Volume 4 — Federal Cases

<p>[On exceptions to decision of commissioner in bankruptcy. In the matter of Maynard Bragg.</p>

[At law. Action by Braxton Bragg against Lorio and others to recover possession of land.) This cause was submitted to the court upon the issues of law and of fact, the parties having waived the intervention of a jury. [Judgment for defendants.)

About the 31st day of May, 1858, the plaintiffs employed one Edward Heilbruth, a merchandise broker, to sell as a broker, 650 bags of Manilla coffee.

[At law. Action by the assignee of Brain-ard and Geoffray against Williams on a promissory note and a bill of exchange. Demurrer by defendant to the first three counts of the declarations overruled.

<p>Case No. 1,803.</p> <p>Patents — Automatic Gong Attachment for Fire Engine Houses.</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Erastus Brainard and others, owners of the schooner E. Brain-ard, against the steamer Worcester.</p> <p>This libel was in favor of the libelants, the owners of the schooner E. Brainard, to recover damages which they sustained in consequence of a collision between the B. Brain-ard and the steamer Worcester, on the night of the 16th of June, 1S55. At the time it occurred, the schooner was lying at anchor, with her foresail, mainsail, and maintopsail up, in the channel way for vessels proceeding from New London to New York, a little over three fourths of a mile from New London light The steamer was on a voyage from New London to New York. The night was dark and foggy; by the collision the schooner was sunk. At the time of the collision, the steamer was going at from eight to ten miles an hour. The schooner was not discovered in time to prevent a collision.</p>

In admiralty. This was an action brought to recover the wages of libellant as mate, and of his wife as cook, of the scow Bramen during the season of 1870. The action was in personam against Hurst, as the owner of the scow. Hurst denied the ownership and his liability.

[In admiralty. Libel in personam by David P. Bramhall, owner of the barque Eliza Barss, against Thomas 'Shaler, Jr., for breach of a charter party. Decree for libellant] In this case the barque Eliza Barss, owned by the libellant was chartered for a voyage to New Orleans and back, at a fixed valuation of $2,700, one-half of the chartered money to have been paid at New Orleans, by the consignees, and the other half to have been paid in New York on the return cargo.

In equity. This is a motion [by Josiah Brammer] to dissolve an injunction granted to restrain the defendants, [Warren W.] Jones and [John] Benedick, from infringing letters patent [No. 21,856] for “improvement in machines for cutting staves,” granted to William Steele, October 19, 1858.

<p>In equity. This was a petition [by Thomas Branch and others, and Thomas P. Branch, partners as Branch, Sons & Oo. and the South Georgia & Florida Railroad Company] filed in the principal case of [Morris K.] Jessup, Trustee, v. The Atlantic & Gulf Railroad Company et al. [Case No. 7,299] by Branch, Sons & Co. The petition alleged that the Atlantic & Gulf Railroad Company had purchased the railroad of the South Georgia & Florida Railroad Company, in payment for which it had issued preferred stock in its own company. The petitioners averred that they were holders of this preferred stock, and they claimed that on a sale of the railroad of the Atlantic & Gulf Railroad Company, including that portion thereof purchased as aforesaid, they would be entitled to priority of payment out of the proceeds of the sale of so much of the railroad as was purchased from the South Georgia & Florida Railroad Company; that their equities were better than those of the mortgagees of the Atlantic & Gulf Railroad Company. The prayer of this petition was according to this claim.</p>

[In equity. Bill by John P. Branch against the Macon & Brunswick Railroad Company to foreclose a mortgage.] Heard on motion for preliminary injunction and for the appointment of a receiver.

<p>Case No. 1,809.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proof and Payment op Debts — Liens — State Taxes — Secured Debt — Waiver op Security — Presumption in Favor op Innocent Creditors.</p> <p>1. A state has in her sovereign capacity a lien on all her realty for taxes.</p> <p>2. Such lien has priority over any claim of-one of her citizens, no matter when such claim, may have been acquired.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Southwestern Car Co., Case Not 13,192.)</p> <p>3. A creditor, ignorant of his legal rights, will not be held, in the absence of proof of fraud, to intend what his innocent acts imply, particularly if such creditor be acting in a fiduciary capacity.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Montgomery, Case No. 9,729; Re Hope Min. Co., Id. 6,681; Re McConnell, Id. 8,712; Re Parkes, Id. . 10,754; Napier v. Server, Id. 10,010 (in brief); Re Baxter, 12 Fed. 75.)</p> <p>14. Cited in Re Stansell, Case No. 13,293, in Re Jaycox, Id. 7,242. and Merchants’ Nat. Bank of Syracuse v. Comstock, 55 N. X. 24, to the point that a creditor who proves his. whole debt as unsecured, without disclosing the-security, thereby waives and relinquishes his lien.)</p>

[In equity. BUI by David W. Prime and others against the Brandon Manufacturing Company for infringement of letters patent No. 14,119, dated January 15,' 1856, No. 24,-162, dated May 24, 1859, No. 25,148, dated Augqst 16, 1859, issued to Francis M. Strong and Thomas Ross, and No. 35,348, dated May 20, 1862, issued to John W. Howe, as-signee of Strong & Ross, for improvements in weighing scales.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

In bankruptcy. The following question arose and was stated and agreed to by John W. Hinsdale, attorney for H. B. Claflin & Co., and Wolf, Mayer, Hays & Co., creditors of said bankrupt, having entered their appearance in opposition to the discharge of said bankrupt, and Mr. B. Fuller, attorney for said bankrupt, viz.; “Whether, upon the attendance of the bankrupt before the register, at a meeting to show cause in opposition to his discharge, a creditor, who has not obtained…

In bankruptcy. Certificate of William A. Guthrie, Register. The following questions arose in the course of these proceedings, and were stated and agreed to by the attorneys for bankrupt and creditors: I. Whether an order for the examination of a bankrupt, under the twenty-sixth section of the bankrupt act [1867; 14 Stat 529], must not bo the order of the court instead of a mere paper in the form of an order, issued to the register by the clerk of the court, and filled up by…

[In equity. Bill by Daniel R. Brandt against the Virginia Coal & Iron Company and Jane Sinclair, to restrain defendant company from mining coal, and for an accounting.

At law. This was a scire facias. It recited the judgment obtained by the plaintiff [Thomas Brattle], as executor [of W. Brattle], against the estate of the defendant’s testator; the suing out of execution; the marshal’s return of nulla bona. It then suggested waste by administrator, and concluded with a prayer for execution against the administrator de bonis propriis.

<p>Case No. 1,817.</p> <p>Towage — Liability of Owners of Tug as Common Carriers — Liability for Negligence.</p> <p>1. The owners of a steamer, taking, in tow a flat-boat at a low stage of water in the Ohio river, are not liable for the loss of the flat boat and its cargo as common carriers.</p> <p>2. If carelessness, negligence, or want of skill in the navigation of the steamer be proved, the owners are liable for the loss, not otherwise.</p> <p>[See The Fannie Tuthill, 12 Fed. 446.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. The following questions were certified by the register:] “Is a judgment in favor of the United States against the bankrupt for a fine, in default of the payment of which he is now confined in jail, a debt from which ‘a discharge in bankruptcy would release him,’ and is the said bankrupt now entitled to be released from imprisonment, during the pendency of proceedings in bankruptcy, upon his petition?” The attorney of the bankrupt, J. E. Thomas, insists that a…

<p>Case No. 1,819.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Interruption of Voyage— Forfeiture — Imprisonment.</p> <p>1. If a voyage be interrupted without the fault of the crew they shall receive wages during the time they work on board the vessel in port.</p> <p>[Cited in Joy v. Allen, Case No. 7,552; Hoffman v. Harrington, Id. 6,580; The Heroe, 21 Fed. 528.]</p> <p>[See The Maria, Case No. 9,074; Hindman v. Shaw, Id. 6,514; The Hudson, Id. 6,831; Hussey v. Fields, Id. 6,947; The Page, Id. 10,660.]</p> <p>2. The act of congress for the regulation of merchant seamen must be strictly-followed, it being penal. If the mariners suffer imprisonment under the 7th clause of that act, they shall not also forfeit wages under the 5th clause.</p> <p>[Cited in Sherwood v. McIntosh, Case No. 12,778; Brower v. The Maiden, Id. 1,970.]</p>

At law. Trespass on the case for the infringement of a patent right. Plaintiff [Benjamin Bray] was the patentee of an invention entitled a “certain new and useful improvement in spring rollers or fixtures for the hanging and balancing of house curtains, maps, and drawings, and for other similar uses.” [Patent No. 11,G3S.] Defendant [Jacob Hartshorn] pleaded the general issue and also filed certain special defences.

[On appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Connecticut. [In admiralty. Libel against the tug Brazos for breach of a contract of towage. There was decree for libellant in the district court (case not reported), and the owners of the tug appeal.

In bankruptcy. Richard S. Roberts presented a petition to the court, setting forth that Breck & Schermerhorn [William P. Breck and William- B. Schermerhorn] were adjudged bankrupts on December 16th, 1873, on a voluntary petition; that, at the time of filing their petition, they were in possession, as tenants, of premises belonging to the petitioner, under a lease for nine months from May 1st, 1873, at a rent of $4,800 per annum, in which premises they carried on the business…

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of William P. Breck and William B. Sehermerhom.]</p>

<p>[At law. Action by Orson Breed upon a policy of marine insurance.</p>

In admiralty. The case was, that the ship belonged to Boston, and was chartered on a voyage to Bristol in England and back to Boston. On the homeward voyage she was compelled to go into Kinsale, in Ireland, to refit; and there the necessary sum for the repairs was advanced by a person connected in business with the charterers; and a bot-tomry bond was taken in their name for the amount.

In equity. Bill of injunction. The. bill is brought by William H. Breeden, a citizen of the state of New York, against the defendants [A. S. Lee, R. T. Thorpe, and J. M. Sloane], citizens of Virginia.

<p>Case No. 1,829.</p> <p>Collision in East River — Inscrutable Fault.</p> <p>1. Where two schooners came in collision in the East river in the daytime, and the court, on considering the evidence, was unable to determine in what way the collision was caused, held, that the case was one of inscrutable fault, and that the libel must be dismissed.</p> <p>[Cited in The Worthington and Davis, 19 Fed. 839; The Max Morris, 28 Fed. 884.]</p> <p>[See The Scioto, Case No. 12,508.]</p> <p>2. The libellant in a collision case must establish fault on the part of the opposing vessel causing the collision, or he can recover nothing.</p> <p>[Cited in The Alhambra, 33 Fed. 77; The ICallisto, Case No. 7,600.]</p>

In bankruptcy. This was a petition by certain creditors of Henry Breneman, to have him declared a bankrupt, under the act of 19th August, 1841 (5 Stat 440).

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libel by Brennan and others, owners of the schooner Speculator, against the steamship Virgo, to recover for injuries sustained by collision. The district court dismissed the libel (Case No. 10,975), and libelant appeals. [Por a decision granting libelant’s motion to file new security for value pending this appeal, see Case No. 16,976.]

<p>Case No. 1,832.</p> <p>Bankrupt Act — Fraudulent Preference — Withdrawal op Consent to Discharge.</p> <p>1. A creditor who has consented in writing to the discharge of the bankrupt under the fifty per cent, clause, and whose consent has been acted upon and filed, has no absolute right to withdraw or cancel it, though such right be claimed on the day fixed for the hearing.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Seeley, Case No. 12,628.]</p> <p>2. Section 29 [Act March 2, 1867; 14 Stat. 531], as to what frauds upon the bankrupt act will disentitle the bankrupt to a discharge, considered.</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. Nature of jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit court by the second section of the bankrupt act, and what may be reviewed, see Woods v. Buckewell [Case No. 17,991]; Marshall v. Knox (1872); 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 551; Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall. [83 U. S.] 258: Morgan v. Thornhill, 11 Wall. [78 U. S.] 65; Mead v. Thompson. 15 Wall. [82 U. S.] 635; Hall v. Allen, 12 Wall. [79 U. S.] 452; Hawkins v. Hastings Nat. Bank [Case No. 6,245], and cases cited in note.</p>

The writ was returnable to November term, 1811. The plaintiff excepted to the appearance-bail at the first rules in January, 1812. At April rules there was a-common order against the defendant and bail. At May rules the office judgment was confirm•ed. No motion was made at July term, 1812, for judgment against the marshal, but nil debet was joined for the surety.

At law. Assumpsit, against the indorser of a promissory note discounted at the Patriotic Bank of Washington, for the accommodation of the maker. No demand was made of payment on the maker until the day after the last day of grace.

<p>Case No. 1,843.</p> <p>Insolvbnct — Discharge under Insolvent Law —Effect—Judgments—Action on.</p> <p>1. A New York judgment creditor, who has re-sued his judgment in the state court of Wisconsin, but also joined in insolvency proceedings in New York, cannot maintain a suit in the federal court on his Wisconsin judgment.</p> <p>2. The discharge bars the New York judgment, and the other is dependent upon it.</p>

Bill in equity by [W. H. Brett] the as-signee in bankruptcy of one Osborne N. Sargent, against [H. H. Carter] a mortgagee of the stock of stationery and other similar goods.

[In admiralty. Libel in personam by Gustavus A. Brett against Thorgny Zachrissen, consul, to recover on a charter party. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the court on a case made.

[At law. Action of ejectment by Brettaugh against the Locust Mountain Coal & Iron Company. [Prior to 1848, the owner of a tract of land lying in Columbia and Schuylkill counties had the same surveyed, and returned the survey to the county commissioner of Schuylkill county for the purpose of assessment and taxation. In. 1848, the 65+acres lying in Schuylkill county were assessed, and the taxes thereon were thereafter duly paid for the years 1848 and-1849.

<p>Case No. 1,847.</p> <p>Salvage — Admiralty Jurisdiction — Who are Salvors — Compensation—Apportionment and Distribution.</p> <p>1. An American ship captured by a French privateer, and eight days afterwards rescued by the libellants, and carried into a port of the United States. The vessel and cargo were sold, and afterwards a claim on the ship and on the owners of the cargo, for salvage, allowed -by the court</p> <p>[Cited in Willard v. Dorr, Case No. 17,679;] American Ins. Co. v. Johnson, Id. 303; Edwards v. Sherman, Id. 4,298; The Merchant, Id. 9,434; New Jersey Steam Nav.-Co. v. Merchants’ Bank, 6'How. (47 U. S.) 436; Gates v. Johnson, Case No. 5,-268; New York Harbor Protection Co. v. The Clara,- 23 Wall. (90 U. S.) 18. Distinguished in The Missouri, Case No. 9,-654.]</p> <p>2. Jurisdiction of the district court Upon what it is founded.</p> <p>[Cited in Studley v. Baker, Case No. 13,-559.]</p> <p>3. Courts of admiralty proceed in rem. Courts of common law do not.</p> <p>' [Cited in Hill v. The Golden Gate, Case No. 6,491.]</p> <p>4. Jurisdiction [in admiralty is] founded h> original cause and place of transaction.</p> <p>5. No case [can be] sustained at common law for salvage on the high sea.</p> <p>»[Cited in Packard v. The Louisa, Case No. 10,652; Clayton v. Harmony, Id. 2,871.]</p> <p>6. Admiralty courts proceed as often in per-sonam as in rem, [and the] right to proceed in rem does not exclude [the] remedy in personam; [in- admiralty as at common law a] party may pursue several remedies, but can have only one satisfaction.</p> <p>[Cited in The Richard Busteed, Case No. 11,-764.]</p> <p>7. Bona fide compromise precludes farther demand for salvage.</p> <p>8. Salvage can only be allowed on the goods actually delivered.</p> <p>9. [The] quality [and responsibility] of the master is changed by capture [of his vessel]; and, on rescue, he acts in a new capacity.</p> <p>10. Freight lost by capture [is not chargeable to the recaptors who claim salvage where the] voyage [is] destroyed.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,848.</p> <p>Evidence — Testimont in Other Suit — Admissibility.</p> <p>B. brought a suit in equity in this court against C. and others, and in it took the deposition of one I., as a witness. B. then discontinued the suit, and afterwards brought another suit in equity against the same defendants, in this court, for the same cause of action. No proofs were taken in it by either party, and, after it had been set down for hearing, by the consent of both parties, the defendants applied for an order to permit them to read, as testimony, the deposition of I., so taken in the former suit. It was not shown that I. was dead, or that there was anything to prevent his being examined in the usual way: Meld, that the application must be refused.</p> <p>[Cited in The John H. Starin, Case No. 7,-351.]</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by Henry 0. Brewer against Samuel B. Caldwell and others.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,849.</p> <p>Conversion — Damages — Election —Value ob Amount Received — Principal and Agent.</p> <p>Where an agent has converted gold-bearing bonds of his principal, the former is liable either for their value or for the amount received, and the principal may elect which he will have. Equity, having acquired jurisdiction, will give him whichever is more equitable.</p>

[Petition for review of the decision of the district court of the United States for the district of Nebraska.] In bankruptcy. On the 8th day of March, 1S76, the petition in bankruptcy, on which the adjudication is sought, was filed by the Omaha National Bank against the Brewer & Bemis Brewing Company.

<p>Case No. 1,851.</p> <p>Corporations — Subscriptions por Stock —Conditions — Parol Evidence to Vart Written Contract — Withdrawal op Subscription — Bad Faith — Consideration op Contract.</p> <p>[1. Where a paper pledging the signers to pay the amounts put down by them as subscriptions to increase the capital stock of a corporation is circulated, and the subscriptions thereto procured, by an agent of the corporation, parol evidence in an action by the corporation to enforce payment is - inadmissible to prove that the subscriptions were made on the condition that they should be invalid unless a certain amount was pledged.]</p> <p>[2. Parol evidence is admissible in such an action to prove such a condition if the paper was circulated among the subscribers by one of their number, and the signatures thereto were not contracts with the company until the condition was fulfilled.]</p> <p>[3. Where a paper pledging the signers to take stock in a corporation is circulated for signatures by one of the signers, not an agent of the corporation, and under condition that, unless a certain amount is raised, the paper shall never be delivered to the corporation, and shall never become binding upon the signers, the subscriptions become binding contracts as soon as the specified amount is pledged, although the signers are thereafter erroneously informed, by the person circulating the paper, that the amount has not been secured, and thereupon attempt to cancel their subscriptions.]</p> <p>[4. In such a case, if the specified amount had not been pledged at the time of the attempted withdrawal, but was thereafter secured, and if the attempted withdrawal was in bad faith, and for the purpose of enabling the subscribers to establish a rival company, the subscribers are bound.]</p> <p>[5. Where additional capital stock is subscribed on condition that the corporation make a certain extension of their business, one who refuses to pay his subscription, and thereby prevents such extension, cannot be relieved from his liability on the ground that the failure to make the extension rendered the contract void for want of consideration.]</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel in rem by John Curry and others against the cargo and materials of the ship Brewster for salvage.]</p>

<p>At law. This was an action of assumpsit [by Caleb Brewster] against [David Gelston] the defendant, who was collector of the district of New-York, to recover a portion of a forfeiture which the plaintiff claimed under the collection law, as informer. The declaration contained the money counts, and the defendant pleaded the general issue. It appeared on the trial, that the brig Rambler from St. Bartholomew’s, was on the 7th day of March, 1812, boarded, and a man put on board of her at Sandy Hook by the revenue cutter Active, under orders from the collector to send vessels from St. Bartholomew’s bound for Amboy to New-York. The plaintiff was master of the Active, but was absent at the time in the interior of the state, and did not .return until April Ca-hoone, the lieutenant of the Active, boarded the Rambler. He observed by the manifest, that New-London, the port of the Rambler’s destination, had been .erased, and Perth-Amboy freshly written in its place. He received no information, nor saw any thing to excite a suspicion while on board, that the Rambler was violating any law of the United States. The Rambler came up to New-York, where she was seized on the 9th day of March, and on the 16th a libel was filed against her. The seizure was made in consequence of information given to the surveyor, Sehenck, by two of her seamen, Burn-ham and Lovis, and their testimony was very material in procuring her condemnation. There was no evidence offered at the trial, to show that the seizure was made in consequence of information given by the plaintiff. The only attempt made to show this, was by the testimony of Smith, second mate of the Active, who stated, that the defendant had admitted in conversation, that the Rambler was a prize of the Active, and that her officers would be entitled to a share of the forfeiture if the Rambler should be •condemned. He also, and a witness by the name of Clark, testified that Burnham and Lovis had admitted, that they first gave the information of the Rambler’s illegal proceedings to the plaintiff. But the testimony of Cahoone, Sehenck, Burnham, and Lovis, and documents produced on the trial, and the absence of the plaintiff, showed that this was not the fact, and that the plaintiff did not give the information to the collector. It appeared, however, that the plaintiff made exertions to detain Burnham and Lovis, until the trial of the Rambler, and kept them on board his vessel for that purpose; and was instrumental finally, in procuring their attendance as witnesses. It appeared however, that Sehenck made equal exertions for these purposes. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, for 2259 dollars and 94 cents, the share of the forfeiture to which he would have been entitled, had the information been given by him. The defendant’s counsel, excepted to the charge to the jury, which is fully stated in the following opinion of the court, and the bill of exceptions was now argued on a motion for a new trial, for misdirection of the court, and because the verdict was against evidence.</p>

Demurrer to plea. This was an action of replevin 1o recover the possession of fifty-two barrels of high wines, to which the plaintiffs [Brice et al.] claimed ownership by purchase from F. Bergenthal & Bro.

<p>Case No. 1,855.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—War.</p> <p>Mariners ship at Philadelphia, in January, 1783, on a voyage to L’Orient, and back again, it being a time of war. The ship falls down the river in order to commence her voyage, but does not enter on the high seas until the 20th of March, 1783. In the mean time, viz. on the 3d of March, peace takes place. The mariners receive their full wages, according to contract, from the time of signing the articles until the 3d of March, and only customary peace wages after the 3d of March until the completion of the voyage.</p> <p>[See McCulloch v. Lethe, Case No. 8,738; Shaw v. Lethe, Id. 12,721.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,856.</p> <p>Petition fob Removal or Cause — Removal from State to Federal Court — Before Final Hearing — When Case Appealed.</p> <p>1. The act of congress of March 2, 1867 [14 Stat. 558], only authorizes a removal where an application is made before the final hearing or trial of the suit, and this means before final judgment in the court of original jurisdiction where the suit is brought.</p> <p>[See Stevenson v. Williams, 19 Wall. (86 U. S.) 572; Boggs v. Willard, Case No. 1,603.]</p> <p>2. When a case is commenced in the common pleas court of a state, and a trial had in such court, and the case appealed to the district court of the state, it is then too late to ask to have such cause removed into the United States court, under the above-named act</p> <p>[See Lowe v. Williams, 94 U. S. 650; In re Frazer, Case No. 5,068; Craigie v. McAr-thur, Id. 3,341.]</p>

Bill in equity [by Abel E. Bridge and others against Rufus H. Brown and others] for an injunction to restrain alleged infringement of reissued letters-patent' [No. 1,922], for an improved process for extracting tan bark, granted S. W. Pingree, March 28, 1865; and for an account of profits. The original patent [No. 41,782], was granted to Pingree, March 1, 1864. The complainants were the •owners of the reissue for the New England states, by assignment.

Bill in equity [by Abel E. Bridge -against Rufus Brown and others] for an' injunction to restrain alleged infringement of letters-patent for an improved apparatus for making extracts from tan-bark, granted S. W. Pingree Oct. 24, 1865; and for an account of profits.

<p>Case No. 1,859.</p> <p>Patents— Cooking Stoves — Patentability— . >».' Noveltt.</p> <p>1. The patent to Esek Bussey and C. A. McLeod, No. 180,001, July 18, 1876, for “improvement in cooking-stoves,” construed in the light of the art. if sustainable at all, does not cover all methods of raising the shelf by means of closing the oven door, but only the particular method (means) described.</p> <p>2. The cam being old, the use of a swinging door as a lever being old, and the shelf being old, it might be a question whether there was a sufficient degree of invention in bringing these old elements to bear on the hinged shelf to make it patentable.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Affirmed by the supreme court on the ground that, the device of defendant being different, there was no infringement, Mr. Justice Bradley, in delivering the opinion, stating: “Both devices operate upon the same principle precisely as that which has been used for a long time in raising and lowering a carriage step by shutting and opening the door, and in other contrivances by which the same general effect is produced. Cam movements, and others of like character, producing simultaneous operations according to the needs of the case, such as opening valves in a steam engine as the piston ascends and descends, and a thousand other things, are in such common use that it requires but very little invention to adapt them to a particular case, like the one under consideration. We think, with the court below, that the patentee, if entitled to anything, is only entitled to the precise device which he has described and claimed in his patent; and, as the defendants use a different device, they are not guilty of infringement.” Bridge, Beach & Co. v. Excelsior Manuf’g Co., 105 U. S. 618.</p> <p>[Patent No. 180,001 was granted to Bussey and McLeod, July 18, 1876. See Bussey v. Excelsior Manuf’g Co., 1 Fed. 640.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. This was a libel, in rem, filed in the district court, against the steamer Bridgeport, to recover for the damages sustained by a schooner, in a collision between the two vessels, which occurred on the 12th of September, 1804, between one and two o’clock p. m., in the channel which separates Blackwell’s island from the New York shore, near the head of the island.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libel by George Shaw against the steamer Bridgeport, Charles Weeks, and Robert Haydock, claimants, for damages caused by collision. There was a decree for libellant in the district court (Case No. 12,717), and claimants appeal.

[Petition for a writ of habeas corpus by Brown on behalf of Dock Bridges.

[In admiralty. Libel by the Traders’ Insurance Company and other underwriters of the cargo of the schooner Bridgewater to recover from one Dingman and others a portion of said cargo, alleged to have been fraudulently sold by the master. Decree for libellants.] In November, 1870, D. W. Erwin shipped on board the schooner at Chicago 36,000 bushels of wheat, consigned to Buffalo, upon which he effected an insurance of the same by libellants in the sum of $38.600.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel against the brig Bridgewater.</p>

<p>[On certificate of register in bankruptcy.]</p>

<p>[On certificate of register in bankruptcy.]</p>

In bankruptcy. C. A. Briggs & Co., creditors of the bankrupt, within two years after the discharge heretofore granted to him, applied to the court, under section 34 of the statute of 1867, to annul the same.

<p>Case No. 1,869.</p> <p>United States Marshal — Warrant in Bankruptcy — Propertt op Baxkrupt.</p> <p>A transferred property to B, with a view to giving a preference. C purchased a portion of said property from B. The marshal seized the property and effects of A, including that purchased by C, under warrant, whereupon C prays the court to order a return of same. The marshal, under a warrant issued in accordance with section 40 of the bankrupt law [of 1S67; 14 Stat. 537], may take possession of the property of the debtor wheresoever and in whose hands soever he may find it. If indemnified, it is made his duty in the one case to retain possession, and to take possession in the other. With indemnity, he would be liable if he did not exercise his authority — without it, it is optional with him.</p>

BUI in equity [by William Briggs against Arthur French]. The bill set out a fraudulent attachment and levy of the defendant, by a contrivance with his debtor, upon' land sold by the latter to the plaintiff, situate in New Hampshire, before the deed of conveyance to the plaintiff was recorded, and charged the defendant with full notice of all the facts.

Bill in equity [by William Briggs against Arthur French]. The bill set out a fraudulent attachment, and levy of the defendant, by a contrivance with his debtor, upon land sold by the latter to the plaintiff, situate in New Hampshire, before the deed of conveyance to the plaintiff was recorded, .and charged the defendant with full notice of all the facts.

plaintiffs bring their suit on coupons detached from Johnson county bonds, known as normal school bonds, issued under an act of the legislature of Missouri, entitled “An act to aid in the establishment of normal schools,” approved March 19th, 1870.

<p>[In equity. Bill by Jerome B. Brigham, receiver of the Milwaukee and Superior Bail-road Company, against Charles H. Ludding-ton and others, to enforce a decree.</p>

In bankruptcy. This case came before the court on the petition of William S. Briggs, setting forth the following facts, viz.: That upon the petition of the said Briggs, filed October 20, 1842, Gideon Stephens was, on the 8th of March, 1843, decreed a bankrupt. On the 10th of January, 1843, a judgment was recovered by Archibald Stephens,' in the supreme court of this state, for $6,000.

[In equity. Bill by John Bright against John W. Boyd for injunction and other relief. Interlocutory decree for plaintiff, and order of reference to a master.] The bill stated in substance as follows: That on the 3d day of November. 1816. John P. Boyd was seised in fee of the southerly part of lot No. 37, in Bangor, according to the survey and plan of the Settlers’ Lots, made by Park Holland, in 1801.

[In equity. Bill by John Bright against John W. Boyd for injunction and other relief. This cause was formerly before the court, and the decision then had, and the reasons therefor, are reported in 1 Story, 478, et seq. [Bright v. Boyd, Case No. 1,875]. The interlocutory decree then made was as follows: “First Interlocutory Decree in the Case of John Bright in Equity against Jno.

<p>[In bankruptcy. Petition bj' William H. Brightman and Hiram B. Losee to review a decision of the district court for the southern district of New York, refusing their application for discharge.</p>

<p>In equity.</p> <p>[Bill by Aaron S. Bright against the Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Company and others.</p>

A petition in bankruptcy was filed against L. Brightman & Sons, March 22, 1876. On the 15th of April, 1876, resolutions for composition, which had been duly passed and accepted, were ordered to be recorded.

[Appeal from -a decree of the district ■court of the United States for the district of Missouri.] This was an appeal from a decree in admiralty. It was a libel of information, praying process of arrest against the steamer ■“Bright Star,” and a decree for certain penalties, amounting in all to the sum of ?20,-500, and that she be condemned and sold to pay the same.

<p>Case Wo. 1,881.</p> <p>Shipping — Fbeight—Delivery—Lien.</p> <p>A vessel brought a cargo of brimstone from Palermo to New York under a charter which contained no clause binding the goods to the ship and the ship to the goods. On arrival at New York, the cargo was delivered unconditionally, and without any understanding that it should be subject to a lien for the charter-money. But, after such delivery, the owners of the ship filed a libel against the cargo to recover the amount of the charter-money, for which they claimed to have a lien enforceable against the cargo. Held, that the lien of the vessel on the cargo for her freight was lost by the delivery and could not be enforced.</p> <p>[Cited in The Giulio, 34 Fed. 912.]</p> <p>[See Sears v. Four Thousand Bight Hundred and Eighty-Five Bags of Linseed, Case No. 12,589; One Hundred and Eighteen Sticks of Timber, Id. 10,519.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,882.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Assignee—Rights and Duties— Employ or Attokney — Compensation.</p> <p>1. An assignee cannot, without the consent of the court, make an agreement with an attorney employed by him to conduct a suit, by which the fees of the latter are to be contingent on the result of the suit.</p> <p>2. The bankrupt court has power to determine in a summary manner the question as to the proper amount to be allowed as fees to an attorney employed by the assignee, and to order the attorney to pay over the balance of moneys retained by him for his services.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Henry Brinkman. Petition by William R. Dills, assignee, for leave to sell real estate, and to dissolve an injunction to restrain foreclosure proceedings in the state court, heretofore granted on his petition. [For register’s opinion and report upon which this decision is founded, see Case No. 1,884.]

