Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

3 Wash. App. 335

Dillman v. Reilly

Court of Appeals of Washington

Decided September 28, 1970

Court of Appeals of Washington · decided 1970-09-28

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently December 1972

1 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“We find in the record none of the four factors heretofore adopted by this court (State v. Brewer, 73 Wn.2d 58 , 436 P.2d 473 (1968)), and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon which a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial can be said to depend: i.e., (1) a delay of such length alone as to amount to a denial of the right to a speedy trial; (2) prejudice to the defense arising from the delay; (3) a purposeful delay designed by the state to oppress the defendant; or (4) long and undue imprisonment in jail awaiting trial.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 7 Wash. App. 937 - State v. Rolax

Relies on 75 Wash. 2d 678 - State v. Christensen · 76 Wash. 2d 637 - State v. Garman

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1970-09-28

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Per Curiam.

¶1The issue raised by this petition for a writ of habeas corpus is whether the petitioner was denied his right to a speedy trial when the superior court refused to set a trial date during the months of July or August because of the absence of a jury term during that period.

¶2The petitioner’s contentions were answered in State v. Garman, 76 Wn.2d 637, 458 P.2d 292 (1969). The absence of a jury term during the months of July and August were held to be good cause and excused the state from bringing the accused to trial within 60 days after the filing of the information, as required by RCW 10.46.010. We further note that petitioner was granted the earliest possible trial date.

¶3The factors to be considered in determining whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied are fourfold:

(1) a delay of such length alone as to amount to a denial of the right to a speedy trial; (2) prejudice to the defense arising from the delay; (3) a purposeful delay designed by the state to oppress the defendant; or (4) long and undue imprisonment in jail awaiting trial.

¶4*336State v. Christensen, 75 Wn.2d 678, 686, 453 P.2d 644 (1969). In the present case we find none of these factors present.

¶5The application of petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

/3/washapp/335 · .json · Public domain