305 Ga. 534
FINAL COPY
S18A1073. DEBELBOT et al. v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
Albert and Ashley Debelbot appeal their malice murder convictions for the
death of their infant daughter, McKenzy Debelbot.1 The Debelbots each argue
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions, that their
respective trial attorneys rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, and
that their convictions cannot stand for other reasons. We conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of both Albert and Ashley.
But while we are deeply troubled by at least two of the claims of ineffective
1
The crimes occurred on June 1, 2008. In June 2009, a Muscogee County grand jury
returned an indictment charging the Debelbots with malice murder, felony murder, and
cruelty to children in the first degree. The Debelbots were tried together from October 26 to
October 29, 2009, at which time the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The trial court
sentenced the Debelbots to life in prison for malice murder, and the remaining convictions
were purported to be vacated as a matter of law or merged. The Debelbots separately filed
motions for new trial in November 2009 and amended them in 2015. Preliminary hearings
related to the motion for new trial began in September 2014; the merits hearings began in
July 2015 and were completed in August 2017. The motion-for-new-trial court issued an
order denying the Debelbots’ motion for new trial, as amended, on December 12, 2017. The
Debelbots filed a timely joint notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the August 2018
term of this Court. The case was orally argued on August 7, 2018.
assistance of counsel, the nature of the order below prevents meaningful review
of all of those claims. Therefore, we vacate and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the
trial evidence shows that Ashley gave birth to McKenzy on May 29, 2008, at
Martin Army Community Hospital in Columbus,2 and they were discharged
from the hospital on May 31. There were no signs that the baby was unhealthy
or in distress. The Debelbots took McKenzy home and provided the sole care for
the infant for the next 13 hours, during which time — according to the
Debelbots — they fed and played with McKenzy, changed her diaper, and gave
her a bath. In the early morning hours of June 1, the Debelbots took McKenzy
to the hospital after noticing a bump on her head. McKenzy died a few hours
later.
When police arrived, Albert appeared to be very distraught and cried
several times, while Ashley did not appear to be nearly as upset as Albert and
was never seen crying. During police interviews, however, Ashley got upset in
2
Albert was in the United States Army at that time (Ashley having previously served),
and the family was entitled to use the medical services at the on-base army hospital despite
living off-base.
2
explaining McKenzy’s injuries and claimed not to know what happened to
McKenzy. The police conducted a search of the Debelbots’ apartment, but there
is no indication that anything of evidentiary value was recovered.
A GBI medical examiner, Dr. Lora Darrisaw, performed an autopsy on
McKenzy on June 2, 2008. Dr. Darrisaw testified that McKenzy had a fracture
on the left side of her head, extensive fractures on the right side of her head, and
bleeding in the brain. Dr. Darrisaw noted that McKenzy’s birth occurred without
any apparent complications and that the infant had food in her stomach at the
time of the autopsy. Dr. Darrisaw also examined 19 microscopic slides of
McKenzy’s brain, found that no inflammatory cells had formed in response to
the trauma, and concluded that the injuries preceded McKenzy’s death by no
more than 12 hours, possibly as little as one or two hours. Dr. Darrisaw opined
that McKenzy’s birth was not the cause of the trauma, because the extent of the
injuries would not have allowed the infant to eat or do anything else and would
have caused a very rapid death. Instead, Dr. Darrisaw concluded that
McKenzy’s death was a homicide and the cause of death was blunt force trauma,
either by a series of blows to the head or by a “crushing type of injury.”
3
Based on Dr. Darrisaw’s conclusion, the police arrested the Debelbots,
who both denied harming their child. Albert testified at trial, reiterating that
neither he nor Ashley ever harmed McKenzy. In rebuttal, the State called
Melvin Tarver, a felon with multiple convictions who shared a holding cell with
Albert, who testified that Albert had confided in him on the first morning of the
Debelbots’ trial. According to Tarver, Albert said that, on the night McKenzy
was brought home, he left the house to buy drugs and, when he returned, Ashley
told him that she had spanked the infant and put her to bed.
Ashley also testified at trial and denied that she or Albert had hurt
McKenzy. She admitted that McKenzy appeared to be healthy after birth, and
both Albert and Ashley admitted that McKenzy appeared to be fine prior to the
time they found a bump on her head and took her to the emergency room.
Neither Albert nor Ashley called any medical experts to testify in their defense.
During its closing argument, the State made the following argument about
reasonable doubt:
The Judge will charge you on reasonable doubt. Just keep in
mind, and he will charge you, reasonable doubt does not mean
beyond all doubt. It does not mean to a mathematical certainty.
