30 P.R.
Volume 30 — Puerto Rico Reports
331 opinions
- 30 P.R. 1Oyola v. Heirs of Andrade (1921)
<p>Appeal. — When the notice of appeal from a judgment of the district court rendered on appeal from a municipal court is filed after the expiration of the fifteen days allowed by section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended on March 9, 1905, the appeal will be dismissed.</p>
- 30 P.R. 3People v. Cabassa (1921)
<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Ponce in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 37 of the Excise-Tax Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 6Castillo v. Yager (1921)
<p>Damages — Pleading.—In order to recover damages it is neeessary to set forth i^ the complaint what damages were suffered by the plaintiff.</p>
- 30 P.R. 10People v. Villegas (1921)
<p>Evidence. — A certificate of the civil registrar to the effect that Francisco Villegas, de Jesús was a minor on November 2, 1920, does not prove that the defendant, Francisco de Jesús Villegas, was a minor on that day in the absence of evidence showing that the same person is meant.</p>
- 30 P.R. 11People v. Sánchez (1921)
<p>Municipal Ordinance — ’judicial Notice. — Municipal ordinances are not taken judicial notice of by this eourt; therefore, when the record brought up does not contain a transcript of the municipal ordinance referred to in the complaint, the eourt has no way of determining in what respect the ordinance was violated.</p>
- 30 P.R. 12Vázquez v. Registrar of San Juan (1921)
<p>Record op Title — Community Property — Civil Status. — When the record in the registry shows that the grantee of real property is married, subsequent records can not be made contradicting that civil status unless it be shown in proper proceedings that -the said grantee and the woman named in the reeord as his wife were single at the time of the acquisition, and it is not sufficient that they both make sueh a statement in a public instrument.</p>
- 30 P.R. 16Mato v. Banco Territorial y Agrícola (1921)
<p>Mortgage — Submortgage—Consent.—A voluntary mortgage lien may be sub-mortgaged, but the submortgage is subject to' the resolution of the original mortgage. The mortgagee need not obtain the mortgagor’s consent in order to submortgage his lien.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Payment—Cancelation.—When it is shown that a mortgage has been extinguished by the payment of the debt which it secured within the time fixed in the contract, a public instrument duly setting forth this fact is sufficient for the cancelation in the registry of the mortgage and the submort-gage created thereon to secure any obligation, although it were the issuance of mortgage bonds.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—-Damages.—The mortgagee having complied with all of his obligations and duly executed the deed of cancelation, if the registrar of property erroneously refuses to give effect to the instrument the mortgagee is not liable for such damages as the mortgagor may suffer thereby, especially when the mortgagor himself presented the instrument in the registry and did not appeal from the registrar’s decision.</p>
- 30 P.R. 20People v. Hernández (1921)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 61 of-the Excise-Tax Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 24People v. Buxó (1921)
<p>BREACH iof Peace — Intent.—In this ease while a Unionist political meeting was being held at night, the appellant and another came up on horseback bearing torches and displaying political insignia of other political parties and passed through the crowd without disturbance; but after a little while they returned and attempted to pass through a second time, whereby a commotion was produced in the assembly, an offense penalized by section 358 of the Penal Code. Held: That under such circumstances the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his act, which was what produced the breach of the peace, although the first hostile demonstration may have come from some one in the crowd.</p>
- 30 P.R. 26Banco Comercial v. District Judge of San Juan (1921)
PetitioN for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan in Receivership Proceedings. Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion. Tbe respondent did not appear.
- 30 P.R. 33Cádiz v. Jiménez (1921)
- 30 P.R. 37Cintrón v. Camps (1921)
- 30 P.R. 44People v. Burgos (1921)
<p>Fraudulent Registration — Evidence—Discretion of Court. — In this case the court below did not believe the statement of the defendant that he served nine months in jail for larceny, but gave credit to a certificate of the warden of the penitentiary tq the effect that he served one year in the penitentiary. Held: That as the defendant did not controvert the said certificate by presenting a copy of the judgment, the conclusion reached by the district court in its discretion was not erroneous.</p> <p>Id. — Electoral Franchise — Disfranchisement—Ex Post Facto Law. — As the right to vote is not a civil right, but a political privilege, a statute which disfranchises a voter for acts committed before its enactment is not an ex post facto law.</p>
- 30 P.R. 45Conde v. Falú (1921)
<p>Ejectment — Res Judicata. — When it ia finally adjudged in an action of ejectment that the property of 180 aeres sought to be recovered by the plaintiff from the defendant is the same property of 100 acres in the possession of the defendant, nothwithstanding the difference in area and an apparent discrepancy in the boundaries, the same plaintiff can not recover in another aetion of ejectment brought thereafter against the same defendant the alleged difference of 68.21 acres in the area because the aetion is defeated by the rule of res judicata, for if that action should prosper it would result that the property of 180 acres and that of 100 acres are different properties, contrary to what was adjudged in the first aetion, in which by reason of their very identity section 1473 of the Spanish Civil Code, equivalent to section 1376 of the Revised Civil Code, was applied.</p>
- 30 P.R. 55Cruz v. Heirs of Jiménez (1921)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Hiimacao in an Action for Nullity of Lease.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 65Lebrón v. Registrar of Guayama (1921)
<p>Possessory Title — Time ioe Possession — Evidence.—In a possessory title proceeding where the original petition avers that the petitioner acquired the property by inheritance from his father who had been dead for more than twenty years, possession for at least twenty years is sufficiently alleged; and one of the witnesses having testified that the petitioner had held the property since the death of his father when the witness, now fifty-eight years old, was very young; and another witness having testified that the petitioner had held the property for twenty or thirty years, their testimony was limited to that time of possession and it is necessary to conclude that the evidence and the petition comply with number 4 of subdivision 1 and paragraph 2 of subdivision 3 of section 391 of the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Id. — "Value of Property — Taxes.—It being alleged in the petition that the value of the property in question is $120, whieh is taxable under section 291 of the Political Code, the possessory title is not recordable if the appellant does not show that he pays the taxes on the property as owner.</p>
- 30 P.R. 68Muñoz v. Registrar of Caguas (1922)
