Volume 29 — Tennessee Reports

John Dudley filed this bill in the Chancery Court at Knoxville, against Bosworth and his wife, Julia, the daughter of said John, Steel, and wife Elizabeth, another daughter, and others, children of said John, to divest them of the legal title to a lot of ground in the town of Knoxville.

This is an action of trover, commenced by Luttrell as trustee against Garvin, for the value of a quantity of lumber. It was tried by Judge Dunlap and a jury of Knox county, and a verdict and judgment rendered on the plea, of not guilty, for the defendant. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>1. The levy of aa execution, by a sheriff, on real estate held by grant, deed or entry, and a sale thereof, vests the purchaser with an equitable title only; the legal title remains in the execution debtor till the sheriff conveys it to the purchaser. Such equitable title outstanding in a third person is no defence to an action of ejectment.</p> <p>2. Where a party purchased, at execution sale, land held by entry, but received no deed from the sheriff, or instituted no proceeding against the former owner who remained in possession for thirteen years after the execution sale, such facts constitute conclusive evidence that the purchaser had abandoned his claim, and that he possessed no title, either legal or equitable.</p> <p>3. A naked occupation of real estate seven years under a claim of ownership, without title or writing purporting to convey title, vests the occupier with amere right of possession,which is a defence to a possessory action, but is not alienable, or descendible, or liable to execution.</p>

<p>1. Land and slaves were devised to the wife, during life or widowhood, and charged with the education of the children. It was also provided that in the event she married, the land and slaves were to be equally divided amongst the children, with the exception that one slave was given absolutely to the widow. It was insisted that this devise was in restraint of marriage, and therefore void; but the court held that it was not a devise for life, to be void on condition that the widow married, but a devise during widowhood, charged with the education and maintenance of the children, and that it was valid.</p> <p>2. The hire of the slaves, devised to the widow during widowhood, was appropriated to the payment of debts for which other property was previously liable. Her marriage having terminated her estate in the slaves, it is held that she was entitled to be reimbursed such sums so advanced for the benefit of the estate.</p> <p>3. Where real esfate was devised to the widow during her widowhood, and she terminated the estate by marriage whilst crops were growing, it is held, that having terminated her estate in the premises by her own act, she was not entitled to sncli growing 'crops.</p>

<p>Moss obligated himself to deliver on a given day and at a given place-, one hundred bushels of salt to Hunter. Hunter transferred this obligation by assignment, and guarantied the payment of the salt. This was an absolute engagement to deliver the salt, at the time and place specified, if the maker did not; no demand, was therefore necessary, of the maker, and no notice to the guarantor.</p>

Assumpsit by Arnold and wife, Sarah, against Hodges, administrator of Hodges. Plea, non-assumpsit. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs; R. M. Anderson, J. presiding. The defendant appealed.

<p>In this case the presiding judge, Keith, quashed the indictment and the State appealed.</p>

This is an action of ejectment, commenced in the circuit court of Jeiferson county, by Alexander and Wallace against Helms. Tt was tried by Judge R. M. Anderson and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for'the plaintiff. ‘ The defendants appeaíed.

<p>John Bowser leased land to George Bowser, and subsequently transferred his title to Martha Bowser. He brought an action of forcible detainer against George. And the court holds that the tenant may always show that his landlord’s title has expired, or that he has sold his interest in the premises, or that it is alienated from him by judgment and operation of law'.</p>

On the 28th day of June, 1850, the grand jury empan-nelled for Roane county, returned a bill of indictment against Bowling. It charged that Bowling, on the 5th day of May, 1848, made an assault upon Enox, with intent wilfully, maliciously and with premeditation to murder him. He was tried on the plea of not guilty, and acquitted of the felony and found guilty of an assault and battery.

<p>1. An obligee obtained judgment against a surety for ninety-six dollars, and on motion judgment was rendered against the principal, in favor of the surety for the same amount. This judgment against the principal was void for want of jurisdiction in the justice. The act of 1809, ch. 69, authorizes a judgment in favor of a surety against the principal, on motion where judgment has been rendered against the surety, before any tribunal having cognizance thereof, and if the factof the suretyship does not appear on the face of the instrument, the court shall empannel a jury to ascertain the fact. This act confers no such jurisdiction on a justice of the peace, but by its words excludes such idea.</p>

Debt by Brown, Governor, for the use of Smith against Rector and Ryland.

Hale’s heirs sued Whillock in the circuit court of Washington county, in ejectment. The case, was tried by judge Keith and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. Defendants appealed.

This suit was commenced by warrant, before a justice of the peace. There was a judgment for the plaintiff Boyd. McConnell appealed to the circuit court, where it was tried by judge Keith and a jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. Heiskell, for Boyd.

