Volume 30 — North Carolina Reports

This was an action of assumpsit, in which the only question was, whether one Jones, who was offered as a witness for the plaintiff, was competent. Jones was offered as a witness to prove the sale and delivery of the goods. The defendant objected that he was interested and introduced one McCoy to prove his interest.

This was an action on the case for a deceit on the part of the defendant, in trading a note to the plaintiff for a horse. It appeared in evidence, that a conversation took place between the parties about the trade of a note held by the defendant on one - and endorsed by one Worthington, for sixty-eight dollars, in which the defendant said the note was perfectly good.

This was an action of debt on the official bond of the defendant as Clerk and Master of the Court of Equity of Pasquotank County. The facts were submitted to the Court upon the following case agreed.

This suit was commenced before a Justice of the Peace by warrant in “ debt for $75 due by assumpsit.” After judgment and appeals, the cause came on for trial in the Superior Court on nil debet; and on the trial, the plaintiff gave in evidence a written instrument, signed by the defendant, in the following words ; “ I, the subscriber, promise H. Spencer, that if he can malre it appear, that I had in my hands as constable, for collection, three notes, for $75 each, in favour…

The following case was reported by the presiding Judge. This was an action of debt on a bond, executed by the testator of the defendant on the 16th of April, 1839, as one of the sureties of one Sedbury, a constable.

This is an indictment for a forcible entry by the defendants upon the possession of one Flynn, and on the trial, it was fully proved.

The case was this. After a conviction of murder, the prisoner moved in arrest of judgment; and, after the motion was overruled, and sentence passed on him, he appealed. The motion was founded on two reasons. The one, that in several instances the proceedings are stated in the record, in the past, instead of the present, tense.

This was an indictment against the defendant for an assault and battery, and, upon not guilty pleaded, he was convicted ; and the Court sentenced him to pay a fine of one hundred dollars and be imprisoned ten days, and enter into bond for his good behaviour, &c. From this judgment the defendant prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court, which was granted upon his giving the usual ap« peal bond, conditioned that “ he would abide by the sentence, judgment or decree of the Supreme…

This was an indictment under the section of the Revised Statutes, concerning fornication and adultery, to which the defendants pleaded not guilty.

This was an action of ejectment in which the parties agreed upon the following facts.

This was an action for the breach of a covenant for the payment of rent, contained in a lease. The plaintiff, by deed, leased to the defendant a tract of land for the year 1842, reserving a rent of $125, which the defendant covenanted therein to pay. The defendant entered into and kept quiet possession of the land, for the period for which it was leased. The action is brought on the covenant, to recover the rent.

The action is for slander, in indirectly imputing to the plaintiff the crime of perjury, by saying to him, when speaking in reference to the trial of an indictment against one Bryant Adams, and to the examination of the plaintiff as a witness on the trial, “You swore to a lie, and I can prove it/’ Plea, not guilty., In support of his declaration, the plaintiff gave in evidence, the record of an indictment against Adams for a battery on the present defendant, on which there…

The prisoner was indicted for Murder. The day before the trial, the presiding Judge, at the instance of the Solicitor of the State, ordered a special writ of venire facias to issue to the Sheriff, commanding him to summon one hundred Jurors.

The plaintiffs obtained a certiorari, which the defendant moved to quash, because it was improvidently issued. The Court allowed the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. Upon the affidavits and record the case is this. The plaintiffs were, for several years, in possession of a tract of land, claiming it in fee, and as descended from their father; and they leased it to Charles Turnage for the year 1845, and he took possession under his lease.

. This was an action of ejectment, in which the following case appeared. In 1S05, Thomas Cartwright, the elder, devised the premises to his son, John Cartwright in fee, who entered and lived thereon until his death.

’ Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Orange County, at the Spring Term, 1847, his Honor Judge Manly presiding. The action was trover for two mares, a colt, and some corn; and was tried on the general issue. Several points were made for the defendant on the trial, on which the presiding Judge gave opinions; but it is only necessary to state one of them, as the counsel here abandoned all the others.

The case presents but a single point. The plaintiff claims damages of the defendant, for a fraud in the sale of a slave, named Tamer. In order to show the amount, to which he was entitled, the plaintiff introduced witnesses, who testified that the difference, between such a slave as Tamer was, if she had been sonad, and such as she actually was, was one half. So far as is disclosed by the case, this was all the evidence, upon that point, given to the jury.

This is a criminal proceeding against a slave. Upon application to a Justice of the Peace, a warrant was issued against the defendant, for insolence to, and an assault and battery upon a white man. He was adjudged guilty, and sentenced to receive five and twenty stripes. From this judgment his master appealed to the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions. He was there tried, and being convicted, was sentenced by the Court to receive the same punishment.

The action is trover for sundry chattels,, and the plea, not guilty. Held: that it would, and a verdict and judgment were given for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. Trover will lie. 1 Arclibóld’s N. P. 451. 457 Bran-court v. Bridges & others, 1 B. & C. 145. Agar v. Lisle, Brownly’s Rep. 5. Murray & others v. Burling, 10 John. Rep. 172. Com.

<p>The Act of 1S07, giving a right to one surety to recover at law his rateable proportion of the debt of the principal, does not enlarge the rights of the surety, who pays the debt, nor deprive the' co-surety of any just grounds of defence, which would before have been available to him in equity.</p> <p>The only exception is, that, from the necessity of the case, tire Court of law cannot take cognizance of the complicated case of one or more of the sureties at law, when they exceed two, but that it restricts the recovery to an aliquot part of the debt, according to the number of sureties.</p> <p>When two or more embark in the common risk of being sureties for another, and one of them subsequently obtains from the principal an indemnity or counter-security to any extent, it enures to the benefit of all.</p> <p>Where A. a surety for B. received from B. his (A’s. debt) and A. was to pay to B. a debt to which A. was surety, and afterwards it being discovered that A. was surety for other debts of B. and it was then agreed that A. should pay those other debts as well as the first, pro rata in proportion to the debt he had owed B.; and C. being a co-surety with A. in the first debt also received a certain sum from B. in discharge from his liabilitity, and A. had' to discharge the whole of the first debt, held that A. was entitled to recover from C. the sum so received by him from B.</p> <p>The cases of Powell v. Malthis, 4 Ire. 83, Moore v. Moore, 4 Dev. 388, Gregory v. Murrill, 2 Ire. Eq. 233, Kerns v„ Chambers, 3 Ire. Eq. 577, Cooper v. Wilcox, 2 Dev. and Bat. 90, Nelson v. Williams, Id. 118, Smith v. McLeod, 3 Ire. Eq. 3fl0, and Fagan v. Jacoclcs, 4 Dev.263 cited and approved.</p>

The action is trespass for taking and selling four negro slaves; and the defendant justified, as the Sheriff of Northampton County, under the execution hereinafter mentioned. Held: that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and he had judgment accordingly ; and the defendant appealed.