<p>Community Property — Mortgage — Liquidation op Community. — A property being recorded as community property, a mortgage created by the widow on her undivided half interest therein is recordable, but the record must be made subject to the liquidation of the community.</p>
- 30 P.R. 70Toro v. Pizá Bros. (1922)
<p>Lease — Expiration iop Oontract — Tacit Renewal. — In this ease of a lease for no fixed period, the rent being payable monthly when due, the lessor informed the lessees on May 13 that the lease was to be considered as terminated from the 30th of the previous month of April, for which month the rent had been paid, and on May 16 brought an aetion of unlawful detainer against them. Held: 1st. That the lessor is not bound to grant the lessees upon the expiration of the contract a time within whieh to vacate the property. 2nd. That there is no tacit renewal for the reason that the aetion was brought on May 16; therefore it is not premature, for on the 13th of the said month the lessor informed the lessees that the contract, whieh had expired on April 30, had terminated, thus avoiding the tacit renewal.</p>
- 30 P.R. 74Nadal v. Registrar of San Germán (1922)
<p>Record of Title — -Acquiescence.—The right of the grantor under article 6 of the Mortgage Law to obtain the reeord of his contract can not be prejudiced by the fact that his grantee acquiesced in a previous decision of the registrar refusing to record it.</p>
- 30 P.R. 77Wys v. Municipal Council of Ponce (1922)
- 30 P.R. 80Wys v. Board of Awards of Ponce (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 82Martínez v. Registrar of Mayagüez (1922)
<p>Record of Title — Lease Contract — Authentic Document. — A private contract to which the Postmaster General of the United States of America is a party is not an authentic document that can be recorded in the registry of property, according to the Mortgage Law and its regulations.</p> <p>Id.' — Id.—Public Instrument. — Contracts for the lease of real property for more than six years should be made by public instruments.</p> <p>Id. — Id.-—Private Contract — -Affidavit.—Private contracts the signatures to which are authenticated by affidavit are not recordable in the registry of property.</p>
- 30 P.R. 84Alvarado v. Torres (1922)
<p>Ejectment — Double Sale — Contract.—It being proved that the defendant in an action of ejectment made an agreement to purchase the property in controversy, took possession thereof and paid a part of the price to the grantor prior to the sale of the property made by the latter to the plaintiff in a pub-lio deed, it is necessary to eonelude that the fact that the defendant has no written title does not preclude the holding that there was a double sale, for contracts are valid whatever the form in which they may be made; therefore the principle that the first in time is the first in law is applicable.</p>
- 30 P.R. 87Rosa v. Seise (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Debt.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 88Masa v. Registrar of Caguas (1922)
<p>Appear from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing to Record a Homestead Deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The respondent appeared by brief.</p>
- 30 P.R. 92Marín v. Acosta Quintero (1922)
<p>Certiorari — Discretion oe Court. — The granting of a writ of certiorari being highly discretional, a motion by an intervenor. for the discharge of the writ is also directed to the discretion of the court and will be sustained or overruled accordingly.</p> <p>Id. — Attachment—Surety.—It is not a sufficient ground for the discharge of a writ of certiorari issued at the instance of a surety who jointly and severally with another gave bond for the release of an attachment levied to secure the effectiveness of a judgment, that the petition for the writ was not made by both sureties, when it appears that only property of the petitioner was attached and all the facts induce the belief that he was the only person interested in the question raised.</p> <p>Id. — -Although a writ of certiorari to correct errors of procedure should be directed to the lower court, the fact that this practice has not been followed here is not a sufficient reason for discharging the writ returned by the court to which it should have been expressly directed. It will be sufficient simply to correct the title.</p>
- 30 P.R. 98Pérez Bros. v. Arenas (1922)
<p>Correction op Record — Appeal.—The errors which may be corrected in the Supreme Court in accordance with Rules 55 and 56 are those which may have been made in copying and are evident, or those which consist in the omission of a part of the original statement or bill approved, or of the general documents which form a part of the judgment-roll, or of some other independent document duly authenticated as proper or necessary for the appeal; but these Rules do not authorize the striking out of evidence which was included in the statement of the case prepared by the appellants without objection by the adverse party and certified to by the trial judge as correct. '</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The general rule is that a statement of the case on appeal can not be amended or 'changed in the appellate court, because that court should receive and act on the settled ease as it comes from the court below, as importing absolute verity. But the court may allow a reasonable time in which to apply to the lower court for a correction. In some jurisdictions if either party feels prejudiced by reason of matters either inserted in or omitted from the statement of the c&se as settled by the trial judge, he may move the Supreme Court to establish a proper statement in regard to such matters.</p>
- 30 P.R. 101People v. Souffront (1922)
<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of San Juan in a ■ Prosecution for Assault with Intent to Kill.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 104Gandía v. Stubbe (1922)
<p>Cd~TIA-D~oth~WI'o~ `oi' O&ii~.-~ih aaditibn h~ ~he è~u~es dpress1yteeited.~ b~statütt~ ~t1~ç ,courts 1iav~ in1ie~e~t á%ltI1Q~ity to' cQi,t~I~ ~ tTial, ~O]~ othe± causes which in th~ exercise of their discretion tl~ey may deem sufficient., The• s~idd~ii mid dan~e~oud ~i11n~ess'of `meMbe]~ b~'~hd fmi~i1~r ~ ~th~ attoine~ ~or o~ of the paities i~ a just cause f~r a~continiiiuice, biil~ the .neoes'sary ~teps should be tak~n~ to ~13~e~ t~ho adverse, party a~ 1itt1~ ii~conv~i,q~,</p>
- 30 P.R. 109People v. Ríos (1922)
<p>Appeal ftom thé District Court’ of Aguadillk' in a Prosecution for Violation of Section 61 of the Excise-Tax Law.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 113People v. Méndez (1922)
<p>Assault and Battery — Evidence.—In a prosecution for assault and battery the admission of evidence regarding the physical condition of the prosecuting -witness at the time of the trial in connection with the injuries received is not prejudicial error.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The admission of evidence regarding facts alleged in the complaint and not objected to by the defendant can not be considered prejudicial error.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Nonsuit—Discretion oe Court. — Courts have discretional power to reopen a case and allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence after a motion for nonsuit has been made.</p>
- 30 P.R. 115Delgado v. Díaz (1922)