<p>1. Where an interrogatory is submitted in a bill and denied by the answer, the answer can only be overturned by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness with corroborating circumstances. To require, however, such proof, the denial of the answer must be explicit and direct.</p> <p>2. The act of 1820, gives a person whose land is sold at execution sale, a right to redeem it within two years, upon tender of the money bid therefor, ten per cent, and all other lawful charges. It was objected in this case, that the fees for the probate and registration of the sheriff’s deedj obtained by defendant, were not included in the sum tendered. To which the court say they are not satisfied that such fees should have been tendered ; but it was sufficient that the defendant did not object to the insufficiency of the sum tendered.</p> <p>3. The undivided interest of a tenant, by curtesy, in a tract of land, was sold at execution sale, and purchased by a co-tenant. It is held that the purchase was an admission of the interest of the tenant at that time which prevented the bar of statute of limitations in favor of co-tenant.</p>

<p>1. This action of ejectment was commenced according to the common law mode of proceeding, by service of a declaration on the tenant in possession of the estate, and judgment by default was entered against him without an appearance. This was erroneous; for although the act of 1801, ch. 11, which authorizes judgment by default against the tenant in possession, for possession, costs and damages, does not repeal the common law mode of proceeding, yet the common law authorized no such judgment, and the party having elected to proceed according to common law must pursue it.</p> <p>2. The substitution of a sheriff’s return of service of declaration, instead of the affidavit required by common law, has been so long sanctioned in this State, that it must be regarded as law.</p> <p>3. There was no error in permitting the plaintiff to give a bond for prosecution of the suit at a term subsequent to the return term.</p>

A scire facias was issued from the chancery court at Tazewell, on the 8th day of June, 1848.

<p>1. There was a legacy of a slave to minors. The slave was in. the possession of a stranger, claiming her. The administrator, with the will annexed, neglected to sue for two years. It is held that, under such circumstances, the guardian of the minors had a right to sue, in chancery, the holder of the slave and the administrator, for the assertion of their rights; for if the statute of limitations should bar the right of the administrator, it would bar that of the legatees also.</p> <p>2. A bill was filed for the recovery of a specific legacy against the administrator, with the will annexed, and others who held the legacy, claiming it, and the widow, who dissented from the will. No answer was filed by the widow, ana no decree pro confesso was taken against her. Her dower interest would not conflict with the right to the legacy, till all the other property was exhausted, and that not appearing, proceedings against her, was not essential to a valid decree against the others.</p>

This action of ejectment was commenced by Darter against Hale, in the circuit court of Hawkins county. There was a verdict and judgment for Darter. Luckey, judge, presiding. Hale appealed.

<p>Kimbrough was indicted under the provisions of the act of 1835, ch. 66, sec. 1, as the proprietor of a turnpike road for permitting such road to remain out of repair. The charter was not produced. This is held not to be necessary: proof that he received toll as proprietor, and that the road was out of such repair as is required in public roads of the first class, is all that the law requires to sustain the conviction.</p>

<p>Open and notorious lewdness. This charge sustained by circumstantial evidence.</p>

<p>The indictment charged the defendant, in the same count, with stealing a horse, bridle, saddle, blanket and martingal, on the 1st day of November, 1848, in the county of Smith; it was objected in arrest of judgment, that this indictment was bad because it contained charges of distinct crimes, But the court held otherwise. The stealinS of various articles .at the same time and place is only one offence and must be so charged.</p>

Bratton was indicted for murder, in the circuit comt of Giles, and was tried by judge Dillahunty and a jury; found guilty of murder in the first degree, and judgment entered accordingly. He appealed.

<p>1. The indictment against Cash contained four counts; the firsl^cj^arges defendant with stealing Wilson, a slave, the property of Joseph Wites'?-" the second, with stealing ,Wi!son, a slave, the property of William H. Willis; the third charges him with stealing a gray mare, the property of Abner Bryant, and the fourth charges the stealing a bay horse, the property of John Ganaway. The defendant moved to quash this indictment. But the court held that there was no objection in law to the joinder of counts charging the defendant with the commission of several distinct offences of the same degree, though committed at different times, and that such joinder was no ground of demurrer or in arrest of judgment.</p> <p>2. After the close of the proof and the commencement of the argument of the case, the court suggested to the attorney for the State, that the venue had not been proved, and thereupon proof on the subject was introduced ; the defendant objecting. This was not erroneous. The relaxation of the rule of practice on this subject was a matter -of discretion which rests with the circuit judge.</p> <p>3. Where the supreme court had adjudged an act of the general assembly unconstitutional, which established a county, it is held that the circuit judge had the right to declare to the jury, his judicial knowledge of such decision of the court in the f pecified case, and the result of such decision in fixing the boundaries of counties.</p> <p>4 A runaway slave is the subject of larceny.</p>

<p>An indictment for obtaining goods by false pretences must charge the falsity of the pretence by special averment.</p>

The defendant, Anderson, was found guilty of obstructing a private way. He moved in arrest of judgment, but the judge, W. B. Campbell, overruled the motion and gave judgment against the defendant. He appealed.