Which means we don’t have to prove that ninety percent. You don’t
have to be ninety percent sure. You don’t have to be eighty percent
4
sure. You don’t have to be fifty-one percent sure. It does not mean
to a mathematical certainty.
And it does not mean beyond a shadow of a doubt. That’s just
something the [TV] made up. It’s actually beyond a reasonable
doubt. And that would be a doubt to which you can attach a reason.
And I submit to you there is no reasonable doubt in this case.
(Emphasis added.) Neither of the Debelbots’ trial counsel objected to this
argument. The trial court later charged the jury on the burden of proof by
stating:
The defendants are presumed to be innocent until proven
guilty. Each defendant enters upon the trial of the case with a
presumption of innocence in his or her favor. This presumption
remains with the defendant until it is overcome by the State with
evidence that is sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged.
No person shall be convicted of any crime unless and until
each element of the crime as charged is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every
material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of
the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no burden of proof upon the defendant whatsoever,
and the burden never shifts to the defendant to produce evidence or
to prove innocence.
However, the State is not required to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond all doubt or to a mathematical certainty. A
reasonable doubt means just what it says. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt of a fair-minded, impartial juror honestly seeking the truth.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon common sense and
reason. It does not mean a vague or arbitrary doubt but is a doubt
5
for which a reason can be given, arising from a consideration of the
evidence, a lack of evidence, or a conflict in the evidence.
The jury deliberated and found the Debelbots guilty of malice murder. The
Debelbots filed motions for new trial in 2009, raising general grounds and
asserting that their respective trial counsel was ineffective for, among other
things, failing to call an expert to introduce medical testimony to counter the
State’s case and that Albert’s counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
State’s argument about reasonable doubt. Following numerous and lengthy
hearings from 2014 to 2017, the motion-for-new-trial court — which had
qualified the Debelbots’ expert witnesses as experts — issued a short order
denying relief and concluding that the Debelbots’ proffered expert and non-
expert witnesses who testified in support of the motion for new trial were not
credible, and that all of the medical evidence presented by the Debelbots’ expert
witnesses was inadmissible under Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519 (
292 SE2d 389)
(1982).
1. The Debelbots argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict them
because the State failed to present direct evidence that either one of them
6
inflicted or helped the other inflict the alleged injuries to McKenzy. We disagree.
Under both former OCGA § 24-4-6, in effect at the time of
[the Debelbots’] trial, and present OCGA § 24-14-6, in order to
convict [the Debelbots] of the crimes based solely upon
circumstantial evidence, the proven facts had to be consistent with
the hypothesis of [their] guilt and exclude every reasonable
hypothesis save that of [their] guilt. Not every hypothesis is
reasonable, and the evidence does not have to exclude every
conceivable inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those that
are reasonable. The reasonableness of an alternative hypothesis
raised by a defendant is a question principally for the jury, and
when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though
circumstantial, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
save that of the accused’s guilt, this Court will not disturb that
finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.
Akhimie v. State, 297 Ga. 801, 804 (1) (
777 SE2d 683) (2015) (citations
omitted). Even if a person is not directly responsible for the crime, he or she
may be convicted as a party to the crime if he or she “intentionally aids or abets
the commission of the crime, or intentionally advises, encourages, hires,
counsels, or procures another to commit the crime[.]” Smith v. State,
277 Ga.
95, 96 (
586 SE2d 629) (2003) (citing OCGA § 16-2-20). “Whether a person is
a party to a crime may be inferred from that person’s presence, companionship,
and conduct before, during, and after the crime,” and “where the crimes involve
relatives with close relationships, slight circumstances can support the inference
7
that the parties colluded.” Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 288 (3) (
824 SE2d 346)
(2019) (punctuation and citations omitted).
The evidence in this case, although entirely circumstantial as to who
committed the crimes, was legally sufficient to support the malice murder
convictions. The evidence shows that McKenzy was healthy when she left the
hospital following her birth. The State’s expert testified that the injuries to
McKenzy were non-accidental, were caused by blunt force trauma, and could
not have occurred during birth or the infant’s initial stay at the hospital
following her birth. This unequivocal expert testimony that McKenzy had been
murdered went essentially unrebutted; the only meaningful point brought out on
cross-examination was that the expert did not know who committed the
homicide. And between the initial hospital stay and her return to the hospital in
distress, McKenzy was in the sole care of the Debelbots — a married couple
who insisted that neither of them did anything to harm McKenzy. Although a
close question, we conclude that this evidence was sufficient to allow the jury
to find both Albert and Ashley guilty of malice murder under the standard of
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (
99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See
Gomez v. State,
301 Ga. 445, 452-453 (3) (
801 SE2d 847) (2017) (rejecting
8
couple’s argument that evidence was insufficient to convict for felony murder
of their child, where they were the only caregivers during the time of the injury
and the State’s medical experts testified that the injuries were inconsistent with
an accident).