The plaintiff’s ease, as alleged, is as follows. Hixie Jones died in the year, 1823, seized and possessed, of the premises in dispute, leaving five children, to-wit: Willie Jones, Lydia Witcher, Eliza Jones, John C. Jones, and Atlas Jones. He claims three undivided fifth parts, as lessee of the three first named children, and two undivided fifth parts, as lessee of Jesse Person.

This was an action of assumpsit brought in the Su« perior Court of Randolph. The following was the case : The plaintiff was employed by the defendant and others, as an agent, to go to Alabama, and settle the estate of their brother, and receive from the executor, his share thereof, and bring it to this State. The appointment of the plaintiff was by deed.

This was an action of assumpsit. The only question presented in the case, is, as to the competence of a witness. One William Westbrook, being indebted to the plaintiff, it was, as the plaintiff alleges, agreed between him and the defendant, that the latter should pay the debt. No question is made, as to the sufficiency of the consideration for the promise of the defendant, or to its being by parol.

This is an action of trespass quare■ clausum fregit. On the trial, in order to show title, the plaintiff offered in evidence the transcript from the records of the County Court of Sampson, showing a judgment and venditioni exponas, in behalf of Holmes and Bunting against one Harman Owen, and a sheriff’s deed covering the land in question.

This is an indictment at common law, for a forcible entry into the dwelling house of one Kitchen. The house was situated on a tract of land, which had belonged to one Herring, who contracted to sell it to Kitchen, and covenanted to convey in fee upon the payment of the purchase money ; and he let him into possession.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Wayne County, at the Fall Term, 1547, his Honor Judge Manly presiding.</p> <p>The plaintiff issued a warrant in debt on a note against the defendant as the administrator of John J. Briggs, deceased. It was returned by the constable,- “ Executed and the Justice of the Peace made thereon the following entry; “Jugment confessed to the officer by the administrator, Aaron- F. Moses, for the sum of fifteen dollars with interest from the first day of January, 1843, and costs. April 24, I84.5-. Signed, “L. Cogdell, J P.” On the same paper the magistrate made further entry: “Execute the goods and chattels of the deceased, and sell to satisfy the above judgment and costs. April 24, IS45.” Signed, “ L. Cogdell, J. P.”</p> <p>The constable returned thereon nulla bona. On the 10th of June, 1847, the plaintiff brought the present writ by warrant in debt on the above, as a judgment, suggesting a devastavit, and seeking to recover from the defendant de bonis propriis ; and, after’ a judgment for the plaintiff, out of Court and appeals, the case came on to be tried in the Superior Court, on the plea of nil debet, that there was no such judgment; and fully administered.</p> <p>For the defendant it was insisted, that the entry on the original warrant of the 24th of April, 1845, was not a judgment by the magistrate, but simply a memorandum of a conversation between him and the officer and nothing-more : And, secondly, that, if to be considered a judgment, it was not valid against the defendant, because he was not summoned to appear for trial at any particular time or place. The first point the Court reserved by consent of the parties. On the other, the defendant offered the constable, who returned the warrant, as a witness; and he deposed, that he did not give the defendant notice of the time and place of trial; but that the reason was, that, when he served the warrant, the defendant told him, he did not wish to attend the trial, and was willing a judgment should be rendered against him. Upon this evidence the Court directed the jury to find the issues for the plaintiff; which was done. But the Court, being af< terwards of opinion for the defendant on the point reserved, set aside the verdict, and ordered a nonsuit, under the agreement, and the plaintiff appealed.</p>

This suit was brought in the County Court, and, after a verdict and judgment against the plaintiff, he appealed to the Superior Court; but he gave bond with only one surety. At the term at which the transcript was filed, the defendant moved to dismiss the appeal, because there was but one surety to the appeal bond.

Debt on the bond given by the defendant Lea, as sheriff of Caswell. The breach assigned is in not paying to the relator a sum of money, collected by a deputy of the defendant on a fieri facias, on a judgment of a Justice of the Peace, in his favour against one Palmer. Plea, conditions performed.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Granville County, at the Special Term in November 1847, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>This is a proceeding under the Act giving damages, to the owner of stock which has been injured by another. Rev. St. Ch. 48, Sec. 3. The plaintiff alleges, that his stock has been injured by the defendant, within her enclosed grounds, or by other’s acting under her authority. From the assessment made by the magistrate, and freeholders, and the judgment rendered thereon, the defendant appealed to the County Court and from the judgment of that tribunal to the Superior Court. In each. Court, a motion was made by the defendant to quash the proceedings for error. The error assigned in the case, is, that the magistrate in his warrant designates the name of one of the freeholders, to be summoned.</p> <p>In the Superior Court, the motion was over-ruled. From this judgment, she was allowed to appeal.</p>

<p>Under our wreck laws, the master, owner, merchant or consignee of wrecked vessels or other property has a right to take possession of them and dispose of them as he may think proper, without any responsibility to the wreck-master for commissions or in any other respect.</p>

This was an action of debt upon the official bond of the defendant, as sheriff of the County of Brunswick. The defendant, Woodside, was the sheriff of the county of Brunswick, whose duty it was, to collect the county taxes for the year 1842. The action is brought on his official bond, against him and his sureties, the other defendants. Two breaches are assigned : one, for collecting and not paying over to the relator, the county, poor, and school taxes.

This is an action of covenant, contained in a lease, granted by the plaintiff’, Read, to the defendant, Gran-berry, in the year 1837.

This is an action upon a guaranty of the note of David Underwood, which the defendant passed to the plaintiff’s intestate in part payment for his crop of cotton, and was tried on the general issue. The guaranty, is in these words: “Clinton, May 1st, 1840. This is to certify, that I pass over the following notes to Sti-eet Ashford for value received, and I agree to make them good, should any of them not be so. One note of J. S. Chesnut for f 138 05.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Brunswick County, at the Spring Term, 1847, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>This was a scire facias against the sheriff of Brunswick County, as special bail for one David Treadwell, against whom the plaintiffs had recovered a judgment. The defendants pleaded nul tiel record, payment, statute of limitations, no ca. sa. issued; no ca. sa. returned. Much controversy existed, as to the’ sufficiency of the ca. sa. The presiding Judge charged the jury that the ca. sa. produced was void, as not corresponding with the judgment ; 'whereupon they returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, on all the issues ; and from the judgment the plaintiffs appealed.</p>

The plaintiffs are the children of Lucy Bennett; and the action is detinue for a slave, Sylvia, and several of her children. Pleas : non delinet, and statute of limitations. The negro Sylvia formerly belonged to Emanuel Wicks, of Nottaway County in Virginia; and two or three years before his death he lent her to his daughter Lucy, then the wife of Walker Bennett, of the same County.

Debt on a bond, and plea of a certificate of bankruptcy to the defendant as a voluntary bankrupt, granted by the District Court of the United States.