<p>Case No. 1,884.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Estate op Bankrupt — Mortgage Foreclosure in State Court — District Court —Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. Mortgagees should not be permitted to pursue the estate of the bankrupt in the state courts, but should come to the tribunal which, under federal laws, is charged with its administration.</p> <p>2. The purpose and intent of the bankrupt law is to bring the property of the bankrupt into the bankrupt court for administration, and that court is furnished with all needful power to liquidate and settle all liens thereon, and where there are adverse claims which it is not proper to litigate by summary enjoining and order, provision is made by giving jurisdiction to the district court, permanently with the circuit court, for that purpose.</p> <p>3. In certain eases mortgages upon the real estate of the bankrupt may be foreclosed in a state court, providing no objection is made, and where the assignee is satisfied that the mortgaged premises is of less value than the mortgage debt.</p> <p>4. Where a foreclosure is pending at the time proceedings in bankruptcy are commenced, the validity of the mortgage and the amount due thereon may sometimes be settled in the state court, and then it is discretionary with the court in bankruptcy to permit a sale by decree of the state court or not.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Augustine v. McFarland, Case No. 648.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For report of the decision in the district court, see Case No. 1,883.]</p> <p>NOTE rfrom original report]. In re Sacchi [Id. 12,200], Woodruff, J., settles the practice in this circuit.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,886.</p> <p>Bankreftcy — Rights op Creditors Who Have Proved their Debts — Nonproving Creditors Entitled to Balance after Paying Debts Proved.</p> <p>1. A creditor ought not to be heard until he has proved his claim, and he has no right to be heard in any other character than that of a creditor.</p> <p>2. The trial of all questions relating to the bankrupt’s discharge should be postponed till the hearing of his petition for discharge.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,887.</p> <p>Qui Tam and Penal Actions — Unlicensed Steamboat — Action against Collector — Requisites of Complaint.</p> <p>1. In an action for a penalty given by statute the complaint must state that the act oi omission by which it was incurred was done or omitted contrary to the statute.</p> <p>[Distinguished in The Idaho. 29 Fed. 189. Cited in Fish v. Manning, 3l Fed. 311.]</p> <p>£See Cloud v. Hewitt. Case No. 2.901; The Betsy, Id. 1.365; Barney v. Washington, Id. 1,033; Cross v. U. S., Id. 3,131.]</p> <p>2. In an action for a penalty by a private person the complaint must allege the right of the plaintiff to sue therefor.</p> <p>3. In an action against a collector of customs for the penalty given by section 21 of the steamboat act of 1S52 (10 Stat. 71), it must appear from the complaint, with reasonable certainty as to time and place, that the vessel was engaged in carrying passengers while navigating the waters of the United States.</p> <p>1. The allegations that a vessel was engaged in carrying passengers between January 1 and May 1, 1868, and that on certain trips such vessel carried goods or passengers, are bad for uncertainty.</p> <p>[NOTE. For proceedings by the United States against the Eanier, see The Eanier, Case No. 11,565.]</p>

At law. This was an action tried before NELSON, Circuit Justice, to recover the value of a case of goods that was lost while in one of the custom-house warehouses in New-York, during the time the defendant [Cornelius W. Lawrence] was collector of that port.

<p>Case No. 1,889.</p> <p>Collision — Pbactice in Admiralty — Compelling Secukity in a Ckoss-Suit.</p> <p>A libel was filed against the steamer Bristol to recover damages for a collision between her and the bark George S. Brown. The owners of the Bristol filed a cross-libel against the bark to recover' the damages sustained by the steamer, and moved, on notice to the proctors for the libellant in the suit against the steamer, to stay proceedings in that suit until security was given on the cross-libel. No process had been issued on the cross-libel. Held, that the supreme court did not intend, by the 54th rule in admiralty, to give this court jurisdiction of the second libel without a seizure of the bark within the district. That the object of the 54th rule is to compel the appearance and giving of security by respondent in a cross-libel in personam, in cases where it does not appear proper that he should be relieved from giving such security.</p> <p>[Disapproved in The Toledo, Case No. 14,-077. Cited, but not followed, in .Empresa Marítima a Vapor v. North & South American Steam Nav. Co., 16 Fed. 503. Cited in The Medusa, 47 Fed. 822.]</p> <p>[See Vianello v. The Credit Byonnais, 15 Fed. 637.]</p> <p>[NOTE. For hearing in the district court and decision upon the merits, see Case No. 1,890; and, for affirmance of the district court decree in the circuit court, see Case No. 1,892.]</p>

[In admiralty. Cross libels by John Pon-ton, owner of the barque George S. Brown, against the steamer Bristol, and by the Narragansett Steamship Company, owners of the steamer, against John Ponton and others for damages sustained by collision. There was a decree in favor of the owner of the barque, and dismissing the libel of the steamship company.. [Bor denial of a motion to compel the libellant Ponton to give security, see Case No. 1,889.]

[In admiralty. Libels by the master and chief officer of the barque Bessie Rogers against the steamer Bristol, and by the Narragansett Steamship Company, owners of the steamer, against Charles Connolly, owner of the barque, for damages caused by collision. Interlocutory decree for apportionment of damages.] Beebe, Donohue & Cooke, for the steamboat.

<p>[In admiralty. For a statement of the case, see Case No. 1,890.</p>

Bill by Alfred Bristol, as-signee in bankruptcy, against Samuel T. W. Sanford, to exclude defendant from participation in the proceeds of the bankrupt estate.

<p>Case No. 1,894.</p> <p>•IPrize — Costs—Expenses of Crew of Prize Vessel.</p> <p>The expenses of the crew of a prize vessel, who are not needed or used as witnesses, incurred after their arrival in port, are not chargeable upon the proceeds of the prize.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by George W. Churchill and others, owners of the American brig Carrie Winslow, against the British ship British America. [For proceedings by the owners of the British America for limitation of liability, see Churchill v. The British America, Case No. 2,715.]

<p>[In admiralty. Libel for restitution of vessel captured as prize.</p>

The schooner Nancy, belonging to British subjects, was captured on the 12th January 1795, by the schooner Fonspertius, Brown, commander. On plea to the jurisdiction, it appeared that the Fonspertius arrived here from Jac-quemel in St. Domingo with a cargo of' coffee in bulk, which was regularly entered at the customhouse. She was then fitted as a privateer, but not armed, and had only eight or ten men on board.

<p>Case No. 1,899.</p> <p>Prize — Right to Property of the Captors on Recaptured Vessel ey the Owners.</p> <p>1. An American brig was captured by three British privateers, and sent to Nassau. One of the privateers previously put on board of her sundry valuable goods, to be carried to Nassau. The brig was retaken by her own people, and brought in here. British captain libelled for his goods; but it being proved that there was no ground for capture, the owners of the brig recovered damages out of the goods, and the rest were adjudged to be restored.</p> <p>[Cited in Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. (23 U. S.) 487.]</p> <p>[2. Cited in New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants’ Bank. 6 How. (47 U. S.) 436, to the point that it is proper to prosecute in admiralty for marine torts in personam as well as in rem.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,900.</p> <p>Salva ge — Restitution—Compensation.</p> <p>1. Restitution, upon payment of salvage, will be adjudged in all cases, if the original owners can be found.</p> <p>2. Salvage never should exceed more than one half of property saved.</p> <p>[Compare Sprague v. One Hundred and Forty Barrels of Flour, Case No. 13,253; The Waterloo, Id. 17,257.]</p>

[In admiralty. Proceeding to condemn the schooner British Empire and cargo as prize for attempting to violate the blockade.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by John W. Brittan against the ship Alboni (William A. Barnaby, claimant) to recover value of goods shipped in New York for delivery at San Francisco.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,903.</p> <p>Limitation — Running op Statute — Tout by Military Officer — Non-Intercourse — Negotiable Instruments — Seizure—Confiscation— Authority.</p> <p>1. To an action of assumpsit the defendant pleaded, (1) that he was military commander under the United States, at New Orleans, and martial law obtained there, from May 1st, 1862, till December 16th, 1862; that, on September 1st, 1862, the armed forces under his command captured a person endeavoring to make his way from the enemy’s lines, in Mississippi, to New Orleans; that there were found concealed on his person certain drafts drawn by persons in Natchez, Mississippi, then in the occupation of the enemy, on persons in New Orleans, then in the occupation of the forces of the United States; that the defendant, in his military-capacity, and under the authority of the president and the acts of congress, captured said drafts, and caused the proceeds thereof, when collected, to be turned over to the treasury of the United States, and they had been credited to him, by order of the president; and that the causes of action sued on arose out of said acts and doings; (2) that the pretended acts which, if true, would give to the plaintiff the supposed causes of action sued on, were performed by the defendant, if performed, as a military officer of the United States, and in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the orders of the president, and during the late rebellion, and that said supposed causes of action did not accrue within two years next before the commencement of the suit, nor within two years after March 3d, 1863: Held, on demurrer to the pleas, that the pleas were bad.</p> <p>[Cited in Flanders v. Tweed, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 518.]</p> <p>2. Commercial intercourse between the state of Mississippi and the city of New Orleans being unlawful, under section 5 of the act of July 13th, 1861 (12 Stat. 257), and the proclamation of the president, of August 16th, 1861 (12 Stat. 1262), the drafts mentioned in the first plea were illegal and void instruments.</p> <p>[Cited in Williams v. Mobile Sav. Bank, Case No. 17,729.]</p> <p>[See U. S. v. Lapene, 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 601.]</p> <p>3. The seizure of the drafts passed no title to the United States to the moneys in the hands of the drawees in New Orleans, which were collected on the drafts, the bills not having been accepted before seizure.</p> <p>4. The moneys in the hands of the drawees of the bills were not, on the facts set out in the first plea, subject to seizure.</p> <p>5. A mere declaration of war does not confiscate enemy property, or debts due to an enemy, nor does it so vest the property or the debts in the government, as to support judicial proceedings for confiscation of the property or debts, without the expression of the will of the government, through its proper department, to that effect. Under the constitution of the United States, the power of confiscating enemy property and debts due to an enemy, is in congress alone.</p> <p>6. The confiscation acts of August 6th, 1861 (12 Stat. 319), July 17th. 1862 (12 Stat. 589), and March 12th, 1863 (12 Stat. S20), all of them provide for a seizure only with a view to judicial proceedings.</p> <p>7. None of the confiscation acts authorize the confiscation of moneys situated as the moneys in this case are alleged by the said first plea ■to have been situated.</p> <p>[Cited in Flanders v. Tweed, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 518.]</p> <p>8. The possession of the unaccepted drafts, considered as captured documents constituting the evidence of debts due to an enemy, gave no right to the captors to take physical possession •of the moneys of the drawees.</p> <p>9. The act of March 2d, 1867 (14 Stat. 432), approving, legalizing and making valid certain acts and orders of the president, or acts done by his authority or approval, and certain proceedings, acts, arrests and imprisonments, does not embrace the transactions set up in said first plea.</p> <p>10. The fact, that martial law obtained in New Orleans, on September 1st, 1862, does not, on the allegations in said first plea, make an order of the president authorizing or-approving the seizure of said moneys, an act or order of his respecting martial law, or make the act of the defendant in seizing the moneys an act of his respecting martial law, within the meaning of said acts. There is nothing in the mere existence of martial law, which, on the facts alleged in said first plea, justifies the seizure of said moneys.</p> <p>11. If said moneys were voluntarily paid to the defendant, the fact that he received them as a military commander, and in obedience to the orders of the president, and paid them into the treasury, and that such payment has been approved by the president, cannot vary his liability for them to the plaintiff, if he would otherwise be liable for them.</p> <p>12. The 7th section of the act of March 3d, 1863 (12 Stat. 757), providing a two years’ limitation for the bringing of a suit for an arrest or imprisonment made, or trespass or wrong done or committed, or act omitted to be done, during the late rebellion, under authority of the president, or of an act of congress, does not apply to an action of assumpsit.</p> <p>[See Milligan v. Hovey, Case No. 9,605.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. This case was subsequently heard upon the merits, at which judgment was directed for the defendant, on the ground that, the plaintiff’s cause of action was barred by'the statute of limitations. See Case No. 1,904, following.]</p>

[At law. Action by William A. Britton against Benjamin P. Butler to recover the proceeds of certain drafts seized by defendant in his capacity of military commander at New Orleans during the Civil War. Judgment for defendant. [Por decisions sustaining a demurrer to the special pleas interposed by defendant to the declaration, see Case No. 1,903.]

[In bankruptcy. Suit by John W. Britton, assignee in bankraptcy of Theodore E. Baldwin and Edward W. Burr, against Charles Payen and Matthew T. Brennan, sheriff, etc., and others, also suit by same plaintiff against Henry Brewster and others, to set aside a judgment, execution, and levy as void, under the thirty-fifth and thirty-ninth sections of the bankrupt act of 1807.

[At law. Zenas E.] Britton obtained judgment in this court, November 5, 1870, for $8,458, damages and costs, against the corporation named “The Inhabitants of the Town of Platte City,” in an action on the case for injuries received by reason of a defective sidewalk of the city. An execution was issued November 29, 1870, and on December 15, 1870, it was returned nulla bona.

<p>Case No. 1,908.</p> <p>Libel — Words Actionable per se — Adultery— Innuendo — Special Damage — Pleading.</p> <p>1. A false publication concerning one that there are “suits pending against him to the effect that he has put himself in unlawful relations with the wiTes of other men” is libellous per se.</p> <p>2. The words being actionable per se, an innuendo is not needed to connect them with any extrinsic facts.</p> <p>3. Where a nublieation is libellous per se, special damage to the business of the person may be shown, though the words were not published concerning that business; and it is not necessary to allege the names of the customers who have ceased to do business with the plaintiff in consequence of the publication.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,909.</p> <p>Removal — Filing Record — Certiokari to State Court — Laches.</p> <p>The plaintiff took proceedings, in December, 1875, under the act of March 3d, 1875 (18 Stat. 470), to remove into this court a suit brought by him in a state court. The state court made an order that the cause be removed, but eighteen days afterwards vacated such order. A term of this court began on the first Monday of April, 1876. The plaintiff, although he had, in January, 1876, obtained from the clerk of the state court a certified copy of the record, did not file it in this court, or enter his appearance there, but, in May, 1876, applied to this court to issue a certiorari to the state court, commanding it to remove the suit to this court, and to certify the record therein according to law: Held, that the plaintiff had been guilty of laches, and could not be allowed now to perfect the removal of the cause; that he already had all which the certiorari could give to him; and that the application must be refused.</p> <p>[Cited in McLean v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co., Case No. 8,892; Woolridge v. M’Kenna, 8 Fed. 667.]</p> <p>[See Kidder v. Featteau, 2 Fed. 616; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 IT. S. 5; McLean v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co., Case No. 8,893; Hyde v. Phoenix Ins. Co., Id. 6.973; Jackson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., Id. 7,141.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libels by James M. Broad-well, as master, for the owners of the steamboat Princess No. 3, against J. C. Butler & Co., and against Keys, Maltby & Co., for the recovery of freight alleged to be due.

In bankruptcy. The creditor [Brock] presented his petition under the provision in section thirty-nine of the act which authorizes the creditor to proceed against the debt- or and have him declared a bankrupt in case he “shall conceal himself to avoid the service of process in an action for the recovery of a debt or demand provable under the act.” The debtor [Hoppock] appeared by counsel and demanded a trial by jury.

<p>Case No. 1,914.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proof and Payment of Debts— Lien of Landlord — Distraint for Rent — Act of Bankruptcy.</p> <p>1. A debtor promised in writing to deliver six thousand four hundred pounds of cotton to pay for rent, and for mules, corn, and fodder bought from landlord. The debtor assigned cotton and farm-stock to his brother to pay just debts, with his own and brother’s knowledge of his insolvency, and subsequently was adjudged a bankrupt. Bold, landlord could not distrain under the statutes of Mississippi, and had no lien on cotton raised as against general creditors.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Mallory, Case No. 8,991; Re Brinkman, Id. 1,884; Re Dole, Id. 3,965.]</p> <p>2. The debtor’s transfer to Ms brother was an act of bankruptcy.</p> <p>[3. Cited in Re St. Helen Mill Co., Case No. 12,222, to the point that the assignee is the agent of the creditors, and as such may maintain proceedings in regard to the property of the bankrupt which, on grounds of public policy or otherwise, the latter would not be allowed to do.]</p>

At law. Attachment to secure rent not due, was levied on goods not upon the demised premises. moved to quash the attachment, contending that the law only meant to give the same remedy before as after the rent became due, and that nothing could be attached unless on the premises.

<p>Case No. 1,918.</p> <p>Bankruptct — Assignment without Preference —Intent op Bankrupt — Presumption.</p> <p>Where a bankrupt, who had failed on Feb. 25th, 1868, on that day made an assignment of all his property for the benefit of all his creditors without preference, and on Feb. 29th, filed his petition in bankruptcy: Held, that even if the bankrupt could be allowed to show, that he had no intention, at the time of making his assignment, of filing a petition in bankruptcy, yet he had failed to show it. His denial of such intention, in the absence of any confirmatory circumstances, is not sufficient to repel the presumption which arises from the fact. That, therefore, his discharge must be refused.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Rainsford, Case No. 11,537;</p> <p>Re Seeley, Id. 12,628.]</p>

[At law. This was an action on the case, tried, upon submission, before Mr. Justice Field, without a jury, to recover damages for the infringement of letters patent for an “improved amalgamating barrel,” granted to James Brodie, July 5, 1804. [The invention consisted In malting the wooden lining of amalgamating barrels of blocks of wood, placed so that the fibres of the wood were inside, and exposed to the wear of the ore.

A rule on the plaintiff to give security for •fees had been laid at the last term. When the cause was called for trial, F. S. Key, for the defendant, moved for a rule on the plain-tiff to give security for costs, and contended that the rule for fees was prima facie evi•dence that the plaintiff did not reside within the District of Columbia.

In bankruptcy. On the 10th day of April, 1876, proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy were instituted against the debtors [Hugo Broich, Louis Kurz, and John Kremer], who composed the firm of Broich & Co. The petitioning creditors were three in number, as follows: Fette & Meyer, whose claims were stated in the petition as amounting to $327.-24, M. S. Cotzhausen, representing $842.18, and N. B. Caswell, a creditor to the amount of $800.

In bankruptcy. This was a petition by Van Burén Bromley, assignee of Ellwood Loy, a bankrupt, praying an order of sale of certain real estate of the bankrupt, and also setting forth a mortgage of said real estate, given by Ellwood Loy and David M. Loy to Dominicus Jordan, to secure their note for $5,000, with a prayer that the same be declared-by the court to be void for the usury therein stated.

[In equity. Bill by Jeremiah Bronaugh against John Mason for an accounting and payment over of moneys held in trust for creditors.

<p>Case No. 1,924.</p> <p>Seamen — Wages—Liability op Owner — Sale of Vessel — Loss of Vessel on Homeward Vot-ase.</p> <p>1. Seamen have a triple security for their wages, the vessel, the owner, and the master.</p> <p>[Cited in The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 595.]</p> <p>2. The owner of a vessel, although his name is not stated in the shipping articles, is liable for the wages of a seaman.</p> <p>[Cited in The Swallow, Case No. 13,665.]</p> <p>3. The sale of a vessel by the owner, subsequent to the making of the shipping articles, does not discharge his liability for the wages of a seaman, even though the voyage was not terminated, or the wages were not demanded, previous to the ssle.</p> <p>[Cited in The Swallow, Case No. 13,665.]</p> <p>4. Where a vessel which arrives at a foreign port, discharges her cargo, and remains there some time after the discharge, is lost on the homeward voyage, the seamen are entitled to their wages up to the time of the discharge, but not for half the time she afterwards remained in the foreign port.</p> <p>[Disapproved in Pitman v. Hooper, Case No. 11,186. Cited in The Niphon’s Crew-, Id. 10,277.]</p> <p>[See Giles v. The Cynthia, Case No. 5.424; The General Chamberlain. Id. 5,310; Hind-man v. Shaw, Id. 6,514; Flanagan v. United States & B. M. S. S. Co., 30 Fed. 202.]</p>

<p>Case No. 1,926.</p> <p>Specific Performance — Requisites of Contract Deed — Sufficiency — Vendor and Purchaser —Execution of Contract.</p> <p>1. Chancery will decree a specific execution of a contract, equally in behalf of the vendor as in behalf of the vendee.</p> <p>2. But to carry into effect a contract, there must be mutuality.</p> <p>3. Where only a part of the vendors were bound for a title, there is a want of mutuality, and a specific execution will not be decreed.</p> <p>4. A deed of general warranty may be good, although it may not contain, technically, the five covenants, which such an instrument usually contains.</p> <p>5. A reasonable time only, can be allowed to a vendor to execute his part of the contract.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,927.</p> <p>Practice — Production of Books and Papers— Notice.</p> <p>A motion to produce a paper, in the possession of the plaintiff, which is necessary to enable the defendants to plead, may be granted in the discretion of the court, although no notice has been given. But, where the possession of a paper is desired to be used in evidenae, a notice is necessary.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Hutton, Case No. 15,433.]</p>

<p>These are suits in equity to enforce certain equitable rights against the real estate described in the respective bills of complaint. The suits have been commenced since the last term, and subpoenas in chancery returnable to the March rules, 1873, have been issued and served upon certain of the defendants, and returned by the marshal “Not found” as to the remaining defendants. An application is made, under section 13 of the act of June 1, 1872 (17 Stat 198), at rules, and before the next term after the suit was brought, for an order of publication of the subpoenas in chancery, against the defendants whom the marshal returns as not found within the district.</p>

At law. Ejectment for 160 acres of land. Trial to court The plaintiff claims title under a patent from the United States to himself, dated June 1, 1863. The defendant is in possession under tax deeds, which are regular and vest the title in the defendant if the land was subject to taxation under the laws of the state of Iowa, for the year 1861. The defendant had no notice of the defect below mentioned in the plaintiff’s entry of the land.

<p>[In equity. Bill by Greene C. Bronson and James T. Soutter, trustees, etc., against the La Crosse & Milwaukee Railroad Company, the Milwaukee & Minnesota Railroad Company,' Selah Chamberlain, Henry Yallette, and others, to foreclose a mortgage. Defendants moved to suppress certain depositions.</p>

[In bankruptcy. Action by Lloyd Brooke, assignee of C. B. Comstock & Co., against John McCraken, to recover the value of merchandise alleged to have been transferred to the defendant in violation of section 35 of the act of 1867. Defendant demurs.

[In bankruptcy. Action by Lloyd Brooke, assignee of C. M. Comstock & Co., against Woodson A. Scoggins, to recover the value of wheat transferred by the bankrupt by way of preference.

<p>Case No. 1,933.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p>

At law. This was a case in which a number of seamen [James Smith and 13 others] claimed additional compensation, beyond that stipulated in the articles. It appeared that it was the primary intention of the owners that the vessel should go to the isl- and of Ichaboe, to procure a cargo of guano. In order to prevent competition, file destination of the voyage was kept secret, and it was only communicated to the captain and the first and second mates.

<p>At law. This was a libel filed to recover damages for the loss of about four thousand bushels of oats, and about fifteen hundred bushels of rye, shipped by the libel-lants, Isaac G. Parker and others, as owners thereof, on the 5th of May, 1863, at Fort Miller Bridge, Saratoga county, New York, on board of the canal-boat Ann Maria Nichols, to be transported, by the way of the Champlain canal and the Hudson river, to the city of New York. The canal-boat arrived at West Troy, and entered the river, and was there taken in tow by the steamboat Brooklyn, to be towed to New York. The libel alleged that on the 14th of May, between the hours of twelve and two o’clock in the afternoon, the Brooklyn, having the canal-boat, with her cargo, in tow, carelessly ran the canal-boat against pier No. 2, in the North river, causing the canal-boat to fill, and to sink to the bottom with her cargo; that the loss to the libel-lants, which was stated at five thousand dollars, was caused by the carelessness and negligence of those navigating the Brooklyn, in carelessly towing the canal-boat against, and causing her to come into collision with, the said pier, when there was room enough to have passed without striking; and that the canal-boat could have done nothing to prevent the collision, as she was fast to, and under the control of, the Brooklyn. The libel did not aver any contract of towage by the Brooklyn, or any breach of any such contract by her, but merely, that the canal-boat, after her arrival at Troy, was taken in tow by the Brooklyn, for the purpose of being towed from Troy to New York, and that the loss happened by the alleged carelessness and negligence above referred to.</p> <p>The defence set up in the answer was, in substance, that the Brooklyn engaged to tow the canal-boat only to off the foot of North Moore street, New York, which was above the place of collision; that when the Brooklyn reached New York, the wind was northeast, and the tide strong ebb; that a large fleet of wind-bound vessels was lying at anchor in the North river, extending well over to the Jersey shore, leaving a channel open along the docks for the passage of boats and tows; that near North Moore street, the Brooklyn, with her tow, ran in as close as it was prudent to go, and blew her whistle for the canal-boat to -drop off; that the canal-boat did not drop off; that, there being no opening through which the Brooklyn could safely take her tow out into the river, she kept on down the channel before spoken of; that when she was off pier No. 4, North river, two vessels came suddenly to anchor in the channel, ahead of her, and substantially closed it up, compelling her to stop her headway; and that the ebb tide then sagged the boats in tow toward the pier, and the canal-boat struck It.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, by the owners of the schooner Sarah E. Packer, against the steam ferry-boat Brooklyn to recover damages for a collision which occurred between the two vessels on the evening of the 10th of January, 1856, in the East river.

[In admiralty. Libel by Henry D. Brook-man and others against the schooner Rebecca Fogg for supplies, repairs, and advances.' This was a suit brought to recover for supplies, repairs, and advances, furnished to the schooner by the libellants. It appeared in evidence that the schooner was a foreign vessel, owned in Boston. She had been chartered by a parol agreement on shares, the libellant being in ignorance thereof.

[In admiralty. Libel by Henry D. Brook-man and others against sixty barrels of molasses, etc., for freight and demurrage. This case came up on exceptions to the commissioner’s report. The suit was brought to recover an alleged balance of freight and demurrage. on a charter party. The court decided in favor of the libelants for both freight and demurrage, and referred it to a commissioner to ascertain the amount.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri.] In bankruptcy.

In bankruptcy. [On certificate of register in bankruptcy.] I, the undersigned, having been designated by the court as the register in bankruptcy, before whom the proceedings in the above matter of the bankruptcy of Samuel W. Brooks are to be had, do hereby certify that in the due course of such proceedings, the following question, pertinent to the same, arose, and was stated and agreed to by Samuel Hunter, counsel for Daniel Ladd, a creditor, and W. B. Bennett, Esq..,…

[In. equity. Bill by Moses Brooks and Joseph L. Morris against Benjamin Bick-neli and. Ebenezer Jenkins to enjoin infringement of a patent for an improvement in wood-working machines, granted to William Woodworth, December 27, 1828, and extended to his administrator February 1G, 1842, and for other relief.

[In equity. Bill to enjoin infringement of a patent. For decree dissolving an injunction theretofore granted, see preceding case, No. 1,944. An issue out of chancery as to the validity of the patent and renewal was tried by a jury, and a verdict rendered for defendants. See Brooks v. Jenkins, Case No. 1,953. And thereafter a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial of the issue was denied. See Case No. 1,946.

[In equity. Bill by Moses Brooks and Joseph L. Morris against Benjamin Bieknell and Ebenezer Jenkins to enjoin infringement of a patent for an improvement in wood working machines, granted to William Woodworth December 27, 1828, and extended to his administrator February 16, 1842. On the question of validity of the patent and renewal, the court directed the issue to be tried before a jury (see Brooks v. Jenkins, Case No. 1,953), and the jury found for defendants.

Bill in equity [by William Brooks against Ezekiel Byam and others to enjoin prosecution of a suit at law, and for other relief. Heard on plaintiff’s exceptions to the answer. Exceptions allowed]. The bill in this case states, that one Alonzo D..

Bill in equity [by William Brooks against Ezekiel Byam and others to restrain prosecution of a suit at law] for an injunction and for relief. [Dismissed.] This is the same case which has already been before the court on an interlocutory motion [on exceptions taken by plaintiff to the answer of defendant Prentiss Whitney]. 1 Story, 296 [Case No. 1,947].

[In equity. Bill by William Brooks against Ezekiel Byam and others to restrain an action at law, and for other relief.] This cause came on to be argued again, upon the reserved question of costs. [Por determination of motion on exceptions to answer, see Case No. 1,947. Por decree dismissing the bill, see. Case No. 1,948.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Bill in equity by the assignees in bankruptcy of Richard II. Atkinson. The bill was brought in the district court. It appeared that Atkinson was a dealer in groceries; that he applied through his attorney, Butler, to the defendant, Davis, for a loan of money upon security of the lease of the store, which he occupied.

This was a bill in equity, by the complainant [Horace J. Brooks] as assignee in bankruptcy of the Employment and Indemnity Company of the City of New York, to set aside a bill of sale of personal property executed by that company to the defendant [Adolphus] D’Orville, and a mortgage of the same property executed by D’Orville to the defendant [George] Marthaler, and by him assigned to the defendant [Samuel] Kellinger, on the ground that said bill of sale was fraudulent under…

<p>[Libel in rem for damages caused by collision.</p>

[This was an issue to a jury, out of chancery, tried before Mr. Justice McLean. The original suit in equity was for the infringement of letters patent for a machine for “planing, grooving, and cutting boards and dressing brick,” granted to William Wood-worth, of New York, on December 28, 1828.

In equity. This was an application to Hon. H. H. EMMONS, judge of the sixth circuit, to prevent the collection of a tax upon the capital of the plaintiffs [Brooks and others], who are merchants in Memphis, levied under a mandamus from the circuit court-of the United States, for the district of West Tennessee, to pay a judgment in favor of Talmadge E. Brown, as surviving partner of T. E. Brown & Co., against the city of Memphis.

The complainants [John W. Brooks and Al-pheus Hardy] exhibited a bill in equity to quiet the title to certain real estate, to which the defendant [Mills county] filed a plea in abatement, setting up the pendency of a suit in the district court of Mills county, Iowa, involving the same subject matter, to which plea the complainants replied that they were not made parties to the suit in the Mills county court.

[In equity. Bill by Hiram W. Brooks against John Moorhouse to enjoin infringement of patent No. 68,361 for a shoe but-toner, granted to J. F. Goldthwait, September 5, 1S67, and for an accounting. Decree for complainant.]

This was a bill in equity, filed [by Artemus L. Brooks, James G. Wilson, and others] to restrain the infringement [by Nicholas G. Norcross and others] of letters patent granted to William Woodworth, for an “improvement in the method of planing, etc.,” more particularly referred to in the report of the case of Foss v. Herbert [Case No. 4,957].

