, conditioned to pay all said debts and to save Amos harmless therefrom.

In bankruptcy. In Bennett's case the bankrupt was one of the children of an intestate, whose land having been sold under proceedings in the orphan’s court of the proper county of the state, a third of the money produced was invested so as to secure to the intestate’s widow the receipt of the interest for her life, and to his children the receipt, in equal shares, of the capital at her death.

At law. On October 14, 1867, Susan Bennett exhibited her petition to the judge of the district court, praying for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus, directed to Sanford J. Bennett, to obtain the custody of her infant child, Anna Bennett, alleged to be unlawfully detained from the petitioner by said Sanford J. Bennett.

At law. This case came before the court on a case stated by counsel, as follows: “This action is brought for the recovery of eight penalties, under the seventh section of the supplement to an act of the legislature of New Jersey regulating fisheries in the river Delaware, passed November 28th, 1822, and assented to and adopted by the legislature of Pennsylvania January 29th, 1823, prohibiting the use of gilling seines in said river, except in certain cases, mentioned in a…

<p>Case No. 1,320.</p> <p>Appearance — Notice to Solicitor.</p> <p>Where the defendant in a suit in equity has appeared by a solicitor, notice of application for a decree, after an order pro confesso, must be given to such solicitor.</p> <p>[Cited, but not followed, in Austin v. Riley, (8th Cir.) 55 Fed. 837.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,321.</p> <p>Insurance — Principal and Agent — Ratification —Proof of Loss — Waiver — Assignment of Policy — Pleading and Proof.</p> <p>1. Circumstances stated which amounted to' a ratification, by a fire insurance company, by silence, of the act of its agent, in accepting the responsibility of a broker to whom the assured paid the premium, in lieu of the money of the assured.</p> <p>[See Miller v. Life Ins. Co., 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 285; Southern Life Ins. Co. v. McCain, 96 U. S. 84.]</p> <p>2. The policy not requiring the payment of the premium in money, the premium was paid by the acceptance by the agent of the promise of the broker, in lieu of the money, and the company could not cancel the policy without repaying the premium to the assured.</p> <p>3. Provisions in a policy of fire insurance for notice of loss and proofs of loss are for the benefit of the insurer, and can be waived.</p> <p>4. Notice of loss to the agent of the insurer was, in the absence of knowledge of the revocation of his agency, notice to the insurer.</p> <p>5. After knowledge by the insurer of the fact of loss, its repudiation of the policy without objecting to the sufficiency of the notice of loss, was an acquiescence in the sufficiency of such notice.</p> <p>[Cited in Timayenis v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 21 Fed. 227.]</p> <p>[See, also, Norwich & N Y. Transp. Co. v. Western Mass, Ins. Co., Case No. 10,363; Bang v. Farmville Ins. Co.. Id. 838; Ramsey v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 2 Fed. 429; Akin v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., Case No. 121.]</p> <p>6. Repudiation by the insurer of liability for the loss was a waiver of the necessity of furnishing proofs of loss.</p> <p>[Cited in Ball & Sage Wagon Co. v. Aurora F. & M. Ins. Co., 20 Fed. 236.]</p> <p>7. An assignment by parol of the right of action on a policy of fire insurance, after a loss, is sufficient to transfer the cause of action.</p> <p>8. “Where the answer to the complaint, in an action on a policy of fire insurance, only denies the allegations of the complaint, the defendant cannot prove a defence based on a breach of any conditions in the policy other than such as are conditions precedent to the right of the plaintiff to recover.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,322.</p> <p>Recognizance — Taken out or Court — Justification — Exoneration of Marshal.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,323.</p> <p>Partnership — Sale bt One Partner — Pleading.</p> <p>If the goods sold belonged to a partnership at the time of sale, the action must be brought in the name of all the partners, although the defendant was ignorant of the partnership.</p>

In admiralty. This was the ease of a libel for an assault. The libellant was a seaman on board the ship Mount Vernon, of New Bedford, of which E. S. Sherman was master, in a whaling voyage, commencing in November, 1S37, and which was finished by the arrival of said ship, at New Bedford, in the month of March last.

<p>Case No. 1,326.</p> <p>Salvage — Amount—Sale op Vessel — Charges— Foreign Consul — Commissions.</p> <p>[1. The Sardinian brig Tevere, bound from Cuba to Bremen, while on Alligator reef, and in peril of total loss, was assisted by three sloops carrying 39 men, who carried out an anchor, lightened the brig, and, after heaving her off, towed her into port. The services were rendered in bad weather, and were attended with considerable risk to the persons and property of the salvors. The vessel and cargo were valued at between $17,000 and $20,000. Held, that as the necessary repairs to the vessel would cost more than her worth after repair, and that as the master could raise no money, the court would order a sale of the vessel and cargo, and award 42 per cent, of the net value to the salvors.]</p> <p>[2. Where the net value of property ordered to be sold to pay salvage is necessary to be known to the court, for the purposes of its just decision, the court may determine the legality, justice, and amount of all charges against it, and may order the same to be produced before it for such determina I ion.]</p> <p>[3. The consul of Spain had no right to consular fees from the proceeds of the sale of such vessel for attending such sale, when it appeared that the vessel was Sardinian, the cargo owned by Belgians, and that interests of Spanish subjects were in no wise affected.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. Petition by the assignee in bankruptcy of James Benson for an order to sell certain real estate of the bankrupt.

moved for a continuance of the suit at law, on the ground of a bill for a, discovery not answered, and now ready to be taken for confessed, the defendant, Bennett, being absent, and the usual notice having been given by publication, and of the death of Thompson, the most material witness. If a bill for a discovery be taken for confessed, the suit at law will be perpetually enjoined. 2 Har. Ch. Pr. 231, 233.

[Appeal from decision of the board of California land commissioners.] Claim [by William Bennitz] for five leagues of land [called the “Rancho Breisgau”] in the county of Shasta, rejected by the board, and appealed by. the claimant.

[At law. Action by Joseph Bensusan, Jr., against Thomas Murphy, collector, to- recover back duties paid. The plaintiff imported from Bordeaux, in Prance, and entered at the custom house at New York, for consumption, 37 cases of claret wine, in bottles, on the 3d of April, 1871.

This was an action on a policy of insurance on goods in the sloop Polly, from the lading at Providence, in Rhode Island, to the unlading at Baltimore, in Maryland.

[In equity. Bill by Thomas Bentley and wife against Abner Phelps to have a deed absolute on its face declared a mortgage.

[In equity. Bill by Thomas Bentley and wife against Abner Phelps to have a deed, absolute on its face, declared a mortgage. Decree for complainants. Defendant petitions for a rehearing. This was a petition for a rehearing in a bill in equity decided between these parties at the last term of this court. [Bentley v. Phelps, Case No. 1,331.] Reference may be had to the report of that case for the statement of the facts and the opinion of the court thereon.

In bankruptcy. Petition of creditors for adjudication of [A. Benton & Bro.] debtors as bankrupts. [Granted.] The testimony disclosed the following facts: — In June, 1876, the firm of A. Benton & Bro., becoming embarrassed, borrowed from certain creditors eleven thousand dollars for business purposes, giving therefor a judgment note, which was duly entered of record.

On libel of George W. Turner, voluntary assignee of McDowell, Caul & Brett, for coal furnished the propeller Benton. It appeared that the Benton was owned by six persons residing in Ohio and Michigan, two of whom were McDowell and Caul. Some time in July, 1S77, McDowell, Caul & Brett made an assignment to Turner for the benefit of their creditors, and he filed these libels for coal furnished the propeller by his assignees, to the amount of about six thousand dollars.

In admiralty-. This was a libel [by James S. Benton against John Whitney] for assault and battery. It appeared that the vessel of which the respondent -was master, and on board of which the alleged assault and battery took place, had been twelve days in port before this suit was brought, or any complaint made by the libellant of ill usage.

<p>[In equity. Bill by the Berdan Fire-Arms Manufacturing Company against E. Remington & Sons.</p>

<p>[Appeal from the commissioner of patents, upon an interference declared.</p>

<p>On habeas corpus.</p>

[At law. Scire facias by James M. Bergen against G. D. Williams on judgment for breach of the conditions of a bond. Defendant pleads nil debet and nul tiel record. Plaintiff demurs to both pleas.

<p>[At law. Scire facias by James M. Berger against G. D. Williams on judgment for breach of bond.</p>

In bankruptcy. Petition of Doggett, Bas-sett & Hills, of Chicago, to set aside adjudication in bankruptcy [against John B. Ber-geron. The petition sets forth that petitioners were creditors of Bergeron upon an open account for merchandise to the amount of fourteen hundred and twenty dollars and forty-six cents.

<p>[At law. Action by Berlin & Son against Jones. Defendant demurs to declaration.</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel against the steamship Bermuda for damages from collision. Dismissed. Libellant subsequently appealed.</p> <p>The Bermuda, 11 Fed. 913.]</p>

In admiralty. This was the last of the contested prize cases in this district. All the decrees appealed from were affirmed by the supreme court. In this case, the vessel, and the munitions of war composing part of her cargo, were long since condemned. These decrees of condemnation have recently been affirmed. [The Bermuda. 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 514.] The following opinion of the district court applies to the residue of the cargo [condemned.]

[In equity. Bill by Elizabeth J. Bernard, Mary A. Bernard, Corine Bernard, and Thomas Bernard, (heirs of Thomas Bernard, deceased,) by William Cannon, their next friend, against Mary W. W. Ashley, (executrix of Chester Ashley, deceased,) William E. Ashley, and Henry C. Ashley, (heirs of Chester Ashley, deceased,) and Silas Craig, to vacate patents to land. Cross-bill by defendants against original complainants. Decree for defendants to original bill.

[In admiralty. Libel by Otto Bernhard and others against Francis Creene and others for torts committed on the high seas. Defendants except.

<p>In bankruptcy. The firm of Wilmerding, Hoguet & Co. obtained a judgment against [Henry Bernstein] the bankrupt, on the 21st of October, 1868, for $2,930.30, in a suit in the supreme court of New' York, for a money demand on contract, founded on two promissory notes made by him, and on a sale and delivery of goods to him. The suit was commenced on the 25th of September, 1S07, and the judgment was obtained in due course, by default, after personal service of a summons. On the same day on which the judgment was obtained, an execution was issued thereupon to the sheriff of the city and county of New York, and he made a levy thereunder on a stock of goods in the store of the bankrupt in the city of New York. The goods were advertised for sale by the sheriff for the 28th of October,1S67, but the sale was stayed by the state court, and a motion was made by the bankrupt in that court to set aside the judgment, execution, and levy, but the motion was denied. On the commencement of the suit in the state court, an attachment was issued in it, under which the same stock of goods above mentioned had been attached. A motion was made by the bankrupt in the state court to-dissolve that attachment, which motion was heard at the same time with the'other motion before mentioned, and was also denied. After the denial of these motions, the sheriff advertised the goods for sale for the 22d of November, 1867. On the 21st of November, 1S67, the petition in this matter, praying for an adjudication of bankruptcy, was filed, and this court, under the fortieth section of the bankruptcy act, [March 2, 18G7; 14 Stat. 536,] at the time it made an order to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted, issued an injunction restraining the sheriff from selling the goods under the execution on the levy made thereunder. There was afterwards an adjudication of bankruptcy in this matter. On a representation that the goods levied on were of a perishable character, and were deteriorating in value, this court made an order modifying the injunction so as to permit the sheriff to sell the goods under the execution, and directing the sheriff to hold the proceeds until the further order of this court concerning the same. The plaintiffs in the judgment now moved the court to dissolve the injunction wholly, and to allow the proceeds of the sale to be applied in paying the judgment and the costs and the charges and fees of the sheriff.</p>

[Application by Robert M. Berry for letters patent for an improvement in sewing machines. The commissioner of patents denied the application. The applicant appeals.

<p>Case No. 1,356.</p> <p>W itness — Evidence — Competen ex of Party— When Compellable to Testify — State Law.</p> <p>Where by the laws of a state parties are both competent and compellable to testify, the same rule, under the legislation of congress, applies to civil actions in the federal courts sitting therein; and one of the parties may in such an action be compelled to testify at the instance of the adverse party.</p> <p>NOTE, [from original report.] In Tenny v. Collins, [Case No. 13,833,] it was held by the U. S. district court, eastern district of Missouri, that upon a motion to set aside the discharge granted to a bankrupt, the wife of the bankrupt cannot be required to testify as a witness against her husband. Respecting the point, Treat, District Judge, remarks: “The plaintiffs also summoned the wife of the bankrupt, who was sworn as a witness, and were proceeding to examine her in relation to the conveyance, in 1866, of land held mi her name by herself and husband, to her father in payment of other debts, and as a security for debts upon which he was jointly liable with the bankrupt. Objections were interposed, that while the bankrupt act provided for the examination of the wife of the bankrupt before the register for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of his estate, it did not alter the common rule, that the wife could not be a witness for or against the husband, in a motion to set aside the discharge. The objection was sustained by the court.</p>

At law. This was an action of trespass brought by the plaintiff, the editor and proprietor of a newspaper in the town of Richmond, in Missouri, against Thomas C. Fletcher, late governor of that state, and also against Montgomery, a colonel commissioned by Governor Fletcher under the act of the state legislature, authorizing the organization and employment of the state militia to aid in the execution of civil process, and against certain other persons, citizens of the town of…

<p>Case No. 1,358.</p> <p>Insurance— Conditions op Policy — Preliminary Proops op Death — Waiver — Constitutional Law — Discrimination against Foreign Insurance Companies — Life Insurance not Commerce.</p> <p>[1. The giving of preliminary proofs of death, though, by the terms of a policy of life insurance, a condition precedent to recovery, is not a “condition” of the policy, within the meaning of a provision that no waiver of the conditions shall be valid unless made at the head office, and signed by an officer of the company.]</p> <p>[2. An offer by a life insurance company to compromise a suit is a waiver of the provision of the policy requiring preliminary proofs of death.]</p> <p>[3. A corporation created under the laws of a state is not a citizen thereof, within the meaning of Const. U. S. art. 4, § 2, providing that the “citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states;” and a state law imposing a special rate of interest upon judgments against foreign corporations is valid under that section.]</p> <p>[4. The issuing of a policy of life insurance is not “commerce,” within the meaning of the provision of the federal constitution giving congress power to regulate commerce among the states.]</p> <p>[See Severn v. Queen, 2 Can. Sup. Ct. 90, for a definition of the words “trade or commerce.”]</p>

At law. Case agreed. Judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff, in the supreme court of Pennsylvania; and a fieri facias issued on the 1st of January 1811, and was delivered to the sheriff on the same day about twelve o’clock, with direction not to levy it, till further instructions. On the same day, the plaintiff’s counsel called at the house of the defendant, to inform him of the issuing of the execution,. and to request his taking immediate measures to discharge it.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel for seaman’s wages by James Berry against the schooner Montezuma.)</p>

In bankruptcy. [In the matter of John Berryman & Co.] Petition of [John Berry-man] one member of a collapsed firm, that the firm and copartners be adjudged bankrupt. The other alleged copartner [Sarah A. Hall] appeared, and by answer denied the copartnership; the cause was heard upon petition, answer, and proof.

In equity. The bill was filed [by Arnold Bertonneau] against the board of directors of city schools of the city of New Orleans, a corporation created by the state of Louisiana, Wm. O. Rogers, chief superintendent of the public schools of New Orleans, and George H. Gordon, principal teacher of the school known as the Fillmore school, in the third district of the city of New Orleans. [Heard on demurrer to bill.

<p>At law. This action is brought by vendor against vendee, to recover the purchase-mon•ey for two thousand barrels of flour sold. A special verdict lias been agreed upon by the parties.</p> <p>[Defendants subsequently appealed to the supreme court, which affirmed the judgment in Lyon v. Bertram, 20 How. (G1 U. S.) 149.]</p> <p>The answer of defendant consists of six ■different pleas. The first is the statute of limitations; the sixth is a denial of the allegation in the complaint, which avers an assignment of Flint. Peabody & Co. to the present plaintiffs. These two pleas are disposed of by the special verdict agreed on, and the court is remitted to the issues raised by the four intermediate pleas. All these resolve themselves into a general denial of the allegations of the complaint, setting up a contract ■of sale.</p> <p>On the argument, it was contended by the counsel for the defendant, that the description in the contract, that the flour sold was “Haxall,” when it turned out to be “Galle-go,” rendered the contract void upon the legal principle, which requires that, to constitute a contract, there should be a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted. That this case comes within the operation of the rule, that where parties contract in relation to a thing which at the time of the execution of the contract they believed to be in existence, and which it is ascertained had no existence at the time, the whole contract is void, inasmuch as the consent of the parties had never met on the subject-matter of the •contract, it not having been in existence.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [In admiralty. Proceedings to condemn as prize the Betsy and cargo, (Stoughton, Spanish consul, claimant for Maury & Co.) The district court condemned the whole cargo, (nowhere reported.) Maury & Co. appeal as to a moiety thereof. The Betsy, a British vessel chartered by Maury and Co. of Malaga, was captured on a voyage from Malaga to St. Petersburg. No invoice was found on board.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [In admiralty. Libel against the schooner Betsy, (Drinkwater, claimant.) A decree of forfeiture was entered, (nowhere reported.) Claimant appeals. This was a case of seizure for the violation of the 27th and 28th sections of the revenue collection act of the 2d of March, 1799, c. 128.

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, for wages. The libellant shipped, Oct. 9, 1839, for a coasting voyage, along the coast of the United States, as mate, for twelve dollars a month. In the prosecution of the voyage, the vessel went to Savannah, and was there employed as a lighter on the river for a considerable time, when she returned to Portland. The libellant claimed a balance of $46.10 due.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania. [In admiralty. Libel for seaman’s wages by Duncan against the brig Betsy. A decree was entered for the libellant. Respondent appeals. This was an appeal from the district court. The libel states, that the libellant shipped on board of this brig at Liverpool in 1807, on a voyage from thence to Philadelphia, and thence to Hayti.

In equity. Bill by Caroline M. Bettes, a citizen of the state of Maine, [against Francis W. Dana, to quiet complainant’s title to certain lands. Upon the death of defendant. complainant exhibited a bill of revivor against Ann P. Dana and Charles F. Dana. Heard on demurrer to the bill of revivor. Bill revived. Heard also on a general demurrer to the bill.

[At law. Action of trover by George C. Betton, assignee in insolvency of Macy, against David M. Valentine. Verdict was given for defendant.] This was a motion by the plaintiff for a new trial. The facts appear in the opinion of the court.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Betts.) This was* an appeal from a decision of the United States district court for the eastern district of Missouri, sustaining a demurrer to the bankrupt’s answer to a petition of Calvin P. Burnes for an order on the bankrupt to deliver possession of certain property. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court, orally pronounced, as given below.

[In equity. Bill by C. Wyllys Betts, as trustee, against Charles W. Drew and others, to foreclose a mortgage. There was no formal opinion delivered in this case, but the conclusions reached by Mr. Justice HARLAN, are contained in a letter addressed by him to counsel, and from that letter we have extracted what is now given as the opinion.

At law. This was an action instituted by the plaintiff [Royston Betts against the Franklin Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia] on a policy of insurance on goods, to recover for damages sustained by fire. The defendant’s prayers, to which allusion is made in the instructions given by the court, are not to be found among the papers to the cause.

[In admiralty. Libel by Benjamin F. Betts and others, owners of the C. Durant, against Eben Goodwin and others, for breach of a contract of towage.

At law. This was an act of assumpsit by [Robert D. Beverly] a citizen of Virginia, as the indorsee of certain Davidson county warrants, drawn by the county judge upon the county trustee, in favor of Samuel Donel-son, clerk of the criminal court of said county, without the addition of the words, “or order,” or, “or bearer,” and indorsed by the payee. County warrants payable to a party or order, or to a party or bearer, are negotiable promissory notes. Story, Prom.

<p>[In equity. Bill by Abner G. Bevin against the Bast Hampton Bell Company for infringement of letters patent.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland. [In admiralty. Libel by Morton Beyer and others, owners of the bark Azow, against the steamer Numberg, for collision, Decree for respondent Libellants appeal.

Trover [by John Bholen and another against Aaron P. Cleveland and another] for certain cases of merchandise. Plea, not guilty. At the trial, the facts appeared to be these.

This was a policy on the Mary Ann, at and from Cape Francois to Baltimore. It appeared in evidence by the testimony of Captain West, that he commanded the Mary, and that he left the cape in company with the Mary Ann, and that they continued together until the afternoon of the 8th of September, 1804, when the Mary Ann hove to, in consequence of which,' the Mary did so too, the wind blowing fresh.

<p>Case No. 1,384.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Desertion—Unseaworthiness —Insufficient Food — Evidence.</p> <p>[1. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption obtains that the hiring of a crew is for the return of the vessel to her port and their common port, where the service commenced.]</p> <p>[Compare Graham v. The Exporter, Case No. 5,667.]</p> <p>[2. Alleged unseaworthiness of a vessel, or insufficient supply of wholesome provisions for the support of the crew, unless clearly established, will not, in an action for wages, justify a seaman’s desertion of his vessel before the completion of the voyage for which he shipped.]</p> <p>[3. In a libel for wages, to which the defense is desertion, the libellants may show legal cause for such desertion, without alleging same in the libel, since such cause is not the foundation of the action.]</p> <p>[4. Three weeks’ time, consumed mostly in discharging cargo, and in taking another at a port during the progress of the voyage, does not show such an abandonment of the voyage as will justify desertion and a suit for wages at such intermediate port.]</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by John W. Bibbins against the ship Citizen and Mulford and Sleight for wages.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,387.</p> <p>District Court — Jurisdiction over Political Prisoners — Mandate to Militart Officer.</p> <p>[1. The United States district court for the southern district of New York had no jurisdiction to act on the petition of a political prisoner who had been imprisoned in Fort Lafayette, in New York harbor, but who was imprisoned in Fort Warren, in Boston harbor, at the time of filing the petition.]</p> <p>[2. Such court will not issue a mandate to a major general in charge of a military department to leave his immediate post of service, proceed to a remote one, and return from thence a political prisoner confined by order of the president, in order that such prisoner may be brought within the jurisdiction of the court, and receive the relief which the court can administer.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,389.</p> <p>Patents for Inventions — License to Make and Use — Includes Right to Repair and Purchase — Reservation of Right to Prosecute for Infringement — Equity—Jurisdiction —Doubtful Legal Right.</p> <p>1. The right to construct a patented machine is distinct from the right to use it.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Jenkins v. Greenwald, Case No. 7,270.]</p> <p>2. The right to use necessarily implies the right to repair, and also a right to purchase a machine, when the one in use is destroyed, or too much worn for use.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Jenkins v. Greenwald, Case No. 7,270. Cited in Steam Cutter Co. v. Sheldon, Id. 13,331.]</p> <p>3. A patentee may reserve to himself the right to prosecute for piracies, within a district where the right of use is conveyed; but, if he shall afterwards clearly divest himself of that right, by conveying all his interest in the patent, within the particular district, the person who owns the right within the district may prosecute for piracies. It would be unreasonable, under such circumstances, to call upon the patentee to prosecute.</p> <p>4. If. in the various transfers made, it may be doubtful whether an action at law can be maintained, it affords a ground for the exercise of a chancery jurisdiction.</p> <p>[NOTE. This patent was granted to William Woodworth December 27, 1S28. for a planing mill; reissued. No. 71, July S, 1S45; also reissued in 1S71.</p> <p>[These patents have been the subject of litigation in the following cases: Gibson v. Van Dressar, Case No. 5.402; Brooks v. Fiske, 15 How. (50 U. S.l 214; Pitts v. Edmonds, Case No. 11,191: Wilson v. Barnum. Id. 17,-787: Motte v. Bennett. Id. 9,8S4; Olcott v. Hawkins, Id. 10.4S0; Brooks v. Bicknell. Id. 1.944; Brooks v. Jenkins, Id. 1,953; Wash-burn v. Gould, Id. 17.214: Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. (45 U. S.l 646; Woodworth v. Wilson. Id. 712; Woodworth v. Hall. Case No. 18,016; Gibson v. Betts, Id. 5.390; Van Hook v. Pen-dleton, Id. 16,851; Woodworth v. Hall, Id. 18.017; Smith v. Mercer, Id. 13,078; Gibson v. Harris. Id. 5,396; Woodworth v. Edwards, Id. 18,014; SI oat v. Patton. Id. 12,947; Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How. (48 U. S.) 650; Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. (05 U. S.) 539; Bloomer v. Millinger, 1 Wall. (6S U. S.) 340; Bloomer v. Gilpin, Case No. 1,558; Bloomer v. Stolley, Id. 1,559; Brooks v. Norcross, Id. 1.957; Brooks v. Bicknell, Id. 1.945, Id. 1.946; Brooks v. Stolley. Id. 1.962: Brown v. Shannon. 20 How. (61 U. S.l 55: Dean v. Mason. Id. 19S: Foss v. Herbert. Case No. 4.957; Gibson v. Cook, Id. 5,393; Gibson v. Barnard, Id. 5.389; Gibson v. Gifford, Id. 5.395; Jenkins v. Greenwald, Id. 7.270: Livingston v. Wood-worth, 15 How. (56 U. S.l 546; Lippincott v. Kelly, Case No. 8.3S1: Ritter v. Serrell, Id 11.866: Simpson v. Wilson. 4 How. (45 U. S.) 709; Van Hook v. Pendleton, Case No. 16,-852: Wilson v. Sherman, Id. 17.833: Wilson .v- Simpson, 9 How. (50 U. S.) 109; Wilson v. Barnum, 8 Plow. (49 U. S.l 258; Wilson v. Stolley, Case No. 17,839; Wilson v. Turner, Id. 17,845; Wilson v. Rousseau, Id. 17,832; Brooks v. Stolley, Id. 1,963; Wilson v. Stolley, Id. 17,840; Woodworth v. Cook, Id. 18.011; Woodworth v. Sherman, Id. 1S.019; Wood-worth v. Stone, Id. 18,021; Woodworth v. Weed, Id. 18,022; Woodworth v. Curtis, Id. 18,-013.]</p>

Petition [of Clement C. Biddle and others] for partition among tenants in common, under the statutes of Massachusetts, of 11 March, 17S4, c. 41, and 14th of February, 1787, c. 53. Aylwin, for certain persons appearing as respondents, moved the court to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that this was a statute remedy, limited by the terms of the statute to the state courts.

