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303 Ga. 704

Johnson v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided May 21, 2018

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2018-05-21

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently May 2024

9 state decisions

Relies on Brady v. United States · McCarthy v. United States · State v. Jackson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2018-05-21

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303 Ga. 704
FINAL COPY




                   S18A0017. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.


      NAHMIAS, Justice.

      Appellant Stephen Randall Johnson challenges the trial court’s order

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony murder. Appellant

claims that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he was

intoxicated when he entered it and that the trial court applied an erroneous

standard of review in ruling on his motion. We affirm.

      1.    The record shows that after an initial indictment in 2013 charging

Appellant with felony murder and drug conspiracy, he was re-indicted in Peach

County on April 6, 2016 for three counts of felony murder (based on trafficking

methamphetamine, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon) in connection with the shooting death of Matthew Garner; three

counts of felony murder (based on the same predicate felonies) in connection

with the shooting death of Kenneth Sharpe; and one count of theft by receiving

a stolen firearm. Later that day, the trial court held a plea hearing during which
Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to Count 1 of the indictment — felony

murder based on trafficking meth in connection with Garner’s death. In

exchange, the State agreed to waive the recidivism notice it had filed, which

otherwise would have required Appellant’s sentence to be life in prison without

the possibility of parole, and to nolle pros the remaining charges.

      At the plea hearing, the State represented that the evidence, if there were

a trial, would show the following. On October 10, 2013, Appellant and his

friend Garner met Sharpe at a motel in Warner Robins to sell Sharpe a

half-pound of meth for $6,500. All three men were armed with handguns.

Sharpe arrived with only $3,000, and at some point, there was a dispute, during

which Garner shot Sharpe. Sharpe then shot Garner, who was killed instantly.

Sharpe fled the motel, drove to Oxford, Alabama, and called his sister to tell her

that he was dying and to “remember the name, Sam Owens, he tried us both.”

Sharpe then pulled into a parking lot, where he died from his gunshot wound.

Appellant uses the name “Sam Owens,” and the number for a contact labeled

“Sam” in Sharpe’s phone matched a cell phone number linked to Appellant. In

Sharpe’s car, Alabama police found a stolen gun that was later linked to

Appellant, $3,000, and a half-pound of meth. Appellant’s fingerprints were


                                        2
found on a small bag of meth in the motel room, and the police found two card

keys to the motel room when they searched Appellant’s home. In addition,

several witnesses would testify that Appellant admitted to them that he was

involved in a meth deal that went bad, which resulted in Garner’s shooting

death.

      Before the plea hearing, Appellant and his plea counsel completed and

signed a 29-question form entitled “Plea of Guilty: Acknowledgment and

Waiver of Rights.” One question was, “Are you now under the influence of

alcohol, drugs, narcotics or pills of any kind?” The circled answer was “No.”

During his colloquy with the trial court, Appellant confirmed that he had signed

the form, that his counsel had explained his constitutional and other legal rights

to him, and that he understood those rights and had no questions about them.

The court informed Appellant that the maximum sentence he could receive

should he proceed to trial would be life without the possibility of parole, which

Appellant acknowledged. Appellant then entered his guilty plea. The court

asked him if he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty; Appellant

replied, “Yes sir.” The court also asked Appellant if he had been threatened in

any way or promised anything of value to make him plead guilty; Appellant


                                        3
answered, “No, sir.” After finding that there was a factual basis to believe the

crime was committed as alleged and that Appellant had made a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, the court accepted

the guilty plea. Appellant then asked for and was granted permission to address

Garner’s mother, and he gave lengthy remarks lamenting Garner’s death. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in

prison with the possibility of parole.

      About a month later (and in the same term of court), Appellant wrote the

trial court, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant was appointed new

counsel, and on July 15, 2016, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the

motion. At the hearing, Appellant testified that he did not voluntarily plead

guilty because he was under the influence of six “anti-psychotic” Trazodone

pills that he had acquired in jail by bartering honey buns with another inmate.

He also claimed that when his plea counsel was explaining his rights to him

before the plea hearing, the attorney repeatedly asked him “are you okay, what’s

wrong with you?” Appellant did not offer testimony from his plea counsel at

the motion hearing. To rebut Appellant’s claims, the State submitted the plea

hearing transcript and the guilty plea form.


                                         4
      Later that day, the trial court entered an eight-page order denying

Appellant’s motion. After discussing the record from the plea hearing and

Appellant’s testimony at the motion hearing, the court concluded:

             After review of the entire record, it is very clear that
      [Appellant] in this case gave his plea knowingly, intelligently, and
      voluntarily, with full knowledge of the charges and consequences
      of his plea. . . . There is no manifest injustice in refusing to allow
      [Appellant] to withdraw his plea.

Eight months later, Appellant filed a motion for out-of-time appeal on the

ground that his counsel had not been notified of the denial order. After the trial

court granted the motion, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case

was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2017.

