Volume 30 — Tennessee Reports

This bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Nashville. It was tried, on bill and demurrer thereto, by the presiding chancellor, Cahal. It was dismissed.

<p>This indictment for larceny charged the defendant with having stolen “ ten dollars, good and lawful money of the State of Tennessee.” This is not a sufficient description of the thing stolen — money should be described as so many pieces of current gold or silver coin, and the coin must be stated by its appropriate name»</p>

This is an indictment which was filed in the circuit court of Jefferson county, against John Moyers. It was submitted to a jury under the direction of R. M. Anderson, presiding Judge. The defendant was found guilty and convicted.

Jesse Stubbs died in the county of Roane, in 1822 ; haying made his last will. In that will he devised a negro man and the tract of land on which he resided at the time of his death to his son George, and directed that at the death of his son George it should be “ equally divided amongst his children.” George died intestate in 1844, leaving many children.

This is an action of trespass on the case by Pearce against .Hawkins, for the value of a horse which was seized by Hawkins, a constable, and sold at execution sale. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

This motion was instituted in the County Court of Jefferson, against Hamilton and his securities. The presiding judge, R. M. Anderson, on hearing the evidence dismissed the motion, and the Attorney General on behalf of the State, appealed.

Trover in the Circuit Court of Hamilton county, by Dough-erty against Buson, for the seizure and sale of a wagon, by execution against Wilhite. There was a verdict on the plea of not guilty, (Alexander, J., presiding,) against Buson for the value of the wagon, and judgment thereupon. He cited 5 Hum., 612; 4 Kent, 139, 140; 2 Hum., 298; 1 Hum., 452. He cited Meigs 281, 76; 2 Kent. 497; 2 Greenleaf, sec. 640; 7 Yerger, 497; Chitty on Con., 392.

<p>Sherley executed a bond to Riggs on good-consideration, binding himself to attend to the defence-, of a suit prosecuted against Riggs, and to pay all damages and costs that might be recovered. It was insisted this bond was void for maintenance, but the court held otherwise, for Riggs had the right to employ an agent, professional or unprofessional, to attend to the securement of his legal rights, and to contract in advance for the payment of any damages or costs that might be recovered against him.</p>

Thomas Smith by last will, bequeathed a slave Letice, to his daughter Mayes, for and during her life, with remainder to her daughters. She had five daughters, Nancy, Patsy, Jane, Elizabeth and Priscilla; Nancy and Patsy died before their mother, the other three survived her. Satterfield administered on the estate of Patsy, and Oliver on that of Nancy. After the death of the mother, Priscilla died, and J. Ivey administered on her estate.

Bolinger sued Gordon on a promissory note and the case was tried by a Justice of the Peace and judgment given in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Circuit Court of the county (Rhea) where the case was submitted to a jmy by Alexander, the presiding judge. Verdict and judgment for defendant.

This is an action on the case by Gray against Tate, in the Circuit Court of Grainger: upon the plea of not guilty, a verdict and judgment were given for the plaintiff for seventy-five dollars, and a judgment for cost for the same amount, and a judgment for the defendant for the residue of the costs, to-wit, <one hundred and eighty six dollars.

This suit was commenced before a Justice of the Peace by Moore against Bettis, in the county of Jefferson. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The proceeding was removed to the Circuit Court by certiorai, where it was tried by R. M. Anderson, J , and a jury, and a verdict and judgment given for the defendant.

This is an action of trover by Allison against Knox and Hampton in the Circuit Court of Monroe county, for the seizure and sale of a horse and other chattels by execution. Hampton justified the seizure and sale under process, and a special deputation thereupon, by a Justice of the Peace. Verdict and judgment, (Alexander, J., presiding,) for the defendants. He cited 2 Yerger, 337-341, Cro. Eliz. 328, 11 John, 133'. He cited 6 Mass, 519, 1 Greenleaf, 344.

<p>This is a scire facias. There was judgment in the Circuit Court of Claiborne, in favor of defendant; Tt. M. Anderson, J., presiding.</p>

This action was assumpsit, by the Bank oí Tennessee, against Oliver, in the Circuit Court of Anderson county. There was a verdict and judgment on the plea of non-assump-sit, for the plaintiff; Alexander, J. presiding.

This action of debt was instituted in the Circuit Court of McMinn, by Keer against Clark. Verdict and judgment for the defendant, Alexander, J., presiding.

Ejectment by Chesnut against White in the Circuit Court of Polk county. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff, Alexander, J., presiding.

This bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Cleveland, by Shoemaker against Smith, to obtain a decree divesting the title of a tract of land out of defendant, and vesting it in the complainant. This was done, by order of Williams, the presiding Chancellor.

The Bank of Tennessee, the holder of a bill of exchange, sued Blair in assumpsit in the Circuit Court of Washington county. Plea non-assumpsit; there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; Lucky, J., presiding.