Morrow was indicted in the circuit court of Lawrence and was tried and convicted before Hardin, special judge. His motion in arrest of judgment being overruled, he appealed.

This is a motion which was made in the circuit court of Jackson county, against Quarles, as surety on a bond given by the sheriff, for the collection of taxes. Judgment was given for the defendant. The State appealed.

<p>3. The judge of one circuit holding a court in another has power to appoint a special term and may exercise all the powers which the judge of such circuit may exercise.</p> <p>2. Where a defendant was recognized to appear at a special term and there was no special term held, the act of 1835, ch, 5, see. 5, providing against discontinuances, applying to special as well as regular terms, a forfeiture taken at the next succeeding regular term is held valid. '</p>

<p>This is an action against a stakeholder. The circuit judge charged the jury that if the stakeholder was directed to pay over the money to the winner, and no time was specified when it should he paid, and the payment was made, after the election on which the bet was made, in good faith, such payment would exempt the stakeholder from liability to the looser; provided he had not been previously notified not to pay over the stake. This charge is strictly correct.</p>

A judgment was rendered in the circuit court of White county, by Campbell, Judge, against Elms and securities on a bond executed by them. Elms and securities procured a transcript of the record to be filed, and prayed a writ of Error. The transcript contains no bill of exceptions.

This case was tried in the circuit court of DeKalb, by Campbell, judge, and a jury. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants, Richardson and Price, appealed.

<p>This is an action of debt on a note to which the defendants pleaded that they had paid sixty dollars on the note declared on. There was an issue on that plea submitted to a jury, and a verdict foi' the balance of the debt after deducting the sixty dollars, and judgmen^ The court held that part of plaintiff’s claim was answered, and part unanswered; that the plaintiff might have demurred to the plea or he might have waived the objection, taken issue on the set off, and demanded^ a judgment by default as to the balance. The judgment was erroneous, and reversed, and judgment entered by default for the amount of the claim unanswered.</p>

<p>Til's is a bi!l to set aside an award; and two grounds are relied on — 1st Tint one of the arbitrators asked a witness questions at the instance of the party in whose favor the award was given, and read a paper to the abitrators which was not evidence. These circumstances do not establish the charge of partiality. 2d. That after the arbitrators had given their award and signed it, three of the five agreed to re-hear the case. This is no ground to set it aside. After the award was determined upon and delivered, the abitrators had no further power over the case.</p>

This is an action of ejectment which was instituted in the county of Grundy, by the State of Tennessee against Duncan and Martin, for six hundred and forty acres of land. It was tried before judge Anderson and a jury, and a verdict and judgment for the State. The defendants appealed.

<p>It is a rule in chancery that, where an answer denies the allegation of a bill its effect shall he not set aside but by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating circumstances. This rule does not prevail, however, where the answer is not on oath, as in the cate of a corporation, o r where the answer is not direct and positive, or is upon information and belief; or where the bill is sworn to as well as the answer.</p>

Shelby owned land over which a road, established by public authority, run, beginning on Cumberland River, near the town of Nashville, and running thence north. The road was superseded by the White’s Creek Turnpike for all public purposes, and the portion of it which lay north of the turnpike was closed by order of the county court.

This suit was instituted before a justice of the peace. There was an appeal from the judgment of the justice, to the circuit court of Macon, where it was, by Campbell, the presiding judge, submitted to a jury. There was a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, Pirtle. Holland appealed.

This is an action of replevin, brought in the circuit court of Smith county, by Pickett against Bridges for four slaves; Cloney, John, Catharinejand Emmet.

The bank of Tennessee sued Hill as endorser of a note owned by the bank. Hill pleaded the statute of limitations, and this bill was filed in the chancery court at Nashville, by the bank, to enjoin him from pleading it. The bill charged that Hill gained the time by promising not to plead the statute; which Hill denied. At the hearing on bill, answer and proof, the bill was dismissed and the bank appealed.

This is an action of covenant, on an apprentice bond, in the circuit court of Macon, by the chairman of the county court, for the use of Gains against Davis. Davis executed a covenant to the chairman to teach Gains the art of blacksmithing, and to read, write and cypher, and to give him, at the termination of his minority, a suit of Sunday clothes, and a set of blacksmith’s tools.

This action was tried in the circuit court of Rutherford, by judge S. Anderson and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

Covenant in the circuit court of Wilson. On an issue on the plea of “ covenants performed,” there was a verdict for the defendant. S. Anderson, judge, presiding. The plaintiff appealed.

