Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

303 Ga. 43

Fletcher v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided February 5, 2018

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2018-02-05

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently February 2025

9 state decisions

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Bradshaw v. State · In re Lang

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2018-02-05

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

303 Ga. 43
FINAL COPY




                   S17A1978. FLETCHER v. THE STATE.


      GRANT, Justice.

      Appellant Patrick Fletcher was found guilty of two counts each of malice

murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during

the commission of a felony in connection with the April 2013 shooting deaths

of Wayne and Octavia Brown. Fletcher now appeals, asserting erroneous

admission of “other acts” evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404

(b)”). Because any error in the admission of that evidence was harmless, we

affirm.1



1
 The murders were committed on April 22, 2013. Fletcher was indicted by a Ben
Hill County grand jury. At the conclusion of a trial held from June 22 to June 26,
2015, a jury found Fletcher guilty of two counts each of malice murder, felony
murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony. The trial court sentenced Fletcher to life imprisonment without parole
for both malice murder convictions, running concurrently, plus five years
consecutive for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon convictions, which
were made to run concurrent to each other. The trial court purported to merge the
remaining counts into the malice murder counts. Although the trial court properly
merged the aggravated assault counts with the malice murder counts, the felony
                                        I.

      Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence at

trial showed that on the morning of April 22, 2013, Wayne and Octavia Brown

were found shot to death in their home. Patrick Fletcher lived next door to the

Browns with his girlfriend Taccarra Leverette in the Blue Gray Trailer Park in

Fitzgerald, Georgia. Fletcher and the Browns were involved together in drug

dealing.

      The night before, neighbors saw Fletcher running out of his trailer and

heard him yelling “these mother f*****s are going to die tonight.” It was

apparent that Fletcher was referring to the Browns, and in response to an

inquiry from one neighbor, Fletcher said that “they had snitched and that they

were going to die tonight and that this girl was coming down from Atlanta and

she was going to whip her a** and he knows that she could.” Another neighbor

heard Fletcher yell that the Browns “are the po-po and they are going to die.”



murder counts should have been vacated by operation of law. See Culpepper v.
State, 
289 Ga. 736, 737-739
 (
715 SE2d 155
) (2011).
       Fletcher filed a timely motion for new trial on July 13, 2015, which was
subsequently amended. A hearing was held on the motion on December 1, 2016,
and the motion was denied, as amended, on December 12, 2016. Fletcher filed his
notice of appeal on December 21, 2016. The appeal was docketed to the August
2017 term of this Court and thereafter was submitted for a decision on the briefs.
When the Browns arrived home, neighbors saw Fletcher run to their vehicle

and begin talking loudly.

     Later that night, sometime after 11:00 p.m., Fletcher called Wayne’s

cousin Kourtney Campbell, who overheard Fletcher “fussing” with Octavia

and claiming that she had tried to set up a mutual associate named Terrance

Thornton, also known as “Ransey,” in a drug deal with police. Around that

same time, another friend of the Browns, Patricia Walker, called Octavia, who

told her that Fletcher was “nutting up and acting all crazy” about Octavia and

Wayne being “snitches.” Octavia also told Walker that she was trying to

contact Ransey to tell him that she and Wayne were “not like that.”

     Around 3:00 a.m., another neighbor heard three gunshots. After a pause,

two more gunshots followed. Fletcher had been seen carrying a handgun a few

weeks before.    Around dawn, Fletcher’s girlfriend approached Norman

Hodges, the trailer park’s maintenance man, and asked him to accompany her

to check on the Browns’ residence because no one was answering the door.