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Enoch Brooks and others against the steamboat Peytona for mariners’ wages.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,960.</p> <p>Life Insurance — Participating Policy — Dividend— Cancellation of Premium Notes — Removal of Causes — Act March 8, 1875 — Costs— Recovery Less than *500.</p> <p>1. A mutual life insurance company insured, by an endowment policy, the life of a husband for the sole benefit of his wife, in an amount payable to her on a day named. For four years the company accepted the notes of the husband as payment of one-half of the annual premium. The notes were given on the representation by the company that they would be paid by dividends. The notes pledged the policy and all payments which might become due thereon, to the company, for the payment of the notes. In a suit by the husband and wife, in the right of the wife, against the company, to recover the amount insured, the plaintiffs claimed that the dividends declared, if credited on the notes, would pay them in full. The defendant claimed that the amount due on the policy was the sum insured, less the amount due on the notes: Held, that the company was liable for the amount insured without any deduction for the unpaid notes.</p> <p>2. The suit having been removed into_ this court, under the act of March 3d, 1875 (18 Stat. 470), it was held, under § 6 of that act, and § 968 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to costs, because their recovery was less than $500, exclusive of costs, but that they ought not to pay costs.</p> <p>[See Goggill v. Lawrence, Case No. 2,957.]</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel by the steward of the ship Sophia against the master, for personal damage. After service by arrest, and when a day had been appointed for a hearing, the master effected a settlement with the libellant, in the absence of his proctor, for the sum of sixty dollars, obtaining his receipt in full, and then tendered the legal costs to the proctor. The proctor refused to receive the same, and on the day appointed brought the case up for a hearing.

[In equity. Bill by Moses Brooks and Joseph L. Morris against John H. Stolley to enjoin infringement of a patent for an improvement in wood-working machines, granted to William Woodworth December 27, 1828, and extended to his administrator February 1C, 1842.

The present case was a hill in equity [filed by Moses Brooks and Joseph L. Morris against John H. Stolley] to restrain the infringement of letters patent for an improved’, method of planing, tonguing, and grooving;, and cutting into moldings, or either, plank, boards, or other material, and for reducing the same to an equal width and thickness, etc., granted December 27, 1828, to William Woodworth, extended for seven years from and after December 27, 1842, in the name of…

[In equity. Bill by Francis A. Brooks and others against the Vermont Central Railroad Company, John Gregory Smith, Worth-ington C. Smith, and Joseph Clark to foreclose a mortgage, and for other relief. Hearing upon pleas and demurrer.

[In admiralty. Libel by Brooks, Barden, and others, owners of the steam packet Gordon, and by the owners of the steam tug Jasper, against the ship William Penn for salvage.

In bankruptcy. In this case, the assignee in bankruptcy presented a petition to the court asking for the cancellation of a trust deed executed by the bankrupt [James E. Broome] of lands in Florida.

<p>[In bankruptcy. Proceeding by the as-signee in bankruptcy of James E. Broome to set aside an assignment of the bankrupt’s lands. Decree for assignee.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,968.</p> <p>Revised Statutes — Construction — Seamen— Wages — Shipping Commissioner —Vessel in West India Trade — Tender—Costs.</p> <p>1. While, in the construction of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the presumption is against an intention to change the law, yet where the language used in the revision cannot possibly bear the same construction as the re-' vised and repealed act, full effect must be given to the new enactment.</p> <p>2. The master of a vessel, which had returned to New York from a voyage from Philadelphia to' ports in the West Indies and thence to New York, offered to a sailor the amount of wages due him. There was a difference of $2 be-, tween the amount offered and the .amount claimed. ' The sailor refused to receive the amount offered and claimed that the - wages should be paid in the presence of the shipping commissioner, and filed a- libel against the vessel. On- the trial the court found that the amount due was the sum offered. It was claimed for the sailor that under sections 4504 and 4549 of the Revised Statutes of the United States the offer of the money was inoperative-as a tender: -Held, that under those sections it was not incumbent on the master of this vessel to pay the sailor in the presence of the shipping commissioner' of the port.</p> <p>3. The tender was good; and, although it had not been kept good by the payment of the amount into court under rule 72, the suit being unnecessary and the difference between the parties trifling, no costs would bp allowed to the libellant.</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel by John C. Maxwell & Co., owners of the schooner Supply, against the tug Brothers and the propeller Lady Franklin, for damages by a collision in the Chicago river; the Lady Franklin having run into the Supply while the latter was in tow of the tug Brothers.

In admiralty. On the 1st of December, 1831, the libellants [Peter Brower, Zoeth Keen, and Jacob Hess] shipped [on the schooner Maiden, Joseph Baymore, master] for a voyage from Philadelphia to Wilmington, in the state of North Carolina, and back to Philadelphia at the wages of fourteen dollars a month.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libels by John H. Brower and others against the brig Water Witch, by .William H. Sheldon against the same, and by John Clifton against a quantity of cotton. The district court decreed in favor of libel-lants in the first two cases, but dismissed the libel filed by Clifton.

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Samuel C. Brown. Petition of William D. Sponsler, assignee, for an order to pay rent to John D. Gorgas.

In bankruptcy. [Statement of Jacob Lisk: [“To Hon. Theodore B. Gates, Register, etc., etc.: Application is hereby made to you by Jacob Lisk, a creditor of… Held: in Re Williams [supra], that where a judgmént is rendered after the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, upon a debt which existed before that time, neither the debt nor the judgment is provable. The debt is merged in the judgment, and the judgment did not exist at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy.”

[In the matter of Thomas Brown. Proceeding by Otis F. Presbrey to punish said Brown, as for a contempt, for refusing to submit to examination under the act of June 30, 1864, relating to the income tax. The matter was submitted by agreement with the same effect as if an attachment had issued.

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of George Brown.</p>

[On certificate of register in bankruptcy. [In bankruptcy. In the matter of James B. Brown.] • I, Frank S. Hesseltine, a register of said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify that in the course of the proceedings in said cause the following question, pertinent to said proceedings arose and was stated, and agreed to by Arthur Hood, Esq., counsel for the bankrupt, and T. K. Appling, Esq., who appeared for Hamilton Perry, administrator of the estate of Elam Lee, a creditor of…

<p>Case BTo. 1,982.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Proceedings in Different Districts.</p> <p>The bankrupt resided in this state, but did business in New Jersey. On the 27th of July, 1878, a creditor’s petition was filed in the district of New Jersey. The proceedings were contested, reference had, and much testimony taken, and on or about March 1, Í879, an order of adjudication was entered. On August 31, 1878, the day the bankrupt law expired, a creditor’s petition was also filed in this district, and an order to show cause issued, returnable October 5, 1S78. This order was not served, and on the 5th of Feb., 1879, a new order was issued returnable Feb. 15, 1879. On the return day of the latter order, an order of adjudication was entered by consent. It appeared that the case was r- put upon the calendar for Feb. 15, 1879, ana that the attorney for creditors in the New Jersey ease was thereby prevented from appearing to oppose an adjudication. On the 4th of March, 1879, the bankrupt procured an order staying all proceedings in the New Jersey case. Sold, that the provisions of general order No. 16 did not apply; and that, under the circumstances, the adjudication in this case should be set aside and all proceedings stayed pending the proceedings in me district of New Jersey.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,983.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Vacating Discharge — Limitation.</p> <p>The limitation contained in section 5120 [Rev. St.], in relation to proceedings to annul a discharge, is absolute, and the time begins to run from the date of the discharge, and not from the discovery of the fraud.</p>

<p>Case No. 1,984.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Attorneys’ Pees — Lien.</p> <p>A petition for a decree in bankruptcy was filed by B., on the 18th of February, in which were inserted three promissory notes, amounting to $400. On the 7th of February preceding, a suit in chancery had been commenced against B. and his former partner, P. At the time the suit was commenced, P. delivered to B.’s attorney, (who is the attorney for prosecuting B.’s petition in bankruptcy,) at B.’s request, the notes in question, for the purpose of being given over to the general assignee. Sold, that B.’s attorney has a lien on the notes to satisfy his taxable costs, including solicitor and counsel fees, up to the time B.’s petition for a decree in bankruptcy was presented, and also the cost of the reference.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Wilson, 12 Fed. 238.]</p>

[Adjournment from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [In bankruptcy. Petition by the assignee to expunge a claim from the list of proved debts, and petition by creditor praying payment of the claim so proved. The ease was adjourned from the district court on an agreed statement of facts, and the court certified the adjourned question in favor of the creditor.) Wm.

At law. This was an action of assumpsit [by Margaret J. C. Brown against Kneeland F. Adams] containing several common counts and one special count.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Brown against the propeller Albany, a foreign vessel, for supplies. Motion to dismiss the libel.</p> <p>This was an action for supplies. The libel alleged that the supplies were furnished on the credit of the vessel, which was a foreign vessel, and were necessary for her. The case coming on for trial, the claimant moved to dismiss the libel, on the ground that there was no allegation in it that it was also necessary that the credit should be given to the vessel at the time.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by John Brown, James Nicholson, Gregorious Kauffman, and others against the bark Alexander McNeil for wages and expenses of board. Schuch-ardt & Son, mortgagees, intervene, and oppose the claims.

At law. This was an ejectment to recover 400 acres of land, within the triangle lying north and west of the Ohio, Alleghany and Conewango. The plaintiff produced five warrants, granted to the Population Company in different names, with no other description than one adjoining the other; neither of which, however, was the leading warrant. The warrants were dated 13th April, 1792.

[In admiralty. Libel by John E. Brown against the steamboat Alida to foreclose a lien given by the New York statute. The court referred the matter to a commissioner to ascertain the amount of debt due in New York county.]

<p>Case No. 1,992.</p> <p>Seamen — Injurt in Service op Ship — Wages.</p> <p>A mariner who is injured in the service of the ship is entitled to be cured at the expense of the ship although no one is in fault, but he cannot recover damages in the nature of extra wages unless there has been some carelessness or other fault on the part of the officers of the ship.</p> <p>[Cited in The Guiding Star, 1 Fed. 349; The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 596.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The right to be cured at the expense of the ship for hurts or wounds received, or sickness contracted, in the ship’s service, is well established by the maritime law. Brown v. Overton, Case No. 2,024; The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390; Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 Fed. 651; Reed v. Canfield, Case No. 11,-641; The Ben Flint, Id. 1,299; Ringgold v. Crocker, Id. ll.S-,3; Myers v. The Lizzie Hopkins, Id. 9,993; Tomlinson v. Hewett, Id. 14,-087; The W. L. White, 25 Fed. 503; The Vigilant, 30 Fed. 288; Brown v. The D. S. Cage, Case No. 2,002; The Governor Ames, 65 Fed. 327. This right is not confined to seamen proper, but will extend to a fireman on a steamer (The North America, Case No. 10,314), or one fishing on shares (Knight v. Parsons, Id. 7,886). It is immaterial that the sickness is contracted in the home port. Reed v. Can-field, supra. But a seaman is not entitled to an allowance if he has incurred no expense (The Cortes, Id. 3,253; The Centennial, 10 Fed. 397), nor if he has refused suitable treatment at the ship’s expense, and personally made other arrangements for his treatment (Richardson v. The Juliette, Case No. 11,784; Brunent v. Taber, Id. 2,054).</p> <p>[Injury in the “service of the ship” in this connection includes hurts received in executing improper orders, wrongful punishment by an officer (Ringgold v. Crocker, supra), or a wound accidentally self-inflicted while engaged in quelling a disturbance on board (Callón v. Williams, Case No. 2,324).]</p>

In equity. This was a bill alleging that the complainant [Emily Brown] was daughter of Gideon Brown, late of Johnston, in Rhode Island, and that the respondents [Cyrus Brown and another] were other children of his by a former wife; that she is now resident in Massachusetts, and they, on the homestead farm of which said Gideon died seised in said Johnston; that Gideon, on the 14th of May, 1833, conveyed certain lands worth .?3,000, to Arnold Brown, one of the defendants, for…

<p>Case No. 1,995.</p> <p>[See The Packet, Case No. 10,055; The Virgin, 8 Pet. (38 U. S.) 538; Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Pet. (30 U. S.) 709; The Phebe, Case No. 11,065.]</p>

In admiralty. This was a motion by a surety in a stipulation to cancel the stipulation.

<p>Case No. 1,997.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Appeal—,Amending Case — Libel—Pleading.</p> <p>1. Amendments in a case rest in the sound discretion of the court where the proceedings are pending, and the order of the court in this respect cannot be called in question in the appellate court.</p> <p>2. Where the master of a vessel loaned to the owner two hundred dollars, which it was agreed the master should take out of the first earnings of the vessel, a libel filed in the district court to enforce the payment of the two hundred dollars, was dismissed for the want of an allegation that the two hundred dollars had not been paid out of the earnings of the vessel. Held, on appeal, that such allegation was unnecessary, it being substantially contained in the general allegation that the whole of the two hundred dollars was still due and unpaid.</p>

<p>Pin admiralty. Libel by John Brown and others, seamen, against R. D. Chandler, shipowner, for three months’ extra wages under Rev. St. § 45S2.</p>

In equity. Bill [by Alonzo Brown against George Curtis]. The facts were, that in October, 1827, John A. Wadsworth, John Welder, and Joshua B. Wood, entered into a copartnership for making steam-engines, under the firm name of the Providence Steam-Engine Manufacturing Company.

[In admiralty. Libel by Brown against the steamboat D. S. Cage to recover for injuries sustained by a boiler explosion. The respondents excepted to the libel in the district court on the ground that libellant could not proceed in rem, and the libel was dismissed.

At law. This was an action on the ease for the violation of letters patent, granted by the United States to the plaintiff [John Brown] for an improvement in the gaffs of vessels.

<p>Case No. 2,003.</p> <p>Pleading — Demükkek.</p> <p>If there he one good plea on the record, and a ■demurrer be filed, alleging that “the several jileas” are not sufficient, this will be intended to be taken to all the pleas, and must be overruled. [NOTE. For decision overruling a subsequent denmrier, see ease following (No. 2,004).]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,005.</p> <p>Shipping — Bill op Ladino — Liability for Loss op Bagqaoe — Evidence op Loss — Sufficiency —Presumption.</p> <p>[1. The fact that owners of a vessel and her officers treated a receipt, asserted to have been given by the mate, as genuine and authentic, is sufficient evidence that the mate signed it and gave it by authority.]</p> <p>[2. The receipt having gone directly into the possession of the shipper’s agent, and remained there until the trial, the shipper could not object that the insertion of the words “personal baggage” in the receipt was improper, and not binding on her.]</p> <p>[3. The incompetency of a witness as to the loss of goods shipped is immaterial, where the loss has been sufficiently otherwise proved.]</p> <p>[4. A vessel is not liable for failure to deliver at its destination personal baggage gratuitously carried, and unaccompanied by the owner, where there is no proof of actual negligence or misconduct, or of improper delivery, on the part of the carrier.]</p> <p>[5. In such a case, a presumption of want of proper care or diligence does not arise from the fact of nondelivery.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Reversed by the circuit. court in Case No. 4,424.]</p>

At law. Ejectment for land in Erie county, north and east of the Ohio and Alleghany rivers and Conewango creek. The plaintiff’s title consisted of a patent to certain persons, as trustees for the Population Company of Pennsylvania, and a lease by the trustees in 180S, to the lessor of the plaintiff for seven years, to commence from the 1st of March, 1807.

[In equity. Bill by Peter Brown to restrain George C. Hall and others from infringing letters patent.] This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs, of a suit in equity, founded on letters patent [No. 26,248] issued to the plaintiff, November 29th, 1859, for an “improvement in paint-cans.” The specification stated, that the invention was “a new and improved [paint]2 can;” and that the body of the can was constructed with a semi-circular projection, or bead, near to its…

In admiralty. This libel was filed [by Thomas Brown and others against the sloop Gideon Lee] to recover the damages occasioned to the libellants’ vessel, the Stella, by a collision with the sloop. The Stella was properly moored alongside of a dock at Jersey City, and the Gideon Lee was run into the slip or basin above the Stella, with intent to pass in beyond the place of her mooring, alongside of the dock in her rear.

At law. This was an action of assump-sit [by George O. Brown and others against the Hartford Fire Insurance Company] on a policy of insurance. [There was a trial and a special verdict, and defendant moved for judgment non obstante veredicto, which, being treated as a motion in arrest of judgment, was granted.] As the case turned entirely on the particular allegations in the pleadings, their substance is here inserted.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel in personam 'by Wesley Brown against Richard F. C. Hart-ley, master of the ship Hungarian, for extra wages as a seaman.</p> <p>In November, 1849, the libellant signed shipping articles for a voyage as seaman on board the ship Hungarian, from the port of Saco, in Maine, to a port in the Gulf of Mexico, and thence wherever the ship may proceed with or in search of freight, for the time of ten calendar months. The ship went to Mobile, and thence to New Orleans. At the latter port she was moored out of the precincts of the city, to prevent the libellant and other colored men of the crew being put in prison diming the stay of the ship there, according to the laws at that port After so remaining a few days, the libellant requested the defendant, the master of the ship, to procure him a berth on board another vessel going north, to relieve him from the danger of imprisonment at New Orleans. Such place was procured for him, and three other colored men of the crew. — berths on board the ships Egyptian and Trenton, one bound to New York, and the other to Boston. The libellant shipped accordingly on such vessel at the same rate of _ wages he was paid on the Hungarian, and sailed to this port. He was paid in New Orleans his full wages on board the Hungarian to the time he shipped on board the Egyptian.</p>

In equity. This is a bill by [Edward S. Brown] a mortgagee against the mortgagors [Benajah W. Hiatt and Martha Ann Hiatt] to foreclose the mortgage below described. [Decree for complainant] The original bill was filed February 27, 1S67.

<p>Case No. 2,010.</p> <p>Admiralty — Suit by Minor — Guahdian* ad Litem —Pno Forma Pauperis — Liability for Costs.</p> <p>1. It seems that seamen who are minors over the age of fourteen may sue in admiralty in their own names without a guardian ad li-tem, at least in suits for wages or salvage.</p> <p>2. A guardian ad litem in such a case will mot be admitted to sue in forma pauperis.</p> <p>3. Where it is necessary that a guardian be appointed, and the party is not able to produce a responsible person, the court may appoint a standing oiiicer and discharge him of all liability fur costs.</p>

In equity. Motion for preliminary injunction [to restrain an alleged infringement of . a patent right, on the bill of complaint and accompanying affidavits].2 [Denied.] The bill [brought by Henry L. Brown against James Hinkley and others] alleges that the invention in question is a new and useful “improvement in hand-cars for railroads,” and that a patent [No. 94,469] therefor was duly issued to the complainant, September 7, 1869, and was reissued [No. 5,274] in two…

<p>[At law. Action of ejectment by Jacob B. Brown and others against Benjamin Huger.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by William Brown against the brig Independence (J. S. Howell, master) for wages.

At law. Indebitatus assumpsit [by Brown against John Jackson] for goods, &c., and another account upon- a bill of exchange. [There was a verdict for plaintiff on the first count, and he consented to a new trial.] ■ The .defendant being indebted to the plaintiff, a merchant in London, for two separate shipments of goods, remitted to him in December 1S04, a bill of exchange drawn by Mr. Crawford, on Barclay & Salkield, at Manchester, at sixty days, for the amount of the last…

At .law. Indebitatus assumpsit [by Brown against John Jackson,.for goods sold and delivered, in the first count, and on a bill of exchange, in the second count. Plaintiff recovered a verdict on the first count on a former trial (Case No. 2,015), but consented to a new trial, upon which he recovered the principal and interest of the bill]. This case, in which a new trial was awarded at the last term, — 1 Wash.

In admiralty. This was an allegation in a case of substraction of wages.

In admiralty. This was the case of a libel In personam for seaman’s wages, brought l>y Rebecca Lull, administratrix of Jonathan Lull, deceased, against Charles Brown and others (the respondents and appellants.) as ■executors of the last will and testament of Israel Thorndike.

At law. Motion for new trial. [Granted.] This was an action on a policy of insurance [issued by the Mechanics’ & Merchants’ Insurance Company of Pottsville, Pa.] on a property belonging to Brown, situated in Pittsburg, N. H. By the terms of the policy the loss, if any, was payable to Geo.

At law. This was an action on the case,. to recover the amount of certain notes made by the defendants [Brown and Ives] and endorsed to the plaintiffs [Minturn and Champlin].

[Petition by T. E. Brown for a writ of mandamus to compel the city of Memphis to levy a tax to pay certain judgments recovered by the petitioner. For decision as to the validity of the bonds issued by the city, and which formed the subject-matter of the actions upon which the judgments were recovered, see Memphis v. Brown, Case No. 9,415.]

<p>Case No. 2,022.</p> <p>Seamen — Wrongful Absence — Wages—Negligence.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel is detained in port by the wrongful absence of a seaman, a deduction from his wages is allowed, to the amount of loss actually sustained.</p> <p>[Cited in The T. F. Whiton, Case No. 13,-849.]</p> <p>[See The Harvest. Case No. 6,175; Brink v. Lyons, 18 Fed. 605.]</p> <p>2. A seaman is chargeable for the value of articles lost by his inattention and carelessness; and the amount may be deducted from his wages.</p>

At law. This was an action of assumpsit on several general counts for goods sold, money had and received, &c. The plaintiff [Allen J. Brown] is described as a citizen of Rhode Island, and the defendants [Ira Noyes and C. A. Cobb] as citizens of Massachusetts; the sum, demanded in damages, both in the declaration and ad damnum, is 51,000. The defendant, Noyes, appeared and pleaded, that he never promised jointly with Cobb, the other defendant, as alleged.

<p>Case No. 2,024.</p> <p>Seamen — Injury is Service of Ship — Compensation.</p> <p>1. A seaman receiving an injury in the performance of his duty, must be cured at the expense of the ship.</p> <p>[Explained in The Ben Flint, Case No. 1,299. Cited in Myers v. The Lizzie Hopkins, Id. 9,993; Tomlinson v. Hewett, Id. 14,087; Peterson v. The Chandos, 4 Fed. 651; The W. L. White, 25 Fed. 504.]</p> <p>[See Brown v. The Bradish Johnson, Case No. 1,992, note.]</p> <p>2. On a voyage from Calcutta to Boston, and twenty-five days before passing within sight of St. Helena, a seaman fell from aloft and broke both legs: Held, that it was the duty of the master to have put into St. Helena, for the cure and relief of the seaman.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ben Flint, Case No. 1,299.]</p> <p>3. The master was also held responsible for neglect during the passage, and after reaching Boston.</p> <p>[Cited in The City of Aexandria, 17 Fed. 394.]</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. From this decree the respondent appealed, but before the hearing the case' was settled by the parties.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,025.</p> <p>Corporations — Stock—Proxy—Injunction—Api plication — Jurisdiction — Remedy at Law— -Corporations — Election of Officers — Irrep- . arable Injury — Notice of Application for Injunction — Service—Parties—Procedure.</p> <p>1. An irrevocable power of attorney or proxy, given by an owner of stock in a corporation, to vote upon such stock, reserving certain privileges to-such owner in regard to the manner of dealing in the stock and withdrawing from such ownership, is not contrary to public policy or open to objection.</p> <p>2. Where an affidavit, to oppose a motion for an injunction, is made by a defendant in a suit in equity, and such affidavit denies one of the allegations of the bill, but does not deny other material allegations charged as within the knowledge of the defendant individually, every intendment must be taken most strongly against the defendant, as an admission of all the matters stated in the bill, which the affidavit does not controvert. *</p> <p>3. In order to deprive a court of the United States of jurisdiction in equity, because the remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete, the remedy at law must be as efficient to the ends of justice, and its complete and prompt administration, as the remedy in equity.</p> <p>4. An election of the directors of a corporation, made by holders of less than one-half of the shares of stock, is legal, although it is effected by the exclusion from voting, by the injunction of a proper court, having jurisdiction, of the holders of other shares.</p> <p>5. It is common, to produce a positive effect, through an injunction out of chancery, by means of a prohibitory order, and a mandatory order is, in courts of equity, seldom denied, unless the remedy at law is perfectly adequate.</p> <p>6. A case of irreparable injury to the plaintiff, and one where no such injury can be produced to the defendant, is one eminently of equity jurisdiction.</p> <p>7. Under the statute of the United States, which requires reasonable previous notice of an application for injunction to be given to the adverse party, notice to a corporation, at its office, is notice to the directors of such corporation.</p> <p>8. A defendant, whose affidavit is used to oppose an application for an injunction, is concluded from setting up a want of sufficient notice of such application.</p> <p>[See Thayer v. Wales, Case No. 13,S71; Marsh v. Bennett, Id. 9,110; Bell v. Ohio Life Ins. Co., Id. 1,261; Bradley v. Reed, Id. 1,785.]</p> <p>9. Service of notice of such application on a corporation, at its office, cannot be considered as service on such shareholders of the corporation as are not directors of it.</p> <p>10. Where it is shown that a defendant is seeking to do an act, as proxy for a shareholder in a corporation, against doing which he ought to be enjoined, he will be so enjoined, although his principal is not a party to the suit and is not enjoined.</p> <p>11. Where it would oust the jurisdiction of this court to make a party plaintiff a person applying to be made such, he will be made a party defendant, where, by that being done, he can equally have the benefit of the suit.</p> <p>12. The 47th and 48th of the rules of practice for the courts of equity of the United States, prescribed by the supreme court, applied to the question of parties in this suit.</p> <p>[Cited in Plummer v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., Case No. 11,232; Belding y. Gaines, 37 Fed. 819; Hamilton v. Savannah, F. & W. By. Co., 49 Fed. 420.]</p> <p>13. In regard to granting an injunction, it is regular to proceed against defendants who have been served with process or notice, and are before the court, although other defendants have not been served.</p> <p>. NOTE [from original report]. The injunction issued was as follows, omitting the formal parts: “You, the said defendants respectively, and your respective associates, attorneys, proxies, substitutes, officers, directors and agents, are restrained, and formally enjoined as follows, that is to say: First — That you, the said Frederick Billings, Isaac Taylor and Bufus G. Beardslee, inspectors of election, your successors, and all and every other person who may in any way be appointed or selected to serve as inspectors of election, to hold any election for directors of said Pacific Mail Steamship Company, do absolutely desist and refrain, until the further order of the said court, from holding any election on said 20th day of November, A. D) 1867, or any other day, wherein or whereat Brown Brothers & Co. are enjoined and forbidden, or prevented, by the judgment or process of any competent court, from casting, or said or any inspectors are prevented from receiving, the votes of Brown Brothers & Co. upon 26,666 ■shares of the capital stock of that company, standing in their names ‘in trust,’ being the shares held under the arrangement with Skiddy and others, or upon the 26,666 shares of the stock standing in their names as ‘trustees,’ being the shares held under the agreement between the said Pacific and Atlantic Mail Companies, and from receiving any vote or votes on the part of the said defendants Hartson, Jos-lyn, Green, Charlick, Lockwood and Davenport, or either of them, in person or by proxy, or as the proxy or substitute, in any wise, of any ■other person, unless the said Brown Brothers ■& Co. shall first have had an opportunity to vote upon all the shares held by them, except only the 24,072 shares formerly standing in the name of Allan McLane, trustee. Secondly — That you, the said defendants Hartson, Joslyn, Green, Charlick, Lockwood and Davenport, and your and each of your associates, attorneys, agents, proxies and substitutes, do absolutely desist and refrain from aiding in or appointing any inspectors of election, or co-operating or voting, either in person or by proxy, or as. proxy or attorney or substitute for any other person, at the said ensuing election for directors of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, or any election for directors of that company, until the further order of the said court, upon any shares whatever, unless the said Brown Brothers & Co. shall first have had an opportunity, free from injunction of any kind, of voting upon said shares so held by them in trust and as trustees, or otherwise, as aforesaid, except only said 24,072 shares, except the defendants But-terfield, Masón and Cambios. Thirdly — That, until the further order of the said court, you, the said defendants, and each and every of you, your directors, agents, officers, servants and proxies,, do absolutely desist and refrain from any proceedings to restrain or prevent the firm of Brown Brothers & Co., or any member of that firm, from voting at the election for directors of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, to be held in the city of New York on the 20th day of November, 1867, upon those shares of stock standing in the name of that firm on the books of the said company, mentioned or referred to in the agreement between Francis Skiddy, Charles A. Davis, Allan McLane, Howard Potter, William Dennistoun, Moses H. Grinnell, Leonard W. Jerome and Elisha Biggs, bearing date the 11th day of October, 1864, or upon those other shares of stock mentioned or referred to in the agreement between the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and the Atlantic Mail Steamship Company, bearing date the 19th day of October, 1865, or on any of the said shares in either of the said two parcels of stock, and from in any way, manner, or form, directly or indirectly, obstructing, impeding or opposing the giving or reception of the vote of said firm, or of any member thereof, at such election, on said stock or any part or portion thereof.”</p>

At law. This is an action of trespass vi et armis for assault and battery and alleged; imprisonment and detention, brought by the plaintiff [Charles H. Brown], a free negro, against the defendant [Robert B. Robertson], a police officer of the city of Washington, for arresting and imprisoning the plaintiff in the watch-house for being out after ten o’clock at night, contrary to-the provisions of the by-law of the corporation of the city of Washington, approved May 31, 1827.2

[In equity. Bill by William W. Brown and others against the Rubber-Step Manufacturing Company and others for alleged infringement of letters patent No. 19,347, granted to E. W. Chaffee, February 16, 1858.

At law. This is an action of ejectment [by Abijah Brown against Henry E. Schoon-maker] to recover lot No. 159, on the northerly side of Twelfth street, in the city of New York.

In equity. This was a bill [Ly George W. Brown against James Selby and others] to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 9,893] for “an improvement in seed planters,” granted to complainant August 2, 1853, antedated February 2, 1853, re-issued February 16, 1S58, and again reissued September 11, 1860, in five divisions, numbered 1,036, 1,037,1,038,1,039,1,040; and also letters patent [No. 12,811] for “an improvement in seed planters,” granted to…

[Edward S.] Brown, having engaged in the late Rebellion, became subject to the penalties of the confiscation acts, and proceedings were had by which his property had been forfeited and sold.

In equity. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Suit brought [by Alzirus Brown, a territorial assignee, against Jonathan R. Whittemore, John R. Whittemore, Benjamin Belcher, and John W. Belcher, for an alleged infringement of]2 letters patent [No. 21,712] for an “improvement in hay-rakes,” granted to George Whitcomb, October 5, 1858, and reissued in two divisions, June 16, 1868, and assigned to complainant.

The defendant filed a bill, on the equity side of this court, against the lessor; charging, that his title to the land in question, was derived under some colourable conveyance, by persons living in this state, with intent to give jurisdiction to the circuit court; and praying a full discovery.

This was a writ of error to the district court of the district of Massachusetts. An action was brought by the United States against [J. Vincent Browne] the plaintiff in error, to recover of him a balance of $1,164.75, alleged to be due from him as navy pension agent. [There was a verdict for the United States, and Browne brought error.

Ejectment [by Brownell and wife against Charles De Wolf] for certain parcels of land in the state of Rhode Island. [Judgment for plaintiffs.] The case arose upon the construction of the will of Charles De Wolf, late of Bristol in the state of Rhode Island, deceased. ' The material clauses upon which the questions arose were as follows: The will was made in May, 1806, and after the usual introductory clause it proceeds thus: “First, after the payment of all my just debts and…

At law. Case [by Pardon Brownell against Elisha Dyer] for disturbance of a right of way ten feet wide. Plea, not guilty. [Verdict for plaintiff.] At the trial it appeared, that the parties respectively claimed title to the premises on each side of the way, as privies in estate of Benjamin Eddy and John Young, between whom an indenture was made on the 18th of September, 1794, under which the right of way was claimed.