<p>Case No. 1,390.</p> <p>Seamen- — Wages—Vessel Sailed ox Shares.</p>

<p>[At law. Action by Anna R. Bidwell against the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company to recover on a policy of insurance. Defendant demurs.</p>

[In bankruptcy. This was an application for leave to amend petition for discharge. stated that the petition in this case had been prepared for the discharge of the petitioners individually, but that nearly all the debts were those contracted as the firm of Bidwell, Banta & Co., that the petitioner was the surviving partner of that firm, the other members having died insolvent.

<p>Case No. 1,394.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discontinuance op Proceedings —Setting Aside Stipulation — Fraud.</p> <p>[Where a bankrupt gives a receipt and release under seal to his assignee in a settlement out of court, and a stipulation is filed discontinuing the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankrupt court has power to set aside the stipulation on proof that it was obtained from the bankrupt by .fraud, or given under a mistake of fact: but such court will not do so until the bankrupt has sought and obtained relief in a court having jurisdiction to set aside the release for fraud, or to award damages.]</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Edward Bigelow, David Bigelow, and Nathan Kellogg, composing the firm of E. & D. Bigelow, involuntary bankrupts. For further proceedings, see Case No. 1.396.]</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Edward Bigelow, David Bigelow, and Nathan Kellogg. Heard on an application by the National Bank of the Commonwealth for an order to sell certain collaterals.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Edward Bigelow, David Bigelow, and Nathan Kellogg, doing business as the firm E. & D. Bigelow & Co. Heard on application by John Bigelow to prove a certain claim and the register’s report thereon. Proof allowed. Heard also on claim of bankrupt's counsel. The firm of E. & D. Bigelow & Co., composed of the bankrupts above named, and its individual members, were adjudged bankrupts, in involuntary proceedings.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Edward Bigelow, David Bigelow, and Nathan Kellogg, doing business as the firm of E. & D. Bigelow & Co. Heard on application by Mary B. Bigelow to prove a certain claim and the register’s report thereon. In this ease objections were filed by creditors to a claim of Mary B. Bigelow against the estate of ber husband, Edward Bigelow.

This was an action, of assumpsit [by John Bigelow and others against William Elliot and Stanford Hovey] for goods sold and delivered, and the case was submitted to the •court upon an agreed statement of facts. The plaintiffs claimed to recover of the defendants as partners in trade under the firm name of S. Hovey. Hovey did not appear, and was defaulted. Elliot appeared and pleaded the general issue.

This was an action on the case, [by George T. Bigelow, administrator, etc., of Samuel Nicholson and Walter R. Davis, against the city of Louisville, and was] tried by the court, without a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent for an “improvement in wooden pavements,” granted to Samuel Nicholson, August 8, 1S34, reissued December 1, 18G3, and extended for seven years from August 8, 1868.

<p>Case No. 1,401.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Noveltt—Improved Soda-Water Apparatus.</p> <p>1. In the apparatus described in the reissued patent granted to Edmund Bigelow, December 4th, 1866, for “improved apparatus for supplying and measuring syrups in soda-water,” the original patent having 'been granted to him April 6th, 1858, an air tube or vent in the chamber of the faucet is necessary to enable such chamber to fill and discharge, and is a part of such faucet.</p> <p>2. Under the first claim of such patent, namely, “the employment of reservoirs in permanent cases or stands, revolving or otherwise, as herein described, with the registering faucets, substantially as and for the purposes herein set forth,” a faucet, to be the faucet of such claim, must be a faucet with such air tube or vent.</p> <p>3. The second claim of such patent, namely, “a self-registering apparatus, with an air tube or vent, substantially as herein set forth, combined with a reservoir, as and for the purposes herein described.” is, in this view, a mere duplication of the first claim.</p> <p>4. The first claim of the reissued patent granted to Edmund Bigelow, August 6th, 1867, for “improved soda-water apparatus.” the original patent having been granted to him January 25th. 1859, namely, “the combination of the conduit through which the mineral waters are drawn, and the syrup-cans, with the ice reservoir, all in one stand or castor, substantially as and for the purpose described,” is void for want of novelty.</p> <p>5. The measuring faucet is not a part of the combination in such claim and is not a part of the syrup-can.</p> <p>6. The second and third claims of such reissued patent of 1867 are valid and are infringed by apparatus constructed in accordance with letters patent granted to John Matthews, Junior, October 3d, 1865, for a “soda-water apparatus.”</p>

[At law. Trover by John Biggs and another against Michael O. Barry and others. Verdict for plaintiffs. Defendants move for new trial.

<p>Case No. 1,403.</p> <p>Ejectment — Judgment — Validity—Reversal — Scire Facias — Attachment — Affidavit — Irregularities — Set-Off — Vendor and Vendee —Bona Fide Purchaser.</p> <p>1. When a title is set up under a judgment on an attachment, although the affidavit on-which the writ issued does not appear in the record, the judgment cannot be treated as a nullity. This omission by the clerk does not show that no affidavit was made, as required by the statute.</p> <p>2. When the court has a general jurisdiction,, irregularities do not make void the proceeding. The proceedings on the attachment may be erroneous, which may be ground for reversal, but when the judgment is used collaterally, such errors do not make void the judgment.</p> <p>[See Pennington v. Gibson. 1C How. (57 TJ. S.) 65; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 23; Miller v. TJ. S., 11 Wall. (78 TT. S.) 268; Ludlow v. Ramsey, 11 Wall. (78 TJ. S.) 581.]</p> <p>3. The attachment was laid on part of a larger tract of land, without describing specially the part. The judgment on the attachment after the sale of the land, was reversed. The Bank of Steubenville, the plaintiff in the attachment, became the purchaser. At common law, when a judgment is reversed, the party shall be restored to all he has lost. And where the thing lost is certain, this is done without a scire facias.</p> <p>4. In a suit against administrator of Biggs by the bank, the amount at which the land was purchased was pleaded as an offset, and allowed the administrator.</p> <p>5. The land having been sold to an innocent purchaser, the legality of the sale on the attachment becomes a question.</p> <p>6. The sale of the tract followed the description of the property given on the service of the attachment, of a part of the tract. This is indefinite, but may be made sufficiently certain, if the residue of the tract had been sold. To afford an opportunity to show this fact a new trial is granted.</p>

[In equity. Suit by James Bigler against William Waller and Robert Saunders to remove cloud from title to land. Decree that complainant pay Waller’s administrator the sum of $17,377.48 in United States coin.] Bigler, a citizen of New York, in May, 1853, purchased from Waller, a citizen of Virginia, the estate of Rippon Hall, consisting of two thousand acres of land, and improvements, lying in the county of York, and state of Virginia.

<p>Case Wo. 1,405.</p> <p>Arrest — Privilege—Witx esses.</p> <p>A recommitment of a debtor upon a ca. sa. after he has been out for more than ¡t year upon a prison-bounds bond, is not a breach of his privilege as a witness and party, bound to attend the court.</p> <p>Habeas corpus [for the discharge of A. T. F. Bill from custody.] Upon the return it appeared that Mr. Bill had been committed in execution upon a ca. sa., and had taken the benefit of the prison bounds, upon giving the bond and security required by law, more than a year ago. At the expiration of the year the plaintiff required the marshal to recommit him to close custody, agreeably to the act of congress of June 24, 1S12, § 3, (2 Stat 755,) “to amend the laws within the District of Columbia,” by which it is enacted, “that the benefit of the prison rules shall not be allowed to any debtor hereafter taken or charged in execution within the said district for more than one year from the date of the bond given by him or her for keeping within the said rules, after the expiration of which time, if the person so taken or charged in execution shall not be discharged by due course of law, it shall be the duty of the marshal or other officer, to whose custody such person was committed, to recommit him, or her, to close jail and confinement, there to remain until the debt for which, he or she was taken or charged in execution shall be paid, or until he or she shall be discharged under the act of congress for the relief of insolvent debtors within the District of Columbia.”</p> <p>The marshal, accordingly, so recommitted him during the session of this court, and while Mr. Bill was bound to attend this court as a witness, and had a cause depending in court for trial at this term. Mr. Bill moved to be discharged, and claimed the right of a witness, and of a party to be free from arrest during the session of the court.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of Ohio. [In bankruptcy. Petition by H. N. Bill, as assignee of John C. Neal, against Seth R. Beckwith, Charles P. Vaupel, and James P. Moore for the recovery of property fraudulently transferred by the assignor. The petition was dismissed, and the assignee now petitions for review.

In equity. This was a petition for an accounting and the appointment of a receiver [of the New Albany & Salem Railroad Company,] filed under decrees in this case rendered in June .and December, 185S, by John Savage Shaw, a bondholder as well as a stockholder of the road, for himself and all others similarly situated in relation to the property.

<p>[In bankruptcy. Application of William Billing, a bankrupt, for a discharge.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,409.</p> <p>Removal of Causes —State Practice — Writs— Attachment.</p> <p>1. An action at law commenced in a state court by summons and complaint was removed into this court before issue joined. Before removal, an attachment had been issued in the suit, according to the law of the state, and a reference made to take the deposition of a witness to be used on a motion in the suit. After removal, the defendant entered a rule in this court requiring the plaintiff to declare, and the plaintiff entered a rule in this court requiring the defendant to plead. The plaintiff now moved to set aside the first rule, and the defendant moved to set aside the second rule, and the plaintiff also moved for leave to proceed in the reference so made and pending, in accordance with the statute of New York: Held, that all three of the motions must be granted.</p> <p>[Cited in Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss,_l Fed. 395; Bryant v. Leyland, 6 Fed. 127.]</p> <p>2. As a complaint had been put in in the state court, no further pleading on the part of the plaintiff was necessary. Nor was there any occasion for the plaintiff to enter a rule to plead against the defendant, there being no such practice in the state court.</p> <p>[Cited in Oscanyan v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., Case No. 10,690.]</p> <p>3. The provisions of sections 646. 914, and 915 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and of sections 4 and 6 of the act of March 3, 1875, (IS Stat. 471. 472,) show an intention to secure in each state one method of procedure in all common law cases, and to attain that result by adopting, in general, the procedure of the state courts in the respective states.</p> <p>[Cited in Central Trust Co. v. South Atlantic & O. R. Co., 57 Fed. 10.]</p> <p>4. The distinction between law and equity is preserved, both in substance and in procedure, and the provisions of positive statutes of the United States are not invaded; but, in the absence of such provisions, the state practice prevails.</p>

[In bankruptcy. John J. Binford excepts to the report of the register of the liens and their priorities binding on the estate of Charles T. Binford, a bankrupt.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia. [In bankruptcy. John J. Binford excepted to the report of the register of the liens and their priorities binding on the estate of Charles T. Binford, a bankrupt. Exceptions sustained. Case No. 1,411.

<p>Case No. 1,412.</p> <p>Carriers of Goods — Notice to Consignee — Due Diligence.</p> <p>1. It seems that apart from any agreement between a common carrier and the consignee of goods entrusted to his care, the strict rule of the common law with respect to the liability of other carriers, is not applicable to steamers and railroads that have a regular time of arrival and departure.</p> <p>2. When the question of diligence arises at all in the case of a carrier, he is bound, like other bailers for hire, warehousemen or wharfingers, to the exercise of due diligence only.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>NOTE, [from original report.] It is from this part of the opinion that we seriously dissent, and think we can show, upon authority conclusive at least in this country, and particularly so in Virginia, that the doctrine as laid down by the learned judge is not law. It appears, we think, from the very authorities he cites in his own support. In the case of Amies v. Stevens, [1 Strange, 12S,] cited by the judge, it was decided that the act by which the loss was occasioned was an act of God, and that, therefore, the carrier was not liable; and we think the fair inference is, though it was considered the act of God, yet the carrier would have been held responsible if the slightest negligence had been shewn. So. in Golt v. McMechen, [6 Johns. 160,] cited as above, where the vessel ran ashore in consequence of a sudden failure of the wind, and the goods were injured, the court was of opinion that this was an act of God, and relieved the carrier of his liability; but even from this judgment Chancellor Kent dissented, being of opinion that the captain might have avoided the loss by tacking the ship before she was so near the shore as to run into it by the wind’s sudden failure. So, in Siordet v. Hall, also cited by Judge H., where damage was done to a cargo by water escaping through the pipe of a steam boiler, in consequence of the pipe having been cracked by frost, the carrier was held responsible, though the freezing was the act of God, yet the consequences might have been avoided by care. In the case of Dale v. Hall, [1 Wils. 281,] also, it was held that a loss occasioned by a leak which was caused by rats gnawing a hole in the bottom of a vessel was not to be deemed a loss by inevitable casualty. These are the only authorities which Judge Haliburton cites, and in our opinion, so far from supporting him, they are very strong the other way.</p> <p>The rule, so far as we have been able to gather it from a careful examination of the authorities, seems to be that the inevitable accident (or the act of God, for in many of the authorities these are used as convertable terms) which win excuse a carrier from his liability as such must be such an accident as could not have been avoided by the exercise of any human skill and foresight. For this proposition we have authority in almost every state in the Union where such a question would be likely to arise. For instance, in the case of McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend. 190, cited with disapprobation by Judge H., it is explicitly decided by the supreme court of New York that nothing will excuse a carrier from liability except inevitable accident or acts of public enemies, and proof of the utmost care was inadmissible. In that case the captain stranded the vessel by mistaking a light, and it was shown that it was almost impossible to avoid the mistake which caused the accident. We have already noticed the opinion of that distinguished jurist, Chancellor Kent, in the case of Colt v. McMechen. decided by the same court. In Boyle v. McLaughlin, 4 Har. & J. 291. An unexpected freshet in the river injured flour which the carrier had placed in a situation generally safe on the bank. It was held he was liable because he might have placed the flour in a situation where no such liability would have existed. So in Steamboat Co. v. Bason, Harp. 262, the supreme court of South Carolina decided, in a case where a steamboat was grounded, where grounding was inevitable, and the stern of the vessel sank, and bilge water injured the goods that, although great care was taken, possibly greater diligence might have been used. The same court, in the case of Campbell v. Morse, referred to above, decided that in a case where a waggoner, crossing a regular ford, was stalled, and, the creek rising rapidly, the goods were injured, the carrier was held responsible because he might have avoided the accident.</p> <p>In the case of Sprowl v. Kellar, 4 Stew. & P. 382, it is said in the judgment of the court that the inevitable accident which excuses a carrier must be beyond the prevention and control of human prudence. So, in the case of Turney v. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340, it is decided that a carrier is liable for all losses that could have been prevented by any human skill and foresight. In the case of Eagle v. White, 6 Whart. 505, the defendants, who were common carriers on the railroad from Philadelphia to Columbia, undertook to carry certain boxes of goods belonging to the plaintiffs from Philadelphia to Columbia. The cars arrived at the latter place about sun-down on a Saturday evening, and by direction of the plaintiff were put on a sideling. The plaintiffs declined receiving the goods on that evening, on the ground that it was too late, whereupon the agent of the defendant left the cars on the sideling, taking with him the keys of the cars, and promised to return on Monday morning. The car remained in this situation until Monday morning, when they were opened by the plaintiff by means of a key which fitted the lock; and on examination it was discovered that one of the boxes had been opened, and the contents taken away. Held, that the defendants were liable to the plaintiff for the value of the goods lost. The defendants were held liable as common carriers. Rogers, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: “A common carrier is in the nature of an insurer, and is answerable for accidents and thefts, and even' for a loss by robbery. He is liable for all losses which do not fall within the excepted cases of the act of God or inevitable accident, without the intervention of man and public enemies. This, as Chancellor Kent remarks in his Commentaries, has been settled law for ages; and the rule is intended as a guard against fraud and collusion, and is founded on the broad principles of public policy and convenience. It is a principle of extraordinary responsibility, which has stood the test of experience, and which we are unwilling to see frittered away further than has been already done in those cases where carriers have been, as I think, unwisely permitted to limit their own responsibility.” In Dusar v. Murgatroyd, [Case No. 4,199,] Judge Washington decided that the owner of a vessel was answerable for the carelessness or unskilfullness of his master, and that by the common law nothing could excuse a carrier but the act of God, of the public enemy, or of the party complaining.</p> <p>In Virginia, in as full and explicit a manner as in any other state in the Union, the common law doctrine of the liability of carriers is decided in our courts in Murphy v. Staton, 3 Munf. 239. There, the court of appeals decided that “a common carrier is liable for all accidents to goods entrusted to him for trans-poration except such as arise from the act of God, the public enemy, or owner of the goods,” and that, in order to excuse a carrier from his liability as such, “it is not enough for him to prove (the goods being carried by water) that the navigation is attended with so much danger, that a loss may happen, notwithstanding the utmost endeavors of the waterman and crew to prevent it, that the person conducting the boat possesses competent skill, has used due diligence, and provided hands of sufficient strength and experience to assist him.” The onus lies on him to exempt himself from liability. So, in the case of Friend v. Woods, 6 Grat. 189, the court of appeals sanctions the doctrine laid down in Murphy v. Staton, that the common law liability of carriers is the law of Virginia, and Judge Daniel, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, says: “By the common law a carrier is treated as an insurer against all damage to or loss of goods intrusted to him for transportation, except such as may arise from the act of God, the public enemies, or the act of the owner of the goods:” and, further: “The case (Murphy v. Staton') may be regarded as settling that the liabilities of common carriers upon dur navigable streams are fixed by the common law rule, and that losses arising" from the ordinary dangers of navigation, however great and however carefully guarded against, do not fall within the exception.” This case came up on an exception to the instruction of the court below “that if the jury believed from the evidence that the boat was stranded by running upon a bar previously formed in the ordinary channel of the river, but that the existence of the bar might by human foresight and diligence have been ascertained and avoided, although those in charge were ignorant of its existence at the time the boat, ran upon it, the defendants were liable for the loss.” This instruction the court of appeals unanimously affirmed, and in the opinion cites with approbation the decision in Mc-Arthur v. Sears, the case to which Judge H. also refers, and which he overrules. We think these cases show that, so far from there having been any modification of the common law doctrine of the liability of carriers, that liability, in most of the states of the Union, has been upheld in its broadest extent, and that the rule laid down in the decision of Friend v. Woods and McArthur v. Sears, that a carrier is answerable for injury to goods in his charge, wherever that injury might have been ascertained and avoided by human foresight and diligence, or by the use of all possible precaution, is the rule of law upon the subject in this country. We have,been the more particular in our consideration of these authorities because we think that the adoption of the modified rules laid down in this opinion would generally place the mercantile community in the power of insolvent and irresponsible agents, and enable them, by fraud or negligence, to inflict incalculable mischief.</p>

[In equity. Bills by Charles S. Bingham, as assignee in bankruptcy of David S. Wing, against Frost and against Williams, to restrain proof of debts. Opinion of referee in favor of complainant.]

[In equity. Bill by Charles S. Bingham, as assignee in bankruptcy of David S. Wing, against John W. Reddy, to set aside a mortgage. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant moves for a new trial.

<p>Case No. 1,415.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Fraudulent Tran spers — Intent op Creditor.</p> <p>A creditor who accepts a chattel mortgage with a view to obtain a preference, having reasonable cause to believe at the time that a fraud on the act was intended, and that his debtor was insolvent, will not be allowed to prove his debt in bankruptcy, and likewise loses the lien of his mortgage.</p> <p>[See In re Richter’s Estate, Case No. 11,803; In re Black, Id. 1,458.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel [by Delucena L. Bing-ham against Job W. Wilkins, late owner and master of the schooner Hero] for wages, with a capias against the master. The libel-lant commenced suit against the respondent, on the 21st May, 1836, before an alderman of the city of Philadelphia, for the same cause of action. The warrant was returned, and the parties appeared, on the 11th August.

[In bankruptcy. Petition for writ of prohibition to state courts to prevent further proceedings tending to hinder the administration of a bankrupt estate by the district court under the bankrupt law of United States.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

[In bankruptcy. Petition by the creditors of Abraham Bininger and Abraham B. Clark, bankrupts, to compel Clark to elect whether to prosecute in the circuit court his petition of review of the adjudication in bankruptcy, or to proceed with certain actions begun in the state courts.

<p>Case No. 1,420.</p> <p>Involuntary Bankruptcy — Amendment of Petition — Motive of Petitioner — Act of Bankruptcy — Insolvency — Appointment of Receiver — Intent.</p> <p>1. The district court, on the trial before a jury, as to the fact of bankruptcy, in an involuntary proceeding under section-39 of the bankruptcy act of March 2, 1867, (14 Stat. 536,) has power to permit an amendment of the creditor’s petition.</p> <p>[See In re Craft, Case No. 3,316; In re Gal-linger, Id. 5,202.]</p> <p>2. What constitutes insolvency, under section 39 of that act, defined.</p> <p>[See Warren v. Tenth Nat. Bank, Case No. 17,202.]</p> <p>3. An order of a state court appointing a receiver of the property of a debtor is “legal process,” within the meaning of section 39 of that act The appointment by a state court of a receiver of the property of a debtor, for the purpose of paying his debts, defeats and delays the operation of that act.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Stuyvesant Bank, Case No. 13,-581; Re Safe-Deposit & Sav. Inst., Id. 12,-211; Re Hathorn, Id. 6,214.]</p> <p>4. Where a debtor voluntarily procures his property to be taken on legal process, and the effect of such taking is to defeat or delay the operation of that act, he must be held to have intended to produce such effect.</p> <p>[Cited in Warren v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., Case No. 17,194.]</p> <p>5. For a solvent trader to suspend payment and not resume within fourteen days is fraudulent as against his creditors, and is an act of bankruptcy, within section 39 of that act.</p> <p>[See Yanderhoof v. City Bank, Case No. 16,-842; In re Ess, Id. 4,530.]</p> <p>6. In a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy against two debtors, where only one of them contests the fact of bankruptcy, it is not proper, the acts of bankruptcy being established, to inquire into the motive of the petitioners in prosecuting the petition, or info the fact of the cooperation of the other debtor with the petitioners, or into his motive for doing so.</p>

In bankruptcy. I, the undersigned register in charge of the above entitled matter, do hereby certify that a petition has been filed with me, on the part of John S. Beecher, Esq., assignee, setting forth that on the 24th day of November, 1871, he was served with a notice, which notice was to the effect that several creditors of the bankrupt who had proved their claims had filed with the register in charge a request in writing that the said assignee, John S. Beecher, be…

<p>In bankruptcy. This was a petition by James T. Burns and Daniel H. Watson, judgment creditors of [Leonidas Binns] the bankrupt, praying for the vacation or modification of an injunction restraining the sheriff of the city and county of New York, and all other persons, from selling, incumbering, assigning, disposing of, or in any way whatever interfering with, the property of the bankrupt.</p> <p>The petition set forth, that on December 8th, 1869, an action was commenced, in the marine court of the city of New York, by the petitioners against the bankrupt, for goods sold and delivered, and that, on December 22d, 1869, judgment was entered therein by default for $205.73, and an execution issued and a levy made on certain millinery goods belonging to the bankrupt; that, on December 28th, 1869, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the bankrupt, and the injunction now sought to be modified was issued and served upon the sheriff; that said action was instituted adversely to said defendant, and was brought on a debt justly due, and said judgment was obtained without fraud or collusion; and that the property levied upon was perishable, and unless sold immediately would greatly deteriorate in value. The prayer of the petition was, that the injunction might be vacated or modified, so as to permit said sheriff to sell enough of the property to satisfy the execution, or for such other or further relief as might be proper. The matter was referred to the register, to take proof of the truth of the matters alleged in the petition, and, on the coming in of the register’s report, was brought to a hearing.</p>

In equity. Bill to enjoin the defendant from printing, engraving, etching, copying, publishing or selling a certain historical print of the Declaration of Independence, which the plaintiff claims to have invented and designed, at April term, 1819.

