M. D. O. v. Desantis

                                       751

       Argued and submitted January 16, 2019, affirmed March 11, 2020


                               M. D. O.,
                       Petitioner-Respondent,
                                  v.
                         Jeff A. DESANTIS,
                       Respondent-Appellant.
                     Marion County Circuit Court
                        17SK02472; A166829
                                  

     Respondent appeals a permanent stalking protective order (SPO), contending that the trial court erred in determining that petitioner’s alarm when petitioner was being followed by respondent was objectively reasonable. He also contends that the trial court erred in determining that his statement to petitioner,
“If I don’t get you now, I’ll get you later,” was a qualifying predicate contact for
issuance of an SPO, because the statement (1) was not a threat of imminent serious harm and (2) did not cause petitioner to fear imminent and serious personal
violence. Held: The trial court did not err. Given the acrimonious relationship
between petitioner and respondent, petitioner’s alarm when he was being followed by respondent was objectively reasonable. Further, in light of contextual
factors, including petitioner and respondent’s acrimonious relationship and their
historical conduct toward each other, respondent’s statement was a threat of
imminent serious harm. Finally, from petitioner’s testimony, the trial court could
infer that respondent’s statement caused petitioner to fear imminent and serious
personal violence.
    Affirmed.



    Janet A. Klapstein, Judge pro tempore.
   Andy Simrin argued the cause for appellant. Also on the
brief was Andy Simrin PC.
    No appearance for respondent.
  Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge,
and Shorr, Judge.
    TOOKEY, J.
    Affirmed.
752                                                    M. D. O. v. Desantis

           TOOKEY, J.
         This is a civil stalking case involving what the
trial court aptly described as “bad blood” between two individuals who, after two of petitioner’s children assaulted
respondent, simply could not, as the trial court viewed it,
“leave well enough alone.”1 During the year following the
assault of respondent by petitioner’s children, the parties’
anger with each other grew and ultimately culminated in
respondent following petitioner, stating that he would “get”
petitioner, and petitioner seeking a stalking protective order
(SPO) against respondent under ORS 163.738. As explained
further below, for a trial court to issue an SPO under ORS
163.738, a petitioner must demonstrate that there have been
at least two qualifying “contacts” between the respondent
and the petitioner. In this case, the trial court determined
that there were two such qualifying contacts and issued an
SPO.
         On appeal, respondent raises two assignments of
error, which, given his arguments, he acknowledges present
“essentially the same legal question”: In his first assignment
of error, he contends that the trial court “erred by finding
that there were two qualifying contacts for the purposes of
the stalking statutes.” In his second assignment of error, he
contends that the trial court “erred by issuing a permanent
stalking protective order.” For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
         As an initial matter, we note neither party has
requested that we review this matter de novo. Because this is
not an exceptional case, we will not do so. See ORAP 5.40(8)(c)
(providing that the court will exercise its discretion to
review de novo “only in exceptional cases”). Therefore, given
the trial court’s conclusion that the SPO should issue, “we
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the petitioner.”
Gray v. McGinnis, 

, 

 (2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we review
as “a question of law whether the evidence presented was
    1
      In civil stalking cases, such as this one, we ordinarily refer to the parties
by their designation in the trial court. King v. W. T. F., 

, 534 n 1,

 (2016) (so stating).
Cite as 

 (2020)                                               753

sufficient to support the elements required to obtain an
SPO.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                             BACKGROUND
        Before turning to the “contacts” on which the trial
court relied when issuing the SPO, we provide a brief summary of the historical “bad blood” between petitioner and
respondent to provide appropriate context for those contacts.
         Petitioner and respondent are both residents of a
small community in Oregon. In January 2017, petitioner’s
two sons—who were juveniles at the time—assaulted respondent outside of a restaurant that respondent co-owned, causing what the trial court described as “pretty significant leg
injuries” to respondent.2 Respondent viewed petitioner’s
sons’ assault on him as “life-changing”; as a result of the
assault, he had to have steel plates embedded in his leg and
ankle, and he suffered ongoing medical concerns as a result
of his injuries.
         The day after the assault, petitioner went to respondent’s restaurant. Petitioner felt that respondent, and not
petitioner’s two sons, was responsible for the assault. After
entering the restaurant, petitioner spoke to a co-owner of
the restaurant and asked to see respondent, whom petitioner accused of being a “child molester” or “child abuser.”
Petitioner further stated that he wanted to “kick [respondent’s] ass” and that he should “burn down” the restaurant. He explained to the co-owner that, in his view, had
it been the co-owner’s children involved in the assault, the
co-owner would also want to burn down the restaurant to
“get at the guys who did this to your kids.” During the hearing on the SPO, the co-owner described petitioner as having
been “seething with palpable anger,” and explained that he
was concerned petitioner was going to become violent. The
co-owner reported the incident to the police and to respondent’s wife.
    2
       The trial court described petitioner’s sons’ conduct as an “assault” of
respondent. In a separate proceeding, petitioner’s sons were found to be within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for their conduct vis-à-vis respondent. For
ease of reference in describing petitioner’s sons’ conduct in this opinion, as the
trial court did, we refer to petitioner’s sons’ conduct as “assault.”
754                                                    M. D. O. v. Desantis