A motion is made to dismiss this case on the ground that there are no averments in the pleadings, which show jurisdiction of either subject-matter or the parties. The case had been transferred to this court from the district court of the 11th judicial district of this state, under the 12th section of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789.

<p>Case No. 2,040.</p> <p>Negotiable Instruments — Demand of Patment —Banks—Officers.</p> <p>1. When a note is deposited with a bank for collection, when due, it is a sufficient demand if the teller of the bank, presenting the note, inquires of the book-keeper whether a deposit has been made to pay the note, and is informed that there are no funds to pay it.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The demand is good though the teller acted as clerk of the notary public who protested the note.</p> <p>3. The teller represented the bank, and it was responsible for the money if paid.</p> <p>4. The notice was made out by the clerk, but signed by the notary, and the court will not presume a. fact, not proved, against the face of the paper.</p> <p>[NOTE. Where a promissory note is made payable at a particular bank, there is a sufficient demand if the note is in the possession of the bank at maturity. Fullerton v. Bank of U. S., 1 Pet. (26 U. S.) 604; Beeding v. Thornton, Oase No. 1.228: Bank of U. S. v. Smith, 11 Wheat. (24 U. S.) 171; Bank of U. S. v. Oarneal, 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 543. Presentment of such a note during banking hours is sufficient. Camden v. Doremus, 3 How. (44 U. S.) 515. So is the examination by .the bank of the maker’s account. Bank of U. S. v. Smith, 11 Wheat. • (24 U. S.) 171. There is a sufficient demand where a bank delivers a note to a notary after banking hours for protest, informing him it has no funds of the maker. Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 543. But there is no presentment or demand if the presence of the bill in the bank is unknown to the cashier. Chicopee Bank v. Seventh Nat. Bank, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 641.]</p>

In admiralty. Browning & Brothers, owners of the steamer Aroma Mills, libel the firm of B. & J. Baker & Oo. for compensation for damages sustained by their vessel in the service of the respondents as wreckers. B. & J. Baker & Co. libel the steamer Aroma Mills, lost while wrecking off Cape Henry, for salvage for saving her.

At law. This, was a general demurrer to a declaration, in an action [by Mark Brown-son, administrator, etc., of Lyman Ayrault, deceased, against Danforth Wallace] upon a promissory note.

At law. This was an action of trespass to try title [by the city of Brownsville against Maria Josefa Cavazos and others]. Held: as the following opinion shows, that the institution of a suit by the original defendants against the grantees of the original plaintiffs relieved the latter from the obligation of commencing-a suit; that they could defend their title in this suit.

In bankruptcy. In this case, the register certified to the court that a claim which had been presented, for the rent of certain premises, was objected to by the bankrupt [Cos-more G. Bruce], on the ground that he did not rent the premises for the time claimed; that the facts were, that the bankrupt hired the premises on May 1, 1871, and about July 1, 1871, he sold out his business to his brother, and surrendered the premises to him, but paid the rent for August and September…

[In bankruptcy. The assignee and James W. Brock, mortgagee of land belonging to the bankrupt, William Bruce, submitted an agreed case for the determination of the court as to who was entitled to certain products of the mortgaged land, and the court made an order in favor of the mortgagee.]

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by Elijah K. Bruce against the tackle, apparel, and furniture of the steamboat America for materials furnished. Decree for libelant.] The liens of material men and seamen, were equal and of the same nature and effect on the water craft, except the- right of priority of the seamen in marshaling the liens. The Mary Ann [Case No. 9,195]; The Jerusalem [Id. 7,294]; Conk. Adm. 14, 52, 60; Abb.

[At law. Action by John M. Bruce and others against Thomas Murphy, collector of the port of New York, to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. Judgment for plaintiffs.] This ease was tried by the court, the parties thereto having consented and waived a. jury, as per stipulation on file, according to-the statute in such case provided.

<p>Case No. 2,049.</p> <p>[Cited in Guaranty Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Green Cove Springs & M. R. Co., 139 IT. S. 145, 11 Sup. Ct. 515.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The word “month,” when used in statutes, means calendar month. Union Bank of Georgetown v. Forrest, Case No. 14.356; Com. y. Chambre, 4 Dali. (4 U. S.) 143; Hunt v. Wickliffe, 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 201; Guaranty Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Buddington, 27 Fla. 215, 9 South. 246; Baltimore & D. P. R. Co. y. Pumphrey, 74 Md. 80, 21 Atl. 559; Sand-val v. Ford, '55 Iowa, 461, 8 N. W. 324. Likewise when used in contracts, unless some other intention is apparent. Sheets v. Selden’s Lessee, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 177. As used in equity rule 83, giving one month’s time from filing a master’s report to file exception thereto, means calendar month. Gasquet v. Crescent City Brewing Co., 49 Fed. 493. Used without explanation in a sentence of imprisonment means lunar month of 28 days. Com. v. Stanley, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 543; Com. v. Martin, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 334, 23 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.) 256.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by Richard P. Bruff against William A. Ives for infringement of reissued patent No. 5,624, for an improvement in machinery for manufacturing curved or gauge-lipped augers.

<p>Case No. 2,051.</p> <p>Mistake in Polict of Insurance — Agent op Insurance Company — Insurance Interest — Relief upon Reformed Contract.</p> <p>1.A mutual mistake in a policy of insurance will be corrected by a court of equity, even after a loss, where the mistake is satisfactorily shown, either from the application or oral testimony.</p> <p>[Cited in Spare v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Fed. 572; Same v. Same, 19 Fed. 19; Durham v. Fire & Har. Ins. Co., 22 Fed. 470.]</p> <p>[See Bailey v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 13 Fed. 250, and note.]</p> <p>2. When the local agent of an insurance company solicits business for his principal, and prepares the application for a policy, in so doing, prima facie, be is the agent of the company, and his mistakes are its mistakes.</p> <p>3. A party in possession of a mill belonging to another to whom he advanced a portion of the purchase-money, and who holds such other’s power of attorney, authorizing him to dispose of the same, has an insurable interest therein.</p> <p>4. A court of equity, when it has reformed a contract, may enforce it, or grant such relief upon it as the complainant shows himself entitled to.</p> <p>[Cited in Herbert v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 12 Fed. 808.]</p>

[At law. Action by Frederick W. Bruñe & Sons against William H. Marriott, collect- or of the port of Baltimore, to recover back customs duties alleged to have been illegally exacted.

[At law. Action by Frederick TV. Bruñe, trustee, against Robert M. Smith, collector of internal revenue, to recover back taxes paid uu ler protest.

<p>Case No. 2,054.</p> <p>Seamex — Wages—Injukt in Sebvice or the Ship</p> <p>1. Where a seaman, disabled in the service of a whaling ship, is necessarily left abroad, he is to be paid from the ultimate proceeds, the same proportion of his lay for the whole voyage, as the time he served was of the time of the whole voyage.</p> <p>[Cited in Callón v. Williams, Case No. 2,324; Worth v. Steamboat Lioness No. 2, 3 Fed. 925; Boulton v. Moore, 14 Fed. 926.]</p> <p>2. In such ease, the seaman is entitled to recover the expenses of his return.</p> <p>[Cited in Antone v. Hicks, Case No. 493; Worth v. Steamboat Lioness No. 2, 3 Fed. 925.]</p> <p>3. The payment by the master, of three months’ extra wages, does not exonerate the vessel from the obligation to pay for his return.</p> <p>4. Nor is such payment to be charged to the ’ seaman, if he has received no benefit therefrom.</p> <p>[Cited in Callón v. Williams, Case No. 2,324.]</p> <p>5. He was entitled to be cured at the expense of the ship.</p> <p>[Cited in The Ben Flint, Case No. 1,299.]</p> <p>[See note at end of Case No. 1,992.]</p> <p>[6. Cited in Coifin v. Weld, Case No. 2,953, to the point that, unless the consul acts within statutory authority, settlements of wages and other terms of discharge made by or with his authority may be inquired into or varied.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of William Brunquest. Proceeding by Smith & Butler and Simpson & Simpson to establish a statutory lien against the bankrupt estate. The commissioner reported in favor of the claims, and the assignee and certain mortgage creditors excepted to the report.

<p>Case No. 2,058.</p> <p>Collision — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>1. Vessels have a right to anchor in crowded harbors; but if they remain there in a dense fog they must exercise the most constant vigilance and activity to make known their position, and if they fail to do this they cannot expect full reparation for damages. Bells must be rung at shorter intervals than two minutes.</p> <p>2. A ferry boat having run into a schooner at anchor in New York bay, and both vessels having been found to be at fault, the damages were equally apportioned, and no costs were awarded to either party.</p> <p>3. A cross libel was filed by the ferry boat against the schooner for injuries done by the ferry boat to another schooner in consequence of the collision and which were paid for by the ferry boat. This libel was dismissed because the libellants were themselves also in fault.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,059.</p> <p>Amendment — At Common Law.</p> <p>1. At common law an amendment might be made whilst the proceedings were in paper.</p> <p>2. A judgment of a previous term cannot be set aside on motion.</p> <p>[Cited in Sprague v. Litherberry, Case No. 13,251; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 552; U. S. v. Millinger, 7 Fed. 189; U. S. v. Walsh, 22 Fed. 648.]</p> <p>3. Amendments in England, under their statutes, constitute no rule for the courts in this country.</p> <p>TNOTE. A motion to correct or amend a judgment in any respect other than in respect to mere mistakes or clerical errors must be made at the term at which the judgment was rendered. Bank of U. S. v. Moss, 6 How. (47 U. S.) 31; Medford v. Dorsey, Case No. 9,389; McClelland v. Fosbender. Id. 8.695; Wood v. Duse, Id. 17,950; Bradley v. Eliot, Id. 1,778; Crabtree v. Neff. Id. 3,315; Doubleday v. Sherman, Id. 4,019; Sibbald v. U. S.. 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 488: Scott v. Blaine, Case No. 12.525; Mc-Micken v. Perm, 18 How. (59 U. S.) 507; Bank v. Labitut, Case No. 842; Coleman v. Neill. 11 Fed. 461; Jenkins v. Eldredge, Case No. 7,269. For cases in which the judgment has been vacated or corrected after the term for the reason of irregularity, mistake, surprise or the like, see Crookes v. Maxwell, Case No. 3,415; U. S. v. Bennett, Id. 14.573: Jones v. ICemper, Id. 7,472; U. S. v. MeKnight, Id. 15,695; Lytle v. Fenn, Id. 8.651; Pierce v. Turner, Id. 11,148; Shuford v. Cain, Id. 12,823; Sheer v. Bank of Pittsburg, 16 How. (57 U. S.) 571; Doggett v. Emerson, Case No. 3,961; Newton v. Weaver, Id. 10.193; Homans v. Coombe, Id. 6.653; Ringgold v. Elliot, Id. 11,844; Figh v. U. S., 3 Ct. Cl. 97.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the-United States for the district of Massachusetts. [In admiralty. Libel by Woodbury and' others against the privateer Brutus for the-distribution of the proceeds of prizes. There was a decree for libellants in the district court (case unreported), and the respondents appeal.

In bankruptcy. The case is heard upon the petition of Joseph Bryan, assignee, praying the court to declare null and void a sale made by [J. Ambler Smith] a preceding as-signee, of certain interests of the bankrupt in the estates of his father, William Major, Sr., and of two sons deceased [and also upon the joint petition of William Major, the bankrupt, and John C. Major, for the like purpose.

I, Frank S. Hesseltine, register of said court in bankruptcy, do hereby certify, that in the course of the proceedings in said cause the following questions arose pertinent to said proceedings, and were stated and agreed to by Richard K. Hines, Esq., who appeared for Francis W. Forth, a creditor, and L. P. D. Warren, Esq., who appeared for John Neal, another creditor of the said bankrupt.

<p>Case No. 2,063.</p> <p>Jury — Impaneling—Taking Oath.</p> <p>A juror cannot be permitted to make solemn affirmation in lieu of oath, unless he be one of those people who hold it unlawful to take an oath on any occasion.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,064.</p> <p>Limitations — Alabama Statute — Suit on Executor’s Bond — Running or Statute.</p> <p>L A suit brought by a legatee against a surety on the bond of an executor is not, under the limitation law of Alabama, barred in six years from the date of a decree of the probate court merely ascertaining the amount due the legatee, but making no valid order directing its payment.</p> <p>2. When legatees under a will were made defendants to a bill brought by other legatees against the executor to compel the payment of their legacies, and by the final decree such defendant legatees were authorized to file petitions in the case to propound their claims, held, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run against them from the date of such final decree.</p> <p>3. A decree against the executor, rendered in favor of such defendant legatees on the petitions which they were permitted to file, is not a bar to an action at law against the surety on the bond of the executor to recover the amount of such decree.</p>

In equity. The bill charged, that Davis McGee, deceased, became indebted in his life to the plaintiffs [Bryan and others] for goods sold, and gave his promissory note therefor; that he died, and that James McGee, a citizen of New-Jersey, the defendant, took out letters of administration in New-Jersey, and became possessed of all his property; that he pretends he has fully administered, but that the goods purchased by Davis McGee from the complainants were sold by him to the…

<p>[In equity. Bill by Ezekiel Bryan (Byam), - Whitney, and Seth King against John A. Stevens to restrain an alleged infringement of letters patent No. 68, granted to Alonzo D. Philips, October 24th, 1836, for an improvement in friction matches.' The court reserved decision until the rendition of a verdict at law upon the validity of the patent and other matters.]</p>

<p>[At law. Petition by George Bryant, a seaman imprisoned for desertion, for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

[In equity. Bill by Thomas X. Bryant, individually and as administrator of Margaret Hare, against George Hunter, William Hunter, and Thomas Todd, for an accounting and the application of certain of the estate of A. Hare to the satisfaction of a marriage article bond made by said Hare to Margaret Hare, in the nature of a marriage settlement.] The bill states, that on the 10th of November, 1789, Andrew Hare, of New-Orleans, gave his bond to the defendants, George and William…

<p>[In bankruptcy. Motion to set aside or reopen a meeting of creditors in composition.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,070.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement — What Constitutes— Damages.</p> <p>1. A patent right is infringed, by making the thing patented, though employed by another to ■do so.</p> <p>[Cited in Potter v. Crowell, Case No. 11,323.]</p> <p>[See Delano v. Scott, Case l$o. 3,753.]</p> <p>2. But where the thing was made without the knowledge of its having been patented, more ■than nominal damages should not be given.</p> <p>[Cited in Hogg v. Emerson, 11 How. (52 TJ. S.) 60S.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by the executor of Alexander Brydie against Miller, Hart & Co. and William Brown & Co. for a resettlement of partnership accounts.

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by the owner of the canal boat Buffalo for damages sustained by collision.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of William Buchanan.] On the petition of the American Sheet and Boiler Plate Company, original petitioning creditor, for leave to dismiss its petition and discontinue the proceedings, and the answer and objections of the Cleveland Boiler Plate Company as intervenor under the last clause of section 42 of the bankrupt act.

In equity. This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs, of a suit in equity [by Coe S. Buchanan against Gardner Howland and Joseph B. Palser] founded on letters patent [No. 17,3S7] granted to Marie Amedie Charles Mellier, of Paris, France, on the 26th . of May, 1S57, for fourteen years from the 7th of August, 1854, for “a new and useful improvement in making paper pulp.” The bill alleged an infringement of the rights of the plaintiff, as the assignee and owner of the…

<p>Case No. 2,075.</p> <p>Depositions — Pleading—Amendment — Commis- ' sion — Extension op Time pok Retckn op — Laches in Procuring.</p> <p>[1. In an action by an ex collector of revenue in Ireland, against a British consul, a commission could not be executed because defendant had erroneously pleaded that the moneys claimed by plaintiff were the property of the queen, whereas in fact, by a local law, the moneys in question, being import taxes, were regarded as the property of the treasurer of the county. Held, that defendant should be allowed to amend his plea, and should also be granted sufficient time for the return of a new commission.]</p> <p>[2. Decision on demurrer to a special plea by defendant was rendered April 5; an amended plea was filed on the 8th; plaintiff replied February 23, the following year; and thereafter defendant obtained the issuance of a commission. Held, that there was no laches in procuring the commission.]</p> <p>[3. Defendant, having no reason, from the instruction given him, to doubt that the moneys in question belonged to the crown, was not culpably remiss in failing to plead with exactness in reference to the ownership thereof.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,076.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Dischaiígb Inadvertently Granted — Motion to Vacate.</p> <p>On the 8th of February, a discharge was inadvertently granted to a bankrupt, although specifications in opposition had been filed. No ruling was made on the specifications and no trial on them was had. Afterwards, on the faith of the discharge, the bankrupt borrowed money, and with it went into a new business, as a partner with two other persons, and contracted many new debts, both as a member of the firm and individually. On the 29th of June following the discharge, the creditors who filed the specifications moved to vacate the discharge, alleging that the fact of the discharge did not become known to them or their solicitor till the 23d of June. No proceeding was taken In time to review in the circuit court the granting of the discharge: Held, that the motion must be denied.</p>

[At law. Action by William Buchtel against the Mason Lumber Company upon an instrument of guaranty. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moves for a new trial.

<p>[At law. Action on a policy of insurance. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,079.</p> <p>Patents — Injunction against Agent Selling Infringement — Parties to the Bill to Restrain Infringement — Injunction to Restrain Infringement, When Granted.</p> <p>1. An agent who merely sells an article which is an infringement of a patent, is a joint trespasser with the manufacturer of the same, and an injunction will lie as well against the former as the latter.</p> <p>[Cited in Potter v. Crowell, Case No. 11,323.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. A person interested in a patent though not within the particular district in which the suit is brought, may be made a party to a bill to restrain infringement in such district.</p> <p>3. An exclusive possession of long duration under a -patent is ground for granting an injunction to prevent an infringement, without obliging the patentee previously to establish his right at law.</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. Liability for Selling Infringement. Persons making sales for the owner of an infringement are rendered personally liable as infringers. Potter v. Crowell [Case No. 11,323].</p> <p>[NOTE. For other cases involving this patent, see Buck v. Gill, Case No. 2,080, note.]</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by Darius Buck against Gill and others to restrain infringement of patent No. 1,157.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 2,081.</p> <p>Witness — Competency—Intehest in Result— Evidence.</p> <p>1. As a general rule, a party cannot be a witness in his own cause. Nor will he be permitted to avail himself, by indirect means, of evidence which would be-rejected as incompetent if offered directly.</p> <p>2. In cases of criminal prosecutions for a cheat, perjury, &c., the party aggrieved is a competent witness for the prosecution. But, when he has been used as a witness for the prosecution, the record of conviction is inadmissible in a civil proceeding instituted by him for relief against the fraud.</p> <p>3. In an action for the infringement of a patent within the county of Albany, N. Y., brought by parties claiming the exclusive right to the patent in that county: Seld, that a party who was possessed of the exclusive right to the patent in several counties in the state of New York, but who had no interest in the patent in the county of Albany, and no interest in the suit in which he was called, was a competent witness for the plaintiff.</p> <p>[See Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. (20 U. S.> 356; Foote v. Silsby, Case No. 4,920; Tread- - well v. Bladen, Id. 14,154; Evans v. Het-tiek, Id. 4,562)</p> <p>4. But a verdict for the plaintiff could, under no circumstances, be evidence for such witness, in a trial at law or in equity on the merits of the patent, although it would be admissible on a motion for a provisional injunction in a suit in equity.</p> <p>[Cited in Matthews v. Iron-Clad Manuf’g Co., 19 Fed. 322)</p> <p>5. The record of such verdict would be evidence for such witness only when his own deposition would be competent, that is, where the application is to the sound discretion of the court, as on a motion for a provisional injunction.</p> <p>[Cited in Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 Fed. 147)</p> <p>NOTE [from 11 Law Rep. 321], It is understood that Judge Conkling, who entertained and expressed doubts at nisi prius of the correctness of his decision there, as to the competency of the witness Jackson, fully concurred in the opinion of Judge Nelson. In the case of Wood-worth v. Edwards [Case No. 18.014], tried in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, at Boston, in April, 1848, before Mr. Justice Woodbury, the plaintiff claiming that the defendants, in using Brown’s patent planing machine, were infringing on Woodworth’s patent planing machine, one Rogers was called as a witness by the defendants. The counsel for the plaintiff objected to the competency of Rogers, because he was a defendant in a suit, wherein the identical machine under consideration in. the case on trial, was in litigation, and Judge Woodbury held that the objection was a good one. If that decision went upon the ground that a verdict for the defendants in the case on trial would be evidence for the witness thereafter, it would seem to conflict with the decision of Judge Nelson.</p> <p>[NOTE. For report of the new trial herein, see Case No. 2,0S2. For other cases involving this patent, see note to Buck v. Gill, Case No. 2,0S0.J</p>

<p>At law. This was an action [by Darius Buck and others against John C. Hermanee], tried before NELSON, Circuit Justice, and CONICLING, District Judge, for the infringement of letters patent [No. 1,157] granted to Darius Buck on the 20th of May, 1839, for certain improvements in the construction of stoves used for cooking.2</p> <p>The invention of Buck consisted in taking the stove known as the Hathaway stove — in which the oven was extended under the apron or open hearth of the stove, and which had what are called reverberating flues, that is, two flues, starting from the top of the back of the stove, one at each side, running down the back and under the bottom to the front, and there uniting in a centre flue which returned under the bottom and up the back to the stove-pipe — and adding to it a close flue or fire-chamber in front, • between the front plate of the stove and the front plate of the oven. Into this fire-chamber, which had no opening except into the fines under the bottom of the oven, the smoke and gases generated by combustion entered, and in it they circulated before returning through the centre fiue. By this means, the front part of the oven was more effectually heated and a more uniform baking in all parts of it was ensured. In the Buck stove, the dividing strips between the side flues and centre fiue under the bottom did not extend quite to the front plate of the stove. The defendant's stove had the extended oven and reverberating flues, and a hollow space between the front plate of the stove and the front plate of the oven, closed on all sides except where it communicated with the reverberating fines; but the dividing strips between the flues extended quite to the front plate of the stove, and upwards into the space in front. He insisted that the smoke and gases in his stove passed immediately from the side fines into and through the centre flue, without circulating in the fire-chamber, because there was no space for them to circulate; and that, therefore, he had no fire-chamber such as Buck had, but only reverberating flues. He therefore claimed that he did not infringe Buck’s patent He also set up various stoves prior to Buck’s as containing his invention, and produced evidence for the purpose of showing that Buck had fraudulently obtained a patent for the invention claimed, and that it was in fact the invention of one Solomon Crowell, Jr., from whom Buck obtained a knowledge of it</p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p>[Hathaway Cooking-Stove. Fig. 1 represents stove complete. The two lower apartments (marked in Fig. 2, a,) are ovens for roasting and baking. The upper apartment, b, Fig. 2, is the fire-room, the top of which is perforated with holes of any shape or size to admit of boilers; between the back of the stove and the backs of the fire-room and upper oven is a plate, c, running parallel with the back, which divides the space— which should be from two to six inches, according to the size of the stove — into two flues. This dividing plate rests on the back of the lower oven, which terminates the forward perpendicular flue, d, Fig. 2. The bottom of the upper oven and top of the lower one are placed at sufficient distance apart to form a horizontal flue, f, between the ovens, which is connected with flues which completely surround the lower oven. The front flue, g, is formed by a space between the lower front of the stove and the front of the oven. The bottom flue, h, is formed by a like space between the bottom of the stove and the oven bottom; the back flue, i, by a like space between the back of the stove and back of the lower oven, running to the pipe. The back of the fire-room —called the fire-plate — has an aperture, k, of sufficient capacity to admit of all the smoke to pass. The plate c, which forms a division of the upper flues, is made sufficiently wide to come as high as the top of the aperture in the fire-back, and on the top of said plate rests a plate or damper, 1, of sufficient dimensions to close either of the flues. This damper may be moved by a rod, m, which protrudes through a hole in the back of the stove, so as to cover either flue. When this damper is drawn so as to dose the back flue, the smoke will pass through the aperture k in fire-back, and ascend immediately to the pipe, which is situated on the top of the stove, over the flues; when the damper is shoved so as to close the top of the front flue, the smoke and heat pass through the aperture k in the fire-back, thence down the back of the upper oven, through the horizontal flue between the ovens, down the front, and under the bottom, thence enters the back flue, and ascends to the pipe. When ovens have acquired a sufficient temperature of heat, the damper may be drawn to close the back flue, which stops the circulation of air and confines the heat in the flues around the oven, thereby keeping an even and proper heat for baking and roasting. The same principles may be applied to a stove with but one oven; which oven may be divided by horizontal and other plates into apartments, as represented in Figs. 3, 4, and 5.]4</p>

<p>Case No. 2,083.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction' — Foreign Seamen — Shipping Articles — Agreement not to Sue-Right to Sue for Wages — Unseaworthiness op Vessel.</p> <p>1. The maritime courts of this country and of England are not without jurisdiction over actions, whether in rem or in personam, between foreigners. But as a general rule, both the American and English courts will decline to entertain such actions, excepting where it is manifestly necessary that they should do so, to-prevent a failure of justice.</p> <p>[Cited in The Russia, Case No. 12,168.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. A stipulation in shipping articles, by which the master and crew of a foreign vessel, about to sail to this country, agree that they will not sue in any courts abroad, but will refer all disputes to the courts of their own country for adjudication, is lawful and binding, and will, in general, be respected and enforced by the American courts. But where the interests of justice require it to be disregarded — e. g., where the voyage is broken up in an American port, by some other cause than the wreck of the-vessel, or where the man is discharged or becomes entitled to a discharge by reason of improper treatment — the American courts will entertain a suit by a foreign seaman for his wages, notwithstanding his stipulation in the-articles not to sue until his return home.</p> <p>[Cited in The Elwin Kreplin, Case No. 4,427;: The Hermine, Id. 6,409; The Lilian M. Vigus, Id. 8,346.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>3. Under the practice in this country, the approval of the consul, or other representative of the nation to which foreign seamen belong, is not absolutely necessary to the maintaining ■of a suit between them.</p> <p>4. It seems that a deviation from the voyage for which foreign seamen shipped, is not a ground upon which our courts should entertain jurisdiction of a suit for wages, where, by the articles, the libellants have stipulated to sue in their own country only.</p> <p>[Referred to in The Becherdass Ambaidass, Oase No. 1.203, as not announcing any general rule, but rather suggesting important exceptions to a sound rule.]</p> <p>5. Unseaworthiness of a vessel releases the crew from obligation to sail with her; and on showing such condition of the vessel, and that they left her on that account, they may maintain an action in personam for wages here, although all parties are foreigners, and are under agreement not to sue while abroad.</p> <p>[Cited in The Heroe, 21 Fed. 528.]</p> <p>6. A report that a ship is seaworthy, made by marine surveyors, upon occasion of the crew demanding to leave her for unseaworthiness, is not conclusive against the crew, in a subsequent action for wages, after leaving.</p> <p>[NOTE. Courts of admiralty, while not bound to take jurisdiction in matters of controversy between foreigners, will do so where justice requires it. The Sailor’s Bride. Case No. 12.220; The Bee, Id. 1.219; The Havana, Id. 6,226; Thomassen v. Whitwell. Id. 13,928; Davis v. Leslie, Id. 3,639; Mason v. The Blaireau, 2 Cranch C6 U. S.) 240; The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 435; Boult v. The Naval Reserve, 5 Fed. 209; Willendson v. The Forsoket, Case No. 17,682; Bernhard v. Green, Id. 1.349; The Belgenland. 9 Fed. 576; The Noddleburn, 30 Fed. 142; Orr v. The Aehsah, Case No. 10,586. Urgent reasons or special circumstances should exist. Fry v. Cook, Id. 5,-13S; The Carolina, 14 Fed. 424; The Monta-pedia. Id. 427; Thomson v. The Nanny, Case No. 13.9S4; The Pacific, Id. 10,644; Graham v. Hoskins. Id. 5.609; The Becherdass Ambaidass, Id. 1.203; One Hundred and Ninety-Four Shawls. Id. 10,521; Saunders v. The Victoria, Id. 12.377; Gonzales v. Minor, Id. 5.530. See Tile El wine Krepiin, Id. 4,426; The Amalia, 3 Fed. 652. As the breaking up of the voyage or the unlawful discharge of the seaman. The Infanta. Case No. 7.030; Lynch v. Crowder, Id. 8.637; Saunders v. The Victoria, Id. 12,377; Thompson v. The Catharina. Id. 13.949; The Napoleon, Id. 10,015; The Lilian M. Vigus, Id. 8,346; Willendson v. The Forsoket, Id. 17.682. And see Davis v. Leslie, Id. 3,639; The Her-máne, Id. 6,409; The Pawashiek, Id. 10,851. Or where the seaman’s contract has been broken by cruel and unwarrantable treatment. Wei-berg v. The St. Oloffi, Id. 17,357. A deviation such as to entitle a seaman to his discharge will justify the interference of admiralty. Moran v. Baudin, Id. 9,785. The remedy, however, should be no greater than the party would have been entitled to in the foreign jurisdiction. The Infanta, Id. 7,030; Thompson v. The Catharina. Id. 13.949. Comity is no reason for declining jurisdiction. The Russia, Id. 12,168; Fry v. Cook, Id. 5,138. And see Thomassen v. Whitwell, Id. 33,928. Having taken jurisdiction, the proceeds should be distributed according to the rights of the parties. Covert v. The Wexford, 3 Fed. 577.]</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel by William F. Tucker against the propeller Buckeye, owned by the Northern Transportation Company, and navigating the lakes, to recover damages for injury to part of the cargo in July, 1871. The libellant shipped on board the propeller for Chicago, a quantity of mer-chándise, and, while the propeller was at Detroit, embarking passengers, she was found to be on fire, in the hold, near the boiler.

[In bankruptcy. Gough, as survivor of the firm of Gough & Flynn, sought to prove a debt against the bankrupt firm of Buck-hause & Gough, of which he was a member, and the proof was allowed.]

On motion to suppress deposition. The cause was tried in the district court at Detroit, on the 8th day of December, A. D. 1856. On the same day the deposition of one McQhesney was taken in Chicago, but did not reach Detroit until December 10th — too late to be read on the trial.

[At law. Action for work and labor by Mark Buckingham against Richard Burgess and another. [For denial of a motion to dismiss the action for failure to file a sufficient bond as security for costs, see Case No. 2,088.]

-{At law. Action by Mark Buckingham •against Richard Burgess and McConahan for work and labor. A motion was made on behalf of defendants to dismiss the action, because of an insufficient bond as security for costs.

<p>[In equity. Bill by James Buckingham and others against Andrew Jackson and others for an accoimt.</p>

Rule to plead. Objection overruled. By the law of Maryland, an administrator is not bound' to plead plene administravit. See the case of Frazier y. Brackenridge. [Case No. 5,071].

