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306 Ga. 417

Scott v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided August 5, 2019

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2019-08-05

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently May 2025

9 state decisions

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Jackson v. Virginia · Vega v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2019-08-05

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306 Ga. 417
FINAL COPY

                   S19A0598. SCOTT v. THE STATE.


      ELLINGTON, Justice.

      Jeremy Scott was convicted of felony murder, aggravated

assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,

and criminal use of a firearm with an altered identification mark in

connection with the death of Romondo Ashley.1 Scott contends that


      1 The shooting occurred on December 20, 2014. On March 18, 2015, a

Chatham County grand jury indicted Scott for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder (Count 2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Counts 3, 5, 7, 9), aggravated assault (Counts 4, 6, 8), and criminal use of a
firearm with an altered identification mark (Count 10) in connection with the
shooting death of Romondo Ashley and the aggravated assaults of Arianna and
Dionna Kearse. Following a jury trial held on October 27-30, 2015, Scott was
found guilty of felony murder (Count 2), possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Counts 3, 5), aggravated assault (Count 4), and
criminal use of a firearm with an altered identification mark (Count 10). The
jury acquitted him of the remaining counts, which included those counts
alleging crimes against Arianna and Dionna Kearse. On January 5, 2016, the
trial court sentenced Scott to serve life in prison for felony murder; five years
in prison for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to run consecutively
to his murder conviction; and five years on probation for criminal use of a
firearm with an altered identification mark, to run concurrently with his
firearm possession sentence. The remaining counts merged. Scott filed a timely
motion for a new trial on January 6, 2016, which he later amended on August
28, 2018. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on October 1,
2018. Scott filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case was docketed in this
his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court erred by

giving the jury an incomplete and misleading charge on accident.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

      Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the record

shows the following. On December 20, 2014, Ashley was visiting his

girlfriend, Arianna Kearse, and their daughter at Arianna’s house.

Arianna’s sister, Dionna Kearse, and others were also present.

Around 1:00 a.m., Ashley woke Arianna and told her that her ex-

boyfriend, Scott, was outside her house in his brother’s truck.

Arianna had dated Scott briefly after being in a relationship with

Ashley, but she and Scott broke up in November. Thereafter, she

resumed her relationship with Ashley.

      When Arianna heard that Scott was outside, she woke her

sister. The two women went outside to ensure that there was no

friction between Scott and Ashley, given that Ashley had gone onto

the front porch to wait for a ride home from a friend. As Arianna and



Court for the April 2019 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.

                                      2
Dionna tried to convince Ashley to come back inside, Scott walked

toward the porch. The sisters told Scott to leave, but Scott started

cursing, asking Arianna if she was having sex with Ashley. Angered,

Ashley swung his fist at Scott, but missed. The sisters pulled Ashley

away by his arms, attempting to get him back inside. Scott followed,

pulled a gun from behind him, and shot Ashley twice in the head.

Scott then walked back to his brother’s truck and left.

     Ashley collapsed onto the porch, bleeding profusely and

shouting his daughter’s name. Neighbors called the police while

Arianna and Dionna tried to comfort Ashley until help arrived.

Ashley later died at the hospital. One bullet entered his cheek and

exited through the back part of his ear; another entered his forehead

and passed through his brain before lodging in his skull.

     Arianna and Dionna told the responding officers what had

happened and both identified Scott as the shooter. The sisters also

later identified Scott from a photographic lineup. Arianna took the

police to Scott’s home and showed them the truck that he had driven

to her house. While Arianna was aiding the police with the

                                 3
investigation, Scott called her and asked her if she had “told on him.”

Officers secured search warrants for Scott’s property. During their

search, the officers found a revolver hidden under a shed. The

weapon contained three empty shell casings and part of its serial

number had been filed away. A ballistics expert determined that the

bullet the medical examiner had removed from Ashley’s skull had

been fired from the revolver. The weapon was functional and it took

about ten-and-a-half pounds of pressure to pull the trigger. The

expert testified that it is “highly unlikely” that the revolver would

have fired absent pressure on the trigger.

     In a recorded interview, Scott told the police that he felt

threatened by Ashley. He claimed that he took the gun from his

pocket, pointed it at Ashley, and then, using the revolver as a blunt

instrument, struck Ashley on the head with it in self-defense. He

claimed that the gun accidentally discharged during the altercation.

