State v. Phillips

                                      618

   Submitted January 15, 2019, affirmed March 4, petition for review denied
                         June 4, 2020 (

)


                      STATE OF OREGON,
                       Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                 v.
                JACQUELINE MARIE PHILLIPS,
                      Defendant-Appellant.
                 Clackamas County Circuit Court
                      16CR38468; A164790
                                  

     Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for both unlawful delivery and
unlawful possession of methamphetamine, assigning error to the trial court’s
denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of her residence. The search occurred after police officers engaged defendant in conversation, during which defendant invited the officers to search her residence. The
officers did not provide defendant with Miranda warnings before the search. On
appeal, defendant argues that the circumstances became compelling over the
course of the conversation such that the searching officers should have given her
Miranda warnings and, because they did not, evidence found during the search
should have been suppressed. Held: Defendant was not in compelling circumstances during the conversation that preceded the officers’ discovery of the evidence that defendant sought to suppress. Accordingly, the trial court did not err
when it denied defendant’s suppression motion.
    Affirmed.



    Katherine E. Weber, Judge.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and John P. Evans, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher A. Perdue, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge, and
Hadlock, Judge pro tempore.
    HADLOCK, J. pro tempore.
    Affirmed.
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         HADLOCK, J. pro tempore
        Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for one
count of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine and one
count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine, challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
For the reasons set out below, we conclude that the trial
court correctly denied defendant’s motion. Accordingly, we
affirm.
         We set out the facts consistently with the explicit
and implicit findings that the trial court made in the course
of denying defendant’s suppression motion, which the record
supports. See State v. Dodge, 

, 

,
rev den, 

 (2019) (“In reviewing the trial court’s
denial of defendant’s suppression motion, we are bound by
the trial court’s findings of historical fact so long as evidence
in the record supports them.”).
         Police officers found methamphetamine at defendant’s residence, a unit in a manufactured-home park, after
they visited her while searching for a stolen firearm. Officers
were following up on information that another person, DK,
had possession of that stolen gun; they also believed that
DK, along with his father, RK, were inside another unit in
the same manufactured-home park. RK had commented to
multiple people that he “was thinking about committing
‘suicide by cop.’ ”
         Officer Scharmota and several others arrived at the
park and attempted repeatedly to contact DK and RK at the
residence where police thought they were located, initially
without success. The activity drew attention from other people at the park; officers tried to direct people away from the
area and to stay in their homes. Officers also learned that
other people inside the residence were acquainted with defendant, who lived 50 to 100 yards away. A detective (Meade)
went to defendant’s residence to see if she had any information about RK’s location. Defendant also learned about the
police activity from a neighbor who had called to tell her
about it. In the meantime, and after about 50 minutes of
attempted communication, RK said he would come outside.
He and DK were taken into custody without incident.
620                                          State v. Phillips

         Most officers then left the scene, but some, including
Scharmota, remained. RK told the officers that he had given
the stolen gun to another tenant in the park—defendant—
in exchange for methamphetamine. After talking with RK
for about 20 minutes, Scharmota walked to defendant’s unit
and saw her and Meade standing on the porch outside of
her door, talking. Defendant “was very relaxed” and polite;
she and Meade were engaged in “non-confrontational,” calm
conversation. It was about 4:30 p.m. when Scharmota got to
defendant’s unit.

         Scharmota told defendant that he had information
that RK “had brought the gun to her” and traded it for
drugs; he explained that police “were still looking into trying to figure out where this gun was.” Defendant denied
having any drugs or a gun in her home and invited the
officers to come in and search. Scharmota said something
like, “we might get to that point,” but he did not tell defendant that she could be arrested or charged with a crime.
After about 10 to 15 minutes of conversation on the porch,
defendant “asked if we could go inside so she could sit down,”
inviting Scharmota into the residence. Scharmota described
the conversation as “killing time until somebody else could
come down there and assist [him] with searching the residence.” He and defendant engaged in nonconfrontational,
“very mild” and “comfortable” conversation, but Scharmota
“did ask her a little bit more about the presence of guns and
drugs in the house,” and Scharmota “would imagine” that,
in a nonconfrontational way, he had asked defendant to be
honest with him or said “that we would appreciate her cooperation and her being honest.” However, Scharmota did not
threaten to arrest defendant; nor did he promise her any
leniency. Defendant invited Scharmota to search the residence “several times.” Scharmota did not search the residence at that point because he was alone and without cover
(at some point, Meade had left).

