147
Argued and submitted July 30, 2018, affirmed October 16, 2019, petition for
review allowed March 5, 2020 (366 Or 257)
See later issue Oregon Reports
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CATRICE PITTMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
16CN03799; A162950
452 P3d 1011
During a criminal investigation, the police seized a smartphone from defendant’s purse and subsequently obtained a warrant to search its contents. The
police were unable to access the contents, however, without the smartphone’s
passcode. The state moved to compel defendant to disclose the smartphone’s
passcode, and, after hearing argument from the parties, the trial court granted
the motion. Based on that ruling, the court ordered defendant to enter the correct
passcode into the smartphone. When defendant failed to do so (twice entering
an incorrect passcode), the court held her in contempt. On appeal of the contempt judgment, defendant argues that ordering her to enter the passcode into
the smartphone violated Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution and
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, both of which prevent
the government from compelling a person to testify against herself in a criminal
prosecution. Held: The act of entering a passcode into a smartphone is testimonial in nature and therefore subject to protection under Article I, section 12,
and the Fifth Amendment. And a court order constitutes compulsion. However,
applying the “foregone conclusion” doctrine recognized in Fisher v. United States,
425 US 391, 411,
96 S Ct 1569, 1579,
48 L Ed 2d 39 (1976), the trial court did not
err in this case.
Affirmed.
Tracy A. Prall, Judge.
Sarah Laidlaw, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
148 State v. Pittman
Before Hadlock, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
Aoyagi, Judge.
AOYAGI, J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 300 Or App 147 (2019) 149
AOYAGI, J.
This appeal presents a question of first impression
for us under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution
and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
whether a court ordering a suspect to enter the passcode
into a smartphone, which the police have lawfully seized
and have a warrant to search but are unable to access without the passcode, violates the suspect’s rights against compelled self-incrimination. In this case, defendant was held in
contempt after failing to comply with a court order to enter
the correct passcode into a seized iPhone.
We agree with the trial court and the parties that
the act of entering a passcode into a smartphone is testimonial in nature. It communicates an assertion of fact—
specifically that the suspect knows the passcode and, by
extension, has access to the device (as its owner or otherwise)—and therefore is subject to protection under Article I,
section 12, and the Fifth Amendment. We also agree with
the trial court and the parties that it was appropriate to
apply the “foregone conclusion” doctrine recognized under
the Fifth Amendment and, as a matter of first impression,
adopt that doctrine for purposes of Article I, section 12. As
for how that doctrine applies in this context, we conclude
that, before the court could order defendant to enter the
passcode into the iPhone, the state had to prove that defendant’s knowledge of the passcode was a foregone conclusion.
The state did not, however, have to prove that the contents
of the iPhone were a foregone conclusion. Given the latter
conclusion, defendant’s challenge to the court’s ruling (as
presented in her opening brief) is not viable, and we affirm.
FACTS
Defendant was the suspected driver in a singlevehicle accident in which a car struck a tree. At the hospital,
hospital employees found white powder, drug paraphernalia, and cash on her person, which they gave to the police.
Defendant also had a purse with her at the hospital; the
purse contained an iPhone.
Based on evidence collected, the police suspected
that defendant had operated a vehicle under the influence
150 State v. Pittman
of intoxicants, operated a vehicle while distracted, delivered
methamphetamine, and/or conspired to deliver methamphetamine. As relevant here, the police obtained a warrant
to search the iPhone in defendant’s purse. The police soon
determined that they could not access the iPhone without a
passcode. According to the police department’s technological investigator, it would take “approximately a thousand
years” using “the fastest computer we have access to” to
access the information in the iPhone without the passcode.
Further, the investigator testified, an iPhone can be set to
“delete itself” after 10 incorrect passcode entries, posing an
additional risk.