This is an appeal, by the plaintiffs in error, from the judgment of the circuit court of Smith county; W. B. Campbell, judge, presiding.

This is an action of debt which was tried in the circuit court of Wilson, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff; S. Anderson, judge, presiding. Defendant appealed.

This is an action of debt, tried in the circuit court of Wilson, and verdict and judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs; S, Anderson, judge, presiding. The defendant appealed.

Crowder sued Eastham in the circuit court of De-Kalb, in covenant, and there was a judgment by default and a writ of enquiry of damages. Judgment final for plaintiff, Campbell, judge, presiding. Defendant appealed.

This bill and petition were filed in the chancery court at Gallatin. At the hearing before chancellor Ridley, he dismissed the petition for a settlement, and gave a decree for complainants in the bill. The case was removed to the supreme court by appeal.

This is an appeal from a justice of the peace, to the circuit court of DeKalb county, where the matter in controversy was submitted to a jury by the presiding judge, Campbell, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff, Smith, appealed.

Witt recovered a judgment before French, a justice of the peace of Franklin county, against Carter, Russey and Smith, for sixty dollars, and execution issued therefor. The case was removed by Russey to the circuit court, so far as he was concerned, by writ of certiorari.

In this case a verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiffs in the circuit court of Jackson county, Campbell, judge, presiding. The defendant appealed.

This is an action of ejectment, which was commenced by Vance’s heirs against Fisher, in the circuit court of Marshall county. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant; from which judgment, the plaintiffs appealed.

This is an action of ejectment which was instituted by Vance’s heirs, in the circuit court of Montgomery county, against Johnson, the vendee of Washington. There was a verdict and judgment rendered (Martin, judge, presiding) in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed.

This is an action of ejectment, in the circuit court of DeKalb, by Johnson against Estes. It was tried by judge Anderson and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

This is an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, to the circuit court of Bedford county. It was then tried by judge S. Anderson and a jury, and verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

This is action on the case which was instituted in the circuit court of Rutherford, by McKnight against Gooch. It was tried by judge S. Anderson, and a jury, on the plea of non-assumpsit, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, McKnight. The defendant appealed.

This action of ejectment, by Shultz and Hoard against Elliot, in the circuit court of Rutherford, was tried by judge S. Anderson, and a jury, on the plea of not guilty, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed.

This is a bill for a specific execution of a contract for real estate, filed in the chancery court at Shelbyville, by' Bussey against the administrator and heirs of Gant. At the hearing on bill, answer and proofs, chancellor Ridley decreed a specific .conveyance on the payment of two hundred and eighty six dollars, interest, &c , and if not paid in a specified time, the land should be sold for the payment of said sum. Complainants appealed.

This is a motion made in the circuit court of Davidson county, against the sheriff and his sureties, for an insufficient return, by the Union Bank. The presiding judge, Maney, rendered a judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

This is an action of assumpsit, brought by Beardin against Winchester, in the circuit court of Sumner. It was tried by judge Maney and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

This is a proceeding in the circuit court of Marshall county, to test the validity of the will of Richard Long. It was determined against the will, by judge Dillahunty and a jury, and a verdict and judgment rendered accordingly. The defendant appealed.

This action was instituted by Robinson against Welch, in the circuit court of White county, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff; Campbell, judge, presiding. The defendant appealed.

This is an action on the case in the circuit court of Montgomery county, by Baynham against Lunsford and Davie. The plaintiff hired defendants a slave for a year to work on a farm. The slave was employed in driving a wagon and team from defendants’ mills and farm, to a landing on Cumberland river, and during the time he was so engaged, he was taken sick and died. The facts are more particularly detailed in the opinion of the court.

This bill was filed in the chancery court, at Sparta, by Carrick and others, against Prater, praying relief against an alleged usurious transaction. There was a decree for the complainant. Defendant appealed.

In this case, a judgment was rendered by a justice of the peace, for the county of Montgomery, in favor of Taliaferro against Williamson, on the 24th January* 1849, which was stayed by Herring on the 28th of the same month. Herring, at the expiration of the stay, removed the case to the circuit court by petition. A motion to quash the execution, which had been issued, was made. The presiding judge, Martin, over-ruled this motion, and gave judgment for the plaintiff.

This is a bill, which was filed in the chancery court, at Carthage, for the purpose of procuring a sale of real estate, under the act of 1827, ch. 54, for the purpose of dividing the proceeds amongst those entitled. The chancellor presiding, (Ridley) decreed in conformity with the prayer of the bill. The estate was sold, and an appeal was taken by one of the defendants. The facts are fully stated by the court.