        After Scharmota had been alone with defendant for
about 15 or 20 minutes, two officers (Murphy and Green)
arrived. Defendant again invited a search of her home.
Murphy testified at the suppression hearing that defendant had “a very relaxed demeanor kind of dictated by her
Cite as 

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own willingness” to allow the officers to search; he testified
that he did not pressure her by stating that “something else
would happen” if she did not consent. Scharmota began to
search, starting with the bedroom. Immediately upon entering that room, he saw a baggie with a white substance that
he believed to be methamphetamine. Scharmota brought the
baggie into the living room and told Murphy what he had
found. Murphy then asked defendant if there were any additional drugs, and defendant said she needed to use the bathroom. Murphy asked if any methamphetamine was in that
room, and defendant said, “Yes, under the sink.” Defendant’s
demeanor had not changed at that point; nor had Murphy
threatened her in any way. Murphy described defendant as
“kind of nonchalant.” Scharmota testified that defendant
“was giving off the demeanor that she was trying to help us
and answer our questions and be cooperative with us.”

         Scharmota looked under the bathroom sink and
found a “methamphetamine bong” but no drugs; he then
returned to the living room and asked for more information.
Defendant said there was a makeup bag under the sink, giving “pretty specific directions on where to find the drugs.”
Scharmota “felt [defendant] was trying to be helpful and
be honest with us”; he returned to the bathroom and found
a digital scale, plastic baggies, and methamphetamine in
the bag that defendant had described. Defendant said that
the items had been left there by one of her friends, but
she acknowledged that her fingerprints would be on them.
Defendant went to use the bathroom after the officers had
retrieved the methamphetamine from that room; while she
was there, Murphy found additional methamphetamine in
the living room.

          Additional conversation and questioning occurred
after that point, related solely to the stolen gun, which officers eventually found in defendant’s bedroom based on information that defendant had provided. At that point, Murphy
told defendant that she could be lodged in jail, although the
officers would not take her to jail that day, and that he would
“be referring it to the District Attorney’s Office.” Murphy
had not previously made any statements to defendant about
jail or submitting the case to the prosecutor.
622                                         State v. Phillips

         The officers left defendant’s residence at about the
same time, clearing the scene at 5:43 p.m. Scharmota had
spent about an hour and 15 minutes at defendant’s home at
that point. During that time, Scharmota never restricted
defendant’s movement, he never told defendant that she
could not leave the residence, and defendant never asked to
leave. Murphy described the scene as having been “fluid,”
with a few officers coming and going, but no more than three
officers in the residence at any one time. Murphy did not
observe any officers make threats or arguments. Defendant
remained calm throughout. Neither Scharmota nor Murphy
ever read Miranda warnings during the encounter, and neither of them heard any other officer give those warnings.
        A neighbor testified at the suppression hearing that
defendant told her, after the incident, that she had been “so
intimidated” by the officers who went to her home.
         After being charged with possession and delivery of
methamphetamine, defendant moved to suppress evidence
found during the search. The trial court denied the motion,
having found that defendant “volunteered to allow the law
enforcement into her home and consented to a search” of
“the whole place.” The court also ruled that defendant had
not been in compelling circumstances that necessitated
Miranda warnings, even after “she [was] presented with the
initial drugs” found by the officers. After the court denied
defendant’s suppression motion, she entered a conditional
guilty plea and received a probationary sentence.
         On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred when it denied her suppression motion. Defendant contends that she was in compelling circumstances and, therefore, the officers should have provided Miranda warnings
before questioning her. According to defendant, the circumstances became compelling either when Scharmota told her
that he had information that she had traded drugs for the
stolen gun or when officers later discovered methamphetamine in defendant’s bedroom and asked her whether additional drugs were present. In either case, defendant argues,
later-discovered evidence should have been suppressed
because its discovery derived from the preceding Miranda
violation. In response, the state argues that defendant was
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never in compelling circumstances and Miranda warnings were therefore not required. The state further argues
that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of her
residence and that her voluntary consent attenuated any
Miranda violation that had occurred.
          Our evaluation of the parties’ arguments starts
with basic principles. Article I, section 12, of the Oregon
Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be … compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” To protect that right against self-incrimination, police
officers “must provide Miranda warnings to a suspect before
interrogating that suspect if the suspect either is in ‘full
custody’ or in ‘compelling circumstances.’ ” State v. Courville,