The state moved to compel defendant to disclose the
iPhone’s passcode. Anticipating a constitutional challenge,
the state asserted that, to the extent that disclosing a passcode is a testimonial act, in that it “inferentially communicate[s] that [defendant] ha[s] control over—or at least access
to—the phone,” the trial court nonetheless could compel the
disclosure, because it was already a foregone conclusion that
defendant had control over the phone. As discussed later,
“foregone conclusion” is a term of art from Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence. Defendant opposed the state’s motion, arguing, first, that the warrant was overbroad and, second, that
compelling her to disclose the passcode to the iPhone would
violate Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment. On
the latter issue, defendant focused on the act being testimonial in nature and did not directly address the “foregone
conclusion” issue. In reply, the state defended the warrant,
and it reiterated its “foregone conclusion” argument in more
detail.
The trial court held a hearing on the state’s motion.
The state argued, consistently with its briefing, that it was
a foregone conclusion that defendant knew the passcode
and had access to the iPhone and that compelling her to
disclose the passcode therefore would not violate Article I,
section 12, or the Fifth Amendment. In response, defendant
argued that the foregone conclusion doctrine did not apply
because the state failed to establish that the “desired evidence” actually existed on the iPhone, that defendant was in
control of the iPhone and its passcode, and that the “desired
evidence” on the iPhone was authentic. Defendant asserted
Cite as 300 Or App 147 (2019) 151
that the state had to satisfy all three requirements for the
doctrine to apply.1 The state argued in rebuttal that it had
established that defendant was in control of the iPhone and
passcode and that requiring it to prove what was on the
iPhone before searching it would “put[ ] the cart before the
horse.” In the state’s view, there was no need for it to prove
what was on the iPhone, beyond meeting the probable-cause
requirements for the warrant.
After the hearing, the trial court issued a letter
opinion, ruling in the state’s favor on the “foregone conclusion” issue and also ruling, subject to certain limitations,
that the warrant was not overbroad. The trial court began
its analysis by making several statements about “probable
cause,” including that there was “probable cause to believe
that defendant has knowledge of the passcode and contents
of the iPhone.” The court then described its understanding
of the foregone conclusion doctrine in a manner consistent
with defendant’s argument—and inconsistent with the
state’s argument—but nonetheless agreed with the state
as to the result, i.e., that ordering defendant to disclose the
passcode would not violate Article I, section 12, or the Fifth
Amendment:
“The foregone conclusion exception applies when the state
can prove its independent knowledge of three elements:
the documents’ existence, the documents’ authenticity,
and respondent’s possession or control of the document.
The court finds, based on the evidence found and Officer
Boyce’s training and experience, that it is a foregone conclusion that the iPhone will contain evidence of the crimes
of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit delivery of a controlled substance.”
On the same day that the trial court issued its letter opinion, the parties appeared before the court, and the
court orally ordered defendant to enter the passcode into
1
The trial court gave defendant leave to file a supplemental brief on the
foregone conclusion issue after the hearing. She did so. As she had at the hearing,
defendant argued in her supplemental brief that, to satisfy the foregone conclusion doctrine, the state had to prove that the information the state was seeking
was on the iPhone, that the iPhone was in defendant’s control or that she knew
the passcode, and that the state had “actual knowledge of incriminating evidence
on the phone.” (Emphasis in original.)
152 State v. Pittman
the iPhone. An officer observed defendant enter “123456,”
which failed to unlock the iPhone. The court again ordered
defendant “to enter the appropriate code,” warning her that,
“[i]f you enter a wrong code again, you would be in contempt
of court.” Defendant again entered “123456,” which again
failed. The court found defendant in contempt of court and
sentenced her to 30 days in jail.
Defendant appeals the contempt judgment, challenging both the underlying order requiring her to disclose
the passcode and the contempt judgment itself, which the
state agrees is permissible under the circumstances of this
case.2 Defendant raises two assignments of error. First, she
argues that the trial court erred in ordering her to enter
the passcode into the iPhone, because it violated her rights
under Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment. We
address that issue below. Second, she argues that the trial
court plainly erred in holding her in contempt, because the
evidence was insufficient to establish a “willful” violation.
Applying the standard for plain error review, we reject the
second assignment of error without written discussion.