This is a bill filed in chancery court at Lebanon^ There was a final decree rendered by the presiding chancellor, (Ridley) at the January term of said court in 1849, in favor of complainant; from which defendant appealed.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Smithville, by Lawrence against Vick. At the hearing on bill, answer, replication and proof, the presiding chancellor (Ridley) dismissed the bill, and complainant appealed, They cited 2 Hum., 68; 3 Hum,, 582. They cited 3 Hum.. 581; 1 Jh. Ch. R., 328; 3 Jh. Ch. R., 36; 4 Hayw., 17, 18; Cooke’s Rep., 36; 6 Jh. Ch. R., 87.

This is an action of covenant, in the circuit court of Maury county. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, on the plea of “ covenants performed.” Dillahunty, judge, presiding. The defendant appealed.

This action on the case was instituted in the circuit court of Wayne county, and was tried on the plea of not guilty, by A. M. Hardin, special judge, and a jury. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Springfield. At the hearing, before chancellor Ridley, on bill,answer and proof, a decree was rendered in favor of the complainant for the sum of eight hundred and fifty-;five dollars and eighty cents. The defendant appealed.

Batson and others, distributees of Agnes Johnson, filed this bill in the chancery court at Charlotte, against Murrell, administrator of said Agnes, to restrain the sale of certain slaves, and for an account, &c. &c. The defendant answered; proof was taken and a decree being rendered, which was unsatisfactory to complainants, by the presiding chancellor, Cahal, they appealed. The facts are fully stated in the following opinion of the court.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Shelby-ville, by Lewis and others, against Daniel,' executor of Singleton, deceased.

The Planters’ Bank recovered a judgment against Nixon and others, in the circuit court of Maury county, for one hundred and sixteen dollars and costs. An execution was issued and placed in the hands of N. Porter, sheriff. Porter did not return the execution at any time. A motion was made against him for the non-return, and he introduced evidence to show that the defendant, Nixon, had paid the Bank, after the return day of the execution.

This bill was filed in. tbe chancery court at Clarks-ville. At the hearing on bill, answer, replication and proof, chancellor Ridley dismissed the bill. The complainants appealed.

Kercheval instituted an action of assumpsit against Thomasson, the administrator of Elizabeth Thurston, in the circuit court of Lincoln county. It was tried on the plea of non-assumpsit, and the defendant relied on the lunacy of the deceased. There was a verdict and judgment, (Marchbanks, judge, presiding,) for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

This is an action of covenant, which was instituted in the circuit court of Maury county. On the plea of “ covenants performed,” it was submitted to .a jury under the charge of-■, presiding judge. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

Assumpsit by Burton against White in the circuit court of Davidson county. Plea non assumpsit. Verdict and judgment (Turner, judge, presiding) for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

<p>See 1 Gutty's PI. 477.</p> <p>See 6 Yerger 491, 3 Yerger, Hopkins vs, Rodgers, 3 Hum. 56, 2 Hum. 518, 4 Hum. 218.</p>

Isaac Sitler, a citizen of Davidson county, bequeathed to a slave Laura Jane, aged six years, her freedom, and the sum of $200 dollars per annum, till she arrived at the age of sixteen, for her support and education. Laura Jane was taken to the State of Ohio by her mother, where she' with her child, Laura Jane, resided. No proceedings were instituted in the State of Tennessee to obtain the assent of the government to her emancipation.

Assumpsit in the circuit court of Sumner. Plea non assumpsit. The case was tried by judge Maney and a jury. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. He cited 6 East, 614, Story on. Sales, 239, 240. They cited 2 Kent, 492, 7 East, 571.

<p>This is an appeal in error from the judgment of the circuit court of Van Burén county, Marehbanks, judge presiding.</p>

G. M. Deaderick obtained a decree in chancery for about seventeen hundred dollars. The money was paid to Morrison for goods of the value of five hundred dollars, or thereabouts, on the order of G. M. Deaderick, directed to the clerk and master.

<p>A judgment was rendered against Porter, sheriff of Giles, and execution was issued thereupon directed to the sheriff of Giles county. This execution came to the hands of the coroner, and he having failed to return it, a motion was made against him for such failure; but the court refuses judgment against the coroner, for the writ not being directed to him he had no authority to execute it, and was not liable for a failure to re-. turn it.</p>

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Gallatin, by Harris against the administrator of Carney, to establish a mortgage by parol. It was tried by chancellor Ridley, on bill, answer, replication and proof, and a decree rendered for complainant. Defendant appealed.

R. Hall executed his note to 'Hart for two hundred and twenty-eight dollars, with Th. Hall as security for the payment of the money. Th. Hall, with a view to reduce amount within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, executed his note to Hart for the sum of eighty-five dollars, and that amount was credited on the note for two hundred and twenty-eight dollars, as a payment thereon. The note for eighty-five dollars was subsequently paid.

