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306 Ga. 166

Tookes v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided June 10, 2019

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2019-06-10

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently October 2019

1 state decisions

Relies on Huff v. State · Brewner v. State · McGuyton v. State

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Decided 2019-06-10

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306 Ga. 166
FINAL COPY

               S19A0674. TOOKES v. THE STATE.


     BLACKWELL, Justice.

     Kavion Wyzeenski Tookes pleaded guilty to murder with

malice aforethought, kidnapping, armed robbery, and other crimes,

all in connection with a violent home invasion. The trial court

accepted his plea and promptly imposed sentence, including a

sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole for

the murder. The next day, Tookes filed a motion to withdraw his

plea, claiming that his lawyer had misadvised him about his

sentence and that he was denied his right to be present for a portion

of his plea and sentencing. The trial court denied his motion, and

Tookes appeals. We see no error and affirm.

     1. Early on the morning of June 23, 2017, Tookes, Travione

Reynolds, and Jeffrey Lee Wallace invaded the Fayette County

home of Albert and Beverly DeMagnus. In the course of this home

invasion, Mr. DeMagnus was fatally stabbed, and Mrs. DeMagnus
was forced at gunpoint to surrender cash and jewelry. Tookes and

Wallace fled the scene in Mr. DeMagnus’s car, which they later

wrecked while attempting to elude law enforcement officers. When

Tookes eventually was apprehended, he grabbed the firearm of one

of the arresting officers, and he was subdued only after the officers

deployed a Taser.

     In September 2017, the grand jury indicted Tookes, Reynolds,

and Wallace, charging them with murder, kidnapping, armed

robbery, home invasion, aggravated assault, and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a crime. In addition, the grand

jury charged Tookes and Wallace with theft by taking of a motor

vehicle or fleeing attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, and

it charged Tookes alone with attempting to remove a weapon from a

public official. Their case was set for trial in May 2018.

     As trial approached, Tookes learned that Reynolds and Wallace

intended to plead guilty. Upon the advice of counsel, Tookes decided

to plead guilty as well, and on the day that the trial was set to

commence, Tookes and both of his co-defendants were brought to the

                                   2
courtroom to enter their pleas. The trial court started with Reynolds,

advising him of his rights and conducting a plea colloquy. The trial

court then turned its attention to Tookes. The trial court advised

Tookes of his rights and began a plea colloquy. At first, Tookes

indicated that he did, in fact, intend to plead guilty, but as the plea

colloquy went on, Tookes apparently changed his mind. When he

announced that he did not want to plead guilty, the trial court

suspended the plea colloquy and turned to Wallace, advising him of

his rights and conducting a plea colloquy with him. When the trial

court finished the plea colloquy with Wallace, Tookes was excused

from the courtroom so that he could prepare for his trial, which

would commence shortly. After Tookes was led away, the

prosecuting attorney proffered the factual basis for the pleas entered

by Reynolds and Wallace, and the trial court received evidence in

aggravation and mitigation as to Reynolds and Wallace.

     In the meantime, Tookes met with his lawyer and mother at

the jail, and he changed his mind yet again about pleading guilty.

He was returned to the courtroom as Reynolds was presenting his

                                  3
mitigation evidence, and when Reynolds finished, the trial court

turned its attention back to Tookes. The trial court resumed its plea

colloquy with Tookes, advising him again of his rights. When the

plea colloquy was concluded and Tookes entered his guilty plea, the

trial court asked the prosecuting attorney to proffer the factual basis

for Tookes’s plea, noting that Tookes had been absent for the earlier

proffer. The prosecuting attorney did so, and the State then

presented evidence in aggravation as to Tookes — the testimony of

the officer from whom Tookes attempted to take a weapon and a

video recording of his efforts to resist arrest. Tookes then presented

three witnesses in mitigation. And his lawyer made a statement on

his behalf, expressing remorse and asking for mercy. The trial court

then proceeded to pronounce sentence for all three defendants.