2. The Debelbots, who were represented by different trial counsel, both
allege that their respective trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in
several respects; Ashley also asserts direct error by the trial court. While we are
deeply troubled by at least two of the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
we conclude that the nature of the order below prevents us from reviewing
meaningfully the most significant alleged deficiency by trial counsel for both
Ashley and Albert — their failure to offer an alternative explanation for
McKenzy’s injury. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s order denying the
Debelbots’ motion for new trial and remand for further proceedings.
To prevail on their claim, the Debelbots must show both deficient
performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (
104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To show deficient
performance, each appellant must prove that his or her counsel acted or failed
to act in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and
9
in the light of prevailing professional norms. See id. at 687-690. “This is no easy
showing, as the law recognizes a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel performed
reasonably,” and to overcome this presumption, an appellant “must show that
no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have
failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Davis v. State,
299 Ga. 180, 183 (2) (
787
SE2d 221) (2016). To establish prejudice, each appellant must demonstrate that
there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland,
466 U. S. at 694.
As discussed above, the case against the Debelbots was entirely
circumstantial, and the only evidence that a crime had been committed at all was
the expert medical testimony of Dr. Darrisaw, the State’s medical expert who
performed the autopsy. Neither Albert nor Ashley offered a rebuttal expert;
Ashley’s trial counsel had spoken to Dr. John Plunkett, but a scheduling conflict
prevented that expert from testifying at trial.
At the motion for new trial hearings, the Debelbots called four doctors to
testify about McKenzy’s injuries, and the motion-for-new-trial court qualified
10
these witnesses as experts in their fields: Dr. Plunkett (general and forensic
pathology), Dr. Peter Dehnel (pediatrics), Dr. Julie Mack (general and pediatric
radiology), and Dr. Daniel Sahlein (radiology, neuroradiology, neurology, and
interventional neuroradiology). The four experts reviewed, among other things,
CT scans of McKenzy’s brain, McKenzy’s medical records, the autopsy report,
photographs, Dr. Mack’s 3D reconstruction of the CT scans of McKenzy’s skull
and brain, and relevant medical literature. Collectively, the experts testified that
McKenzy suffered from a vascular event in utero that caused the bleeding in her
brain and this event was the cause of her death. The experts also testified that the
right side of McKenzy’s skull was malformed, including that a piece of skull
was missing, and concluded that a portion of McKenzy’s brain matter was
missing. The experts further opined that the trauma of the birthing process
caused the additional and more acute fracturing to the left side of McKenzy’s
skull, and denied that post-birth trauma caused McKenzy’s injuries. The State
offered Dr. Darrisaw and two other experts in response, who disagreed. We note
that the motion-for-new-trial court conducted the quite lengthy and complex
proceedings with care — the hearing transcript alone runs over 2,000 pages —
11
and afforded both the Debelbots and the State ample opportunity to make their
respective cases.
Despite having qualified all four of the Debelbots’ expert witnesses as
experts, however, the motion-for-new-trial court dismissed all their testimony
in two separate ways. First, the court concluded in one sentence that all the
Debelbots’ witnesses, expert and otherwise, were not credible. And second, the
court concluded that all of the Debelbots’ medical evidence was inadmissible
under our decision in Harper. As we explain further below, the sweeping nature
of these conclusions precludes our meaningful review at this time, requiring that
we vacate and remand for more precision.
We ordinarily afford great deference to credibility determinations by trial
courts, including in the motion-for-new-trial context. See, e.g., Grant v. State,
295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) (
757 SE2d 831) (2014) (“In reviewing a claim of
ineffective assistance, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings and
credibility determinations[.]”). But there are several different kinds of credibility
at issue here, and the deference that we may afford depends on which kind the
motion-for-new-trial court found lacking. First, there is the kind of credibility
that goes to the truth or falsity of a fact that has been asserted. This is the kind
12
of credibility determination we almost always afford strong deference. See, e.g.,
Cartwright v. State, 291 Ga. 498, 499-500 (2) (a) (
731 SE2d 353) (2012)
(deferring to trial court’s crediting of trial counsel’s testimony that trial counsel
did not advise defendant, as defendant claimed, that his juvenile record could be
used to impeach him); Murphy v. Balkcom,
245 Ga. 13, 14 (
262 SE2d 784)
(1980) (“[a]fter hearing all the evidence, the habeas judge, being the finder of
facts, believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved petitioner and thus denied
habeas relief” on the claim that attorney did not file an appeal as allegedly
requested by petitioner). But the court could not have found that kind of
credibility lacking from everything said by all of the Debelbots’ witnesses
during lengthy hearings spanning thousands of pages; in fact, many of the facts
asserted by those witnesses were undisputed, were the same as facts asserted by
the State’s witnesses, or were otherwise amply supported by the record. To the
extent that the court intended to resolve particular fact disputes on this basis, on
remand it should specify on which such material points it found a lack of
credibility.