<p>1. In this case, depositions of witnesses residing out of the county in which the suit was pending were offered and objected to on the ground that the witnesses were in court and might be subjected to a personal examination. The depositions were read. There was no error in this. The 3rd section of the act of 1817, ch. 389, authorizing the taking of depositions of witnesses residing out of the county, gives the adverse party the right to have the witnesses examined in open court. The depositions may therefore be read, and the adverse party may examine the witnesses in open court.</p> <p>2. Where the plaintiff read the depositions of witnesses, and the defendant introduced them for personal examination in open court, it seems that they are witnesses for the plaintiff and not defendant.</p> <p>3. Circuit Judges are not bound to give opinions on abstract propositions which may be submitted to them on the progress of a trial.</p>

This is an action on the case brought by Rowan against Hildebran in the Circuit Court of Polk county. It was submitted to a jury on the plea of not guilty, and a verdict and judgment (Keith, judge, presiding,) rendered for the plaintiff for the sum of one hundred and seventy-eight dollars.

This is an action of assumpsit in the Circuit Court of Roane county, by Byrd vs. Marney. A verdict and judgment were-given for the plaintiff; Alexander, J., presiding.

This issue involving the validity of the will of Jones, was tried in the Circuit Court of Sullivan, by Luckey, J., and a jury: verdict and judgment, given for the plaintiff.

This action of assumpsit was brought in the Circuit Court of Meigs county: it was submitted to a jury on the plea of non-assumpsit under the direction of Judge Keith, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the defendant.

<p>A recital in an appeal bond, that an appeal had been granted from a judgment of a Justice of the Peace to the Circuit Court, is not sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction of the case. Theie must be an entry to that effect by the Justice. Where no bond, or an insufficient bond, or insufficient security has been given for an appeal, or where no entry, or an insufficient entry of an appeal lias been made, the Circuit Court has power by the act of 1821, ch. 20, to supply such defects. In this case the entry of an appeal was made by way of amendment in the Circuit Court, and it will be presumed it was made by the Justice of the Peace, in the absence of proof to the contrary.</p>

<p>The plaintiff claim» title nnder an execution sale founded on a judgment by attachment. The record of tho judgment exhibited /the affidavit on which the attachment was issued. The affidavit states ’ the existence of a'' debt, and effects within the county, but nothing more. The attachment states the making of an affidavit according to law. It is held that the affidavit being a part of the record, as well as the attachment, its insufficiency was apparent, and the proceedings founded on it void, and the plaintiff therefore without title.</p> <p>2* In the trial of an ejectment it appeared that. plaintiff claimed title by virtue of an execution sale, and that he purchased at the instance of the debtor under an agreement that the debtor should redeem the land, who died without an effort to redern. It is held that these facts formed no ground for the action of a Court of law, but their consideration belonged exclusively to a Court of Equity.</p>

This is an action of ejectment, commenced in tbe Circuit Court of Grainger and transferred to Claiborne, where it was tried by Judge R. M. Anderson and a jury. Verdict and judgment for the defendant.

<p>He cited 2 Jh. Ch. 595, 2 Jh. Ch. 130, 2 Story’s Eq. 89, 2 Sug. 109, 1 Hum. 443, 7 Hum. 463.</p> <p>He cited 12 Jh. 436, 6 Con. 13, 13 Jh. 359, 16 Jh. 260, M. & Y. 228, 9 Hum. 399.</p>

<p>Ejectment in the Circuit Court of Polk county, by Hannah against Morgan. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; Keith. J., presiding.</p>

This is an action of debt which was instituted in the Circuit Court of Sevier county, by the Bank of Tennessee, against Cowan and others. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. The presiding Judge, R. M. Anderson, arrested the judgment.

<p>The tax collector for the town of Knoxville, reported lots belonging to Swan for the nonpayment of taxes due from 1842 to 1849 inclusive, and the lots were ordered to be sold for the payment of them. Swan acquired title to the lots after the right to the taxes accrued. It is held first, that Swan had the right to appear, and move the Court to vacate tlie judgment, he being the owner at the time of the making of the report.</p> <p>2nd. That by virtue of the act of 1835, ch. 15, the collector was authorized to report the lots for non-payment of the taxes due from 1842 to 1849 inclusive, and the Court was authorized to render judgment for such taxes.</p>

<p>If any person shall appear before the Clerk of any Court, and make the affidavit prescribed by the act of 1821, ch. 21, authorizing poor persons to commence suits, or prosecute writs, of error without security, such Clerk is bound to issue1 the writ, and has no discretion to refuse or allow it. If on the return thereof, the affidavit be insufficient, its defects may be supplied, or if untrue the party may give security for the proseoution ot the suit- or appeal.</p>

<p>1. Rothwell whose land had been sold at execution sale, called at the residence of Gettys, the purchaser, with a view to redeem the land, having the money necessary with him. Gettys was not at home, and Rothwell left a note informing him of the object of the visit. It does not appear that Gettys received the notice. This was not equivalent to a tender of the money, and a refusal thereof by Gettys, and Rothwell was not entitled to redeem.</p> <p>2. In all cases where the debtor has the right to redeem real estate by the payment of money to the clerk, he must pay it to the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the sale was made, without regard to the locality of the land or the residence of the defendant.</p>