, 

 (2016) (quoting State
v. Roble-Baker, 

, 

 (2006)). The
“overarching issue” in determining whether circumstances
were compelling “is whether the questioning occurred in a
‘police-dominated atmosphere.’ ” State v. Turnidge, 

, 

 (2016), cert den, 

 (2017).1
The question must be addressed from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the suspect’s position, considering the
totality of the circumstances. Id. Pertinent factors include
“the location of the encounter, the length of the encounter,
the amount of force exerted on the suspect, and the suspect’s
ability to terminate the encounter.” Id.
        In this case, some of those factors weigh against a
determination that the circumstances in which defendant
was questioned were “compelling” or, at least, are more-orless neutral on that point. Defendant was at her own home
during her interactions with the officers. Indeed, defendant initially talked with Meade on her porch and, after
Scharmota arrived, invited the officers into her home without prompting. Those facts significantly reduce the likelihood that the circumstances were inherently compelling.
See Turnidge, 

 (that the defendant’s encounter

     1
       Although Turnidge addressed whether police officers had violated the
defendant’s Article I, section 12, right to counsel during custodial interrogation,
it explained that the right attaches when the suspect is in custody or the same
type of “ ‘compelling circumstances’ that give the right to Miranda protections
more generally.” 

. Accordingly, its discussion of “compelling circumstances” informs our analysis here.
624                                          State v. Phillips

with police officers occurred “at or within close proximity to
his home” significantly reduced “the likelihood that the circumstances were inherently compelling for purposes of the
Article I, section 12, analysis”); State v. Shaff, 

, 

 (2007) (although questioning in a person’s
home might be compelling under certain circumstances,
“the fact that the interview occurs in familiar surroundings
diminishes the police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda
warnings were intended to counteract”). Moreover, the officers did not restrict defendant’s movement. That factor,
too, tends to weigh against a “compelling circumstances”
determination.
         Nonetheless, defendant suggests that the “significant
police presence” in the manufactured-home park contributed to her being in compelling circumstances when questioned. Defendant notes that we have held that, “when a
person’s home becomes the location of a significant police
operation, that police presence can at least tend to establish a police-dominated atmosphere in otherwise ‘familiar
surroundings.’ ” State v. Heise-Fay, 

,

 (2015). We are not persuaded. Police officers’
confrontation with RK and DK occurred elsewhere in the
manufactured-home park, away from defendant’s home, and
it ended before officers searched defendant’s residence. The
record does not establish that a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would have perceived that confrontational
activity to continue in association with officers’ presence at
her home. Cf. Turnidge, 

-04 (rejecting argument
that the presence of multiple officers with drawn weapons
contributed to a police-dominated atmosphere, given that
those officers had not been visible to the defendant).
         Given the circumstances in which defendant’s
encounter with police officers occurred, the duration of that
encounter does not weigh strongly in favor of a determination that those circumstances were “compelling” at either of
the two points in time relevant to defendant’s arguments on
appeal—first, when Scharmota arrived at defendant’s home
and told her about the purported drugs-for-gun exchange
or, second, when the officers later found methamphetamine
in defendant’s bedroom and asked her if there was more.
The record does not establish exactly how long officers were
Cite as 

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present at defendant’s residence (both inside and outside),
but the encounter appears to have lasted no more than a
total of about two hours. Of that, 20 to 30 minutes passed
before Scharmota arrived and told defendant that he had
information that she had given RK drugs in exchange for
the stolen gun. Under the circumstances—particularly that
the encounter occurred at defendant’s home and had a non-confrontational tone, as discussed below—the fact that the
encounter had lasted for perhaps a half-hour at that point
did not contribute to making circumstances compelling.
Even later—when officers asked defendant whether she
had more drugs beyond those they had discovered in her
bedroom—the entire two-hour-long encounter had not yet
transpired. After the officers asked defendant about the
methamphetamine and she acknowledged that some was
in the bathroom (the pertinent point in time), officers continued their search for drugs and then engaged in further
discussion with defendant about the stolen firearm before
they located the weapon. Thus, police officers had been at
defendant’s home for less than two hours when she told them
about the methamphetamine in her bathroom. Although the
interaction had lasted longer than a typical traffic stop by
that point—a metric that courts sometimes have referenced
in conducting the “compelling circumstances” analysis2
—it nonetheless was not so long that the duration of the
encounter (as opposed to its character) would contribute
meaningfully to circumstances being compelling. See, e.g.,
State v. Grimm, 