<p>Appeal — Evidente.—When by stipulation the trial court had before it only the testimony of witnesses transcribed from another case and not the witnesses themselves, the Supreme Court, is in the same situation to weigh the facts as was the court below.</p> <p>Negligence — Automobile—Excessive Speed. — When a pedestrian appears on the road in front of an automobile it is the duty of the driver to have the car under such control as the circumstances may require and he has no right to rely on his ability to get by.</p> <p>Id. — Damages.—It being proved that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the chauffeur and that the boy would be more or less incapable of steady work on account of the injury of his leg, a judgment for $3,000 with costs and attorney fees is reasonable.</p>
- 30 P.R. 117Schluter v. Fernández (1922)
<p>Commercial Transactions — Damage to Merchandise. — The plaintiff sold to the defendant several tierces of hams and when the purchaser took possession of the merchandise and proceeded to sell it he found that many of the hams were rotten, for which reason he refused to pay for the merchandise within the time agreed upon. It was shown that the vendor did not know that the hams were rotten at the time of the sale, if they were, but only knew that they were old and this fact was considered in fixing the .price. The purchaser admitted that He made use of at least twenty per cent of the hams. Under these circumstances it was held that the district court did not err in sustaining the complaint on the authority of section 333 of the Code of Commerce.</p>
- 30 P.R. 122Wiscovich v. Registrar of San Germán (1922)
<p>Record oe Title — Possessory Title. — Owners without written recordable titles may avail themselves of the proceedings prescribed by article 390 of the Mortgage Law in order to record their rights in the registry.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Contradictory Record. — When the possession or ownership of a property is recorded in the registry in the name of a person other than the actual owner, who finds it is impossible, difficult or expensive to obtain a, written recordable title from such person, the said owner may avail himself of the means supplied by article 390 of the Mortgage Law, and in such a case the proceedings established by article 393 of the Mortgage Law must be followed from the beginning.</p> <p>Id. — Id.'—Taxes.—Although there may be a discrexiancy between tne facts recited in a certificate issued by the Treasurer as to the payment of taxes and the faets that must be proved according to law, if other evidence introduced explains such discrepancy satisfactorily a record of the title in the registiy should not be refused on that ground.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—In the case referred to in article 393 of the Mortgage Law, whether the judgment is returned to the court after the registrar has found a contradictory record, or whether the contradiction is established from the beginning, the person in whose name the contradictory record appears should be summoned personally, or, if dead, his heirs. When it can not be ascertained who the heirs are in order to summon them personally, they should be summoned by publication. That requirement ivas not complied with in this case and for that reason the registrar’s decision refusing to record the title is affirmed.</p>
- 30 P.R. 129Martínez v. Municipal Judge of Mayagüez (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 131Crédito y Ahorro Ponceño v. Registrar of San Juan (1922)
<p>Record oe Title — Mortgage — Distribution — Liability — Subsidiary Mortgage — Cancelation.—Alter having agreed upon the amount for -which each of the mortgaged properties should respond in order to secure a certain debt, the parties agreed that each and all of the mortgaged properties should respond for the whole liability of the mortgagor' to the mortgagee, and that the lien created on the several properties should not be canceled partially until the whole of the debt and interest thereon had been paid. Held: That the contract is not recordable because the said additional agreement is contrary to> article 119 of the Mortgage Law, to article 164 of the Mortgage Law Regulations and to the rule laid down by this court in the case of Ortiz v. Registrar, 16 P. R. R. 643.</p>
- 30 P.R. 135Alvarez v. Suárez (1922)
<p>Inheritance — Special Bequest — Conditional Bequest. — In this ease the testator made a special bequest in favor of one of three children named on the condition that after the testator's death the one designated by agreement between them or by lot should live in the family residence. Seld: That living in the family residence was the essential condition of the special bequest and the designation of the favored one by agreement or by lot a mere incident thereof; therefore, another heir without a special bequest having proved failure to comply with the condition, an action for the annulment of the special bequest can be maintained even in the absence of evidence to support the allegation that there had been no agreement or drawing of lots.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—When the heir favored by a conditional special bequest does not comply with the condition within a reasonable time according to the circumstances of the cáse, counting from the time when he had knowledge of the condition and of the death of the testator, the special bequest should be considered void.</p>
- 30 P.R. 142Mestre v. Michelena (1922)
<p>Foreclosure— Ees JudicatA' — Estoppel.—While a foreclosure proceeding was pending the defendants therein brought an action principally for the annulment of the mortgage and prayed in the complaint, among other things, for the annulment of the foreclosure proceeding. Seld: That a new action by the mortgagors for the annulment of the said foreclosure proceedings being one between the same parties or their successors in interest, if not barred by the rule of res judicata is barred at least by the general rule of estoppel.</p> <p>Id. — Summons.—In order that the summons to a mortgagor may be served on the person in charge of the property, in accordance with article 171 of the Mortgage Law Eegulations, it is sufficient that the owner does not reside in the municipality where the property is situated, and it is not necessary that the owner’s residence be unknown.</p> <p>Id. — Limitation—Contract.-—If a deed of sale executed in a foreclosure proceeding is not void, but voidable, it is a contract, and an action for its annulment is barred after four years, in accordance with section 1268 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id.' — Prescription—Nonresident.—The nonresidence to which section 1859 of the Civil Code refers in connection with the different periods of possession necessary for acquiring ownership by prescription, is not the nonresidence of the holder but that of the owner.</p> <p>Id. — Third Person. — The facts show that the principal defendant had the character of a third person.</p>
- 30 P.R. 151Medina v. Heirs of Bird (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action of Filiation.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 156Madera v. Campillo (1922)
<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan in an Attachment Proceeding.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 158Swiggett v. Colmore (1922)