<p>Allen by will provided, that certain slaves should be the property of his wife for life, with remainder to his daughters, Polly L. and Fanny Farnsworth. JBy agreement between the daughters and the tenant for life, a slave, was delivered to Polly by parol gift, who held said slave for thirty years. Farnsworth and wife brought this bill against Polly L. to recover a share of said slave and her increase. It is held: 1st. That the children of Polly Lemons, are competent witnesses for her in the case, for they could neither gain or lose by the decision of the case, nor could the decree be used as evidence against them in any subsequent proceeding. 2nd. That the gift of the slave by parol prior to the act of 1833, ch. 90, in the absence of any restriction on the power to aleniate, being valid between the parties, the right of Farnsworth was defeated by such gift and the lapse of time — but the feme covert (his wife) not having been previously examined, her right remained inafiected. The hill was therefore dismissed without prejudice to the rights of the feme covert.</p>

This case was tried by Campbell, judge, and a jury in the Circuit Court of Smith county. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff.

This action was instituted in the circuit court of Maury county. There was a demurrer to the declaratiou and judgment on the demurrer for the defendant.

Haile was indicted for murder in the circuit court of Smith county. The case was submitted to a jury, under the direction of Judge Campbell, and the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, and judgment entered thereupon.

This indictment was prosecuted in the circuit court of Williamson county. The defendant was found guilty and appealed ; Maney, judge, presiding.

The indictment in this case is as follows: “The Grand Jurors for the State of Tennessee elected, em-panneled, sworn and charged to enquire for the body of the county of Rutherford, upon their oath present, that Kit, a slave, the property of one John Williams, late of said county, yeoman, on the 15th day of November, in the year eighteen hundred and fifty, with force and arms in the county aforesaid, in and upon one James Hutchinson, in the peace of God and our said state,…

This is a bill of indictment which was filed in the Circuit Court for Jackson county, against Luster, .charging him with malicious stabbing. He was found guilty; (Campbell,!., presiding,) and ordered to be imprisoned for two years.

The indictment in this case was follows: The Grand Jurors, for the State of Tennessee, elected, empannelled, sworn and charged to… Held: then and there feloniously, unlawfully, maliciously, and of his malice aforethought, did strike, cut off, and disable the organs of generation of him the said slave Josiah, thereby, then and there, by the cutting, and striking with the razor aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid, the said slave Josiah was maimed and disabled to the…

This is a motion to correct a verdict and judgment, in the Circuit Court of Cannon county, after the expiration of the term at which they wore entered. This was done by order of the presiding judge.

This is an action of trespass brought by Brown against Walker in the Circuit Court of Wilson county. It was submitted to a jury under the direction of S. Anderson, judge, on the plea of not guilty. A special plea of justification was filed and stricken out. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

This is an action of ejectment in which was instituted in the Circuit Court of Rutherford. It was tried by Judge S. Anderson and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the defendant Elliott.

This is an action of ejectment for real estate brought by Collins & Nance against Wilson & Wheeler, in the circuit court of Bedford county. It was submitted to a jury under the direction of S. Anderson, Judge. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs.

This action was instituted in the circuit court of Davidson county. There was a judgment for the defendants on demurrer to the declaration; S. Anderson, Judge, presiding.

Young was indicted in the Circuit Court of Wilson county, for the murder of Stephen, a slave. It appeared on the trial before Judge S. Anderson and a jury, that Stephen made threats that he would beat Young badly on sight; that he pursued him from place to place, and that Young being-informed of the threats of Stephen, procured a pistol, loaded it, and stationed himself on the street, and that a conflict took place about dusk, in which Stephen was killed by a pistol shot.

<p>In this case there was judgment in the Circuit Court of De Kalb ; (S. Anderson, J., presiding,) for the defendant.</p>

<p>The costs on all prosecutions of slaves, for capital felonies, must be paid by the State.</p>

Trover for a buggy by Butterworth against McKinly, in the circuit court of Rutherford county. Verdict ’and judgment for the defendant; S. Anderson, Judge, presiding.

Eason brought an action of replevin against Cummins. There was a judgment on agreed case for the defendant; S. Anderson, Judge, presiding.

This is a bill which was filed in the Chancery Court at Woodbury, by Parker against Bragg, and others. There was a decree (Ridley Chancellor, presiding,) in favor of the complainant.

This action on the case was instituted in the circuit court of Wilson county, by Jones against Man’s. There was a verdict, S. Anderson, Judge, presiding, for the plaintiff, and judgment arrested.

The presentment is as follows : The grand jurors for the State of Tennessee, elected, empanneled, sworn and charged, to enquire for the body of the county aforesaid, upon our oaths present, that within the incorporated limits of the town of Murfreesboro, in said county, there is and for a long time has been, a certain public street and highway, extending from the turnpike road, which leads from said town of Murfreesboro’ to Shelbyville, and intersects the old Shelbyville…

This is an appeal from the judgment of a Justice of the Peace for Rutherford county, to the circuit court of that county, where on the trial of the matter in dispute, S. Anderson, J., presiding, a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff Birdwell.

This presentment was filed in the circuit court of DeKalb. There was judgment for the defendant; Campbell, J., presiding.