<p>. [At law. Action by Binns and Halsted against E. S. Williams. Defendant moves to quash an attachment.</p>

Attachment under Act Md. 1705, c. 56, [in suit by Birch & Small against Butler.] Mr. Morsell and Mr. Dorsey, 1. Objected that the oath was made by Small only. 2. That the Christian names of Birch & Small are not mentioned, either in the writ of ca-pias. or of attachment, nor in the affidavit. S. That it must appear on the papers that the plaintiffs were citizens of the United States. The act was made for a certain class of people, for citizens of the United States only.

<p>Slander. The declaration was “he stole.” The evidence was “you stole.”</p>

[At law. Action by the executors of Stephen Bird against John Cockrem, receiver of the New Orleans National Banking Association, for not surrendering property alleged to belong to plaintiff.] This cause was heard upon the motion of defendant to vacate the order removing the case from the fifth district court of the parish of Orleans.

In equity. The defendants are a mutual insurance company incorporated by the legislature of Pennsylvania by a charter under which they carry on their business in the city of Philadelphia. In September, 1847, they executed and delivered to the complainant at Philadelphia a sealed policy of insurance in $5000 upon his life, payable to his wife. The premium paid was $155.50.

<p>In admiralty. These were two libels for salvage, one filed by the Coast Wrecking Company, a corporation incorporated for wrecking purposes, and one filed by John Clough and others, owners of the steam-tug William Fletcher, against the brig Birdie and her cargo. The libel of the Coast Wrecking Company alleged, that, on the 3d of March, 1868, the brig Birdie, which, with her cargo of flour, was worth about $30,000, went ashore on the south side of Bong Island; and that the company, hearing of the wreck, dispatched two steam-tugs to her, on the 4th of March, which reached her about 9 P. M. of that day, finding her deserted, and got her off about 9 o’clock the next morning, and brought her to New York, for which service the libel prayed compensation. The libel of the owners of the Fletcher set up substantially the same facts. The answer of the owners of the brig and her cargo averred, that the brig was driven ashore by the ice, and her master left her, on March 4th, to get assistance, returning to her that night; that, while he was away, the officers and crew left her temporarily, on account of the intense cold, and had not deserted her; that the Coast Wrecking Company knew, on the morning of March 4th, that the brig was aground, but concealed the fact from others engaged in the business, in the hope of making more profitable arrangements for getting her off, and employed the Fletcher, without disclosing to her owners the object for which she was wanted; that such owners had other and better means of getting vessels off, which they would have dispatched to the assistance of the brig, if they had known her situation; and that, but for such concealment, the brig would have been got off before she was.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libels, one by the Coast Wrecking Company, and the other by John Clough and others, owners of the steam tug William Fletcher, against the brig Birdie and her cargo. Decree for libellants in the district court.

[In equity. Bills by John C. Birdsall against A. McDonald, and by the same against the Ashland Machine Company, for infringement of letters patent No. 20,249, and reissue of the same, No. 1.299, granted, respectively, to complainant May 18, 1S58, and April 8, 1862, and of letters patent No. 35,209, granted to complainant May 13, 1862.

<p>Case No. 1,433.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement — Preliminary Injunction — Former Adjudication — Evidence.</p> <p>In another suit, against other defendants, but in which these defendants contributed to the ■defence, the complainant’s patent had been sustained. Upon a motion, in this suit, for a preliminary injunction, the defendants claimed to "be able to produce, if the opportunity were .given, additional witnesses to establish the contrary of some of the facts found in the other •suit, which would invalidate the complainant’s patent, by showing its want of novelty: Meld, that whatever may be the effect of the additional testimony upon the case at the final hearing, the complainant ought now to have the benefit of his adjudicated rights, and is entitled to an injunction.</p> <p>[NOTE. Patent No. 35,209 was granted to J. 0. Birdsall May 18, 1862. For other cases involving this patent, see Birdsall v. McDonald, Case No. 1,434; Perrigo v. Spaulding, Id. 10,-994. For subsequent proceedings, to punish for a contempt in violating the injunction, see Case No. 1,436.]</p>

<p>At law. Demurrer to pleas. The declaration, which was an amended one, set out that the plaintiff [John C. Birdsall] “is a citizen of the state of Indiana,” and that the defendant [William Perego] “is a citizen of the state of New York.” It then averred, in substance, that the defendant entered into a contract or agreement in writing with the plaintiff, in and by which the plaintiff agreed to allow, and did allow and transfer, to the defendant the exclusive right to manufacture and sell a certain clover machine, (for which patents had been issued by the United States to the plaintiff, on the 18th of May, 1858, [No. 20,249,] and on the 13th of December, 1859, for the period of fourteen years from the dates of said patents respectively,) for the supply of the territory of the eastern part of the state of New York, as described, until the said patent should expire; and in and by which the defendant did undertake and agree with the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff, for such exclusive right to manufacture and. sell such clover machines, the sum of thirty-live dollars for each and every machine manufactured and sold by him for the supply of the territory aforesaid, one half thereof to be paid on the sale of each machine so sold by him, and the balance in six months after such sale; that the defendant, on the 30th of November. 1803, manufactured and sold a large number, to wit, thirty-eight, of said clover machines, whereby the defendant became, and was, on the 1st of June, 18G4, indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,338, to be paid, &c. It also averred a request of payment, and that such debt was ■ unpaid, &c. The contract was made with the defendant and one Spencer, his then partner, but, by its terms, it became the separate contract of the defendant, on the subsequent dissolution of the firm. This appeared on the face of the declaration. The defendant pleaded nil debet and three or more special pleas. By his third plea, he alleged, in substance, that, after the alleged making of the agreement declared on, and before the alleged manufacture and sale of any of said clover machines by the defendant, to wit, on the 31st of December, 18(51, and at divers other times both before and after that day. without the consent and against the will of the defendant, the plaintiff, by himself, and by and through his authorized agents, manufactured and sold one hundred of said clover machines, for the supply of the district and territory described in said contract and declaration; that all of said machines were so manufactured and sold by the plaintiff and his authorized agents, for use, and were, in fact, used, with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, within and for the supply of said territory, contrary to the intent and meaning of the contract, and in violation thereof, &e., by lheans whereof the defendant did not, on the 1st day of January, 1802, nor at any other time thereafter, have or enjoy the exclusive right of manufacturing and selling said machines, for the supply of the said territory or any part thereof; and that the defendant was, at all times, ready and willing and able to manufacture and sell said machines for the suply of said territory, and to pay the plaintiff thirty-five dollars on each and every machine thus manufactured and sold by him for the supply of said territory, if the plaintiff would have allowed and secured to the defendant the exclusive right of manufacturing and selling said machines for the supply of said territory, but which the plaintiff neglected and refused to do. To this third plea the plaintiff demurred, and assigned, as special cause of demurrer, that said plea was double, in this, that it contained several and distinct matters of defence. By a fourth plea, the defendant alleged, in substance, that the patents mentioned in the agreement set out in the amended declaration were void, because the plaintiff was not the first and original inventor of the improvements therein claimed as the plaintiff’s invention, and, also, because each of the patents was for more than was the invention of the plaintiff. This plea then concluded as follows: “Wherefore this defendant says, that, if any such contract or agreement was ever in fact made or entered into by the said defendant and the said Samuel Spencer with said plaintiff, as is in that behalf alleged in said amended declaration, the same was void and of no force or effect, for want of consideration therefor,” &c. To this fourth plea the plaintiff demurred, assigning for special cause of demurrer, that such plea was argumentative.</p>

A motion for an attachment to commit defendants for contempt of court. In 1S74 the complainant [John C. Birdsell] sued the defendants for infringing upon his reissued patent, granted April 8th, 1862, as a reissue of the patent originally granted him May 18th, 1858, for improvement in machines for threshing and hulling clover-seed.

Motion to enjoin complainant [John C. Birdsell] from bringing suits against the defendants’ vendees. In this case an injunction had been issued restraining defendants from infringing on the reissued patent granted complainant May 18th, 1858, [No. 20,249,] reissued April 8th, 1862, [No. 1,299,] for an improvement in machinery for hulling and threshing clover.

At law. This was an action [by Christopher Bischoff and others] against [Hugh Maxwell] the collector of the port of New York, to recover hack a penalty of 20 per cent, on the value of the goods, exacted, under protest, for the undervaluation of silks, on their entry at the custom-house. It was claimed, that the imposition of the penalty, which amounted to $598.20, was warranted by the 8th section of the act of July 30th, 1846, (9 Stat. 43.)

[Appeal from the commissioner of patents. [Application by George S. Bishop for letters patent for a sliding block, for use in connection with a bumper, having formed in its end a chamber for guiding and holding links in a horizontal position. Prom a decision of the commissioner of patents denying an application for a patent, the applicant appeals.

At law. The action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by Miss [Harriet] Bishop by the upsetting of a stage of the defendants [Lucius W. Stockton and Daniel Moore,] in January, 1842. The upset occurred 1 y2 miles east of Uniontown, Fay-ette county'.

<p>[At law. Action by Samuel Bispham against Patterson & Walter. Defendant Patterson moved to set aside a verdict for plaintiff.</p>

[At law. Samuel Bispham against James T. and Samuel Pollock upon an account. • Fletcher & Butler appeared for the plaintiff. and the defendants being in default, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of inquiry of damages was awarded.

<p>[At law. Action by Samuel Bispham against Taylor and others upon a bond executed by the defendant Taylor, .as marshal, and by the other defendants as his sureties. Defendants demur to its declarations.</p>

[At law. Action by Samuel Bispham against Taylor and others upon a bond executed by the defendant Taylor as marshal, and by the other defendants as his sureties. [For decision overruling a demurrer to the declaration, see Case No. 1,443.]

<p>Mortgages — Assumption’ of Mortgage by Grantee — Foreclosure —Decree for Deficiency— Liability of Grantee to Creditor of GranTOR.</p> <p>[1. The promise of a grantee of land to his grantor, to pay a mortgage thereon, inures to the benefit of the mortgagee, who, in proceedings to foreclose, is entitled to a decree against such grantee for any deficiency after sale of the mortgaged premises.]</p> <p>[See Hayden v. Drury, 3 Fed. 782; Twichell v. Hears, Case No. 14,280.]</p> <p>[2. The bringing of the suit is a sufficient acceptance of the grantee’s promise by the mortgagee.]</p> <p>[See New York Life Insurance Co. v. Aitkin, 26 N. E. 732. 125 N. Y. 660; Hayden v. Snow, 14 Fed. 70; Baer v. Knewitz, 39 Ill. App. 470; Lowe v. Hamilton, 31 N. E. 1117, 132 Ind. 406; Rouse v. Bartholomew, 32 Pac. 10S8.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,440.</p> <p>Specific Performance — Statute of Frauds — Witness — Competency—Interest.</p> <p>1.The brother of the complainant owed the defendant a debt exceeding five thousand dollars, for which he had given a mortgage on certain lands in Ohio, and a lien on twenty-two shares of railroad stock in the Erie and Kalamazoo road. The bank proposed to its debtor, Edward Bissell, that he should substitute mortgages on property in the state of Michigan for the Ohio mortgages. The debtor proposed to give the bank a mortgage on a farm in Lenawee county, which was owned by his brother, the complainant, but the title was held in trust by Edward. The bank acceded to the proposition, and a mortgage was executed by the complainant and his brother. And it was afterwards agreed that so soon as a claim, under an attachment, should be removed from the Lena-wee farm, a deed should be executed for it to the bank, and the bank should transfer to the complainant the Ohio mortgages, and transfer the railroad stock. The substance of this agreement was drawn up in writing, and was left, with other papers, in the hands of Mr. Walker, to be delivered to the respective parties, on the embarrassment on the title being removed. A motion was made to set aside the attachment, which failed. On this, Mr. Walker delivered up the papers. The bank afterwards applied to be put in possession of the farm, to defend the suit against the attachment claim. On which defense the claim was held void. The bank remains in possession, receiving rents and profit. The complainant filed his bill for a specific performance. The court decreed a specific performance — requiring complainant to pay costs on attachment and ejectment.</p> <p>2. Also that the statute of frauds does not apply.</p> <p>3. That Edward Bissell was a competent witness, &c.</p> <p>[See Harrison v. Evans, Case No. 6,135; Scott v. The Plymouth, Id. 12,544; Stump v. Roberts, Id. 13,561.]</p>

At law. This was an action [of ejectment] to recover a league of land. It was tried by the court without a jury. The following is a summary of the facts condensed from the findings filed by the court: The plaintiff [George B. Bissell] claimed title under a Mexican grant of five leagues of land, made to Charles William Flugge, which was duly presented to the board of land commissioners, finally confirmed and patented to Thomas O. Larkin.

At law. This was an action of ejectment for lands in Hebron, in the state of Connecticut, alleging that the defendant ousted the plaintiffs of the demanded premises eighteen months before the commencement of the action, and. had ever since remained in possession. moved to erase this cause from the docket on the ground that from the description of the parties it did not appear to be within the jurisdiction of the court.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri. [In admiralty. Libel by Peter Bissell, for the recovery of pilot’s wages, against the respondents, Michael S. and William G. Mep-ham, owners of the steamboat Iron City. Decree for libellant, reversing the unreported decree of the district court.)

[At law. Action by Francis M. Bixby and others against Eleazer M. Couse, William H. De Camp, and others. Plaintiffs move to vacate an order of removal from the state court.

[In bankruptcy. Jorgen Bjornstad, a bankrupt merchant, claims an exemption of stock in trade to the value of $200, under 2 Tayl. St Wis. c. 134, § 32, subd. 9, which was allowed. [For proceedings on application for discharge of the bankrupt, see 5 Fed. 791.]

<p>Case No. 1,452.</p> <p>Courts — Jurisdiction—Foreion Consul.</p> <p>Where an action on contract was brought in this court against the persons composing a firm, and the jurisdiction of the court depended wholly on the fact that one of the defendants was a consul in the United States for a foreign power, and it was held that the firm was not liable, but that one of the defendants, other than the consul, was liable, with two other persons, who composed, with him, a former firm: Held, that this court had no jurisdiction to give judgment against such defendant.</p> <p>[Cited in Froment v. Duelos, 30 Fed. 386.]</p> <p>[See St. Luke’s Hospital v. Barclay, Case No. 12,241.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for freight by B. F. Woodbury, master and agent of the schooner B. J. Willard, against Moro Phillips, charterer of the schooner.

<p>Case No. 1,455.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Judgments and Liens — Illegal. Preference — Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment — Failure to Record.</p> <p>[1. Judgments and liens under execution, acquired before a petition in bankruptcy by or against the debtor, are prima facie good and enforceable in favor of vigilant creditors, unless, an illegal preference has been obtained, or an intent to evade the provisions of the bankrupt act is manifest.]</p> <p>[2. The concurrence of the following facts are-necessary to constitute an illegal preference within the act: The debtor must be insolvent,, or acting in contemplation of insolvency; his. purpose must be to give a preference, or, when, the preference has been obtained by means of' legal process, the seizure or attachment must have been procured or suffered by the debtor;, the creditor must have reasonable cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent; he must know that the seizure is fraudulent as against the bankrupt act; and in voluntary cases the preference must have been given within four months of filing the petition in bankruptcy.]!</p> <p>[3. The giving by a debtor for a consideration of equal value of a warrant of attorney to. confess judgment is not an act of bankruptcy,, though the warrant is not recorded, but kept in. the creditor’s custody, unknown to others.]</p> <p>[J. In such a case the creditor may enter judgment, issue execution, and sue when insolvency is apparent, provided he is not assisted, by the debtor.]</p>

[At law. Action by Blachly, Strong, and Simpson against Davis and Moon. Defendants move to dismiss for failure to prove that they are citizens of the state. Mr. Pettit moved the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiffs cannot recover, unless they shall prove that the defendants are citizens of this state.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of James Black and William Secor, involuntary bankrupts. Decree directing the sheriff to pay over to the assignee in bankruptcy the proceeds of a sale on execution against the bankrupts.]

Creditors taking out executions against prop-, erty of debtors not having reasonable cause to believe him insolvent, such executions are valid. A sheriff is entitled to poundage on a levy at the time he makes the levy. [In bankruptcy'. In the matter of James Black and William Secor, involuntary bankrupts.

[In equity. Bill by Charles N. Black, as administrator of Moses Thompson, and Eliza W. Fitzgerald, as administratrix of William P. N. Fitzgerald, against Joseph B. Hubbard and Charles North, for infringement of letters patent No. 12,678, granted to said Thompson, April 10, 1855, and reissued March 31, 1857 (No. 446).

In admiralty. A steward of a ship belonging to Philadelphia, was discharged, for malconduct, at Liverpool, in England, where the vessel had delivered her cargo, and earned her freight, for that section of the voyage. On the ship’s arrival at Philadelphia, he sued for wages during the whole voyage. He alleged that he had been discharged, at the foreign port, without lawful cause.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania. [In bankruptcy. Petition by C. L. Black for leave to issue process from the state court on a judgment entered therein May 6, 1875, on a verdict rendered January 12, 1875, against William H. McClelland, who was adjudicated a bankrupt March 20, 1875. From an order granting the prayer of the petition, the bankrupt appeals.

[In equity. Bills by Charles N. Black, as administrator of Moses Thompson, and Eliza W. Fitzgerald, as administratrix of William P. N. Fitzgerald, against Daniel Munson and Henry Knight, and by the same against Henry F. Wells and others, for infringement of letters patent granted to said Thompson— one, April 10, 1835, numbered 12,678, reissued Mftrch 31, 1857 (No. 446); the other, December 15, 1S57, numbered 18,874r — for improvements in furnaces for burning wet fuel and in…

<p>Case No. 1,464.</p> <p>Executors and Administrators — Demands against Estate — Claim op Ward — Priority— Statute op Wills — Meaning of “Estate”— Lien op Ward — Equitable Conversion.</p> <p>1. The proceeds of the sale of the real estate of J. L., deceased, constituting a very large fund, being in the hands of the federal court, for distribution among his creditors, the executor of W. L. M., a ward of J. L., moved the court for an order that he should receive the amount of the ward’s claim against J. L.’s estate, which had been established by a decree of the court of chancery for the state of Virginia. The fund in possession of the court being inadequate for the payment of all the debts of J. L., deceased, for which his real estate was bound, the executor of the ward claimed the whole amount of the debt due to his testator, both as a creditor by bond (the guardian having given a bond in which his heirs were bound), and by virtue of the acts of assembly of Virginia, in such cases provided. By the law of Virginia, it is provided, that the “estate of a guardian or curator, appointed under this act, not under a specific lien, shall, after the death of such guardian or curator, be liable for whatever may be due from him or her, on account of his or her guardianship, to his or her ward, before any other debt due from him or her” (see act concerning guardians, &c., 1 Rev. Code, c. 108, § 12, p. 408), and that “the executors or administrators of a guardian, of a committee, or of any other person, who shall have been chargeable with, or accountable for the estate of a ward, an idiot, or a lunatic; or the estate of a dead person, committed to their testator or intestate, by a court of record, shall pay so much as shall be due from their testator or intestate, to the ward, idiot, or lunatic, or to the legatees, or persons entitled to distribution, before any proper debt of their testator or intestate” (see act concerning wills, intestacy, and distributions, Id. c. 104, § 60, p. 389). The will of J. L., contained the following clauses: — “In the first place, I desire that all my just debts may be paid, and for this purpose, I subject my whole estate, real and personal. In case it should be necessary for the purpose of paying my debts, to sell any part of my real estate, I give to my executors, after named, the power of so doing,” “and authorize my said executors, or such of them as may act, to make conveyances to the purchaser or purchasers.” “All the rest and residue of my estate, after the payment of my debts and legacies as aforesaid, 1 give to my two children, Andrew and Jane.” The devisees of the residue, were his heirs at law. Held: 1. That the 12th section of the law concerning guardians, &e., and the 60th section of the act concerning wills, &c., having both been passed at the same session of the legislature, and being in pari materia, must be considered in connexion as if they were parts of the same act; that the latter section applies only to executors and administrators, in the administration of the effects of their testator or intestate, that come to their hands in their official character, giving priority to debts due to a ward, an idiot, a lunatic, or the estate of a dead person, &e., over all others, but placing them all on the same footing with reference to each other.</p> <p>2. That the word estate, in the 12th section, concerning guardians. &e., must be construed to apply only to the real estate of the guardian, for if it were applicable to the personalty also, it would give the ward the priority on the personal estate, over persons who are, by the section respecting wills, &c., expressly placed on an equal footing with him. But this act gives the priority to the debt due to the ward, to any bond debt due from the testator or intestate, on his own account.</p> <p>3. But this statute does not create a lien on the lands of the guardian, for that would bind them in the hands of a purchaser. To give it such an interpretation, would violate the general policy of the law, in setting up a secret lien, in restraint of alienations, and is not required, either by the express words of the act, ■or any necessary construction of it. But</p> <p>. 4. Although this act does not create a lien on the guardian’s lands, it does create a liability •of the heir, or devisee, to pay the debt due to the ward on guardianship account, in consideration, and to the amount, of the land descended or devised, and does not merely give the preference to an existing liability. The words in the section, “the estate of a guardian, or curator, appointed under this act, shall be liable, &c.,” although the comma in the printed code, is placed after the word “curator,” must be read as if it was placed after the word “guardian,” so as to bind the lands of all guardians, and not merely “guardians appointed under this act,” or statutory guardians. Thus, the debt due to the ward of a testamentary guardian who was not required to give bond, would as effectually bind his lands in the hands of the heir, or devisee, under this construction of the act, as of a statutory guardian who had given a bond binding his heirs.</p> <p>[See Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. (36 IT. S.) 54; U. S. v. Three Railroad Oars, Case No. 16,-513; U. S. v. Voorliees, 9 Fed. 144; Hammock v. Farmers' Loan ■& Trust Co., 105 U. S. S3.]</p> <p>5. The testator X L., having, by his will, subjected his whole estate to the payment of his debts, (which was a valid devise, sanctioned both by the principles of equity, and the act for the relief of creditors, against fraudulent devises,) and empowered his executors, or such ■of them as might act, to sell his lands, and convey to the purchaser; has converted his whole real estate into equitable assets, subject to the payment of all his debts equally.</p> <p>6. The 12th section of the act concerning guardians, &c., before cited, having declared that “the estate of a guardian, or curator, &c., shall, &c., be liable for whatever may be due from him or her, on account of his or her guardianship, &c., before any other debt, &c.,” although it gives priority, and creates liability, if it did not before exist, can apply only to real estate, in a condition to be reached by other debts. The language of the section is comparative, comparing the charge it creates with other charges, and giving it the priority over them. Before the passage of the act against fraudulent devises, lands devised, were not liable for any debt whatever, and that statute expressly protects devises for the payment of debts, and declares them valid: it protects the trust, and leaves the estate to its operation. The act of assembly applies to legal, and not to equitable assets. Wherever real estate is made equitable assets by the will, the equitable principle must prevail, and the executor of the ward is only entitled, therefore, to his equal proportion of the fund arising from the real estate of X L.</p>

2 [In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. [Suit brought (by Charles N. Black, as administrator of Moses Thompson, and Eliza W. Fitzgerald, as administratrix of William P. N. Fitzgerald, against Samuel Thorne, James McFarlane, and Jonathan Thorne, Jr.) upon two letters patent granted to Moses Thompson: One (No. 12,678) for an “improvement in furnaces for burning wet fuel,” granted April 10, 1855; reissued October 7, 1856, and again March 31, 1857 (No. 446), and…

[In equity. Bill by Charles N. Black, as administrator of Moses Thompson, and Eliza M. Fitzgerald, as administratrix of William P. N. Fitzgerald, against Samuel Thorne, James McFarlane, and Jonathan Thome, Jr., for infringement of letters patent Decree for complainants, and accounting ordered. Case No. 1,465. Defendants except to the master’s report.