<p>A, in 1791, devised as follows, “I lend mito B. W. all the lands I own in Conehoe Island, <5'C. during his natural life, and after his death I give tho above mentioned land to his heirs lawfully begotten, to them and their heirs forever; and in case he should die without lawful issue of his body, then I lend the above mentioned land to his brother H. W. ic.”</p> <p>Held, that the words here used “heirs lawfully begotten,” were words of limitation and not of purchase ; that B. W. therefore took an estate tail, which by the Act of 1784, was converted into a fee simple, and that the remainder over was void.</p> <p>Held, also, that the words “ to them and their heirs,” superadded to the words “his heirs lawfully begotten,” did not affect this construction of the devise.</p>

This is a scire facias to revive a judgment. The defendant McNeill pleaded a certificate of bankruptcy granted on his application by the District Court of the United States for this District.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Orange County, at the Special Term, on the second Monday of December 1847, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>This action is debt against the sheriff of Orange for the negligent escape of Mordecai Flemming, committed to the defendant in execution. Plea, nil debet, and issue thereon. The plaintiff obtained judgment against Flemming in Orange County Court, and afterwards, at November term, 1839, the bail brought him into Court, and surrendered him, and on the motion of the plaintiff, he was committed in execution, and was received by the defendant, who was then sheriff of Orange and confined . Mm in the gaol of the County until the 1st day of November, 1844, when the debtor escaped. It was admitted by the parties, that, during the whole period of Flemming’s detention, and when he escaped, the defendant was the sheriff of Orange; that the gaol was new, well constructed, and strong ; and that, when the prisoner escaped, the doors of the gaol were locked, and that he made his escape by cutting asunder two iron bars of the grating of a window of the debtor’s room, and thereby made an opening, through which he passed ; that there was no apartment in the prison for a gaoler’s residence ; and that the escape took place in the night time, and without the knowledge or consent of the defendant; and that, from the form of the window, the position of the grating, and the manner in which the bars were -sawed, it appeared that Flemming was assisted to escape by some person on the outside of the prison.</p> <p>Upon the foregoing facts, the counsel for the plaintiff contended, that he was entitled to recover, because the defendant was bound to keep the debtor safely, and that nothing would excuse him for not doing so, but the act of God, or of the enemies of the country. On the other hand, the counsel for the defendant insisted, that, upon a proper construction of the Act of Assembly, the defendant was not responsible in this action, as the debtor escaped without any actual negligence of the defendant, or his gaolers. Of this latter opinion was the presiding Judge ; and he so instructed the jury, who found, accordingly, for the defendant, and from the judgment the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The action of debt is given by the Statute, Westminster 2, ch 11, (13 Ed. 1.)</p> <p>Coke in his commentary on this statute, says that it is the duty of the sheriff to keep the prisoner in “ salva el arela custodia.” 2 In. 381.</p> <p>•Under this statute by judicial decisions in England, escapes had been classed into negligent and voluntary— the distinction is, however, only important where in a civil action, the sheriff pleads recaption before suit, which he may do when the escape is negligent only.</p> <p>The sheriff here has been guilty of a negligent escape, and every escape, which does not arise from the act of God or the King’s enemies, is, in law, negligent. 2 II. B, 111. 113 4 T. R. 789. 4 Co. Rep. 84, b. Ex’r. Rainey v. Downey, 2 Murph. 388.</p> <p>The term “negligent escape,” had acquired a legal and technical meaning and must be supposed to have been used by our Legislature in its well understood sense.</p> <p>. Our Statute of 1836 makes a marked distinction between the escape of a criminal, and that of a debtor— when the sheriff is indicted for the escape of a criminal “he may be permitted to shew that the escape was not by his consent or negligence, but that he acted with proper care and diligence,” that is, that there was no actual negligence — Rev. St. 109 — but in civil cases no such plea is given by the Stat. Id. 569. Upon the indictment where the inquiry is as to guilt, the knowledge of the sheriff is material — but in the civil action he is charged upon grounds of policy, as in the case of common covines: the law arms him with the whole power of the county for the purpose of keeping the debtor safely, and will not permit him to allege a rescue or breach of prison, unless by the public enemy — a release by a mob is no defence — Elliott v. Duke, of Norfolk, 4 T. R.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, in which the following facts appeared. The declaration contains three several demises, the 1st from W. A. Whitfield, the 2d from James Herring, and the 3d from Buckner Hill* The defendants entered into the common rule, and pleaded not guilty.

A petition was filed in the Court of Equity for Montgomery County, of which the defendant was Clerk and Master, to sell land, for the purpose of partition. The defendant was appointed a commissioner to make the sale, and he accordingly made the sale, and returned,his report to Court.

This is a scire facias against Daniel McNeill, John McNeill, and Henry Arnold, as the bail of James McNeill, in an action of covenant brought by the plaintiff against James and Daniel McNeill. Among other pleas were that of nul tiel record, and also that John McNeill and Henry Arnold were the bail of Daniel McNeill, and not of James McNeill. Upon the trial, the plaintiff produced the record of his recovery against the principal, James McNeill.

<p>A sheriff has no authority to take a bond for keeping the prison bounds from a person arrested, until after he has been committed to close custody; and a bond so taken is void.</p> <p>When a summary judgment is moved foron such a bond, it is not necessary for the defendants to plead non esi factum, but they may give the whole matter in evidence to the Court.</p>

<p>Where in a suit on a guardian bond it appeared that the account between the guardian and the ward had been settled, and that the guardian gave his own bond to the ward, which was received by the latter in satisfaction of the balance due, and he then gave his guardian a receipt: Held, that this was a sufficient defence to the suit on the guardian bond.</p> <p>The same defence, which might be made to an action at law or suit in Equity, brought in the name of the ward himself against the guardian, is good in an action brought on the bond.</p> <p>The case of the State v. Lightfoot, 2 Ire. 306, cited and approved.</p>

The defendant, in the year 1843, was, and still is, Cleric of the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions of Rocking-ham County. In that year a writ issued from his office* at the suit of one Charles G. Taft against the present plaintiff Nathan Wright.

<p>Where A. grants a license to B. to flow the water from B’s land through A’s ditch, B. has no right to increase the quantity of water so flowed, either by adding to the number of his ditches or clearing new land or enlarging his ditches, so that the flow of water will be greater than it was when the license was granted — and A. may recover damages for any injury *us-tainod thereby.</p> <p>License to turn one stream upon A’s land is not an authority to stop that, at the party’s pleasure, and turn another in its stead.</p> <p>The case of Carter v. Page, 4 Ired. 424, cited and approved.</p>

The prisoner was convicted upon an indictment for the murder of James Flowers, and moved for a venire de novo, and then in arrest of judgment; and after a disal-lowance of the motions, and sentence of death, he appealed.

This is an action of debt for the negligent escape of Mordecai Flemming, committed in execution to the de-fenda.m, the sheriff of Orange, by the Superior Court of Davidson on a judgment rendered in that Court in October 1839, for $604 30, with interest &c. and $16 08 for costs.