Henry, a slave, was indicted in the circuit court of Williamson county, for the murder of J. G. Eelbeck. The case was submitted to a jury, under the direction of Maney, the presiding Judge. He was found guilty, and judgment entered on the verdict.

The defendant was indicted in the circuit court of Sumner county. He was found guilty, Maney, Judge, presiding, and sentenced to be executed.

This action of trover, for a slave, was tried by Judge Campbell and a jury, on the plea of not guilty, in the circuit court of Smith county, and a verdict and judgment rendered for tbe plaintiff, for the value of the slave.

Nuthill was indicted and convicted, as an accessory before the fact to murder in the first degree, before Judge Turner in the criminal court at Nashville.

This is a distress warrant issued at the instance of the May- or and Aldermen of Nashville against Dyer Pearl. It was removed by the defendant, Pearl, to the circuit court of Davidson county, where the warrant was quashed by the presiding Judge, Maney.

<p>1. The defendant to a bill in chancery, has the right to file his answer with the clerk, before the terra to which the process is returnable; bnt, for all purposes, except, perhaps, of founding a motion to dissolve an injunction the answer so filed is to be taken as having been filed at the return term.</p> <p>2. .By the act of 1801, ch. 8, sec. 24, the complainant has until the second rule day after the term at which the answer is filed, to reply or file exceptions.</p> <p>3. The proper practice uuder the act of 1801, as amended by the act of 1842, ch. 92, sec. 2, in reference to setting the cause ior hearing upon bill and answer for want of replication, is to give the rule for replication on the second rule day after the term, or immediately thereafter, if the complainant shall have failed to except or reply to the answer on or before that day; and on ailure to comply with such rule, the cause may be set down for hearing at the next succeeding rule day, but at no earlier day.</p> <p>4. The 23d rule of practice adopted by the Chancellor, was made merely to supply an omission in the act of 1801, and applies ouly to cases where the answer has been filed in vacation pursuant to an order of the court enlarging the time for putting in an answer.</p>

Trespass on the case in the circuit court of Smith county, by Kitrell against Lipscomb. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, Campbell, L, presiding.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Columbia, by Rains against W. Rainey, and the administrator of J. Rainey. The bill was dismissed by the presiding Chancellor, Cahal, and the complainant appealed.

<p>1. Where the State sells lands to two individuals, and the first purchaser fails, within the time required by law, to perform the conditions upon which he is to have a title» thereby forfeiting his right, the title will vest in the younger claimant who has complied with the conditions, and the State cannot afterwards, by extending the time for the performance of such conditions, take away the title that has so vested.</p> <p>2* Therefore, where the same land has been entered by two dtfferent persons, and an interval of one day occurred between the expiration of the time given by one act to perfect entries by obtaining grants, and the commencement of another act giving further time, and the younger enterer had taken out a grant previous to such interval, and the elder enter-er had not — it was held, that the title of the younger enterer was perfected in the interval, and could not be divested by the subsequent act»</p>

This is an action of covenant brought by White against Jones, in the circuit court of Macon county, on the warranty of the soundness of a slave. It was submitted to a jury under the direction of Campbell, Judge, and a verdict and judgment given for the plaintiff.

Assumpsit by Furber against Carter & Yergin, in the circuit court of DeKalb county. There was a verdict and judgment (Campbell, Judge, presiding) for the defendants.

This application was made in the county court of Smith county, which being refused, the petitioners appealed to the circuit court. The presiding Judge, Campbell, reversed the judgment of the county court.

<p>The purchaser at a master’s sale is entitled to a deed, unless there be some special circumstances to authorize the biddings to be opened; but these circumstances need not be such as are required, in transactions between individuals, to afford a proper ground of equitable relief. It is not the interest of parties that the sale of the master should be set aside for slight causes; there should be special circumstances rendering it inequitable to confirm the sale. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. In this case, the purchaser was allowed, by the Supreme Court, his election to take the land at the price all parties supposed it was bringing, or to have the sale set aside.</p>

<p>1* Under a power “to mortgage or convey fbrthe payments of debts,” the property may be con* veyed to a trustee with authority to sell for the satisfaction ot debts.</p> <p>2. A deed of trust is not fraudulent because it stipulates, that in default of payment, the property conveyed shall be sold on a credit.</p> <p>3. A deed of trust made by an attorney in fact, must depend upon the power of attorney for its validity, and the extent of its operations. If there are provisions and stipulations in the deed not warranted by the power, such stipulations and provisions, being an excess of authority, would be void, but the deed in other respects would be valid.</p> <p>it seems a condition in a deed excluding from its benefits, all creditors who should bring suits for their debts, would tender the deed fraudulent and void.</p>

<p>The certificate of discharge in "Bankruptcy is prima facie conclusive as to the vaiidity of the discharge, subject however, to be impeached for fraud, if any were perpetrated in obtaining it. And it may be impeached by any of the creditors against whom it shall be pleaded, whether they contested his discharge in the District Court of the United States upon his application to be declared a bankrupt or not.</p>

