485
Argued and submitted November 16, 2018; in A164540 and A164542, judgments
of forfeiture reversed; in A164506, affirmed February 26, 2020
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEVEN MAX SNELGROVE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Washington County Circuit Court
16CR50052; A164506 (Control)
A164540, A164542
462 P3d 302
In this criminal case, defendant, who was convicted of various drug offenses,
appeals from a judgment of conviction and from two judgments of forfeiture.
Defendant challenges the trial court’s authority to enter judgments forfeiting
$50,000 and $25,000 in security after he failed to appear at two pretrial hearings. Defendant asserts that, because he appeared in court within 30 days after
the court entered orders forfeiting the entire security amount, the court lacked
authority under ORS 135.280 to enter judgments of forfeiture for the entire security amount. Held: Nothing in the text or context of ORS 135.280(3) gives a trial
court authority to enter a forfeiture judgment against a defendant who appears
within 30 days of the court’s forfeiture order; rather, the statute’s text authorizes
entry of a forfeiture judgment only after the 30-day window has elapsed. Because
defendant appeared within 30 days of the court’s orders, the court erred in entering judgments of forfeiture for the entire security amount.
In A164540 and A164542, judgments of forfeiture reversed; in A164506,
affirmed.
D. Charles Bailey, Jr, Judge.
Kristin A. Carveth, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and
Matthew Maile, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Mooney, Judge.*
______________
* Mooney, J., vice Garrett, J. pro tempore.
486 State v. Snelgrove
POWERS, J.
In A164540 and A164542, judgments of forfeiture reversed;
in A164506, affirmed.
Mooney, J., dissenting.
Cite as 302 Or App 485 (2020) 487
POWERS, J.
Defendant, who was convicted of various drug
offenses, appeals from a judgment of conviction and from
two judgments of forfeiture, challenging the trial court’s
authority to enter judgments ordering $50,000 and $25,000
in security forfeited after he failed to appear at two pre-trial hearings. On appeal, defendant asserts that, because
he appeared in court within 30 days after the court entered
orders forfeiting the entire security amount, the trial court
was not statutorily authorized to enter judgments of forfeiture for the entire security amount. The state remonstrates
that although ORS 135.280(3), which we set out in full below,
specifically requires the court to enter a judgment if a defendant fails to appear within 30 days of an order of forfeiture,
the court may nevertheless enter a forfeiture judgment even
if defendant appears within the 30-day period. We review
the trial court’s interpretation for errors of law and reverse
the trial court’s judgments of forfeiture.
The pertinent facts are undisputed. After the state
charged defendant with three drug crimes, defendant was
released under a $50,000 security release agreement that,
among other requirements, mandated his appearance as
ordered by the court until he was discharged. Defendant
posted $5,000 or 10 percent of the total security amount as
a deposit required by ORS 135.265(2).1 Defendant appeared
for a September case management conference but failed to
appear as directed for the next hearing on October 3, 2016.
As a result, the trial court issued an order that provided:
“This case came before the Court for PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE. The Defendant did not appear as
required. There being no good cause for such failure to
appear, and the Court being fully advised, it is hereby
1
ORS 135.265(2) provides, in part:
“The defendant shall execute a release agreement and deposit with the
clerk of the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money
equal to 10 percent of the security amount, but in no event shall such deposit
be less than $25. The clerk shall issue a receipt for the sum deposited. Upon
depositing this sum the defendant shall be released from custody subject to
the condition that the defendant appear to answer the charge in the court
having jurisdiction on a day certain and thereafter as ordered by the court
until discharged or final order of the court.”
488 State v. Snelgrove
ORDERED that Defendant’s Personal Recognizance/
Conditional/Security Release Agreement be revoked,
that Defendant’s Security deposit be forfeited and
judgment entered for the full amount of security
release amount, and that a Bench Warrant be issued for
Defendant’s failure to appear in the amount of $25,000.”
(Capitalization, boldface, and italics in original.) Six days
later, defendant was arrested on the warrant and appeared
in custody the next day on October 10, 2016. Defendant
then entered into another security release agreement in the
amount of $25,000. He again posted 10 percent of the security amount, which amounted to a $2,500 deposit, and was
released.