The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant Lisk, for the sum of thirty-four dollars forty cents, ($34 40,) with interest from the 6th day September, 1838, on a warrant from a Justice of the Peace, whereupon a capias ad satisfaciendum issued, dated the 10th day of January, 1845, upon which the defendant was arrested and gave bond for his appearance at the Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, to be held for said county, on the 1st Monday of April, 1845, with…

This was an action on the case against the defendant, Alexander Murchison, as the owner of a raft of timber, to recover damages for an injury done by said raft to a toll bridge, the property of the plaintiff, William S. Ashe.

This was an action of ejectment, in which the plaintiff claimed under a judgment, execution, venditioni ex-ponas, and sheriff’s sale, and sheriff’s deed. The judgment was for $40 20 — the venditioni exponas for that sum and interest.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Randolph County, at the Spring Term, 1848, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding.</p> <p>The defendant was tried at Randolph, on the last Spring circuit, before his Honor Judge Pearson, on the following bill of indictment:</p> <p>“State of North Carolina, ) Superior Court of Law, Randolph County. [ Spring Term, A. D. 1848.</p> <p>The Jurors for the State upon their oath present that John Clark, late of said county, on the first day of May now last past, with force and arms in the county aforesaid, one bull tongue of the value of six-pence, and one piece of iron, of the value of six-pence, of the goods and chattels of one Thomas Winslow, then and there being found, felo-niously did steal, take and carry away against the peace and dignity of the State.”</p> <p>The testimony on the part of the State proved that the defendant had stolen a plough share belonging to the prosecutor ; that the plough share in question was a long piece of iron, sharpened at the point and widened and flattened in the middle, so as to be in the shape of the tongue of a bull, and that it was usually called a “ bull tongue,” though it was sometimes also called a gopher.</p> <p>Upon this testimony, the defendant’s counsel moved the Court to instruct the jury, that the allegation of the article stolen, being a piece of iron, was not supported by the evidence : and that the allegation of its being “one bull tongue” was too vague and indefinite, to justify a conviction, for the reason that “ bull tongue,” as applied to a species of plough share, was a mere local term. His Honor instructed the jury as requested, upon the first point, saying that although the article stolen “was made of iron, yet when it was shaped, and formed into a distinct article, such as a ring, or clevis, or plough share, it was no longer a mere piece of iron.” Upon the second point, he charged, “ that if the jury believed from the evidence, that the defendant had stolen a plough share, which was usually called a bull tongue, the charge in the indictment was sufficiently specific to justify a verdict.” The jury found the defendant guilty, when he moved for a new trial, which was refused. He then moved in arrest of judgment, which was also refused and judgment being pronounced, he appealed.</p>

The defendant was tried atJRandolph Superior Court on the Spring Circuit of 1848, before his Honour Judge Pearson, for failing to make, and keep up during crop time, a sufficient fence about his cleared ground under cultivation, “ there being no navigable stream or deep water course that might be deemed sufficient instead of a fence.” From the testimony, given on the trial, it appeared, that the defendant was the owner of afield, lying in Randolph County on Deep River, and…

This was a scire facias against the defendant as the bail of one Laurence Moore.

This was an action of trespass vi et armis quare clau-sum fregit, brought by the plaintiff, as the Chairman of the County Court of Montgomery, to recover damages for the burning of the Court House of that County by the defendant’s intestate. Pleas, the general issue, libe-rum tenementum, and licence.

. Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Surry County, at the Fall Term,] 1847, his Honor Judge PearsoN presiding. This is a sci. fa. against the defendant, who was the sheriff of Robeson County, to recover of him the sum of $100, for not returning a writ of capias ad respondendum.

The case is as follows: In 1835, the plaintiff hired from one Brooks a negro, for the sum of $16, and gave' his note with the defendant as his surety for its payment. The plaintiff was the agent of one Shelton, for whose use the negro was hired. Of this fact the defendant was ignorant, at the time the note was given, and, upon learning the truth, insisted that Brooks should give up the note' to him, which was done upon Shelton assuming to pay the debt.

Caldwell presiding. The defendant, the widow of James L. Bowers filed her petition in the County Court of Martin at January term, 1847, for the purpose of having allotted to her her dower in the lands, of which her husband died seized and possessed.

This suit was commenced by warrant on the 14th of February, 1S46, to recover the sum of $25 for a town tax, claimed from the defendant as a transient person keeping a shop in the town of Wilmington. A Private Act, passed in 1784, provided for the election of Commissioners of the town, and incorporated them and their successors, with the usual powers of appointing the necessary town officers, making ordinances and regulating the police of the town.

The defendant, a free man of colour, was indicted under the act of 1840, ch. 30, for unlawfully carrying about on his person, and unlawfully keeping in his house, a pistol, without having obtained a license therefor, from the proper authority.

.Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Cumberland County, at the Spring Term, 184S, his Honor Judge Bailey presiding. The indictment in this casé, was returned to the June term, 1846, of Cumberland County Court, and the defendants, being convicted, appealed to the Superior Court. Upon a suggestion of a diminution of the record, in the latter Court, a writ of certiorari was, on motion, ordered to bring up a more perfect transcript.

Term, 184S, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding. Thisisan action on the case brought February 28th,1845, on the act of 1820, for aiding and assisting in removing one Thomas Sharp from Rockingham County, with the intent to hinder and defraud the plaintiff of a debt, which Sharp owed him. Pleas: Not guilty, release, and accord and satisfaction.

The indictment charges that the defendants did erect, keep up, and use a certain public gaming table, called by the name of Shuffle-board, at which games of chance were played, contrary to the form of the statute.

The action is debt for a penalty of @20, for refusing to serve in the office of Warden of the Poor, to which the defendant was elected by the County Court of Martin, at April term, 1847. Held: that the penalty, existed under the Act of 1777, of which that of 1846 was an amendment, and judgment was. entered against the defendant, and he ap¡-p.ealed.

The defendant was indicted, with two others, for playing together “ at a certain public gaming place called a Ten-pin-alley, a certain game of chance called Ten pins, and betting money thereat,” contrary to the statute. Upon not guilty pleaded the defendant was tried alone.

After the new trial granted in this case at June term, 1847, (see 7 Ire. Rep. 280) it was again tried at Chatham, on the Spring circuit of 1848, when the defendants had a verdict and judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.

This was an action of ejectment brought to recover a house and lot of land in the town of Windsor. The lessor of the. plaintiff showed in evidence a deed from one David Ryan to himself, and proved that the building and lot mentioned in that deed are the same as those described in the declaration. The said deed is dated 4th Feb. 1841.

Honor Judge Settle presiding. This is an action on the case, brought, under the statute, by one surety of an insolvent principal against a co-surety for contribution. The case was as follows. -The firm of II. N. Williams and Co., composed of H. N. Williams and 0. C. Green, did business as merchants in Elizabeth City, and made several promissory notes to different persons, which were also executed by the plaintiff and the defendant and one Proctor as sureties.

