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303 Ga. 487

Jackson v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided April 16, 2018

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2018-04-16

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently September 2021

5 state decisions

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Jones v. State · Alvelo v. State

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Decided 2018-04-16

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303 Ga. 487
FINAL COPY




                                   S18A0127. JACKSON v. THE STATE.


           BENHAM, Justice.
           Appellant Lavoris Jackson was tried jointly with Ramel Brown,1 and

both were convicted for murder and other crimes arising out of the shooting

death of victim Curtis Jordan. 2 Witnesses testified that on the afternoon of

the shooting, a person who was known to be a member of the Bloods street

gang, and who was wearing a red bandana indicative of being in that gang,

taunted a group of other men that included Jackson, who was wearing a blue

or purple bandana, indicative of being in a gang other than the Bloods.

1

      This Court affirmed co-defendant Brown’s convictions in Brown v. State, 
300 Ga. 446
 (
796 SE2d 2 283
) (2017).
           The crimes occurred on September 21, 2012. On February 26, 2013, a Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment charging
appellant with criminal street gang activity, malice murder, felony murder (aggravated assault by shooting the victim with a shotgun), felony
murder (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (a handgun), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following a jury trial conducted between March 3, 2014 and March
7, 2014, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder and fifteen
consecutive years for criminal street gang activity. In addition, appellant was given a five-year suspended sentence for the guilty verdict for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and a five-year sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to be
served concurrently with the sentence for criminal street gang activity and murder. The guilty verdicts for felony murder were vacated by
operation of law, and the remaining guilty verdict for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was merged for purposes of sentencing.
Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial on March 11, 2014, which was later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the
motion as to the guilty verdict for criminal street gang activity. Thereafter, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to enter a nolle
prosequi order for that charge. In response to a motion for clarification of the order on appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial court entered
an order clarifying that the motion for new trial was denied as to all counts other than the guilty verdict for criminal street gang activity.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and this case was docketed to the term of court beginning in December 2017. The case was submitted
for decision on the briefs.
Jordan, also wearing a red bandana, and who was identified at trial as a

member of the Bloods street gang, was riding a bicycle nearby when this

occurred. According to one of the witnesses, he smiled and laughed at the

taunting.   Later that evening, witnesses saw four men together in the

apartment complex where the taunting had occurred, including Brown, who

was holding a shotgun, and Jackson, who was holding a handgun. One

witness saw both Brown and Jackson shooting their respective weapons, and

she saw a third person with them whom she could not identify. She also saw

an unidentified man shooting a shotgun out the window of a truck that was

passing by. That witness saw the victim running and then falling to the

ground, after which she saw Jackson, Brown, and the third person fleeing on

foot in the direction taken by the truck. The victim collapsed and died at the

scene. In this witness’ first interview with a detective, she did not mention

Jackson, but in her second interview she stated that she saw him shooting a

handgun, which was consistent with her trial testimony.        The evidence

demonstrated the victim was shot twice with a shotgun, including once with a

shotgun slug, and five to six times with a handgun. The medical examiner

testified that the wounds from the handgun bullets, by themselves, could have

produced death from bleeding, but the immediate cause of death was the
wound caused by a shotgun slug to the victim’s torso. We affirm appellant’s

convictions.

      1.       Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

the convictions. He argues that because the evidence established that the

victim died as a result of a shotgun wound, and no evidence was presented

that he fired a shotgun at the victim, he could not be found guilty of the

crimes charged. He also argues that even though two witnesses testified they

saw appellant holding a handgun, only one witness testified consistently with

her earlier statement that appellant fired the handgun. That witness also

testified that an unknown male leaning out of a truck fired shots from a

shotgun. While acknowledging that the credibility of witnesses is a matter

solely within the province of the jury, appellant nevertheless asserts that the

totality of the evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find appellant

guilty, as charged in the indictment, of murder “by shooting [the victim] with

a shotgun,” or guilty of felony murder or aggravated assault with a shotgun

because the evidence showed only that he fired a handgun, whereas his co-

defendant fired the shotgun.

      Appellant ignores that sufficient evidence was presented to support his

convictions, at least as a party to the crimes charged. See OCGA § 16-2-20.
The trial judge properly instructed the jury on the law of party to a crime and

mere presence.    While proof of shared criminal intent with the actual

perpetrator of the alleged criminal act is necessary to be convicted as a party

to a crime, such intent may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct before,

during, and after the crime. See Grant v. State, 
298 Ga. 835, 837
 (1) (
785 SE2d 285
) (2016). The element of shared intent certainly may be inferred

from the evidence presented in this case. Even where it is undisputed that the

victim was shot by another person, every person concerned in the

commission of the crime may be convicted of the crime. See Jones v. State,

292 Ga. 656, 658
 (1) (a) (
740 SE2d 590
) (2013). The evidence presented to

the jury was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions as a party to the

crimes. See 
id.
 See also Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307
 (
99 SCt 2781
, 61

LE2d 560) (1979).

      2.    The indictment charged appellant with murder as well as felony

murder for causing the victim’s death “by shooting him with a shotgun . . . .”

The evidence was sufficient to show that appellant’s co-defendant was the

party who actually shot the victim with a shotgun, whereas it showed that

appellant, standing nearby, shot the victim with a handgun. As noted above,

the evidence was also sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction as a
party to the crime of shooting the victim with a shotgun and killing him.

Nevertheless, appellant asserts he was entitled to a jury instruction on

proximate causation, which was not given. Acknowledging that he did not

request such an instruction or raise an objection on this ground to the jury

instruction that was given, appellant argues the trial court committed plain

error by failing to give an instruction on proximate cause. Appellant further

acknowledges that to meet the burden of showing plain error, he must

demonstrate that the instruction was erroneous, that it was obviously so, and

that the error likely affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Alvelo v.

State, 
290 Ga. 609, 615
 (5) (
724 SE2d 377
) (2012).

     When considering whether error exists in the instructions to the jury,

this Court considers the instructions as a whole. Sapp v. State, 
290 Ga. 247, 251
 (2) (
719 SE2d 434
) (2011). In this case, the trial court’s instruction on

murder, felony murder, and on the law of party to a crime

     was sufficient to inform the jury that, in order to convict, it had to
     determine [appellant] caused or was a party in the causing of [the
     victim’s] death, and thus no error is shown by the trial court’s
     failure to give a charge on proximate cause. See Pennie v. State,
     
292 Ga. 249, 252
 (2) (
736 SE2d 433
) (2013).

Flournoy v. State, 
294 Ga. 741, 746
 (3) (
755 SE2d 777
) (2014) (in which the

evidence showed it was appellant’s co-defendant who was armed and fired
the gun, resulting in the robbery and kidnapping victim’s shooting death).

See also Williams v. State, 
298 Ga. 208, 218
 (7) (
779 SE2d 304
) (2015). The

trial court read the indictment to the jury, which accused appellant of causing

the victim’s death by shooting him with a shotgun. It properly instructed the

jury on the law of party to a crime and mere presence. The jury instruction

defined murder and felony murder, including the element that the accused

caused the death of another human being. With respect to the felony murder

charges, appellant’s convictions were vacated by operation of law;

nevertheless, we note that the trial court properly instructed the jury

regarding the necessary relationship between the charged felonies and the

homicide.   Despite the trial court’s failure to give a separate instruction on

proximate causation, the charge to the jury in this case, when considered as a

whole, created no obvious error with respect to the element of causation in

the crimes for which appellant was convicted.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
                              Decided April 16, 2018.

      Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Goger.

      Debra K. Jefferson, for appellant.

      Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Arthur C.

Walton, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

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