Thereafter, defendant made his court appearances
as required, but after his trial was reset for lack of judicial
resources, he again failed to appear on January 27, 2017.
The trial court issued a warrant for his arrest, entered an
order forfeiting the $2,500 deposit, and ordered a judgment
to be entered for the entire $25,000 in security. Eight days
later, defendant was arrested on the warrant and he later
appeared in court on February 6, 2017. He remained in custody until he pleaded guilty to the original drug charges.
At sentencing, defendant moved for an order remitting his security arguing that (1) there was good cause for
the failures to appear because, in both instances, he had
been trying to find a place to store his personal belongings
in anticipation of being evicted, and (2) ORS 135.280(3) foreclosed the court’s authority to enter judgments of forfeiture
because he had appeared within 30 days of the date of each
failure to appear. The court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that good cause did not exist to set aside the orders
and remit his security. The court entered the judgments of
forfeiture at issue in this appeal.2
On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial
court’s determination that he failed to establish good cause
2
On appeal, the state correctly acknowledges that both judgments incorrectly state that defendant failed to appear within 30 days of the respective forfeiture orders. As described earlier, defendant appeared—albeit only because he
was arrested—within 30 days of each order. Given our disposition, however, we
need not address those factual errors in the judgments.
Cite as 302 Or App 485 (2020) 489
for failing to appear in October and January; rather, the
issue as framed by the parties’ arguments is a narrow one:
Was the trial court authorized to enter forfeiture judgments
despite defendant appearing in the 30-day window created
by ORS 135.280(3)? Defendant argues that, although ORS
135.280(3) requires a forfeiture judgment to be entered if an
absconding defendant does not appear within 30 days after
the trial court ordered the forfeiture, an appearance within
30 days prevents the trial court from entering a judgment
forfeiting the entire security amount. The state contends
that the statute allows the trial court to enter a forfeiture
judgment before or after the 30-day period provided by the
statute. We agree with defendant’s interpretation.
To answer that question, we must ascertain the
meaning of ORS 135.280(3), using the familiar interpretative principles discussed in State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-
72,
206 P3d 1042 (2009). Under that framework, we review
a question of statutory construction for errors of law by first
examining the statute’s text and context and, as a second
step, any pertinent legislative history to discern the legislature’s intended meaning.
Id. “When the text of a statute is truly capable of having only one meaning, no weight
can be given to legislative history that suggests—or even
confirms—that legislators intended something different.”
Id. at 173.
ORS 135.280(3) provides, in part:
“If the defendant does not comply with the conditions of
the release agreement, the court having jurisdiction shall
enter an order declaring the entire security amount to be
forfeited. Notice of the order of forfeiture shall be given
forthwith by personal service, by mail or by such other
means as are reasonably calculated to bring to the attention of the defendant and, if applicable, of the sureties the
order of forfeiture. If, within 30 days after the court declares
the forfeiture, the defendant does not appear or satisfy the
court having jurisdiction that appearance and surrender
by the defendant was, or still is, impossible and without
fault of the defendant, the court shall enter judgment
for the state, or appropriate political subdivision thereof,
against the defendant and, if applicable, the sureties for
the entire security amount set under ORS 135.265 and the
costs of the proceedings. At any time before or after entry
490 State v. Snelgrove
of the judgment, the defendant or the sureties may apply
to the court for a remission of the forfeiture or to modify or
set aside the judgment. The court, upon good cause shown,
may remit the forfeiture or any part thereof or may modify
or set aside the judgment as in other criminal cases[.]”
The framework constructed by the text of ORS 135.280(3)
contains four general parts for security forfeitures.
First, if a defendant fails to comply with the release
conditions, such as appearing in court as was required by
the terms of defendant’s security release agreement, the
trial court “shall enter an order declaring the entire security amount to be forfeited.” ORS 135.280(3). Thus, at the
outset, failing to appear has the immediate consequence of
losing the 10 percent deposit posted for release and the prospect of having a judgment entered for the entire security
amount.
Second, after the court orders forfeiture, it must
notify the defendant and any sureties of its forfeiture order
“by personal service, by mail or by such other means as are
reasonably calculated to bring” the order to their attention.
Id. This notice provision signals to defendant and any sureties that there are potential forthcoming consequences for
the failure to comply with the release conditions.
