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305 U.S. 263

59 S. Ct. 176

83 L. Ed. 164

Docket No. 55.

McDonald v. Thompson

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued November 8, 9, 1938.

Decided December 5, 1938.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1938-12-05

3 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The Commission ruled that since a ‘common carrier’ may transport only a ‘class or classes of property’, the authority granted under the ‘grandfather clause’ of § 206(a) ‘should reflect any limitation in the undertaking’ of the common carrier ‘as indicated by the service actually rendered on and since the statutory dates.’ . It accordingly proceeded to eliminate commodities which, though of the same general class as the others, had been carried before but not after June 1, 1935. It further restricted future operations to those commodities which prior and subsequent to June 1, 1935, had been carried in substantial amounts and with a degree of regularity. We would not disturb those conclusions if only a question as to the weight of the evidence was involved. But we are not satisfied that the Commission applied the proper criterion in reaching its conclusion that only specified commodities could be carried in the future. “Sec. 206(a) requires a showing that the applicant, or its predecessor, was ‘in bona fide operation as a common carrier’ on June 1, 1935, and ‘since that time’. By § 208(a) the certificate must specify ‘the service to be rendered’ by the carrier. * * * It is plain that a carrier’s holding out and actual perforinance may be limited to a few articles only. That is to say he may be a common carrier 'only of a restricted number of commodities. * * * On the other hand, if the applicant has carried a wide variety of general commodities, he cannot ’ necessarily be deni”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Arrowhead Freight Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 339 - Cardinale Trucking Company v. United States

““A common carrier by water is defined in part III of the act as ‘any person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in the transportation by water in interstate or foreign commerce o-f passengers or property or any class or classes thereof for - compensation. * * * ’ Under the ‘grandfather’ clause, an applicant for a cer tificate must show that it ‘was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by water on January 1, 1940, over the route or routes or between the ports with respect to which application- is made and has so operated since that time. * * * ’ “It will be noted that in neither instance is there any reference to whether the transportation performed by the carrier is or is not subj ect to regulation. In determining a carrier’s status and the scope of its operation during the ‘grandfather’ period, its entire operations should be considered, and not merely that part which the Congress has seen fit to make subject to regulation. To find that ‘grandfather’ rights may be granted only to the extent that a showing- is made as to the performance of regulated transportation requires the reading into the law of language which, in fact, is not there. “This matter is particularly important in instances like the present where an applicant is seeking a certificate covering all commodities, or general cargo. Obviously no carrier actually transports all commodities, and therefore the bona fides of an applicant’s operations depend on the representative character of the”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 76 F. Supp. 567 - Inland Nav. Co. v. United States

Relies on Crowell v. Benson · D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin · Petition of Public Nat Bank of New York

Cited in Case Law’s definition of “bona fide operation”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · 8–0 · Decided 1938-12-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 337 later decisions (33 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2002 · most notably Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc. (1944), United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. (1942)

64 federal appellate · 64 district · 52 state decisions — followed in 12 states

138019381940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Messrs. Lloyd E. Price and T. S. Christopher for petitioner.

¶2Messrs. William M'cCraw, Attorney General of Texas, and Albert C. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.

¶3*264By leave of Court, briefs of amici curiae were filed by Messrs. Daniel W. Knowlton and E. M. Reidy on behalf of the Interstate Commerce Commission, in support of petitioner; and by Messrs. John E. Benton and Clyde S. Bailey on behalf of the National Association of Railroad & Utilities Commissioners, in support of respondents.

¶4Mr. Justice Butler

¶5delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶6Petitioner brought this suit in the federal court for the northern district of Texas against the members of the Texas Railroad Commission and its enforcement officers to enjoin them from enforcing against him the state Motor Truck Law.1 Respondents answered; thereswas a trial; the court made findings of fact, stated its conclusions of law, and entered a decree permanently enjoining respondents from interfering with petitioner’s business in interstate transportation. The circuit court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the bill. 95 F. 2d 937. This Court granted a wit of certiorari.

¶7Section 3 of the state law requires every carrier of property by motor for hire over public highways of the *265State to obtain from the Railroad Commission a certificate of convenience and necessity. Section 4 makes it the duty of the commission to regulate the transportation, to prescribe rules for safety of carriers’ operations, and to supervise all matters affecting relationships between the carriers and the public.

¶8The federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935,2 § 206 (a), declares that no common carrier by motor vehicle · Case Law">common carrier by motor vehicle subject to its provisions shall engage in interstate commerce unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing the operation. A proviso in that section’declares that, if any such carrier “was in bona fide operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle on June 1, 1935,” over routes for which application is made and has so operated since that time, the commission shall issue the certificate without requiring further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served by the carrier’s operation. Pending determination of the application, the applicant is authorized to continue operations.

¶9Since some time' before the passage of the Act, petitioner has been continuously using Texas highways in interstate transportation of property by motor vehicle for hire. Claiming to have been in bona fide operation as contemplated by the proviso, he made timely application to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a certificate authorizing him to continue to operate over the highways he has been using. The application is still pending, and petitioner insists that, notwithstanding state law, he is entitled to continue operations under the proviso. The question first to be decided is whether his claim of bona fide operation is well founded.

¶10In May of 1934 he applied to the state commission for a certificate authorizing operation as a common carrier in *266interstate commerce. July 14, 1934, the commission denied the application on the ground that the proposed operations would subject the highways named in it to excessive burden and endanger and interfere with ordinary use by the public. Petitioner appealed to the district court of Travis county and obtained a decree enjoining the commission from interfering with his operations. The court of civil appeals, January 8, 1936, reversed and dissolved the injunction. 90 S. W. 2d 581. Thus it appears that petitioner’s operations have been without authority of the Texas commission and, unless within the proviso of the federal Act, without authority of federal law.

¶11Exact definition of “bona fide operation” is not necessary. As the Act is remedial and to be construed liberally, the proviso defining exemptions is to be read in harmony with the purpose of the measure and held to extend only to carriers plainly within its terms. Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 286 U. S. 299, 311. To limit the meaning to mere physical operation would be to eliminate “bona fide.” That would be contrary to the rule that all words of a statute are to be taken into account and given effect if that can be done consistently with the plainly disclosed legislative intent. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208. Ex Parte Public National Bank, 278 U. S. 101, 104. There is nothing to justify rejection of these qualifying words. The expression, “in bona fide operation,” suggests absence of evasion, excludes the idea that mere ability to serve as a common carrier is enough, includes actual rather than potential or simulated service, and in context implies recognition of the power of the State to withhold or condition the use of its highways in the business of transportation for hire. Plainly the proviso does not extend to one operating as a common carrier on public highways of a State in defiance of its laws.

¶12*267As petitioner is not protected in his operation as a common carrier by the proviso, we need not consider to what extent, if at all, the federal Motor Carrier Act superseded the state Motor Truck Law, or any other question presented by petitioner.

¶13Affirmed.

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