Blake v. State

FINAL COPY




                    S18A1162. BLAKE v. THE STATE.


      WARREN, Justice.

      Appellant R’Shon Chauncey Blake challenges the trial court’s denial of

his plea in bar, based on double jeopardy, after the court declared a mistrial —

over Blake’s objection — of his murder trial during jury deliberations. In its

order denying Blake’s plea in bar, the court determined that “jury-wide

discussion of improper information about legal terminology compromised the

integrity of a verdict and manifestly necessitated a mistrial.” Having reviewed

the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

declaring a mistrial and therefore affirm the denial of Blake’s plea in bar.

      1.    The record shows that in March 2015, Amountrae Hawkins, a

marijuana dealer, was shot and killed during a drug transaction. On June 23,

2015, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Blake for malice murder, three

counts of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon.

      A jury trial began on Monday, June 19, 2017. Although the precise time

that the jury began deliberating is unclear from the record, Blake acknowledges

that “[t]he case was probably submitted to the jury mid-day on Thursday, [June

22], but in any event by the next day.” After jury deliberations on Friday, June

23, and after the parties and other jurors had left for the weekend, the

foreperson informed the court that one of the jurors had been doing outside

research and discussing it with other jurors.

      On the morning of Monday, June 26, the trial judge brought the

foreperson into the courtroom to question her about the information she had

presented before the weekend. The foreperson alleged that Juror 17 had sought

information from a police detective, who was her friend, about “the meaning

of the charges” of malice murder and felony murder, and had shared that

information with other jurors. According to the foreperson, the information

included explanations that malice murder was “if you walk into your home and

you see your boyfriend cheating on you, you grabbed a vase and hit him over

the head and then he ultimately died from that injury,” but that “felony murder

with assault is if you were riding in the car with them and that your friend saw
that and you would then be what she would think would — what she would

have thought would be accessory.” The foreperson confirmed that Juror 17

shared this information with the entire jury and that other jurors discussed it.

The foreperson described Juror 17 as being “very stubborn on some of the

things, and she just keeps referring back to those examples.” She also informed

the court that Juror 17 independently researched the possible sentences for

malice murder and felony murder and shared that information with the other

jurors, though the other jurors refused to discuss it because the trial judge had

previously instructed them not to consider sentencing during their

deliberations. Finally, the foreperson stated that she saw Juror 17 put a note in

her purse, which the foreperson and at least one other juror thought proved that

Juror 17 was doing other outside research.

      After the trial judge finished questioning the foreperson and the

foreperson left the courtroom, the judge expressed concern that the examples

Juror 17 provided to the other jurors were legally inaccurate and that she was

“providing that incorrect information to other jurors.” The trial judge stated

that she did not know if there was a way to cure the situation. Blake requested

that Juror 17 be removed and that the jury be recharged, but the State argued

that the trial could not proceed because if Blake were convicted, the juror-
research issue would be a significant issue on appeal. The court then brought

Juror 17 into the courtroom for questioning.

      Juror 17 denied discussing the case with a detective or with any other

outside person, but admitted to conducting Internet research about certain

words contained in the legal definitions of malice murder and felony murder

and sharing that information with the other jurors. She then told the court that

“pretty much everyone in there” also conducted independent, outside research

and discussed this “new information” with the rest of the jury, including one

juror who consulted with a lawyer friend about legal terminology and shared

that information with the jury. Juror 17 concluded, “I think everybody did

what I did from discussions.”

      The trial court denied Blake’s request that each member of the jury be

individually questioned because its questioning of two jurors — the foreperson

and Juror 17 — confirmed that there appeared to be inappropriate discussions

among the entire jury and that it did not have much choice but to declare a

mistrial, which it did.

      Before he could be retried, Blake filed a plea in bar, arguing that the State

was barred from trying him again on the same charges because the trial court

overruled his objection to the mistrial without a finding of manifest necessity.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the plea in bar.1 Blake filed a timely

notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term beginning in December

2018 and orally argued on August 6, 2018.

      2.     “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, says that ‘[n]o person

shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb . . . .’” Harvey v. State, 

 (

) (2015) (quoting

U. S. Const. amend. V). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII;

OCGA § 16-1-8 (a). Jeopardy attaches when the jury has been impaneled and

sworn. State v. Cash, 

 (

) (2015). But even after

jeopardy has attached, “trial courts may declare a mistrial over the defendant’s

objection, without barring retrial, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the

circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for doing so.”

Laguerre v. State, 

 (

) (2017) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

      In essence, “[t]his ‘manifest necessity’ standard” requires “‘a “high

degree” of necessity’” to grant a mistrial. 

 at 124 (quoting Harvey, 

         This case originally was tried before Judge Courtney L. Johnson, who declared the
mistrial, but was later reassigned to Judge Daniel M. Coursey, Jr., who entered the order
denying Blake’s plea in bar.
at 831); see also Tubbs v. State, 

 (

) (2003).

“Whether such necessity exists is to be determined by weighing the

defendant’s right to have his trial completed before the particular tribunal

against the interest of the public in having fair trials designed to end in just

judgments; and the decision must take into consideration all the surrounding

circumstances.” Laguerre, 

 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Although the trial judge “is not required to make explicit findings of manifest

necessity nor to articulate on the record all the factors which informed the

deliberate exercise of his discretion,” the record must at least “show that the

trial court actually exercised its discretion.” Harvey, 

 (citation

and punctuation omitted); see also Laguerre, 

. And although

trial courts should “give careful, deliberate, and studious consideration to

whether the circumstances demand a mistrial, with a keen eye toward other,

less drastic, alternatives,” Harvey, 

 (citation and punctuation

omitted), a court’s rejection of other alternatives is a proper exercise of the

court’s discretion — and not an abuse — “if reasonable judges could differ

about the proper disposition.” Tubbs, 

 (citation and punctuation

omitted).
      In cases, like this one, where there is no prosecutorial misconduct and

the basis for a mistrial is the effect of outside influences on the jury, a trial

court has “broad discretion” in deciding whether to grant a mistrial and “great

deference” is accorded to a decision that a mistrial was necessary. Meadows

v. State, 

 (

) (2018) (citing Arizona v.