Second, there is the kind of expert credibility that goes to whether the trier
of fact believes the experts know what they are talking about based on whether
13
they have sufficient experience and qualifications. Indeed, the State challenged
the qualifications of the Debelbots’ experts at considerable length. And during
closing arguments, the motion-for-new-trial court summarized many of those
challenges as an argument that one of the experts “wouldn’t have survived a
vigorous voir dire by the State,” and that the judge who presided over the trial
would not have accepted him as an expert. But — notwithstanding the vigorous
voir dire the State actually conducted — the motion-for-new-trial court did
accept the proffered experts as experts at the hearing. And the court did not
explicitly reverse that determination in its order, so we are unsure of the extent
to which the adverse credibility determination applied here.
Finally, the relative weight given to testimony of expert witnesses is also
nearly always at issue in cases like these. But the question under Strickland is
not whether the motion-for-new-trial court found the experts persuasive, but
whether a reasonable juror could. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 302 Ga. 488, 493 (2)
(b) (
807 SE2d 344) (2017) (given the equivocal testimony of the proffered
medical expert, there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome had
trial counsel secured this expert witness for trial); Humphrey v. Nance,
293 Ga.
189, 223-224 (
744 SE2d 706) (2013) (holding that because there was no
14
reasonable probability the jury would have found expert credible, there was no
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different
even if expert’s testimony had been presented). For example, there may not be
a reason to challenge an expert’s qualifications, but a court could nevertheless
find that a reasonable jury would not find the expert’s opinion persuasive
because it was too speculative, was too equivocal, or did not stand up to the
strength of other evidence in the record. But we afford little deference to this
kind of credibility determination. See Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 810 n. 5
(
771 SE2d 362) (2015) (explaining that in examining whether a defendant has
shown Strickland prejudice, we review the record de novo and weigh the
evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done). Because the order
was not specific about what kinds of credibility the motion-for-new-trial court
found lacking as to which pieces of critical testimony, we cannot determine what
kind of deference we afford each of the credibility findings.
Similarly, the court’s determination that all the Debelbots’ medical
evidence was inadmissible under Harper is insufficiently precise. Harper guides
a trial court’s determination of whether certain scientific evidence is admissible
in a criminal case when it is based on a procedure, technique, or theory that “has
15
reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty[.]” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525-526
(1); see also, e.g., Caldwell v. State,
260 Ga. 278, 286-287 (1) (b) (
393 SE2d
436) (1990) (concluding that DNA testing and analysis were based on sound
scientific theory and, if proper procedures were followed, analysis could
produce reliable results). Some of the medical evidence presented by the
Debelbots’ experts was simply the result of the application of commonplace
medical expertise to undisputed facts. Some of the medical evidence was
conclusions stemming from medical theories the State challenged as not
generally accepted. And some of the medical evidence came from the use of
imaging software — for the 3D reconstruction of CT scans of McKenzy’s skull
and brain — that the State challenged as not FDA-approved. But although the
State framed its Harper challenges differently over time and ultimately very
broadly in closing arguments, many of its challenges appear to be more properly
characterized as challenges to the qualification of the witnesses as experts or to
the persuasiveness of the experts’ testimony in the light of conflicting testimony
from the State’s experts. It seems plain that Harper — to the extent it applies
here — does not apply to literally every word of medically related testimony
16
from the Debelbots’ experts. It also seems likely that at least portions of that
testimony are appropriately analyzed under Harper.
Without more precise credibility and Harper findings, we are unable to
conduct a Strickland analysis to determine whether either Albert’s or Ashley’s
trial counsel was ineffective. Regarding an assessment of deficient performance,
even if trial counsel could be said to have made certain tactical decisions, a
defendant may still establish deficiency if he can show those tactical decisions
were unreasonable in the light of the particular circumstances of a case. See
Terry v. State, 284 Ga. 119, 120 (2) (
663 SE2d 704) (2008) (“The
reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is examined from counsel’s perspective at
the time of trial and under the particular circumstances of the case.”). Whether
either trial counsel acted reasonably under the circumstances of this case
depends largely, if not entirely, on whether the expert evidence presented at the
hearings was admissible and credible. Compare Mosby v. State,
300 Ga. 450,
454 (2) (
796 SE2d 277) (2017) (“Deficient performance of counsel is not shown
by trial counsel’s failure to present a witness whose testimony would have been
inadmissible.”) with Jowers v. State,
260 Ga. 459, 462 (2) (
396 SE2d 891)
17
(1990) (trial counsel’s failure to present evidence that was available and could
have supported an alternative theory was not sound trial strategy).
