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306 F.2d 751

Docket No. 16728.

Coleman v. United States

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued May 9, 1962.

Decided May 31, 1962.

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1962-05-31

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently December 1967

4 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“‘The co-defendant Britton, whose conviction we have affirmed, was shown to have been in the building where the housebreaking occurred, but the evidence failed to bring home to this appellant either that he aided and abetted Britton by acting as ‘look-out’ or that he participated in any actual breaking or entering of the building, essential elements of the offense charged. By using a police dog to follow a scent appellant was located near the scene, but neither the evidence to that effect, nor other evidence, placed him at any time in the building or established that he had collaborated with Britton in the crime itself. “The jury were not warranted in finding appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including McClard v. United States

Relies on Kelley v. United States · Britton v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1962-05-31

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Mr. Werner J. Kronstein, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellant.

¶2Mr. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Acheson, U. S. Atty., Nathan J. Paulson, and Luke C. Moore, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.

¶3Before Fahy, Washington and Dan-aher, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Appellant was tried jointly with a co-defendant for housebreaking as defined in 22 D.C.Code § 1801 (1961). We affirmed the conviction of the co-defendant. Britton v. United States, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 301 F.2d 531. As to this appellant there was testimony which gave rise to the possible application of our decision in Kelley v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 236 F.2d 746, on the question of a tacit admission. The subject was gratifyingly well briefed and presented by counsel for the United States and also by counsel for the appellant. Nevertheless, we feel obliged in any event to decide the case on another ground which was reserved for our review and also presented on the appeal, namely, the inadequacy of the evidence. We have concluded upon consideration of the evidence as a whole that the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the evidence should have been granted.

¶6The co-defendant Britton, whose conviction we have affirmed, was shown to have been in the building where the housebreaking occurred, but the evidence failed to bring home to this appellant either that he aided and abetted Britton by acting as “look-out” or that he participated in any actual breaking or entering of the building, essential elements of the offense charged. By using a police dog to follow a scent appellant was lo*752cated near the scene, but neither the evidence to that effect, nor other evidence, placed him at any time in the building or established that he had collaborated with Britton in the crime itself.

¶7The jury were not warranted in finding appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶8Reversed and remanded.

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