The storm door was closed, but the inside door was partially open; Hodges saw

Octavia sitting in a chair covered in blood and not moving. He called his

employer, who in turn called 911.
      Law enforcement arrived and began investigating the scene. A crowd

gathered as word of the Browns’ death spread, including neighbors, friends and

family of the Browns, and Fletcher. Fletcher made many statements to those

around him that morning. Fletcher’s statements were incriminating, were

inconsistent (with each other, with later statements he made to police, with his

alibi, or with evidence that was later discovered), and included information that

he should not have known at that time if he were innocent of the killings. For

example, when Campbell arrived at the scene, she repeatedly confronted

Fletcher with her suspicion that he had killed the Browns, and Fletcher would

only smile in response each time she asked; Campbell’s distrust had been

heightened because earlier that morning, Fletcher had laughed and told

Campbell on the phone that the Browns were “stanking a** dead.” Fletcher

also told Wayne’s cousin, with what would have been remarkable accuracy for

someone not involved in the killings, that “Octavia had been beat and shot in

the eye and Wayne had been beat and shot in the head”; his explanation was

that “they were snitches and that’s what snitches get.” And Fletcher told a

neighbor in the crowd that somebody killed the Browns because “they had

snitched.” Fletcher separately told several members of the Browns’ family that

he went to the Browns’ trailer that morning, peeped through the door, and
could see that something was wrong; because Octavia appeared to be sitting in

a recliner bloodied and beaten, he went back home and told his girlfriend to

check on them. While police were still inside with the bodies, Fletcher

announced to another bystander that Wayne had been shot in the head

execution style. This contention was also accurate.

      After Fletcher was arrested for the murders, his cellmate, Jeffrey Cole, a

convicted felon, testified that Fletcher admitted to murdering the Browns with

Tommy Belmer, another drug associate. Cole testified that Fletcher told him

that Belmer shot Wayne “execution style” and that Fletcher then shot Octavia

because “he knew she would tell on them” and “they were snitches and they

were trying to set Ransey and DeLow up”; Ransey had paid them for the

killings. Fletcher also said that he cleaned up with bleach, burned his clothes,

and “ran around” the mobile home park “messing around to throw the heat

off.” As he explained it to Cole, Fletcher then went back in to sit Octavia up

on the couch, and asked his girlfriend to get Norman to come over and find the

bodies. Fletcher further informed Cole that he preferred revolvers because they

do not drop shells, and that he had burned and buried the gun he used in the

killings. Fletcher also admitted that he was “messing with” Octavia; Wayne
had found out, but Fletcher, for obvious reasons, did not want his girlfriend to

find out too.

        Fletcher was interviewed three times by law enforcement. In those

interviews, he claimed that the last time that he saw the Browns was at 7:30

p.m. on the night of the murders; he denied knowing about anyone who might

have thought that the Browns were “snitches”; and he said he didn’t receive

any phone calls between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. on the night of the murders.

Fletcher’s cell phone records, however, showed that he placed and received

multiple phone calls on the night of the murders between himself, another

associate in the drug trade named J. T., and Campbell.

        In addition to hearing testimony that established the facts above at trial,

the jury also heard from a courtroom deputy who saw Fletcher speaking with

Campbell, a key witness, and Wayne’s mother Angela Jordan, another witness,

in the courtroom prior to trial. According to the deputy, Fletcher told the two

witnesses that “the clock is ticking. You are going to get what’s coming to

you.”

        Although Fletcher has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions, we have independently examined the record

according to our usual practice in murder cases and conclude that the evidence
admitted at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that Fletcher was guilty of the crimes of which he was

convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307, 318-319
 (
99 SCt 2781
, 61

LE2d 560) (1979).

                                         II.

      Fletcher asserts a single ground for reversal, claiming that the trial court

erred in overruling his objection to the admission of the following “other acts”

evidence under Rule 404 (b): (1) a 1999 conviction where Fletcher pled guilty

to two counts of selling cocaine; (2) a 1999 conviction where Fletcher pled

guilty to sale of a counterfeit substance, aggravated assault (brandishing a

handgun during the transaction), and possession of a firearm during

commission of a crime; (3) a 2000 conviction where a jury found Fletcher

guilty of armed robbery; and (4) evidence of a 2011 traffic stop and arrest

where law enforcement attempted to stop Fletcher after they confirmed he had

an active arrest warrant; where he failed to stop until a PIT maneuver was

performed; and where officers discovered crack cocaine and marijuana on his

person. Rule 404 (b) provides:

            Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be
      admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
      action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
      other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
      opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
      absence of mistake or accident. . . .