<p>Agency —■ Prohibition — Conduct oip Agent. — The rule laid down in Silva Brothers 4" Co. v. Registrar of San Juan, 28 P. E. E. 164, that "although an agent cannot acquire the property of his principal, this prohibition is to be construed strictly and if the principal himself sells the property to the agent the agency is understood to be revoked and the prohibition does not apply," is not absolute. The conduct of the agent is a decisive factor and if it can be concluded that he took advantage of the information obtained by him during the agency and procured its termination in order to profit personally on that information, without giving his principal the benefit oit, his action should not be recognized by the courts as a lawful source of right.</p>
- 30 P.R. 169González v. Fajardo Development Co. (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Hnmacao in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 178People v. Collado (1922)
<p>False Personation — Falsity—Intent.—Falsity is an element of the crime of false personation and the theory that personation can only be done by word of mouth is inadmissible. The wrongful intent may be manifested not only by word of mouth, but also in writing, or by gestures or attitude.</p>
- 30 P.R. 182People v. Collado (1922)
- 30 P.R. 183Gandía v. Stubbe (1922)
<p>Appeal — Attachment.—An appeal having been taken from an order overruling a motion for an attachment based on a judgment rendered in a certain aetion and thereafter reversed, it would be futile to consider the appellant’s right because the basis of his claim was destroyed.</p>
- 30 P.R. 184Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (1922)
<p>ÍJnlawful Detainer — Claim of Adverse Title. — The decisions of this court ' indicate that to a certain extent where a defendant is in possession under a genuine claim of title a court will not render judgment in unlawful de-tainer, but send the plaintiff to try his title in other ways. But this court has never held that a mere claim of title, without more, would defeat the possessory action of the plaintiff. On the contrary, the general tendency of its decisions is that there must be such a demonstration of possession under an adverse claim of title that would convince the trial court that there was a real issue of title between the parties.</p>
- 30 P.R. 186Hernández v. Registrar of San Juan (1922)
<p>Record op Title — Tax Sale — Executor—Notice.—Notice of a tax sals directed to the heir of the executor and not to the members of the succession is insufficient, and a certificate of sale under these circumstances is not recordable in the registry.</p> <p>Id.' — Id.'—Id.—Id.'—Quaere: Whether the property of a testator should ever be recorded in the name of the executor; whether a notiee of sale- to the executor is sufficient.</p>
- 30 P.R. 188Compañía Azucarera del Toa v. Galan (1922)
<p>Costs — Judgment—Appeal.-—An appeal from an order approving a memorandum of costs will be dismissed when the record contains no copy of the judgment on which the memorandum of costs and its approval were based.</p>
- 30 P.R. 192Morales v. District Court of Humacao (1922)
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Humacao in a Proceeding for Designation of Heirs. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondent did not appear.
- 30 P.R. 193Rodríguez v. Molero (1922)
<p>Contract — Purchase and Sale — Defects in Vendor’s Title — Specific Performance. — Where the evidence shows that the contract of purchase and gale was entered into, the faet that the grantor’s title contained defects of which the grantee had knowledge when the contract was made will not affect the former’s right to demand specific performance.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Deferred Payment — Mortgage—Consent of Wife. — It being proved that with the consent of his wife the grantee bound himself to give a mortgage on the property purchased to secure the deferred part of the purchase price, if he can not create the mortgage on account of his wife’s refusal to join in it the grantor is entitled to recover the whole purchase price.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Interest—Products.—It is presumed that the products of a property which the grantor was compelled to take charge of because of its abandonment by the grantee before paying the purchase price, are sufficient to compensate the grantor for any loss of interest which he may have suffered.</p>
- 30 P.R. 202American Railroad Co. v. Treasurer (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Refund of Taxes Paid under Protest.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 204Ramírez v. Ramírez (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in an Action for Provisional Support.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 207Mercado v. Rosado (1922)
<p>Ejectment — Mesne Profits — Pleading.'—An action for fruits and profits begun by a sole heir after the death of the ancestor and claiming therein the fruits in her own name covering a period in the lifetime of the ancestor, will lie, as all the rights and actions of the ancestor descend or pass over to the heir.</p> <p>Id.- — Id.—Id.—The count sufficiently described the fruits and profits when it alleged that the defendants had appropriated all of the products of a coconut and fruit grove for three years, valued at $150.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—It being alleged that the complainant and her husband had bought the property in question and that her husband had died intestate and without heirs, it sufficiently appeared that the complainant was the owner of all the property and no specification of the share she held in her own. name was necessary, nor how much she inherited.</p>
- 30 P.R. 209Tardi v. Tardi (1922)
<p>Designation of Heirs — Pleading — Amendment — Discretion of Court. — An amendment to a petition for a designation of heirs allowed by the court at the trial is no ground for reversal unless it is shown that the court abused its discretion.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.—In this case it was held that considered in the light of the principles laid down in MX parte Otero et at., 27 P. R. R. 315, the evidence was sufficient.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Jurisdiction.—It can not be concluded that a judgment in pro-ceodings for a designation of lieirs ivas entered without jnrisdietion because it was not rendered within six days after the trial, as required by section 20 of the Law of Special Legal Proceedings, for that is a directive provision and does not affect the jurisdiction.</p>
- 30 P.R. 216Capital Merchandise Co. v. Geraldino (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in an Action of Debt. — Motion for Dismissal of the Appeal.</p> <p>Tlie 'facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 219People v. De Jesús (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in a Prosecution for Rape.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 220Serrallés v. Treasurer (1922)
<p>Taxes — Refund of Taxes- — Action Against The People of Porto Rico — Bond. — Act No. 76 of 1916 authorizes actions against The People of Porto Rico as prescribed therein and although an action for the refund of taxes may be considered an action against The People of Porto Rico, section 4 of Act No. 76 of 1916 perhaps being applicable, nevertheless when the action is brought exclusively under Act No. 80 of 1919 compliance with the requirements of that Act, which does not require a bond, will be sufficient.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Pleading.—The fact that in the complaint in an action brought under section 66 of Act No. 80 of 1919 for the refund of taxes it is not alleged that the plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the Board of Review and Equali-nation, or that he paid the taxes under protest, does not warrant the conclusion that the complaint does not show a cause of action, for in such a case it is not necessary to appeal to the board or to pay under protest.</p>