Similarly, when we consider whether a defendant was prejudiced by the
alleged deficiency of trial counsel, we measure the evidence that should have
been — but was not — presented to the jury against the totality of the evidence
that was presented. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“In making [the prejudice]
determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury.”); see Humphrey v. Morrow,
289 Ga.
864, 870 (
717 SE2d 168) (2011) (in determining prejudice from trial counsel’s
deficient performance in failing to present certain evidence, we must assess
“how a jury might have reacted to the additional evidence”). This prejudice
determination is necessarily affected by the quantity and quality of the evidence
that was presented to the jury and that which should have been, and “a verdict
or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been
affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Strickland,
466
U.S. at 696. Because the trial court’s limited findings in the light of the
voluminous testimony do not make it possible to review what, if any, evidence
was properly ruled to be inadmissible under Harper, we cannot engage in a
18
meaningful prejudice analysis here. Therefore we vacate the motion-for-new-
trial court’s order and remand for further findings, where the court should
specify which material medical evidence is properly subject to such a Harper
analysis and perform that analysis.
We also note our serious concern regarding the State’s closing argument
during trial that flatly stated that proof beyond a reasonable doubt in this murder
case does not require the jury to be even 51 percent sure — in other words,
requires less than even the preponderance of the evidence required to meet the
burden of proof in a civil case. That is obviously wrong. A case like this one,
where there was no direct evidence to prove that Albert, Ashley, both of them,
or neither of them killed McKenzy, could turn on reasonable doubt, and the
verdict could be affected by an argument that 50-50 proof is good enough. And
the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt — which in many cases
may cure previous misstatements on the subject — did not cure the State’s
obviously wrong argument here. The State’s point was to define reasonable
doubt as not requiring the State to prove its case to “a mathematical certainty”
— a phrase the State repeated twice. Of course, that is a phrase that occurs in the
pattern instruction as well, and so when the trial court gave that instruction, it
19
may well have been understood by the jury not as correcting the State’s error,
but as reinforcing it. We cannot conceive of any good reason that a competent
criminal defense attorney could have to fail to object to such an egregious
misstatement of the law. Whether that deficiency supports reversal, however,
depends on weighing prejudice from all deficiencies, see Daughtry v. State, 296
Ga. 849, 853 (2) (
770 SE2d 862) (2015) (the effect of prejudice resulting from
trial counsel’s deficient performance is viewed cumulatively), which will
depend on the conclusions of the motion-for-new-trial court on remand.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order denying the Debelbots’
motion for new trial and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.3
Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
3
The Debelbots were tried almost ten years ago, and the motion-for-new-trial court
displayed concern for the delay as early as 2014, when it required sworn testimony from one
of the Debelbots before granting a continuance. Accordingly, we have confidence that court
will proceed promptly on remand.
20
BETHEL, Justice, concurring.
I concur fully in the decision of the Court to vacate the judgment and
remand the case. I write separately to emphasize the erroneous nature of the
State’s closing argument wherein the State suggested to the jury that
reasonable doubt is less than 51 percent — functionally less than a
preponderance of the evidence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof
recognized in our system of jurisprudence. While it is true that there is no
mathematical component to the standard, that description is better understood
as preventing the bar from being raised too high rather than permitting the
bar to be lowered. The State’s closing argument invited the jury to apply a
significantly lower standard, which is repugnant to our system of criminal
justice and its requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a
conviction. Indeed, under the State’s proffered paradigm, if the jury thought
it was equally possible that Albert acted to harm McKenzy as it was that
Ashley had done so, then the jury was authorized to convict both Albert and
Ashley. But if two causes of an outcome are equally likely, neither has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
2
Decided March 13, 2019.
Murder. Muscogee Superior Court. Before Judge Smith.
Thomas M. Flournoy III, Jimmonique R. S. Rodgers, James C. Bonner,
Jr., Brandon A. Bullard; Robins Kaplan, A. James Anderson; Eversheds
Sutherland (US), Anna C. Halsey; Carrie Sperling, for appellants.
Julia F. Slater, District Attorney, Sadhana P. Dailey, Alonza Whitaker,
Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia
B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
3