<p>The act of 1809, oh. 53, provides, that where any person shall die intestate and without issue, his estate shall descend to the next of kin to the decadent, resident in the United States, to the exclusion of aliens related to the decedent in a nearer degree. It results from this statute, that contrary to the course of the common law, the course of descent is not broken or changed by the alienage of the ancestor of the next resident of kin, but such next of kin shall inherit just as if such alien ancesto had been a resident or naturalized citizen and died.</p>

<p>The act of 1848, ch. 191, provides, that where an execution may he returned satisfied by the sale of property, and the property or its value he recovered from the officer or the plaintiff, the judgment may he revived by scire facias. This act does not apply to executions returned before its passage. Its operation is prospective only.</p>

This action of ejectment was instituted in the circuit court for DeKalb county. It was tried by a jury, under the direc-rection of Turner, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

This is an action of covenant, brought in the circuit court of DeKalb county. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, and the presiding Judge, Turner, arrested the judgment. See 1 Coke Lit. 12, 1 Ten. 189, 8 Hum. 653, 3 Yerg. 408.

This is a motion made in the Circuit Court of Jackson county by Hare against Young and sureties. Notice was given to Young. His written acknowledgment of the receipt of fees belonging to Hare as jailor, was read to the court, after objection made. There was a judgment for the plaintiff against Young and sureties.

This is a petition for a mandamus, filed in the Circuit court of Lawrence county, by Lucas & Gaither against the entry-taker of said county. The petition charged, that they tendered locations of land in Lawrence county and fees, to Shel-bing, and that he refused to receive the fees, and in other respects to do his official duty, on the ground that the lands were already entered, and appropriated by Johnson and others.

<p>Loinau, the owner of two tavern houses in McMinnville, sold and conveyed one of them td Smart, with a verbal agreement, made at the same time, that the other house should not be used as a tavern. Leinau disregarded the verbal stipulation, and Smart brought an action for damages. It is held, 1st. That his verbal agreement is not affected by the act of 1801, oh. 25. 2d. That additional terms may be established by parol testimony when such terms amount to a collateral contract.</p>

Ejectment in the Circuit Court of Fentress county by Manning against Funa. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; Campbell, judge, presiding.

<p>In this case there was a verdict and judgment for the defendants, Marchbanks, Judge, presiding.</p>

This indictment for larceny was submitted to a jury in the the criminal court at Nashville by Turner, presiding Judge. Defendant was found guilty and judgment entered.

<p>The act of 1842, ch. 91, fixing the compensation of the Clerk and Master, or special Commissioner, for sales of real or personal estate under a decree of the court, declares that he shall have at the rate of four dollars for the first hundred, at the rate, &c. &c. until his fees shall amount to one hundred dollars, and in no case shall his fees exceed the sum of one hundred dollars, and no other compensation sliall'be made for executing said decree. It is held, that the allowance of one hundred dollars for the sale, and two and a half per centum commissions on the amount of the sale, for the collection and payment of proceeds, was illegal and unauthorized, and that the Clerk was only entitled to compensation according to the rates fixed by the statute for sale, collection and payment» and to the.extent only of actual receipts and disbursements of money.</p>

This is a bill which was filled in the chancery court at Nashville. It was heard on bill, answer and proof, and a decree rendered for defendants by the presiding Chancellor.

This bill was filed by in the chancery court at Franklin, by Carter and others against Rolland and wife. There was a decree by the presiding Chancellor, Cahal, from which the complainant, Carter, appealed.

This action was brought in the circuit court of Rutherford county, and judgment on demurrer for defendant, S. Anderson, Judge, presiding.

On the 4th of April, 1850, the N. & C. Railroad notified Cowardin, that on the 16th of May, 1850, the Company would move the circuit court of Davidson to appoint five commissioners to make a valuation of a lot of land, or so much thereof as might be necessary for the purposes of the depot of said Company, at Nashville, on Walnut or Lawrence street, near said town, which lot is owned by you, &c. &c., according to the charter of said Company.

<p>X. Ejectment. The act of 1825, oh. 29, declares that where application’is made to amend the declaration in ejectment, by laying a demise in the name of some other person, the person making the application shall give bond and security to indemnify such person against the costs: And in no case shall any demise be laid in the name of another person, not present, unless by his consent in writing, and if the act be not pursued the suit shall be,dismissed on motion of the defendant. Previous to the passage of this act the introduction of a co-plaintiff by amendment, though without his consent, subjected him to liability for costs. This act was intended to guard him against that liability, by a requirement that bond and security should be given. The co-plaintiff, however, thus introduce ed, may waive the bond and security, and if he do, the defendant cannot have] the suit dismissed.</p> <p>2. In ejectment, as in local actions generally, the venue must be proved. In this case the title papers recite, that the land lies in a particular county, and that the county in which the action is brought. The proof shows that the title papers cover the land in dispute. This is satisfactory proof of venue,</p> <p>3. The supreme court will not grant a new trial on the facts, where there is any evidence to sustain the verdict.</p>

An assumpsit in thh circuit court of Davidson county, by R. H. Brockway against Comparree. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Fayetteville. There was a decree by the presiding Chancellor, Cahal, in favor of the complainant.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Fayetteville. There was a decree by the presiding Chancellor, Cahal, for the complainant.