- 30 P.R. 225Newman v. Benedicto (1922)
- 30 P.R. 225Serrallés v. Benedicto (1922)
- 30 P.R. 226Fernández v. Registrar of San Juan (1922)
<p>Appeal — Interest.—An administrative appeal will be dismissed when the decision of the registrar does not prejudice the appellant.</p>
- 30 P.R. 227Betancourt v. Board of Awards of Río Grande (1922)
<p>Mandamus — Costs—Temerity.—A municipal board of awards appealed from a judgment for costs in this ease, in which after both parties had rested the said board agreed to comply with a conditional writ of mandamus issued at the instance of a bidder who alleged in his petition for the writ that he had customarily taken part in the auctions until the defendant denied his right to make bids. Held: That the temerity of the respondent justified the judgment for costs and that consequently it was not necessary to allege that demand had been previously made upon the board to admit the bids of the petitioner.</p>
- 30 P.R. 229Bonilla v. Santiago (1922)
<p>Attachment — Bond—Authentic Document — Affidavit.—In this case the notary endorsed the following on a promissory note: “Affidavit No. 852. I certify that on this day, July 21, 1919, Angel Santiago, resident of San Juan, manufacturer, widower, personally known to me, declared that he owes to Juan Bonilla the sum of five hundred dollars ($500) and interest thereon, which he set forth in this note on June 26, last; and Manuel Ledesma declared before me and witness Eleuterio Vázquez that he made this document by order of Angel Santiago. To which I attest in San Juan on July 21, 1919. (Signed) Carlos V. Urrutia, Notary Public.” Held: That the declaration of the debtor is not the kind of affidavit referred to in section 3 of the Act of March 12, 1903, but an acknowledgment whieh converts the obligation into an authentic one and, gives the creditor the right to an attachment without giving bond.</p>
- 30 P.R. 231People v. Rivera (1922)
<p>OoneessioN — Instruction to Jury. — When there is a substantial conflict in the evidence, while the voluntary character of a confession must first be decided by the court, the question of whether such a confession was voluntary or not should be left to the jury, especially if an instruction on the point is requested. Without such a request the court may silently leave the question of voluntariness to the jury.</p>
- 30 P.R. 235Pitre v. Estrella (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Annulment of Contract.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 241People ex rel. Salgado v. López (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in Quo Warranto Proceedings. — Memorandum of Costs.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 243Gandía v. Porto Rico Fertilizer Co. (1922)
<p>Appeal — Attachment—Jurisdiction.—A district court has authority to grant an attachment after an appeal has been taken from the judgment.</p>
- 30 P.R. 248In re Tormes (1922)
<p>Attorney — Disbarment.—Generally legislatures enaet laws specifying the causes for disbarment of attorneys and the proceeding to be followed in such cases, but these laws do not restrict the general powers of courts over attorneys who, as its officers, may be disbarred for other causes than those specified in the law.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The opinion discusses and determines the scope of our disbarment law and concludes that it is broad enough to include any imaginable just cause.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—The general rule is that the Supreme Court will not interfere for the purpose of judging the' conduct of attorneys in the original investigation of criminal acts committed by them without relation to the practice of their profession. But if the matter is duly brought before the Supreme Court and the crime involves moral turpitude, it may take immediate independent action if it seems that justice so demands.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Intent.—The charges of the complaint demurred to not being clear as to the intent of the respondent, the demurrer was sustained with leave to amend.</p>
- 30 P.R. 255Sosa v. Cardona (1922)
<p>Stolen Goods — Public Store — Evidence.—It being alleged in the complaint that the article claimed as belonging to the plaintiff was seized because of a criminal action brought against his vendor for the theft of the said arti- - cle, in order that the plaintiff may recover the article after the theft is proved it is necessary, according to section 466 of the Civil Code and subdivision 2 of article 85 of the Code of Commerce, for him to prove that he purchased the article in a shop or store open to the public.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Pleading.—It appearing from the evidence of the plaintiff that the article claimed was seized as stolen goods and although the defendant only made a general denial of the allegations of the complaint, the evidence of the defendant regarding the theft and the identification of the article can not be considered as affirmative evidence of faets not alleged by the defendant.</p> <p>Evidence — Impeachment — Cross-examination. — For the purpose of impeaching a witness the defendant may cross-examine him about his family relationship with the plaintiff and may introduce in evidence an affidavit in which the witness had made contrary statements previously.</p>
- 30 P.R. 262Matanzo v. Vizcarrondo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 264People v. Concepción (1922)
- 30 P.R. 266Hernández v. Standard Milling Co. (1922)
<p>Principal and Agent — Estoppel — Commission Merchant. — In this case the defendant corporation, the Standard Milling Company, had designated the plaintiffs as its agents and shipped its goods to them under the name of the Houston Eice Company. On- appeal from a judgment against the defendant for commissions on sales of rice of the Houston Eice Company it was held: Thaj; as the evidence showed that hy its act the defendant induced the plaintiffs to believe that they were doing business with the defendant and not with the Houston Eice Company, the defendant is estopped from denying its liability and is, therefore, under obligation to pay the commissions.</p>
- 30 P.R. 268Dumont v. Registrar of Guayama (1922)
<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property Ee-fusing to Eecord a Dominion Title.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p> <p>Tbe respondent appeared by brief.</p>
- 30 P.R. 271People v. Morales (1922)
- 30 P.R. 273People v. Lecompte (1922)
<p>Appeal — Assignment oe Errors. — The judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and it is the duty of the appellant, not of this tribunal, to discover and establish the existence of any more, or less technical error that might constitute a possible ground for reversal.</p>
- 30 P.R. 274People v. Rodríguez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 276Alonso Riera & Co. v. Campillo (1922)
Petition for a Writ of Prohibition against the Judge of the First District Court of San Juan. The facts are stated in the opinion. The respondents did not appear.