Third, and what forms the heart of the disagreement in this case, is a provision that requires the court to
enter a judgment against defendant for the entire security
amount:
“If, within 30 days after the court declares the forfeiture,
the defendant does not appear or satisfy the court having
jurisdiction that appearance and surrender by the defendant was, or still is, impossible and without fault of the
defendant, the court shall enter judgment for the state, or
appropriate political subdivision thereof, against the defendant and, if applicable, the sureties for the entire security amount set under ORS 135.265 and the costs of the
proceedings.”
Id. Defendant contends that, if a defendant does appear
“within 30 days after the court declares the forfeiture,” as
he did in this case by appearing six and eight days after the
court’s forfeiture orders, then the trial court has no authority
Cite as
302 Or App 485 (2020) 491
under ORS 135.280(3) to enter a judgment of forfeiture for
the entire security amount. The state takes the opposite
view, arguing that the statute merely “describes the circumstance where the court must automatically enter judgment
against a non-compliant defendant,” but that a court may
enter a judgment against a defendant that appears within
30 days of the court’s forfeiture order. The problem with the
state’s interpretation is that it is not grounded in the text of
the statute. There is nothing in the text or context of ORS
135.280(3) that gives a trial court authority to enter a judgment against a defendant who appears within 30 days of the
court’s forfeiture order; rather, the statute’s text authorizes
entry of a forfeiture judgment only after the 30-day window
has elapsed.3
The fourth and final part to ORS 135.280(3) provides context to that interpretation. Under this last portion of the statute, the defendant or any sureties may, “[a]t
any time before or after entry of the judgment,” apply “for
a remission of the forfeiture” or “to modify or set aside the
judgment.” Applying for a remission of the forfeiture before
the entry of the judgment provides an opportunity for a
defendant to remit the security deposit or “any part thereof”
3
By framing the question as whether a defendant’s appearance within 30
days of a forfeiture order “divest[s] the trial court of its authority” to enter a
forfeiture judgment, the dissenting opinion similarly approaches the issue from
the premise that something in the text of ORS 135.280(3) affirmatively grants
a trial court authority to enter a forfeiture judgment even when a defendant
appears within 30 days. See 302 Or App at 497 (Mooney, J., dissenting). Nothing
in the text of ORS 135.280(3) affirmatively grants that authority and neither
the state, nor the dissenting opinion, reveal why we should insert that authority
into the text of the statute when the legislature has not done so itself. See ORS
174.010 (providing that courts are “to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or
in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit
what has been inserted”); Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 363 Or 537, 544-45,
423
P3d 706 (2018) (rejecting proposed interpretation because it would have required
the court to insert wording that the legislature chose not to include). Moreover,
the interpretation advanced by the dissenting opinion, which would require a
showing of good cause before or after a judgment is entered, renders the 30-day
window created by the explicit text of the statute to meaningless surplusage. See
ORS 174.010 (instructing courts to construe statutes so as to “give effect to all”
provisions); State v. Cloutier,
351 Or 68, 98,
261 P3d 1234 (2011) (observing that
“an interpretation that renders a statutory provision meaningless should give
us pause, both as a matter of respect for a coordinate branch of government that
took the trouble to enact the provision into law and as a matter of complying with
the interpretive principle that, if possible, we give a statute with multiple parts a
construction that ‘will give effect to all’ of those parts” (quoting ORS 174.010)).
492 State v. Snelgrove
if the court finds good cause. If a judgment has been entered
for the entire security amount, a defendant may apply for
a modification or to set aside the judgment on a showing of
good cause. In either case, we review the denial of a motion
for remission of forfeited security for an abuse of discretion.
See State v. Normile,
52 Or App 33, 42,
627 P2d 506 (1981)
(holding that forfeiture is not limited to failure to appear
and reviewing for an abuse of discretion).