<p>This was verdict and judgment in the circuit court, Maney, Judge, presiding, in favor of the plaintiffs.</p>

<p>There is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the circuit court of Davidson county, Turner, Judge, presiding.</p>

This petition for the sale of Richardson’s slaves was filed in the circuit court of Davidson county. The petition was dismissed by Maney, presiding Judge.

This is a bill which was filed in the chancery court, at Nashville, by Johnson against Smith and others. Decree by Cahal, the presiding chancellor, in favor of the complainant.

This is a petition filed by Paine and others against Gup-ton and wife in the chancery court, at Clarksville. There was a decree for the complainants, Chancellor Cahal presiding, from which Gupton and wife appealed.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Nashville. There was a demurrer to the bill, which was disallowed by the Chancellor, (Cahal,) and on the hearing there was a decree for a perpetual injunction.

<p>3. Martin conveyed slaves to W. Conrad, with a parol agreement, that after the lure of the slaves should reimburse said Conrad a certain sum, he should convey them to Frances W , with remainder to her children. W.. Conrad, by will, bequeathed the slaves to G. Conrad. It is held; 1st. That W. Conrad was a trustee by parol for F. Williams and children; that the representative of W. Conrad was a necessary party to a suit for the íecovery of the slaves, to ascertain whether the money had been paid to said Conrad. 2d. That the barring of the right to the life estate by the act to protect the estates of deceased meu did not effect the interest in remainder.</p> <p>2. The act of limitations of 1715, cli. 48, sec. 7, in favor of the estates of deceased persons, contains no exception or saving in favor of infants, femes covert, or others laboring under disabilities, and consequently, such persons are as much within the bar as those who are free from disability.</p> <p>3. All persons are considered “creditors”under this act, who have demands originating from contracts or agreements. Consequently, a person claiming a life .interest in slaves agreed lo be conveyed upon certain trusts, by a person who afterwards dies, may be barred by failing to assert the claim against his estate in seven years.</p>

This is an action on the case in the circuit court of Davidson county. Yerdict and judgment, Maney, Judge, presiding, for the plaintiff.

This motion was made before a justice of the peace against Hilliard, a constable, and his sureties, for a failure to return an execution for $150 by the constable. Judgment for the defendants, and appeal by plaintiff to the circuit court. In the circuit court there was a judgment, before Dillahunty, Judge, for the defendants.

This bill was filed in the chancery court, at Nashville. There was a decree in favor of the complainants by the presiding Chancellor, Cahal, from which the defendants appealed.

<p>1. The act of 1784, ch. 22, sec. 8, declares that all conveyances made to children or others with intent to defraud the widow of dower are void j but no such protection is given to her in respect to the personal estate. She cannot allege the fraud of the intes. tate in the sale or gift of his personal estate any more than the distributee or personal representative.</p> <p>2. A widow is not entitled in the drstribution of her husband’s estate to have the advancements made to the children collated for her benefit. She is only entitled to a share of what remains, excluding the advancements.</p>

This action for slander was tried by Judge Walker and a jury, in the circuit court of Marshall county. Verdict and judgment for tbe plaintiff, Birks.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Smithville. It was heard on bill, answer and proof, by Ridley, presiding chancellor. He dismissed the bill.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Charlotte, by Simmons against Marable. Decree by the presiding chancellor, Cahal, for the complainant.

This is an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace for Davidson county, to the circuit court held for the county. There was a verdict and judgment (Maney, J., presiding,) in favor of the defendant Merritt.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Clarksville. Decree by the presiding chancellor, Cahal, for the complainant.

Hall, administrator, recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace against Stuart and Turner. It was stayed by Beeler. Stuart was surety, and Turner principal. This fact, however, did not appear on the face of the judgment or of the execution which was issued thereupon. No property of Turner having been found, it was levied on the property of Stuart.

This motion was made in the circuit court, at Gallatin. There was judgment against the plaintiff, Maney, Judge, presiding, from which he appealed.

Three justices of the peace, for the county of Giles, ren. ered a judgment in favor of Suttle against White, in an action for a forcible entry and detainer of his land. White removed the case to the circuit court, where it was submitted to a jury, under the charge of Walker, Judge, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff.

Trover for a slave in the circuit court of Dickson county. There was a verdict and judgment, (Martin, J., presiding,) on the plea of not guilty, for the defendant.

This is an action of ejectment, instituted in the circuit court of Lawrence county, by Meeks against Richards. Verdict and judgment (Walker, J., presiding,) for the plaintiff.

This is a bill which was filed in the chancery court at Pulaski, by Moffitt against McDonald. There was a decree (Cahal, chancellor, presiding,) for the complainant.

This case was tried by Judge Marchbanks and a jury, in the circuit court of Warren. There was a verdict and judgment for the will.

This is an action of ejectment, instituted in the circuit court of Lincoln county. Verdict and judgment for the defendants, Marchbanks, J., presiding.

This bill was filed in the chancery court, at Carthage. The presiding Chancellor (Ridley) dismissed it, and the complainant appealed.