This is an action of covenant on a warranty in a deed of conveyance, brought by Chairs against Hobson, in the circuit court of Maury county. The defendant pleaded “covenant performed, and “champerty.” Issues on these pleas were submitted to a jury, under the direction of judge Dillahunty, and found for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

This action of assumpsit was instituted, in the circuit court of Davidson, and was tried on the plea of non assumpsit, before judge Turner. Verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at McMinn-ville,^ by Rowan against Mercer. The chancellor, (Ridley,) at the hearing on bill, answer, replication and proof, dismissed the bill, and the complainant appealed. He cited Calvert p. 133, 138.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Clarksville fey Moore against Crockett. There was a decree for the ■complainant by the special chancellor, Nicholson. The defendant appealed.

This is an appeal from a decree given by chancellor Ridley, in the chancery court at Pulaski. They cited 2 Dess. 279; 1 A.K. Marshall 492; 2 Paige 122. He cited 2 Dev. Eq. 387; 6 Murph. 374; 3 Murph 18; 2 Dev. and Bat. L. 125; 2 Dev. and Bat. Eq. 20,22, 211.

This bill was filed in the chancey court at Nashville. The chancellor, Cahal, gave a decree in favor of the complainants. Defendant, Demoss, procured a transcript of the proceedings in the chancery court, to be filed by the clerk of the supreme court, and assigned error therein.

This is an action of replevin in the circuit court of Smith county, by the Nashville Insurance and Trust company against Alexander and others. The sheriff seized the property and it was not replevi-ed by the defendants. The plaintiff declared in trover. To this declaration there was a demurrer.

James, a person of color, instituted an action of trespass vi et armis, in the circuit court of Rutherford, against Jones. Jones held James as a slave, and the action was brought to assert his right to freedom. On the trial before judge Turner and a jury, the plaintiff offered in evidence the record of suit brought by James in the circuit court of Davidson county against Prichard, which resulted in a verdict for plaintiff, by which he obtained his freedom.

This is action brought by Ezell, against the Union Bank, in the circuit court of Davidson county. It was submitted to a jury on the plea of non assumpsit by the presiding judge, Turner. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant' appealed. .

The Legislature in 184G passed a resolution which directed the Governor of the State to notify the several internal improvement companies in which the State was a stockolder under the act of 1838, ch. 107, that the dividends of the bank after payment of other charges, and the dividends on the stock of the State in such works, were insufficient to meet the interest on the State bonds issued to such companies, and upon the failure of any of said companies to meet its share of…

This is an action on the case instituted in the circuit court of Davidson. There was a judgment on demurrer (Turner, judge, presiding,) for the defendants. The plaintiff filed a transcript of the record and assigned error.

This case was tried in the circuit court of Williamson; Maney, judge, presiding. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

<p>This action was commenced by warrant for “debt due by account.” The warrant was accompanied by an affidavit in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1819, ch. 27, in which it was averred that defendant had fraudulently obtained possession of” a note. This action was misconceived, as the act authorizes suit on the note, and not on the original consideration. The statute dispenses with profert of the note, but the suit mus.t be brought and conducted in all other respects, as if the note were in the possession of plaintiff.</p>

<p>The presentment in this case was quashed by the presiding judge, Walker. The State appealed.</p>

This is a bill which was filed in the chancery court at Huntingdon. It was dismissed on demurrer' by the presiding chancellor, Jones. The plaintiff appealed. They cited 2 Story Eq. sec. 588, 589; 1 Paige Ch. Rep. 284; 2 Paige 300; 1 Ten. Rep. 286; 5 John. Ch. 228. He cited the act of 1832, chap. 90; 4 Hum. 484; 2 Hum. 115.

Dunlap and Sanderlin sued Strong by warrant, before a justice of the peace, of Shelby county. There was judgment for the defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. It was tried by judge King and a jury in the circuit court. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. The defendant appealed. He cited 2 Hum. 467. He cited act of 1835, ch. 54; 3 Hawkes 520.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered against the plaintiff, Jones, in the circuit court of Gibson, Fitzgerald, judge, presiding. The plaintiff appealed.

The grand jury of Hardin county indicted William Spencer for an assault and battery, and the defendant filed a plea which avers, that before the finding of the indictment, to wit, on the 23d day of May, 1849, he was, without his own procurement, arrested upon a State’s warrant, and brought before R. J. Wilkerson and Josiah Dodds, acting justices of the peace for said county of Hardin, for the same offence for which he is indicted, and having pleaded guilty to the same, was…

<p>1. The act of 1843, ch. Í9, authorizes the issuance of an attachment upon an affidavit, stating indebtedness, and that the defendant is absconding, or concealing himself or his effects. The affidavit in this case, states the indebtednos* and that defendant “is concealing his property and effects.” This is sufficient. The attachment may issue, although personal service may be had. The sole object of the attachment is to secure the property of the debtor, since the right to seize his person has been abrogated by the act of 1849, ch. 3.</p> <p>2. Where an action is commenced by attachment levied on property, the defendant may plead thereto without replevying the property seized.</p>

Deberry recovered judgment against Johnson & Fenner before a justice of the peace. The case was removed to the circuit court of Madison county, by a writ of certiorari, issued on the application of defendants. The petition was there dismissed by Read, the presiding judge. The Defendants appealed. They cited 8 Hum. 793. They cited 4 Hay., 142, 148, 101, 102 ; 8 3 Yerg., 408.