In equity. The [defendant] company authorized about four million dollars of bonds to be issued to raise money to. build the road, and executed a mortgage upon all the property in the states of Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee, including about forty-five miles of finished road in Alabama. The loan did not attract the money-lenders, and only 8310,000 of the bonds were actually issued.

In equity. This was a petition for an injunction against Stannard and his assignees, upon the alleged ground that the creditors of Stannard have filed proceedings in the district court against him as a bankrupt, and in this petition, they alleged that he was collecting the debts, and that the other respondents were selling the property put into their hands.

<p>Case Mo. 1,469.</p> <p>Shipping — Damage to Cargo — Negligent Stowage-Evidence.</p> <p>1. A bill of lading for a cask of wine receipted for it “in good order and condition,” and excepted “the dangers of the seas.” On arrival in port, and before being moved from its place in the vessel, it was found to be leaking, with one of its heads crushed in, and a large proportion of the wine had leaked out. In a suit in rem, in admiralty, against the vessel, to recover for the value of the lost wine: Held, the libellant must show negligence in the handling •or stowage of the cask.</p> <p>[Cited in The Pharos, 9 Fed. 914.) .</p> <p>[See Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. (53 U. S.) 2S0; The Sabioncello, Case No. 12,198.)</p> <p>2. The condition of the cask on arrival was prima facie evidence of such negligence.</p> <p>[Cited in The Pharos, 9 Fed. 914.)</p> <p>[See Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. (53 U. S.) 280; English v. Ocean Steam Nav. Co., Case No. 4,490; Bazin v. Steamship Co., Id. 1,152; The Live Yankee, Id. 8,409; The Neptune, Id. 10,118; The Oriflamme, Id. 10,571; The Sabioncello, Id. 12,198; The Compta, Id. 3,069; The Vincenzo T., Id. 16,94S.)</p> <p>3. The vessel must then show that the dam,age was not caused by negligence on the part •of the vessel.</p> <p>[Cited in The Pharos, 9 Fed. 914.)</p> <p>[See Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. (53 U. S.) 280; English v. Ocean Steam Nav. Co., Case No. 4,490; Bazin v. Steamship Co., Id. 1,152; The Live Yankee, Id. 8,409; The Neptune, Id. 10,118; The Sabion-cello, Id. 12,198; The Compta, Id. 3,069; The Vincenzo T., Id. 16,948.)</p> <p>4.General evidence as to proper stowage •and dunnage, in place, does not show that the head was not crushed in, in handling, after the vessel took charge of it.</p> <p>5.Such handling is part of the stowage.</p> <p>6.The vessel was liable for the value of the lost wine.</p>

[In equity. Bill by Ebenezer Blackman and others against Joseph H. Hibbler and others for infringement of letters patent No. 123,325, granted February 6, 1802, to said Blackman, and re-issued December 5, 1876, by the No. 7,417.

In admiralty. Collision — The schooner S. H. Woodbury, coal laden, came in collision with the large screw steamer Blackstone of the Merchants’ Line, between Boston and New York, and was sunk and totally lost at about two o’clock in the afternoon of the twenty-ninth of July last.

<p>' [In chancery. Bill by W. T. Blackwell and J. S. Carr, partners under the style of W. T. Blackwell, against L. L. Armistead to enjoin infringement of a trademark.</p>

[In chancery. Bill by W. T. Blackwell & Co. against W. E. Dibrell & Co. to enjoin the infringement of a trademark. Decree for perpetual injunction and for an accounting.] Some time before the year 1860 the North Carolina Railroad was laid off oyer the farm of Dr. Bartlett, Durham, in Orange county, North Carolina. A station was established there, and called Durham Station.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel for salvage by Jefferson Blagg and others against the steamboat E. M. Bicknell and cargo.</p>

[At law. Action by Blagg against the Phoenix Insurance Company upon a policy of insurance for the cargo of the schooner Splash. Motion by defendants to continue. It appeared that a similar motion had been before four times made, with success. The affidavit stated no precise evidence expected in consequence of their commission to the Spanish Main, but, generally, that they expected to obtain material evidence under it: this had been before sworn to.

[At law. Action by Benjamin Blagge against Sarah B. Miles. This was a writ of entry, in which the demandant claimed the demanded premises as grandson and heir of Sarah Blagge. Held: that the power was not executed. His language is: “The words are not a specific description of any estate, or of any species of interest, but adapted to comprehend every thing, which was, and to exclude every thing, which was not a part of her property.

[At law. Action by Blagg against the Phoenix Insurance Company upon a policy of insurance for the cargo of the schooner Splash. Verdict was given for plaintiff. Case No. 1,477. The hearing is now upon a] rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Brice N. Blair and Thomas Appleby, trading as Blair & Appleby. On petition of Detwiler & Co. and others. Heard on exceptions to the register’s report. On exceptions to the register’s report.

<p>Case No. 1,482.</p>

[In error to the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri.] This was an ordinary action at law by the plaintiff [Joseph H. Blair], as assignee in bankruptcy of one Husbands, under, section 35 of the bankrupt act,' to recover the sum of $1,600, alleged to have been paid to the defendant [Gerard B. Allen] or for his benefit by the bankrupt in violation of the provisions of that enactment.

[At law. Action by James A. Blair against the First National Bank of Mansfield upon a promissory note. Hearings upon demurrer to defendant’s answer. Demurrer sustained. Charge to jury. Verdict for plaintiff, and motion for new trial.

<p>Case No. 1,486.</p> <p>Courts — Jurisdiction—Citizenship —Removal to Another State — Domicile.</p> <p>The plaintiff, having left Cincinnati in 1856, with the purpose of permanently residing in Chicago, and having resided there till 1859, in the meantime exercising the right of voting in Illinois, was a citizen of that state in 1858, when this suit was brought, and had a right to sue in this court, though he afterward returned to Cincinnati. The fact, that his wife and younger children remained at Cincinnati did not, under the circumstances of this case, prevent the plaintiff from becoming a citizen of Illinois.</p> <p>[See Cooper v. Galbraith, Case No. 3,193.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Alvah Blaisdell and others.] In this case one of the bankrupts having applied for his discharge, his petition was referred to the register. The register gave him duplicate lists of the creditors who have proved their debts, one of which he left with the assignee to be certified as correct by him. The assignee having failed to do so, the bankrupt obtained from the register an order that the assignee show cause why he should not sign the lists.

<p>[In equity. Bill by John H. Blaisdell against Gustavus D. Dows for infringement of letters patent.</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by John H. Blaisdell against Calvin D. Puffer for infringement of letters patent.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,491.</p> <p>Patents — Soda-Water Apparatus.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 40,811, granted to John H. Blaisdell, December 8th, 1863, for an improvement in soda-water apparatus, in view of the state of the art, held valid.</p> <p>[NOTE. Patent No. 40,811 was granted to J. H. Blaisdell, December 8, 1863. Por other cases involving this patent, see Blaisdell v. Dows. Case No. 1,489; Blaisdell v. Puffer, Id. 1,490.]</p>

In bankruptcy. This was a case of involuntary bankruptcy. Adjudication was made June 10th, 1868.

<p>[In equity. Reargument of motion to appoint a receiver of defendant, a bankrupt-</p>

[In equity. Bill by Charles F. Blake and others against Elizabeth E. Boisselier and others for infringement of letters patent. Heard on motion for a preliminary injunction.

In equity. This was a bill in equity [by Blake and others against the Eagle Works Manufacturing Company] to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent for an “improved machine for breaking stones” .granted to Eli W. Blake June 15, 1858, and re-issued January 9, 1866. The facts and the claims in the patent appear in the opinion, .and are also fully stated in Blake v. Stafford [Case No. 1,504].

At law. This was an action of assump-sit [by Blake against the city of Elizabeth] to recover an amount claimed for services and disbursement by the plaintiff, as an attorney at law. It was tried Oct. 13,1879, before Judge Nixon and a jury, and resulted in a verdict of $6,103.32 for the plaintiff.

<p>[In equity. Action by Eli W. Blake against the Greenwood Cemetery for infringement of a patent.</p>

At law. Action to recover back from a collector of internal revenue in this district money paid under protest as a succession tax under the act of June 30. 1804 [13 Stat. 223]. The case was submitted upon the following agreed statement of facts.

[In equity. Bill by Eli W. Blake and others against George W. Iiawson for infringement of letters patent] Final hearing upon pleadings and proofs. 2 [This suit was brought upon letters patent for “improvement in machinery for breaking stone,” granted Eli W. Blake, June 15, 1858, and reissued January 9, 1866. The patent had been previously sustained.

[In equity. Bill bj- Eli W. Blake against John Robertson and others for infringement of letters patent.] Motion for provisional injunction. Suit brought on reissued letters patent granted Eli W. Blake, January 9, 1866, for “improvement in machinery for crushing stones,” as a reissue of the patent originally granted him, June 15, 1853. The patent had been extended after a vigorous opposition, and had been sustained by several adjudications in the courts.

<p>[In equity. Bill by Eli W. Blake against John Robertson and others to enjoin infringement of patent.</p>

[At law. Action by Philos Blake and others against Walter M. Smith for infringement of patent. Verdict for defendant. Plaintiffs move, on exceptions taken at trial, to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial.

At law. This was an action [by Philos Blake and others against Alvin Sperry] for an alleged violation of a patent, by the manufacture and sale by the defendant of a specific quantity of the articles which the patentee claimed the exclusive right to manufacture and sell.

This was an action at law [by Eli W. Blake against Charles W. Stafford], for the infringement of reissued letters patent granted to the plaintiff, January 9th, 1866, for an “improvement in machinery for breaking stones,” on the surrender of original letters patent, granted to him as inventor, June 15th, 1S58.

In equity. Motion for a preliminary injunction on bill of complaint and accompanying affidavits, to restrain the defendants from an alleged infringement of a patent for a stone crusher. The affidavits were made, some in Connecticut and some in Pennsylvania, and were all sworn to before notaries public. They were all made before this suit was commenced.

At law. This was an action [by Thomas Blanchard against Philo S. Beers and Albert Goodyear] for the infringement of letters patent granted to Thomas Blanchard, January 20th, 1820, for “a machine for turning and cutting irregular forms.” The history of the patent and a copy of its specification are set forth in 1 Blatchf. 258, 259, 201-269 [Blanchard’s Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, Case No. 1,521].

This cause coming before a jury which had been struck on both sides, Mr. Hirst asked permission to make two more peremptory challenges, in the way allowed in the state courts under the act of their legislature (Act April 4, 1809, § 2) which provides “that in all civil suits each party shall be allowed to challenge two jurors peremptorily.” He said that the state practice had been uniformly adhered to in this court for twenty years; a statement in which Mr. Randall and other…

<p>[In admiralty. Attachment issued against the ship Cavalier on a libel by Alfred Blanchard and others for possession. Notice was to have been given to all persons claiming the ship, but no person or party was designated to whom such notice should be given. Messrs. Snow & Burgess move to discharge the attachment for irregularity in not having been taken out against them and served on them specifically by name.</p> <p>The libel is averred to be “in a cause of possession civil and maritime,” and alleges that the libelants are owners of the ship by purchase at a marshal’s sale, and that ever since such purchase possession thereof has been wrongfully withheld from them by Snow & Burgess, of this city, on the pretence of having some claim or interest in her, as owners or otherwise.</p>

[In equity. Suit by Thomas Blanchard against Eldridge for infringement of complainant’s patent for a machine for turning irregular forms. Decree for complainant. Defendant’s motion for a new trial denied. Blanchard v. Eldridge, Case No. 1,510. Plaintiff now moves for attachment against defendant for breach of injunction.

At law. Thomas Blanchard had brought a suit, in his own name, at law, and recovered damages for an infringement of a patent he had obtained for turning every kind of irregular forms. [Defendant moves for a new trial.

In admiralty. This case [by Amos Blanchard against Thomas Haven and others] came on to be heard upon a statement of facts-agreed by the parties as follows. On the 7th of 'November, 1814, the plaintiff entered as prize master on board the privateer Macedonian of Portsmouth, Penn Townsend commander. The agreement between the owners, officers, and crew, contained among others the following articles; viz. “Art. 5. That the cruise shall be where the owners may direct.

This was a bill in equity [by Thomas Blanchard against John Haynes], praying an injunction to restrain the defendant from using a certain last machine built by him, and which was alleged to run in violation of the plaintiff’s patent. [Injunction granted.] The plaintiff was the inventor and patentee oc the celebrated machine for turning irregular forms, long extensively used in this country.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine.] This was an admiralty appeal. The libel [by Alfred Blanchard and others] was filed to try the title to one-fourth part of the brig Martha Washington. Answers were made by William Anderson as master and part owner, by Phebe J. Flood, Amos D. Dol-liver, George H. Coggins, Jacob Anderson, and Ferdinand McFarland.

At law. - This was an action on the case [by Alonzo V. Blanchard, John D. Blanchard, and Franklin Blanchard against Antoine Puttman, Conrad Weaver, and John Bittin-ger], tried before the court and a jury, for the infringement of letters patent [No. 6,951] for an “improvement in bending wood,” granted to Thomas Blanchard, December 18, 1849, reissued [No. 853] November 15, 1859, and extended December 18, 1863. [Verdict for defendants.] The material portions of the…

In equity. This was a motion [by Thomas Blanchard] for a provisional injunction to restrain the defendants [Biddle Beeves, Charles Beeves, Isaac B. Eldridge, and others] from infringing upon letters patent granted to Thomas Blanchard, January 20, 1820, for “a machine for turning and cutting irregular forms,” and extended, by act of congress for fourteen years from the expiration of the first term.

This was a bill in equity brought by [Thomas] Blanchard, who was a citizen of Massachusetts, against [Chandler] Sprague, who was a citizen of the same state. The bill charged the respondent with the infringement of certain patent rights owned by the complainant, and prayed for an account and for an injunction.

At l<aw. Case [by Thomas Blanchard against Chandler Sprague] for the infringement of the patent right of the plaintiff, secured to him by act of congress of the 30th of June, 1S34 [6 Stat. 5S9, c. 213]. flea, the general issue.

At law. Case [by Thomas Blanchard against Chandler Sprague] for violation of a patent right. An action between the same parties for an alleged violation of a patent under the act of congress of 1834, c. 213 [6 Stat. 589], was dismissed at a former term. See 3 Sumn. 279 [Blanchard v. Sprague, Case No. 1,517]. Since then a new grant of letters patent was made by act of congress of 1839, c. 14 [6 Stat. 748], under which the present action was brought.

In equity. This was a motion for a provisional injunction, to restrain [Eli Whitney from] the infringement of letters patent granted to Thomas Blanchard, September 6th, 1819, for “a machine for turning and cutting irregular forms.” By an act of congress, passed February Cth, 1839 (6 Stat. 748), the patent was extended for fourteen years from the 20th of January, 1834.

<p>Case No. 1,520.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement—Trial—Instructions— New Trial — Weight op Evidence.</p> <p>1. The rule that the verdict of a jury will not be set aside where evidence was given on both sides, and there was no misdirection as to the law, is applicable to an action on the case for the infringement of a patent.</p> <p>[See Stanley v. Whipple, Case No. 13,2S6.]</p> <p>2. Where, in such an action, it was submitted to the jury, as a question of fact, -whether the defendant was concerned in using the infringing machine, or was merely a purchaser of the articles manufactured by it, and the jury, having been instructed that the defendant was not liable if he was only the purchaser of the articles after they were manufactured, found for the plaintiff: if old that, as there was evidence on both sides of the question, and the verdict was not clearly against the weight of evidence, it must stand.</p> <p>[Cited in Bust v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 24 Fed. 189.]</p> <p>[See Blagg v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Case No. 1,478.]</p> <p>[3. The purchaser of patented articles from an infringer is not liable as an infringer.]</p> <p>[See Goodyear v. Central R. Co., Case No. 5,563.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Por other cases involving this patent, see note at end of Blanchard v. Reeves, Case No. 1,515, and note at end of Blanchard’s Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, Id.</p>

At law. This was an action on the case [Blanchard’s Gun-Stock Turning Factory against Norman Warner] for the infringement of letters patent granted to Thomas Blanchard for “a machine for turning and cutting irregular forms.” The original patent was granted September 6th, 1819; but, it being deemed inoperative by reason of a defective specification, a new patent was granted for the invention, on the 20th of January, 1820, for 14 years from the latter day.

[In admiralty. Libels by Francis Markee and Lewis W. Phillips against the steamboat Blanche Page (Edward Moran, claimant) for negligently causing the loss of the canal boat Hays and the canal boat Cornelius Haggerty.

[In admiralty. The executions issued on the summary judgment in the cause of The Blanche Page, Case No. 1,523, having been returned by the marshal wholly unsatisfied, libellants move for an examination of James C. Hartt and Edward Godfrey concerning their property with a view to its sequestration, and for punishment for contempt. [For opinion granting motion for judgment against the sureties’ bond on appeal to the circuit court, see The Blanche Page, Case No. 1,525.]

At law. This was an action of assumpsit [J. B. Bland against the Southern Express Company] for the value of certain shipments, chiefly of bulky produce, made under the circumstances detailed by the court in its written decision. There was a trial by jury, and a verdict for plaintiffs. A motion for a new trial was introduced.

[In admiralty. Motion by libellants in the cause of The Blanche Page, Case No. 1,523, for judgment against sureties on claimant’s bond on appeal to the circuit court after af-firmance by such court.

Bankruptcy. This was a petition by the wife of [E. G. Blandin] the bankrupt for the allowance of a claim against his estate for property lent by her to him, with a promise made by him at the time of the loan that he would repay her. The property consisted of stock and money in savings banks to the amount of two thousand dollars, which the wife received as a distributive share from her mother's estate.

In equity. This was a bill in equity [by Henry and Frederick J. L. Blandy] filed to restrain the defendants [Thomas Griffith and Francis Wedge] from infringing letters patent [No. 21,059] for “an improvement in steam engines,” granted to complainants August 3, 185S. The invention consisted of a hollow bed plate, substantially in the form of an eight inch pipe, about eight feet in length, which was attached by feet or saddles to the side of the boiler of a portable engine.

In equity. This was a hearing upon a petition, in behalf of the defendants in the original suit, for leave to file a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review. The original suit was [by Henry and Frederick J. L. Blandy against Thomas Griffith and Francis Wedge] upon letters patent for an •“improvement in steam-engines,” granted complainants August 3,1858. Judgment was rendered in favor of complainants in September, 18G9.

At law. This was an action of debt, on a bond with collateral condition, brought by Thomas Blane, the obligee, in his own name, against William Drummond, one of the ob-ligors.

In equity. The complainant in this case— an equity bill, praying an injunction and account of profits — was the assignee of one [William B.] Sickles, to whom a patent [No. 2,631] had been granted. The bill charged that the validity of the patent had been put in issue in a suit at common law, between Sickles and one Rodman, of which it gave an account, and its validity established by a verdict for the patentee. It charged also that the defendants were infringing the patent.

A sale of land free from incumbrances, does not pass to the purchaser the bankrupt's right to any portion of the growing crops thereon, stipulated to be paid him by way of rent.

At law. This was an action of covenant upon articles of agreement, bearing date the 15th of November, 1804, entered into between these parties, whereby the defendant covenanted, amongst other things, to repay to Bleecker the amount of two notes, for 1250 dollars each, and the amount of an unliqui-dated account, when the same should be liquidated, forthwith, after Bond should obtain, or be in a legal capacity to obtain the lawful possession of about 700,000 acres of land in…

<p>Case No. 1,535.</p> <p>Execution — Death of Partt after Fieri Fa-cias — Venditioni Exponas — Security to Save Issue of — Breach of Condition — Return of Security.</p> <p>1. In Pennsylvania, the death of either of the parties after a fieri facias issued, does not prevent the venditioni exponas from issuing immediately upon the return of the fieri facias, levied on land, and the same condemned. A scire facias is not necessary.</p> <p>[See Taylor v. Miller, 13 How. (54 TJ. S.) 287; Wilson v. Hurst, Case No. 17,808.]</p> <p>2. The agreement of the plaintiff to receive certain securities for the debt, and to give time on their being certified in a particular way, being conditional, and the condition not being performed, the plaintiff might proceed with his execution, though he had not returned the securities.</p> <p>[For trial and verdict in this case, see Case No. 1,534. For subsequent proceedings after sale on venditioni exponas, see Id. 1,536.]</p>

At law. Rule upon the marshal, at the instance of the administrator of Bond, to bring the residue of the money in his hands into court The case is as follows. Under a venditioni exponas, which issued in this-cause, all the real estate of which Bond died seised, and which had been levied upon by virtue of the writ of fieri facias, was sold by the marshal, to satisfy the judgment under which the process issued.

<p>Case No. 1,538..</p> <p>Prize — Vessel and Cargo Condemned for a Violation of the Blockade.</p> <p>[A vessel with a British registry, flying the British flag, but having a Confederate flag on board, owned by her master, who, with a majority of the crew, were British subjects, and laden with a general cargo from Nassau, where the cargo was owned, cleared for St Johns, but proceeded to Wilmington, N. C., and, on attempting to enter that port, was captured. The master and crew had previously run the blockade, and knew of its existence. Held, that the circumstances justified the condemnation and forfeiture of the vessel and cargo.]</p>

<p>[At law. Action by Bleeker against O. M. Hyde for goods sold on faith of a letter of credit</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by John S. Barnard against the British bark Blenheim for a quantity of flour taken on board by mistake, and not accotmted for to the libellant (Peter Iredale and others claimants).

In bankruptcy. On the 22d June, 1842, the administrator of Peter Blight, deceased, who had been decreed a bankrupt, under the act of congress, of [April 4]… Held: that in the ease of an insolvent debtor, the presumption that all his debts were paid, arose after a lapse of fourteen years. See Judge Rogers’ charge to the jury, page 267, confirmed by the court on page 278. In many of the cases here, no doubt, a right to the dividend had been lost by the statute of limitations.

This was a special action on the case [by Deborah Blight, executrix of George Blight, deceased, against Ashley, Fisher, and Bay-ard, assignees of Peter Blight, a bankrupt]. The declaration contained four special counts, and two general counts, for money lent, and for money had and received.

This was a motion made on the .part of the defendants [by Ashley, Fisher, and Bayard, assignees of Peter Blight, a bankrupt) to dismiss this suit and for an attachment against the plaintiff [Deborah Blight, executrix of George Blight, deceased) for a contempt, in having had a summons served upon them in April, 1808, whilst they were attending at the court, in a suit in which they were plaintiffs against the present plaintiff.

<p>In bankruptcy. In this case, the register certified to the court the question whether, if he was satisfied that the bankrupt [Augustus A. Bliss] had, through his friends, chosen an assignee in his own interest, he should certify his opinion and the grounds of it to the court.</p>

[In equity. This was a bill in equity, brought [by William H. Bliss] to restrain the defendant from infringing letters patent for an “improvement in hose-couplings,” granted to Robert Lawson and William H. Bliss, February 22, 1859, and reissued to plaintiff December 21, 1809, and referred to more particularly in the report of the case of Bliss v. Haight [Case No. 1,548].