<p>proceeding in the county court to set aside the probate of a will, and have its validity contested in the circuit court is a suit, and the judgment of the county court may be appealed from? the mode of proceeding should be by petition, summons to the executor, and answer j and it should be contested only by a person interested in the property disposed of by the will.</p>

. This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery county, rendered by the presiding judge, (Martin.) Niblett, the defendant, appealed.

<p>3. In a trial for a capital felony ono of the jurors spoke to a person, not of the jury,1 in the presence of the court and jury. Held, that this was no cause for a new trial.</p> <p>2. One of the jurors went about fifteen steps apart from his fellows, but was under the eye of the officer. .Held, no ground for a new trial.</p> <p>3. Spirituous liquors were brought to the room of the jury, of which they drank, hut not to excess, so as to disqualify them from an intelligent performance of duty. Held, no ground for a new trial.</p> <p>4. The jury passed through crowds in going to and from the hotel at which they dined, and dined with crowds $ but no one attempted to tamper with them or spoke to them. Held, no ground for a new trial.</p>

The indictment filed in this case in the circuit court of Hardin, is as follows: “ The grand jurors of the State of Tennessee, duly elected, impanelled, sworn and charged, to inquire for the body of the county of Hardin aforesaid, upon their oath present, that a certain negro slave, named David, alias Have, the property of one Daniel G. McCarn, not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved and instigated by the instigation of the devil, on the sixth day of…

<p>This bill was filed in the chancery court at Trenton, by Brewer against Connell. Decree by Jones, Chancellor, for the complainant.</p>

<p>In a case of capital felony, a circuit court has no power to authorize the separation of the jury, with the consent of defendant and the State’s Attorney; if it be done and defendant be found guiUy, a new trial will be granted.</p>

<p>The indictment in this case was quashed by Walker, the presiding Judge, in the circuit court, held for Decatur county.</p>

This action was instituted in the circuit court of Perry county, by Stephens against Hancock, and was submitted to a jury by Hardin, special judge. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

<p>Moore, the owner of an occupant claim, died without having perfected his title thereto by grant. The administrator, with the money of the estate, obtained a grant in the name of the heirs, and having exhausted the personal estate, petitioned the circuit court for the sale of the real estate for the payment of debts. It is held, 1st, That the heirs held the legal title as in trust for, and subject to the rights of creditors. 2d, That the circuit court had as full and ample jurisdiction to order the sale thereof as a court of chancery, and to make all orders necessary to carry into effect the objects of the act of 1827, ch. 54.</p>

This case was heard by Judge Humphreys, and a jury in the circuit court of Shelby. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendants.

<p>There was a judgment in the circuit court of Madison, (Read J., presiding,) in favor of defendant McGregor.</p>

This case was tried by Judge Read and a jury in the circuit court of Haywood county. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

<p>"Where a sheriff mado a false return of service of a writ on defendant, and judgment is rendered against him without notice or appearance, a court of chancery will interfere and enjoin the judgment.</p>

<p>In this case judgment was rendered by Read presiding Judge, for the plaintiff.</p>

This action of ejectment was tried by Fitzgerald, and a jury in the circuit court of Obion county. Yerdict and judgment for the defendant.

<p>This motion was'made in the circuit court of Perry county. It was dismissed by the presiding Judge Walker.</p>

<p>The father of Sandel Britt died at his residence in Carroll county, Tenn., and a guardian was appointed for her. Her mother intermarried witli Thomason, who removed them to Arkansas, and from there to Mississippi, where Sandel died. It is held, that the residence of the deceased parent was the domicil of the minor; that neither she nor her step-father had any power to change her domicil, and that her estate was subject to distribution according to the laws of Tennessee.</p>

<p>Robert* being sued before a justice of the peace on a note for the payment of money, offered an affidavit as a plea, which described the note, and stated that said Roberts did not sign said note nor make his mark thereto, nor authorize any person to do so for him, and that said note was wholly unjust and forged. This affidavit was held to be a sufficient plea of non est factum before a justice of the peace, in the sense of the acts of 1817, ch. 86, and of 1819, ch 27, and that a valid assignment of perjury might be made thereupon.</p>

<p>The attachment in this case was quashed by the presiding Judge, (Humphreys,) in the circuit court of Hardeman.</p>

This case was tried by Fitzgerald, J., and a jury in the circuit court held for Gibson; verdict and judgment for the defendant.

This action of trover was tried in the circuit court held lor Obion, by Fitzgerald, J. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant; the plaintiffs appealed.

The demurrer to the declaration in this case, was argued before Humphreys, presiding J., and judgment being given for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.