- 30 P.R. 285Loíza Sugar Co. v. Calderón (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Acknowledgment of Servitude.</p> <p>The facts are stated in. the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 288Coira v. Registrar of Caguas (1922)
<p>Appeap from a Decision of the Registrar of Property Refusing’ to Transfer the Record of a Property to a different Registry.</p> <p>Record op Title — T-Ieirs.—Persons who in the character of heirs execute a public deed for the purpose of obtaining an entry in the registry in connection with a property of their ancestor must show such character either in the deed itself or in an independent document.</p> <p>Id. — Survey.—A certificate of survey of a certain part of the boundary lino between two municipalities presented to the registrar together with a deed for the purpose, of transferring tho record of a property from one registry to another, without anything to show' a connection between the survey and the property in question except the mere statement of the parties to the deed, is not sufficient.</p> <p>Id. — Copy up Deed — Signature and Seal up Notary. — A copy of a deed presented in the registry must show- clearly that the original was signed, marked and sealed by the notary.</p>
- 30 P.R. 291New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co. v. Porto Rico Fruit Union (1922)
- 30 P.R. 295People v. Rodríguez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 297González v. Hernández (1922)
- 30 P.R. 299Delgado v. Acevedo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 302People v. Rodríguez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 304People v. Otero (1922)
- 30 P.R. 306Juncos Central Co. v. Del Toro (1922)
- 30 P.R. 308Creswell v. Porto Rican Express Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 310Torres v. Mattei (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce in Proceedings for Authorization of Court.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 314Léctora v. Municipal Assembly of Guayama (1922)
<p>Taxes — Municipal Ordinance — Appropriation.—A municipal ordinance imposing an additional tax and fixing its rate for the jrarpose of constructing certain public- works and improvements, is not necessarily void because it does not specify the items and the department for which the appropriation' is made. This requirement of section 61 of the Municipal Law of 1919 should be complied with after the special tax is collected and the proceeds are appropriated by an ordinance.</p>
- 30 P.R. 317López v. Quiñones (1922)
<p>Summons — Service—Return.—When a summons is not served by the marshal because the deputy marshal who serves it does not sign the return in the name of the marshal, and it is not stated in a sworn return that the server is not a party to the action and, is more than eighteen years of age, the service is void.</p> <p>Id. — Td.—Id.—In this case, following the signature of the server to thb return are the words: “Over eighteen years.” Held: That as that statement was not made in the body of the return it can not be considered a part of it.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Id.—Evidence.—When the return does not show that the person who served the summons was not a party to the aetion and was over eighteen years of age, the burden of proving these facts is on the defendants in the aetion for annulment.</p> <p>Id. — Id.—Jurisdiction'—Prescription—Good Eaith. — The good faith necessary to acquire ownership by ordinary prescription can not be pleaded by one to whom the property was sold in execution of a judgment in an aetion in which the court did not acquire jurisdiction of the defendants because the service of the summons ivas void.</p> <p>Mortgage — Counter-claim.—In an action to annul the judgment entered in another previous action in which these defendants were plaintiffs and these plaintiffs were defendants, to recover the deferred part of the purchase price of a property secured by a mortgage on.the same property, a counter-claim by these defendants for various instalments of the mortgage can be maintained.</p> <p>Costs ■ — ■ Temerity. — When the facts do not show temerity on the part of the defendants the costs should not. be imposed upon them.</p>
- 30 P.R. 332Carlo v. Registrar of Arecibo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 334People v. Velázquez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 336Sandoval v. Registrar of Guayama (1922)
- 30 P.R. 340People v. Ruiz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 342People v. Hernández (1922)
- 30 P.R. 344Forés v. Balzac (1922)
- 30 P.R. 346Gandía v. Porto Rico Fertilizer Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 352Cividanes v. A. Hartman & Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 354People v. Montalvo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 356People v. Echeandía (1922)
- 30 P.R. 358González v. Council of Administration (1922)
- 30 P.R. 368In re Casablanca (1922)
- 30 P.R. 376People v. Delgado (1922)
- 30 P.R. 382Berríos v. Municipal Assembly of Yabucoa (1922)
- 30 P.R. 387Marín v. Acosta (1922)
- 30 P.R. 390Successors of Fantauzzi v. Municipal Assembly of Arroyo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 413Central Victoria, Ltd. v. Pérez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 416Mayagüez Show Co. v. Municipality of Mayagüez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 420García v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 422Alcaide v. Alcaide (1922)
- 30 P.R. 424People v. Cartagena (1922)
- 30 P.R. 426Matos v. Quidgley (1922)
- 30 P.R. 429People v. Colón (1922)
- 30 P.R. 434Borrás, Muñoz & Co. v. Matta (1922)
- 30 P.R. 439Pabón v. Municipal Judge of Juana Díaz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 443People v. Concepción (1922)
- 30 P.R. 447Delgado v. Registrar of San Juan (1922)
- 30 P.R. 452People v. Miranda (1922)
- 30 P.R. 454García v. Municipal Assembly of Cayey (1922)
- 30 P.R. 460Rodríguez v. Registrar of San Juan (1922)
- 30 P.R. 462Rodríguez v. Registrar of San Juan (1922)
- 30 P.R. 463Sampol v. Heirs of Colón (1922)