[In equity.] Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit [by William H. Bliss against the city of Brooklyn] brought on reissued letters patent for “improvement in hose-couplings” [No. 3,768], granted William H. Bliss, December 21, 1869, as a reissue of the patent originally granted to Robert B. Lawton and William H. Bliss, February 22, 1859 [No. 23,033].

<p>Case No. 1,545.</p> <p>Costs — Security for — Dilatory Motion.</p> <p>When a suit in equity has been once heard, on issue joined, and is opened for a further hearing, on an amended answer only as a matter of favor, it is too late to move for security for costs on the ground of the non-residence of the plaintiff, that having appeared on the face of the original bill.</p> <p>[Cited in Southwestern Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Louisiana Electric Light Co., 45 Fed. 896.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For other cases involving the patent in this suit, see note to Bliss v. Haight, Case No. 1,548.]</p>

[In equity. Suit by William H. Bliss against the Gaylord Patent Coupling & Manufacturing Company and others to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 23,033, granted to complainant and Robert B. Law-ton, February 22, 1859, and reissued to complainant December 21, 1869, for an improvement in hose couplings.

In equity. The bill in this case was founded on two letters patent. One [No. 23.033] of them was granted on the 22d of February, 1859, to Robert B. Lawton and the plaintiff [William H. Bliss], for an “improvement in hose coupling,” and Lawton’s interest in it was assigned by him to the plaintiff on the 2d of June, I860 [and reissued to him December 21, 1S69 (No. 3,76S)].

<p>These were actions brought [by Ira Bliss against H. X Redfield, same against Augustus Schell, Septimus Crook against Greene C. Bronsen, and same against H. X Redfield,] to recover an excess of duty paid on railroad iron imported to the port of New York from Cardiff and Newport in Wales, via Liverpool and London.</p> <p>It appeared in evidence that the appraisers at the custom house, under instructions from the secretary of the treasury, added to the market value of all railroad iron coming from Wales by way of Liverpool and London, 7s. 6d. sterling per ton, as freights or cost of transporting the iron from Wales tó Liverpool or London, to make up the dutiable value at London, at the period of the exportation. It also appeared that railway iron is always bought and sold at a price free on board in Wales, and is always a rule so quoted in the circulars and prices current of Great Britain. It further appeared that the iron in question was shipped at Cardiff or Newport, in Wales, for Liverpool or London, it was, in fact, destined to New York;, and only went by way of Liverpool or London as a matter of convenience to the importer, on account of the want of vessels at Cardiff or Newport bound for New York.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,551.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Composition—Objections to Vote —When to be Taken — Confirmation—Reversion of Profertt to Bankrupt — Prior Wrongful Act of Bankrupt — Effect.</p> <p>1. Objections to the vote of a creditor upon a resolution of composition, on the ground that his claim is fictitious or invalid, should be made at the first meeting and before the vote is taken; or if the facts impeaching its validity are aft-erwards discovered, application should be promptly made for relief; such objections cannot be raised for the first time upon a motion for confirmation.</p> <p>2. The composition was for twenty-five per cent., payable five cents cash in five days after confirmation, and ten cents at the end of three and six months each from the same date. The resolution provided that upon payment of the five cents the property should revert to the debt- or. It appeared that the bankrupts had, with a full knowledge of the wrongful nature of their act, used moneys belonging to a creditor, without his consent, which they had deposited in bank in their own name as a special deposit for him. Held, that the arrangement was not judicious nor reasonably safe for the creditors. A person proved once to have misappropriated the funds of another, fully understanding the wrongful character of the act, is unfit to be trustee of property for the benefit of his creditors.</p> <p>[Cited in Re McNab & Harlin Manuf’g Co., Case No. 8,906.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,550.</p> <p>Removal op Causes — Foreign Corporation.</p> <p>Where, in a ease removed into this court, under the Í2th section of the judiciary act of September 24th, 1789 (1 Stat 79), the defendant is a foreign corporation, this court has jurisdiction of the case, although no suit can be commenced in this court by original process against a foreign corporation.</p> <p>[Cited in Winans v. McKean R. & Nav. Co., Case No. 17,862; Sands v. Smith, Id. 12,305; Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 45S, 7 Sup. Ct. G37.]</p> <p>[See Barney v. Globe Bank, Case No. 1,031; Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., Id. 12,421; Clarke v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., Id. 2,859.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For further litigation between the same parties, see Cases Nos. 10,156 and 10,157; 23 How. (64 U. S.) 420.]</p>

In bankruptcy. On the petition of Constant C. Pond, a creditor, on whose petition the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced, for the removal of David B. Hibbard, Jr., as assignee. Answer was put in by the as-signee substantially denying the allegations of the petition, and proofs have been taken before Register Eugene Pringle, to whom it was referred for that purpose.

In bankruptcy. This was on petition of Daniel B. Hibbard, Jr., assignee, for a decision add determination of claims of exemption by the bankrupts out of partnership property. The answers of the bankrupts need proofs. The claims of exemption are, first, of a separate exemption to each individual member of the firm, out of the partnership stock, of two hundred and fifty dollars in value; or, if not so entitled, then, second, of an exemption of a like amount to the firm as such.

In admiralty. The brig Blohm, a Hamburg vessel, shipped a crew in Hamburg for a voyage to New York and back, at various rates of wages, payable in marks courant. After the vessel had arrived in New York, the second mate left her, and one of the crew, named Struck, was appointed second mate in his place, and another sailor, named Ter-nan, was shipped to supply Struck’s place.

An involuntary petition in bankruptcy [against Erastus S.'Bloom] was filed in this case on the 10th of April, 1877, the alleged bankrupt having previously, to wit, on the 10th of February, 1877, made a voluntary assignment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors under the state assignment law. AH of his available assets consisted of a stock of goods, such as are usually found in a country drug store.

In equity. This was a bill in equity filed [by Elisha Bloomer against Thomas Gilpin and Joseph H. Gilpin] to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent for “improvements in planing and tonguing and grooving machines,” granted to William Woodworth, December 27, 1S2S, and more particularly referred to in the case of Foss v. Herbert [Case No. 4,957].

[In equity. Bill by Elisha Bloomer, assig-nee of letters patent granted to William W. Woodworth, December 27, 1S28, extended November 15, 1842, and reissued to William Woodworth, administrator, etc., July 8, 1845 (No. 711,' against John H. Stolley, for infringement. Defendant moves to vacate an injunction granted in vacation.

In bankruptcy. On filing the petition of adjudication of bankruptcy, a petition was filed and an injunction was allowed against one Charles E. Bloss, a son of the alleged bankrupt, to restrain the sale of certain real estate upon an execution in favor of the said Charles E., and against the said alleged bankrupt, issued from the circuit court for Wayne county, for the reason, as alleged in said petition, that the judgment upon which the execution issued was obtained by…

[At law. Action by the Blossburg & Coming Railroad Company against the Tioga Railroad Company.] This case came up on a demurrer to a surrejoinder.

In admiralty. This suit was instituted for the recovery of damages occasioned by a collision, on the 19th day of December, 1843, at sea, in the night, a few miles off Sandy Hook, between the schooner Harriet Smith, owned by the libellant, and the pilot-boat Blossom, owned by the claimants.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. This was a libel in person-am [by Benjamin Blossom and Charles J. Blossom against Jonas Smith and Paul Hulse], filed in the district court, to recover the value of a quantity of resin. After a' decree in that court in favor of the libel-lants [Case No. 1,500], the respondents appealed to this court.

[In admiralty. Libel in personam by Benjamin Blossom and Charles J. Blossom against Jonas Smith and Paul Hulse to recover the value of 69 barrels of resin consigned to libelants.

In equity. The bill states that the female plaintiff [wife of Blount] is the daughter of Daniel P. Knight, formerly of Philadelphia county, who, on the 22d of April, ISOS, conveyed to James Darrach, Thomas Bioren, and John Bioren, a certain real estate in trust for himself for life, and after his death, to the use of his said daughter in fee tail; and in default of issue, to the use of the children of Michael Knight, and his sister Elizabeth, as tenants in common in tail;…

<p>In admiralty.</p> <p>[See Neidlinger v. Insurance Co. of North America, Case No. 10,086, for decision of a case arising out of substantially the same state of facts.]</p>

At law. Assumpsit upon the defendant’s promissory note, payable in twelve months with interest. The declaration omitted the words “with interest.” was permitted, after offering the note in evidence, and after objection to its going to the jury on account of the indorsement of the plaintiff, to strike out the indorsements.

[Appeal from the district court.) In bankruptcy. It appears from the record in this case that [bankrupt) the Blue Ridge Railroad Company is a corporation under the laws of South Carolina, and that on the 20th of April, 1S54, it executed a mortgage of all its property whatsoever to certain persons therein mentioned to secure the payment of certain bonds named in said mortgage and the interest thereon to accrue.

<p>|In admiralty. Libel by Henry Blukeman against the steamboat Pacific.</p>

<p>[On habeas corpus. Petition by Godcho Blum for discharge from imprisonment other than as a prisoner of war.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Louisiana. [In admiralty. Libel by Blum, Frank & Co. against the steamer Caddo for failure to deliver goods shipped.

<p>Case No. 1,574.</p> <p>Liability of Sleeping Car Companies for Money Lost — Sleeping Car Company not Liable as a Common Carrier.</p> <p>Neither as a common carrier nor as an innkeeper is a sleeping car company responsible. It must not only furnish a berth to its guests, but keep a watch during the night, exclude unauthorized persons from the car and take reasonable care towards preventing thefts. If loss should occur by reason of negligence in this regard, the company is liable for such articles as are usually carried by a passenger about his person, and such a sum as may be deemed reasonably necessary for traveling expenses.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for $100.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Isaac Blumenthal. Heard on application for discharge.</p> <p>The discharge was subsequently granted. In re Blumenthal, Case No. 1,576.]</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Isaac Blumenthal. A discharge was heretofore denied. Case No. 1,575. The cause is now heard upon further proof.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,577.</p> <p>Salvage — Bt Pilots — Towing Vessel in Distress.</p> <p>[1. Pilots conducting into port vessels in distress or in apprehension thereof are entitled to salvage compensation therefor.]</p> <p>[2. Towing into port a vessel in peril and distress, and unable herself to reach a place of safety, is salvage service.]</p>

Case for maliciously arresting the plaintiff and holding him to bail in a civil action, in the sum of $10,000. Plea not guilty. At the trial the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and $2,000 damages.

[At law. Qui tarn action by Edmund M. Blunt against Richard Patten to recover the penalty for an infringement of copyright. Verdict for plaintiff. For bill in equity to restrain infringement, see Case No. 1,580.] This action was brought for a breach of copyright.

<p>Case No. 1,680.</p> <p>Coptright — What Subject to — Infringement— Question por Jury — Injunction — Action at Law.</p> <p>1. The natural objects from which a chart is made, being open to the examination of all, a copyright cannot subsist in a chart as a general subject.</p> <p>[Cited in Johnson v. Donaldson, 3 Fed. 25; Chapman v. Ferry, 18 Fed. 54l.]</p> <p>2. A right in such a subject is violated only when another copies from the chart of him who has secured the copyright, and thereby avails himself of his labor and skill.</p> <p>3. In all such cases, it is a proper question for a jury whether the one is a copy of the other or not. And if there is some small variance, it would be a proper subject of inquiry whether the alteration were not merely colorable.</p> <p>[Cited in Johnson v. Donaldson, 3 Fed. 25; Chapman v. Ferry, 18 Fed. 541.]</p> <p>4.If it is doubtful whether or not there has been an infringement, an injunction will not be granted in the first instance; but a trial at law will be directed.</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Minnesota.] The government has brought numerous civil suits in the nature of trover to recover the value of pine saw-logs cut upon the public lands by the defendants [E. F. Bly, B. F. Hartley, and others] or their vendors, and which, before the suits were commenced, had been rafted and brought down into the booms at Minneapolis, Brainerd, and other places.

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiff [Richard i\ Blydenburgh] as administrator of Jesse Smith, to recover $1,000 received by [George Lowry] the defendant to the use of the estate of Jesse Smith, in the lifetime of a previous administrator who obtained his letters of administration in Philadelphia, where the intestate died.

This was an action [by Blydenburgh and Burns] to recover damages from the defendant, for not delivering a quantity of coffee agreeably to a contract between him and the plaintiffs, through the agency of Joshua Percival, a regular broker employed by the plaintiffs.

This was a hearing, upon habeas corpus. It appeared that William Cummines, Jr., had, with the knowledge, if not with the assent, of his father, who resided in Pennsylvania, been apprenticed to the claimant [James M. Boaler] under the Delaware act of 5th February, 1S27 (Rev. Laws Del. 1S52, p. 224), which provides that minors over fourteen years of age, and not having parents or guardian within the state of Delaware, may validly apprentice themselves till the age of…

<p>Case No. 1,585.</p> <p>Salvage — What Constitutes — Vessel Aground —Use of Tackle — Tender—When a Bar.</p> <p>[1. Rescuing a stranded vessel from impending peril is a salvage service, though the service was not indispensable nor attended with danger.]</p> <p>[2. Giving the benefit of skill and experience and other incidental acts of relief may constitute a salvage service, though there is no actual labor or effort.]</p> <p>[3. Employment of wrecking tackle, under an agreement to arbitrate the value of services rendered, is a salvage service, and not a hiring of the articles on a quantum meruit.]</p> <p>[4. The tender of adequate compensation for salvage service, without deposit in court before answer, is no bar to an action for such service.!</p>

[In equity. Bill by the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America against Samuel S. McMaster, administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of Anne P. White, to enforce the payment of a bequest.

<p>Case No. 1,688.</p> <p>Carriers’ Liability — Goons Damaged bt Sea Perils — Refusal of Consignees to Accept.</p> <p>Where wool arrived damaged; and in a perishing condition, from causes for which the carrier was not responsible, and the consignees declined to receive it, and it was subsequently sold by the carrier to prevent its perishing on his hands: Held, that the carrier’s duty and liability terminated on the discharge of the wool, and reasonable notice and opportunity given to the consignees to take it away. He thenceforth became a compulsory bailee of the goods, bound only to such reasonable care as a prudent and honest man would take of property of which he has become the involuntary custodian.</p>

[At law. Actions on a bail bond, by Boby-shall and Sower against Oppenheimer, and by the same as assignees of the marshal against Oppenheimer. For further proceedings, see Cases Nos. 1,590-1,592.) The first of these cases came on upon a rule to show cause why an exoneretur should not be entered upon the bail piece; and the second, to show cause why the writ should not be dismissed with costs.

[At law. Action on a bail bond by Boby-shall and Sower against Oppenheimer. For prior proceedings, see Case No. 1,589.] After the discharge of the two former rules, —4 Wash. C. C. 317 [Case No. 1,589,], — Phillips entered a rule upon the plaintiff to show cause, why proceedings should not be staid on the bail bond, on payment of costs, and confession of judgment by the principal.

[At law. Action on a bail bond by Boby-shall and Sower, assignees of the marshal, against Oppenheimer, Hyneman, Levy, and Morris. Por prior proceedings, see Cases Nos. 1,589 and 1,590.] This was an action of debt brought upon' the bail bond given for the appearance of Oppenheimer, and assigned by the marshal to the plaintiff. See 4 Wash. C. C. 333 [Case No. 1,590]. The defendants plead comperuit ad diem.

[At law. Actions on bail bonds by Boby-sball and Sower against Oppenheimer, and by the same against Oppenheimer and his sureties. For prior proceedings, see Cases Nos. 1,589-1,591.] These causes came before the court upon rules to show cause why the proceedings in both should not be stayed, and the causes dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and why the writ of inquiry, and all proceedings under it, in the first case, should not be quashed.

[At law. Actions by William Bockee against William B. Crosby, tenant, and by the same against Beekman and wife, for the recovery of lands. Heard on demurrer to a plea in abatement.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Simon Bodenheim and Jacob Adler. The bankrupts applied for discharge, which the register refused. Heard on exceptions to the register’s ruling. Register McKee certified to the court that the following question under the following stated facts qrose in this case and is pertinent to the issue, and at the request of Messrs. Adams & Speed, attorneys for bankrupt, is certified to the Hon. District Judge for his decision.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of Florida. [In admiralty. Libel by I. Bodin and others, owners of the bark Marie, against the bark Thule, for collision. cited: The Louisiana, 3 Wall. [70 U. S.] 164; The Merrimac, 14 Wall. [SI U. S.] 199. cited: The Morning Light, 2 Wall. [69 U. S.] 550; The Great Republic, 23 Wall. [90 U. S.] 20; Owners of the James Gray v. Owners of the John Fraser, 21 How. [62 U. S.] 184.

[On habeas corpus. In the matter of Robert D. Bogart. A writ of habeas corpus having been issued and duly served upon Thomas O. Sel-fridge. in pursuance of the prayer of a petition filed on behalf of Robert D. Bogart, under the act of congress of February 5, 1867 (14 Stat. 385), the respondent produced the body of said Bogart, and made a return to the writ, in which he states, that he, Thomas O. Selfridge, is a duly appointed and acting rear admiral in the navy of the United…

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by John Bogart and others against the steamboat John Jay, her tackle, etc. (George Logan, claimant).</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Henry Bogert and Robert D. Evans. Heard on the register’s certificate, which was as follows:] In this cause now pending before me at chambers of this court, the petitioners have been adjudicated bankrupts. There are some thirty creditors, nearly half of whom have proved their claims.

[In bankruptcy. Iu the matter of John B. Bogert and Cornelius Oakley, Jr. Heard on the register’s certificate, which was as follows:] The undersigned, one of the registers in bankruptcy, hereby certifies to this honorable court, that, at the first meeting of creditors, objections were made to the following proofs by Mr. Ira O. Miller, of counsel for J. & D. J. Stewart, two of the creditors, to wit: Kate B. Bogert.$ 7,456 88 E. A. Bogert. 4,979 51 John Y. Bogert.;. 56,939 08…

<p>Case No. 1,599.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Powers op Register — Employment of Watchman to Guard Property.</p> <p>The bankrupts surrendered their property to the register, who appointed a watchman to guard and keep it, and submitted a report of his action to the district judge for approval, who ordered United States commissioner to take testimony as to the facts.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Carow, Case No. 2,426; Re Brinkman, Id. 1,884.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Walter D. C. Boggs against the brig Loutra for alleged salvage services. The brig was a Portuguese vessel of about 100 tons burden, found by the steam tug Huntress, on the 15th of January last 15 or 20 miles below Sandy Hook light, on the coast, with a signal up for a pilot. The tug took her in tow and brought her into this harbor, without injury or exposure to the tug or her crew, within a period of 3 to 5 hours.

This was an application on the part of the complainant, George Boggs, for leave to file in this court a transcript of the record in this case, from the superior court of Cook county. [Application denied.] On the 6th of October, 1868, the complainant had filed his bill in the superior court of Cook county for relief against the sale under a power of sale contained in a certain mortgage given by himself to defendant Willard, setting up in substance that at the time the…

<p>Case No. 1,602.</p> <p>Collision — Between Steam and Sail — Division of Damages and Costs.</p> <p>Example where both vessels are in fault in a collision, and the damages are divided.</p>

At law. This was an action [by John G. Boker and others] against [Greene C. Bronson] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an excess of duties paid under protest on an importation of liquors. At the trial, the plaintiffs had a verdict, and the defendant now moved for a new trial.

At law. Action by John G. and J. Boker against Hernán J. Redfield, collector, etc., to recover back certain duties on importations of brandy and gutta percha paid under protest, and alleged to have been illegally levied. The jury found for the plaintiffs on the gutta percha, and for the defendant on the brandy.]

At law. This was an action at common law [by • John G. Boker against Greene C. Bronson], in which a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. On a motion for a new trial made by the defendant, a written decision was made by the judge holding the court, and filed, granting a new trial on condition that the defendant “pay the costs of the trial within twenty days after service of this order.” [Case No. 1,605.] No other or more formal order was made.

<p>Case No. 1,607.</p> <p>Prize — Neutral Property ix Enemy’s Ship— Capture op Mortgaged Property.</p> <p>Neutral property in an enemy’s ship is forfeited by the 14th article of the treaty between the TJ. States and France. If mortgaged property is left in the possession of the mortgagor who-puts it on board the vessel of a belligerent, it is subject to capture, and the mortgagee is without remedy.</p> <p>[Distinguished in TJ. S. v. The Areola, Case No. 14,464a.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,608.</p> <p>Embargo — Act Jan. 9, 1809 — Seizure — Information — Sufficiency—Proceeding in Rem — Authority of Collector — Sufficiency of Notice — District Courts — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. In an information on the third section of the act of the 9th January, 1809, c. 72 [4 Bior. & D. Laws, 190; 2 Stat. 507], for not unloading, or giving bonds, the time of receiving the act at the port, where the offence was alleged to have been committed, and also of the notice to unload, were material and traversable.</p> <p>2. In such an information, it was held insufficient to allege, that notice was given “to discharge the cargo, or to give bond, according to the law in such case provided.” The nature of the requisition should have been stated, and to whom the notice was given, that the court might judge of its sufficiency.</p> <p>3. A prosecution in rem, is authorized by the act 9th January, 1809, c. 72, and an- information would have lain upon common law principles, even had no mode of prosecution been provided.</p> <p>4. The collector, by that act, was authorized to seize for any violation, and would have had the right, even upon general principles.</p> <p>5. To make such a seizure legal, it was not necessary that it should be made by the collect- or in person, or by his written-authority; nor that a record of suoh seizure should be made.</p> <p>6. The court has jurisdiction in revenue causes, although the property seized may never have come into possession of the officers of the court.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. The Reindeer, Case No. 16,-144.] ' •</p> <p>[See The Abby, Case No. 14; The Little Ann, Id. 8,397; The Merino, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 401.]</p> <p>7. Of the exchequer practice in England.</p> <p>8. It was not necessary that the collector’s notice, under this act, should specially state the requisitions of the act.</p> <p>[9. Cited in Robinson v. Hook, Case No. 11,-956, to the point that in information on seizures the informer is always, as seizor, named a party, and, if he is entitled to any share of the forfeiture, the judgment of the court ascertains and decrees it.]</p> <p>[10. Cited in U. S. v. Trice, 30 Fed. 495, to-the point that penal acts should be interpreted according to the manifest intent of the legislature.]</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. After the cause was fully argued, and the court was about to deliver the above opinion, the cause was compromised by the parties, so that no decree was actually pronounced.</p>

In admiralty. Augustus Josline, of Waterford, in this state, the libellant, alleges, that on or about the 1st of June, 1845, he shipped at Troy, on board the scow Bolivar, as a second hand, at the rate of sixteen dollars a mopth; that said vessel was owned by James Rynders, the master, and was employed in carrying freight upon the tide waters of the Hudson river, between Troy, Bristol and the city of New-York; that he was employed at that rate from the time he. shipped until…

In admiralty. On rehearing. This action was instituted by John W. Shook for the recovery of a balance alleged to be due him for wages earned as a hand upon the scow Bolivar, a small sailing vessel of fifty tons burthen and over. The pleadings and the evidence for the defense were mainly the same as in the case of Jos-line v. The same vessel [Case No. 1,609]. For the reasons set forth in the decision in that cause the libel was dismissed with costs.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas.] At chambers. In June, 1871, the bark Chal-mette, which was at anchor outside of Galveston bar, receiving a cargo of cotton brought by lighters from Galveston, was driven by a storm from her moorings, a distance of thirty miles, when she came to anchor in a disabled condition. She was towed back to her anchorage by the tug Bolivar, whose owners filed a libel against the bark for salvage.

This was an action for the recovery of damages for an infringement of the celebrated patent of James Harley, for “A new and useful improvement in the mode of casting chilled rollers and other metallic cylinders.” It was tried at Pittsburg on the 20th and 21st Nov’r, 1850, before Honorable R. C. Grier, justice of the supreme court, and Honorable Thos. Irwin, of the district court of the United States.

In equity on a motion for an injunction on bill and answer. The bill set forth that the complainant [Joseph Bonaparte] was an alien, that in virtue of a special law of New Jersey, he was enabled to hold land in the state, and had purchased two thousand acres of land adjoining Bordentown, whereon he had made extensive and valuable improvements, at an expense of three hundred thousand dollars, and where he had resided for many years.