[In admiralty. Suit to i eco ver marine hospital tax, alleged to have been illegally exacted.

<p>Case No. 2,093.</p> <p>Evidence — Record op Deed — Presumption op Execution — Rebuttal.</p> <p>1. Under the territorial government, the copy of a deed recorded is. prima facie evidence of its execution. But this presumption may be rebutted by facts or circumstances.</p> <p>2. Where the acts of the grantor are inconsistent with the presumption that the deed was delivered, they may be shown as weighing with the jury against such presumption.</p> <p>S. All such presumptions gain strength against the deed, where there has been no possession under it for half a century, no claim asserted to nor taxes paid on the land. And where the party claims bona fide, having been in possession many years, under a conveyance, such possession is greatly strengthened by the lapse of time, and the adverse claim is necessarily weakened, as the title of the person in possession is made stronger.</p>

<p>At law. This was an action of debt [by John Buckley, Jr., against llufus K. Page and others] on a poor debtor’s bond, dated the 26th of November, 1859. A verdict for the plaintiff was taken at the preceding term, subject to the opinion of the court upon the questions of law raised at the trial, but reserving the right to either party, after the opinion, to turn the case into a bill of exceptions.</p> <p>The writ was dated the 20th of July, 1858, and defendants appeared and pleaded performance. The plaintiff introduced the bond on which the suit was brought. The condition of the bond was, that, if the first-named defendant shall, in six months from the time of executing the same, cite the creditor before two justices of the peace, quorum unus, and submit himself to examination agreeably to the one hundred and ninety-fifth chapter of the laws of Maine, approved March 24, 1835, and take the oath or affirmation provided in the seventh section of the two hundred and forty-fifth chapter of the laws of the state, or pay the debt, interest, costs, and fees on the execution, or be delivered into the custody of the jailer, agreeably to the eighth section of the first-named statute, then the obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force. Two certificates of discharge were offered in evidence by the defendants, to prove performance of the conditions of the bond. The plaintiff objected to the reading of those certificates upon the ground that they were not admissible, unless it was first shown by other evidence than the certificates that the justices granting and signing the same had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, but the court overruled the objection, and the certificates were read to the jury. One was granted the 25th of December, 1S57, and the other April 12, 1858. Both were signed by James L. Child and Edward Fenno, and recited that the subscribers thereto were two disinterested justices of the peace and of the quorum, for the county of Kennebec, and in all other respects were in the usual form, reciting, in substance, that the first-named defendant, a poor debtor arrested on an execution issued on a judgment therein described, but enlarged on giving bond to the creditor, had caused the creditor to be notified according to law of his desire of taking the benefit of the oath prescribed by law for the relief of poor debtors; that he appeared at the time and place therein mentioned, submitted himself to examination, and, after being duly cautioned, took before them tiie oath prescribed in the law of the state, approved April 2, 1836; and it was further recited in the first-named certificate that the debtor, at the same time and place, also took the oath prescribed in the twenty-eighth chapter of the Revised Statutes of Maine, approved October 2, 1840. As rebutting testimony, the plaintiff offered the records of the justices who granted the respective certificates of discharge relied upon by the defendants. Among other things, it was certified in such record that one of the justices was chosen by the debtor, and that the other was chosen by a deputy marshal at the request of the debtor, the creditor not being present by himself or his attorney, and neglecting to choose. Appended to the records was a copy of the respective notices which the debtor gave to the creditor before making his disclosure, from which it appeared that he made complaint in both instances to a justice of the peace for Kennebec county, and not to the jailer, as required by the ninth section of the act under which the bond was given. By that statute the debtor was authorized to make the complaint to the prison-keeper, setting forth that he had not sufficient estate to support him in prison, and thereupon it is made the duty of the keeper to apply, to a justice of the peace of the county, who shall make out a notification, under his hand and seal, to the credit- or of the prisoner’s desire to take the benefit of the oath or affirmation prescribed by that act. But the same records certified that the debtor gave due notice to the creditor of his intention to take the benefit of the oath or affirmation, and that he appeared before the justices, submitted himself to examination, and that the prescribed oath was administered to him according to law, as stated in the certificates introduced by the defendants. Defendants objected to the admission of the records, insisting that the adjudication of the justices as to the sufficiency of the notice, as shown by the certificates of discharge, was conclusive, but the court overruled the objection, and the records were read to the jury. At this stage of the trial it was agreed that the defendants could prove that the debtor had no property at the times when the oaths were administered by the justices; and that if that evidence was by law admissible upon the subject of damages, then the verdict must be set aside, and a new trial granted. Under the direction of the court, the jury returned their verdict in favor of the plaintiff.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel for salvage services by John Buckley and others against the cargo and materials of the schooner William M. Jones.

In equity. Bill by [Josiah A. Bucknam] a creditor of [Daniel M. Goss] a bankrupt [against David Dunn and Olive R. Goss] to enforce a lien that had been adjudged to exist by the bankrupt court upon a parcel of the bankrupt’s estate against [Dunn] the purchaser thereof from the assignee, who sold the same subject to the lien [and against Mrs. Goss, the grantee of said Dunn]. The cause was heard upon bill, answer and proof [and there was a decree for complainant].

In equity. Bill by [Josiah A. Bucknam] an assignee of [Daniel M. Goss] a bankrupt against [Abial Goss] his mortgagee to annul a mortgage given in fraud of the bankrupt act The mortgagee by answer, denied all fraud, and all knowledge of the mortgage- or’s insolvency, and insisted that the mortgage was given part to secure a present loan, and in any event as to that was valid. Proofs were taken.

<p>[In bankruptcy. Henry S. Buckner against W. B. Street, assignee of Walter Sessions, a bankrupt.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libels by Bucknor and others, owners of separate portions of the cargo of the schooner Gilbert Green, to recover damages for injury to the cargo.

BOUNDARIES. Judge Symmes’s purchase, between the Miami rivers, was completed only for one million of acres. A base line was run from the Great Miami to the Little Miami river, so far from the Ohio river, as to admit of a straight line. And lines running north from the termini of the base, were run so as to include the land purchased.

[Appeal from the district court of the United states for the eastern district of Missouri.] This is an appeal by the United States from an order made by the Hon. Samuel Treat, judge of the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri, on the 9th day of March, 1875, in a proceeding by habeas corpus [unreported], discharging Augustus C. Buell from the custody of the marshal for said district, and refusing, on the motion of the district attorney, to…

[Action by Anna M. Buell against the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company. Defendant moves under Rev. St. § 724, to require plaintiff to produce on the trial a letter, written by plaintiff’s husband, containing evidence pertinent to the issue, and alleged to be in plaintiff’s possession and control. [For decree sustaining plaintiff’s demurrer to the second defense interposed by defendant, see Case No. 2,104, following.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court, by one Bolton, against the ship Buena Vista, to recover a balance of wages. He shipped at Callao, in Peru, as steward, for a voyage to New York, at 850 per month, and signed the usual shipping articles. A portion of his wages was advanced to him.

[In equity. Suit by Jacob E. Buerk: against William Imhaeuser, Theodore Hahn, and Charles Keinath for infringement of letters patent No. 48,048, for an “improvement in watchman’s time detectors,” issued to complainant as assignee of John Buerk, January 1, 1861, reissued August 22, 1865, and again reissued March 8, 1870, and numbered 3,869.

[In equity. Suit by Jacob E. Buerk against William Imhaeuser, Theodore Hahn, and-Charles Keinath for infringement of letters patent No. 48,048, for an “improvement in watchman’s time detectors,” issued to complainant, as assignee of John Buerk, January 1, 1801, reissued August 22, 1865, and again reissued March 8, 1870, and numbered 3,869. There was a decree for an injunction, and a reference to a master to ascertain as to damages. Case No. 2,106.

[In equity. Suit by Jacob E. Buerk against William Imhaeuser, Theodore Hahn, and Charles Keinath for infringement of letters patent No. 48,048, for “an improvement in watchman’s time detectors,” issued to Jacob E. Buerk, as assignee of John Buerk, January 1, 1861, reissued August 22, 1865, and again reissued March 8, 1870, and numbered 3,869.

[Ill equity. Suit by Jacob E. Buerk agaiust William Imhaeuser, Theodore Kahn, and Charles Keinath for infringement of letters patent No. 48,04S, for an “improvement in watchman’s time detectors,” issued to complainant, ns assignee of John Buerk, January 1, 3861, reissued August 22, 1865, and again reissued March 8, 1S70, and numbered 3,869. There was a decree for an injunction, and an accounting.

[This was a suit in equity by Jacob E. Buerk against Dennis Valentine.] 2 [Final hearing on pleadings and proofs.

<p>Case No. 2,110.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Revival of Suit by Administratrix — Costs.</p> <p>1. Three causes brought, on the same facts, by different libellants, being at issue, it was stipulated that two should abide the decision of the third. Before the third was brought to hearing, the libellant died; and his adminstra-trix continued the cause. A decree was rendered in favor of the claimants; but without costs, for the reason that the action was prosecuted by an administratrix.</p> <p>2. Eeld, that in the other causes, the claimants were entitled to decrees dismissing the libels, with costs.</p>

At law. Trover [by William Buffum, Jr., against Barney Merry] for 2,900 pounds of cotton yarn and 7,000 yards cotton cloth.

In admiralty. A libel was filed in the usual form against the “Buffalo” for repairs, and for work and laDor done in fitting her for the purpose of a tow barge, intended for the carriage of lumber.

<p>Case No. 2,113.</p> <p>Patents — Gutter Machine — Infringement.</p> <p>Upon the construction given by the court to-reissued patent, No. 6,675, granted to complainant October 5th, 1875, for a machine for making gutters for buildings (the original patent having been dated July 25th, 1871, and numbered 117,255), the defendants held not to have-infringed.</p>

In equity. This was a suit [by B. D. Buford and others]' to set aside and cancel a sheriff’s deed, issued to the defendant, John C. Henzier, as the purchaser at a certain execution sale of real estate, on the ground that complainants were junior judgment creditors and had redeemed the property from the sale within one year, under the Indiana statute.

[At law. Action upon a judgment. Defendant’s special demurrer to the declaration was overruled by the court below, and he appealed.

• In bankruptcy. The Merchants’ Bank of Canada having filed with the assignee in bankruptcy appointed in this proceeding, proof of an alleged debt of [Oliver Bugbeej the bankrupt to the amount of fifteen thousand and thirty dollars and eighty-five cents, in lawful money of the dominion- of Canada, being gold; and it .appearing thereby that two thousand three hundred and ninety-eight dollars and ninety cents of the sum mentioned in such proof were claimed to be due upon a…

<p>Case No. 2,116.</p> <p>Admiralty — Jurisdiction'—Monet Borrowed to Bepair.</p> <p>If the master borrow money for repairing damages to the vessel done on the high sea, the admiralty has jurisdiction.</p> <p>[Cited in The Packet, Case No. 10,654; The-Gold Hunter, Id. 5,513; The Boston, Id. 1,-669.]</p> <p>[NOTE. A loan which, by the maritime law, is a privileged debt, gives a lien on the vessel, enforceable in admiralty. Davis v. Child, Case No. 3,628. One who advances money to release a vessel from the custody of a marshal has a lien therefor. The J. R. Hoyle, Id. 7,557. A lien given by a state law for advances made by a master of a vessel navigating the interior wa-térs of a state may be enforced in' admiralty. Whitney v. The Mary Gratwick, Id. 17,591. ■There is no lien for the balance of an account of moneys paid for the use of the owners of a vessel by the agent thereof. Minturn v. Maynard,' 17 How. (58 U. S.) 477. One part owner cannot have a lien for moneys advanced to his co-owner. The Larch, Case No. 8,085. One who loans money for the purchase of a vessel, and takes the bill of sale and a power of attorney to sell her. and so reimburse himself, has no lien. The Perseverance, Id. 11,017. Where a stipulation in a hypothecation of a vessel provides that the lender shall not take the risks usual in bottomry, admiralty has no jurisdiction. Maitland v. The Atlantic. Id. 8,980.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,118.</p> <p>Insurance —Application — Concealment — Misrepresentation — Description op Voyage in Policy — Deviation.</p> <p>1. All facts material to the risk, known to the assured and not to the underwriter, - and which may influence the latter as to;taking the risk on the rate of premium, must be fully and in good faith disclosed when the policy is ef-footed.</p> <p>[See Hubbard v. Coolidge, Case No. 6,816; Kohne v. Insurance Co. of North America, Id. 7,020.]</p> <p>2. But this rule does not apply where the concealment is as to a matter which is covered by a warranty, express or implied.</p> <p>8. If, however, a misrepresentation of facts respecting such matter is made in answer to inquiries, it will avoid the policy — for the contract of insurance is one of good faith.</p> <p>4. And if such misrepresentation is voluntarily made, without being drawn forth by inquiries, it will have the same effect — for the false information may have prevented the inquiry.</p> <p>5. As where the insured volunteered a representation, which was untrue, as to the age of the vessel, and her standing on the books of insurance companies in a distant city, it was hdd, that although such representation related to the seaworthiness of the vessel, of which there was an implied warranty, yet, if material, that it would avoid the policy.</p> <p>6. Where the policy described the voyage as from Ocrocoke to St. Bartholomew’s or St. Thomas, and at and from thence to Tobasco, it was held, that it did not authorize the assured to go to both ports, but to either, at his election; and that, having first stopped at St. Bartholomew’s, and afterwards proceeded to St. Thomas, it was a deviation.</p> <p>[Cited mf Hearn v. New England Mut. Mar. Ins. Co., Case No. 6,301.]</p> <p>7. Such a departure from the voyage will not be a deviation, if shown to be a usage; for usages of trade are supposed to be known to underwriters, and are impliedly made part of the contract; but the usage should be so certain and uniform as to warrant the presumption that it is generally known as the law of the trade.</p> <p>[Explained and distinguished in Hearn v. New England Mut. Mar. Ins. Co., Case No. 6,301. Cited in Hostetter v. Gray, 11 Fed. 181; Hostetter v. Park, 137 U. S. 40, 11 Sup. Ct. 1.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>[NOTE. An intended deviation not actually carried into effect will not vitiate the policy. Marine Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 3 Cranch (7 U. S.j 357: Maryland Ins. Go. v. Woods, 6 Cranch (10 U. S.) 29. Unjustifiable delay constitutes a deviation. Warder v. La Belle Greole, Case No. 17,165. But a delay of a few hours to take from a foreign vessel the crew of a deserted ship will not amount to a departure. Williams v. Box of Bullion, Id. 17,717. Trading at a port, at which liberty is given to touch, may, when it involves delay, amount to a deviation. Maryland Ins. Go. v. Leroy. 7 Cranch (11 U. S.) 26; United States v. The Paul Shearman, Case No. 16,012. But a discharge of cargo which causes no delay nor increases the risk is not a deviation. Hughes v. Union Ins. Co., 3 Wheat. (10 U. S.) 159: Same v. Same, 8 Wheat. (21 U. S.> 294. It is not a deviation to take necessary measures to prevent capture. Haven v. Holland, Case No. 6,229. To go out of the course to save property, merely, is a deviation, but otherwise if the turning aside is to save human life. The Boston, Id. 1,673; The Henry Eubank, Id. 6,-376: Bond v. The Cora, Id. 1,021. affirming Id. 1.620; St.urtevant v. The George Nicholaus, Id. 13,578; Crocker v. Jackson, Id. 3,39S. Nor is there a deviation when the departure is authorized by the usages of the trade. Bentaloe v. Pratt, id. 1,330; Haven v. Holland, supra. For a vessel insufficiently manned at the commencement of her voyage to go- out of her course to supplement her crew constitutes a deviation. Cruder v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., Id. 3.452. And see. generally. Glidden v. Manufacturers’ Ins. Co., Id. 5,4S2; Martin v. Delaware Ins. Co.. Id. 9,161; Wintbrop v. Union Ins. Co., Id. 17,901; Govon v. Pleasants. Id. 5.647; Coles v. Marine Ins. Co., Id. 2,988; Wood v. Pleasants, Id. 17,961.]</p>

<p>[At law. Action of ejectment by the lessee of Bulkley and others against Joseph Buffington.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Nebraska. [At law. Petition by Jesse H. Bull and William Turtle for a writ of habeas corpus, directed to Samuel McClay, sheriff, requiring him to produce the petitioners. On the return of the writ the petitioners were discharged from custody by the district judge.

<p>Case No. 2,120.</p> <p>Municipal Corporations — Bonds.</p> <p>The provisions of the act of the legislature of New York, passed May 5th, 1870, incorporating the village of Edgewater, Richmond county, are so repugnant to the provisions of the act of May 11th, 1869, authorizing the issuing of bonds by certain towns, that the town of South-field, in Richmond county, was excepted from the operation of the act of 1869, and the act of 1869 was repealed so far as that .town was. concerned, and bonds purporting to have been issued by that town under the act of 1869, after the passage of the act of 1870, are void, because such bonds were issued without authority of law.</p>

At law. Debt on a liability created by statute. Held: that no averment concerning the original party is necessary, all such notes and bills may be sued in the courts of the United States, which was not the intention of the statute; and they farther cited Montalet v. Murray, 4 Craneh [8 U. S.] 46; Sere v. Pitot, '6 Cranch [10 U. S.] 332. The suit is within the jurisdiction of the court.

This was an action [by Silas Bullard and others] on a policy of marine insurance on the brig Star, at and from Fall River to Havana, and thence to a northern port in the United States. The vessel was valued in the policy at $3,000, and was insured for $2,-000. It appeared that the vessel performed her outward voyage to Havana, took a cargo of molasses there, and sailed on her return voyage.

At law. This was an action of assumpsit [by John Bullene against Celestin Blain] on a promissory note for five hundred dollars-made by the defendant, dated on the 23d day of January, 1872, payable to plaintiff in one year from date. Plaintiff introduced the note and rested.

[At law. Action by 0. & T. Bullet against the Bank of Pennsylvania to recover upon a bank note. Judgment for plaintiff.] Case agreed. The plaintiffs being bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, possessed of certain notes issued by this bank, and having occasion to remit money to Baltimore, cut them in halves, and in February, 1S0C, enclosed the half parts of said notes to their correspondent in Baltimore, which were duly received.

[In equity. Bill by Edwin W. Bullinger against Joseph Mackey to restrain infringement of a copyright. After a hearing on hill and answer, the bill was dismissed, and plaintiff moved for leave to file a replication .and take testimony.

<p>Case No. 2,127.</p> <p>Copyright — Subject of— Compilation — Proof op Originality — Infringement.</p> <p>1. A compilation of information respecting railroads, &c., is a proper subject of a copyright.</p> <p>[See Banks v. MeDivitt, Case No. 9G1; Lawrence v. Cupples, Id. 8,135.]</p> <p>2. The fact that the plan, arrangement and combination of a copyrighted work originated in the brain of its author, may be proved by some other person than such author.</p> <p>[See Boucicault v. Pox, Case No. 1,691.]</p> <p>3. The defendant’s compilation in this case held not to have been copied from that of the plaintiff.</p> <p>4. A compilation made from original sources is a new work.</p> <p>5. The plaintiff’s method of imparting information in his compilation, employed by the defendant, held not to have been new with the plaintiff Or to have involved invention, although the plaintiff had, for the first time, aggregated various methods, each of which had been used before.</p>

<p>Petition to confirm and divide a Spanish claim, under the act of 26th May, 1824 (4 Stat. 52).</p>

[Appeal from the -district court of the United States for the district of Georgia. [In admiralty. Libel by William W. Bul-loch against the steamer Lamar to recover damages for the loss of two negro slaves by collision. The bill was dismissed in the district court (case not reported), and libellant appealed.

[In bankruptcy. Petition by creditors of Benj. Bullock’s Sons to have them adjudicated bankrupts. Motion for the court to designate a time for the dismissal of the petition, if the petitioning creditors do not show that the required number of creditors have joined in the petition.)

<p>Case No. 2,131.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,132.</p> <p>Patents — Printing Machines — Anticipation— Infringement — Injunction—Accounting.</p> <p>1. The invention described in the specification of complainant’s patent for an improvement in printing machines, being for the employment of a yielding sheath in two strips, pressing outward, one on each side of a fixed knife in a revolving cylinder, for two purposes; one to hold the paper firmly against the edges of the .groove for the knife in the opposite cylinder while the knife severs it, the other to hold the end of the web till it is taken by other machinery and drawn along for the next operation; and the ninth claim of the patent being for the combination of the sheath with the fixed knife in the same cylinder: Held, not anticipated by .a combination composed of a springing knife, with a sheath in the same or opposite cylinder.</p> <p>2. The rules of law applicable to the test of the originality and priority of an invention, •considered.</p> <p>3. The prior knowledge and use of the invention by others which will invalidate a patent, •explained.</p> <p>4. After suit brought, the defendants stopped using the infringing device, but did not disclaim the right to it; Meld, not a reason why a decree for an injunction should not be granted.</p> <p>5.Where the proofs at the final hearing showed that there can have been no profits from the infringement, and it does not appear whether or not complainant suffered damage therefrom: Held, not a reason why a decree for an account should not be granted.</p>

In equity. This was a final hearing, on pleadings and proofs, on a bill in equity, filed by Mary E. Bunce, and Francis M. Bunce, her husband, Francis A. Bull, George H. Bull, William W. Bull and Henry K. W. Welch against Jane Ann Gallagher and Michael Smith, to annul and declare void an alleged forged deed, and the record thereof. purporting to convey to the defendant Gallagher the title to a house and two lots of land situated on Staten Island, in the state of New York, and…

<p>[In equity. Bill by Josephine M. Bunkley against Robert M. De Witt, James Davenport, William S. Tisdale, and Charles H. Beale to restrain publication of a certain manuscript work.</p>

[In equity. Bill by Amasa Bunnel and others, children and heirs of Lucy Bunnel, together with the administrators of certain deceased children, against Henry Stoddard and Asa P. Stoddard, to enforce a trust vested directly in Henry Stoddard, and to set aside certain conveyances in favor of Asa P. Stod-dard, which were alleged to have been procured by fraud.]

<p>Case No. 2,136.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Discharge op Involuntary Bankrupt-Certificate of Conformity.</p> <p>An involuntary bankrupt may receive a discharge as well as a voluntary bankrupt, but is not entitled to it, or to a certificate -of conformity, unless his assets equal fifty per cent, ■of the debts proved, or he files the assent, in writing, of a majority of his creditors in number and value.</p>

[In equity. BUI by David Burbank to annul an alleged fraudulent conveyance. Decree for complainant.) The plaintiff was the assignee of a mortgage made by the defendant, Josiah H. Hammond, to Asa Dresser, on the 27th of July, 1835, of certain real estate in Roxbury, Massachusetts, which was then subject to a mortgage to one Caleb Parker, Jun. The mortgage to Dresser was to secure the payment of a promissory note for $3,063.62 in six months, with interest.

<p>[In bankruptcy. Petition by a creditor of Thomas P. Burch praying an adjudication of bankruptcy against him.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,141.</p> <p>Shipping —Title and Sale op Vessel — Parol Evidence — Admiualtt Jukisdiotion —Foreign Seamen.</p> <p>[1. One having neither the actual nor constructive possession of a vessel, nor the right of possession, cannot transfer a good title thereto.]</p> <p>[2. A power of attorney authorizing a person to receive a vessel from her commander, and to sell her, does not give the right to sell the vessel until possession is delivered.]</p> <p>[3. Instructions to the master of a vessel, executed at the same time with a power of attorney to another to receive and to sell her, and referred to in a previous contract in relation to the vessel, may be received to elucidate the meaning of the parties to the power of attorney.]</p> <p>[4. Where a voyage of a foreign ship is broken up in a port of the United States, its courts will take cognizance of the claims of the foreign seamen, and administer, as nearly as practicable, that justice to which they would be- entitled at home.]</p> <p>[See note to Bucher v. Klorkgeter, Case No. 2,083.]</p>

[At law. Action by William Burdell, D. M. Smith, and S. T. Smith against Augustus M. Denig and William Lee for damages for infringement of patent William Burdell, in 1851, bought of the assignees of the patent [No. 7,776] granted to Allen B. Wilson, November 12, 1S50, for an improvement in sewing machines,” the exclusive right under said patent for Franklin county, Ohio.

This was a bill in equity, filed [by Henry Burden against Erastus Corning, John F. Winslow, and Erastus Corning, Jr.] to restrain the defendants from infringing letters patent [No. 17,665] for an “improved machine for making horse shoes,” granted to complainant June 30, 1857.

This was an action brought [by Peter A. Burden] for the violation by the defendants [Erastus Corning and John P. Winslow] of patent [No. 1,890] granted to Henry Burden, of Troy, on the 10th of December, 1840, and thereafter assigned to plaintiff.

[In equity. Bill by Riley Burdett against Jacob E,stey and others to restrain infringement of letters patents No. 87,241, granted to complainant February 25, 1869, for an improvement in reed organs, and for an accounting.

[In equity. Bill by Riley Burdett against Jacob Estey and others to restrain infringement of letters patent No. 87,241, granted to complainant February 23, 1869, for an im-pnovement in reed organs, and for an accounting. There was an interlocutory decree granting a perpetual injunction (Case No. 2,145), and complainant now moves for an attachment against defendants for a violation of the same.

[This cause was removed to the circuit court, and the plaintiff moved to remand the same to the state court, which motion was granted.]

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by George R. J. Burdoin against the schooner Harriet Smith for failure to deliver a shipment of cigars. Decree for libelant.]</p>

Habeas corpus, ad subjiciendum. The return states a warrant, from a large number of justices, to bring before them the prisoner, to find sureties for his good behavior.

<p>Case No. 2,149.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Return—Attachment por Contempt.</p> <p>1. Upon an attachment from the orphans’ court for contempt in not appearing to answer, &c., the marshal cannot justify the imprisonment of the party after the return day of the attachment, unless by an order of commitment by that court.</p> <p>2. A person surrendered by his bail, and prayed in custody, but not charged in execution, may be discharged upon habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,150.</p> <p>Banks — Lien upon Stock for Unpaid Notes.</p> <p>The Bank of Potomac has a lien upon its stock in the hands of a stockholder whose notes are lying over, unpaid.</p> <p>[See Union Bank of Georgetown v. Laird, 2 "Wheat. (15 U. S.) 390; In re Dunkerson, Case No. 4,156; Brent v. Bank of Washington, Id. 1,834; Same v. Same, 10 Pet. (35 U. S.) 596.]</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. Petition by Joseph H. Burgess, a bankrupt, for his discharge. Granted.]</p>

Mr. Mason’s causes, which were non pros-sed at the former session of this term, were reinstated upon his stating that he was confined to his bed by sickness in the country, and unable to attend and to write. In equity. Injunction.

[At law. Action by Benjamin Burgess, Nathan B. Gibbs, and Benjamin F. Burgess against James C. Converse, administrator of Philip Greely, deceased, late collector of the port of Boston, to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Carl B. Burgthal Against the ship George Skolfield to recover for nondelivery of goods shipped.</p>

<p>At law. Habeas corpus.</p>

In bankruptcy. Upon the petition of the assignee to have papers designated for publication of notice of sale at public auction.

[On habeas corpus. The petitioner, James H. Burke, was duly appointed as agent to receive and transport one Samuel Prank to Illinois as a fugitive from justice, in furtherance of a requisition by the governor of that state upon the governor of Minnesota. Prank was delivered to petitioner, and while proceeding through Wisconsin, en route to Illinois, was discharged on habeas corpus by a court of that state, and, returning to Minnesota, he was re-arrested by petitioner.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. [In admiralty. Held: though in no immediate danger so long as the wind blew off shore, leaving smooth water under the lee of the wall, the Alpine’s captain or agent and crew were preparing to clear the powder-boat’s chain from the Alpine by running a line from the sea-wall or fastening-post to the powder-boat, and procuring a slack of the powder-boat’s…

In admiralty. These three libellants shipped as seamen on board the schooner Ella Franklin at Boston, on the third of November last. The voyage was alleged to be from Boston to the Cape de Verd Islands, one or more ports as the master might direct, and back to the United States, the voyage not to exceed six months.

In admiralty. This was an appeal from a decree of the district court [of the district of Massachusetts (case unreported)] in a cause of bottomry. It was a suit in rem, instituted by the appellant [John Burke] to recover the amount of a certain bottomry bond upon the brig [M. P. Rich], given by the master. [There was a decree in favor of the claimants, George H. Blanchard and others, and the libellant appealed.

<p>Case Wo. 2,162.</p> <p>Costs in Admiralty — Insurance Effected by Marshal.</p> <p>1. Where a vessel, seized under a warrant form the district court, continued in the custody of the marshal until the case was disposed of in the circuit court, the marshal had no right to effect insurance on the vessel, while so remaining in his custody, at the expense of either party, without their consent.</p> <p>2. Money paid by the marshal for such insurance cannot be allowed in the taxable costs.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] In admiralty.

In bankruptcy. The defendant was the trustee under an assignment, made within six months before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, by the bankrupt, •of all his estate for the equal benefit of his •creditors. The suit was under the auxiliary summary jurisdiction, by a petition containing informally the essential averments which would have been required in a bill in equity to set aside the assignment; and prayed a •citation.

<p>Case No. 2,166.</p> <p>Patents — Infringement — Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>Where a preliminary injunction is sought to restrain alleged infringement of a patent which has not been sustained by judicial decision, the infringement must clearly appear.</p> <p>[Cited in New Tork Grape Sugar Co. v. American Grape Sugar Co., 10 Fed. 837.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by Augustus H. Burley, assignee in bankruptcy of David Kreigh, against James L. Flint, executor of Thompson J. S. Flint, deceased, to review so much of a decree of foreclosure as denied the statutory right to redeem.] Motion [by defendant] to dismiss the bill of review for want of necessary allegations and for want of equity.

In equity. The Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company filed a bill in this court against the Burlington and Southwestern Railway Company, to foreclose a mortgage which it held on its property situate in the counties of Putnam, Sullivan, and Linn, in the state of Missouri. Pending the proceedings, the defendant counties undertook to collect of the Burlington and Southwestern Railway Company taxes assessed against the same in the several counties named.

The plaintiff [Francis Burnap], a citizen of the state of Illinois, instituted this action against the defendants [Augustus J. Albert, William J. Albert, and John R. Moore], on the 1st of May 1854, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him, in his profession as a lawyer, by an alleged malicious and unfounded suit in chancery, brought in the state of Illinois by the defendants, against the plaintiff, as assignee in trust for the benefit of defendants and…

[In bankruptcy. Taxation of costs in the matter of Burnell Bros.] In the bill of fees rendered by the marshal in this case, he included the following items: For serving creditor’s petition on the two bankrupts, two dollars each; commission on disbursements at two per cent., thirty-eight cents, and commission on value of stock seized and held by him, thirty dollars and ten cents. In the taxation of costs the clerk rejected each of these items and the marshal appeals.

In bankruptcy. This was a petition by Peter L. Groot, a creditor, as holder of certain notes amounting to $3,000, and interest, secured by chattel mortgage on the property of the bankrupts, Evan Burnett & Evan Burnett, Jr., which, by consent of parties, had been sold by the assignee, and the proceeds brought into court to be distributed among creditors, according to priority.