OREGON CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
We begin with Article I, section 12, because we typically “consider[ ] state constitutional claims before considering federal constitutional claims.” State v. Cookman, 324 Or
19, 25,
920 P2d 1086 (1996).
Under Article I, section 12, a person cannot be
compelled to testify against himself or herself in a criminal prosecution. Or Const, Art I, § 12 (“No person shall …
be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against
himself.”). That protection applies “to any kind of judicial or
nonjudicial procedure in the course of which the state seeks
to compel testimony that may be used against the witness
2
Typically, on appeal of a contempt judgment, the defendant cannot collaterally attack the underlying order. State ex rel Mix v. Newland, 277 Or 191, 200,
560 P2d 255 (1977). However, an exception applies when the defendant had no
meaningful opportunity to obtain appellate review of the underlying order before
violating it and when compliance with the order would have resulted in irremediable harm. State v. Crenshaw,
307 Or 160, 165-68,
764 P2d 1372 (1988). As the
state notes, in this case, defendant requested a stay of the underlying order so
that she could pursue mandamus, but that request was denied, and the court’s
order required immediate compliance.
Cite as
300 Or App 147 (2019) 153
in a criminal prosecution.” State v. Langan,
301 Or 1, 5,
718 P2d 719 (1986). There are three requirements to trigger Article I, section 12, protection: (1) testimony; (2) that
is compelled; and (3) that could be used against the person
in a criminal prosecution. State v. Fish,
321 Or 48, 53,
893
P3d 1023 (1995). “Testimony” includes not only speech but
also acts that communicate a person’s “beliefs, knowledge,
or state of mind.” Id. at 56. “For an individual to reveal his
or her thoughts is necessarily to make a communication,
whether by words or actions.” Id.
In this case, there is no real dispute that the three
requirements for Article I, section 12, protection are met.
The trial court necessarily concluded that the act of entering a passcode into an iPhone is testimonial, that a court
order is compulsory, and that the state could use defendant’s
implicit testimony against her in a criminal prosecution—
otherwise the court never would have reached the “foregone
conclusion” issue. The state also appropriately concedes each
of those points on appeal, and we agree. The act of entering a passcode into a smartphone is testimonial in nature,
because it requires the suspect to reveal her knowledge
of the passcode and, by extension, allows a factual inference that she has access to the device and its contents.3 A
court order is an “obvious example[ ]” of compulsion. Fish,
321 Or at 57. And there is no question that, if incriminating evidence is found on the iPhone, evidence of defendant’s
access to the iPhone could be used against her in a criminal
prosecution.
The dispute in this case instead centers on the trial
court’s application of the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, a
doctrine first articulated in Fisher v. United States, 425 US
3
We consider in this case only the act that defendant was ordered to perform:
entry of a numeric passcode into a smartphone. Most courts to consider the issue
have agreed that that is a testimonial act. See G. A. Q. L. v. State, 257 So3d 1058,
1061 (Fla Dist Ct App 2018) (collecting cases). By contrast, the law is far less
developed regarding compelling the use of a fingerprint or other biometric data to
unlock an electronic device. We express no opinion on whether compelling someone to use their fingerprint or other biometric data to unlock an electronic device
would implicate Article I, section 12. Because defendant has not raised the issue
or made any argument regarding it, we also express no opinion as to any possible
distinction between ordering someone to enter a passcode unobserved, ordering
someone to enter a passcode while observed, or ordering someone to disclose a
passcode orally or in writing.
154 State v. Pittman
391, 411, 96 S Ct 1569,
48 L Ed 2d 39 (1976), in the analogous context of the Fifth Amendment. As discussed more
later, the United States Supreme Court held in Fisher that
the compulsion of a physical act with a testimonial aspect
does not violate the Fifth Amendment so long as the “testimony” at issue is a foregone conclusion. Here, the trial
court concluded that there was “probable cause to believe
that defendant has knowledge of the passcode and contents
of the iPhone” and that it was “a foregone conclusion that
the iPhone will contain evidence of the crimes of unlawful
delivery of a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit
delivery of a controlled substance.” On that basis, the court
concluded that compelling defendant to enter the passcode
would not violate her rights under Article I, section 12, or
the Fifth Amendment.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred in its application of the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.