At law. On exception taken to the defendant’s plea; grounded on the fourth section of 1789, 23, 677, respecting the limitation of time for bringing suit against administrators and executors.

[In bankruptcy. In Re Addison F. Bond the certificate of the register is as follows:] I, the undersigned, one of the registers of this court, do hereby certify that while taking testimony in the above entitled case, a question was asked by the assignee which was objected to by counsel for the bankrupt as immaterial, and not pertinent to any issue that could arise in the proceedings.

[In admiralty. Libel by Phineas Bond, Esq., his Britannic majesty’s consul general for the middle and southern states, against the British brig Cora, praying a restoration of the said brig to her owners; also libel for salvage against the said brig by Nathaniel L. Griswold and George Griswold, owners of the brig Ceres, Bartlet Shepherd, master, and others, seamen, of the Ceres; also a libel for salvage by Don Juan de Echevirria, passenger, and by Daniel Ludlow and others,…

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania. [In admiralty.

<p>Case No. 1,622.</p> <p>Negotiable Instruments — Action on Foreign N ote — Computation.</p> <p>1. Judgment for sterling money. Difference between English and Irish sterling.</p> <p>[2. Under an act authorizing the court to settle the rate of exchange, witnesses may be examined to prove such rate.]</p>

In equity. On the 6th day of June, 1804, Phineas Bond, as attorney for the creditors of Ezekiel Edwards, a British subject, obtained a decree in this court, for the sum of $180,884 70, against David Boss, payable in installments, viz.: $10,000, payable on the first day of October following, $10,000 on the first day of January, 1805, and $16,666 66, payable semi-annually, until the whole decree should be fully satisfied and paid off.

[Appeal from the district court of the Unit■ed States for the district of Pennsylvania.] The Superb sailed from Palermo for Philadelphia, with a cargo composed in part of tropical fruits. Bad weather compelled her to put into the port of St. Thomas, where it was found necessary for the general safety of the ship and cargo to repair her, and in ■order to do this, to unload and reload part of the fruit.

[In equity. Bill brought by railroad bondholders against the railroad commissioners •of the state of Wisconsin to enjoin them from executing the state act of March 11, 1874, known as the “Potter Act.” On motion for preliminary injunction.

[In admiralty. A libel was filed by George W. Bone against the steamer Norma for salvage, but, before any claimant appeared in-court, the claim for salvage was settled without a sale of the property libeled. Heard on rale by the United States marshal, upon the libelant, to show cause why his commissions should not be paid in conformity to Act Feb. 26, 1853 (10 Stat 161, c. 80).

<p>Case No. 1,627.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proceeding by Assignee to Recover Assets.</p> <p>Where a summary proceeding by petition, by an assignee in bankruptcy, against a third person, to recover assets claimed to belong to the bankrupt, had been entertained by the district court, and it had made a decree thereon in favor of the assignee, and the defendant petitioned this court, under the second section of the bankruptcy act of 1867, to review such decree, this court set aside such decree as founded on irregular proceedings, without costs to either party, and with leave to the assignee to file a bill in the usual way against the defendant.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Ballou, Case No. 818; Voorhies v. Bonesteel, Id. 17,001; Goodenow v. Milli-ken, Id. 5,535; Knight v. Cheney, Id. 7,883; Barstow v. Peekham, Id. 1,064; Bradley v. Healey, Id. 1,781; Re Marter, Id. 9,143.]</p> <p>[See In re Evans, Case No. 4,551.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For a subsequent decree, dismissing the assignee’s bill in equity, see Voorhies v-Bonesteel, Case No. 17,001.]</p>

Action on coupons belonging to school bonds issued by the defendant under the act of March 21, 1870, referred to in the opinion of the court. The petition is in the usual form, and sets forth in full a copy of the bonds. The bonds are signed by the corporate officers of the defendant, and are under its corporate seal. The defendant demurred to the petition. The grounds of the-demurrer are stated in the opinion. [Demurrer overruled.]

<p>[At law. Alexander Bonnell and others against F. M. Weaver.</p>

This was an action brought by [William Bonner] the holder of a bond for $1,000, issued by the city of New Orleans, payable to the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad Company, or their assigns, in twenty years from date, with interest, and dated Hay 1,1854.

This was an application [in the matter of James Bonnet, Jr.] for a decree of bankruptcy in invitum, the points raised in the objections to which appear in the learned judge’s opinion.

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Bon-nett, Schenck, and Earle.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of D. Blake Bonnett and others.</p>

<p>Case ÜTo. 1,635.</p> <p>Contracts — Performance—Construction.</p> <p>1. Where B. contracted with a railroad company, in writing, to build certain bridges on its road, at a certain sum per foot, to be paid, one-fourth in cash, and thTee-fourths in the stock of the road at par value, and the contract was entirely silent as to the time or place of payment: Held that, looking to the contract alone, B. could not call for payment, either of the cash or stock, until a complete performance of the contract on his part, or, at any rate before, or oftener than a bridge was fully completed. Nor could he then sue and recover for-the stock without proof of a special request and of a refusal to deliver it. . For, if no time be fixed in the contract, or by other agreement- of the parties, either express or implied, for the doing of the thing, a request is essential to the cause of action.</p> <p>2. The company, after, the commencement of a suit by B. on the contract, having mortgaged its road, to secure the payment of debts due from it to third persons: Held, that the act of mortgaging the road would not work or amount to a disability to perform the contract, or make the defendants liable to pay money in lieu of the stock.</p> <p>3. Where it appeared that it was the custom of the company to make monthly payments to B. and its other contractors, for work done on its road, upon estimates made by the engineer at the end of each month: Held, that this must be considered the rule of payment under the contract, established by mutual consent, and binding upon the parties, so as to make a special request for the stock unnecessary.</p> <p>4. Held, also, that, under the circumstances^ of this case, no tender or offer of the stock having been made by the company, B. was entitled to recover its value.</p> <p>5. After the making of the original contract, B. proposed to put in iron bearings, instead of wood, for so much per foot of the bridges, varying, like the prices in the original contract, according to the different spans in the bridges, “in addition,” as B. said, “to the former proposal;” but nothing was said as to the manner of paying the additional expense: Held, that it might be well inferred, that the mode of paying for the iron bearings was to be the same as that provided for building the bridges.</p>

This was a writ of error by the plaintiffs [H. H. Boody and others] on a judgment rendered in the district court, September term, 1841, in favor of the United States, against the present plaintiffs, as sureties on three official bonds, for Thomas Todd, as postmaster of Portland. The whole case, as agreed upon by the counsel, and as disposed of in the district court, is annexed, and forms a part of the record.

<p>Case No. 1,637.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Practice — Petition by Infant — How Brought — Effect of Judgment — Relief from Tout — Discharge — “Persons in Inter'EST."</p> <p>.L A formal plea in bankruptcy'is not necessary nor usual, and, if filed, will be treated as a motion.</p> <p>2. An infant is entitled to the benefit of the bankrupt act</p> <p>3. The proceedings may be had in his own name.</p> <p>4. The bankrupt law relieves against a judgment for a tort.</p> <p>[See In re Comstock, Case No. 3,073,]</p> <p>5. Any one interested in the administration of the effects of the bankrupt may object, though technically he is not a creditor.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Sheppard, Case No. 12,753; Re Derby, Id. 3,815.]</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by George B. Boomer and Rufus E. Boschert against the United Power Press Company and others for an accounting, and for an injunction to restrain the infringement of patent No. 108,753. A decree was given for complainants for an account, and directing an ascertainment of damages to April 10, 1874, with costs.]</p>

<p>[At . law. Assumpsit [by William C. Boon and others] on a policy of fire insurance brought to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Connecticut, and tried, on an issue closed to the court, before WOODRUFF, Circuit Judge, and SHIP-MAN, District Judge, at the April term, 1874.]3</p>

This was a libel [by William Boon and Henry L. Boon, trading as Wilham Boon & Son, against the canal boat Hornet, Samuel Bisbing, owner] for work and materials.

Assumpsit by [Robert Boone] the payee against [Charles J. Queen] the maker of a promissory note for $1,300, payable twelve months after date.

<p>Case No. 1,645.</p> <p>Taxation — Funds held bt Assignee in Bank-buptct.</p> <p>No state can tax the funds in the hands of an assignee.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Re Mitchell, Case No. 9.658.J</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. The question in the above case was not certified to the court, but the judge expressed his approval of the decision.</p>

In equity. This was a motion [by Don Alonzo Booth] for a provisional injunction to restrain the defendants [Julius Gross Garelly and others] from infringing the plaintiff’s patent. The ease is ■ sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court'

<p>Case No. 1,647.</p> <p>Salvage — Restoration op Vessel.</p> <p>A vessel in distress, met with at sea, and brought into the port of a neutral power, must be restored, after payment of salvage, to those who were in possession of her when she was met with.</p> <p>[Cited in Packard v. The Louisa, Case No. 10,652.]</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by Jonathan L. Booth against George Parks, Grant B. Turner, William A. Taylor, and James A. Vaughn to restrain infringement of a patent]</p>

This suit was brought under reissue patent No. 1,826, granted to complainant on November 29, 1804, for improvement in grain separators, for the use of a machine, which was one of a number, for the manufacture of which the complainant had recovered from the makers.

<p>Case No. 1,649.</p> <p>Negotiable- Instruments — Voluntary Destruction of Promissory Note — Recovery.</p> <p>Where the payee and owner of a promissory note has voluntarily destroyed the same, he cannot recover judgment against the maker either upon the note itself, or upon the debt which was the consideration for which the note was given.</p>

<p>[Bill by J. B. Boothe, assignee in bankruptcy of Hightower & Butler, against Brooks, Neely & Co.</p>

This was an appeal from the judgment of the mayor of Georgetown, who has, by charter, the powers of a justice of the peace, upon four warrants for the violation of an ordinance or by-law of the corporation of Georgetown respecting taverns.

In bankruptcy. The question in this case arises upon the bankrupts’ claims to exemptions under 'the statute.

In bankruptcy. On-petition of assignee [of William H. Boothroyd and Frederick G. Gibbs] for an order directing Gibbs to vacate a certain lot heretofore claimed by him as a homestead, and certain mortgagees to discharge a mortgage given by him.

<p>Case No. 1,664.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—Fifty Per Cent. Clause — Value.</p> <p>An appraisement of the stock of goods of the bankrupts, made a few days after the filing of their voluntary petition, fixed its value at a certain sum, but they were sold by the assignee for much less. There was no proof that the goods depreciated in value before their sale. Taking the value at the amount realized by the assignee, the assets of the bankrupts were not equal to fifty per cent, of the claims proved against their estate, on which they were liable as principal debtors: Held, that the appraisement was exaggerated, and the amount realized by the assignee was the only safe guide as to the value of the assets, and as the bankrupts had not filed the assent in writing of a majority in number and value of their creditors, discharges must be refused, them.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Waggoner, 5 Fed. 917.]</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel in person-am [by Thomas Borden] against [Charles A.] Hiern, the master, and [Thomas] Harvey, the mate, of the ship Ajax.

At law. Trespass quare clausum fregit, and cutting trees, &c. [by Thomas Borden against Benjamin Manchester]. Plea as to force and arms and part of trees, not guilty: 2.

In admiralty. This was a case, in which several seamen [Bordman, Wilson, and others], of an American ship 2 [the brig Elizabeth], carried into a port of a belligerent captor for adjudication, claimed their wages for the whole voyage. They were forcibly taken out of the Elizabeth, and put on board the capturing frigate. They were carried into another port of the captor, and there liberated.

In admiralty. From the evidence in this case it appears that the ship Golden Rose is a foreign vessel chartered by Tunno & Cox, merchants of this place; where the owners of the ship have also a correspondent That the captain, a foreigner, has been supplied by the actor with various articles, and some money, amounting together to about one hundred and fifty dollars.

<p>Case No. 1,659.</p> <p>Witness — Competency—Right to Freight at Intermediate Port — Delays.</p> <p>1. To render a witness incompetent he must be interested in the event of the suit.</p> <p>2. He is incompetent if the verdict can be evidence either for or against him.</p> <p>3. Consignee of goods, who has delivered them over, without the payment of freight, is a competent witness in a suit, by the master of the vessel, against the owner of the goods.</p> <p>4. Where a vessel is unable to reach the destined port, and the owner of the cargo receives it, at an intermediate port, freight, pro rata itineris, may be recovered.</p> <p>5. The master, who is driven to an intermediate port by stress of weather, and his vessel is unable to proceed, is bound to repair his vessel, in convenient time, or procure another vessel to convey the goods. And if he fail in this, he is not entitled to freight.</p> <p>6. Where the owner of the cargo is the cause why it is not transported to the port designated, full freight may be demanded.</p> <p>[Cited in Weston v. Minot, Case No. 17,453; Hart v. Shaw, Id. 6,155.]</p> <p>7. A permanent embargo excuses the master from the performance of his contract. If the obstruction be temporary it suspends it.</p> <p>8. A contract for the transportation of goods on our lakes, may not, in every respect, be subject to the maritime rule, which applies to the high seas. If there be an obstruction on the lake, a land conveyance may be resorted to. This is preferable to a delay of several months.</p>

At law. This was a writ of formedon in remainder. There were several pleas in the case: 1. The general issue, ne done pas: 2. A special plea, setting forth, in substance, that the estate had been confiscated by a judgment at law, under the revolutionary confiscation acts of Massachusetts, as the es'-tate of the prior tenant in tail, John Lindall Borland. There was a demurrer to this plea and a joinder in demurrer.

In bankruptcy. The plaintiffs [Borland and Manlove] are assignees in bankruptcy of Yan Possen & Britton, who were private bankers in Port Scott. Defendants [Phillips and Scovill] were also private bankers in the same place.

In equity. This was a bill filed by D. Bornio against Stockdale, collector, etc., for an injunction to restrain the collector from proceeding by distress to collect a tax of $150, assessed against the petitioner as lottery ticket dealer; also to restrain him from attempting in like manner to collect a fine or penalty which the United States assessor had; assumed to assess against petitioner, in the sum of $1,000, for failure to pay special tax as such dealer.

At law. An.act of the general assembly of this state, approved February 16th, 1859 [Laws Ark. p. 154, § 1], provided, among other things: That the county courts of the counties of Desha and Phillips should divide the overflowed lands in each of said counties into not less than four nor more than seven levee districts; that it should appoint for each levee district three freeholders, residents of the district .for which they were appointed, whose duty it was to report to the…

<p>Case No. 1,665.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Effect op Adjudication.</p> <p>A bankrupt cannot be held in the custody of the sheriff of the county on account of a judgment obtained against him. for costs in an action in a state court.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Wright, Case No. 18,065.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,666.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Dischahge—Opposition.</p> <p>1. A creditor, who has proved his debt after the time for the hearing of the application for discharge has expired, cannot be heard in opposition to such discharge, nor can his debt be counted among the claims proved, so as to affect the discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Read, Case No. 11,600; Re ICetchum, 1 Fed. 840; Re Read, 5 Fed-722.]</p> <p>2. The hearing of the case on the specification of the grounds of opposition mentioned in general order No. 24, is a different thing from the hearing of the application for discharge mentioned in section 33 of the bankrupt act [of' 1867 (14 Stat. 533)].</p>

In equity. This was a bill filed by Peter Bosseau for the specific performance of an alleged contract of sale made by the defendant [Cornelius O’Brien] with the complainant in August, 18G4, for the S. %, Sec. 25, 32 N.. R. 12 E., in Kankakee county.

In admiralty. The first libel in this case was filed, in rem, by William Morrison, to enforce a bottomry bond executed to him in Glasgow, in Scotland, on' the 3d of November, 1831, by Henry Upton, as master of the ship Boston, an American vessel.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] In admiralty.

In admiralty. The libellants, Louis J. Au-denried & Company, coal merchants, doing business in Philadelphia and Boston, shipped a cargo of coal on board the schooner Boston at Philadelphia, and received a bill of lading requiring delivery at Boston to Bos-worth & Hamlin or their assigns, at a freight of two dollars and twenty-five cents per ton and three cents per ton for each bridge.

In admiralty. The steamers Frank and Boston, two small passenger boats belonging to this port, lay at or near the same wharf, in this harbor, and were in the act of going out together, their trips being appointed for the same hour. They were competitor boats, making frequent trips daily from Canal-street slip to landing places a few miles up the Hudson river, on the New-Jersey shore.

<p>Case No. 1,673.</p> <p>Salvage — Right to — Forfeiture — Embezzlement— Amount — Derelict—Parties — Libel— Answer — Evidence — Appeal — Witnesses—Insurance — Deviation.</p> <p>1. In a libel for salvage, all the parties should be inserted and brought before the court.</p> <p>[Cited in McConnochie v. Kerr, 9 Fed. 60.]</p> <p>2. Libels in admiralty, especially those for salvage, are usually too loosely framed. They should state the subject matter in articles, with certainty and precision,' and with averments admitting of distinct answers.</p> <p>[Cited in Wells v. The Anne Caroline, Case No. 17.389a; Dupont de Nemours v. Vance, 19 How. (60 U. S.) 175; Card v. Hines, 35 Fed. 600.]</p> <p>3. The answer should meet each material allegation of the libel with an admission, a denial, or a defence.</p> <p>[Cited in Dupont de Nemours v. Vance, 19 How. (60 U. S.) 175; Card v. Hines, 35 Fed. 600.]</p> <p>4. No evidence is admissible, except it be appropriate to some of the allegations in the libel or answer.</p> <p>[Cited in The Morton, Case No. 9.864; The Sarah E. Kennedy, 29 Fed. 26G; In re Hawkins, 147 U. S. 4SC, 13 Sup. Ct. 512.]</p> <p>5. In admiralty proceedings, a supplementary libel alleging new matter, and an answer thereto, may he filed after appeal, at the discretion of the court.</p> <p>[Distinguished in The Mabey v. Atkins, 10 Wall. (77 U. S.) 420. Cited in The Morton, Case No. 9,864. Distinguished in the Saunders, 23 Fed. 304. Cited in The Venezuela, 3 C. C. A. 319. 52 Fed. 875; Re Hawkins, 147 U. S. 48G, 13 Sup. Ct. 512.]</p> <p>6. In case of a supplementary libel being filed after closing the testimony on the original libel in prize causes, the new testimony taken must be applicable merely to the new allegation; hut in other causes this rule is much relaxed.</p> <p>7. Since the act of March, 1803, c. 93 [2 Story’s Laws. 905; 2 Stat. 244, c. 40], in admiralty, as well as equity cases, carried up to the supreme court by appeal, all the evidence goes with the case, and it must accordingly he in writing.</p> <p>8. In a libel in rem, against a vessel or cargo for salvage, the underwriters, not having accepted an abandonment, are not proper parties. ,</p> <p>[Cited in The Idaho. Case No. G,996; The Senator, Id. 12,665.]</p> <p>9. A stoppage to save the crew of a wrecked and sinking ship, whose lives are in jeopardy, is justifiable, and is not a deviation, that discharges underwriters; but a delay to save property is such a deviation. See The Henry Ewbank [Case No. 6,376].</p> <p>[Cited in The Emblem, Case No. 4.434: Stur-tevant v. The George Nieholaus, Id. 18,-578; Peterson v. The Chandos. 4 Fed. 653: The Centurion, Case No. 2,554; Roff v. Wass, Id. 11.999.]</p> <p>10. Where the master and crew had left their vessel in a sinking condition, and taken to the long boat, and were picked up by another vessel, while yet in sight of the wreck, the vessel and cargo, thus left, are considered, in admiralty, as derelict.</p> <p>[Cited in The John Gilpin, Case No. 7,345; The H. B. Foster. Id. 6,290; Sturtevant v. The George Nicholaus, Id. 13,578. Distinguished in Cromwell v. The Island City, Id. 3,410. Cited in The Georgiana, Id. 5,-355; The Ann L. Lockwood, 37 Fed. 237.]</p> <p>11. On appeal in salvage cases, the court of appeal does not alter the amount of salvage upon slight grounds, or inconsiderable differences of opinion.</p> <p>[Cited in brief in Lubker v. The A. H. Quin-by, Case No. 8,586.]</p> <p>[12. Cited in The Maggie P., 25 Fed. 206, to the point that a party who does not appeal from a decree cannot question its correctness.]</p> <p>[13. Cited in Sewell v. Nine Bales of Cotton, Case No. 12,683, and The Henry Ew-bank, Id. 6,376, to the point that under ordinary circumstances the owners of the salving vessel are entitled to one third.]</p> <p>[14. Cited in The John Gilpin, Case No. 7,-345, to the point that salvage service may be rendered within the ebb and flow of the tide, without regard to location, whether on the high seas, or inter fauces terrae.]</p> <p>15. The right of salvage is forfeited by embezzlement on the part of the salvors.</p> <p>[Cited in The Rising Sun, Case No. 11,858; Williams v. Waterman, Id. 17,745; Cromwell v. The Island City, Id. 3.410; The Mulhouse, Id, 9,910; Harley v. Gawley, Id. 6,069; U. S. v. Stone, 8 Fed. 251; The Albany, 44 Fed. 435.]</p> <p>[16. Cited in The Mulhouse, Case No. 9,910, to the point that embezzlement by the salvor crew does not work a forfeiture or diminution of the shares of the owner, where there is no fault on his part.]</p> <p>[17. Cited in The Rising Sun, Case No. 11,-85S, to the point that embezzlement by a master who is part owner forfeits his rights to salvage both as master and owner.]</p> <p>18. Embezzlement in port is a forfeiture no less than at sea.</p> <p>[Cited in Cromwell v. The Island City, Case No. 3,410.]</p> <p>19. Embezzlement by the .salvors, after the property is put into the hands of the marshal, is a forfeiture of salvage; and that, whether the custody of the property be at the time given to the salvors or not.</p> <p>[Cited in The Missouri, Case No. 9,654; Cromwell v. The Island City, Id. 3,410.]</p> <p>[20. Cited in The Mulhouse, Case No. 9,910, and Browning v. Baker, Id. 2,041, to the point that, while it is the policy of the law to liberally reward all meritorious salvage service, it will punish every negligence with diminished compensation or forfeiture.]</p> <p>21. The rules of the common law, as to the competency and ineompetency of witnesses, are adopted in the admiralty, in the ■ exercise of its jurisdiction as an instance court.</p> <p>[Cited in The Neptune. Case No. 10,120; The Peytona, Id. 11,05S.]</p> <p>22. The case of salvage is an exception to the rule, as to the ineompetency of witnesses on account of interest. The salvors are, from necessity, witnesses as to facts occurring at the time of the salvage service; but only as to such facts.</p> <p>[Cited in Bean v. The Grace Brown, Case No. 1,171; The Peytona, Id. 11.05S; Roberts v. The St. James, Id. 11,914.]</p> <p>23. The testimony of persons, who are parties to an admiralty suit, ought to be taken under a special order of the court showing the cause, that the court may in its order limit the inquiries to matters within the exception to the rule, that parties are not witnesses.</p> <p>24. In a salvage suit in admiralty the sal-vors, being parties to the suit, are not competent witnesses as to facts occurring in port after the property is brought in.</p> <p>25. The testimony of interested witnesses weighs little in opposition to that of those disinterested.</p> <p>[Cited in Bean v. The Grace Brown, Case No. 1,171; Roberts v. The St. James, Id. 11,914.]</p> <p>[See Andrews v. Hyde, Case No. 377.]</p>

<p>[At law. Action by William Judson against the Boston Belting Company.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,675.</p> <p>Patents — Invention—Phi ok Public Use.</p> <p>1. The reissued patent for an improvement in cutting sheets of rubber into threads, number 5,903, dated June 2, 1874. granted to the complainants as assignees of Liveras Hull, held invalid for want of novelty in the invention.</p> <p>2. A patent may be defeated by showing that the thing secured by the patent had been invented and put into actual public use prior to the discovery of the patentee, however limited such use (other than experimental) of the prior discovery may have been.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,676.</p> <p>Patents — Invention—Anticipation.</p> <p>Where the invention described and claimed in a patent is of a machine of specified construction, jt is anticipated by a prior machine of substantially the same construction; although a new, and perhaps patentable, use of the machine is suggested in the specification of the patent.</p> <p>[NOTE. For subsequent litigation between the same parties involving the s.ime patent, see Case No. 1,075.]</p>

[Petition to review the decision of the district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut.] In bankruptcy. On the 20th of December, 1S70, a petition was filed in the district court, by James Alden, an alleged creditor of the Boston, Hartford and Erie Railroad Company, alleging the insolvency of the corporation, and the commission of an act of bankruptcy, and praying an adjudication declaring it bankrupt.