Washington, 

 (

, 54 LE2d 717) (1978) and

Tubbs, 

)). Because “the accused’s right to a jury free of

outside influence” is a safeguard to a defendant’s entitlement to a fair and

impartial trial, Turpin v. Todd, 

 (

) (1999), we

have long recognized that “the exposure of the jury to unauthorized outside

influence prior to a completion of [trial] subjects the judicial process to severe

dangers.” Owens v. State, 

 (

) (1983) (reversing

convictions where a non-jury member entered the jury room and explained to

jurors possible verdicts and sentences) (citing Shaw v. State, 

 (

) (1889)).     Indeed, Georgia courts have before reversed criminal

convictions because outside influences, such as a juror’s independent legal

research, made their way into a jury room. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 

 (

) (2013) (reversing conviction because

juror conducted Internet research about the definition of legal terms and
discussed that information, which included misinformation, with the rest of

jury during deliberations); Steele v. State, 

 (

) (1995) (reversing jury verdict and granting new trial because juror

looked up encyclopedia definitions of legal terms as well as sentencing

information and discussed that information with fellow jurors, who relied on it

during deliberations), disapproved on other grounds by Kennebrew v. State,

, 404 n.2 (

) (1996); Moore v. State, 

 (

) (1984) (reversing jury verdict and granting new trial

because juror conducted legal research about murder and voluntary

manslaughter and then discussed it with other jurors).2 Cf. Hodges v. State,

 (

) (2017) (juror looking up definitions of

words was harmless, in part because she did not share the information with

other jurors); O’Donnell v. Smith, 

 (

)

(2013) (juror conducting Internet research about the case not shown to affect


2
  This Court has also reversed jury verdicts in cases where jurors impermissibly gathered
outside evidence and shared it with the jury. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 

, 683-
685 (

) (1976) (reversing convictions because two jurors made unauthorized
visits to crime scene, conducted fact-finding, and reported findings to the rest of the jury).
And we have affirmed trial-court declarations of mistrials where jurors inadvertently were
provided inadmissible evidence during deliberations. See Varner v. State, 

 (

) (2009) (no double jeopardy bar where mistrial declared based on
inadvertent transmission of inadmissible evidence to jury).
verdict because no showing was made that he communicated his findings to

other jurors).

      The circumstances here were similar to, if not more troubling than, cases

in which the Court of Appeals has reversed convictions because jurors

researched legal terminology and shared that information with other jurors.

Here, the foreperson informed the court that Juror 17 had consulted with a

police detective about the meanings of malice murder and felony murder; the

information Juror 17 gathered included legally inaccurate examples about the

charged crimes; and Juror 17 shared that information with the rest of the jury,

which discussed it during deliberations. The foreperson also stated that Juror

17 conducted independent research on sentencing for the charged crimes and

shared that information with the jury.

      Faced with these allegations of juror misconduct, the trial judge

separately questioned Juror 17 on the record and with the parties present.

Although Juror 17 flatly denied discussing the case with non-jurors, she

admitted conducting Internet research about the legal differences between

malice murder and felony murder and that she shared her findings with the

other jurors. She also asserted that other jurors conducted outside research,
including one juror who consulted with a lawyer about legal terminology, and

discussed that “new information” with the rest of the jury.

         The record shows that the trial judge identified a significant likelihood

that the jury had been exposed to outside information during deliberations, and

that she recognized the threat that posed to Blake’s right to a fair and impartial

trial.    See Turpin, 

; Owens, 

.             She also

acknowledged that the jury’s exposure to outside information would be “a

major issue on appeal.” The trial judge, however, did not immediately declare

a mistrial; instead, she deliberately exercised her discretion by first questioning

the foreperson who made the allegations of juror misconduct, and then

questioning the juror accused of the misconduct, to better understand the full

set of circumstances. And although Juror 17 denied discussing the case with

anyone outside of the jury, she asserted that she — along with “everybody”

else on the jury — conducted independent, outside research and discussed

those findings, a claim that raised even more concerns than the jury foreperson

initially presented to the court. See Laguerre, 

 (emphasizing

that trial judges are in a “far better position” than appellate court to evaluate

jurors’ conduct).
      Moreover, the record shows that the trial judge considered other possible

alternatives such as removing and replacing Juror 17, recharging the jury and

allowing deliberations to continue, and conducting further inquiry of the

remaining jurors. But in a reasonable exercise of her discretion, the trial judge

rejected those alternatives and concluded, “I don’t know that I have much

choice but to declare a mistrial.” See Laguerre, 

; cf.

Meadows, 

. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the

trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining that there was a

high degree of necessity to declare a mistrial over Blake’s objection. Thus,

retrial is not barred, and the denial of Blake’s plea in bar is affirmed.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
                        Decided December 10, 2018.

      Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Coursey.

      James C. Bonner, Jr., Michael W. Tarleton, for appellant.

      Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Deborah D. Wellborn, Helen P. Pott,

Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia

B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General,

for appellee.