In her opening brief,4 defendant contends, as she did in the
trial court, that, for the doctrine to apply, the state had to
establish both that the contents of the iPhone were a foregone conclusion (known to the state with “reasonable particularity”) and that defendant’s knowledge of the passcode
was a foregone conclusion. Defendant argues that the trial
court erred in finding that the iPhone’s contents were a foregone conclusion, because, in her words, “the content of the
sought evidence was unknown to police” and “[t]he state did
not state with any reasonable particularity the contents of
the phone.” As for her knowledge of the passcode, defendant
addresses that issue in only three sentences—she points out
that she has never admitted to owning the iPhone, acknowledges that its presence in her purse “permitted an inference
that [she] owned the phone,” but asserts that typing in the
passcode “would be new and stronger evidence that [she]
owned the phone.”
In response, the state argues that, to rely on the
“foregone conclusion” doctrine, it needed to establish only
that it was a foregone conclusion that defendant knew the
4
We limit our discussion to the arguments contained in defendant’s opening
brief and do not address new arguments made for the first time at oral argument.
See Colton and Colton, 297 Or App 532, 547-48,
443 P3d 1160 (2019).
Cite as
300 Or App 147 (2019) 155
passcode—and that it met that requirement. The state
asserts that it was not required to prove anything about
the contents of the iPhone. Thus, the state implicitly disagrees with the trial court’s approach—which included
determining that the contents of the iPhone were a foregone
conclusion—but it defends the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that ordering defendant to enter the passcode would not
violate Article I, section 12.
Given the parties’ arguments, we must consider
whether and how the “foregone conclusion” doctrine applies
under Article I, section 12. Because there is no Oregon case
law on point, we begin by describing the doctrine as articulated by the United States Supreme Court for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment.
Under the Fifth Amendment, like Article I, section 12, the government generally cannot compel a person
to commit an act that is “testimonial” in nature and that
can be used against the person in a criminal prosecution.
United States v. Hubbell, 530 US 27, 34-35,
120 S Ct 2037,
147 L Ed 2d 24 (2000). An act is “testimonial” for Fifth
Amendment purposes if it communicates “either express or
implied assertions of fact or belief.”
Id. at 35. We apply a
similar standard under Article I, section 12. Fish,
321 Or
at 56 (“Facts giving rise to inferences, no less than direct
statements, communicating an individual’s state of mind is
evidence that is subject to the right against compelled self-incrimination.”). Both the United States Supreme Court and
the Oregon Supreme Court have adopted a rule of thumb to
identify testimonial acts: If answering a question or complying with a directive requires the person to choose between
telling the truth or telling a lie, it is likely testimonial in
nature. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz,
496 US 582, 597,
110
S Ct 2638,
110 L Ed 2d 528 (1990) (“Whenever a suspect
is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an
express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the ‘trilemma’ of truth, falsity, or silence, and hence
the response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a
testimonial component.” (Footnote omitted.)); Fish,
321 Or
at 57-58 (positing the same “cruel trilemma” for purposes of
Article I, section 12).
156 State v. Pittman
The United States Supreme Court has long held
that the act of producing documents in response to a government subpoena may be sufficiently testimonial to trigger
Fifth Amendment protection—and we briefly discuss that
case law because it is where the “foregone conclusion” doctrine arose. The fact that the subpoenaed documents themselves may contain incriminating information is irrelevant
to the Fifth Amendment analysis, because they were created voluntarily, not under compulsion. Hubbell, 530 US at
36. Nonetheless, “[t]he act of producing evidence in response
to a subpoena … has communicative aspects of its own,
wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced.”
Fisher,
425 US at 410. The act of production may require
the subpoena recipient to “communicate information about
the existence, custody, and authenticity of the documents,”
making the act testimonial in nature. Hubbell,
530 US at
36-37.