        Petitioner’s sons’ assault of respondent resulted in
the state filing delinquency petitions to bring petitioner’s
sons within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. At some
point during the pendency of those proceedings, respondent obtained copies of petitioner’s sons’ school records and
contacted an individual employed by the Oregon Youth
Authority (OYA) regarding those records. The OYA employee
was concerned by respondent’s possession of the records
and, eventually, an attorney for one of petitioner’s sons was
informed that respondent had obtained the school records.
The attorney informed petitioner.
         In the summer of 2017, respondent was arrested for
allegedly assaulting a private investigator who was involved
in one of petitioner’s sons’ juvenile court cases. Respondent
was charged with assault.3 Petitioner believed that respondents’ alleged assault on the private investigator was severe
enough to cause the private investigator to be “put … in
the hospital.”
         Following respondent’s arrest and charges being
brought against him related to the alleged assault of the
private investigator, petitioner obtained and distributed
copies of the arrest report and criminal complaint related
to the alleged assault at locations around petitioner and
respondent’s community—for example, at a tire store, a grocery store, and the post office—as well as to individuals in
petitioner’s and respondent’s community.4 Respondent was
aware of petitioner’s distribution efforts. Respondent asked
local police to speak with petitioner about distributing the
documents and request that petitioner stop doing that, but,
nevertheless, petitioner persisted in distributing them. The
trial court characterized petitioner’s distribution campaign
as “inappropriate.”
        Additionally, in the summer of 2017, petitioner and
respondent were driving in opposite directions in the downtown
    3
      At the time of the SPO hearing, the charges against respondent related to
the alleged assault on the private investigator were pending. The charges were
ultimately dismissed after a civil compromise was reached.
    4
      In its ruling, the trial court explained that it considered the assault charge
that was then pending against respondent only insofar as “it is an underlying
basis for the passing out all these documents … that caused the latest round of
angry activity.”
Cite as 

 (2020)                             755

of their community. Though petitioner had the right of way,
respondent, on seeing petitioner, snapped, and made a
quick left turn in front of petitioner, which required petitioner to slam on his brakes to avoid T-boning respondent’s
pickup truck. Respondent then started laughing and slowed
his truck down so that petitioner could see respondent’s
reaction—namely, laughter—to nearly causing a collision
with petitioner. The force with which petitioner had to slam
on his brakes to avoid hitting respondent caused petitioner
physical pain due to preexisting spine and neck injuries.
         The first contact on which the trial court based its
decision to issue the SPO occurred on September 19, 2017.
On that day, respondent observed petitioner driving in the
local downtown area, near the local grocery store and tire
store in which petitioner had previously distributed the documents related to respondent’s alleged assault on the private
investigator. Respondent had been informed by an employee
of the tire store that, only a few days before, petitioner and
one of his sons were distributing those documents in the tire
store. Respondent, angry at petitioner for distributing the
documents, pulled his truck behind petitioner’s truck and
began to follow closely behind him.
         Petitioner observed respondent following closely
behind him and believed that respondent wanted to follow
petitioner to petitioner’s house. Petitioner also saw that
respondent did not take the turn that respondent usually
takes when respondent is going to respondent’s house.
Petitioner kept driving, followed closely by respondent, out
into “farm country.” Eventually petitioner, concerned that
he was in farm country alone with respondent, turned his
car around in a farmer’s field and headed back into town and
into the parking lot of the local police department to seek
protection. Respondent also turned around and, after doing
so, followed petitioner into the police department parking
lot. The total distance respondent followed petitioner was
approximately 15 miles. Petitioner perceived respondent to
be “hunting [him] down.”
       Petitioner entered the police department, and
respondent followed petitioner inside. Once inside the police
department, respondent snapped and proceeded to say to
756                                       M. D. O. v. Desantis