, 

, rev den,

 (2018) (circumstances were compelling, but not
because of the duration of the defendant’s encounter with
police, which lasted no more than one and one-half hours;
that period of time was “not an insignificant amount of time
to undergo questioning by police officers,” but “neither [was]
it determinative of compelling circumstances”).
         We next consider factors related to the character of
the encounter, rather than its mere duration. In considering
“the amount of pressure exerted on the defendant during
the encounter,” we have acknowledged that that factor can
be “fairly amorphous.” Grimm, 

. Some
    2
      See Shaff, 

 (“[O]fficers detained defendant for only a brief
period of time, no more than a typical traffic stop.”).
626                                          State v. Phillips

pressure can come in the form of officers’ aggressive tone
or demeanor, contributing to a determination of compelling
circumstances. Conversely, an officer’s calm, conversational,
and nonconfrontational demeanor can sometimes weigh
against a compelling-circumstances determination. See
Courville, 

 (no compelling circumstances where, among other things, the officer’s tone was
“friendly and conversational” throughout an interview that
lasted over an hour; noting that “mundane” conversation
that occurs in familiar surroundings tends to diminish the
police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were
intended to counteract); State v. Schwerbel, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2010) (identifying
the questioning officer’s “polite and nonconfrontational”
demeanor as one factor “tend[ing] to make the circumstances less compelling,” although the court concluded based
on other factors that the totality of the circumstances was
compelling); see also Shaff, 

 (circumstances
not compelling where, among other things, a police officer
“did not raise his voice, threaten defendant, or engage in a
show of force”). In this case, the officers’ demeanor and tone
remained calm and conversational throughout the encounter, and Scharmota described his initial conversation with
defendant as “very mild” and as “killing time.” Defendant
also remained calm, cooperative, and helpful. Those facts
weigh against a “compelling circumstances” determination.
         The demeanor of police officers and suspects is not
the only important consideration, however. Pressure can
also come in the form of the specific questions that officers ask or accusations that they make. That is the focus
of defendant’s argument; she contends that the circumstances became compelling either when Scharmota told her
that he had information that she had traded drugs for a
gun, or when officers confronted her with the methamphetamine they found in her bedroom and asked if there was
more. Defendant asserts that those confrontations “would
have a coercive effect on a reasonable person in defendant’s
position, because the person would know that she could be
arrested and charged with serious crimes.”
       Several “compelling circumstances” cases have turned
on whether officers made “coercive use” of evidence of a
Cite as 

 (2020)                               627

suspect’s guilt during questioning, like defendant contends
happened here. It is settled that circumstances do not
become compelling simply because a suspect knows that
officers have information that he or she may have committed a crime, or because officers suggest that possibility. For
example, in Shaff, officers responded to a report of domestic
abuse at the defendant’s home and found an injured woman,
who said that she had fallen. 

. The Supreme
Court held that the officers did not create compelling circumstances when they told the defendant that they were
there to make sure that the woman was safe, even when
they noted that the woman had obviously been assaulted,
asked the defendant “if he knew why she would say now
that she had been assaulted” (which she had not actually
said), and asked what the woman had done to anger him.

. The court emphasized that the officer had
raised the assault issue only twice during a 10-minute conversation and had “acted in an appropriate and courteous
manner in carrying out an inquiry into a citizen’s welfare.”

.
         Thus, “mere reference to evidence of a suspect’s
guilt in the course of nonaggressive questioning that does
not assume the suspect’s guilt is not sufficiently coercive to
give rise to compelling circumstances.” State v. Northcutt,

, 

 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Nor are “questions that merely suggest that
an officer is concerned about possible ‘illegal activity’ ” usually enough to create compelling circumstances. Heise-Fay,

. Rather, what matters is “whether
the officers used that [incriminating] evidence in a coercive manner.” Shaff, 

. “[T]he gravamen” of the
factor relating to the amount of force exerted by police “is
the use of aggressive and coercive police interrogation practices, especially including, but not limited to, those explicitly
predicated on assumptions of a suspect’s guilt or calculated
to contradict a suspect’s assertions of innocence.” Northcutt,