[At law. Action upon a bond. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the court below on defendant’s demurrer to the declaration, and defendant appealed.

At law. Motion for a new trial. Action of trespass [by Daniel Burnham] against the defendant [Edward L. O. Adams], as jailer of Cumberland county, to recover damages for an alleged illegal imprisonment of the plaintiff, who was arrested by virtue of an execution issued on a judgment obtained against him by one Isaac Dyer, in the supreme court of the state.

The plaintiffs [Joseph A. Burnham and James Blake], citizens of Massachusetts, are trustees in an ordinary railway mortgage, executed by the defendant, the Chicago, Du-buque, and Minnesota Railroad Company) an Iowa corporation, and brought this bill in the state court' (circuit court of Dubuque county), to foreclose the mortgage. The bill is in the usual form.

<p>Writ of entry [by Daniel Burnham] to recover [from Andrew I. Hewey] the possession of land.</p>

<p>This was a bill in equity, in which the complainants [Daniel Burnham and another] were described as citizens of New Hampshire, and the respondent [James Rangeley] as a citizen of Maine. The bill was filed, and the subpoena served September 26, 1843. The respondent pleaded, that he was not a citizen of Maine at the time the bill was filed, but was then, and since, a citizen of the state of Virginia. On this, issue was joined, and certain facts proved or admitted which will be given in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>In this case the hill in equity was dismissed at the October term, 1845 (1 Woodb. & M. 7 [Case No. 2,170]), on account of the want of jurisdiction in consequence of the plaintiff [Daniel Burnham] being an inhabitant of New Hampshire, and the defendant [James Rangeley], though called as of Portland, Me., was shown, by the evidence in the case, to have had his domicil, at the time of the service of the subpoena, in the state of Virginia. Before that term of the court closed, the respondent moved for his costs. This motion was resisted by the plaintiff on the ground, that where a bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction no costs could be taxed.</p>

<p>At law. This was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note of one thousand dollars. The defendant [Ebenezer Webster] pleaded the general issue, and, for a second plea, a former judgment of the supreme court of New Brunswick, in favor of the defendant. Issue was joined by the plaintiff [Noah Burnham] on the first plea, and to the second he replied that the supreme court of New Brunswick was a foreign court and had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this suit at the time when the judgment was rendered, and that the note set forth in the declaration was withdrawn from said court by consent of the parties and by leave of the court before the verdict and judgment To this replication the defendant demurred specially, and assigned for causes of demurrer, that the replication was double and argumentative, and the plaintiff joined the demurrer.</p>

At law. This was an action of assumpsit [by Noah Burnham against Ebenezer Webster] on a promissory note, tried here May term, 1845, before the district judge.

<p>In bankruptcy. The petition, in this case, sets forth the following facts: The petitioner, [Burnham], who resides in Matanzas, in Cuba, in the month of October last, pursuant to previous authority, shipped to [P. & W. H. McLellan] the bankrupts, merchants of Boston, one hundred and fifty boxes of sugar, on joint account of himself and them. The whole cost of the sugars was about $2,500.00, towards the payment for which Burnham applied about $483.00, funds belonging to the McLellans then in his hands, and the residue he purchased with his own means. The sugars were shipped in a vessel of which the McLellans were part owners and ship’s husbands, and the bill of lading was sent to them. Against this shipment Burnham drew a draft on the McLellans for about $1,700.00, at sixty days’ sight, which was intended to cover th'e balance of cost of their half above the $483.00 retained by him, and also as an advance on his half of the sugars. The draft arrived in Boston in the same vessel with the sugars, on the fourteenth of November last, and on the same day was presented, by Robert C. Hooper, the agent of Mr. Burn-ham, to the McLellans, and accepted by them. On the arrival of the vessel, an inspector of the customs took charge of it in the usual manner, and put his locks upon the hatches, whence the sugars were subsequently removed to the government stores, wheré they remained, without being entered, until the time of the hearing on this petition. On the twenty-first of November, Mr. Hooper, learning that the McLellans were preparing to go into bankruptcy, demanded the whole or half of the sugars for Mr. Burn-ham; at the same time offering to return the $483.00, and give up the draft. On the twenty-second of November, the McLellans filed their petition in bankruptcy. The petitioner, Burnham, prayed that the whole, or half of the sugars, (as the court should decide his right to be,) might be restored to him, upon his refunding the $483.00 retained, and giving up the draft.</p> <p>contended, that this was a case in which the petitioner had a right to stop the goods in transitu; that the transit was not terminated, because the goods had not come into the possession, either actual or constructive, of the consignees; that the possession of the government officers, prior to entry, was not such a possession of the consignees as to determine the transit, notwithstanding the presentment and acceptance of a draft, intended to cover the price, subsequent to the arrival of the vessel which brought the goods, and the receipt of the bill of lading by the consignees (Northey v. Field, 2 Esp. 613; Nix v. Olive, reported in Abb. Shipp. 393; Abb. Shipp, pt. 3, c. 93, passim); that the right-of the consignor to stop goods in transitu was the same, whether he be an agent for others, or the owner and vendor of the goods (Feise v. Wray, 3 East, 93); that the fact, that the consignees were part owners of the vessel, did not create such a possession in them as to determine the transit, prior to entry; and that as to Burnham’s one half, he had a right to retake that, even from the possession of the bankrupts, at any time before a bona fide sale (Stubbs v. Lund. 7 Mass. 453; Newhall v. Vargas, 1 Shepley [13 Me.] 93; Abb. Shipp, ut supra); that Act Cong. 1842, c. 20 [270], § 12, was not intended to settle or define the rights of shippers, but was passed alio intuitu.</p> <p>[Winsor, assignee], did not deny the right of the petitioner to one half of the sugars; but as to the other half, contended, that the cases of Northey v. Field, and Nix v. Olive, above cited, were mere nisi prius decisions, and that the points there held had never been so decided in this country; that in those cases the drafts were accepted before the arrival of the vessel which carried the goods; that the fact, that in this case they were presented to and accepted by the bankrupts subsequently to such arrival, taken in connection with the facts, that the bankrupts were part owners and ship’s husbands, and not liable (in this case) to pay any freight, and that the bill of lading was sent to them only, amounted to a recognition by the consignor of their possession, and a waiver of his right to stop in transitu; that by Act 1842, c. 20 [270], § 12, goods in the possession of the collector, are at the risk of the owner, importer, consignee or agent; and that, as neither of these terms could be applied to Burnham, the possession of the collector was by that statute declared to be the possession of the consignees in this ease. Gray cited Henley, Bankr. pp. 321-324, 326, 329, and cases there enumerated, particularly Neate v. Balls [2 East, 117]; also, Archb. Bankr. 235.</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill to sot aside alleged fraudulent conveyances, for reconveyance, and for an accounting.</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of William Burns, one of the firm of S. & M. Burns. Motion by the First National Bank of Clarion and by the sheriff of Jefferson county to dissolve an injunction previously granted, restraining further proceedings on a judgment recovered by the bank against the bankrupt.

In equity. This was a bill by Austin E. Burpee, assignee of Charles W. Hodson against the First National Bank of Janes-ville and George Barnes, to set aside a mortgage for $5,000, given by the bankrupt to the bank on the 18th of September, 1871, upon his grist-mill in Janesville, to secure a preexisting indebtedness to the bank for that amount At that time an action was pending in this court, and on the calendar for trial, by the government against these defendants and…

offered evidence of the discharge of the principal under the insolvent act of Maryland, and prayed an exoneretur of the bail. objected, and alleged fraud of the principal in contracting the debt with a view to insolvency.

This was a bill in equity, founded on two reissued letters patent granted to the plaintiffs [Henry A. Burr and others], as assignees of Henry A. Wells, one on the 30th of September, 1856, [No. 300], and the other on the 7th of October, 1856, for inventions connected with the manufacture of fur hat-bodies. The original patent [No. 4.472] was granted to Wells on the 25th of April, 1846.

These were three hills in equity filed by the same complainant [Henry A. Burr] to restrain the same defendants [Peter S. Duryee, Henry A. Jacques, and Henry W. Duryee] from tlie infringement of three separate patents.

[In equity. Bill by Richard Burr against Edward N. Gregory for specific performance of a contract relating to a patent. The defendant demurred to the bill, and the demurrer was sustained.]

<p>Case No. 2,192.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Surrender of Property and Proof of Debt.</p> <p>1. In a case simply of constructive fraud, a mortgagee who has taken the mortgaged property and held it until a trial and finding against him in favor of the assignee, but who then, and before judgment, surrenders the property, may be allowed to prove his debt in bankruptcy.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Graves, 9 Fed. 821, as conflicting with the modern authorities. Approved in Re Cadwell, 17 Fed. 694.] .</p> <p>2. In this case he was ordered to pay a reasonable fee to the counsel for the assignee, and .all costs and special expenses.</p>

In equity. The following is the substance of the case and matters in controversy. In 1799, Samuel Blodjet conveyed to the defendants [McEwen, Hale, and Davidson] fifty acres of land in the county of Philadelphia, for the nominal consideration of 10,000 dollars, no part of which was paid, nor was there any definite agreement made as to the terms on which the conveyance was made.

<p>Case No. 2,194.</p> <p>Patents — Hat Bodies — Infringement — Preliminary Injunction — Adjudication at Law.</p> <p>[1. On motion for a preliminary injunction, a verdict against other defendants, sustaining the validity of plaintiff’s patent, while not conclusive, is entitled to great consideration; and, if the alleged infringing machine is substantially similar to plaintiff’s, an injunction should issue.]</p> <p>[2. A patent for machinery for making hat bodies, consisting in part of a chamber so shaped as to concentrate flying fur from a revolving brush, and to discharge it by means of a vacuum and air current upon a perforated or wire cone, and for a process whereby, after the formation of the bat on the cone, it is covered with moist cloth, and another like cone placed within the one upon which the bat is formed, so as to facilitate its handling and immersion in water, is infringed by machinery in which the chamber is partitioned, and in which the fur fibres pass through each compartment to the point of discharge, to a perforated cone or wire gauze, with a finer one of grass cloth over it, furnished with an exhaust chamber and means of producing an air current and substituting a metallic picker for the revolving brush; the bat being hardened, so as to be easily handled, by the discharge of steam jets upon it during the process of its formation.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Jonathan S. Burr and others, moiety owners of the ship St. Thomas, for a sale of the vessel and division of the proceeds. Elwell and others, claimants, move to be allowed to retain possession upon giving security to libellants. [For the former disposition of a similar motion, see Burr v. The St. Thomas, Case No. 2,19ia, next preceding.]

[In equity. Bill by Henry A. Burr and others] owners of the Frost & Monroe bran duster, claiming as the assignees of a patent [No. 6,148] granted to Frost & Monroe in 1849 [February 27th], and reissued [March 13, 1855, No. 302], to restrain the defendants from using in their mills, in Brooklyn and Williamsburg, the Bradfield bran duster.

At law. This was an action of assumpsit upon the following contract, made between the plaintiff [Charles Burrill] and F. W. Lincoln, Jr., as mayor of the city of Boston: “In consideration that Charles Burrill, of Brookline, Mass., shall obtain credits upon the quota of the city of Boston, I hereby agree to pay to the said Charles Burrill the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars per man, for each and every full man so credited upon said quota, the money to be paid to…

In equity. Suit was brought [by Margaret Burrall and others against John A. Rumsey and others] upon letters patent No. 38,002 (William D. Burrall, assignee), granted [to T. D. Burrall] March 24, 1863, for “improvement in corn-shellers.”

<p>[Bill by an assignee In bankruptcy to set aside an assignment by one Farnsworth, the bankrupt, of his interest in a copartnership.</p>

At law. The plaintiff [Ebenezer Burrill) was a commission merchant in the city of New York, with whom the defendant [James Phillips] deposited certain cotton for sale. The cotton was sold to Murray &' Wheaton on a credit of four months, according to the custom of factors at New York to sell on credit. A note was taken for the amount, and before it became due, Murray and Wheaton failed.

[At law. Action by the survivors of Francis Burritt against Bench and others to recover for loss of and damage to goods delivered to defendants as common carriers. The plaintiffs had a verdict, but by consent it was set aside, and judgment rendered for plaintiffs for a stipulated sum.]

[Bill by the United States against Thomas C. Butler and Josiah Sturges to set aside a mortgage executed by Butler and wife to Sturges to indemnify the latter against a bond for the payment of duties, or, by way of other relief, to have the benefit of the mortgage applied to the use of the complainant.

In bankruptcy. On the 9th of March, 1876, Asa W. Burrows, a confectioner, executed a chattel mortgage on his stock in trade, fixtures, furniture, and utensils, to secure to William T. Gibson the payment of certain promissory notes.

[At law. Action by Burrows. Hall & Co. against Edward A. Hannegan. The defendant demurred to the first and second counts of the declaration, setting forth the place of making, indorsement, and payment, and the demurrer was overruled. See next following case, No. 2.206.

[At law. Action by Burrows, Hall & Co. against Edward A. Hannegan. Defendant demurred to the first ^and second counts of the declaration, and the demurrer was overruled.]

[In equity. Bill by John E. Burrows against the Lehigh Zinc Company for infringement of patent No. 13,416, granted to complainant August 15, 1855, for a furnace to be used in the manufacture of white oxide of zinc. [Por decision on interference awarding priority of invention to complainant a,s between him and Wetherill, see Burrows v. Wetherill, Case No. 2,208.]

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of New York.</p> <p>[In bankruptcy. The assignee of Edward Burt and Thomas Towne, bankrupts, appeals from a decision of the district court affirming an order of the register (case not reported) allowing a statutory lien on certain machinery of the bankrupt, the lien being claimed by a state prison agent, by reason of a contract between him on behalf of the state and the bankrupts.</p>

The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts as follows: This is an action of contract upon a judgment rendered by the ¿¡strict court for the second judicial district of the state of California, in and for the county of Tehama, in favor of the plaintiffs [H. H. Burt and Tipton], who are citizens of the state of California, against John G. Wright, Lester Goodwin, and James Delano, copart-ners under the firm name of Wright, Goodwin, & Delano, and having their usual…

In bankruptcy. Burt was proceeded against by certain of his creditors in the district court for the district of Minnesota [case unreported], under the 39th section of the bankrupt act [14 Stat. 530]. Two acts of bankrupt were charged in the petition. 1. That being a merchant, or trader, he had fraudulently stopped, or suspended, and not resumed payment of his commercial paper for a period of fourteen days. 2.

In equity. Henry ICeyes was a partner in the firm of Keyes, White & Co. *His son, Martin Keyes, was also a member of that firm. Henry Keyes, being a man of wealth, loaned his name in order to obtain credit for the firm. The other members had but little financial standing. On the 8th of February, 1858, their liabilities were $54,800, when the firm failed.

<p>[In bankruptcy. Motion by the Union Bank of Lower Canada, a creditor having a lien by attachment, to dismiss the petition in involuntary bankruptcy, on the ground that Burton was not a resident of the United States.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Peter R. Burton and William H. Lingo, owners of tbe schooner William Clarice, against tbe schooner Commander in Chief, for damages sustained by collision. There was a decree for libelants, and a reference to compute the damages. On the coming in of the commissioner’s report, the claimants, Abraham La Tourette and Daniel Butler, excepted to the report, which exceptions were overruled.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York. [In admiralty. Libel by Peter R. Burton and William H. Lingo, owners of the schooner William Clarke, against the schooner Commander in Chief, to recover damages sustained by a collision.

<p>Case No. 2,217.</p> <p>'Seal — Sckoll—Voluntary Agreement — N.ot Enforced — Relationship as a Consideration— Bill to Determine Adverse Claim.</p> <p>1. A scroll made with a pen, inclosing the letters “L. S.” will be held to be a seal, if the party appending it to his signature to a written instrument intends at the time to adopt it as a seal.</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. It is not necessary to state in the deed, or In the witnessing clause, that the party has affixed his seal, in order to make a scroll a seal, if it is apparent from the instrument and the ■circumstances under which it was executed, that it was intended to adopt the scroll as a seal.</p> <p>3. An executory agreement, or an imperfect ■conveyance, without a valid or meritorious consideration. will not be inforced in equity against the promissor or' grantor, or his personal representatives, or subsequent voluntary grantees; and a fortiori will not be inforced against subsequent grantees for a valuable consideration.</p> <p>4. The relation of son-in-law does not constitute such a valuable or meritorious consideration as will take a conveyance out of the category of a voluntary conveyance within the rule.</p> <p>5. Under section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, authorizing the bringing of a suit to determine an adverse claim to land, the complainant can only obtain relief upon the grounds alleged in his bill. If he alleges title in fee, and possession in himself, and an adverse claim as the only grounds for relief, and it appears in evidence that he has neither title nor possession, he can have no relief in equity.</p> <p>6. Where a complainant asks to have determined an adverse claim to land, upon a bill alleging only title in fee and possession in the complainant, and an adverse claim by defendant, he cannot have a decree charging the defendant with holding the legal title in trust for him, and for a conveyance.</p> <p>[NOTE. An impression on paper sufficiently clear to be recognized will constitute a valid seal. Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. C54 IT. S.) 472, affirming Pillow v. Roberts, Case No. 11,167; Follett v. Rose, Id. 4,900; Pierce v. Indsetk, 106 U. S. 546, 1 Sup. Ot. 418. The interposition of wax is unnecessary. Id. An ink mark, if so intended, will be sufficient. TJ. S. v. Coffin, Case No. 14,S23. The existence of a seal may be presumed from a statement in the instrument that the grantor affixed his seal, etc. Le Franc v. Richmond, Id. 8,209. A deed is not invalidated by the seal being torn off by the grantor or with his consent. Cutís v. TJ. S., Id. 3,522.]</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of New Hampshire. [In admiralty. Libel for seaman’s wages by Joshua Burton against Henry F. Salter,, master of the Albert Gallatin. Respondent appealed from a decree of the district court in favor of libelant.

In equity. The bill states, that before the intermarriage of the plaintiffs, an indenture tripartite was made between Samuel E. Howell, and R. R. Smith, executors of Samuel Howell, of the first part, Hannah L. Howell, the female plaintiff, of the second part, and the defendant’s intestate, William E. Howell, of the third part, which, after reciting a bequest of £3.000 by Samuel Howell to his granddaughter Hannah L. Howell, an intended marriage between her and Burton, and an…

<p>[In bankruptcy. Motions by Claflin & Co. and by Patón & Co. to annul an adjudication in bankruptcy as to L. Bush.</p>

In bankruptcy. Scheele was served with a rule to show cause why he should not deliver to assignee two horses belonging to the bankrupt, or pay the value of the same.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine. [In admiralty. Libel by William Bush against the schooner Alonzo for wages. There was a decree for libellant in the district court (The Alonzo, Case No. 25S), and the claimant, Thomas Hagget, appealed.

[In bankruptcy. Proof of debt by Tan Camp Bush against the bankrupt estate of Dunkle & Dreisbach. The register reported in favor of the validity of the claim, but the assignee. .Tosiali Crawford, excepted to the report, and his exception was sustained by the district court. In re Dunkle, Case No. 4,161.

At law. This was an action on the case brought to recover a balance due upon a judgment entered in the court of exchequer in Ireland, upon a bond and warrant of attorney to confess judgment, and also the amount of a note of hand for £300 sterling, which, by a settled account between the parties, it was agreed was to be paid out of the proceeds of a certain copper mine, in which these parties and others were concerned.

<p>Case No. 2,327.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Notice to Creditobs — Doty or Register.</p> <p>Proper notice must be given by the assignee to creditors, and the register should see that this duty is performed. The non-performance of it renders the bankrupt liable to lose his right to a discharge.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Blaisdell, Case No. 1,488.]</p> <p>[In the matter of Michael N. Busbey, a bankrupt]</p>

This was a bill in equity filed [by Ezek Bus-sey and Charles A. McLeod] against the defendants [James Wager, E. J. Hicks, and G. G. Wolfe] for infringement of reissued letters-patent No. 5,435, dated June 3, 1873 [patent originally issued to Bussey and McLeod, December 5, 1S65, and numbered 51.292], granted to complainants for improvements in-reservoir cooking stoves.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.]</p> <p>In admiralty.</p>

The plaintiffs [William Butcher and Samuel Butcher] were the holders of a note-drawn by George W. Tyson & Co. for $1,137.-01, which was made payable to the defendant, David I. Tyson, and endorsed “David I. Tyson, per G. W. Tyson, Atty.” The suit was brought against the defendant as the endorser of this note. [Judgment for defendant.] On the trial the plaintiffs proved and gave in evidence a power of attorney from the defendant, David I. Tyson, duly executed by him to George…

<p>Case No. 2,334.</p> <p>Whit of Error — Effect of Allowance — Secu-itiTY — Supersedeas.</p> <p>1. Where the supreme court of a state gave judgment for a perpetual injunction against defendants, and they sued out a writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, and within ten days gave bond in the sum of $10,000 to supersede the judgment of the state court, a justice of the United States supreme court refused, on motion, to require plaintiffs in error to give an additional bond with a larger penalty, although satisfied that the bond already given was not sufficient to cover the fees and emoluments claimed by defendants in error, which would come to the possession of the plaintiffs in error by reason of the supersedeas of the judgment of the state court.</p> <p>2. As soon as a writ of error from the United States supreme court is applied for and allowed, the jurisdiction of that court attaches and supersedes any further action of a justice of that court at chambers.</p> <p>3. It seems to be the settled understanding of the courts of the United States that both appeals and writs of error operate as a supersedeas without any express order to that effect, if taken within the proper time and with an offer' of the requisite security.</p>

In bankruptcy. Some time in the year 1857 James T. Butler purchased from H. C. Pea-tross a tract of land in Caroline county, known as “Ready Church,” containing 183 acres, for the sum of $1,S30. In August, 1857, James T. Butler executed his bond to Peatross for 8524.G3, in part payment of this land. Pea-tross assigned this bond to T. L. Scott.

<p>In bankruptcy.</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by Thomas Butler against the steamboat Arrow for the loss of a horse delivered for carriage.</p>

At law. This case, although it comes before the court in the form of a rule to show cause why the action should, not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, is connected with that question by an agreement of the counsel, that the finding of the jury, subject to the opinion of the court upon the question of jurisdiction, should be put into the form of a special verdict, and judgment to be entered thereon, as may be decided on this rule, so as to enable either party to sue out…

This case comes before the court on a special verdict, the material parts of which find; that the plaintiff [Pierce Butler] formerly lived in the state of South Carolina, where, as well as in Georgia, he had a valuable plantation, which he cultivated, and still cultivates, by his overseers and slaves, and on which he had, and still has, a furnished house and servants.

In admiralty. This was a libel against the master and mate of the barque Argo, for an assault and battery of the libellant, while the barque was in the port of Matan-zas, in the island of Cuba. [Decree for libel-lant].

At law. Assumpsit brought by the plaintiff [Edward K. Butler], as an importing merchant, against the defendant [Thomas Bussell], as collector of the port of Boston, to recover back import duties, alleged to have been illegally exacted and paid under written protest.

<p>Case Ho. 2,244.</p> <p>Sales — Statute of Fkauds — Memorandum bt Broker.</p> <p>A. employed a broker to sell for him a quantity of sheet iron to arrive from Russia. The broker offered it to B. verbally, at a price named, and B. verbally accepted it at that price. The broker then signed two papers, in the same words, as follows: “New York. July 10th. 1807. Sold by A. to B. 705 packs first quality Russia sheet iron, to arrive at New York, at 12% cents per pound, gold, cash, actual tare. Iron due about Sept. 1, ’67. C., Broker.” Below was a memorandum of the number of packs of each of eight different sizes, numbers or marks. One of these papers, so signed, was delivered by the broker to A., and one to B. This paper was the only written contract between the parties. A. sued B., alleging a refusal by B. to accept and pay for the iron, and a resale of it by A., at a loss, and claimed to recover such loss from B.: Held, that the paper signed by the broker was not a note or memorandum in writing, of the contract, subscribed as required by the statute of New York (2 Rev. St. p. 136, § 3) in regard to contracts for the sale of goods.</p> <p>[NOTE. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment to the supreme court, "which reversed the same, on the ground, that the expression of sale in the memorandum necessarily imported a purchase, and the contract, being signed by the agents of the buyer and the seller, was obligatory on both the parties thereto. Butler v. Thomson, 92 U. S. 412.]</p>

[At law. Action of ejectment by Charles Butler against James Young and others. Plaintiff moves to strike off so much of defendants’ cross petition as sets up a purely equitable defense and as prays equitable relief.]

At law. Appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace. Stinger had obtained judgment before Robert Clarke, Esq., a justice of the peace, against Robert Ritchie, who appealed, and gave an appeal-bond, with Butt as his surety.

<p>In bankruptcy. Opposition to discharge. The specifications of opposition are in the language of the bankrupt act. [14 Stat. 535.]</p>

[In bankruptcy. In the matter of Leander S. Butterfield and Harvey W. Burr.] The register certified that a letter of attorney, purporting to be executed on behalf of the Michigan Central Railroad Company, for the purpose of representing said company at a meeting of ereditoz-s, was offered to be filed.

[At law. Action by Frederick Butterfield and others against Chester A. Arthur, collector of the port of New York, to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. There was a verdict for plaintiffs, and defendant moves for a new trial.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. This was a libel in per-sonam, filed in the district court, by [Carlos Butterfield] the owner of the Mexican steamer Iturbide, against [John J. Boyd and others] the owners of the ship Mercury, to recover damages occasioned by a collision between the two vessels.

<p>Application of Thomas H. Butterworth to become a citizen of the United States. Applicant admitted to final examination.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by John P. Butter-worth, owner of the ship John Barring, against the brig Washington and cargo (M. & W. Livingston claimants), for salvage services.]

[At law. Action against a United States collector of customs for slander. The defendant removed the case to the circuit court, and plaintiff moves to remand the case to the state courts.]

At law. The note in suit was given by defendants, John S. Harris and Albert B. Harris, to the plaintiff, in the city of Milwaukee, by which they promise to pay to the order of the plaintiff, two years after date, at the Marine Bank, in said city, three thousand dollars, with interest at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum, said interest payable semi-annually with exchange on Boston, on said principal, and interest not exceeding one per cent.

<p>Case No. 2,357.</p> <p>Amendment on Payment of Costs — Payment as Condition Precedent.</p> <p>When costs are given, on leave to amend, the payment of the costs is not a condition precedent.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,258.</p> <p>Verdict in Pounds Sterling — Arrest or Judgment.</p> <p>It is no cause for arresting judgment, that the jury have found the damages in pounds, when the damages in the declaration are laid in dollars.</p>

<p>[In bankruptcy. In the matter of the discharge of Joseph Buxbaum.]</p>

This was a writ of entry [by Luther Bux-ton] to recover [from Coomer Bowen] a tract of land situated in Smithfield in this state. A trial was had here on the general issue at June term, 1S43, and a verdict taken for tlie demandant, subject to be set aside or amended, as agreed in the statement of facts, made and argued at June term, 1840.

<p>[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Michigan.</p> <p>[In admiralty.]</p>

At law. This was an action on the case for an infringement of a patent-right for the manufacture of loco-foco matches, belonging to the plaintiffs [Ezekiel Byam and others]. It came before the court on a statement of facts, wherein it was agreed that, before the date of the writ, the defendants [Bullard and others] sold, to an agent of the plaintiffs, who was employed by the plaintiffs to make the purchase, matches, of the value of six cents.

This was a suit in equity, founded on the infringement of letters patent [No. 68]. A provisional injunction having been granted against the defendant [Ezra B. Eddy], pursuant to the prayer of the bill, the plaintiffs ¡[Ezekiel Byarn and others] afterwards moved for an attachment against him for a breach of the injunction.

This was a bill in equity founded on letters-patent [No. 6S], and praying for an injunction and an account The complainants-moved for a preliminary injunction, to restrain the defendants from making the thing patented.

[At law. Action by Byrd & Hall against W. G. Badger.] A trial by jury was waived by the parties, and the case submitted to the court upon the law and facts, as disclosed by the pleadings.

<p>[At law. Action by E. Byington and Benjamin Murphy against James Lemmons. Defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiffs upon a verdict rendered.]</p>

On motion to set aside an order [for the examination of the judgmentdebtor W. G. Badger, in proceedings supplementary to execution] previously entered, on the ground that it had been improvidently granted by the court. [For the trial of this ease, in which judgment was rendered for plaintiffs, Byrd & Hall, see Case No. 2,265.]

As to the rule for ascertaining the value of the ten slaves specifically bequeathed to J., but. not designated by name, see the second opinion following [Case Ño. 2.268],

In pursuance of the interlocutory decree, recited in the last case, the commissioner to •whom the accounts were referred, made his report in May, 1825, showing the amount of debts paid by the executrix of William Byrd, •out of the personal fund for which the estate was bound.

<p>Error to Pulaski circuit court.</p> <p>[At law. Action by William A. Gasquet against Richard C. Byrd. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.]</p>

[In equity. ' Bill by William A. Byrd, as-signee in bankruptcy of William Usry, against Harrold. Johnson & Co., and J. W. Mize, sheriff of Sumter county, to restrain the defendants from further interference with the bankrupt estate and for other relief. An injunction issued, and, in accordance with the prayer of the bill, a rule was entered adjudging the defendants guilty of contempt.

The defendant obtained a rule upon the plaintiff, to show cause why the judgment .entered in this case, and the execution, should not be set aside. The judgment was entered in the clerk’s office on a bond, with a power of attorney to confess judgment, dated in September, 1800. The judgment was entered in December, 1806, and an execution issued, which was levied. The ground of the motion was, that the plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of this -state.

[In admiralty. Libel by Patrick W. Byrnes & Co. (Edward Saul, survivor) against the ship Ilockaway to recover the value of property set out in a bill of lading. Decree for libellant.]

[In admiralty. Libel in rem by John Al-bury and six others, against the bark Byron (Joseph H. Titus, master) for salvage.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York.] In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, filed in the district court [by Chandler L. Ingersoll], against the barque Carbarga, to recover the value of two boats built for that vessel by the libellant at his ship-yard in New York, on the order of her master.

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem, filed originally by Charles H. Sanborn, against the ship Cabot, to recover wages. The libellant was one of the crew’ of the ship Cabot, and had earned wages in the course of his employment on board her. The ship arrived at the port of New York from a circuitous voyage to ports in Europe and back, on December 2S, 1847.

was brought up on a habeas corpus, ad subjiciendum awarded, some days ago, directed to the keeper of the debtors’ apartment of the jail of the city and county of Philadelphia. The writ was awarded upon the affidavit of the party, stating, that he was, at the time of his commitment, in the character of secretary, attached to the Spanish legation; and had been committed, by a warrant from the governor of this state, on the ground of a criminal charge.