petitioner that petitioner’s ex-wife is a “whore” and a “slut,”
that petitioner’s “fucking kids are bastards,” and that his
ex-wife had petitioner’s children “through another guy.”
Petitioner testified that the experience left him “rattled.”
          The second contact on which the trial court based
its decision to issue the SPO occurred on November 19, 2017.
On that day, petitioner was waiting in the parking lot of
a local restaurant for a pizza to be ready when he heard
someone’s voice, turned his head, and saw respondent’s
truck “window to window” with his own. The trucks were
close enough that petitioner was not sure if he could open
his door without dinging respondent’s door. Respondent
again snapped and proceeded to call petitioner a “hillbilly”
and petitioner’s ex-wife “every nasty thing you can think
of.” Petitioner responded with “every four-letter word [he]
could think of.” Petitioner testified that he believed respondent engaged in that exchange because respondent wanted
petitioner to instigate a physical fight so that respondent
could “be the victim,” and that respondent could not “control
himself.”
         Respondent then told petitioner “let’s go,” “I’ll fight
you right here,” and that he wanted to “beat the shit out of”
petitioner. He also told petitioner, “If I don’t get you now,
I’ll get you later.” Petitioner perceived this to be a direct
“threat” to harm petitioner and was frightened. Petitioner
testified that respondent’s statements left him “rattled.”
Petitioner also testified that he believed respondent would
follow through on his stated intent to “get” petitioner,
because respondent had previously been accused of engaging in a violent act—viz., assaulting the private investigator.
Petitioner feared that he or his children would be the next
target of respondent’s violence, because respondent felt petitioner was responsible for respondent’s estrangement from
his wife and his business troubles, and blamed petitioner
and petitioner’s sons for the assault.
         The next day, November 20, 2017, petitioner executed a uniform stalking complaint, ORS 163.744, which
was filed on November 22, 2017. On December 27, 2017, the
trial court issued an SPO, determining that respondent’s
September 19, 2017, following of petitioner and respondent’s
Cite as 

 (2020)                                          757

November 19, 2017, verbal exchange with petitioner constituted qualifying contacts for issuance of an SPO. When
so doing, the court considered the history of animosity
between the parties that had gone on for almost a year, and
that rather than settle down over time, the parties’ anger
with each other had instead gotten “worse and worse and
worse and worse.” It also determined that petitioner was
“understandably frightened” about respondent’s “hot temper” (and that respondent was “understandably frightened” about petitioner’s “hot temper”) and that respondent’s
November 19, 2017, verbal exchange with petitioner was
something more than a “simple exchange of bad words,” but
included an “overt threat” by respondent to petitioner—viz.,
that respondent said to petitioner that he would “get you
now, [or] get you later.”
                              ANALYSIS
        The SPO in this case was issued pursuant to ORS
163.738, which begins with a complaint by the victim and a
law enforcement officer’s issuance of a citation to the respondent.5 Under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), a trial court may enter
an SPO if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
      “(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
   engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other
   person or a member of that person’s immediate family or
   household thereby alarming or coercing the other person;
      “(ii) It is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim’s situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and
      “(iii) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the
   victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal
   safety of the victim or a member of the victim’s immediate
   family or household.”
        Thus, the statute requires at least two unwanted
contacts. See ORS 163.730(7) (“ ‘Repeated’ means two or
more times.”). Each contact “must give rise to subjective
alarm and that alarm must be objectively reasonable, and
    5
      By contrast, an SPO proceeding under ORS 30.866 begins with a victim
directly petitioning the court for an SPO. Both ORS 30.866 and ORS 163.738
require the same evidentiary showing. Carter v. Bowman, 

,

, rev den, 

 (2012).
758                                        M. D. O. v. Desantis

the contacts, cumulatively, must give rise to subjective
apprehension regarding the petitioner’s personal safety or
the personal safety of a member of the petitioner’s immediate family or household, and that apprehension must be
objectively reasonable.” Blastic v. Holm, 

,

 (2012). “Alarm” is defined by statute to mean
“to cause apprehension or fear resulting from the perception of danger.” ORS 163.730(1). “Danger” refers to “a threat
of physical injury, and not merely a threat of annoyance or
harassment.” Outlaw v. Richey, 

, 

 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “contact”
includes “almost any interaction with the petitioner and
can be divided between nonexpressive contacts and expressive, also known as communicative, contacts.” Christensen v.
Carter/Bosket, 

, 

 (2014); see
also ORS 163.730(3) (defining “contact”).