.
        State v. Saunders, 

, 

,
rev den, 

 (2008), provides another example of
police questioning that did not create compelling circumstances even though it involved confronting the suspect with
628                                          State v. Phillips

evidence of criminal activity. In that case, police officers
(1) questioned the defendant for one and one-half hours at
his home about allegations of child sexual abuse, (2) showed
the defendant a stick-figure drawing to which the defendant
reacted nervously, (3) told the defendant that the victim’s
allegations were credible and that she appeared to lack a
motive to lie, and (4) told the defendant that they did not
believe him. Id. at 119. We held, in light of Shaff, that the
officers had not used the incriminating evidence coercively
in their questioning of the defendant and that, therefore,
confronting him with that evidence “did not make the circumstances compelling.” Id. at 120.
         Other cases provide contrasting examples of what
may constitute coercive use of incriminating evidence
during questioning of a suspect, depending on the totality of
the circumstances. In State v. Esquivel, 

, 761,

 (2017), we held that coercion existed when an
officer told a suspect that there was sufficient evidence for
arrest, including “video of her committing the crime,” and
gave her the choice of answering questions and receiving a
citation or declining to answer questions and being arrested.
Coercion may also exist when officers escalate pressure over
the course of an interview, repeatedly confronting a suspect
with their knowledge that she is lying, pointing out inconsistencies in her description of events, and describing evidence
of her guilt. See State v. Ford, 

, 

, adh’d to as modified on recons, 

, 

 (2011) (by “persistently pressur[ing] defendant for
more information in ways that assumed defendant’s guilt,”
an officer contributed to making the circumstances of an
interrogation compelling); see also State v. Mattheisen, 

, 

 (2015) (compelling circumstances where officers “did much more than simply confront
defendant with adverse evidence” but “persisted in telling defendant that he should identify himself either as a
pedophile or an ‘opportunistic’ individual,” demonstrating
“a clear intent to build pressure on defendant to confess”);
State v. Machain, 

, 

 (2009) (circumstances were compelling when officers’ pressure escalated over a two-and-one-half-hour interview, which was
the third interview of the defendant in less than 24 hours).
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In addition, officers may create compelling circumstances
if they expressly confront a suspect with evidence that the
officers have probable cause to arrest the suspect, assert
control over the defendant or an intention to do so, and are
strongly considering the possibility of arrest. See Heise-Fay,

 (discussing cases); see also State v.
Stone, 

, 

 (2015) (similar).
          Recently, in Grimm, we emphasized the significance of “escalating … pressure” during interrogation. 

. In that case, the defendant, who was suspected of indecent exposure, was questioned at a police station for, at most, one and one-half hours. 

. Over the
course of that interview, officers repeatedly told the defendant that his description of events was inconsistent with
the complainant’s account, explaining that his story did not
make sense. 

. Each time an officer pointed out a
discrepancy between defendant’s account of events and the
complainant’s account, the defendant changed his version to
try to make it align with the complainant’s. 

. After
that, an officer changed tactics, asking the defendant about
his use of pornography and accusing him of being aroused
by being around the complainant in circumstances where he
might get caught. 

. The officer ultimately suggested that the defendant had a sexual addiction problem
and asked him to tell her what really had happened; at that
point, the defendant admitted the indecent exposure. 

.
         On appeal, we considered whether the circumstances had become compelling by the time the defendant
admitted his criminal conduct, noting that, at the beginning of the encounter, the officers had “simply confronted
defendant with incriminating evidence—the complainant’s
version of events—in a noncoercive and nonaggressive manner and asked defendant for his side of the story.” 

.
We then emphasized the increasing pressure that officers
applied throughout the rest of the interview:
   “However, after [the defendant] answered, [the officers]
   persisted, escalating the pressure on defendant to continue
   talking at every stage by telling him that his explanations
   did not make sense in light of the complainant’s statement,
630                                            State v. Phillips

   indicating that they did not believe him, and repeatedly
   asking him to explain the inconsistencies. After about the
   third time that the officers asked defendant to explain the
   discrepancies between his story and the complainant’s, the
   questioning became more intrusive.”

. Observing that the officer’s questioning then
turned to sexual matters, including a suggestion that the
defendant had a sexual addiction problem, we concluded
that the officer’s “questions and remarks implicitly assumed
that defendant was guilty of the charged behavior.” 