<p>Case No. 2,279.</p> <p>Suit against National Bank — Jurisdiction op State Court — Waiver.</p> <p>1. T., a resident of Kentucky, and a creditor of a national bank incorporated under the act of congress of June 3d. 1864 (13 Stat. 09), and located in Alabama, brought a suit against it, in the supreme court of New York, to recover a debt alleged to be due from the bank to him, and, in such suit, attached certain moneys in the possession of a national bank in New York, as the property of the Alabama bank. The suit was commenced by attachment and publication of the summons. C., who was appointed receiver, of the Alabama bank, under the provisions of the said act, was, on his own application, substituted as defendant in such suit, in place of the Alabama bank, with the like force and effect as if the suit were continued in the name of said bank, and thereupon put in an answer therein, setting up a want of jurisdiction, in the state court, over him, as an officer, or over the bank, or over the subject of the action, and other defences. The suit was tried, and a judgment was rendered, that T. recover of C., as receiver of the bank, a certain sum, “to be levied and collected of the moneys and property whereon an attachment has been heretofore levied in this action.” Afterwards, U. filed a bill in equity in-this court, against T. and the New York bank, praying for an injunction against T. from proceeding further on his attachment, or on any judgment in the suit in which such attachment was issued, and for the payment to him. C., of the moneys in the hands of the New York bank. The Code of Procedure of New York (section 227) provides, that, in an action arising on contract, for the recovery of money only, “against a corporation created by, or under the laws of, any other state, government, or country,” the plaintiff, at the time of issuing the summons, or at any time afterwards, may have the property of such corporation attached, in the manner thereinafter prescribed, as a security for the satisfaction of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover. The same Code (section 427) provides, that an action “against a corporation created by, or under the laws of, any other state, government, or country,” may be brought in the supreme court of New York, by a plaintiff not a resident of the state of New York, “when the cause of action shall have arisen, or the subject of the action shall be situated, within the state.” The bill proceeded on the ground that the state court had no jurisdiction of the suit against the Alabama bank, because it could not acquire jurisdiction, in in-vitum, of a suit against a •corporation created under said act, and also because the cause of action in such suit did not arise within the state of New York: Erhl that, so far as the provision of section 427 of the Code of New York was concerned, the supreme court of New York had jurisdiction over the suit.</p> <p>2. The effect of the provisions of the 57th section of the said act of June 3d, 1804 [13 Stat. 110], was to deprive the state court of jurisdiction over the suit.</p> <p>3. C. was not estopped, by the proceedings in the suit in the state court, from questioning the jurisdiction of that court over'him. or its jurisdiction to render against him the judgment which he did render.</p> <p>4. C. was entitled to the relief prayed for.</p> <p>5. A national bank incorporated under said act can be sued only in the courts designated in the 57th section thereof.</p> <p>[Cited in Harvey v. Allen, Case No. 6,177: McCracken v. Covington City Nat. Bank, 4 Fed. 607.]</p> <p>6. Whether the cause of action, in the said suit arose in New York, quere.</p> <p>7. In the case of a corporation aggregate, no waiver of an objection to jurisdiction can be produced, by the fact that the corporation appears and pleads by attorney.</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel in rem [by Charles Matthews and others] for wages. The shipping articles were, “from the port ■of Boston to a port or ports in the West Indies, and back to a port or ports in the United States, for and during the term of six months from September 25th, 1829.” The vessel arrived at New-York on the 25th of December, 1829.

Tin admiralty. Libel in personam by Abraham Cadmus & Co. against Ransom Bemaii for supplies furnished to 'respondent for a vessel of which he was the master.]

<p>Case No. 2,282.</p> <p>Deviation — Seamen’s Wages — Accrual of Right of Action for — Forfeiture for Desertion— Entry in Log-Book.</p> <p>1. The question as to deviation in a voyage, is open to proof, and cannot be decided as matter of law. It relates to usage and the course of trade, and is to be determined as a question of fact upon the evidence introduced by the parties, and cannot be judicially noticed by the court as a question of law.</p> <p>LSee note to Case No. 2,118.]</p> <p>2. Where seamen are discharged by the master before the expiration of the time specified in the shipping articles, a right of action for their wages accrues immediately, and they need not wait until the expiration of the period for which they shipped.</p> <p>3. The entry in the log-book, in order to lay the foundation for a forfeiture of wages, under the act of congress, — 2 Bior. & D. Laws, 117 [1 Stat. 133, § 5], — must state substantially that the absence was without leave. Such entry must be made on the same day the seaman absented himself; and it can take effect only from the day when made.</p> <p>4. Although seamen who have absented themselves, come on board again within the forty-eight hours allowed them by the act [1 Stat. 133, § 5], yet if they refuse to do duty, it is not a return within the meaning of the act. The return in order to save a forfeiture of tvages, must have been unconditional, and a return to duty generally.</p> <p>5. In the United States, independently of the act of congress, the general doctrine of the marine law as to the nature and effect of desertion has been uniformly recognized; and is uniformly held to incur the penalty of forfeiture of all wages antecedently due.</p> <p>6. It is the duty of the court to watch over and protect the.rights of seamen; and although they should be held strictly to the great and leading objects of their contracts, yet, when minor and less important stipulations are drawn in question, it ought to apply to them very liberal and equitable considerations.</p> <p>[NOTE. A seaman who deserts the service of the ship forfeits wages previously earned. Coffin v. Jenkins. Case No. 2,948; The Rovena, Id. 12,090; Burton v. Salter, Id. 2,218; The John Martin, Id. 7.357; The Philadelphia, Id. 11,084; The Swallow, Id. 13,664; The Merrimac, Id. 9,474. The desertion must occur during the voyage. The Martha, Id. 9,144; Francis v. Bassett, Id. 5,037; Cloutman v. Tunison, Id. 2,907. The forfeiture is discretionary with the court. Gifford v. Ivollock, Id. 5,409; Swain v. Holland, Id. 13,661; Lovrein v. Thompson, Id. 8.557; The Union, Id. 14,347; The Balize, Id. 809. Quitting the ship with intention not to return is desertion. The Balize, supra; The Union, supra; The Catawanteak, Case No. 2,-510; The Rovena, supra; Hart v. The Otis, Case No. 6,154; Hayes v. The J. L. Wickwire, Id. 6.262; Costello v. American Steamship Co., Id. 3 263; The Ericson, Id. 4,510; Scully v. The Great Republic, Id. 12,571. To forfeit wages for desertion under the act of 1790, an entry of the desertion must be made in the log book. Magee v. The Moss. Id. 8,944; Cloutman v. Tunison, supra; The Phoebe v. Dignum, Case No. 11,110; The Hercules. Id. 6,401; Wood v. The Nimrod. Id. 17,959; Brower v. The Maiden, Id. 1.970; The Catawanteak, supra; Knagg v. Goldsmith. Case No. 7,872; Bray v. The Atlanta, Id. 1,819; The T. F. Whiton, Id. 13,849; Hart v. The Otis, Id. 6.154. As to what should be entered, see The Hercules, supra; Wood v. The Nimrod, supra; The Catawanteak, supra; Ulary v. The Washington, Case No. 14,-323; Snell v. The Independence, Id. 13,139.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel in personam by Abraham Cadmus and others against Charles Pol-hamus, master of the sloop Mad Anthony, for supplies furnished.]

A policy, in the sum of $7,500, was, on March 1, 1S71, granted by the corporation defendants to the plaintiff [Resolved W. Cady], contracting to indemnify him, for one 3rear from that date, against loss or damage by fire on his cotton-factory building, and the stone and frame additions thereto, situated in North Providence, R. I.. and known as the Grey Stone Mill, and on the machinery, both fixed and movable, therein, including also the engine, boilers, and their…

[At law. Action by Resolved W. Cady upon a policy of fire insurance. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and the defendant now moves for a new trial.]

This was a bill in equity, to part of which each of the defendants demurred. The bill W'as filed by [Augustus F. Cady] the assignee in bankruptcy of the estate of Charles L. Peirce and James M. Whaling, bankrupts, and charged in brief that in November, 1867, the bankrupts commenced business in Milwaukee, as partners under the firm name of Peirce & Whaling, with a nominal capital of $5,000.

In admiralty. The libellant, the master of the Italian brig Matilda, signed a clean bill of lading for 4,030 cantars of brimstone, to be delivered at Philadelphia, The respondents, the consignees at Philadelphia, and the shipper’s agent, claimed to deduct from the freight the value at Philadelphia of 43,180 lbs., short weight according to the bill of lading, ascertained by the custom house weight at Philadelphia, and accordingly deducted $007.22 in gold, from the freight…

<p>[At law. Action of debt by James D. Cage against Richard Jeffries. Heard on demurrer to the declaration.]</p>

Bill in equity. Suit was brought [by Jeremiah Cahart against Charles - Austin] to recover damages for the alleged infringement of a patent for an improvement in reed musical instruments. The patent [No. 4,912] was twice reissued [Nos. 372 and 484] and was also extended. The original patent was entitled an improvement in bellows for musical instruments.

<p>Case No. 2,289.</p> <p>^Forfeiture of Policy — Company Confined to Reason Alleged — Solicitor — Agency — Payment of Premium-Clause as to Payment of Premium.</p> <p>1. When forfeiture of an insurance policy is •claimed for non-compliance with its conditions, the company is bound by the reason which they .assign at the time; — they cannot declare a forfeiture on one ground and then claim the advantage of additional grounds, and it seems they cannot claim a cancellation broadly, and give .any reason they may see fit afterwards.</p> <p>(.See Cashau v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. Case No. 2,499.]</p> <p>2. Where an insurance solicitor, who is not the agent of any company, but procures the “placing” of insurance, has placed a risk, and the company delivers him the policy for delivery to the assured, he becomes for that risk the agent of the company, and payment of the premium to him binds the company; and though he never pays the money, the policy remains binding, and cannot be forfeited for non-payment of premium.</p> <p>3. This is true though a clause in the policy provides that the policy shall not take effect until the premium is actually paid, for the presumption is that the solicitor was authorized to receive the premium, and when the'company has given him the credit, and the assured is thus misled, the company cannot take advantage of this clause.</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. If the notice or preliminary proofs are imperfect or informal, all objection may be waived by the insurers; and they will be held to have made such waiver by acts qr conduct which authorized the insured to Believe that the insurers were satisfied with the proof they had received, and required, nothing more. 2 Pars. Cont. [5th Ed.) 461, and cases collected and cited in note. See further that a distinct refusal to allow the claim on grounds, other than the sufficiency of the notice is a waiver of notice or preliminary proof and an excuse for not furnishing it. Vos v. Robinson, 9 Johns. 192: Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend. 3S5, 401; McMasters v. WTestchester Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 25 Wend. 379; O’Neil v. Buffalo Fire Ins. Co., 3 N. V. 122; Clark v. New England Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 6 Cush. 342; Boynton v. Clinton & E. Mut. Ins. Co., 16 Barb. 254; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Coates. 14 Md. 2S5; Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Crandall, 33 Ala. 9. Upon the furnishing of proofs, all objections that might be and are not taken, if the company objects to paying will be considered waived. Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, IS Ill. 553; Great Western Ins. Co. v. Stnaden, 26 Ill. 360;-Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 54 Ill. 164; Dohn v. Farmers’, etc., Ins. Co.. 5 Lans. 275; Globe Ins. Co. v. Boyle. 21 Ohio St. 119. See, also, Cashau v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co.. [Case No. 2,499.]</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by Miles S. Cahill against John D. Beckford and others to enjoin the alleged infringement of letters-patent No. S3,925, and for an accounting.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,291.</p> <p>Patents — Dressing por Leather — Patentability — Infringement—Validitt— Anticipation.</p> <p>1. Inventors of a new and useful composition of matter, duly secured by letters patent, are entitled to the same protection as the owners of a patent for a new and useful art, machine or manufacture, and the rules and regulations in suits for infringement are the same in all material respects.</p> <p>2. A claim in a patent for a bronze dressing for leather, as a new article of manufacture, composed of spirit-varnish and aniline fuchsine, with or without the addition of aniline blue or bronze-powder, as set forth and described, held, to be for a patentable invention.</p> <p>3. Such invention is not anticipated by a prior provisional English specification, which relates to a method of dyeing or staining woven fabrics or paper, and for coloring the surface of glass previously coated with pyroxyline by the application of a solution of the desired color to the previously prepared surface.</p> <p>4. Nor by a prior patent for a peculiar mode of coloring and bronzing leather cloths, which consists in applying to such cloths, when properly prepared, certain well-known coloring matters composed of solutions of various aniline colors, and then burnishing the surface.</p> <p>5. Where nothing is contained in the specifications of prior patents which would aid a me-chanie to prepare the patented dressing, it follows that they are not of a character to anticipate the patent of the complainant.</p> <p>[See Jones v. Sewall, Case No. 7,495; Atlantic Giant-Powder Co. v. Parker, Id. 625; Roberts v. Dickey, Id. 11,899; Goff v. Stafirord, Id. 5,504.]</p> <p>6. Where prior patentees approach very near to the discovery of the complainant, but do not discover the principal feature of his invention, and are not able to give any directions by which the same can be successfully prepared and applied, the patent is not anticipated.</p> <p>7. Letters patent No. 83,925, granted to Miles S. Cahill, November 10, 1808, for an improvement in bronze dressing for leather, held valid.</p> <p>[NOTE. Patent No. S3.925 was granted to M. S. Cahill, November 10, ISOS. For another case involving this patent, see Cahill v. Beck-ford, Case No. 2.290.]</p>

This was a bill in equity [by James B. Cahoon et al. against Aaron Ring] founded upon letters-patent [No. 18,083] granted to Charles W. Cahoon, September 1, 1857, for an improved seeding-machine. On the 26th of the same month the inventor assigned to James B. Cahoon the entire interest. James B. Cahoon subsequently assigned one half of the patent to Dependance H. Furbish. The patent was reissued to the complainants May 11, 1858.

<p>Case No. 2,293.</p> <p>Bill of Lading — Delivery at Particular Place —Demurrage.</p> <p>1. A bill of lading recited that the vessel was bound to a certain wharf in Charlestown, and undertook to deliver safely at the aforesaid port of Charlestown. Held, that the contract was to deliver at that particular wharf.</p> <p>2. The lay-days under the above-mentioned bill of lading were to begin in twenty-four hours after arrival at the port and notice to the consignee. Held, the vessel had not arrived until she reached the wharf mentioned in the contract. 3. A tender admits the cause of action in admiralty as at law. NOTE [from original report]. The provision of a bill of lading, for delivery at a particular place, may be construed with reference to a usage of the consignees. Bradstreet v. Heran [Case No. 1,792]. As to the effect of quarantine regulations on delivery, see Bradstreet v. Heran, supra; Leland v. Agnew [Case No. 8,236].</p>

In admiralty. This was a libel filed by James Drain and James Murphy, against the remnants and proceeds of the bark Caith-nesliire, in rem, and also in personam, against J. Rankin, her master, to recover for wages and for salvage services. The libel demanded the recovery of $6.75, wages due to each libellant, and also an additional compensation to each of $75, for salvage services on board the vessel after the period to which wages were charged.

<p>Case No. 2,295.</p> <p>New Trial.</p> <p>Although the omission of the court to charge the jury, on important questions of law, involved in the case, is not in itself a reason for granting a new trial; yet the court will exercise a discretion; and, if they think the justice of the case will be promoted, they will grant it.</p> <p>[Cited in Allen v. Blunt, Case No. 217.]</p> <p>[NOTE. Por the new trial, see next following ease, No. 2,296.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,296.</p> <p>Marine Insurance — Foreign Judgment as-Evidence or Breach op Warrantt — Concealment.</p> <p>1. Under the clause introduced into policies of insurance, relative to the sentence of a foreign court of admiralty, the foreign sentence is not conclusive, in our courts, to falsify the warranty, which the assured is still at liberty to vindicate. The underwriters may. nevertheless, read the proceedings of the foreign court, as evidence; though not as conclusive evidence.</p> <p>[Overruled in Croudson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 434.]</p> <p>2. Whether it was the course of trade, to put on board a Spanish supra-cargo, with Spanish papers, and colours; is a question of fact for the jury; and if this is proved to their satisfaction, the underwriters, who are bound to know the course of the trade, cannot object that such circumstances were concealed from them.</p> <p>[See Livingston v. Maryland Ins. Co., 7 Cranch (11 U. S.) 506; Buck v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 1 Pet. (26 U. S.) 151; Hazard v. New England Marine Ins. Co., S Pet. (33 U. S.) 557.]</p> <p>3. It is a breach of warranty of neutrality, that a vessel and cargo, warranted American property, shall be navigated and claimed as Spanish property; and that all the evidence to prove the neutrality of the vessel and cargo, is concealed, from the captors.</p> <p>[See Livingston v. Maryland Ins. Co., 7 Crunch (11 U. S.) 500.]</p> <p>4. In case of such warranty, it is not only necessary that the cargo should be in truth neutral, but also that no act of commission or of omission should be performed, to jeopardize the claim to a neutral character, whether by the owner, or by his agents.</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Courüand Williams and others, master and crew of the schooner Dart, against the ship Calcutta and cargo, for salvage services.]

In bankruptcy. The bankrupt, John Caldwell, by his petition, filed on or about June 7th, 1873, demands homestead in a tract of land surrendered in his schedules, known as “the Elizabeth Owens dower land,” which contained about 190 acres. Elizabeth Owens was widow of Cuthbert Owens, who died in 1841. The land claimed by Caldwell was assigned to her as dower; she died in the year 1860. Cuthbert and Elizabeth Owens left some ten or eleven children.

At law. Assumpsit [by William A. Caldwell against David J. Harding and others, administrators] for moneys received by the defendant’s intestate to the use of the plaintiff.

<p>Case No. 2,303.</p> <p>Carrier — Negligence—Damages—How Computed.</p> <p>1. The carrier is liable if he negligently expose property to capture by a public enemy, in consequence of which it is captured and destroyed.</p> <p>2. A package of confederate notes was delivered to defendant at Jackson, Tennessee, by plaintiff, then living within confederate territory. The money was to be carried to New Orleans. but before it reached that city, in the usual course of business, New Orleans was taken by the federal troops. After a reasonable delay, the package was returned to Jackson for redelivery to plaintiff, but before this could be done that town was taken and destroyed by United States troops. Held, that the value of the package at the close of the war was the proper measure of damages. It was then demand was made, and interest should be allowed from that time.</p>

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the southern district of New Xork. [Libel by Caldwell, owner of the tug Rattler, against the steamboat State of Maine. There was a decree dismissing the libel, and libelant appeals.]

<p>Suit [by Robert W. Caldwell against Lewis Weitzel, collector of internal revenue] to recover $2,730, an alleged excess of tax on distilled spirits assessed and paid under protest.</p>

This was an application by the creditors of R. & L. Calendar, for a decree in bankruptcy. It appeared that subsequent to the filing the petition, and prior to the time appointed for the hearing, the petitioning creditors had effected an arrangement with their debtors. On the day appointed for the hearing, application was made by the creditors to withdraw their petition. At the same time a motion was made by other creditors to enter an appearance and proceed with the case.

<p>Case No. 2,309.</p> <p>Railroads — Accretions—Mortgages—WnAT are Included — The Rule as to After-Acquired Lands.</p> <p>1. Where a railroad company makes a general mortgage of the railroad this does not pass after-acquired lands, unless they are used in connection with the actual operations of the road as a part thereof.</p> <p>[Cited in Moran y. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R.v. Co., 32 Fed. 8S7; New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. v. Parker, 143 U. S. 42, 12 Sup. Ct. 36S.]</p> <p>[See note at end of case.]</p> <p>2. The doctrine of accretions does not extend to such lands.</p> <p>3. If the intention is to include in the mortgage lands which the company expects to acquire. they should be described with reasonable certainty. They would not pass under a mortgage, where the property is described as “the railroad then constructed and to be constructed, etc., and all other corporate property, real and personal of said railroad company, belonging or appertaining to the said railroad, whether then owned or thereafter to be acquired.”</p> <p>[Cited in Moran t. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 32 Fed. 887; New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co. v. Parker, 143 U. S. 42, 12 Sup. Ct. 368.]</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. In Sutherland v. Lake Superior Ship Canal Co. [Case No. 18,-643], decided at Detroit, March, 1874, .Judge Bmmons_ lays down some important rules of practice in foreclosure eases, viz.:</p> <p>Parties in Equity Necessary. Prior incum-brancers are necessary parties to a bill brought by a junior mortgagee against a mortgagor his assignee in bankruptcy, if there are real doubts as to the amounts due or as to the property which their liens embrace.</p> <p>Doubtful Interest — Sales in Equity. Where any doubt exists as to its character and extent, a court of equity will not decree the sale of an interest capable of being reduced to a certainty.</p> <p>Foreclosure of Mortgage — Practice. If a subsequent incumbrancer is already brought before the court by a prior one, an original bill, subsequently brought by him to foreclose his mortgage, will not be entertained. In the first suit full relief may be had, with or without a cross-bill, according to circumstances.</p> <p>Independent Suits. Where property is in the hands of a receiver, parties having an interest, and more especially active parties, will not, without leave of the court, be permitted to enforce their rights by an original suit. If the relief may be had in the pending litigation, such leave will not be granted.</p> <p>Mortgage Trustee — Separate Suit by. A subsequent mortgage trustee appeared and submitted to a receiver of the estate, and resigned pendente lite. Without leave had his successor filed an original bill of foreclosure: Held, that it was both unwarranted and unnecessary.</p> <p>Mortgaged Premises — Sale. Mortgaged premises may be sold free from incumbrances by a court of equity, remitting the lien holders to the proceeds at the suit of subsequent incumbran-cers or other parties having rights in the equity of redemption.</p> <p>Practice in United States Courts where Possession of Property is in State Courts — Power of Federal Court to Order Institution of Suits. The decision in the case of Marshall v. Knox, 10 Wall. [S3 U. S.] 551. construed. It is held that notwithstanding that decision, the circuit court has the power to order all matters pending therein to be adjudicated by an original suit where the property is in possession of the state court by proceedings commenced before the bankruptcy: the suit in the circuit court to he subsequently brought by an assignee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bill by Assignee to Sell Mortgaged Property. A bill will be entertained by the circuit court, brought by an assignee in bankruptcy, against several mortgagees and others who are lien holders, for the purpose of ascertaining the amounts due, and to sell the property free from all liens.</p> <p>Cross Bill — Its Office in Chancery Pleadings. If matters are germane and are connected with the subject of the litigation. they may be brought in by cross-bill. The matter introduced may be entirely new.</p> <p>Transfer Pendente Lite. It is only in cases where the complainant parts with his interest and where defendant’s rights are transferred by death or by operation of law, as by bankruptcy or the insolvent laws, that a transfer pendente lite, need be noticed by litigants in courts.</p>

<p>In bankruptcy. The petitioners being creditors of R. & L. Calendar, presented their petition on the 1st day of April, and obtained an order of notice that the parties be heard on the 24th day of May, and now, (April 28,) before the day of hearing for the decree in bankruptcy, the petitioners filed an application for a temporary injunction against R. & L. Calendar, and others, their servants, alleging that the respondents remained in possession of the goods and chattels, which, under the bankrupt law, would belong to the creditors; that they were selling the same, and were in fact collecting the debts of the firm and applying the proceeds to their own use, and that the whole property, amounting to a large sum, was in danger of being squandered and wholly lost to the creditors of the bankrupts, praying that they be enjoined against disposing of any part thereof, &c.</p>

Action on. the case, to recover the stipulated price agreed to be paid by the defendants [John & I. Vecino], for six cases of looking-glass plates. The first count is indebitatus assumpsit, for 9122 dollars, 5 cts., for goods sold and delivered. 2.

[Theophilus C. Callicott, a former collector of internal revenue, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States (see U. S. v. Callicot, Case No. 14,710), and now petitions for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of his imprisonment under the sentence imposed on such conviction.]

<p>Case Ho. 2,312.</p> <p>Practice in Admiralty — Answers —Exceptions —Impertinence—Half Pilotage Lien on Vessel may be Enforced in Admiralty.</p> <p>1. The general answer in admiralty should be pertinent and responsive to the narration or allegations in the articles of the libel, and if the response is not full, explicit and distinct, exceptions for insufficiency lie to compel a sufficient answer.</p> <p>[Cited in The Glenearne, 7 Fed. 605; The Whistler, 13 Fed. 296, 297.]</p> <p>2. But if the answer is responsive to the libel, no exceptions will lie to it, on the ground that it is not a defense to the suit, whether the matter is impertinent or not.</p> <p>[Cited in The Glenearne, 7 Fed. 605.]'</p> <p>3. Exceptions in admiralty, nature and office of, defined.</p> <p>4. It is impertinence to blend matter intended as a defensive allegation, with the response or answer to an allegation of the libel.</p> <p>[Cited in The Whistler, 13 Fed. 296, 297.]</p> <p>5. The state statute gives a pilot half pilot-age as a compensation for tendering his services to pilot a ship out over the Columbia river bar, in case the same are refused: Held, that such a claim is a clainí for pilotage, which, by the general maritime law, is a lien upon the vessel, and the same may be enforced by a suit in admiralty.</p> <p>[Cited in Holmes v. O. & C. By. Co.. 5 Fed. 84; The Glenearne, 7 Fed. 606. Followed in The Alzena, 14 Fed. Í75. Cited in The William Law, Id. 795; The Edith Godden, 25 Fed. 512; The Allianca, 56 Fed. 613.]</p> <p>[See Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. (80 U. S.) 236, affirming Banta v. McNeil, Case No. 966; The America, Id. 289.]</p> <p>[NOTE. On the trial, the libel was dismissed (Case No. 2.313), and the decree of dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the circuit court in an unreported decision.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,313.</p> <p>Secretary of Pilot Commissioners — Appointment— Pilot License — Signature of Commissioners.</p> <p>1.Section 2 of the Oregon pilot act, as amended in 18C8 [Sess. Laws, 2S], provides that the pilot commissioners “may appoint a secretary” and prescribes his duties. Held, that it is the absolute duty of the commissioners to appoint such secretary; and that parol evidence is not admissible to prove the meeting and action of such commissioners concerning the licensing of a pilot, when the act requires a record of the same to be made by the secretary.</p> <p>[Cited in Re St. Helen Mill Co., Case No. 12,-222.]</p> <p>2. A pilot license signed by all three of the commissioners is prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it concerning the examination and licensing of the pilot to whom it purports to be granted; but if only signed by two of such commissioners, the ease is otherwise, unless it also appears from the minutes of the board that the matter was acted upon and the license granted at a meeting of the commissioners when all three were present; or such license contains a direct recital or averment of such meeting and action in reference to such license.</p> <p>3. The power conferred upon a pilot commissioner by the act is a personal trust to be exercised for the public good, and cannot be delegated to another; and therefore one of such commissioners cannot authorize another to sign his name to the license, although it has been agreed or concluded between such commissioners, that such license may be granted.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,314.</p> <p>Bill op Lading — Effect of Admission in.</p> <p>The admission in a bill of lading, “shipped in apparent good order and condition five cases of merchandise, value and contents unknown,” has reference to the external condition of such cases; and it excludes the inference that the carrier thereby admits anything as to the quantity or quality of the contents of the cases at the time of delivery, beyond what is visible to the eye or apparent from handling the same.</p> <p>[See note to Case No. 2,286.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,315.</p> <p>Bankrupt Act Applicable to Railroad Companies.</p> <p>1. The question of the constitutionality of the provisions of the bankrupt act which apply to persons other than merchants and traders is not longer open to discussion.</p> <p>2. It has never been decided that a “law on the subject of bankruptcy,” within the meaning of the constitution, must provide for the discharge of all persons subject to its provisions.</p> <p>3. Railroad corporations are comprehended within the words “moneyed business or commercial corporations.”</p> <p>4. The court has authority to inquire into the value of securities held by creditors of the alleged bankrupt, in order to ascertain whether the debts due the petitioning creditors are of the amount required by the act as amended— and that a secured creditor has a provable debt within the meaning of the act.</p> <p>[Followed in Re Broich, Case No. 1,921. Approved in Re Orossette, Id. 3,435. Cited in Re Bouton, Id. 1,70G.]</p> <p>5. The act declares that the word “person” shall include corporations, and service is therefore to be made personally on a corporation by delivering a copy of the petition and order to show cause to its head or principal officers, and the “usual place of abode” must be construed to mean the principal place of business where alone it can be said to reside.</p> <p>6. There is no provision of law, authority, or precedent, which requires that the authority under which an agent of the petitioning creditors, acts, should be set'forth; the amended act provides that there need only be five signers, and allows both the signing and the verification to be done by an agent, when the first five signers, or any of them, are absent.</p> <p>7. By the sworn statements of the agent, as contained in the two petitions, it appears that one-third of the creditors have not united in the pptition for an adjudication. The court is at liberty to examine the petition for an injunction, inasmuch as it might have been incorporated in the petition for an adjudication, and come to a conclusion on the facts therein stated, even though the petition for adjudication contains an explicit and positive averment that the debts due the petitioners amount to at least one-third of all the debts provable against the debt- or.</p> <p>[Cited in Re McKibben, Case No. 8;859.]</p> <p>8. A debtor ought not to be compelled to file a full list of his creditors, when it appears from the sworn statements of the petitioning creditors that the requisite amount and number have not petitioned.</p> <p>9. Petitioning creditors allowed ten days further time, in which to obtain the consent of others to join in the petition.</p>

This was a libel [by Richard Read] against the hull of a new brig, built during the last season by David Spear.

<p>Case No. 2,317.</p> <p>Patents — Cultivators—Re-issue—Extending Claim — Certainty in Claim.</p> <p>1. Under the patent laws from 1S36 to 1861 [5 Stat. 122; 12 Stat. 246], a patentee can claim in a re-issue whatever clearly appears to have beeD a part of his original invention as then shown or described, either by his drawings, sjiecifications or models.</p> <p>[Cited in Holmes Burglar Alarm Tel. Co. v. Domestic, etc., Tel. Co., 42 Fed. 224.]</p> <p>2. The locating the joint forward of the evener in a cultivator beam, is a patentable feature, as it produces new and useful results.</p> <p>3. Julius Gerber’s re-issue of April 26, 1S70, for “improvement in cultivators,” original patent granted April 24, I860, construed and held valid.</p> <p>4. Certainty in claim for patent need only he such as will enable a person of skill who understands the result to be attained, to construct a machine embodying the principle.</p> <p>[NOTE. For another case involving this, pat-nit, see Calkins v. Bertrand, 8 Fed. Toil.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,318.</p> <p>Practice — Continuance.</p>

This is a creditor’s bill to set aside as fraudulent a transfer of real estate from the debtor to his wife. George McNabb made a conveyance of the land in question to his mother-in-law in 1874, who immediately conveyed the same to the wife of McNabb. The deeds purport to have been for $1,500 consideration, but it is admitted the transfer was voluntary, in order to vest the legal title of the property in the wife of the defendant.