The indictment charged that Joseph S. Humphreys “did feloniously and fraudently forge a certain paper writing, which said paper writing is as follows, that is to say, “Mr. J. G. Bostick, you will please charge Mr. J. S. Hum-phreys’ account to us up to this date. Feb. 7th, 1849. Twyman & Tannehill,” with intent to defraud one R. B. F. Tannehill, and with intent of him, the said Joseph S. Humphreys, to pass and impose the same upon one John G. Bostick as genuine.

This case was tried by 'judge Fitzgerald and a jury, in the circuit court of Weakley. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

This is a bill which was filed in the chancery court at Trenton. It was tried by the chancellor, Jones, on bill, answer, replication and proof. Decree for defendant. The complainant appealed. They cited 9 Yer. 52; 17 John. 388; 2 Peck 614. 1 Dess. 58; 4 Yer. 182; 10 Yer.' 362; 7 Yer. 476. They cited 2 Paige 497. Pitman on P. and S. 168, 170; 2 Barnw. & 0. 208; 9 Hum. 84.

This is an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, in the county of Weakly, to the circuit court of said county. It was submitted to a jury under the direction of Fitzgerald, judge, and a verdict and judgment rendered in favor of Stovall, the plaintiff, administrator of Caldwell. From this judgment the defendant. Glass, appealed.

<p>A juror in a capital felony said lie had formed an opinion in regard to the guilt of defendant, from rumor; that he did not know whether his information was derived from witnesses or from any person who knew the facts; that he did not know who the witnesses were, and that if the. proof turned out difterently from rumor, he could do justice to the prisoner. The court say that a mere hypothetical opinion or loose impression, having no foundation to rest on, will not disqualify a person as a juror; that in testing his competen^ the character of the impression made on his mind is of more consequence than the source from which he derives his information, and that in this case the opinion formed was of, so fixed a character, that it required evidence to remove that opinion, and he was therefore incompetent.</p>

Phillips sued Steele in case for slander, in the circuit court of Weakley. Verdict for plaintiff for seven thousand dollars, and judgment thereupon by the presiding judge, Read. The defendant appealed. \

Nancy Gant filed her bill in the chancery court at Trenton, against W. Gant, for a divorce and alimony. The bill alleges that she owned slaves and other property at the time of her ¡(narriage with defendant, and that the defendant owned slaves and other property. It charges the defendant with adultery.

This case was tried in the circuit • of Haywood. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; Fitzgerald, judge, presiding. The defendant appealed.

Assumpsit by Hill against Miller, Dunn and Payne, in the commercial and criminal court at Memphis. Plea non-assumpsit. There was a jury and verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment thereupon, by King, the presiding judge. The defendants, Miller and Dunn, appealed. They cited 14 East 226; 7 Johnson 308; 2 Greenleaf’s Ev. sec, 113, 116. He cited U. S. Stat. 303, ch. 8; 8 John. 213; Abb. on Shipping, 168.

Benjamin Wroe having made his will, died in Virginia, in 1812. His will contained the following clause: “I lend to my daughter, Jane Settle, during her natural life, a negro woman named Susannah, and her increase, and at her death the woman and her increase to be divided between the heirs of her body.” The negro woman had thirteen children three of whom were sold by D. Settle; Jane and D. Settle had ten children.

This is an indictment for stealing a bank bill for twenty dollars on the Bank of Tennessee, the property of Shull. On the trial before Hardin, special judge, in McNairy county, Pace testified that he and Adams, as magistrates, tried and committed the defendant; that on that trial D. H. Rushing, deceased, testified.

Patterson & Grosvenor sued McKinney in the commercial and criminal court at Memphis, in debt, as partners. Plea, nil debet. An account for eighty-five dollars was presented to defendant. He said he had a claim against Col. Patterson, which he expected would offset said account.

This bill by Farris & Hampton against Martin, executor, was filed in the chancery court at Dresden. The defendant filed a cross bill; and at the hearing the presiding chancellor, Jones, dismissed the bill, and complainants appealed.

This action was commenced by attachment in the criminal and commercial court at Memphis. There was a judgment for the plaintiff; King, judge, presiding.

This is an action for forcible entry and detainer of real estate, instituted before justices of the peace in Benton county, by Settle against Settle. It was taken by appeal to the circuit, when it was submitted to a jury by the presiding judge, Fitzgerald, and a verdict and judgment rendered for the plaintiff Defendant appealed.