- 30 P.R. 464Marxuach v. Tous Torres (1922)
- 30 P.R. 468García v. Registrar of San Juan (1922)
- 30 P.R. 474People v. Vargas (1922)
- 30 P.R. 476Díaz v. Rosado (1922)
- 30 P.R. 491People v. Ocasio (1922)
- 30 P.R. 496Peraza v. Registrar of Arecibo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 499Empresa Teatral Ponceña v. Municipality of Ponce (1922)
- 30 P.R. 501Toro v. District Court of San Juan (1922)
- 30 P.R. 515Marrero v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 516Wilson v. District Court of San Juan (1922)
- 30 P.R. 520People v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 523Ex parte Rivera v. People (1922)
- 30 P.R. 524Bravo v. Miranda (1922)
- 30 P.R. 526Municipality of Aguadilla v. American Railroad Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 528Pirazzi v. Vives (1922)
- 30 P.R. 533Yabucoa Sugar Co. v. Registrar of Humacao (1922)
- 30 P.R. 537Gandía v. Porto Rico Fertilizer Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 539Bernal Estate v. Registrar of San Germán (1922)
- 30 P.R. 542Flores v. People (1922)
- 30 P.R. 545Maceira v. Pietri (1922)
- 30 P.R. 548People v. Quiñones (1922)
- 30 P.R. 550King v. Fernández (1922)
- 30 P.R. 563Goico v. Rodríguez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 567G. H. Hammond Co. v. Diego Agüeros & Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 574Ramírez v. Ramírez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 582Jiménez v. Reily (1922)
- 30 P.R. 679People v. Lanausse (1922)
- 30 P.R. 687Gandía v. Stubbe (1922)
- 30 P.R. 689People v. Pérez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 693Batle v. Registrar of Arecibo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 699Cabrera v. Muñiz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 702Just v. Just (1922)
- 30 P.R. 705Solá v. Solá (1922)
- 30 P.R. 712Ex parte Chabert (1922)
- 30 P.R. 715People v. Pietrantoni (1922)
- 30 P.R. 718Kórber & Co. v. Colón (1922)
- 30 P.R. 719People v. Hernández (1922)
- 30 P.R. 723Torres v. Capestani (1922)
- 30 P.R. 730Aponte v. Registrar of Caguas (1922)
- 30 P.R. 739People v. Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 746Escalera v. Escalera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 749López v. Insular Police Commission (1922)
- 30 P.R. 753Olmedo v. Ortiz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 755People v. Peña (1922)
- 30 P.R. 760Nieves v. Foote (1922)
- 30 P.R. 763Municipality of Naguabo v. Registrar of Humacao (1922)
- 30 P.R. 765González v. González (1922)
- 30 P.R. 768Goffinet v. Polanco (1922)
- 30 P.R. 777Veguilla v. Registrar of Guayama (1922)
- 30 P.R. 779Veve v. District Court of Humacao (1922)
- 30 P.R. 782People v. Avilés (1922)
- 30 P.R. 784Morales v. Heirs of Cerame (1922)
- 30 P.R. 786Hernández v. Algarín (1922)
- 30 P.R. 791Rivera v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 793Cruz v. Heirs of Jiménez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 798Gandía v. Porto Rico Fertilizer Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 800Arguinzonis v. Registrar of Guayama (1922)
- 30 P.R. 801Compañía Azucarera del Toa v. Galán (1922)
- 30 P.R. 803Franco v. Martínez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 807Gonzalo v. Jiménez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 810Successors of Abarca v. Nones (1922)
- 30 P.R. 815Rivera v. Registrar of Arecibo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 817People ex rel. Jusino v. Dávila (1922)
- 30 P.R. 821Polanco v. Goffinet (1922)
- 30 P.R. 826In re Tormes (1922)
- 30 P.R. 837Municipality of Aguadilla v. American Railroad Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 840Irizarry v. Rodríguez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 844People v. Martínez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 848Ex parte Morales (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao in Proceedings for Designation of Heirs.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 858Ríos v. Menéndez (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama in an Action for the Annulment of a Deed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 860Paz v. Bonet (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez in an Action for Damages.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 867Acosta v. Dávila (1922)
<p>Ejectment — Evidence — Prescription. — When in an action of ejectment tlie plaintiff fails to prove liis title of ownership and, on the other hand, the defendant proves possession by himself and his predecessors in interest for more than thirty-six years, a period sufficient for acquiring ownership even without good faith or a colorable title, the complaint should be dismissed.</p>
- 30 P.R. 869Rodríguez v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. (1922)
<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan in an Action for Damages. — Motion to Strike out the Transcript of the Evidence.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 30 P.R. 873People v. District Court of San Juan (1922)
- 30 P.R. 878People v. Arrillaga (1922)
- 30 P.R. 887People v. Arrillaga (1922)
- 30 P.R. 889People v. Arrillaga (1922)
- 30 P.R. 903Gandía v. Trias (1921)
- 30 P.R. 903People v. Lizardi (1921)
- 30 P.R. 904Alvarez v. District Court of Guayama (1922)
- 30 P.R. 904Loiza Sugar Co. v. Baquero & Co. (1921)
- 30 P.R. 904Ex parte García (1922)
- 30 P.R. 905Berríos v. López (1922)
- 30 P.R. 905Gaztambide v. Flores (1922)
- 30 P.R. 905Suarez v. Morales (1922)
<p>Injunction to Recover Possession.</p>
- 30 P.R. 906People v. Morett (1922)
- 30 P.R. 906People v. Andino (1922)
- 30 P.R. 907Successors of Lamadrid v. Saenz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 907People v. Escobar (1922)
- 30 P.R. 908Alvarez v. Díaz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 908Crespo v. Porto Rican & American Insurance (1922)
- 30 P.R. 909Berríos v. Municipal Assembly of Yabucoa (1922)
- 30 P.R. 909Hernández v. Hernández (1922)
- 30 P.R. 910Ayala v. Fernández (1922)
- 30 P.R. 911Blanco v. Saul (1921)
- 30 P.R. 911People v. Dávila (1921)