<p>1. Where a cause of action, accrues in the life-time of the testator or intestate, and a party, as the administrator or executor, sues in trover or assumpsit, and makes profert of letters, non-assumpsit or not guilty admits the representative character. If defendant would contest it, he must put it in issue by special plea.</p> <p>2. Where an executor or administrator has actual possession of a chattel, when it is taken or converted, such possession, whether it be personal or by co-tenant, is prima facie proof of his title, in trespass, replevin or trover for the recovery of the chattel or its value.</p> <p>3. The plaintiff, on cross-examination, asked a witness, (Cheek,) whether he had ever stated that he purchased a specified slave for defendant, and the witness said he had not. The plaintiff then introduced a witness, and asked him whether he had ever heard Cheek say that he had purchased the slave for defendant. He said, after objection overruled, that he had. This evidence was incompetent, either to impeach Cheek or otherwise.</p>

<p>]. A verbal loan of slaves was made in North Carolina, where the slaves were then situa.ted, and they were brought to the State by the bailee : The loan was not made in reference to the removal of the slaves to Tennessee. It is held, that the act óf 1801, chap. 25, declaring that verbal loans shall be declared in writing, proved and recorded within five years, or the title shall be with the possession, did not apply to this transaction.</p> <p>2. The assent oí an executor is necessary to perfect the title of a legatee to a chattel; and this is for the protection of the executor, who is responsible far the payment of the debts to the extent of the personal estate; but this rule does not apply where the legatee is placed in possession of the chattel by the testator, and where there are other assets sufficient to pay debts.</p> <p>3. Where a legacy is limited to several persons in succession, the assent ofihe executor to the first taker, will be considered as an assent to those who are to succeed in remainder, for the several interests constitute but one estate.</p> <p>4. The case of McKissick vs. McKissick, 6 Hum. 72, commented on and distinguished from this.</p>

This case was tried in the circuit court, held for the county of Dyer, by Judge Humphreys. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

This action of ejectment was submitted to a jury by Hum-phreys, Judge, presiding, in the circuit court, held for the county of Hardeman. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

<p>In this case there was a decree for the complainant, by Jones, the presiding chancellor.</p>

This is an action of ejectment, instituted in the commercial and criminal court, at Memphis. It was submitted to a jury, King, Judge, presiding. Yerdict and judgment for the plaintiff.

<p>The inhabitants of Memphis and South Memphis were incorporated separately. In 1849, an act was passed, whereby the inhabitants of both towns were incorporated as one body, uudex the name of Memphis. By the new charter it was provided, that an electiou fox Mayor and Aldermen should take place the last Monday in December, 1849. By the 22d section it is provided, that the act shall take effect ou its passage, but until the election and organization of the first board of Mayor or Aldermen the offices of the City of Memphis and of South Memphis should be administered as under their own respective charters as before. The 24th section provides, that the act shall take effect immediately, and all laws conflicting with the provisions of the act are declared to be repealed. It is held, 1st. That the provisions of the act repealing the old charters were constitutional and valid. 2d. That the Mayor and Aldermen of Memphis did not exercise their fnnetions til] the organization of the new board by virtue of the original charter, for that was repealed, but by virtue of the power derived from the new charter continuing their existence for a limited time. 3d. That the Mayor and Aldermen of Memphis, before the organization of the new board, deriving their power from the act of 1849, had no power to employ attorneys to file a bill to restrain the organization of the new board of Mayor and Aldermen under the act oí 1849.</p>

<p>1. "When a conditional sale is established, the court is inclined to construe it a mortgage, because in so doing justice is' done to all parties, and where the conveyance is in consideration of a pre-existing debt, and such condition exists, it is difficult to find a case that has not been held to be a mortgage.</p>

Bowman leased a lot of ground in Memphis for seven years, to Locke, and the defendant obtained possession from Wilkerson, a sublessee of Bowman. The lot was sold for taxes, and purchased by Delafield; and Stephenson by deed attorned to Delafield. At the expiration of the lease executed by Bowman to Locke, Bowman executed a lease to Richmond, in December, 1848, Stephenson then holding it under the title of Delafield.

<p>Colviu iras indicted for an affray. He pleaded a former conviction before a justice of the peace, to which the State replied : 1st. That said conviction was produced by col* Jnsion with the prosecutor and in fraud of the law. 2d. That said justice did not hear tho evidence: to which there was a demurrer. Held, that the replication was good on both grounds.</p>

<p>Where a bill is presented to a grand jury charging an assault with intent to commit murder in the first degree, they cannot negative the felonious intent, and find a true bill as to the assault and battery.</p>

<p>If a rulo be made on the plaintiff that he give other security for costs of suit, by a given time, it will be in force for the time limited, and not afterwards, at which time the court may enforce it or discharge it. If the motion to dismiss be not made at the specified time, it cannot be made afterwards. The defendant may however renew his motion, and it will be ruled that plaintiff give the Security, and on failure that the suit be dismissed.</p>

<p>1. Slander. No charge made against the plaintiff will be actionable, without special damage, unless it impnte an offence for which he would be criminally liable.</p> <p>2. Where the defendant charged the plaintiff with perjury, in taking out a peace warrant against him, and it appeared that the peace warrant was void for want of a seal, it is held, that the oath to obtain the warrant being in a judicial proceeding before a competent tribunal, and material to the issuance of the warrant, was the subject matter for a valid assignment of perjury, though the process issued thereupon by the magistrate was defective and void; and the charge of perjury being complete without reference to the warrant, there was no necessity to refer to it as proof of the oatli taken.</p> <p>3. This is an action for slander, founded on a charge of perjury. The defendant offered to prove that plaintiff was dishonest and a common barrator: It is held, that the plaintiff’s general character for veracity is admissible in mitigation of damages, hut his character in other respects is not in issue.</p>