     2. Tookes argues that he is entitled to withdraw his plea

because it was induced by the assurance of his lawyer that, if he

pleaded guilty, he would only be sentenced to imprisonment for life

with the possibility of parole. But at the hearing on his motion to

withdraw, both his lawyer and mother testified that the lawyer gave

                                  4
no such assurance. They both testified that the lawyer, in fact, told

Tookes only that there was a chance that he would be sentenced to

life with the possibility of parole if he pleaded guilty. The trial court

found that Tookes was not credible, that his lawyer and mother

were, and that the court actually had considered a sentence of life

with the possibility of parole. The findings of the trial court on these

points are not clearly erroneous, and Tookes is not entitled to

withdraw his plea upon his claim that he was misadvised by his

lawyer. See McGuyton v. State, 
298 Ga. 351, 355
 (1) (b) (
782 SE2d 21
) (2016) (“Credibility determinations are within the purview of the

trial court[,] and the court’s factual findings will not be disturbed

unless clearly erroneous.”).

     3. Tookes also argues that he is entitled to withdraw his plea

because he was absent from the courtroom during a portion of the

proceedings on the day that he entered his plea, and his absence

amounts, he says, to a denial of his right to be present at any “critical

stage” of his prosecution. See Brewner v. State, 
302 Ga. 6, 10
 (II)

(
804 SE2d 94
) (2017) (“[A] ‘critical stage’ of a criminal proceeding is

                                   5
defined as ‘one in which the defendant’s rights may be lost, defenses

waived, privileges claimed or waived, or one in which the outcome of

the case is substantially affected in some other way.’” (Citation

omitted)). See also Huff v. State, 
274 Ga. 110, 111
 (2) (
549 SE2d 370
)

(2001) (“The right to be present attaches at any stage of a criminal

proceeding that is critical to its outcome if the defendant’s presence

would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted)). Here, however, Tookes was not absent from

any part of his proceedings. He was present until after he indicated

in the midst of his original plea colloquy that he did not, in fact, wish

to plead guilty. He was removed from the courtroom for a time to

prepare himself for trial, and during that time, the trial court heard

a factual proffer from the prosecuting attorney and evidence in

aggravation and mitigation as to Reynolds and Wallace. After

Tookes was returned to the courtroom, the trial court reinitiated its

plea colloquy with Tookes, had the prosecuting attorney make a

separate proffer of the factual basis for his plea, and heard evidence

and argument in aggravation and mitigation as to Tookes.

                                   6
     Tookes claims that he should have been present during the

plea proceedings conducted for Reynolds and Wallace, and —

without pointing to anything in particular — Tookes says that the

trial court must have relied on something it learned during those

proceedings “given the harsh sentence . . . Tookes received” for

malice murder. But it does not seem to us that Tookes received a

particularly harsh sentence given the severity of that crime. See,

e.g., Cunningham v. State, 
304 Ga. 789, 790, n.2
 (
822 SE2d 281
)

(2018) (defendant sentenced to imprisonment for life without the

possibility of parole for malice murder conducted during home

invasion); Harris v. State, 
304 Ga. 276, 277, n.1
 (
818 SE2d 530
)

(2018) (same); Brewner, 
302 Ga. at 7, n.1
 (same). Moreover, the trial

court found at the hearing on the motion to withdraw that Tookes’s

sentence was based on the proffer, evidence, and argument

presented in Tookes’s presence, not on things that occurred during

his absence, and the trial court noted that Tookes himself failed to

ask forgiveness or show remorse. These findings are not clearly

erroneous, and the record simply does not show that Tookes was

                                 7
absent for any critical stage of his prosecution. The denial of the

motion to withdraw is not error.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                   DECIDED JUNE 10, 2019.

     Murder. Fayette Superior Court. Before Judge Sams.

     Michele B. Lord, for appellant.

     Benjamin D. Coker, District Attorney, E. Morgan Kendrick,

Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.

Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick,

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.




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