State v. Hayter

                                      235

       Argued and submitted September 28, 2018, affirmed April 1, 2020


                      STATE OF OREGON,
                       Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                 v.
                   KELLIE ANNE HAYTER,
                      Defendant-Appellant.
                 Washington County Circuit Court
                      16CR53075; A164242
                                  

    Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction, after a bench trial, on one count
of possession of methamphetamine, assigning error to the trial court’s denial
of her motion to withdraw a jury-trial waiver. Held: The trial court considered
appropriate factors in rejecting defendant’s request and was not required to
explain its discretionary ruling in greater detail. The trial court’s ruling was
within the permissible range of legally correct outcomes and was therefore a permissible exercise of the court’s discretion.
    Affirmed.



    Janelle F. Wipper, Judge.
   Sarah Laidlaw, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, Band enjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Shorr, Judge, and
Landau, Senior Judge.
    ARMSTRONG, P. J.
    Affirmed.
236                                          State v. Hayter

        ARMSTRONG, P. J.

         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction, after a
bench trial, on one count of possession of methamphetamine,
ORS 475.894. She assigns error to the trial court’s denial of
her motion to suppress evidence obtained after a search of
her car and to the court’s denial of her motion to withdraw
a jury-trial waiver. We write to address only the jury-waiver
issue, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting defendant’s request, see State v. Stewart,

, 

 (2010) (court reviews trial
court’s ruling on withdrawal of jury waiver for abuse of discretion), and affirm.

          At a hearing on the day before her trial, defendant
submitted a written request for waiver of a jury trial. The
court engaged in a colloquy with defendant and accepted
defendant’s waiver. It is undisputed that the waiver was
valid. The court cancelled the request for jurors to be called
for defendant’s trial. On the morning of trial, defense counsel told the court that defendant wanted to withdraw her
waiver. Defense counsel did not give a specific reason, other
than defendant’s change of mind, for her request to withdraw her waiver. No jurors were available. The court denied
the request, stating, “[B]ased on the fact that there was sufficient colloquy and the waiver was accepted yesterday, I am
not going to allow [defendant] to change her mind at this
point.” The parties agreed to try the case to the court, and
defendant was convicted.

         On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying her request to withdraw her
jury-trial waiver, because, in the absence of a finding that
defendant’s motivation for the request was tactical or made
in bad faith, the court was required as a matter of law to
grant it. The state responds that it was well within the trial
court’s discretion to deny defendant’s request. We conclude
that the state is correct.

        In State v. Villareall, 

, 

 (1982), quoting with approval from an opinion of
the California Supreme Court, we addressed factors that a
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court might consider in considering a request to withdraw a
waiver of a jury trial:
   “ ‘Absent special circumstances the court may deny a motion
   to withdraw such a waiver especially where adverse consequences will flow from the defendant’s change of mind. In
   exercising its discretion the court may consider such matters as the timeliness of the motion to withdraw the waiver,
   the reason for the requested withdrawal and the possibility
   that undue delay of the trial or inconvenience to witnesses
   would result from granting the motion.’ ”
Villareall, 

 (quoting People v. Chambers,
7 Cal 3d 666, 670-71, 102 Cal Rptr 776, 

 (1972)).
“Absent special circumstances,” in the exercise of discretion,
a court may deny a motion to withdraw a waiver. Defendant
does not cite any “special circumstance” here that would
preclude the court from exercising discretion to reject defendant’s request. Defendant argues, simply, that the record
does not show that the court considered the factors set forth
in Chambers and cited in Villareall and that a proper consideration of those factors requires the granting of the request.
Further, defendant contends, in light of the fundamental
nature of the right to a jury trial, in the absence of prejudice to the prosecution or evidence that a defendant seeks
to withdraw a waiver for strategic reasons or in bad faith, a
trial court should defer to a defendant’s request.
        In making discretionary rulings, a trial court acts
within certain legal boundaries to choose from several permissible outcomes:
   “Judicial discretion should … be exercised according to
   fixed legal principles in order to promote substantial justice. … In short, judicial discretion is always bounded by
   a simple framework: It must be lawfully exercised to reach
   a decision that falls within a permissible range of legally
   correct outcomes.”
State v. Harrell/Wilson, 

, 

 (2013)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (setting out
factors for trial court to consider on a jury-waiver request);
see also State v. Rogers, 

, 

 (2000)
(“[D]iscretion, as this court has used that term, refers to the
authority of a trial court to choose among several legally
238                                            State v. Hayter

correct outcomes.”). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is outside the range of legally permissible choices or
exceeds the bounds of reason. State v. Garrison, 

, 

 (2014), rev den, 

 (2015);
see also Forsi v. Hildahl, 

, 

(2004), rev den, 

 (2005) (“The trial court abuses
its discretion if it exercises that discretion in a manner that
is unjustified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.”).

         Here, the consideration that the court cited in
rejecting defendant’s request was the fact that the court
had accepted defendant’s valid waiver just one day before
the scheduled trial. Conceivably, the court could also have
relied on other factors that can be inferred from the record,
such as judicial economy or inconvenience to witnesses. The
court did not make findings as to other factors, nor was it
asked or required to do so. See State v. Anderson, 

, 

 (2018) (in assessing sufficiency of trial
court’s explanation of its discretionary ruling under OEC
403, appellate court should consider court’s ruling in light
of arguments made on merits of issue raised by objection, as
well as whether either party asked court to provide a more
complete explanation of its ruling).

         In reviewing the trial court’s discretionary ruling, it
is not this court’s duty to reweigh the relevant considerations
but only to determine whether the court weighed appropriate considerations and whether its ruling was legally permissible. The trial court’s cited reason—the court’s approval
of a valid waiver just the day before—was an appropriate
consideration. See Villareall, 

. The court
was not required to say more, cf. Anderson, 

(in light of the parties’ arguments and defendant’s failure
to raise any issue at trial regarding sufficiency of court’s
explanation of its ruling, record sufficiently reflects that the
trial court balanced probative value of evidence against its
prejudicial effect), and defendant has cited no “special circumstance” that precluded the court from exercising its discretion to deny defendant’s request. Villareall, 

 (in absence of “special circumstances,” court has discretion to deny motion to withdraw jury-trial waiver). On this
record, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
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request to withdraw her waiver of a jury trial was within
the permissible range of legally correct outcomes and was,
therefore, a permissible exercise of the court’s discretion.
        Affirmed.