The premises mentioned in the declaration were sold by the Sheriff of Pasquotank, under a fieri facias against the present defendant, and were bid off by John J. Grandy, ■who took the Sheriff’s deed and recovered them in an action of ejectment against one Morris, who was at that time in possession under Meeds.

The plaintiff declared in trover, for the conversion of a negro named John. It appeared, that, on a Saturday night, the defendant delivered to the jailor of Chowan County, at the jail in Edenton, a negro boy, and said he was hired by the plaintiff, and that he was a runaway. The jailor received the boy, put him in jail and kept him there, until Monday morning, when upon the application of the plaintiff, he delivered him to him on his paying his prison fees, two dollars.

The action is trespass, for false imprisonment in the gaol of Pasquotank in July 1844. Held: that the process was valid as a ca. sa. and authorised the arrest and detention of the plaintiff.

This was an action of debt upon a bond for the payment of seven hundred and fifty dollars, dated in July 1843 ; to which the defendant pleaded the general issue. It was commenced in the County Court and carried by appeal to the Superior Court in which it was tried at Cumberland on the last circuit.

This was an action of assumpsit upon a quantum me-ruit, for work and labor done by the plaintiff for the testator of the defendants. Pleas, the general issue, and the statute of limitations. It appeared upon the trial, that the plaintiff had lived with the defendants’ testator, serving him in the capacity of a manager or overseer, from January 1828, until January 1844.

This is an action of debt to recover $500, as a penalty incurred by the defendant for making a false return of a writ of capias ad respondendum, returnable to the Superior Court of Washington, in which Joseph Long was plaintiff, and Joshua Long defendant, which was delivered to the defendant, then Sheriff of Martin County. Plea, nil debet.

The defendant was convicted upon an indicment, which charged, that he and another unlawfully, forcibly, injuriously, and with strong hand, did break and enter into a certain kitchen of J. D, he the said J. D. being then and there in peaceable and quiet possession of the same, and, having so as aforesaid broken and entered into the said kitchen, then and there being in the actual possession of the said J. D., unlawfully, forcihly, injuriously, and with strong hand, did then…

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Johnston County, at the Spring Term, 1848, his Honor Judge Caldwell presiding.</p> <p>This is an action of slander, in which the words laid in the declaration are “ he has forged my name to a note.” Plea — Not guilty.</p> <p>The case states that, on the trial, a witness for the plaintiff gave evidence, that in a conversation between the witness and the defendant, respecting the plaintiff, the defendant said either “ he has forged my name to a note,” or, “ he has forged my name on a note, and has gone to the South and I believe will not come backbut whether it was the one expression or the other, the witness was unable to say.</p> <p>The case further states, that the defence was, that the defendant had been innocently led to believe, that the plaintiff had written the defendant’s name as an endorser of a note by one William Moody, and that he spoke the words while under a mistake in that respect. And in order to sustain that defence a witness was called, who produced the note alluded to, and it appeared to have been made by Moody to a person, who endorsed it to the plaintiff, and it had on the back of it in writing the words, “ Wm. Moody, David Lunsford’s overseer.” And the witness testified, that the words, “ David Luns-ford’s overseer,” were in the hand-writing of the plaintiff; and that, “ soon after the endorsement to him, the plaintiff, then about going North, placed the note in the hands of the witness, a constable, for collection. And the witness further deposed, that, seeing the name of the defendant on the note, and not being able to read the word “ overseer,” he took out a warrant against Moody as maker, and Lunsford as endorser, and went to Luns-ford’s and served it on both of them ; and that he then showed the note to the defendant, who could read writing, but was, at the time, very sick and in bed. The counsel for the defendant then proposed “ to prove by the witness the conversation that took place between the witness and the defendant at that time,” which was opposed on the part of the plaintiff and rejected by the Court.</p> <p>The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with $500 damages; and the defendant moved for a venire de novo upon the ground, that the Court rejected proper evidence; and, after a refusal and judgment, he appealed.</p>

This was an issue of devisavit vel non, made up and tried in the County Court, where a verdict was found in favour of the propounders of the will. It was afterwards carried by the caveator, Ransom Woolard, to the Superior Court by a writ certiorari, upon his entering into bond with Thomas Latham, and David P. Perry as bis sureties. In the Superior Court, the issue came on to be tried at Pitt, on the last circuit, when the jury, found a verdict establishing the will.

The prisoner was indicted in the County of Granville for the murder of James Meadows, and upon his affidavit his cause was removed to the County of Person, where it was tried on the last circuit.

The prisoner was indicted for the murder of Ben Shipman, a slave, and was tried at Craven on the last circuit. The Solicitor’ for the State examined first a negro woman slave, named Flora.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Guilford County, at the Spring Term, 1848, his Honor Judge Peaeson presiding.</p> <p>This is Trover for two stacks of hay. Plea, not guilty. Upon the exception, the case appears to be as follows.</p> <p>Adam Sharp owned a tract of land in fee, containing 409 acres, and resided on it. He had a son named Samuel, and he permitted him, upon his marriage, to build also on the land and cultivate the greater part of it. The father and son kept separate houses, and cultivated distinct portions of the land. After they had thus continued many years, Adam Sharp in May 1842 conveyed the whole tract in fee to Samuel Sharp in consideration of $2000 paid, as expressed in the deed ; and that was a fair price for it. Just before his death in November 1843, Samuel Sharp, in consideration of love and affection, conveyed the premises in fee to the plaintiff and his wife, who was the daughter of Samuel. Adam Sharp continued to live on the land and to cultivate his portion of it, as he had before, until May 1845., when he removed from the State. When going away, he sold and conveyed to the defendant the crop of grass growing on the meadow in his occupation, in consideration of the sum of $50, which was its full value and then paid. After the conveyance to the plaintiff and his wife, the plaintiff imme? diately entered into those parts of the land, before occupied by Samuel Sharp; and, as soon as Adam Sharp went away, the plaintiff took possession of the residue of the land, and shortly afterwards cut the grass and stacked the hay on the meadow. In a few days the defendant carried it away, and the plaintiff brought this action. On the part of the defendant evidence was given, that many years before 1842, Adam Sharp, as surety for another person, became bound in a bond for $30,000, and that a suit was pending against him thereon, when he made the deed to his son in May 1842, and that it was in 1844 compromised for the sum of $1,200 paid by the same Adam : And evidence was further given, that the consideration of $2,000 mentioned in the deed to Samuel, was not in fact paid, but that only a bond was given for it; and that afterwards the parties, Adam and Samuel, stated to a witness, that it was never meant that it should be paid, as the father had always intended to give the land to his son and made the deed to that intent, but put it in the form of a sale and took the bond for the price, in order to keep the land from being sold under execution, in case judgment should go against the said Adam in the suit then pending: And evidence was further given, that at the same time and upon the ground of such understanding as aforesaid, the witness by the direction and in the presence of Adam and Samuel, entered on the bond a credit for the sum of $1,800, without any part of it being paid and in order to prevent Samuel, upon the death of his father, from being liable for that sum to the other members of the family.</p> <p>On the part of the plaintiff evidence was then given, that when the defendant purchased the grass from Adam Sharp, he was informed of the deed from him to his son Samuel, and from the latter to the plaintiff and his wife.</p> <p>The counsel for the defendant moved the Court to instruct the jury, that, notwithstanding the defendant’s knowledge of the deed from Adam Sharp to Samuel, the same was void, as against the defendant, if the jury believed that he was a purchaser for full value and that the deed was voluntary and made with an actual intent to defraud. The Court refused the'instruction, and directed the jury, that, admitting the deed to have been made in fraud of Adam Sharp’s creditors and also with intent to defraud subsequent purchasers from the grantor, it was, nevertheless, valid against the defendant, if he had notice of it when he bought. The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment, and the defendant appealed.</p>