[Petition for review of the decision of the district court of the United States for the southern district of New Xork. [Application for adjudication of bankrupt-' cy. The district court denied the application of Seth Adams, for leave to intervene and oppose the application. Case No. 1,679.

<p>Case No. 1,679.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Creditor not Petitioning Cannot Interfere.</p> <p>A motion on the part of a creditor who is not a party to the petition, that the proceedings on the petitions for adjudication be dismissed, must be denied on the ground that the denials of bankruptcy by debtors are questions solely between the petitioning creditors and the debtors, with which no outside party, sustaining merely the relation of a person who claims to be a creditor of the debtors, can be permitted to interfere.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Bush, Case No. 2,222. Disapproved in Re Bergeron, Id. 1,342; Re Don-nelly, 5 Fed. 785. Distinguished in Re Mendelsohn, Case No. 9,420.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For other proceedings in Massachusetts. see Cases Nos. 47,152 and 13,684; in New York, see Case No. 1,680; in Connecticut, Case No. 1,677.]</p>

Case [against Jonathan Fisk and another] for infringing a patent for “a new and useful improvement of a spinning frame for spinning cotton,” invented by Paul Moody, and assigned by him to the plaintiff. The patent was dated the 17th of January, 1818, and the assignment the 34th of January, 1819.

<p>[In- equity. Bill by J. Hoyt Bostwick, as-signee in bankruptcy, to set aside a mortgage by the bankrupt to defendant, Addi M. Foster.</p>

[Action of ejectment by the lessee of Thomas E. Boswell against Rodolphus Dickinson and others. The judges were divided in opinion, and the case was certified to the supreme court. See note at end of case.]

<p>Appeal from Independence circuit court</p> <p>[This appeal was presented by James Boswell, administrator of Hartwell Boswell, against Myric D. Newton, appellee.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [Proceedings to condemn the foreign vessels Bothnea and Janstoff as prizes. Decree of condemnation. See note at end of case.]

In admiralty. Case of Bothwell against the Vessel-Owners’ Towing Association, brought to recover damages for the loss of the schooner Fontanelle, through the alleged negligence of the officers of the tug Black Ball No. 2 during the great conflagration of October, 1871. The court remarked that on the night of October 8, 1871, the schooner Fontanelle ■was lying at Hough’s dock, on the South Side, near Van Burén street bridge.

[Error from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] This is a writ of error to a judgment of condemnation in rem by the district court upon an information of seizure of two cases and one hundred and fourteen pieces of broadcloth seized on land at Boston, as forfeited to the United States, and claimed by James Bottomley, Jr., as owner.

This case having been disposed of upon the merits [Bottomley v. U. S., Case No. 1.688], a question afterwards arose as to the charge in the bill of costs of the marshal for custody fees for keeping the goods. It was briefly spoken to by Gray, for the claimant, and by the marshal pro se.

At law. This was an action brought by plaintiffs [Botts and Darnall], citizens of Kentucky, against the defendant, a citizen of Virginia, to recover the amount of certain claims entrusted to him before the war, as attorney-at-law, for collection. It appeared that one Green owed the plaintiffs money, for which he gave them his negotiable notes, which fell due before the war, and were not paid by Green.

At law. This was an action to recover damages for the representation, by the defendants [George L. Fox and James W. Lingard], at the New Bowery Theatre, in the city of New York, of a play called “The Octoroon,” in violation of the rights of the plaintiff [Dion Boucicault], as the author and owner of the copyright thereof. The plea was the general issue. At the trial, the plaintiff had a verdict for $500 damages. The defendant now moved for a new trial.

<p>[In equity. Bill by Dion Boueicault against Joshua Hart. Heard upon demurrer to the bill..</p>

At law. Action [by Dion Boucicault against Joseph H. Wood] for infringement of copyright in three plays composed by plaintiff, “Pauvrette,” “The Octoroon” and “Colleen Bawn.” The plaintiff was a native of England, and was never naturalized. He resided in New York city for several years, and there composed the plays in question, the titles of which he duly filed.

In equity. The plaintiffs, about eighty or one hundred in number, assert themselves to be the next of kin, on the paternal side, to Charles White, who died intestate in the city of Philadelphia some time in the month of January in the year 1S16.

In equity. The defendant who resided in the territory northwest of the Ohio, when in Philadelphia in the year 1796, was served with a subpoena from the equity side of this court, to appear and answer the plaintiff’s bill. He entered his appearance by Rawle; but put in no answer, and stood in contempt.

<p>Case No. 1,696.</p> <p>Patents eoe Inventions — Appeal pkom Commissioner’s Decision — Evidence — Equivalents— —Combin ation — Anticipation.</p> <p>[1. .On an appeal from the commissioner’s decision refusing to grant a patent, it is proper for the court to consider the most material parts of a correspondence had between the commissioner and the applicant, wherein facts are stated, and have been acted upon, and not denied, giving the applicant the benefit of the rule that, when part of the statement is used, the whole of the contemporaneous statement should be received.] ’</p> <p>[2. The true criterion of mechanical equivalence is identity of purpose, and not of form or name; and this is a question of fact to be judged of on' inspection or the testimony of experts. It is an inference to be drawn from all the circumstances by attending to the consideration whether the contrivance used by one party is used for the same purpose, performs the same duties, or is applicable to the same object as the contrivance of the other party.]</p> <p>. [3. There may be a patent for a combination producing a certain result, although neither any of the parts nor any portion of the combination less than the whole are new; for the thing patented is the combination, and not its parts.]</p> <p>[4. The combination, in a thistle-digger, of wheels and knives, the knives_ working under ground at any required depth in a nearly flat position, and sufficiently tilling it, especially in hard, clayey, Canada-thistle soil, the wheels operating to prevent sidewise motion of the knives, whereby they would slip around hard places, is not anticipated by the prior use of wheels in plows, harrows, seed-planters, and the like, or by the combination of a sled with knives which are drawn along the surface of the ground in marshy places, to cut off the “bogs.”]</p>

[This was a petition filed by Charles Bou-ligney and others against the United States to adjust petitioners’ claim to certain land in the state of Louisiana, which they claimed by virtue of a grant from the late French government of that territory.

<p>[In bankruptcy.]</p>

At law. Libel promoted by [Jonathan Bourne and others] the owners of the ship Washington, against [Abraham Ashley and others] the owners of the ship Endeavor, both of New Bedford, for the conversion of a whale in the Okhotsk sea, in July, 1858.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by John Bounty against Patrick Kerrin to recover salvage.</p>

In bankruptcy. Appeal from [an unreport*ed] decree of the district court, allowing claim of Mary L. Bourne against bankrupt estate. On December 30, 1868, Joseph W. Maybin was adjudged a bankrupt. On January 24, 1877, the bankrupt estate being still unsettled, Mary L. Bourne, with Joshua W. Bourne, her husband, filed for allowance a claim against the bankrupt estate for the sum of $30,000.

In admiralty. The libellant [G. W. Bourne] proceeded for his lay of one-thirteenth in the oil and bone procured on the Atlantic whaling cruise of the schooner William Martin, of which he was master, and the defendant [Heman Smith] was managing owner. The voyage began in November, 1867, and ended in September, 1868; and the libel was filed in March, 1871.

•[On certificate of register in bankruptcy.] Application to set aside a sale of stock. Opinion of Register: Diodate Clark, Caroline Kellogg, and Kitty Clark, are creditors of Bousfield & Poole, as follows:— As collateral security for the payment of these claims Diodate Clark, for himself and •the others, held one hundred and nineteen shares of stock in the Ohio Wooden Ware Company pledged by the bankrupts.

[On certificate of register in bankruptcy.] In the matter of exceptions filed by the as-signee to the claim of the Ohio Wooden Ware Company. [Exceptions dismissed.] The Bousfield & Poole Manufacturing Company made an assignment under the state law to J. A. Reddington for the benefit of its creditors. On March 6, 1876, the Bous-field & Poole Manufacturing Company filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and on March 8, 1876, was adjudged bankrupt.

[On certificate of register in bankruptcy. Exceptions to claim. Opinion of Register: In the above named case the United States, on the 2d day of September, A. D. 1S7C, filed proof of a claim against said estate amounting to twenty-one thousand one hundred and twenty-seven dollars and seventy-six cents,' with interest thereon from April 4, 1876, which claim is upon a judgment rendered in the circuit court of the United States at the April term thereof, 1876.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,706.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Petition — Quorum of Creditors —Solicitation by Debtor to Join in Petition.</p> <p>1. In computing the aggregate of provable debts and also the amount of debts represented by the petitioning creditors, secured debts must be eliminated from the calculation. Debts partially secured must be reduced by the amount of tie security, and all offsets due the debtor deducted. Debts barred by the statute at the time of the commencement of the proceedings are not to be included in the computation.</p> <p>2. Lawful solicitation by a debtor to induce his creditors to sign a petition against him in involuntary bankruptcy is permissible.</p> <p>[See In re Saunders, Case No. 12,371; In re Israel, Id. 7,111; also, In re Jewett, Id. 7,305; In re Hazens, Id. 6,285.]</p>

[Petition to review an order of the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia.] Petition for review. The former assignee in bankruptcy, [William H.] Allderdice, had been required to settle his accounts, and these were referred to Atkins, special commissioner, for defendant. The report was returned on the 10th May, 1875, showing a considerable balance due from the assignee, who excepted to parts of the report.

<p>Case No. 1,709.</p> <p>Admiralty — Foreign Attachment.</p> <p>Attachments may issue out of the admiralty courts of the United States, against the goods or debts of an absent person, so as to make him a party to the suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. (23 U. S.) 467; Reed v. Hussey, Case No. 11,-646; Smith v. Miln, Id. 13,081; Wilson v. Pierce, Id. 17,826; Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 305; The Alpena, 7 Fed. 363; Card v. Hines,</p> <p>36 Fed. 575; The Bremena v. Card, 38 Fed. 145. Distinguished in Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., Case No. 602.]</p> <p>[See Clarke v. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., Case No. 2.859; Atkins v. Fibre Disin- ' tegrating Co., 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 272; Manchester v. Hotchkiss, Case No. ,9,004. Contra, New England Ins. Co. v. Detroit Nav. Co., Id. 10,154; McGrath v. The Candalero, Id. 8,810.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For trial of this case upon the merits, see Case No. 1,710.]</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Bouysson and Holmes against Miller and Ryley for seaman’s wages.</p>

At law. This was an action [by Herman Boving and Melchior Wiltie] against [Cornelius W. Lawrence] the collector of the port of New-York, to recover back an excess of duties paid on vermilion. It was charged with a duty of 25 per cent, ad valorem under Schedule D of the tariff act of July 30th, 1846 (9 Stat 46), as a mercurial preparation. The plaintiffs claimed that - it was only liable to a duty of 20 per cent, ad valorem under Schedule E, as vermilion.

At law. The plaintiffs [Cornelius Boving and Melchior Wiltie] brought this action against [Cornelius W. Lawrence] the collect- or of the port of New-York, to recover back an excess of duties paid on mustard seed, caraway seed, cardamon seed, and fenugreek seed, in a crude state. At the trial, before Mr..

<p>Case No. 1,713.</p> <p>Towage — Negligence in Towing — Li ability— Measure op Damages — Partnership — -What Constitutes between Owners op Tug and Barge.</p> <p>1. A tug towing a barge approached a wharf where the latter was to land, but failed to make fast her lines by reason of their slipping and parting. The barge was driven by the tide against the wheel of a stern-wheel steamer lying at an adjacent wharf, thereby causing the wheel to revolve, and to inflict serious injuries on the libellant, who was at work in the wheel. Eeld: 1st, that the barge was in fault in not properly providing and handling the lines upon which she relied to stop her headway; 2d, that the tug was in fault in casting off the barge before she was properly secured, or in not affording her timely aid, or in removing to so great a distance that it was impracticable to do so; 3d, that the libellant was not bound to.lash the wheel of the steamer in such manner as to prevent all injurious consequences of the negligence of others; it was sufficient if the lashings were strong enough to resist the action of the tide or waves, the swell of a passing vessel, or any other force which might reasonably be anticipated; 4th, even if the lashings were not so strong as prudence required, the immediate cause of the accident was the negligence of the respondent, and the rules relating to contributory negligence do not apply.</p> <p>[Cited in Hall v. Little, Case No. 5,939; Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 Fed. 649; Marine Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 653.]</p> <p>2. The rule which restricts damages to such as may reasonably be supposed to have been contemplated by the parties, has no application to cases of tort.</p> <p>3. When the owner of a tug agreed with the owner of a barge that both vessels should be employed in a freighting business, the wages of the servants of the association and expenses, except for repairs, to be paid out of the earnings, and the balance or profits to be divided between them in proportion to the stipulated values of the vessels; held, that this agreement constituted a partnership, and that either partner was liable in an action of tort for damages caused by the negligence of the servants and agents of the partnership, while conducting its business.</p> <p>[Cited in The Henry Buck, 39 Fed. 213.]</p>

At law. This was an action of trespass on the case in assumpsit, the facts being as follows: The First National Bank of Norfolk, duly organized under -the provisions of the national banking act, having suspended on the 26th day of May, 1874, the plaintiff [George E. Bowden], on the 3d day of June in that year, was duly appointed by the comptroller of the currency, a receiver to take charge of and to wind up the affairs of the bank.

These were actions of assumpsit [by George E. Bowden, receiver of the First National Bank of Norfolk, against W. H. •Morris and others, shareholders thereof, for contribution. There was judgment for defendants, but a new trial was thereafter granted. The cases] were heard together, the facts of all being the same. Plea of non-assumpsit. By stipulation between counsel a jury is waived, and the issues of fact, as well as law, are submitted to the court.

In equity. These two cases are so nearly alike that it is only necessary to consider one of them, which will be the one first named. This was a bill in chancery filed by the plaintiff [George L. Bowden], as receiver of the First National Bank of Norfolk, to enforce the personal liability of the defendant, [C. A.] Santos, as the owner of thirty-nine shares of the capital stock of the said bank.

<p>Case No. 1,717.</p> <p>Shipping — The Master — Lien fob Wages and Disbursements — Seamen — Lien for Wages — Salvage — Who abb Salvors — Salvage by . Seamen.</p> <p>1. The master has a lien on the freight for his wages, and necessary disbursements for the use of the ship.</p> <p>2. The seamen have a lien on the freight for their wages.</p> <p>[See Pitman v. Hooper, Case No. 11,185; Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Pet. (30 U. S.) 675; The Monadnock, Case No. 9,704.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>3. In case of shipwreck, they have a lien on the savings of the wreck.</p> <p>4. They may have a further claim against the wreck in the nature of salvage, when it is saved by their exertion.</p> <p>[See Brackett v. The Hercules, Case No. 1,-762.]</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. It seems to be well settled in this country, that the master has a lien on the freight for his necessary disbursements, for incidental expenses, and his liability for such expenses and also for his own wages. Note to Abb. Shipp, p. 147. and the cases there cited; 1 Ware. 149 [Drinkwater v. Spartan, Case No. 4,085]; 7 Cow. 670: 3 Mason, 255 [The Packet Case No. 10.654]; 18 Rich. [18 Pick.] 530. Though notwithstanding the decision of Lord King in White v. Baring, 4 Esp. 22, it is otherwise settled in England. Smith v. Plummer, 1 Barn. & Aid. 575; Abb. Shipp. 147, 377, note. The reason given for refusing the master a lien on the freight is, that he has no lien on the ship for his wages and that the freight is incident to the ship. But the master is authorized to receive the freight, and if he has it in his hands he may pay himself, though he has no personal claim against the owners; for when there are cross demands it is only the balance that is due. See further, as to the English law, Abb. [Shipp.] 656, note. I have nothing to add to what is stated in the case of The Dawn [supra] as to the right of seamen to claim as salvors. In the case of The Neptune, 1 Hagg. [Adm. 227], Lord Stowell seemed to limit their claim to that of wages. *In that case the wreck was saved by the crew; but in the case of The Reliance, Sir S. Lushington held that their claims were good for wages against the wreck, though it was abandoned by them and saved by other parties. 2 W. Rob. [Adm.]</p>

[Action by Alexander G. Bowditch, assignee in bankruptcy of Armstrong & Co., against the city of Boston, for damages sustained by the destruction of buildings to check spread of a fire.

[Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [Action by Alexander G. Bowditch, as-signee in bankruptcy of Armstrong & Co., against the city of Boston, for… Held: in Ross v. New York, 4 Rob. [N. Y.] 50, that circumstantial evidence is admissible to show that the fire might have been occasioned by a riot or mob.

[At law. Actions of ejectment by Champlain Bowen and others against Nelson Chase and others. Defendants moved to strike the causes from the docket, and plaintiffs moved for a commission.

<p>Case No. 1,721.</p> <p>Assignment for Benefit of Creditors.</p> <p>1. An assignment with preferences, made by two members of a firm, in the absence and without the knowledge or consent of the third, who had previously refused to give preference to any creditors, is not valid as to him.</p> <p>[See Marsh v. Bennett, Case No. 9,110; In re Lawrence, 5 Fed. 349; Halsey v. Fairbanks, Case No. 5,964; and see note at end • of case.]</p> <p>2. He haying repudiated the assignment, and with the aid of his partners and a mortgagee of a portion of the property regained possession of it, this court will not entertain a bill by preferred creditors to compel redelivery to the assignee.</p> <p>3. _ Although in Wisconsin a mortgage of a retail stock, not duly filed, or accompanied with delivery of possession, is void as to creditors, a bill by preferred creditors against the mortgagors and the mortgagee, who is equally preferred will not lie unless the mortgagee claims payment in full to their prejudice.</p> <p>4. Where the principal assigning partner was, at the time of the execution of the assignment, laboring under the immediate effects of intoxication, well known to the assignee and the agent of the creditors procuring the assignment, the transaction will not be favored in a court of equity.</p> <p>[See Johnson v. Harmon, 94 U. S. 371.]</p>

In equity. The bill in this case [by Simon Bowen] was brought in the supreme court of Massachusetts for Bristol county, in September last, and an injunction was granted by that court to restrain the defendant from selling certain real estate situated in Attle-borough, particularly described in a certain mortgage made by Hervey M. Richards, to Benjamin Hoppin, to' secure the payment of twenty-five thousand dollars.

<p>Case No. 1,725.</p> <p>Specific Performance — Requisites of Contract — Mistake.</p> <p>1. On a bill for specific performance, the rule of courts of equity is, that the agreement should be certain, fair and just in all its parts, and that all the material parts should be known to both parties; and if any of these ingredients be wanting in the case, a decree will be re- • fused.</p> <p>[See Kendall v. Almy, Case No. 7,690; Smith v. Burnham, Id. 13,019; Oakley v. Ballard, Id. 10,393; King v. Thompson, 9 Pet. (34 U. S.) 204; McConnell v. Lexington, 12 Wheat. (15 U. S.) 5S2.]</p> <p>2. The contract of which specific performance is sought, ought not only to be proved, but the terms of it should be so precise that neither party could reasonably misunderstand them; and if it be vague or uncertain, a court of equity will not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to enforce it, but leave the party to his legal remedy.</p> <p>3. Nor will it compel a specific performance where the contract is a hard or unreasonable bargain, or where there has been any sort of surprise which renders it unfair to call for an execution of it.</p> <p>4. There is a very important distinction running through the cases between ordering a con- ■ tract to be rescinded and decreeing a specific performance; and the latter kind of relief is often denied' even where the circumstances are not sufficiently strong to induce the court to require the contract to be given up.</p> <p>5. Although a party contracting through an agent, being ignormt of facts with which his agent was acquainted, may yet have bound himself at law, it does not follow that a specific performance would be decreed if there was • clearly such a mistake or misapprehension as to the subject-matter of the contract as to render it unjust or inequitable to enforce it.</p>

In equity. This was a rule, on the motion of Rawle, to show cause why the sales made by John Hall, late marshal of the Pennsylvania district, of certain lands taken in execution, as the property of Robert Morris, the defendant, should not be set aside. The following facts were agreed: On the - day of March last, (1801), a commission, as marshal of the eastern district of Pennsylvania, issued to John Shee, who did not accept.

Rule to show cause why an exoneretur i.hould not be entered on the bail-piece, the defendant being confined in the hospital, as a lunatic. The affidavit of the bail, on which the rule was granted, stated, that since the suit was brought, the defendant had become deranged in his mind, and was now in the hospital.

<p>Case No. 1,728.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Injunction — Restraining Enforcement op Judgment — Who may Obtain— District Court — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Before the appointment of assignees, a pe-, tition for an injunction can be filed only by the' bankrupt. After assignees are appointed, the petition should be filed by them.</p> <p>[Cited in Thames v. Miller, Case No. 13,860; Re Steadman, Id. 13,330; Hudson v. Schwab, Id. 6,835.</p> <p>[See Jones v. Leach, Case No. 7,475.]</p> <p>2. United States district courts have full and adequate jurisdiction in all matters relating to bankruptcy, at law and in equity. Its jurisdiction, however, to sell real estate and pay off liens, is not exclusive.</p> <p>[Cited in Clifton v. Foster, 103 Mass. 233; Re Mallory, Case No. 8,991; Re Brinkman, Id. 1,884; Re Hufnagel, Id. 6,837; Augustine v. McFarland, Id. 648; Re Cooper, Id. 3,190.]</p> <p>[See Ex parte High, Case No. 6,473; Ex parte Columbian Metal Works, Id. 3,039; Ex parte Kahley, Id. 7,593; Anonymous, Id. 456; also, Foster v. Ames, Id. 4,965; Ex parte Rhodes, Id. 11,746; Davis v. Anderson, Id. 3,623.]</p> <p>[3. Cited in Re Carow, Case No. 2,426, to the point that an assignee is accountable only to the court appointing him.]</p> <p>[4. Cited in Re Brinkman, Case No. 1.8S4, to the point that an assignee will not be required to sell property incumbered for more than its value.]</p> <p>[5. Cited in Phelps v. Sellick, Case No. 11,-079, to the point that, as regards proof of debts, secured and unsecured creditors stand upon the same footing.]</p>

<p>[In equity.- Bill by Horace L. Bowker against Gustavus D. Dows to enjoin infringement of patent</p>

At law. Case against a common carrier,; for negligence in carrying tobacco from1 Bladensburg in a scow. • .offered the deposition of William Barry, a seafaring man, taken under the act • of assembly of Maryland, 1721, c. 14. .objected that the notice was.only to himself, as attorney, on the day before the taking, which was not reasonable notice. Every departure from the general rules of evidence, must be taken strictly. The act requires notice to the adverse party.

In admiralty. The ship Coringa on her voyage from Calcutta to Boston with a very valuable cargo, — ship, freight, and cargo being worth about $160,000, — lost her rudder head when near Cape Cod, and became nearly or quite unmanageable. Her master brought her to anchor off Nauset light, about two miles from the beach, on the morning of Monday, the seventh of January, 1867, and set his colors union down.

<p>In bankruptcy. On the exceptions of John Dunlop, a trust deed creditor [of Henry Bowler, a bankrupt], filed April 12th, 1877, to commissioner’s report, filed April 4th, 1877.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,737.</p> <p>Sheriffs and Constables — Summary Suspen-' sion of Constable.</p> <p>. A constable suspended from office before rule to show cause.</p>

[In equity. Bill by Isaac S. Bowman, George W. S. Bowman,-Brinker, Mary Brinker, Itebecea Bowman, and Albert T. Burnley, against Athanasius Wathen and the mayor and common council of the city of Jeffersonville, to enjoin the use of a ferry, and for an accounting.