          Because “expressive contacts” implicate Article I,
section 8, of the Oregon Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a “more stringent
standard applies when we evaluate the sufficiency of the
evidence of alarm” caused by expressive contacts. Outlaw,

 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
Supreme Court has explained that, in defining alarm, the
legislature necessarily contemplated that speech-based contact could comprise an element of stalking only if it ‘constitutes a threat.’ ” 

 (quoting State v. Rangel, 

,

 (1999)). Under Rangel, a “threat” is “ ‘a communication that instills in the addressee a fear of imminent
and serious personal violence from the speaker, is unequivocal, and is objectively likely to be followed by unlawful
acts.’ ” Christensen, 

 (quoting Rangel, 

). Qualifying threats do not include “ ‘the kind of
hyperbole, rhetorical excesses, and impotent expressions of
anger or frustration that in some contexts can be privileged
even if they alarm the addressee.’ ” 

 (quoting Rangel, 

).

        We turn first to respondent’s September 19, 2017,
following of petitioner. As we understand respondent’s argument, with regard to that nonexpressive contact, respondent contends that petitioner’s alarm was not “objectively
Cite as 

 (2020)                                               759

reasonable” and characterizes his conduct as mere “objectively innocuous following.” In respondent’s view, that is so
because “there was nothing about respondent’s driving that
would have made it objectively reasonable for petitioner to
be reasonably apprehensive about his personal safety.”
         We disagree with respondent that his following of
petitioner was “objectively innocuous.” As we have emphasized in other cases, “unwanted contacts must be considered in the context of the parties’ entire history.” Pinkham
v. Brubaker, 

, 

 (2001). So
viewed, contacts that “might appear innocuous … in isolation often take on a different character.” 

 (internal quotation marks omitted).
          Here, given the highly acrimonious relationship
between petitioner and respondent, we conclude that petitioner’s alarm when he was being closely followed by respondent for 15 miles, including in “farm country” with no one
else around, was objectively reasonable. That is, against
the backdrop of the parties’ history—viz., (1) petitioner’s
children causing significant “life-changing” injuries to
respondent for which respondent, in part, blamed petitioner,
(2) petitioner having previously accused respondent of
being a “child molester” or “child abuser,” and stating that
he would burn down respondent’s business, (3) respondent
previously obtaining petitioner’s children’s school records,
(4) petitioner’s belief that respondent had previously assaulted
a private investigator who was involved in one of petitioner’s
sons’ juvenile court cases,6 (5) petitioner’s campaign to publicize that alleged assault, (6) respondent previously nearly
causing a collision with petitioner while they were driving and then laughing about it, and (7) respondent’s “hot
temper”—respondent’s conduct of closely following behind

     6
       Although the charges against respondent related to the assault were ultimately dismissed, the accusation against respondent of engaging in a violent act
supports the conclusion that a petitioner’s alarm was objectively reasonable. See,
e.g., Bryant v. Walker, 

, 

 (2003), rev dismissed as
improvidently allowed, 

 (2004) (considering fact that, “at some point
in the past, respondent’s then-wife had accused him of violence” in concluding
petitioner’s “alarm and fear were reasonable”); Habrat v. Milligan, 

, 

 (2006) (concluding petitioner’s alarm was objectively reasonable, where, among other facts, petitioner was informed by respondent’s girlfriend that she feared personal harm from him).
760                                                  M. D. O. v. Desantis

petitioner into “farm country,” turning around when petitioner did so, and continuing to follow petitioner for a total
of 15 miles, would cause a reasonable person in petitioner’s situation to experience “apprehension or fear resulting
from the perception of danger.”7 ORS 163.730(1); see Smith v.
Di Marco, 