The prisoner was indicted in Sampson County for the murder of Alfred Flowers, and, after plea, of not guilty, on his motion and affidavit, the trial was removed to Cumberland. He was there tried and convicted, but,upon an appeal to this Court, the judgment was reversed, and a venire de novo awarded. 7 Ired. 299.

<p>When slanderous words are uttered, tlie law prima facie implies malice, except in the case of a privileged communication, which is, where the party is acting under a duty either legal or moral, towards the person to whom he makes the communication. In such a case malice must be proved by the plaintiff, and it is a question of fact for the jury.</p> <p>In an action of tort, where the plaintiff seeks to recover, and is entitled to, vindictive damages, he may give in evidence the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant.</p>

This was an action of detinue for seven slaves, to which the defendant pleaded the general issue and statute of limitations. It was tried at the Special Term of Orange County in December last, when the plaintiff proved, that she was entitled to the slaves in controversy under the will of her father; that they were in the possession of the defendant and had been demanded of him, before the commencement of the suit.

This was an action of trover brought by the plaintiffs against James M. Patterson and three other defendants, to recover damages for the conversion by them of several slaves.

Henry Bright was seized in fee of the premises in the declaration described, and on the 15th April, 1836, he made his will and therein devised and bequeathed as follows: He directed a tract of land and three slaves to be sold and the proceeds to be applied to the payment of his debts, and the surplus, if any, he gave to his wife, Polly.

<p>Where an admlnistratrator dies without having finally administered the estate of his intestate, an action will not lie by one of the next of kin for his share of the estate against Ms administrator, but must be brought by the administrator de bonis non of the original intestate.</p> <p>The case of Taylor v. Brooks, 4 Dev. &¡ Bat. 143, cited and approved.</p>

This was an action of covenant upon the following instrument, to-wit: “ We, William Bryan, and Henry L. Williams, fishing under the firm of Bryan and Williams, and Jonathan B. Capehart, have made the following bargain, viz: The said Capehart agrees to give the said Bryan and Williams three hundred dollars for the offal from their fishery at the head of the Albemarle Sound, payable as follows, viz : one hundred dollars on the 1st day of January, 1834, and one hundred dollars…

This is an action of replevin for a slave named Ephraim. The defendant entered into bond according to the statute, with condition to perform the final judgment, and pleaded non cepit, and also avowed the taking under a, fieri facias, isued by a Justice of the Peace on a judgment obtained by J. B. K. against Neil McLeod for $51 with interest &c. which was delivered to the defendant, he being a Constable &c. and that by virtue thereof the defendant on &c. seized the slave as…

<p>Where assets have remained in the hands of an administrator for more than seven years unclaimed by the next of kin, and the administrator dies, the Trustees of the University cannot recover in their awn name from the representative of such administrator. The assets can only be recovered by an administrator de bonis non, who is immediately answerable over to the Trustees, provided no claim be set up on the part of the next of kin.</p> <p>The cases of Goode v. Goode, No. Ca. T. R. 255, Taylor v. BrooJcs, 4 Dev. & Bat. 139, and Bratten v. Bateman, 2 Dev. Eq. 115, cited and approved.</p>

The plaintiff lived in the County of Northampton. A colored boy, by the name of Joe Walker, was bound to him for a term of years, by the Court of that County. Before the expiration of the term of service, the plaintiff sold the unexpired residue to the defendant, who lived in the County of Hertford, and where the contract was made.

The prisoner is indicted for murder. The case states, that the prisoner and the deceased, with many other pex*-sons, were assembled>.at the house of a Mrs. Gardiner, to shuck corn — while at dinner, a quarrel arose between the prisoner and one Morrison — in which the deceased, who was present, did not interfere. The prisoner left the table and the house, with the avowed intention of going home.

The action is debt on the bond given by the defendant Long, as sheriff of Rowan, and by the other defendants, as his sureties, suggesting breaches, pleas, conditions performed, and conditions not broken. At the trial the case was, that Long’ arrested the relator upon a capias ad re-spondendum at the suit of Vincent Reid, and tookffrom him a bail bond with sufficient sureties, who were not freeholders.

This is an action of debt upon a covenant. The plaintiff undertook and built a Court House in the town of Charlotte for the county of Mecklenburg, and brings this action, to recover the price agreed to be paid. The defendants were commissioners appointed by the County Court to make the contract, and the action is against them, upon the ground that by the deed executed by them, they are personally bound for the money.

<p>In an action for a slave, where a child claims on the ground that the slave was put in his possession by his parent, and that the parent afterwards died intestate without resuming the possession, evidence of the declarations of the parent made after the possession was transferred and not in the pre* : Bence of the child, that he had lent and not given the slave, is inadmissible.</p> <p>Cases of Moore v. Gwyn, 41 re. 275, and Stallings v. Stallings, 1 Dev. Eg1 298, cited and approved.</p>

<p>It Is incumbent on a party excepting, when the error alleged consists in rejecting evidence, to show distinctly in it, what the evidence was, in order that its relevancy may appear, and that it may be seen, that a prejudic® has arisen to him from the rejection.</p> <p>In like manner, when the alleged error consists in admitting evidence, the exception must set forth the evidence actually given, as it is the only means whereby the Court can ascertain, whether or not the admission did, OS might have done, the party a harm.</p>