<p>Case No. 1,741.</p> <p>Landlord and Tenant — Bent — Payment by Note — Landlord’s Lien — Bankruptcy of Tenant.</p> <p>1. If a note taken for rent is not paid at maturity the landlord is entitled to all his remedies for the security or collection of his claim, in the same manner as if the note had never been given.</p> <p>[See Scriba v. Deanes, Case No. 12,559; Bank of U. S. v. Winston, Id. 944; U. S. v. Mpr-rison, 4 Pet. (29 U. S.) 124; Morsell v. First Nat. Bank, 91TJ. S. 357.]</p> <p>2. If a tenant makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors to a trustee who sells the goods on the premises after the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and turns the proceeds over to the assignee, the landlord is entitled to payment of the rent out of the proceeds.</p> <p>[See In re Beadle, Case No. 1,155.]</p>

This was a rule obtained by the attorney, clerk and marshal, officers of this court, upon the lessees of the plaintiff, and his sureties for costs; to show cause, why an attachment should not issue against them, for their fees in the above suit, and one other, for services rendered to them, and for which they are liable.

<p>Case No. 1,743.</p> <p>Costs — Who Liable.</p> <p>The plaintiff, having recovered at law, the court directed the costs of the bill of discovery, by which the plaintiffs at law were prevented recovering, should be paid by the defendants in the bill, they being plaintiffs at law.</p> <p>[Cited in Hathaway v. Roach, Case No. 6,-213.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For subsequent proceedings in this cause, see Cases Nos. 1,742, 1,990, and 2,035.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,744.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Supplies.</p> <p>[A vessel is not chargeable with supplies furnished her in a foreign port, unless they were furnished on her credit, and an apparent necessity existed therefor.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This decree, dismissing the libel, was reversed by the circuit court (case unreported). In affirming the circuit court decision, the supreme court, per Mr. Justice Davis, stated: It is undisputed that the Patapsco was in a foreign port, and that the coal was ordered for her, specifically by name, and delivered to the officers in charge of her. It is equally free from dispute that the supply of coal was necessary — indeed, indispensable — to enable, her to make her voyage at all. In such a casé the inference is that the credit was given to the vessel, unless it can be inferred that the master had funds or the owners had credit, and that the material man knew of this, or knew such facts as should have put him on inquiry. The Lulu, 10 Wall. (77 U. S.) 192. There is no reason to suppose that the master had funds, or the owners of the line credit, or that the libelant was guilty of laches. On the contrary, it is in proof that the company which owned the line of steamships was, at the date of these transactions, hopelessly insolvent, and was borrowing large sums of money on a mortgage of its steamers, away from. home, and in the very city where libelant resided. It would be strange if the libelant did not know this condition of things, and, in the absence of proof on the subject, it is a reasonable inference that he did. If he had this knowledge, it would be a violent presumption to suppose that he relied on the credit of the company at all for the supplies which he furnished. The company running the steamers was a distant corporation, of no established name, and without personal liability in case the enterprise recently undertaken should prove a failure; and it is hard to believe that a large and intelligent coal merchant in Baltimore, in dealing with this corporation, intended to renounce his claim against the steamers in case he was not paid. It is very clear that there was no credit to the company at the time of sale, because the coal was sold for cash at the lowest market price; and when the libelant waived his privilege of cash on delivery, and put the coal on board the steamship, the presumption of law would be that he thereby gave credit to the steamship, and not to the owners thereof, inasmuch as the supplies were furnished in a foreign port.” The Patapsco v. Boyce, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 329.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,745.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Assets — Bankrupt’s Bight to Wife’s Chose in Action — Rights of Assignee —Failure to Schedule Assets — Effect.</p> <p>1. In May, 1863, a feme sole, being the owner, in her own right, of a chose in action, married, and a suit was instituted shortly thereafter to recover from the debtor in the name of the husband and wife. This suit continued pending until 1868, when the husband, upon his own petition, was declared a bankrupt, and an as-signee was appointed and an assignment executed in the usual form. Thereafter the as-signee was, upon his own motion, by order of the court, made party plaintiff with the wife, and a judgment was recovered in favor of the plaintiffs. Held, that the assignee may proceed to enforce the payment of such judgment by execution, and receive the money when collected — if this he done in the lifetime of the husband and wife — and if collected by him must distribute the same to creditors as the law directs. ■</p> <p>2. The assignee is deprived of no right because the bankrupt has failed to schedule such chose in action.</p> <p>3. Nor [are his rights affected] by the provisions of the constitution in North Carolina, adopted in 1868.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,746.</p> <p>Lien op Judgment — Docket Entkt.</p> <p>1. At common law a judgment was not a lien rnpon real property; but after the statute of Westm. 2, c. IS, allowed the creditor to take a moiety of the debtor’s land upon an elegit, and hold the same until the rents and profits satisfied the debt, it was said that a judgment was such a lien; but even then it could only be made effectual by a levy, which took effect by relation from the entry of the judgment.</p> <p>2. The lien given by section 266 of the Oregon Civil Code upon the docket of a judgment arises from the docketing and not the judgment; it is a strict legal right, and must stand or fall by the statute which gives it.</p> <p>[Cited in Be Estes, 3 Fed. 142.]</p> <p>3. The docket entry is not a part of the judicial proceeding, which ends with the entry of judgment, and therefore such entry cannot be referred to for the purpose of supplying omissions or explaining ambiguities in the docket; the latter must be complete in itself. But the whole entry of the docket is to be looked to, and not merely a single item of it, and if from the whole the amount and date of_ the judgment, the parties to it and the court in which it was rendered appear, the entry will be held sufficient.</p> <p>4. What should be entered on docket under head, “Amount of Judgment.”</p> <p>5. A judgment which by its terms cannot be enforced against the property of a party cannot become a lien thereon.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,747.</p> <p>Patents — What is Granted — Product of Patented Machine — Rights of Assignee.</p> <p>1. The exclusive grant in a patent is, the construction and use of the thing patented.</p> <p>2. Where the right consists in certain instruments by which a bedstead of a particular structure is made, the structure or use of these instruments is prohibited.</p> <p>[See Simpson v. Wilson, 4 How. (45 U. S.) 709; Goodyear v. The Railroad, Case No. 5,563.]</p> <p>3. A patentee for a flouring mill of a certain structure has an exclusive right to make and use such mill, but he can claim no monopoly in the sale of the flour he manufactures.</p> <p>4. The court will not enjoin the sale of a similar article under the same patent, in a particular district assigned to an individual, though manufactured in a different district.</p> <p>[NOTE. Patent No. 797 was issued to J. Lindlay, June 20, 1838. For another case involving this patent, see Boyd v. McAlpin, Case No. 1,748.]</p>

<p>Case Wo. 1,748.</p> <p>Patents — Assignment—Recording—Infringement — Sale op Product — Injunction.</p> <p>1. Under the eleventh section of the act of 1836 [5 Stat. 121] respecting patent rights, the patentee may assign any part of his patent so as to vest in the assignee the legal right. By the same section every assignment of a patent right is required to be recorded in three months, from the time of its execution. A failure to record such patent assignment does not forfeit the right of the assignee.</p> <p>[Cited in Oleott v. Hawkins, Case No. 10,480; Perry v. Corning, Id. 11,004.]</p> <p>[See Brooks v. Byam, Id. 1,948.]</p> <p>2. Should the same right be assigned, after the expiration of the three months, to a stranger, the assignee would hold it, whether he had or had not notice of the previous assignment.</p> <p>[Cited in Oleott v. Hawkins, Case No. 10,480. Questioned in Perry v. Corning, Id. 11,004.]</p> <p>3. The sale of the product of a patented machine is not an infringement of the patent.</p> <p>[Cited in Hogg v. Emerson, 11 How. (52 U. S.) 607.]</p> <p>[See Simpson v. Wilson, 4 How. (45 U. S.) 709; Goodyear v. The Railroad, Case No. 5,563.]</p> <p>4. But, if the person who sells is connected with the use of the machine, he is responsible for damages and may be enjoined.</p> <p>[Cited in Hogg v. Emerson, 11 How. (52 U. S.) 607; Potter v. Crowell, Case No. 11,-323.]</p> <p>5. And this may be done where the court have jurisdiction of the person, although the machine may he used beyond the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>[NOTE. For another case involving this patent, see Boyd v. Brown, Case No. 1,747.]</p>

[Error to the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] [At law. Action by the United States against 50 barrels of Cologne spirits. There was judgment for the plaintiff, and Francis O. Boyd and another, claimants, bring error.

[In admiralty. Libel by James Boyd against the canal boat Towner and 130 tons of coal. The libel in this case was filed to recover remuneration for alleged salvage services. On the afternoon of September 28, 1854, the boat was lying at the wharf at the foot of Spring street. She had been detained by the claimant, the owner of the coal, for the purpose of storing a quantity of coal in her, until he should need to use it.

<p>Case No. 1,750.</p> <p>Admiralty — Practice—Attachment—Decree.</p> <p>In a suit in personam, the defendants not being within the district, but their property being attached, and no appearance entered, the decree will not be against the defendants personally, but only against the property attached. If that property consist of specific articles, the court will order a sale. Such sale will be only of the right of the debtor. If the property attached be money in the registry, the decree will be satisfied therefrom.</p> <p>[Cited in Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., Case No. 602.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,752.</p> <p>Husband and Wife — Wife’s Power to Contract— Separate Estate — Statutes — Construction — Definition of “For Family Supplies or Necessaries.”</p> <p>1. By the common law the wife could not bind herself .or render her separate property liable, and it is only by the statute that her rights and liabilities are enlarged and only to the extent specified therein.</p> <p>2. The statute rendering the separate property of the wife liable for her contracts must be strictly construed.</p> <p>3. The wife cannot as a general borrower of money bind herself so as to render her separate property liable, no matter for what purpose the money may be afterwards applied.</p> <p>4. The meaning of the words “for family supplies or necessaries” as used in the statute defined.</p>

Motion to stay proceedings against bail, or to enter an exoneretur. The ca. sa. against [Owen]' Roberts was returned “non est,” to December term, 1803. On the 7th of Jan-nary, 1804, the law of Maryland was passed to discharge Roberts as an insolvent debtor. On the 27th January, 1804, the scire facias issued against the bail, returnable to July term, 1804, and was returned scire feci. In May, 1804, Roberts was discharged by the chancellor of Maryland.

[In admiralty. Libel by Herman Boyer, owner of the lighter Republic, against the ship Wisconsin and the tug Hector for damages sustained by collision.

<p>In. bankruptcy.</p>

[At law. Action of debt by John Boyle against William G. Arledge. Defendant demurred to a replication to his plea, and the demurrer was overruled in part and sustained in part. Plaintiff entered a nolle prosequi as to the counts of the declaration as to which the demurrer to the replication had been sustained. The case was submitted on the issues formed on the remaining count, and plaintiff thereafter took a nonsuit.]

In equity. The Mexican government in 1839 granted a rancho called “Estero Amer-icano” to Edward Manuel McIntosh. The grant was for twp square leagues, within certain designated boundaries embracing six or more square leagues. It contained the usual provisions for measuring the land, and leaving the surplus to the nation. The grant was approved by the department assembly.

At law. This was an action of ejectment [by Clement Boyreau against Robert Campbell and others], and, a jury having been waived by the parties, was submitted to the court on the law and facts, with a reservation to the parties of the right to except to the rulings of the court in relation to the admission of testimony, as well as to thé decisions made upon the law of the ease on its merits.

[In error to the district court of the United States for the district of Iowa.] This case comes before the circuit court on a writ of error to the district court The plaintiff in error, as assignee of Browne, a bankrupt, sued the defendant Johnston, for the value of goods seized under a writ of attachment against Browne in favor of Johnston, in the state court and sold under the proceedings in that case for Johnston’s debt The district court to which the case was submitted…

In admiralty. On the 22d June, 1830, the libellants, who had been seamen on board the American brig Hercules, which was wrecked on the 25th April, 1830, at Guaza-coalco, on the coast of Mexico, filed their bill , against sundry articles saved from the brig and brought into the port of Philadelphia, on board of the schooner Packet, in which vessel the libellants also returned. The libel-lants claimed the full payment of their wages, and salvage for the articles saved.

Claim for a half-league of land in Marin county, rejected by the board, and appealed by the claimant [Joshua S. Brackett].

<p>[In bankruptcy. Action by W. B. Bradbury, assignee in bankruptcy, against James Galloway, to recover assets alleged to constitute a fraudulent preference.</p>

In equity. Bill for an account of the personal estate of William Bradford; which had come to the hands of the defendant. The case was, that upon the death of William Bradford, a will was found, in all respects regular, in which the defendant was appointed the executor.

At law. In this cause, Wm. S. Flippin (G. Gantt was with him,) moved for an order directing the clerk to issue the necessary process which would enable the plaintiff to commence his action. He stated that plaintiff had some time ago brought suit in this court against the defendants, but, being ruled to give other security, had not been able, owing to his poverty, to do so, and that consequently his cause had been dismissed.

At law. This was a special action on the case. The declaration stated, that a certain conversation was had and moved, between the plaintiffs and the defendant, concerning the importation of books and stationary by the plaintiffs, from Longman & Co. of London, for whom the defendant was agent; whereupon, in consideration that the plaintiffs had promised and agreed to receive 'from the defendant certain books and stationary, on their arrival, and to pay for them at the…

<p>[At law. Action by Vincent L. Bradford, receiver of the Berrien County Bank, against Levi Jenks and others on a promissory note.</p>

[On exceptions to commissioner’s report. • [In admiralty. Libel by Edward Baldwin against the steamer Bradich Johnson, J. M. Stone, and J. H. Stone, claimants. Other creditors intervened, claiming liens for seamen’s wages, supplies furnished in home and foreign ports, etc. E. B. Lott, tax collector of Mobile county, claimed a lien for taxes, and Charles Cavaroe, Jr., claimed a lien by virtue of a mortgage.

In bankruptcy. The firm of H. G. Bradley & Go., composed of Henry G. Bradley, Henry A. Williams and Charles Campbell, were adjudicated bankrupts in this court on their own petition. One of the debts proven against the firm, and also against Charles Campbell, was a note for ¡pl.^o, signed in the firm name, payable thirty days after date to C. Campbell or order, at the National Exchange Bank of Milwaukee, and indorsed to the bank by Campbell.

<p>Case No. 1,773.</p> <p>Maritime Liens — Repairs and Supplies.</p> <p>Work done upon a vessel in the dry dock, in scraping her bottom preparatory to coppering her, is not of a maritime character; and compensation for such labor cannot be recovered in a court of admiralty.</p> <p>[Cited in Cunningham v. Hall, Case No. 3,-481; The Canada, 7 Fed. 122. Cited, but not followed, in The George T. Kemp, Case No. 5,341. Disapproved in The Vidal Sala, 12 Fed. 20S, 211.]</p> <p>Compare the cases of Cox v. Murray [Case No. 3,304]; Gurney v. Crockett [Id. 5,874.]</p>

In equity. This was a bill charging that the respondents [James W. Converse and Henry N. Farwell], as agents and trustees of a certain railroad corporation [the Boston, Hartford & Erie Railroad Company] to buy up certain mortgage-bonds of the same, had bought many of the bonds at less than their par value and had charged the corporation, on settlement, the full par value of the bonds, and that they had made extortionate charges in the said settlement.

In bankruptcy. The complainants [Charles S. Bradley, Charles K. Chapman, and George M. Barnard] were the assignees in bankruptcy of the Boston, Hartford, and Erie Kailroad Company, which was duly adjudged bankrupt, and the respondents, Henry X. Harwell, Asa -Farwell, and Samuel Hall [Jr.], composed the firm of A. G. Farwell & Co.; Henry N. Farwell was a director in the railroad company from Sept. 12, 1866, to Dec. 20, 1869, and vice-president thereof, and he was a member of…

In equity. Bill by [Charles S. Bradley, Charles R. Chapman, and George M. Barnard] the assignees in bankruptcy of the Boston, Hartford, and Erie Railroad Company, to recover property of the corporation alleged to have been transferred to the defendants [Henry N. Farwell, Asa Farwell, and Samuel Hall, Jr.], then partners, to secure a claim of the partnership against the corporation, in pursuance of votes of the board of directors of which the defendant Farwell was a member,…

<p>Case lío. 1,777.</p>

In bankruptcy. The plaintiff [Newton Bradley] is the assignee in bankruptcy of the St. Paul Lumber Company; the defendants are the sheriff [James C. Frost] and [Charles H. Rhines] a judgment creditor of the bankrupt. The action is in the nature of trover to recover the value of certain personal property seized and sold by the sheriff, the proceeds whereof were paid over to the judgment creditor.

[In equity. Bill by Charles S. Bradley and others against Mark Healey to review orders of district court. Order to take testimony rescinded, and further proceedings on petition for sale stayed.]

At law. Assumpsit by [W. A. Bradley] an indorsee against a remote indorser of a promissory note, made by Reddick McKee, agent of the Wheeling Cotton Manufacturing Company, dated at Wheeling, March 22, 1834, at 60 days, for $4,000, payable to the order of Richard Simmes at the North-West Bank of Virginia, without defalcation, for value received, and signed “R. McKee, agent Wheeling Cotton Manufacturing Company;” indorsed by Richard Simmes, Knox & McKee, M. Nelson, and W. B.…

At law. This was an action [by Henry Bradley against William Lili] upon the following promissory note: ‘‘$2,583.51. Chicago, Ill., Sept. 30th, 1859. One year after date, I promise to pay to the order of myself, two thousand five hundred and eighty-three dollars and fifty-one cents in exchange at the office of Messrs. Ashley & Norris, No. 52 Exchange Place, New York. Value received. (Signed) William Lili.

In equity. This is a bill [by James Bradley and others against William Heed and Joseph Hyde and others] claiming title to eleven thousand acres of land in Elk and Jefferson counties, and praying an injunction to stay waste. The land is of great value on account of the timber. The injunction was granted on filing the bill. Respondents’ counsel moved to dissolve it.

In equity. This was a motion for an injunction, predicated, upon a bill filed by [Harry] Bradley and others against [Andrew J.] Bichardson and others, to stay execution of two judgments amounting together to the sum of $51,992.04, recovered by Bichardson and others, at the October term of this court in 1851, against the Burlington) Mill Company, a corporation established under an act of the legislature of Vermont, for the manufacture and sale of woollen goods.

<p>Case No. 1,787.</p> <p>Public Lands — Grants—Exclusiveness.</p> <p>1. The act of assembly of South Carolina, of March 1st, 1870, “gives and grants” to the persons it names, “the right to dig, mine, and remove,” for twenty-one years “from the beds of the navigable streams and waters within the jurisdiction of the state, the phosphate rocks and the phosphate deposits” contained therein, and requires the grantees to pay the state one dollar per ton for every ton removed, requiring a deposit of $500 in cash as a license for, and a bond in the penal sum of $500, to be filed, conditioned for the faithful payment of the amounts accruing to the state. Held, on a bill of injunction brought by the-grantees against the defendants, a company subsequently chartered by the legislature, with similar rights and powers to those conferred upon the complainants by the statute of 1st March, 1870, that the complainants derived no exclusive privilege from the act first in date, and that the injunction must be refused and the bill dismissed.</p> <p>[Cited in-State v. Coosaw Min. Co., 47 Fed. 226.]</p> <p>[See Rice v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 1 Black (66 U. S.) 360.]</p> <p>2. This case distinguished from that of Mas-sot v. Moses, 3 S. C. 168; and assimilated to that of Doe v. Wood, 2 Barn. & Aid. 724.</p>

<p>The complainant submitted the following points:</p> <p>. In Burr’s Case, pages 14 and 15 [Ex parte Burr, Case No. 2,186]: “The court has power to punish for any ill-practice attended with fraud and corruption, and committed against the obvious rules of justice and common honesty. * * * Is not the respectability of the court in some measure connected with that of the bar? A regard to the purity of the administration of justice demands that the bar should be pure and honest, and if possible highly honorable. The members of the bar in this country act in the double capacity of attorneys and counselors. As counselors the court reposes in them great confidence. It cannot doubt their honor and integrity, and it is the duty of the court to see that they conduct themselves in such a manner as to deserve their confidence.” The Case of Brounsall, Cowp. 829, decides the principle that the court will strike from the rolls an attorney who, by his conduct, although not official, has shown himself not to be a fit person to be an attorney. The same doctrine prevails in Virginia. In Leigh’s Case, 1 Munf. 4S1, Judge Rown says: “None are permitted to act as such (attorneys) but those who are allowed by the judge and certified by the court of the county of their residence to be persons of honesty, probity and good demeanor.” In the Case of James A. Porter (U. S. v. Porter [Case No. 16,072]), of this court, the court says: “It is the duty of the court to see that the members of the bar maintain the purity of character of that profession, which Lord Mansfield has justly said should be free from all' suspicion. It is bound to discountenance and to punish every direct attempt by any of its officers to obstruct the due administration of justice, and there are standing at this bar gentlemen of high and honorable character for legal science, and for moral and professional integrity, to whom we should do injustice if we compelled them to associate with men of an opposite character.”</p>

<p>Case No. 1,788a.</p> <p>Promissory Note — Assignment — Necessity op Indorsement — Action on — Defenses.</p> <p>1. Under the statute of assignments (Geyer’s Dig. 60), making all bonds, bills, and promissory notes for money or property assignable, to authorize an assignee to sue in his own name, a note must not only be assigned and made over, but must be indorsed. Delivery without indorsement is not sufficient.</p> <p>2. An indorsement is a written assignment on the back of the note, in the absence of which the holder, neither by statute nor the common law, can maintain an action against the prom-isor in his own name.</p> <p>3. The statutes 3 & 4 Anne. c. 9, placing notes on the footing of inland bills of exchange, cited, and various cases in connection with them commented on.</p> <p>4. The maker of a note may set up the same defence against it in the hands of an assignee, that he mighc make if it were held by the payee.</p>

[In equity. Bill by William L. Bradly against the Phosphate Company, George W. Williams & Co., Pelzer, Rogers & Co., and others.

In bankruptcy. This was a bill In chancery filed by William A. Bradshaw, assignee of Armstead M. Klein, a bankrupt, against Henry Klein and others.

[In admiralty. Libel by William D. Bradshaw against the schooner Sylph (Elizabeth Anna Houseman, claimant), to recover possession of the schooner. On the 16th of November, 1835, the schooner was sold at auction in this city, as a wreck, and was bought in by Wm. R. Kin-caird, for the sum of $320. Kincaird advanced $175 of the purchase money, and the libellant $145. The auctioneer’s bill of parcels was made out to Bradshaw and - Kin-caird as joint purchasers.

In admiralty. This was a libel in per-sonam, by John A. Bradstreet, master of tbe bark Lowell, against David Heran and others, members of the firm of Heran, Lees & Co., to recover a balance of freight due.

In admiralty. John A. Bradstreet, master of the bark Lowell, filed a libel in personam in the district court, against Heran, Lees & Co., of New York, to recover a balance due him for freight on five hundred and seven bales of cotton shipped by that vessel from New Orleans to New York, and consigned to the respondents.

At law. This was an action [by Simon Bradstreet and others] on a policy of insurance on the schooner Gardiner of Gardiner, and the declaration alleged a loss by seizure, &c. The defendants admitting, that the vessel was seized by the Mexican government, averred, that she was so seized, and was detained and finally condemned on account of a violation of the revenue laws of Mexico, and to prove this averment, they pro-' dneed a transcript of the record of the proceedings of…

In equity. This was a bill [by Edwin L. Brady against the Atlantic Works] founded upon letters-patent of the United States for certain improvements in dredging-boats. The chief defence was that the respondents had built the alleged infringing boat under a contract with the government, and that they could not therefore be restrained from so doing. The question of injunction was deferred for further consideration.

[On exceptions to master’s report. [In equity. Bill by Edwin L. Brady against the Atlantic Works to enjoin the infringement of letters patent No. 72,360, issued to complainant December 17, 1867, for improvements in dredging-boats, and for an accounting. There was a decree for an account (Case No. 1,794), and a report by the master to whom the matter was referred, to which report both parties excepted.

At law. Action by Mary Brady, as widow and administratrix, for pecuniary loss caused by the alleged wrongful act of the city of Chicago, occasioning the death of her husband, John Brady. The following is the statute of Illinois, under which the action was brought (Laws Feb. 12, 1853; 1 Gross’ St. 60): “§ 1.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Samuel S. Brag-don against the Kitty Simpson.</p>