<p>Case No. 2,321.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Confirmation of Land Grant.</p> <p>Petition to confirm a grant lying mostly in another state dismissed, for want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. History of the Claim. The petitioners claimed under the Baron de Bastrop, to whom it was represented that the Baron de Carondelet, on the 20th June, 1797,- had granted twelve leagues square, or more than a million of arpeas of land, and situated, according to the figurative plan of Don Carlos Trudeau, royal surveyor, in the port of Onchita, eighty leagues above the mouth of that river, adjoining on the part of the southwest the eastern shore of the river and bayous Ouchita, Bartholomew, and Siard, and giving a further description. The grant is principally situated in Louisiana, the smaller portion being situated in Chicot county, Arkansas, on the bayou Bartholomew. The history of the claim, will be found in full in the case of U. S. v. Philadelphia & New Orleans, 11 How. [52 U. S.] 010, in the supreme court, on appeal from the district court of Louisiana, which was argued by Mr. Crittenden, attorney-general, for appellants, and Mr. Strawbridge, Mr. Soulé, and Mr. Sergeant, for the appellees. The supreme court, by Judges Taney, Catron, Daniel, Nelson, and Woodbury, decided the claim to be invalid, and rejected the same; Judges McLean, Wayne, McKinley, and Grier, dissenting. Ann M. Cal-lender et al. brought their petition in the district court of Louisiana for the confirmation of the de Bastrop grant, which was declared invalid by the supreme court. 11 How. [52 U. S.] 662.</p>

<p>Case Wo. 2,323.</p> <p>Habeas Cokpus — Jurisdiction of Circuit Judge —Pardon—Conviction under Repealed Statute.</p> <p>1.The circuit judge has no jurisdiction to review, on habeas corpus, the judgment of the circuit court, on a conviction and sentence, on an indictment, on an allegation that the statute under which such sentence was imposed had been repealed before such sentence was passed.</p> <p>[Cited in Re Osterhaus, Case No. 10,609.]</p> <p>2. Where it appears that the person on whom such sentence was imposed has been pardoned unconditionally, and has had notice of the pardon, and is not restrained of his liberty, a writ of habeas corpus will not he granted to him, on such allegation, even though it does not appear that he has accepted the pardon.</p> <p>3. The provision of the act of January 11, 1868 (15 Stat. 34), that, from and after the passage of that act, no distilled spirits should be withdrawn from any warehouse until the tax thereon had been paid, and that all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with such provision were repealed, did not operate to prevent conviction and punishment, after the passage of that act, for a previous ofEence committed in violation of section 42 of the act of July 13, 1866 (14 Stat. 162), by the executing or signing, or procuring to be executed, a fraudulent bond for withdrawing spirits from a warehouse, such bond being provided for by section 40 of that act, and in violation of section 30 of the act of March 2,1867 (14 Stat 484). in reference to a conspiracy to commit any offence against the laws of the United States.</p> <p>[4. If a statute denouncing an offence is repealed, there can be no prosecution thereunder for an offence committed prior to the repeal.]</p> <p>[See Anon., Case No. 475; U. S. v. Finlay, Id. 15,099.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Henry Callón against Elisha Williams.] On the 19th of July, 1869, the libellant was shipped at Boston as second mate of the ship Puritan, for a voyage to Melbourne and elsewhere, and back to the United States. That voyage ended at San Francisco in March, 1870.

At the November term of this court, 1801, a judgment at law was rendered in favour of Matthew and John Dobson, administrators of John Dobson, deceased, who was the surviving partner of Dobson, Daltera & Walker, of Liverpool, against James Calloway, surviving partner of Trents & Calloway.

<p>Case No. 2,326.</p> <p>Practice — Extending Time to Plead.</p>

The lessee of Mr. Camac obtained a judgment in ejectment, against Allwine, upon a covenant of re-entry in a lease, for nonpayment of rent, and was regularly put into possession, under an habere facias possessi-onem. Hallowell, some days before, paid into court, for his client, the tenant, all the-arrears of rent which he said were due, with the costs; and obtained a rule to show cause, why the defendant should not have the possession restored.

<p>Case No. 2,329.</p> <p>Commissionee’s Repoet on Accounting — Heaping on Exceptions — New Evidence.</p> <p>It is .no reason, for referring accounts back to-the commissioner, who made the report, that one of the parties suggests, that since it was made, he has obtained evidence in support of his exceptions; and that he expects he will be able to discover new debts and credits, not now known to him. The new evidence may be read, when the exceptions are argued.</p> <p>Tfiee Union ¡Sugar Refinery v. Matthiesson. Case No. 14,398; Magic Ruffle Co. v. Elm City Co., Id. 8,950.]</p>

This was an issue sent by the commissioners of bankrupts, to try whether auy, and what sum was due to the plaintiff from the bankrupt. Maffet’s deposition was offered by the plaintiff, and was objected to on two grounds; first, that in right of his wife, the daughter of Cambioso, he was entitled to a part of Cambioso’s estate, and therefore the recovery, in this case, would be to his advantage.

<p>Case No. 2,331.</p> <p>Railroads — Charges for Carriage — Powers — Competition — Monopoly—Express Company— Preferential Accommodation — Infraction of-Charter — Suit by Stockholder — Mandatory-Injunction — When Granted Interlocutohily' —Citizenship of Joint-Stock Company.</p> <p>1. Of two hills in equity, filed at the same-time, one was at the suit of an express carrier against a railroad company to prevent the continuance by them of a competing business in which they were engaged, as he alleged, without authority in their charter; also to compel the allowance by them of certain disputed facilities and accommodations which he claimed in his own business upon their line, and also to prevent the continuance by them of certain alleged overcharges for transporting his ■ express freights. The other bill was against the-same company at the suit of one of their stockholders. It contained the same allegations and prayed like relief. He was a party in the interest of the express carrier, and, pending the disputes, had bought the stock in order to-promote that interest by thus bringing suit. A preliminary injunction asked under each- bill was refused under both, because if either complainant had an equitable right it was not, in such a case, enforceable until final hearing.</p> <p>[See Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Virginia,’ etc., Water Co., CaBe No. 2,990.]</p> <p>2. A mandatory _ order, as a method of enforcing the concession of a right, is generally inconsistent with the object and appropriate functions of a preliminary injunction; and unless; there is an extraordinary special exigency, will, not be made interloeutonly.</p> <p>3. Under a bill against a corporation by a-stockholder, a preliminary injunction is not ordinarily grantable where the question is not that of preventing forfeiture of the charter from being incurred, hut only that of alleged' erroneous administration of corporate faculties.</p> <p>4. Here, if the defendants had infringed their charter, the mischief was already done, and preliminary injunction could not avert a forfeiture. The value of their stock in other respects could not be impaired by their participation in the profits of a competing business. Their liability to an action at the suit of the express carrier was a risk which the stockholders had voluntarily sought. Therefore, if he were a complainant for his own interest, he could not ask preliminary injunction.</p> <p>5. If any act of the defendants prejudicial to the express carrier was also an infraction off their charter, he was not, on the latter account, entitled to any redress. As to him. the only-questions were those of alleged injury to his. business of a freighter; and those questions, unless there had been a judgment at law, were not of such urgency as necessarily to require-interlocutory decision.</p> <p>6. The charter of a railroad company authorized them to charge certain limited rates of toll to others for passage over the rails; but did not limit their charge for transportation by themselves. The absence of a limitation of the latter charge did not enable them, as common carriers, to make unreasonable charges.</p> <p>7. A statutory limitation of a railroad company’s charges impliedly excludes, within the limit, and question of their unreasonableness, unless rebates from the maximum, or additions to, or rebates from any lower established rates, are systematically unequal. Here equality is understood in a relative sense, as importing that, under like circumstances, a like rate, according to weight or bulk, is charged to all persons for the carriage of goods which are of like descriptions for purposes of transportation. Occasional inequality, even though preferential, is not always necessarily unreasonable. But systematic relative inequality cannot be reasonable.</p> <p>8. The absolute monopoly of .such a company, as owner of the road, includes only the profit from tolls properly so called.</p> <p>9. Any further monopoly is founded only, in the groat relative necessity that, for the security of persons and property, a railroad company should have exclusive. control of the motive power and of the track.</p> <p>10. The monopoly of the company, as a common carrier, depends wholly upon the relative necessity, and cannot be extended beyond its exigency.</p> <p>11. But the company may, as a common carrier, exercise any accessorial functions profitable to themselves and useful to the public.</p> <p>12. Freight which is transportable partly upon their own road, and partly beyond it, can be received by them as consigned for their ulterior destination.</p> <p>18. They may. as common carriers, engage in the accessorial business, with horse power, of collecting freight which is to be transported upon their own railroad, and delivering freight at the places of destination.</p> <p>14. But they cannot monopolize wholly or partly this accessorial business, or promote the monopoly of it by any one else, or appropriate preferential advantages for conducting it, to their own profit, or to .that of any one else.</p> <p>15. Express carriers are not, through any present magnitude, or prospective expansion, of their business, entitled to any such preferential facilities or accommodations from a railroad company as would preclude or impede participation by the railroad company or by any of the public in conducting such business with equal advantage on any scale great or small.</p> <p>16. The charges by a railroad company for such accessorial service with horse power cannot be imposed upon any of the public who decline to use it.</p> <p>17. There is no difference between such a direct overcharge and an indirect one made by refusing abatement from a single aggregate charge which includes it.</p> <p>IS. Quaere, whether a rebate of less than the whole, amount or value of the charge for the service dispensed with can be reasonable.</p> <p>19. Quaere, whether an express carrier who does not himself encroach on rights of the public. and who submits to all necessary and proper regulations of the railroad company, cannot, without obtaining a judgment at law, have relief in equity against such an overcharge.</p> <p>20. An express carrier who does not submit, or offer to submit, to such regulations, but insists on having preferential accommodations or facilities which could not be allowed without encroachment on rights of the railroad company and of the public, cannot be relieved before the final hearing.</p> <p>21. Quaere, whether he can have relief at the final hearing. It seems that he may, in cases in which part of the decree relieving him may be an adjudication against his pretensions which are unfounded.</p> <p>22. The charge of a railroad company for transporting packed parcels by rail, of the full sum which would be payable in the aggregate if they were not packed and were charged for severally, cannot be rightfully imposed upon the public generally, or upon express carriers, or other middlemen.</p> <p>23. A court of law, and not a court of equity, has primary cognizance of the question of the right of the railroad company carrying packed parcels for a- middleman who does net own them ' to charge him with any addition," however small, to what would otherwise be. the regular charge for carrying the package in mass.</p> <p>24. The legal right of the railroad company under the last head is not so clearly deniable as to warrant the summary decision of it against them by a court of equity.</p> <p>25. A joint-stock company was organized under laws of a state, one of which provided that nothing contained in it should be construed to give to such company any rights and privileges as á corporation. The same law authorized such company to sue in the name of their president.</p> <p>Quaere, whether such a company was a citizen of that state within the meaning of the 11th section of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789 [1 Stat. 73], defining the jurisdiction of the circuit court.</p> <p>[NOTE. For disposition on demurrer of a subsequent suit by complainant Dinsmore against the same defendant, see Dinsmore v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., Case No. 3,921.]</p>

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by the owners of the schooner Magnolia against the steamship Cambridge and the steamtugs Under-hill and Chase for damages caused by collision.]</p>

In admiralty. Libel in rem by the owners of the schooner Phenix against the steamer Cambridge for damage to the schooner caused by the fault of the steamer in running her down and sinking her when beating up the Penobscot river. The claim and answer averred that the damages suffered by the schooner resulted from accident, and not from the fault of the steamer, or of her officers and crew.

In admiralty. Libel by the owners of the schooner Susan Ross against the steamer Cambridge for damage by a collision which took place on the night of the 15th of June, 1S70, about ten miles from Monhegan light, on the coast, of Maine. The night was foggy, and the wind light.

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland. [In admiralty. Libel by the owners of the schooner Omega against the steamer Cambridge. There was a decree in the district court dividing the damage (case unreported), and the owners of the steamer appeal.]

<p>Case Wo. 2,335.</p> <p>Seaman’s Right to be Cubed at Ship’s Expense.</p> <p>Held, under the circumstances of this case [i. e. abandonment of the ship’s service], that the seaman had relinquished his right to be cured at the ship’s expense.</p> <p>[See Brown v. The Bradish Johnson, Case No. 1.992.]</p>

[In admiralty. Cross libels by the Camden & Amboy Railroad Company against the sloop Thomas Wallace, and by Daniel Curry and others, owners of the sloop, against the steamboat John Neilson, for damages caused by collision.]

<p>[In admiralty. Libel by the Camden & Am-boy Railroad Transportation Company, owners of the steamboat Independence, against the Swedish bark Lottv (Eric G. Donham, claimant).]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,337b.</p> <p>LlABILITT OP INSURER FOB ACTS OF AGENT — REPRESENTATIONS.</p> <p>1. If an insurance company place their blank policies of insurance, duly signed by its president and secretary, in the hands of their duly constituted agents, who receive, from a party not an agent, the premium for an insurance, and deliver to him the policy, which he countersigns and delivers to the insured, such policy will be binding upon the company, though not countersigned by the agents.</p> <p>[See Cahill v. Andes Ins. Co., Case No. 2,-289; Wilkinson v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co., Id. 17,676.]</p> <p>2. If the property to be insured be represented as an oil warehouse, when it was an oil refinery, the policy would be void, if the liability of the latter to fire is essentially greater than the former; but if the property, its machinery and use, were properly represented, it will be binding upon the company, although it may have been mistaken as to the extent of the liability of such property to fire.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,338.</p> <p>Involuntary Bankruptcy — Parties to the Proceedings — Discontinuance—Petition for Sub stitution — Rights of Creditors.</p> <p>' 1. If the petitioning creditor :in a ease of involuntary bankruptcy desires to discontinue proceedings, and have his petition dismissed, he may do so before adjudication, without giving notice to other creditors of the alleged bankrupt.</p> <p>2. Until adjudication, the only parties to the proceedings are the petitioning creditors and the debtor. The other creditors must file a new petition, or petition to be substituted under the last clause of the 42d section of the bankrupt act [14 Stat. 537].</p> <p>[Cited in Re Lacey, Case No. 7,965.]</p> <p>3. Any creditor wishing to be so substituted must appear on the day to which proceedings have been adjourned, and on that day petition to be substituted.</p> <p>4. When on such adjourned day the petitioning creditor does not “appear and proceed,” and the understanding with the debtor is that such failure to appear shall be equivalent to a dismissal, and no other creditor appears to-be substituted, the proceedings are at an end.</p> <p>[Distinguished in Re Buchanan, Case No. 2,-073.]</p>

In bankruptcy. TV. M. Cameron filed his petition to have the firm of John Canieo & Co. adjudged bankrupts, on the ground that two notes, executed by the firm at Cincinnati, Ohio, had remained unpaid for more than fourteen days.

At law. This was an action of debt in which the plaintiff [John Cameron] claimed the sum of $1,500 for extra work on a certain aqueduct No. S, a part of the canal of said company.

<p>Case No. 2,342.</p> <p>Contracts — Law op Place — Construction — Enforcement.</p> <p>1. The laws which, in any manner, affect a contract, whether in its construction, in the mode of discharging it, or which control the obligation which the contract imposes; are essentially incorporated in the contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 208.]</p> <p>2. A contract is governed by the law of the country where it is made, and may be enforced, in foreign countries, according to their own form of proceeding; but, in such a manner, as to give effect to the contract, according to the law which gave it validity.</p> <p>[See Courtois v. Carpentier, Case No. 3,286; Nicolls v. Rodgers. Id. 10,260; Bainbridge v. Wilcocks, Id. 755.]</p> <p>3. A law of a foreign country, which protects the party to a contract from execution, will, in the courts of the United States, protect the same individual from arrest upon the same contract.</p> <p>[Cited in Golden v. Prince, Case No. 5,500; Woodhull v. Wagner, Id. 17,975.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by William H. Cammeyer and others against John Newton and others for injunction, and damages for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 80,492, reissue No. 6,249.]

[In equity. Bill by William H. Cam-meyer and Samuel Lewis against John Newton and others for the alleged infringement of letters patent No. 80,492.]

[Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.] Appeal in admiralty. The pleadings disclosed the following facts: On the 27th of September, 1859, about seven o’clock in the evening, a collision occurred at the Narrows, in Boston harbor, between the ship Marcellus, returning from a voyage to Singapore, and the schooner Empire, laden with sugar, and bound on a voyage to Bristol, in the state of Rhode Island.

<p>Case No. 2,346.</p> <p>.Enjoining Disposition op Bankrupt’s Property.</p> <p>Injunction to restrain bankrupt and other parties from disposing of the bankrupt’s property until the further order of the court.</p>

[The defendant in error, Christopher H. Price, sued out a writ of certiorari to reverse the action of a justice of the peace in proceedings brought against him before the justice by the plaintiff in error, Tapley A. Camp, as agent of Ashburn Early. The circuit court reversed the proceedings, and Camp brings error.]

In bankruptcy. On the 15th of September, 1877 [T. P. Wigs], the assignee in this cause filed his petition, describing in detail certain various tracts of real estate belonging to [Edward M. Campbell] the bankrupt; among others a one-acre lot of ground near Abing-don, containing a large brick house, the dwelling of the bankrupt and his family, valued at eight thousand dollars.

<p>Motion to dissolve an injunction.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,350.</p> <p>Charter Party — Barratry -op Master and Crew — Repairs to Vessel — Deviation.</p> <p>Owner of a vessel not liable for barratry of captain and crew, beyond the sum mentioned in the charter-party: nor to repairs of the ship, if [unless] warranted by the owner to be kept staunch during the voyage. But in case of loss and expense by necessary deviation, both vessel and cargo must contribute in general average.</p> <p>[See Arthur v. The Cassius, Case No. 564; Donahoe v. Ivettell. Id. 3.980; The Casco. Id. 2,486; The Star of Hope, 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 203; The Joseph Farwell, 31 Fed. S44: Potter v. Ocean Ins. Co.. Case No. 11.335.]</p> <p>NOTE [from original report]. The vessel sold for six thousand dollars. The marshal paid to Campbell and Harvey the following sums:</p> <p>Penalty fixed by charter-party.£ 500 Amount of repairs, deducted from sale of part of the cargo. 518 Ship’s share of general average. 43 £1091</p>

[At law. Action by Andrew J. Campbell against Daniel Barclay.] This is a motion to set aside a judgment entered on default, it being alleged that the default was taken and entered in violation of an understanding between counsel.

Action at law to recover damages for an alleged infringement of letters patent, dated in 1SG3, granted by the United States to the plaintiff for an improved tool for making metallic seams for showcases.

This was an action [by George W. Campbell and others] against [Hiram Barney] the collector of the port of New York, to recover back an additional duty of 10 per cent, ad valorem, paid, under protest, on a quantity of linseed, the product of Calcutta, in the British East Indies, imported into the United States, from London, in England.

This was an action at law [by A. A. Campbell, administrator] to recover mesne profits. The case was this: Under judicial process for possession of a league of land, Hancock and West, acting as attorneys of one Connett, had been put into possession and had leased the land to one Nash, and continued to exercise a general superintendence for Connett. The intestate of the present plaintiff instituted suit against Nash to try the title, and recovered.

<p>Case No. 2,355a.</p> <p>Note Payable in Phoperty — Demand.</p> <p>1. Where a note may be discharged in property at a certain time, no demand is necessary. It is only when property is payable on demand, ■or no time is fixed, that it becomes necessary to aver and prove a demand.</p> <p>2. A note for the payment of money by a certain day, which may be discharged in property, is not a note for the payment of property, and the payee has no right to demand property, nor can the obligor discharge it in property after the day of payment has passed.</p>

Rule to show cause, why the defendant should not be discharged on common bail. The reason assigned was, that the defendant had been discharged under the insolvent law of the state of Pennsylvania. Upon showing cause, it appeared that the plaintiffs were residents beyond sea, and that the contract wras made and payable in a foreign country.

<p>Case No. 2,357.</p> <p>Jdhisdjctiox — Subsequent Proceeding in State Court.</p> <p>1. A suit having been commenced in the circuit court of the United States is not abated by a subsequent suit, in the state court, by attachment. against the defendant, in the first suit, who is summoned as garnishee.</p> <p>[Cited in The Celestine, Case No. 2,541.]</p> <p>2. Jurisdiction having vested in the circuit court, it cannot be divested, by any subsequent proceeding, in a state court.</p> <p>[Cited in Bates v. Days, 11 Fed. 532.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,358.</p> <p>CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE — IMPRISONMENT FOR 1)ebt — Discharge —Adopting State Legislation — Termination of Suit.</p> <p>1. The Massachusetts statute of 1S57, c. 141, does not abolish imprisonment for debt, within the meaning of the United States statute of 1841, c. 2 [5 Stat. 410].</p> <p>2. The United States statute of 1839, c. 35 [5 Stat. 321], is not prospective, but adopts state legislation as it then existed.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Tetlow, Case No. 16,456.]</p> <p>3. The conditions and restrictions upon which imprisonment for debt was allowed in Massachusetts, when the United States statute of 1S39 was passed, were prescribed by the Massachusetts Revised Statutes of 1S36, c. 97.</p> <p>4. A discharge, by taking the poor debtor’s oath, pursuant to the United States statutes of 1800, c. 4 [2 Stat. 5], and 1824, e. 3 [4 Stat. 1], is valid.</p> <p>[Cited in U. S. v. Tetlow, Case No. 16,456.]</p> <p>5. A suit is not terminated by the rendition, of judgment, nor until satisfaction thereof.</p> <p>6. The court has jurisdiction of all proceedings consequent upon the judgment to obtain satisfaction.</p> <p>[See Pollock v. Lawrence Co., Case No. 11,-255.]</p> <p>7. Where a bond for the gaol-liberties is taken, and duly returned and enrolled, the court has jurisdiction of a petition in the nature of a scire facias, upon such bond.</p>

At law. Scire facias to revive a judgment entered upon a bond given by the defendant [Gavin Hamilton] to the plaintiff [Samuel Campbell], executor [of Robert Campbell], for $8,000, with condition to pay the said sum for the use and benefit of the proper and legal heirs of Robert Campbell, the testator, to whom it belongs. Plea, payment, with leave to give the special matter in evidence; of which notice was given.

. Rule to show cause why the judgment should not be opened, and the habere facias possessionem issued thereon, set aside. The material reasons assigned were, that- a copy of the declaration was not left with Harper, one of the defendants; and that it did not appear, by the marshal’s return, that the defendants were tenants in possession.

<p>Case Wo. 2,361.</p> <p>Patents — Post Office Hand-Stamps — Validity — Infringement by Government Officer — Evidence of Prior Invention — Assignment.</p> <p>1. The re-issued letters patent, division A, No. 4,143, granted to Helen M. Ingalls, October 4th, 1870, for an improvement in post-office postmarking and cancelling hand-stamps, (originally granted to Marcus P. Norton, April 14th, 1803, and re-issued to Jacob Shavor and Albert C. Corse, August 23d, 1864, and to said Norton, August 3d, 1809), are valid.</p> <p>[See note at end of ease.]</p> <p>2. The invention was made by Norton before May 4th, 1S59. A letter from Norton, introduced in evidence by the defendant, is evidence for the plaintiff on those points which are in his favor. Evidence to defeat a patent, on the ground of prior invention, ought to be such as to remove all fair and reasonable doubt.</p> <p>3. The assignment on which a re-issue was based was alleged to have been forged by the assignee, but, it appearing that the assignor, after the re-issue, recognized the assignment as valid, it was upheld.</p> <p>4. The execution of an assignment by a corporation and by S., president, held to be a good execution by S. for his individual interest.</p> <p>5. An assignment of a patent to an assignee in trust, gives him the legal title.</p> <p>[Cited in Jonathan Mills Manuf’g Co. v. Whitehurst. 56 Fed. 594.]</p> <p>6. Although the defendant used the invention as an officer of the government, in the performance of his duties, for the benefit of the government, he is liable as an infringer.</p> <p>[Cited in Head v. Porter, 48 Fed. 487.]</p> <p>[NOTE. The master to whom the accounting was referred reported in favor of the complainant, and on the coming in of his report, and after hearing exceptions thereto, the exceptions were overruled, the report confirmed, .and a final decree for complainant ordered. See Campbell v. James, 2 Fed. 33S. Defendant James thereafter applied for a certificate of probable cause under section 930 of the Revised Statutes, providing for the relief of certain revenue officers from personal liability, which application was refused, on the ground that he was not a revenue officer within the meaning of the section. See Same v. Same, 3 Fed. 513. Subsequently motions for rehearing were made on various grounds by the •complainant and the defendants James, Clex-ton, and Caswell, which motions were denied. See Same v. Same, 5 Fed. 806. An appeal was taken to the supreme court by the complainant ■and the defendants .Tames and Clexton, where the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and the cause remanded, with direction to dismiss the bill of complaint. The supreme court made the foregoing disposition of the case upon the grounds as stated by Mr. Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion, as follows: That Norton’s re-issued patent, dated October 4, 1S70. was void, by reason of not being for the same invention specified in the original; that if a patent fully and clearly describes and claims ■■a specific invention, complete in itself, so as not to be inoperative or invalid by reason of a ■defective or insufficient specification, a re-issue cannot be had for the purpose of expanding and generalizing the claim, so as to embrace an invention not specified in the original, — reaffirming Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. (6S TJ. S.) 531,— and the court ought not to be required to explore the history of the art to ascertain what the patentee might have claimed, for he is bound by his statement of what his invention was; that a patentee cannot claim in a patent the same thing claimed by him in a prior patent, nor what he omitted to claim in a prior patent in which the invention was described, he not having reserved the right to claim it in a separate patent, and not having seasonably applied therefor; that a patent for a machine cannot be re-issued for the purpose of claiming the process of operating that class of machines, because, if the claim for the process is anything more than for the use of the particular machine patented, it is for a different invention (reaffirming Powder Co. v. Powder Works, 9S</p> <p>TT. S. 139), and that the government of the United States has no right to use a patented invention without compensation to the owner of the patent (James v.'Campbell, 104 U. S. 356; Clex-ton v. Campbell. Id.; Campbell v. James, Id.).</p> <p>[For denial of motion to open the ease after the dismissal of the bill and amended bill of complaint, see Campbell v. James, 31 Fed. 525.</p> <p>[For other cases involving this patent, see Secombe v. Campbell, 5 Fed. 804; Campbell v. Ward, 12 Fed. 150; Shavor’s Case, 4 Ct. Cl. 440.]</p>

At law. Assumpsit, brought by [Robert G. Campbell] the indorsee of a writing obligatory, a citizen of the state of Tennessee, against the defendant [Benjamin F. Jordan], his immediate indorser, a citizen of the state of Arkansas, and who was also payee of the writing obligatory. Demurrer to the declaration, assigning special causes: 1.

<p>Case No. 2,363.</p> <p>District Courts — Criminal Jurisdiction — Fugitive Slave Act.</p> <p>1. The 7th section of the fugitive act of 1850 [9 Stat. 464] creates new offenses and penalties.</p> <p>2. Jurisdiction is given to the district court of the United States, both in the criminal and civil prosecutions under the act.</p> <p>3. As the circuit court has no jurisdiction originally, in a criminal procedure under the statute, it seems not to come within the provisions of the act of 1840 [9 Stat. 72] authorizing transmissions to, be made, of indictments from the district to the circuit court.</p> <p>4. The act of 1846 does not relate to civil prosecutions.</p>

<p>[At law. Action by A. J. Campbell against J. McManus. The defendant moves to set aside a marshal’s return of levy on execution.]</p>

<p>[In equity. Bill by William W. Campbell against John W. Medbury and others.]</p>

<p>Error to Hempstead circuit court.</p>

Bill in equity [by Calvin C. Campbell and another against the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company and others for foreclosure of a mortgage]. Heard on motion to dissolve injunction, which motion involved the merits of the bill.

<p>Case Wo. 2,367.</p> <p>Railroads — Killing Stock — Presumption of Negligence.</p> <p>[A horse placed at night in a pasture adjoining a railroad track vas found next morning by the side of the track, evidently having been killed by a passing train. The bars of the pasture were down, and it was apparent from the horse tracks that the animal had run about one hundred yards before being struck. Held that, the horse being a trespasser, the court would presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the train had been operated with ordinary care and diiigence, and that consequently the case was one of damnum absque injuria.]</p>

<p>Case No. 2,367a.</p> <p>Appeal — Discretion op Trial Court — Appointment of Elisor — Demand of Oyer — Review.</p> <p>1. Questions as to the trial or continuance of a cause rest so much in the sound discretion of the inferior court, that this court will not interpose unless in a flagrant case.</p> <p>2. The appointment of an elisor to summon a jury, will be presumed to be correct, and to have been done for reasons satisfactory to the court.</p> <p>3. Where profert is not made, oyer cannot be demanded. ></p> <p>4. A judgment of allowance of a competent court, cannot be inquired into, reinvestigated, or impeached in a collateral proceeding, and can only be reinvestigated in the manner pointed out by law.</p> <p>5. If fraudulent, a party is not without .redress.</p> <p>6. A party can take no exception to a verdict in the appellate court where none was made below.</p> <p>7. The breach of the conditions of a penal bond, constitutes, in fact, the basis of the plaintiff’s action, and it should be assigned with certainty and particularity, so as to show the injury.</p> <p>8. Except in a few particular cases, the rule is universal that no execution can be received in evidence, without the judgment on which it was issued.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,367b.</p> <p>Whit or Error — When Lies — Certiorari.</p> <p>1. A writ of error does not lie on an allowance against an executor or administrator.</p> <p>2. Where a new jurisdiction, unknown to the common law, is created, a writ of error will not, and a certiorari will, lie to it. 2 Tidd, Pr. 1051.</p>

<p>Case No. 2,b68.</p> <p>Shipping — Delivery by Vessel — Custom.</p> <p>A delivery of freight to a lighter moored alongside and in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel, where it was the custom of trade to deliver in that way, and where a receipt was given by the master is a good delivery, and binds the vessel receiving the freight.</p> <p>[See note at end of cased</p> <p>[NOTE. That a delivery, to a steamboat or lighter, of goods to be placed aboard another vessel, is a delivery to the latter, see Bulkley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 24 How. (65 TJ. S.) 380; The Edwin v. Same, Case No. 4.301; The Edwin, Id. 4,3U0; The Oregon, Id. 10,553.]</p>

[In equity. Bill by Calvin C. Campbell and another against the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company and others, fo;- foreclosure of a mortgage. This cause was heard for final decree on the pleadings and evidence. It had been before one of the judges of the court (Mr. Circuit Justice Bradley) on a former occasion upon a motion to dissolve an injunction which had been allowed in the case: which motion involved the merits of the bill.

In bankruptcy. This was a bill by George W. Campbell, assignee, of Hitchcock & Endicott, bankrupts [against the Traders’ National Bank], to recover the proceeds of goods sold on execution upon judgments entered by confession a short time before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.

<p>[In admirality. Libel in rem by Campbell and others against the . steamship Unele Sam to recover extra seamen’s wages.]</p>

[In admiralty. Libel by Campbell and others against the steamship Uncle Sam for extra seamen’s wages. There was a decree for libelants in the district court (Case No. 2,371), and the claimants of the vessel appeal.]

This was an indictment against James B. Campbell, for forging and passing counterfeit coin contrary to the act of congress of March 3, 1S25 [4 Stat 119). The first count of the indictment charges the defendant with making, forging and counterfeiting the coin in question. No exception is taken to this count, and it need not therefore be farther noticed.

[Bill by E. B. Campbell, assignee in bankruptcy, against Silas M. Waite and others, to set aside a mortgage executed by the bankrupt, as in violation of the bankrupt act]