This was an action of debt, commenced by the plaintiff, as overseer of a public road in the county of Henderson, by a warrant before a single justice, to recover from the defendant the sum of twelve dollars for four days work of three hands. A judgment was given against the defendant by the justice, from which he appealed to the Superior Court, where, at the Spring Term 1S48, the following case agreed was submitted to the presiding Judge.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Davia County, at the Fall Term, 1847, his Honoi Judge Pearson, presiding.</p> <p>This was an action of assumpsit for money had and received — plea non assumpsit.</p> <p>On the trial it appeared, that the plantiffhad obtained a judgment in the County Court of Davie against one Samuel Newell for $2016 10-100, with interests and costs, an^ that an execution oí fieri facias was issued thereon returnable to August Term 1842, which was placed in the defendant’s hands, as sheriff, and was by him levied on a house and lot, belonging to the defendant in the execution, but he did not sell it on account of an order to that effect from the plaintiff. Several writs of venditioni exponas were then issued from time to time until November Term 1843, and were placed in the defendant’s hands, but the execution of them was suspended by order'of the plaintiff. From November Term 1843, an. other writ oifi fa. was taken out, and placed also in the defendant’s hands but likewise suspended by the plaintiff’s order, and no other execution was ever issued on the judgment. In December 1845, the defendant, who was still sheriff, called upon the plaintiff’s agent for the costs including his commissions, and ' exhibited a statement in writing, in which commisions were charged upon the sum of $2449 08-100, that being the amount of the principal debt with the interest and costs thereon; the commissions amounting to jg61 97-100. The agent paid the costs and commissions, and the action was brought, after a demand, to recover back the latter, either in whole or in part, upon the ground that the defendant was not entitled to receive them and they had been paid by mistake, it appeared further, on the part of the plaintiff, that both she and the defendant in the execution were non residents, and that he had no other property in the county of Davie than the house and lot levied on, and that they were not at anytime worth more than #1000.</p> <p>For the defendant testimony was introduced to show that he had several times advertised the house and lot for sale, but had been prevented frem selling by the orders of the plaintiff’s agent and that in October 1843, while the last execution was in his hands, Samuel New-ell, executed to the plaintiff a deed in fee simple for-the house and lot, in which the consideration was stated to be $2,500.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s counsel contended, that the defendant was not entitled to any commissions, or at most to commissions upon the sum of $1000 only, the value of the house and lot levied upon ; and he insisted that the plaintiff could recover back in this action either the whole or a part of what had been paid to the defendant, as having been paid by mistake. His Honor held, and so instructed the jury, that the defendant was entitled to charge commissions upon the sum of $1000 only, as that was the value of the property which he had levied on, but that the plaintiff could not sustain the action against him for the excess, because the payment was made upon a mistake of law and not of fact, and was a voluntary one, and could not be recovered back in the action for money had and received; and that the defendant’s being sheriff at the time of the payment, made no difference, as he had no process in his hands by which to coerce it. The defendant had a verdict and judgment and the plaintiff appealed.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Superior Court of Law of Cabarrus County, at the Fall Term, 1847, his Honor Judge Pear* BON presiding.</p> <p>This is an action of trespass, in which the defendant is charged with entering on the land of the plaintiff and cutting and carrying away a wagon load of wood. Plea, not guilty. At the trial, the evidence was, that a negro man, who belonged to the defendant, went with her wagon and team to the land of the plaintiff, and cut and hauled away a load of wood, worth fifty cents, and carried it to the defendant’s yard. The counsel for the defendant insisted thereupon, that the plaintiff could not recover in this action, and moved the court so to instruct the jury. But the presiding Judge refused todo so, and instructed the jury, that, though, in such a case, the defendant would not be liable in trespass for the act of a free servant, yet she was liable in this action, because the trespass was the act of an irresponsible slave, doing work for the benefit of the owner. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and, after judgment, the defendant appealed.</p>

This was a petition for a writ of certiorari, in which the petitioner set forth that he had been sued in the County Court in an action of debt, and that knowing it was not just, and thinking it was not legal, that he should pay it, he spoke to an attorney of the Court, who entered an appearance for him, but that afterwards, owing to some misunderstanding between his attorney and the other party, the attorney declined appearing on either side, in consequence of which a…

This was an action of ejectment for a tract of land sold under two executions against the defendant and one Alfred Keith, and purchased by the plaintiff’s lessor. On the trial it was admitted that the defendant was in possession of the land sued for, and the lessor rested his case, after shewing the judgments, executions and sheriff’s deed to himself.

This was an action of assumpsit for $210 being the price of a tract of land, which Alfred Hester conveyed to the plaintiff, upon trust to sell and out of the proceeds pay certain debts mentioned in the deed.

The action was brought against Alley, who was the tenant in possession, and the other defendant, Adam Hampion, was admitted to defend with him.

This action is brought in assumpsit and commenced by warrant, before a single magistrate against the defendant and one Henderson. Judgment was rendered by the magistrate against both the defendants, and Cunningham appealed to the County Court, from which the case was transferred under the Act of Assembly to the Superior Court.

The petition is filed to procure a division of land. It sets forth that the petitioners are tenants in common in fee simple with the defendant, Gash, in three several tracts of land in the County of Henderson, on the waters of the French Broad River. The boundries of the tracts are set forth, in the exhibits filed with the petition, and the tracts are stated to contain thirteen hundred acres.

The plaintiffs claim title to the lands in dispute through Thomas Kendrick. They alleged that John Kendrick, the father of Thomas, devised to him and Green Kendrick, his bi’other, the land in dispute. To show title in John Kendrick the lessors of the plaintiff offered in evidence copies from the register’s office of various deeds covering the land, and a similar copy of a deed from Green Kendrick to Thomas Kendrick of his moiety of the devised premises.

8, his Honor Judge Manly presiding. This was an action of debt commenced in the County Court of Navie, upon a prommissory note for ninety-three dollars and ninety-one cents, on which there was due for interest at the time when the writ was issued, the sum of eight dollars and twenty-one cents, making the total amount of principal and interest, due on the note at that time, one hundred and two dollars and twelve cents.

The plaintiff claimed the premises under a grant made to Jesse Ray, in 1839, for three thousand acres of land, as a bounty for erecting iron works, under the act of 1788.

<p>Under the Acts of Assembly, establishing the County of Polk, connected with the Act of 1836, Rev. St. ch, 31, sec. 39, a citizen of the County of Polk has no right to institute a suit in the Superior Court of Rutherford County against another citizen of Polk, and on plea the suit must be dismissed.</p>

The plaintiff sued out an attachment against the defendant returnable before a single justice, and caused several persons among whom was George Clayton, to be summoned as garnishees.