, 

 (2006)
(respondent’s act of following and watching petitioner was
a predicate contact for an SPO); cf. Weatherly v. Wilkie, 

, 

 (2000) (record was insufficient
to find alarm and apprehension about personal safety were
objectively reasonable where there was “no evidence …
of prior violence, explosive emotions, unstable behavior, or
threatening dealings between the parties”). Although some
of petitioner’s conduct set forth above vis-à-vis respondent
may have been, as the trial court noted, “inappropriate,” that
does not take respondent’s response to that conduct—i.e.,
following petitioner—outside the purview of ORS 163.738.
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner’s alarm was objectively reasonable.
          We turn to respondent’s November 19, 2017, expressive contact with petitioner. Respondent contends that, what
he characterizes as his “challenge to petitioner to get out of
his vehicle and fight,” cannot constitute a qualifying contact
for two reasons. First, any threat of violence was not “imminent.” That is so, respondent urges, because petitioner’s and
respondent’s trucks were parked so close to each other that
the doors could not have been opened without dinging each
other, and accordingly, for respondent to have caused any
injury to petitioner, “either one of them would have had to
move their vehicle or respondent would have had to exit his
passenger side door, gone around both cars and open petitioner’s passenger side door to get at petitioner.” Second,
that respondent’s comments did not actually instill a subjective “fear in petitioner that respondent would engage in a
violent act,” but instead, “instilled a belief that [respondent]
was trying to bait petitioner into engaging in violence.”
    7
      Respondent also contends petitioner never described what it was that he
feared respondent might do and there is no other evidence in the record that
suggests what type of harm petitioner might have anticipated, so there was “no
basis for concluding that any apprehension was objectively reasonable.” Given the
parties’ history with each other—including respondent’s prior conduct of nearly
causing a collision with petitioner while they were driving—we disagree.
Cite as 

 (2020)                            761

          Our analysis in Layne v. MacDonald, 

, 

 (2014), is instructive in addressing respondent’s first argument on appeal regarding his November 19,
2017 contact with petitioner—viz., that his statement was
not a threat of “imminent” violence. In that case, we considered whether a respondent’s statement to the petitioner, his
ex-wife, that he would “fuck [her] up” was an (1) “unequivocal” threat of (2) “imminent personal violence,” which would
satisfy the standard articulated for expressive contacts in
Rangel. Layne, 

.
         We first determined that the respondent’s statement
—that he would “fuck [the petitioner] up”—was an “unequivocal” threat, noting that it was “a colloquial term that, in
context, has but one meaning.” 

.
         Next, we addressed whether the threat was of
“imminent serious physical harm,” acknowledging that that
was a “somewhat closer” question. 

 We explained that
“a threat is [not] imminent only if the threatened harm is
‘immediate.’ ” 

. Rather, the “plain and ordinary”
meaning of “imminent” is “ ‘ready to take place’ ” or “ ‘near
at hand.’ ” 

 (quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
1130 (unabridged ed 2002)). With that understanding, we
looked to “contextual factors,” and determined that the
respondent’s statement was a “threat of imminent serious
harm.” 

 The “contextual factors” in Layne included that
the respondent had assaulted the petitioner during their
marriage, he bragged that he killed people while serving
in the military and warned that he could do the same to
her, he repeatedly showed a willingness to break the law by
allegedly violating his no-contact order multiple times, he
threatened to send his “skinhead” friends to harm her if she
reported those violations, and he actually had “skinhead”
acquaintances. 

.
         Here, as was the respondent’s statement to the petitioner in Layne, respondent’s statement to petitioner in this
case was “unequivocal.” That is, the statement, “If I don’t
get you now, I’ll get you later,” when viewed in the context
of respondent’s surrounding statements to petitioner—viz.,
that he wanted to “beat the shit out of” petitioner and would
“fight [him] right here”—has but one meaning. Cf. Outlaw,
762                                      M. D. O. v. Desantis

 (statement “I’m coming for you,” when analyzed in “the context of [the respondent’s] surrounding statements,” was reasonably understood as a promise to hold the
media accountable through respondent’s own “reporting,”
not a threat of violence). Respondent’s statement was not a
mere “vague invitation to fight.” Cf. Christensen, 

 (statement, “Come down here, motherfucker, and I’ll
show you,” was not a threat under Rangel, as it was only “a
vague invitation to fight”); State v. Jackson, 

, 

 (2013) (accepting state’s concession that
defendant’s statement that he “wanted to fight” victim and
called victim a “pussy” was not a threat under Rangel, where
there was no evidence that defendant approached victim).