      2.    After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea only to

correct a manifest injustice, which exists if the plea was in fact entered

involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges. See Bell

v. State, 
294 Ga. 5, 6
 (
749 SE2d 672
) (2013). See also Uniform Superior Court

Rule 33.12 (B). When a defendant challenges the validity of his guilty plea in

this way, the State bears the burden of showing that the defendant entered his

plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See Cazanas v. State, 
270 Ga. 130, 131
 (
508 SE2d 412
) (1998). “‘The State may meet its burden by showing


                                        5
on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights

being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic

evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing.’”

Graham v. State, 
300 Ga. 620, 620
 (
797 SE2d 459
) (2017) (citation omitted).

In evaluating whether a defendant’s plea was valid, the trial court should

consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea. See Brady v.

United States, 
397 U. S. 742, 749
 (
90 SCt 1463
, 25 LE2d 747) (1970); Shepard

v. Williams, 
299 Ga. 437, 439
 (
788 SE2d 428
) (2016). The court’s decision on

a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be disturbed absent an obvious abuse

of discretion. See McGuyton v. State, 
298 Ga. 351, 353
 (
782 SE2d 21
) (2016).

      In this case, the signed guilty plea form and the transcript of the plea

hearing demonstrate that Appellant was advised of his constitutional rights, that

he understood those rights and the consequences of waiving them, and that he

then voluntarily entered his guilty plea. The only evidence to the contrary is

Appellant’s own testimony at the motion to withdraw hearing that he had taken

Trazodone pills before he entered the plea, that he had not understood the charge

to which he pled guilty, and that he could not recall the details of the plea

hearing. The credibility of that testimony was for the trial court to determine,


                                       6
see 
McGuyton at 355
, and the court plainly rejected that self-serving account.

      During the motion hearing, the trial court noted that Appellant’s account

of the events surrounding his plea was not credible because even though he

insisted that he was in a drug-induced fog that day, he was conveniently able to

remember details that he claimed supported his story. Moreover, Appellant,

with the assistance of counsel, had signed the guilty plea form, swearing that he

was not under the influence of any intoxicants. In addition, the judge had

observed Appellant in presiding over the plea hearing, and nothing in the

hearing transcript suggests that Appellant was intoxicated in any way.

      To the contrary, as the trial court also pointed out, Appellant’s speech to

Garner’s mother at the plea hearing belied his assertion that the pills he had

supposedly taken rendered him incompetent to enter his plea. In those remarks,

Appellant was able to articulate a coherent understanding of the law of felony

murder, how he could be found guilty under that law based on his commission

of the felony of trafficking meth, and the life sentence he expected to receive as

a result of his guilty plea. See McCarthy v. United States, 
394 U. S. 459, 466

(
89 SCt 1166
, 22 LE2d 418) (1969) (explaining that a guilty plea “cannot be

truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in


                                        7
relation to the facts”). See also Davis v. State, 
290 Ga. 757, 760-761
 (
725 SE2d 280
) (2012) (explaining that an illegal drug transaction, particularly with armed

participants, is foreseeably dangerous and thus a predicate for felony murder,

and an attempted armed robbery did not break the causal link between the drug

deal and the killing); State v. Jackson, 
287 Ga. 646, 653
 (
697 SE2d 757
) (2010)

(holding that a defendant may be found guilty of the felony murder of his

accomplice in the underlying felony if that result was a reasonably foreseeable

consequence of their crime).

      Thus, “the evidence contradicting Appellant’s version of events fully

supports the trial court’s finding that [his] testimony was not credible and the

court’s conclusion that [he] was not intoxicated when [he] entered [his] guilty

plea.” Stokes v. State, 
299 Ga. 37, 40
 (
785 SE2d 883
) (2016). See also Jackson

v. State, 
285 Ga. 840, 840-841
 (
684 SE2d 594
) (2009) (affirming the denial of

the appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea where he had told the court

at the plea hearing that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs but

later claimed that his plea was involuntary because he had been intoxicated);

Hardeman v. State, 
273 Ga. App. 550, 550-551
 (
615 SE2d 611
) (2005) (holding

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion


                                        8
to withdraw his guilty plea supported only by his own testimony at the motion

hearing that he was under the influence of medication that caused him to speak

without thinking at the plea hearing).

      3.    Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by applying an

incorrect standard in reviewing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Specifically, Appellant asserts that the court refused to consider evidence

extrinsic to the guilty plea form and therefore improperly ignored his testimony

at the motion hearing that he had been under the influence of Trazodone when

he entered his plea. Appellant points to a discussion between his appellate

counsel and the trial court during the motion hearing in which the court asked

whether it should consider evidence other than the guilty plea form to determine

if Appellant’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Despite that

somewhat confusing interchange, however, the court’s order denying

Appellant’s motion plainly shows that the court considered the evidence and

arguments presented at the motion hearing in addition to the plea hearing

transcript and the guilty plea form. The trial court did not ignore Appellant’s

testimony; as discussed above, the court found that testimony unworthy of

belief, a finding the record fully supports.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                         9
                           Decided May 21, 2018.

      Murder. Peach Superior Court. Before Judge Self.

      Jonathan P. Waters, for appellant.

      K. David Cooke, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth K. Bobbitt, Dorothy V.

Hull, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.




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