      The Rule is, on its face, “an evidentiary rule of inclusion which contains

a non-exhaustive list of purposes other than bad character for which other acts

evidence is deemed relevant and may be properly offered into evidence.” State

v. Jones, 
297 Ga. 156
, 159 (
773 SE2d 170
) (2015) (citing United States v.

Jernigan, 
341 F3d 1273, 1280
 (11th Cir. 2003)). But despite its inclusive

nature, Rule 404 (b) “prohibits the admission of such evidence when it is

offered solely for the impermissible purpose of showing a defendant’s bad

character or propensity to commit a crime.”         
Id.
 (emphasis in original).

Consequently, we use a three-part test to determine if evidence of other

uncharged acts is admissible: (1) it must be relevant to an issue other than

defendant’s character; (2) it must be supported by sufficient proof to enable a

jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed

the act(s) in question; and (3) it must satisfy Rule 403. 
Id.
 (citing Bradshaw v.

State, 
296 Ga. 650, 656
 (
769 SE2d 892
) (2015); United States v. Edouard, 
485 F3d 1324, 1344
 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Delgado, 
56 F3d 1357, 1365

(11th Cir. 1995)). “A trial court’s decision to admit other acts evidence will

be overturned only where there is a clear abuse of discretion.” 
Id.
      Fletcher may be correct that some or all of the evidence he cites was

improperly admitted, but we need not reach that determination because any

error was harmless. See Davis v. State, 
301 Ga. 397, 400
 (
801 SE2d 897
)

(2017) (pretermitting finding of error in admission of other acts evidence

because strong evidence of guilt made any such error harmless).            “In

determining whether trial court error was harmless, we review the record de

novo, and we weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have

done so as opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict.” Peoples v. State, 
295 Ga. 44, 55
 (
757 SE2d 646
) (2014) (citations

and punctuation omitted); see also Rivera v. State, 
295 Ga. 380, 382
 (
761 SE2d 30
) (2014). If “it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the

verdict,” then the error is harmless and the conviction will stand. Smith v.

State, 
299 Ga. 424, 432
 (
788 SE2d 433
) (2016) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Where evidentiary error is deemed harmless, it is often true that the

improper evidence was only “marginal” to the prosecution’s case. Johnson v.

State, 
301 Ga. 277, 280
 (
800 SE2d 545
) (2017).

      Here, Fletcher was heard by multiple people threatening the lives of the

victims the night of the murders, and he made numerous incriminating

statements after the murders—some of which concerned information only the
killer could have known. His jailhouse confession was both detailed and

consistent with his statements to other parties before the murders. It was also

consistent with the fears that Octavia expressed to her friends. Moreover, his

alibi and other statements to law enforcement were contradicted by his own

inconsistent statements, the testimony of witnesses, and phone records.

      Considering the quantity and strength of the evidence against Fletcher, it

is highly probable that any error in admitting these “other acts” did not

contribute to the verdict, especially considering that other evidence also

showed the jury that Fletcher was involved in drug dealing. See Hood v. State,

299 Ga. 95, 105-106
 (
786 SE2d 648
) (2016) (evidence that defendant sold

drugs on other occasions was harmless because inculpatory evidence was

strong); United States v. Sterling, 
738 F3d 228, 239
 (11th Cir. 2013) (evidence

of 15-year-old bank robbery conviction was harmless because of otherwise

overwhelming evidence of guilt); United States v. Brown, 
344 F. App’x 555, 555-559
 (11th Cir. 2009) (evidence of two prior firearm convictions, which

included documentation of other crimes and habitual felony offender status,

was harmless because of overwhelming evidence of guilt). We simply cannot

see any likelihood that the jury would have weighed the case differently in the

absence of the other acts evidence. Accordingly, Fletcher’s contentions fail.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
                          Decided February 5, 2018.

      Murder. Ben Hill Superior Court. Before Judge Pridgen.

      David J. Walker, for appellant.

      Bradford L. Rigby, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.

Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason M. Rea, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

/303/ga/43 · .json · Public domain