          Although the “contextual factors” are not as extreme
as they were in Layne, the “contextual factors” in this case
lead us to conclude that respondent’s statement, “If I don’t
get you now, I’ll get you later,” was a “threat of imminent
serious harm,” Layne, 

. As described
above, petitioner and respondent had a highly acrimonious relationship that had persisted for almost a full year.
During that time, as the trial court found, rather than
settle down, their anger with each other had continued to
grow and grow. Respondent continued to be angry with
petitioner, had a “hot temper,” and had snapped on multiple occasions upon seeing petitioner. Respondent blamed
petitioner for respondent’s estrangement from his wife, his
business troubles, and the assault by petitioner’s children,
which was “life-changing” for respondent. Respondent had
previously engaged in conduct that posed a direct risk to
petitioner’s physical safety—viz., nearly causing a collision
with petitioner’s truck. Given where respondent had parked
his truck, petitioner was prevented from getting out of petitioner’s truck in the usual manner—i.e., through the front
driver’s-side door. And, respondent’s presence next to petitioner’s truck was unexpected.

         Against that backdrop, respondent’s statement—“If
I don’t get you now, I’ll get you later”—was not mere “hyperbole, rhetorical excesses, [or] impotent expressions of anger
or frustration.” Rangel, 

 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Although respondent might be correct that
Cite as 

 (2020)                              763

he would have had to move his car or exit his car to cause
injury to petitioner, that does not mean his statement was
not a threat of imminent serious harm—i.e., threating harm
that is “near at hand.” Layne, 

; see also
DiCarlo v. McCarthy, 

, 

 (2006) (respondent’s statements to petitioner, “I’m going
to fuck you up, I’m going to fuck your old man up, and I’m
going to fuck your truck” up, and “I’ll get you, I’ll find you,
it’s a small town,” was a qualifying contact for issuance of an
SPO, as “respondent’s verbal communications were overtly
threatening, and they reasonably put petitioner in fear of
immediate and serious personal violence from respondent”);
cf. Goodness v. Beckham, 

, 

(2008) (emails from respondent to petitioner did not contain
an “imminent threat” where respondent lived in California,
did not know petitioner’s address, and there was no evidence
that respondent intended to follow up the email statements
with imminent unlawful acts (emphasis in original)).
         We also disagree with respondent’s second contention—that the trial court erred in issuing an SPO because
respondent’s comments did not actually instill a subjective
“fear in petitioner that respondent would engage in a violent
act,” but instead “instilled a belief that [respondent] was trying to bait petitioner into engaging in violence.” To be sure,
respondent is correct that petitioner testified during the
SPO hearing that he believed respondent engaged in name
calling because respondent wanted petitioner to instigate a
physical fight so that respondent could “be the victim.” But
that was not petitioner’s only testimony: Petitioner also testified that he believed respondent would follow through on
his threat to harm petitioner, that respondent could not “control himself,” that respondent’s threat had left him “rattled,”
and that he had previously felt like respondent was “hunting him down.” Further, petitioner had previously sought
police protection from respondent. Although petitioner may
not have used the words “fear of imminent and serious personal violence,” Rangel, 

, when testifying, from
petitioner’s testimony the trial court could infer that he did,
in fact, subjectively have such a fear. Boyd v. Essin, 

, 

 (2000), rev den, 

(2001) (concluding that, although “petitioner did not repeat
764                                      M. D. O. v. Desantis

the words of the statute and say that she had been subjectively alarmed” the court could “infer from her testimony, in
light of the nature of respondent’s contacts … that she was
in fact alarmed,” and that “it was objectively reasonable for
petitioner to be alarmed”).
         In sum, as described above, the parties to this case
had a year-long relationship marred by a growing enmity, in
which one of them had already suffered a significant injury.
Their conduct vis-à-vis each other was seemingly unthethered
from social mores. Against the backdrop of that historical
“bad blood,” we conclude that the trial court did not err in
determining that petitioner had made the requisite showing
for issuance of an SPO.
        Affirmed.