To the extent that the text of the statute leaves any
ambiguity, a review of the legislative history confirms the
significance of a defendant’s appearance in court within 30
days after failing to appear. In 1973, as part of the comprehensive revision of the criminal procedure code, the operative part of ORS 135.280 enacted by the legislature provided
two options after a defendant failed to appear before the
court could enter a judgment for the entire security amount
against a defendant: either “appear and surrender” to the
court within 30 days or “satisfy the court that appearance
and surrender … is impossible and without [the defendant’s] fault” within 30 days.4
In 1987, the legislature again amended ORS
135.280 in ways not relevant to this opinion. In the process of amending the statute, however, the proposed language would have effectively eliminated the significance of
a defendant’s appearance within 30 days.5 House Bill (HB)
2180 (1987), as introduced, would have required defendants
4
ORS 135.280(3) (1973/74) provided, in part:
“If the defendant does not appear and surrender to the court having jurisdiction within 30 days from the date of the forfeiture or within such period
satisfy the court that appearance and surrender by the accused is impossible
and without his fault, the court shall enter judgment for the state against
the defendant and, if applicable, his sureties, for the amount of security and
costs of the proceedings.”
(Emphasis added.)
5
The proposed language of the bill provided, in part:
“If, within 30 days after the court declares the forfeiture, the defendant does not [appear and surrender to] satisfy the court having jurisdiction
[within 30 days from the date of the forfeiture or within such period satisfy the
court] that appearance and surrender by the defendant [is] was, or still is,
impossible and without fault of the defendant, the court shall enter judgment
for the state ….”
HB 2180 (Introduced Jan 12, 1987) (emphases and bracketed text in original).
Cite as 302 Or App 485 (2020) 493
to prove that their appearance was impossible and without
their fault. When the proposed bill was discussed in the
House Judiciary Committee, Representative Stan Bunn
raised concerns that the bill was eliminating one of the
options that defendants had:
“Under the old law, you could either give good reason
to the court, or just appear within the 30 days, you didn’t
have to give good reason. So, in effect, we are removing an
either/or, where you could either have 30 days to appear,
no requirement that you show good cause, just that you
appear. With the requirement now, that requires the defendant to show good cause—and one of the reasons I have a
concern is that the new language, coupled with the old language that we keep, the defendant has to show that they
were totally blameless. … And I want to point out that we
are making that policy change.”
Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, HB 2180,
Feb 26, 1987, Tape 188 (statement of Rep Stan Bunn).
After further discussions, the Judiciary Committee
adopted Representative Bunn’s suggestion to keep the language consistent with the current law at the time and that
language was later adopted by the legislature.6 The operative
language of ORS 135.280 has not changed since this 1987
amendment. Accordingly, a review of the legislative history
confirms that the statute provides two potential pathways
for a defendant to avoid the entering of a judgment for the
entire security amount: either show up within 30 days after
the court declares the forfeiture or demonstrate good cause
for failing to appear.
In this case, as noted above, defendant’s failure to
appear resulted in $5,000 and $2,500 being forfeited, as
well as orders being entered for the entire security amount
to be forfeited. Defendant moved for an order remitting his
6
The enrolled version of HB 2180 (1987) provided, in part:
“If, within 30 days after the court declares the forfeiture, the defendant does not appear [and surrender to] or satisfy the court having jurisdiction [within 30 days from the date of the forfeiture or within such period satisfy
the court] that appearance and surrender by the defendant [is] was, or still
is, impossible and without fault of the defendant, the court shall enter judgment for the state ….”
(Emphases and bracketed text in original.)
494 State v. Snelgrove
security, which was denied for failure to show good cause,
and he is not challenging that denial (and the attendant loss
of a total of $7,500) on appeal. What is challenged on appeal
is the trial court’s authority to enter the judgments for the
entire security amounts, $50,000 and $25,000 respectively,
when defendant appeared within 30 days of the respective forfeiture orders. As described above, the trial court
exceeded its authority in ORS 135.280(3) when it did so,
and, accordingly, we reverse those judgments.
In A164540 and A164542, judgments of forfeiture
reversed; in A164506 affirmed.
MOONEY, J., dissenting.
The question in this case is whether ORS 135.280(3)
authorized the trial court to enter judgments of security forfeiture even though defendant twice appeared in
court within 30 days of his initial failures to appear. It is
important to note that defendant appeared each time only
because he was arrested on warrants issued when he failed
to appear, and that he was escorted to court in custody on
those warrants. Defendant did not voluntarily appear in
court, he did not comply with his release agreements, and
he did not establish good cause for his failures to appear.