. Because the police tactics went beyond “brief and
noncoercive use of incriminating evidence” and instead
were “calculated to contradict defendant’s repeated assertions of innocence and pressure him to continue talking,” we
concluded that the encounter had become compelling by the
point that the defendant admitted his conduct, after nearly
one and one-half hours of questioning at the police station.

. Nonetheless, we noted, the case was a “close”
one. 

.
         Considering the facts involved here in light of the
cases described above, we conclude that defendant was not
in compelling circumstances when Scharmota told her that
he had information that she had traded drugs for a gun.
At that point, defendant had been talking with Meade for
less than one-half hour. When Scharmota arrived at defendant’s residence and imparted the drugs-for-gun information, he did so in a noncoercive and nonaggressive manner.
The record includes no suggestion of “escalating pressure” of
any kind and Scharmota did not suggest that he was going
to—or even could—arrest or detain defendant at that point.
To the contrary, Scharmota did not even request consent to
search; rather, defendant invited him to search her home,
and he did not immediately accept that offer. Moreover,
the circumstances became no more compelling during the
one-half hour or so that passed before other officers arrived
and began the search. During that time, defendant invited
Scharmota into her home and they engaged in comfortable
conversation. Scharmota did not make those circumstances
compelling merely by “ask[ing] her a little bit more about the
presence of guns and drugs in the house” and encouraging
her to be honest with him, given that he did not threaten
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defendant, make promises of leniency, or even take defendant up on her offers to search. Then, when other officers
arrived, they began to search only after defendant once
again extended an invitation. Under those circumstances,
a reasonable person would not have felt that she was compelled to answer officers’ questions or allow them to search
her home.
         We also conclude that the circumstances had not
become compelling by the time defendant told officers that
methamphetamine was in her bathroom. At that point,
Scharmota had already started searching defendant’s
home and had almost immediately found the methamphetamine in defendant’s bedroom. Murphy then asked defendant if there were any additional drugs and when, instead
of responding, defendant said she needed to use the bathroom, Murphy asked whether drugs were in that room.
The officers did not engage in coercive tactics by informing
defendant that they had found the drugs in her bedroom
and asking if there were more. Again, simply confronting
a suspect with evidence of guilt in a noncoercive manner
does not make circumstances compelling. E.g., Shaff, 

; Northcutt, 

; Saunders, 

. True, the “evidence of guilt” in this case
was more concrete than in many others, as the officers
actually had found drugs in defendant’s home; they did not
merely confront defendant with less-direct evidence that
she had broken the law. Nonetheless, the point remains the
same—the officers did not use their discovery of the drugs
coercively or aggressively by asking defendant whether
there were additional drugs in the residence beyond what
the officers had already found. At that point, the tone of
the conversation was still relaxed, and Murphy did not
change his demeanor or threaten defendant in any way.
Defendant’s demeanor was still “kind of nonchalant.” The
record includes no evidence that officers traded on their
initial discovery of drugs in a coercive manner; after all,
defendant already had invited the officers to search her
entire residence. Nothing in the record suggests that the
officers exerted escalating pressure on defendant, for
example by persistently accusing her of lying, pointing out
inconsistencies in her story, or pressuring her to confess;
632                                          State v. Phillips

nor did officers expressly convey any intention to arrest or
detain her.
         In the end, the question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant’s
situation would have felt compelled to respond to the officers’ questions. Given the circumstances here—particularly
including the low-key nature of the encounter, which did not
include threats, promises of leniency, or accusations that
defendant was lying; the fact that the encounter did not last
overly long and occurred in defendant’s home; defendant’s
repeated invitations to search her home; and the officers’
few straightforward questions of defendant, which followed
up on her invitations to search and were in keeping with
her cooperative and helpful demeanor—we conclude that a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have
felt compelled to respond to those questions or to allow the
encounter to continue. The trial court did not err when it
denied defendant’s suppression motion.
         In her second through fifth assignments of error,
defendant challenges conditions of her probation. Defendant
has been discharged from probation, she is no longer subject
to the probation conditions that she challenges, and she has
not identified any persisting collateral effects of those conditions. Accordingly, defendant’s challenges to the probation
conditions are moot and we do not address them. See State
v. Fries, 

, 

 (2007), aff’d on
other grounds, 

, 

 (2008) (declining to
review challenges to expired conditions of probation).
        Affirmed.