In Fisher, the Court concluded that a government
subpoena did not violate the Fifth Amendment where the
existence and location of the subpoenaed documents was a
“foregone conclusion,” such that the act of producing them
was not testimonial in nature. 425 US at 411-12. In that
case, Internal Revenue Service agents served summonses
on taxpayers’ attorneys to obtain documents prepared by the
taxpayers’ accountants. Id. at 394. Because the IRS already
knew what documents existed and where they were located,
the Court concluded that any tacit admissions communicated by the act of production would “add[ ] little or nothing
to the sum total of the Government’s information.” Id. at
411. The “existence and location of the papers [was] a foregone conclusion,” so “[t]he question [was] not of testimony
but of surrender.”5 Id. This is sometimes called the “foregone
conclusion exception” to Fifth Amendment protection. E.g.,
G. A. Q. L. v. State, 257 So3d 1058, 1063 (Fla Dist Ct App
2018) (“In general, if the state can meet the requirements
of the foregone conclusion exception, it may compel otherwise ostensibly self-incriminating testimonial production of
information.”).
5
We note that, in Fisher, the subpoena recipient’s personal knowledge of the
existence, location, and authenticity of the subpoenaed documents did not have
independent significance as incriminating evidence.
Cite as 300 Or App 147 (2019) 157
By contrast, in Hubbell, the Court concluded that a
subpoena violated the Fifth Amendment where it was written so broadly as to require the defendant to apply his own
mental processes to identify and assemble responsive documents for the prosecution, in a manner akin to answering a
detailed interrogatory or series of deposition questions:
“It is apparent from the text of the subpoena itself that
the prosecutor needed [the defendant’s] assistance both to
identify potential sources of information and to produce
those sources. Given the breadth of the description of the 11
categories of documents called for by the subpoena, the collection and production of the materials demanded was tantamount to answering a series of interrogatories asking a
witness to disclose the existence and location of particular
documents fitting certain broad descriptions. The assembly
of literally hundreds of pages of material in response to a
request for ‘any and all documents reflecting, referring, or
relating to any direct or indirect sources of money or other
things of value received by or provided to’ an individual or
members of his family during a 3-year period is the functional equivalent of the preparation of an answer to either a
detailed written interrogatory or a series of oral questions
at a discovery deposition.”
530 US at 41-42 (internal citations omitted).
In Hubbell, the Court rejected the government’s
argument that the “foregone conclusion” doctrine applied.
Referring to Fisher, the Court stated, “Whatever the scope
of this ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale, the facts of this case
plainly fall outside of it.” Hubbell, 530 US at 44. “While in
Fisher the Government already knew that the documents
were in the attorneys’ possession and could independently
confirm their existence and authenticity through the
accountants who created them, here the Government has
not shown that it had any prior knowledge of either the
existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents ultimately produced by respondent.”
Id. at 44-45.
Notably, in Hubbell, the government had an opportunity
earlier in the case to demonstrate with “reasonable particularity” its independent knowledge of the requested documents’ existence and authenticity, but it could not do so.
Id. at 33.
158 State v. Pittman
Having examined Fisher and Hubbell, we understand the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, as articulated for
Fifth Amendment purposes in the context of document subpoenas, as follows. If the existence, location, and authenticity of documents is a foregone conclusion, then compelling a
person to assemble those documents for production does not
reveal the person’s mental processes and therefore is not sufficiently testimonial to trigger Fifth Amendment protection.
However, if the government has minimal information about
what documents exist or what they contain, the act of locating and selecting the documents to produce may require the
subpoena recipient to use his or her own mental processes
in a way that renders the resulting response testimonial in
nature. That is why it matters whether the government has
identified the documents with “reasonable particularity” in
the subpoena. If it has, the government is not relying on a
testimonial aspect of the person’s act of production to make
its case but instead is only seeking to compel the surrender
of the documents. See Fisher, 425 US at 411.