- 30 P.R. 911People v. Rivera (1921)
- 30 P.R. 911People v. Santiago (1921)
- 30 P.R. 911People v. Zayas (1921)
- 30 P.R. 911Suárez v. Heirs of Cortés (1921)
- 30 P.R. 912People v. Ochoa (1921)
- 30 P.R. 912People v. Pepín (1921)
- 30 P.R. 912People v. Santiago (1921)
- 30 P.R. 912People v. Torres (1921)
- 30 P.R. 912People v. Cora (1921)
- 30 P.R. 912People v. Millán (1921)
- 30 P.R. 912People v. Rivera (1921)
- 30 P.R. 913People v. Laboy (1921)
- 30 P.R. 913Flores v. Reyes (1921)
- 30 P.R. 913Landrón v. Nevárez (1921)
- 30 P.R. 913Marengo v. Yambó (1921)
- 30 P.R. 913People v. Viera (1921)
- 30 P.R. 913People v. Fontánez (1921)
- 30 P.R. 913People v. Compañía Mercantil Arroyana (1921)
- 30 P.R. 914Llorens v. Galarza (1921)
- 30 P.R. 915People v. Jiménez (1921)
- 30 P.R. 915People v. Pérez (1921)
- 30 P.R. 915People v. Rodríguez (1921)
- 30 P.R. 915People v. Salazar (1921)
- 30 P.R. 915People v. Caballero (1921)
- 30 P.R. 915People v. Cintrón (1921)
- 30 P.R. 915People v. Ramos (1921)
- 30 P.R. 916People v. Nevárez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 917Honoré v. Toro (1922)
- 30 P.R. 917People v. Cruz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 917People v. Lebrón (1922)
- 30 P.R. 917People v. Martínez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 917Tous v. Rodríguez Serra (1922)
- 30 P.R. 917People v. Montañéz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 917People v. Santiago (1922)
- 30 P.R. 918People v. Pérez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 919Ex parte Peña v. People (1922)
- 30 P.R. 919Ochoa v. González Clemente (1922)
- 30 P.R. 919People v. Laguer (1922)
- 30 P.R. 919People v. Ortiz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 919People v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 919People v. Meléndez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 919People v. Stuart (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920People v. Roca (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920People v. Sánchez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920People v. Soto (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920People v. Torres (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920People v. González (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920People v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920Rivera v. Ponce Railway & Light Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 920Rojas v. Texas Oil Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921González v. Acosta Quintero (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921People v. Cedeño (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921People v. Sánchez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921Aguirre v. Gasco (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921Alvarez v. Jiménez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921People v. García (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921People v. Meléndez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 921Planas v. Rubio (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922Hernández v. Sanders (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922People v. Báez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922People v. Plácido (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922Pérez v. Nogueras (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922Cepero v. Zavala (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922People v. López (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922People v. Ongay (1922)
- 30 P.R. 922People v. Oquendo (1922)
- 30 P.R. 923People v. Lebrón (1922)
- 30 P.R. 924Erle Sumersille v. Santiago (1922)
- 30 P.R. 924Honoré v. Toro (1922)
- 30 P.R. 925Ex parte Aranzamendía v. People (1922)
- 30 P.R. 925Ex parte Rivera v. People (1922)
- 30 P.R. 925Vázquez v. Padró (1922)
- 30 P.R. 925People v. Irizarry (1922)
- 30 P.R. 925People v. Vega (1922)
- 30 P.R. 925People v. Laborde (1922)
- 30 P.R. 925Ruiz v. Ruiz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 926Busigó v. Padró (1922)
- 30 P.R. 926People v. Flores (1922)
- 30 P.R. 926People v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 926People v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 926People v. Matos (1922)
- 30 P.R. 926People v. Díaz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 926People v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 927Gratiot v. Hagen (1922)
- 30 P.R. 927People v. Ramos (1922)
- 30 P.R. 927People v. Rodríguez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 927Succs. of Ortega v. González Padín & Co. (1922)
- 30 P.R. 927People v. Llorens (1922)
- 30 P.R. 927People v. Pérez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 927Coll v. Gandía (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928Berríos v. López (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928Centeno v. Díaz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928Morales v. Rosado (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928Torruella v. Mata (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928Forteza v. Doe (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928People v. Petterson (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928People v. Rivera (1922)
- 30 P.R. 928People v. Vayanilla (1922)
- 30 P.R. 929Ex parte Figueras v. People (1922)
- 30 P.R. 929Llompart v. Díaz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 930People v. Guasp (1922)
- 30 P.R. 931People v. Groenveldt (1922)
- 30 P.R. 932Torres v. Municipal Assembly of Guayama (1922)
- 30 P.R. 932Ruiz v. Ruiz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 933People v. Nieves (1922)
- 30 P.R. 933Ramos v. García (1922)
- 30 P.R. 933Berríos v. Municipality of Yabucoa (1922)
- 30 P.R. 933Fresno v. Pérez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 933People v. Cruz (1922)
- 30 P.R. 933People v. Rodríguez (1922)
- 30 P.R. 934Attorney General v. Foote (1922)
- 30 P.R. 934Gratiot v. Hagen (1922)
- 30 P.R. 934Torres v. Caballero (1922)
- 30 P.R. 934People v. Ortiz (1922)