State v. D. S.

                                 311

          Submitted April 5, 2017, affirmed December 11, 2019


                  In the Matter of D. S.,
         a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                           v.
                          D. S.,
                        Appellant.
               Douglas County Circuit Court
                  16CC03165; A162412
                              

   William A. Marshall, Judge.
   Joseph DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the
brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge,
and Linder, Senior Judge.
   PER CURIAM
   Affirmed.
312                                                 State v. D. S.

         PER CURIAM
         Appellant appeals a judgment committing her to
the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period
not to exceed 180 days. The trial court committed appellant on the ground that her mental illness made her unable
to provide for her basic needs (and one additional ground).
ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B). Appellant contends that the evidence
is insufficient to support her commitment on either ground.
We affirm because the evidence is sufficient to support the
basic-needs commitment under our recent decision in State
v. M. A. E., 

, 

 (2019).
         Our review is for legal error. State v. S. R., 

, 

 (2014). M. A. E. explained the
standard for a basic-needs commitment under current ORS
426.005(1)(f)(B), under which appellant was committed:
   “[A] person meets the ‘basic needs’ definition of a ‘[p]erson
   with mental illness’ under ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) if the person is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs
   in a way that leaves the person at nonspeculative risk of
   ‘serious physical harm’—meaning that the person’s safe
   survival will be compromised—in the near future, even
   though that risk is not imminent.”
M. A. E., 299 Or App at 240 (second brackets in M. A. E.).
There, we concluded that evidence that the appellant’s mental illness would prevent her from obtaining food absent
commitment was sufficient to support a basic-needs commitment. After noting that some of the evidence was too conclusory to support commitment, we explained that some was
“barely” adequate:
   “Nonetheless, other evidence in the record adequately—if
   barely—supports an inference that appellant would quickly
   suffer harm if she were released from the hospital, stopped
   taking her medications, and decompensated. Specifically,
   [appellant’s treating psychiatrist] testified that providers
   like ‘soup kitchens’ would not be willing to serve appellant
   if she appeared in the psychotic, agitated, and violent state
   that likely would result if she were released. Moreover, [the
   psychiatrist] believes that appellant would not be able to
   make food arrangements for herself in that unmedicated
   state.”
Id. at 241.
Cite as 

 (2019)                             313

         The record in this case contains evidence virtually
identical to that we deemed “barely” adequate, but adequate nonetheless, in M. A. E. Specifically, it contains evidence permitting the finding that appellant would not be
able to meet her food needs. Like the treating psychiatrist in
M. A. E., appellant’s treating psychiatrist testified that, in
his opinion, appellant would not “be able to go into a store,
or a restaurant, or a shelter that provides social services
and obtain what she needs to eat” and that she would not,
in her condition, be able to obtain food, shelter, or medical
care. Appellant’s daughter, who had brought appellant to the
hospital shortly before the commitment hearing, testified
that, at that time, appellant lacked the ability to buy food
for herself in the condition that she was in. Finally, similar
to the evidence in M. A. E. that “soup kitchens” would not
be willing to serve the appellant in her unmedicated state,
the precommitment investigator here testified that appellant would not be able to act in “a normal enough manner to
engage in transactions for food and shelter or other things
that she would need to stay alive.”
        In sum, the evidence in this case is not materially
distinguishable from that which M. A. E. held was sufficient
to support a basic-needs commitment.
        Affirmed.