The United States Supreme Court has never applied
the “foregone conclusion” doctrine to any type of compelled
act other than a document production. Nevertheless, a number of state courts and lower federal courts have applied it
to other acts, including compelled decryption of electronic
devices by entry of a password or passcode or otherwise. The
resulting decisions are markedly inconsistent. Perhaps the
most significant point of disagreement is as to what needs
to be a foregone conclusion. At least one court has said that
the password itself has to be a foregone conclusion for the
doctrine to apply—while acknowledging that the government would not need it if it were.6 Other courts have said
that it is the suspect’s knowledge of the password or passcode that must be a foregone conclusion.7 Yet others have
6
See Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va Cir 267, *4 (Va Cir Ct 2014) (“the password is not a foregone conclusion because it is not known outside of Defendant’s
mind,” and “if the password was a foregone conclusion, the Commonwealth would
not need to compel Defendant to produce it because they would already know it”).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, No 17-cr-00259-CRB-1, 2018 WL 1964588
at *1-3 (ND Cal Apr 26, 2018) (upholding magistrate judge’s order compelling the
defendant to decrypt several electronic devices—where the government established that it was a foregone conclusion that the defendant had the ability to
decrypt the devices—and rejecting proposition that the government also had to
Cite as
300 Or App 147 (2019) 159
required that the contents of the electronic device be a foregone conclusion.8
With that understanding of the genesis and current status of the “foregone conclusion” doctrine in mind,
we must first decide whether the doctrine applies under
Article I, section 12. Defendant and the state have assumed
that it does, both in the trial court and on appeal, and the
prove that the contents of the devices were a foregone conclusion); State v. Stahl,
206 So 3d 124, 136 (Fla Dist Ct App 2016) (holding that it did not violate the Fifth
Amendment to compel the defendant to produce the passcode to a cell phone,
where the government established, “based upon cellphone carrier records and
[the defendant’s] identification of the phone and the corresponding phone number, that the phone was [his] and therefore the passcode would be in [his] possession”); Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass 540, 548, 117 NE3d 702 (2019) (the
commonwealth must “establish that a defendant knows the password to decrypt
an electronic device before his or her knowledge of the password can be deemed
a foregone conclusion”); State v. Johnson,
576 SW3d 205, 227 (Mo Ct App 2019)
(“The focus of the foregone conclusion exception is the extent of the State’s knowledge of the existence of the facts conveyed through the compelled act of production,” and, when the state seeks to compel a suspect to produce the passcode to an
iPhone, “[t]he facts conveyed through his act of producing the passcode were the
existence of the passcode, his possession and control of the phone’s passcode, and
the passcode’s authenticity.”); State v. Andrews, 457 NJ Super 14, 18, 24-30, 197
A3d 200 (NJ Super Ct App Div 2018) (upholding order compelling the defendant
to disclose the passcodes for his “lawfully-seized iPhones,” because “the fact that
defendant knows the passcodes to these devices ‘adds little or nothing to the sum
total of the Government’s information,’ ” and rejecting argument that the state
needed to prove that the contents of the iPhones were a foregone conclusion (quoting Fisher,
425 US at 411)).
8
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 670 F3d 1335, 1348-49 (11th Cir 2012)
(subpoena requiring the defendant to produce decrypted versions of computer
hard drives violated Fifth Amendment, where the government “failed to show
any basis, let alone shown a basis with reasonable particularity, for its belief that
encrypted files exist on the drives, that [the defendant] has access to those files,
or that he is capable of decrypting the files”); In re Boucher,
2009 WL 424718 at
*3-4 (D Vt Feb 19, 2009) (subpoena to produce unencrypted hard drive did not
violate Fifth Amendment, where the government already knew “of the existence
and location of the Z drive and its files” and had sufficient evidence to authenticate it); G. A. Q. L., 257 So3d at 1063 (production of the passcodes to a phone could
be compelled where the state established the phone’s contents with reasonable
particularity); People v. Spicer, 2019 Ill App 3d 170814, ¶ 22,
125 NE3d 1286
(2019) (concluding that the state had to identify the documents on a cell phone
with reasonable particularity to rely on the foregone conclusion doctrine); see also
United States v. Apple MacPro Computer,
851 F3d 238, 248 (3d Cir 2017) (magistrate judge did not plainly err in rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge to subpoena requiring the defendant to produce decrypted computer hard drives, where
the defendant did not contest that the drives were his and the government had
a substantial amount of evidence about their contents). Notably, in some cases,
such as In re Grand Jury Subpoena, courts have required both the defendant’s
knowledge of how to decrypt the device and the device’s contents to be foregone
conclusions.