In my view, the court was within its statutory authority to
enter judgments against defendant for the entire amount of
security.
Instead, however, the court today announces a new
rule for those charged with crimes: Even though you agree,
in exchange for your release from jail, that you will forfeit
a certain sum of money if you do not appear in court, you
will not actually forfeit that sum of money so long as you
appear within 30 days—even when you do not have good
cause for your failure to appear and even though the reason you appear within 30 days is that you were brought to
court in custody after having been arrested for failing to
appear in the first place. In my view, the plain text of ORS
135.280(3) compels the opposite result: A trial court may
enter a judgment of forfeiture of the entire security amount
for any defendant who fails to adequately excuse his or her
failure to appear.
Cite as 302 Or App 485 (2020) 495
Persons charged with crimes may be released from
jail before their trial under ORS 135.255 (personal recognizance), under ORS 135.260 (conditional release), or under
ORS 135.265 (security release agreement). When a security release agreement is used, and the defendant fails to
appear, ORS 135.280(3) provides the procedural mechanism
by which the court enforces the security agreement:
“If the defendant does not comply with the conditions of
the release agreement, the court having jurisdiction shall
enter an order declaring the entire security amount to be
forfeited. Notice of the order of forfeiture shall be given
forthwith by personal service, by mail or by such other
means as are reasonably calculated to bring to the attention of the defendant and, if applicable, of the sureties the
order of forfeiture. If, within 30 days after the court declares
the forfeiture, the defendant does not appear or satisfy the
court having jurisdiction that appearance and surrender
by the defendant was, or still is, impossible and without
fault of the defendant, the court shall enter judgment
for the state, or appropriate political subdivision thereof,
against the defendant and, if applicable, the sureties for
the entire security amount set under ORS 135.265 and the
costs of the proceedings. At any time before or after entry
of the judgment, the defendant or the sureties may apply
to the court for a remission of the forfeiture or to modify or
set aside the judgment. The court, upon good cause shown,
may remit the forfeiture or any part thereof or may modify
or set aside the judgment as in other criminal cases, except
the portion of the security deposit that the court ordered
to be applied to child support under subsection (4) of this
section, as the court considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case. The court shall adopt procedures
to ensure that the amount deposited under ORS 135.265
is available for a reasonable period of time for disposition
under subsection (4) of this section.”
To determine when a trial court may enter a judgment of
forfeiture, it is helpful to examine the statute’s component
parts one at a time, keeping in mind that the parts must be
read together to give full effect to the statutory provision.
First, if a defendant fails to appear in court, the
trial court is required to order forfeiture of the entire security amount:
496 State v. Snelgrove
“If the defendant does not comply with the conditions of
the release agreement, the court having jurisdiction shall
enter an order declaring the entire security amount to be
forfeited.”
Id. Second, the trial court must notify the defendant of the
order of forfeiture:
“Notice of the order of forfeiture shall be given forthwith
by personal service, by mail or by such other means as
are reasonably calculated to bring to the attention of the
defendant and, if applicable, of the sureties the order of
forfeiture.”
Id. Third, the court must enter a judgment of forfeiture if the
defendant does not, within 30 days, (1) appear or (2) show
that appearance and surrender was, or still is, impossible,
and not the defendant’s fault:
“If, within 30 days after the court declares the forfeiture,
the defendant does not appear or satisfy the court having
jurisdiction that appearance and surrender by the defendant was, or still is, impossible and without fault of the
defendant, the court shall enter judgment for the state, or
appropriate political subdivision thereof, against the defendant ….”
Id. (emphasis added). Fourth, the defendant may apply for a
remission of the security or for an order that modifies or sets
aside the judgment—by showing “good cause”:
“At any time before or after entry of the judgment, the defendant or the sureties may apply to the court for a remission
of the forfeiture or to modify or set aside the judgment. The
court, upon good cause shown, may remit the forfeiture or
any part thereof or may modify or set aside the judgment
as in other criminal cases ….”
Id.
The majority’s reading of the statute contradicts its
plain text. When a defendant enters into a release agreement, he is allowed to leave jail in exchange for his promise
to later appear in court on the charges pending against him.
Defendant’s agreement to forfeit a designated sum of money
if he fails to appear is fundamental to the release agreement.