The suit began by warrant before a Justice of the Peace for $25 85, due by account. From the transcript the case appears to be as follows : The suit was commenced on the 5th of March, 1845 ; and the defendant appeared before the Justice and “pleaded the statute of limitations.” thereupon judgment was rendered for him and the plaintiff appealed to the County Court.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of' Law of Macon County, Spring Term, 1S48, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>This is an action for maliciously prosecuting tbe plaintiff and causing him to be indicted for stealing some sheaves of oats from the defendant. Plea not guilty. On tbe trial the plaintiff gave in evidence a warrant issued against him for the offence by two justices of the peace, which was not under seal, but only signed by them, and the plaintiff further gave evidence, that the defendant made oath that the plaintiff stole the oats, and applied to the magistrates for the warrant; and that the plaintiff was arrested thereon, and, upon examination had, was bound over by the magistrate to Court on the charge and that the warrant and recognizances were dluy returned. The plaintiff further gave in evidence the record of an indictment found for the larceny, and his subsequent trial, and acquital thereon, and also, that the defendant upon tbe return of tbe process to Coart appeared as a witness against the plaintiff, and was the only one sworn and sent to the grand jury upon the indictment ; and that, pending the indictment, tbe defendant made a bet with another person, that he would convict the plaintiff on the indictment. The counsel for the defendant insisted, that the warrant was void, because it was not under seal, and therefore that the defendant could not be held responsible as the prosecutor on that, and that, for that reason, and because the defendant was not marked on the indictment as the prosecutor, and did not appear to have been a witness on the trial of the plaintiff, there was no evidence that the defendant was the prosecutor of the indictment; and he moved the Court soto instruct the jury. The Court refused the motion; and charged the jury, that the defendant could not avail himself of the want of a seal to the warrant as shewing that he did not cause the plaintiff to be prosecuted and indicted for the larceny ; and that upon the warrant and record and the parol evidence, if believed by them, the jury might find, that the defendant was the prosecutor of the indictment if they were satisfied therefrom, that sr.ch was the fact. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed from the judgment.</p>

The defendant was charged in Buncombe County with being the father of a bastard child, and was bound over to the County Court. He appeared and moved to be discharged, upon the ground, that the Court had no jurisdiction of the case.

This was action of trover for the conversion of a quantity of corn and oats. The defendant pleaded not guilty, and, upon the issue thereon joined, the case was tried at Iredell, on the last Circuit. The plaintiff claimed title to the property in question under a conveyance which, it was admitted, was void as against creditors and purchasers.

This was a scire facias, issued by the plaintiff to subject the defendant as the bail of one J. J. McElrath, and was submitted to the Court upon the following case agreed.

Case in trover for a wagon. Property in the plaintiff was admitted. The plaintiff hired the wagon to one Baily, who swapped it away to a man by the name of Dowell. The latter, upon a visit to the defendant, who is his father-in-law, drove the wagon in question and left it on his premises, where it was found by the plaintiff and claimed.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Haywood County, at the Spring Term, 1848, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.</p> <p>This was an action of ejectment, brought originally against one Joseph Chamberses tenant in possession, but in which the present defendant was afterwards permitted to come in and defend as landlord upon the following affidavit. “James R. Love comes into Court and swears that thé premises in dispute are his, he being the sole tenant of said premises ; that Joseph Chambers, went into possession as subtenant of his tenant, E. Chambers, that affiant swears that said subtenant has no title, and the same solely exists in this affiant, who is the landlord of the premises sued for.</p> <p>The lessor of the plaintiff claimed under a grant from the State issued in 1810, which covered all the land mentioned in his declaration. The defendant claimed under a prior grant issued in 1805, which covered all the land contained within the boundaries of the lessor’s grant, except a very small slip, as to which, however, there was no evidence, besides the defendant’s affidavit, that he or his tenant was in possession at the commencement of the suit, or at any other time. The principal contest was, whether the plaintiff’s lessor had not acquired the better title, by an adverse possession of seven years, of the part covered by the defendant’s grant, of which it was not denied that his tenant was in possession when the suit was brought. But the lessor insisted that, however the jury might find as to that, he was entitled to a verdict for the small slip of land not covered by the defendant’s grant, upon the ground that by coming in to defend as landlord upon affidavit, the defendant had admitted himself to be in possession, and that no evidence of that fact was necessary on the trial. The Court held otherwise, and the jury found a verdict for the defendant. The lessor of the plaintiff moved for anew trial for misdirection in the particular above stated, which was overruled, and a judgment given, from which he appealed.</p>

Appeal • from the Superior Court of Law of Lincoln County, at the Fall Term, 1847, his Honor Judge Pearson presiding. This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, commenced in the County Court of Lincoln, at the December Term, 1846 of which the defendant appeared and pleaded not guilty ; and afterwards, upon the trial of the issue, the defendant obtained a verdict and judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court.

<p>Jn trover for a slave, it appeared that the plaintifFhad had possession of the slave for more than three years, and that at the time she took possession she executed to the owner an obligation with the foiiowing condition, “that whereas the said Mary H. Smith hath this day received of said Houston a negro girl named Nell, which the said Smith is to have the entire service and peaceable possession of during her natural life for the sum of $350 to him in hand paid by the said Smith ; now if the said Smith shall keep the said negro and her issue (if any) in the County and State aforesaid and sufficiently clothe and feed them and humanely treat them during their time of service, and the said Smith or her executors shall before or at her death return said negro or negroes to said Houston,” <frc. Held, that the plaintiff had a title to tire slave and her issue during her life.</p>

This was an action of debt upon a judgment obtained by the'plaintiff against the defendant in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland District in the State of South Carolina. Plea, nul tiel record.

This was an action of debt upon a bond, executed by the defendant Long, on the 5th of August 1844, for the discharge of his official duties as sheriff of the County of Rowan, and by the other defendants as his sureties.

The action is for maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause arresting the plaintiff and holding him to bail on a warrant issued by a justice of the peace. Plea, not guilty. On the trial the case appeared to be this. The defendant sued out a warrant against the ‘plaintiff for a debt of $10 30, and required him to be held to bail thereon. On the 30th March 1846, the constable arrested the plaintiff and returned the warrant.

The defendant Walk was arrested under a capias ad satisfaciendum, at the instance of the plaintiff, and gave bond for his appearance at May Term of Rowan Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, where, upon the motion of his counsel, the execution was set aside, on the ground that it did not appear from the affidavit, that the defendant had no property which could be reached by a 'fieri facias.

This is action on a guarantee, alleged to be contained in a letter, addressed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The case is as follows.

The case is as follows. At the time the transaction took place, of which the plaintiff complains, he resided in the county of McDowell, and having gone into Gran-ville County, took with him a negro slave, his property, by the name of Reuben. When about to return home, Reuben complained of being unwell, and was left in the care of Dr. Robards until sufficiently recovered to travel.

The action is debt on a bond with condition, which, after reciting that the plaintiff had that day sold and conveyed to the defendant a tract of land, therein described, for the price of $448, 50 proceeds thus, “now,if the said Lee shall within two years from this date pay to the said Russell, the said sum of $448 59, and the said Russell, shall then convey the foregoing land to the said Lee, or if the said Lee shall not comply with the foregoing conditions within the said…

The action was assumpsit for money had and received, in which the plaintiff sought to recover the excess above the principal and lawful interest, paid by him upon a contract alleged to have been made between the plaintiff and the defendant’s intestate and to have been usurious. The pleas were, non assumpsit, and the statute of limitations.

This was an action of debt, brought at the instance of another relator, upon the same bond, which was sued upon in the case of the State upon the relation of John Hughes, decidedf at the December Term 1844, of this Court, and reported in 5 Ire. Rep. 203.