160 State v. Pittman
trial court applied it without any separate discussion of
Article I, section 12. Unfortunately, we have received no
briefing on the issue as a result. Ultimately, however, we
believe it is appropriate to recognize the doctrine under
Article I, section 12. The doctrine as we understand it is
grounded in logic, rather than legal principles unique to the
Fifth Amendment. Moreover, other relevant aspects of our
approach to Article I, section 12, have closely tracked the
Fifth Amendment, as discussed earlier. We therefore agree
with the trial court and the parties that the “foregone conclusion” doctrine applies under Article I, section 12.
As far as how the “foregone conclusion” doctrine
applies in this context, both parties disagree with aspects
of the trial court’s decision. Defendant argues that the state
had to establish both the contents of the iPhone and defendant’s knowledge of the passcode as foregone conclusions,
but she disagrees with the court’s determination that the
iPhone’s contents were a foregone conclusion. For its part,
the state argues that it only had to establish defendant’s
knowledge of the passcode as a foregone conclusion—which
is not how the court approached it—but it defends the court’s
ultimate conclusion that compelling disclosure of the passcode would not violate Article I, section 12.
After careful consideration of the principles underlying the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, we agree with the
state that it is only the testimonial aspect of the compelled
act that must be a foregone conclusion, because it is only
the testimonial aspect of the compelled act that is protected
under Article I, section 12. Here, the testimonial aspect
of entering the correct passcode into the iPhone is that
it reveals defendant’s “knowledge” of the passcode. Fish,
321 Or at 56 (acts that communicate a person’s “beliefs,
knowledge, or state of mind” are testimonial); see also, e.g.,
G. A. Q. L., 257 So3d at 1061 (the act of revealing a password “asserts a fact: that the defendant knows the password”). The act communicates to the court, the prosecution,
and potentially a jury that defendant knows the passcode
and, by extension, has access to the device and its contents.
As such, the state had to establish that defendant’s knowledge of the passcode was a foregone conclusion before the
Cite as
300 Or App 147 (2019) 161
trial court could compel defendant to reveal that knowledge
through a testimonial act.
The state did not need to establish, however, that
the contents of the iPhone were a foregone conclusion. In
our view, the courts that have adopted that approach under
the Fifth Amendment have transposed Fisher’s “existence,
location, authenticity” framework for document subpoenas
to a very different context without adequately grappling
with the significance of the different context. When the government subpoenas documents, it is not in possession of the
documents. In that context, although the Fifth Amendment
does not protect against the production of the documents
themselves, the defendant’s act of selecting and assembling
responsive documents may reveal the existence, location,
and authenticity of the documents in a way that is testimonial. By contrast, when the government seeks to compel
disclosure of the passcode to an electronic device that is
already lawfully in its possession, the government already
has possession of the data on the device. The act of entering
the passcode reveals only that defendant has access to that
data; it says nothing about the data itself. In that vein, it
bears remembering that Article I, section 9, and the Fourth
Amendment ensure that the seizure of the data itself is lawful, while Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment
protect only against compelled testimony. As the Court
put it in Fisher, “the Fifth Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination, not the disclosure of private
information.” 425 US at 401 (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted).
As recently and aptly stated by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in applying both the Fifth
Amendment and its own state constitution, “In the context
of compelled decryption, the only fact conveyed by compelling a defendant to enter the password to an encrypted electronic device is that the defendant knows the password, and
can therefore access the device.” Commonwealth v. Jones,
481 Mass 540, 547-48, 117 NE3d 702 (2019). As such, when
the state relies on the foregone conclusion doctrine, what it
must establish is that the suspect’s knowledge of the passcode is a foregone conclusion, not that the contents of the
162 State v. Pittman
device are a foregone conclusion. See, e.g., id. at 548; State v.