It secures his promise to appear and provides the consideration for his release. When the defendant fails to appear as
Cite as 302 Or App 485 (2020) 497
agreed, the trial court “shall enter an order declaring the
entire security amount to be forfeited.” Upon due notice, the
defendant may “apply to the court for a remission” of the
order of forfeiture or “to modify or set aside” the judgment of
forfeiture.
The statute grants a 30-day window of opportunity following due notice for the defendant to appear and
establish good cause for his failure to appear. If he appears
within the 30-day window and establishes good cause, he
avoids entry of judgment altogether. If he appears within
the 30-day window but is not successful in establishing good
cause, the court would necessarily enter a judgment at that
point. If he does not appear at all during that 30-day window, the court is required to enter a judgment of forfeiture
immediately after the 30-day window closes. This reading
of the statute reflects a meaningful 30-day period during
which the defendant can prevent imposition of a judgment.
The existence of a judgment has real-life financial consequences, and the fact that it might later be set aside is
very different from avoiding the judgment in the first place.
Defendant’s appearance alone does not divest the trial court
of its authority—or its obligation—to assess the adequacy of
his excuse or justification and to make an independent judicial determination on his motion. And, the fact that a legislator expressed a view that is not consistent with the plain
text of the current statute during a meeting that took place
over three decades ago, when discussing proposed amendments that the majority acknowledges are “not relevant” to
this case, does not change that. 302 Or App at 492-93. The
majority reads the statute to say that, if the court denies
defendant’s motion, it has no authority to give effect to its
order by entering a judgment. In other words, if defendant
establishes good cause, no judgment will enter and, if defendant does not establish good cause, no judgment will enter.
Here, defendant absconded twice after posting security and agreeing to appear in court. The trial court properly declared his entire security amount forfeited when he
failed to appear, and defendant only appeared after he was
arrested on warrants issued pursuant to those failures to
appear and while he was still in custody. When he moved for
remission of the forfeiture, seeking to excuse his failures to
498 State v. Snelgrove
appear, the court concluded that defendant did not establish
good cause for his failed appearances and denied the motion.
ORS 135.280(3) does not authorize remission or modification
without good cause, and defendant does not dispute that
ruling. At that point, ORS 135.280(3) required defendant’s
“entire security amount” to remain forfeited, and authorized
entry of a judgment of forfeiture to allow enforcement (i.e.,
collection and satisfaction) of that order.
The main objective of a security release agreement
is to secure a defendant’s appearance in court while his
criminal case is pending. The trial court agrees to release
the defendant from jail, after he has been charged with a
crime but before the trial has occurred, in exchange for his
promise to appear in court at a later time. To help ensure
the defendant keeps his promise to return to court on those
charges, he agrees to forfeit a specific amount of money if he
does not appear as promised. He is released upon payment
of a deposit, representing a portion of the entire amount he
risks losing if he fails to appear. By allowing a defendant
to avoid forfeiture of that agreed amount under the circumstances of this case, the court today subverts the objective
of the security release statute, renders meaningless a defendant’s agreement to appear on criminal charges, and guts
the incentive (forfeiture of entire security amount) to adhere
to the agreement.
I acknowledge that the majority opinion requires
defendant to forfeit his initial security deposit and also
that it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when denying his motion for remission of the security deposit. However, the statute requires the court to
order forfeiture of the “entire security amount”—not just
the deposit. The incongruity of the majority’s interpretation
of ORS 135.280(3) is further revealed by section 4 of that
statute, which limits the use of forfeited security for outstanding child support obligations to (a) the amount of the
deposit (b) that does not exceed 66 percent of the entire security amount and, importantly, (c) does not reduce the money
award in the judgment of forfeiture that is owed to the state.
There would be no reason to distinguish the deposit from
the entire security amount if, as the majority holds today,
they are the same thing.
Cite as 302 Or App 485 (2020) 499
By its decision today, the majority effectively grants
wholesale downward modifications of the forfeiture amount
from the “entire amount” to the deposit amount for any defendant who appears within 30 days of his court date without
regard to why he failed to appear or to the circumstances
of his late appearance—even though the statute requires a
showing of good cause for any reduction. This court’s holding today cannot be squared with ORS 135.280(3) or the
purpose of security release agreements.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