The Planters’ Bank sued Maxwell and others, in the circuit court of Shelby. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, Dunlap, judge, presiding. Defendants appealed, They cited 17 Mass. 94; 2 Mason 31; 14 Mass. 29; Ang. & Am. Corp. 242, 246. They cited 6 Porter’s R. 116; 12 N. Hamp. 549; 1 S. & M. 241; 7 Iiow. 230; 18 Pick. Folger vs. Chase, 3 Mason, 506; 11 Wheat. 64.,

This is an action instituted in the circuit court of Shelby county, by Rembert against Hally and Haskins. There was a judgment for defendants, King, judge, presiding. The plaintiff appealed.

This case was tried by Hardin, special judge, in the county of Perry. Defendant was found guilty, by a jury, of murder in the second degree, and judgment of death ■was entered against him. lie appealed.

This is a petition which was filed in the circuit court held for the county of Decatur. The presiding judge, Read, on demurrer, dismissed the petition. The defendant appealed.

Page executed a note to Sheeks; Sheeks sold and assigned the note to Long, and Long recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace for the county of Obion against Page and Sheeks. W. & H. Carter were indebted to Page by note, which was pledged to Adams. Long filed his bill in the chancery court at Dresden, against Page, Adams, and the Carters, to subject the surplus of this note on the Carters to the satisfaction of his debt.

Rice and Hathaway, the endorsees of a bill of exchange, instituted an action of assumpsit in the circuit court of Shelby county, against the Memphis City Hotel Company, Parks and Ragland, endorsers. There was a verdict and judgment (Dunlap, judge, presiding,) for the plaintiffs against the company, and against Parks, and verdict and judgment for Ragland. From this judgment in favor of Ragland the plaintiffs appealed.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Brownsville, by Cherry’s executors against Green, Clements, and wife. There was a decree (Jones, chancellor,) for the complainants. Defendants appealed.

This bill was filed in the chancery, court at Hunting-don, and was dismissed by the presiding chancellor, Jones, on demurrer. The complainant appealed.

Bowers brought this action of covenant against Sto-vall, in the circuit court of Weakley. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; Fitzgerald, judge, presiding. Stovall appealed. Writs of error and super-sedeas.

This case was tried in the circuit court of Carroll, by a jury, under the direction oí judge Fitzgerald. Verdict and judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

This is an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace to the circuit court of Shelby. It was tried in that court ‘by judge King and a jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendants appealed. He cited 5 Hum. 411, 413; Meigs’ Dig. p. 418, 419; 3 Yerg., 463; Peck., 275.

This bill was filed by McKeown in the chancery court at Trenton, against Cameron’s heirs. It was dismissed at the hearing on bill, answer and proof, by Jones, chancellor. Complainant appealed.

Judgment was rendered in this case in the circuit court of Madison, in favor of Starke, chairman of the county court, against Perry and others; Read, judge, presiding. The defendants appealed.

This bill was filed in the chancery court at Trenton, by Knuckolls against Lea. It was heard on bill, answer, replication and proof, by chancellor Jones. He dismissed the bill and defendant appealed.

<p>1. Where the consent of a trustee is made necessary to the execution of a power, that, like any other condition, must be strictly complied with, and if the trustee whose consent is necessary, die before the execution of the power and without having assented to it, the power is gone; and a court of chancery has no power to control such trustee or give consent after his death.</p> <p>2. Dunn by will gave a tradt of land and a slave to his wife for life; the balance of his estate, both real and personal, to his daughter for life, with remainder to her children. It is not to be presumed that he intended to die intestate as to any portion of his estate, and therefore at the death of his wife, the tract of land and slave went to his daughter for life, with remainder to her children.</p> <p>3. Deadrick having derived estate from his father, died intestate and without issue, leaving brothers of the whole blood, and a sister of the half blood on the part of the mother. It is held that the brothers and sister of the half blood take the personalty in equal shares, and that the second husband, in right of his deceased wife, who died after Deadrick, was entitled to her share.</p> <p>4. Armour being entitled in right of his deceased wife, to a distributive share of the estate of one of her children deceased, in the hands of a guardian, obtained his discharge in bankruptcy, without having surrendered this interest. It is held that when he was declared a bankrupt, his entire estate, in possession or action, was vested, by act of law, in the as-signee in bankruptcy, in as full and ample a manner as if he had executed a deed of assignment, and if the assignee abandons it by failure to sue as prescribed by act of Congress, such failure confers no light on the bankrupt to such estate.</p> <p>5. The husband, Armour, received funds which belonged to his wife for life, with remainder to her children. He is held to account after the death of the wife therefor, and for waste suffered during the life estate.</p>