Stahl, 206 So3d 124, 136 (Fla Dist Ct App 2016) (“To know
whether providing the passcode implies testimony that is
a foregone conclusion, the relevant question is whether the
State has established that it knows … that the passcode
exists, is within the accused’s possession or control, and is
authentic. The question is not the State’s knowledge of the
contents of the phone; the State has not requested the contents of the phone ….” (Underscoring in original and internal citations omitted.)); State v. Johnson,
576 SW3d 205, 227
(Mo Ct App 2019) (similar); State v. Andrews, 457 NJ Super
14, 24, 197 A3d 200 (NJ Ct App Div 2018) (similar).9
That brings us to the disposition of this case. In
her opening brief, defendant argues that “the content of the
sought evidence was unknown to police,” that “[t]he state
did not state with any reasonable particularity the contents
of the phone,” and that the trial court therefore erred in ruling that the iPhone’s contents were a foregone conclusion.
Because we conclude that the state did not need to prove
that the iPhone’s contents were a foregone conclusion, defendant cannot obtain reversal on that basis.
At oral argument, defendant challenged a different
aspect of the trial court’s ruling, specifically its determination that defendant knew the passcode to the iPhone, which
the court phrased in terms of “probable cause.” That is not
an argument that defendant makes in her opening brief.
The opening brief touches only briefly on defendant’s knowledge of the passcode—admitting that the iPhone’s presence
in her purse “permit[s] an inference that [she] owned the
phone” but asserting that typing in the passcode “would be
new and stronger evidence that [she] owned the phone”—
and does not identify any purported error by the trial court
on that issue. To the extent that defendant intended to
9
See also Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 Texas L Rev 767, 768-70 (2019) (reviewing nationwide case law
applying the foregone conclusion doctrine in the context of court orders to decrypt
electronic devices, and ultimately arguing that the doctrine should be understood such that “the Fifth Amendment poses no barrier to compelled decryption
as long as the government has independent knowledge that the suspect knows
the password and the government presents the password prompt to decrypt the
device to the suspect”).
Cite as 300 Or App 147 (2019) 163
challenge that aspect of the trial court’s ruling, particularly
the court’s use of “probable cause” language, defendant did
not develop the argument sufficiently for us to consider it.
See State v. Dawson,
277 Or App 187, 190,
369 P3d 1244
(2016) (declining to consider inadequately developed argument); Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific,
186 Or App 696, 700 n 2,
64 P3d 1193 (2003) (it is not our
proper function “to make or develop a party’s argument
when that party has not endeavored to do so itself”). And we
will not consider arguments made for the first time at oral
argument. Colton and Colton,
297 Or App 532, 547-48,
443
P3d 1160 (2019).10
We reject the first assignment of error as it pertains
to Article I, section 12.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Having rejected defendant’s argument under Article I,
section 12, we must next consider her argument under the
Fifth Amendment to see whether the result is any different under federal law. See US Const, Amend V (“No person
… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself[.]”); Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757,
760,
86 S Ct 1826,
16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966) (the Fourteenth
Amendment “secures against state invasion” that same privilege). Neither the Oregon Supreme Court nor the United
States Supreme Court has addressed whether a court ordering a suspect to enter the passcode into an electronic device
violates the Fifth Amendment, so there is no binding authority on point. See J. M. v. Oregon Youth Authority,
288 Or App
642, 646,
406 P3d 1127 (2017) (“The only federal court that
controls over the Oregon Supreme Court on matters of federal law is the United States Supreme Court.”).
In the trial court and on appeal, defendant has
made the same arguments under the Oregon and federal
constitutions; that is, she argues for the same analysis and
10
We do not mean to suggest that a properly raised challenge to the trial
court’s passcode-knowledge determination necessarily would have been successful. To the contrary, we express no opinion on an issue that raises complicated
questions—such as whether a foregone-conclusion determination is a legal ruling
or a factual finding and, if it is a factual finding, what standard of proof applies—
that have not been briefed.
164 State v. Pittman
the same result under both.11 The state also argues that the
analysis is the same. We have found no reason to interpret
the Fifth Amendment differently than Article I, section 12,
for present purposes. Accordingly, we independently apply
the same analysis under the Fifth Amendment as we did
under Article I, section 12, and reach the same result.
Affirmed.
11
Again, we do not consider arguments made for the first time at oral argument. Colton, 297 Or App at 547-48.