     1. Scott does not dispute the legal sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, as is this Court’s practice

in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that,

                                  4
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence

presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize

a rational jury to find Scott guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the

crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307, 319
 (III) (B) (
99 SCt 2781
, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega

v. State, 
285 Ga. 32, 33
 (1) (
673 SE2d 223
) (2009) (“It was for the

jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any

conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).

     2. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the

jury could infer malice from Scott’s decision to leave the scene of the

shooting without calling the police, rendering aid, or giving any

explanation for what he had done.2 Scott contends that the

prosecutor’s argument improperly commented on his pre-arrest


     2 Scott complains about this portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument:

            And again, he walked away afterward. He didn’t stay to
     check on anybody. He didn’t render aid. He matter-of-factly and at
     a slow pace walks away, that’s an abandoned and malignant heart.
     . . . Did he ask if anybody else was hurt? Did he stick around to
     find out? Did he ask if any one of those stray bullets went into the
     house and hit any one of these little bitty children that he had been
     around? No.
                                      5
silence in violation of this Court’s holding in Mallory v. State, 
261 Ga. 625, 629-630
 (5) (
409 SE2d 839
) (1991), and that, therefore, his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and preserve the

error for appellate review.

     To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a

defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that such deficient performance

resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U. S. 668, 687-695
 (III) (
104 SCt 2052
, 80 LE2d 674) (1984);

Wesley v. State, 
286 Ga. 355, 356
 (3) (
689 SE2d 280
) (2010). To

satisfy the first prong, deficient performance, a defendant must

show that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively

unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light

of prevailing professional norms.” (Citation omitted.) Romer v. State,

293 Ga. 339, 344
 (3) (
745 SE2d 637
) (2013); see also Strickland, 
466 U. S. at 687-688
 (III) (A). This requires a defendant to “overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide

range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s

                                  6
decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Simmons v. State,

299 Ga. 370, 375
 (3) (
788 SE2d 494
) (2016). To satisfy the second

prong, prejudice, the defendant must establish a reasonable

probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance,

the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 
466 U. S. at 694
 (III) (B). “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
Id.
 “If an

appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of

the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine

the other prong.” (Citations omitted.) Lawrence v. State, 
286 Ga. 533, 533-534
 (2) (
690 SE2d 801
) (2010).

     When Scott was tried in 2015, the new Evidence Code was in

effect. At that time, whether the Mallory rule had been abrogated

by the new Evidence Code was unsettled and subject to dispute. See

Eller v. State, 
303 Ga. 373, 384
 (IV) (E) (
811 SE2d 299
) (2018) (“We

have specifically declined thus far to decide whether Mallory applies

in trials after January 2013.” (citations omitted)). Shortly after

                                 7
Scott’s appeal was docketed, however, this Court expressly held that

“Mallory’s categorical, bright-line rule excluding all comment upon

a defendant’s silence or failure to come forward as far more

prejudicial than probative . . . was abrogated by the new Evidence

Code.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) State v. Orr,

305 Ga. 729, 739
 (3) (
827 SE2d 892
) (2019).

     Now that we have squarely held that Mallory was abrogated
     by Georgia’s new Evidence Code, it is clear that a defendant
     cannot prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness on the basis that
     his trial counsel failed to rely on a case that was not applicable
     to his trial.

Jackson v. State, 
306 Ga. ___
, ___ (5) (a) (___ SE2d ___) (2019).

     3. Scott contends the trial court erred by giving the jury

incomplete and misleading instructions on his defense of accident.

He argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that

accident was a legal defense to aggravated assault, the felony upon

which his felony murder and firearm possession counts were based.

Further, he argues that the trial court should have informed the jury

that if the jury found the defense of accident to be applicable to the

underlying felony of aggravated assault, the jury’s verdict should be

                                  8
not guilty on the charges premised on this predicate felony. Because

Scott did not object on this ground before the jury retired to

deliberate, his claim may be reviewed on appeal for “plain error”

only. OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). Plain error review has a four-part

analysis:

     First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
     deviation from a legal rule — that has not been
     intentionally      relinquished    or    abandoned,      i.e.,
     affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
     error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
     reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
     the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
     case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
     outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
     if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
     has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which
     ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
     fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
     proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is
     difficult, as it should be.

(Citations omitted.) Walker v. State, 
301 Ga. 482, 485
 (2) (
801 SE2d 804
) (2017).

     The record shows that the trial court fully and accurately




                                   9
charged the jury on the defense of accident.3 The trial court’s

instruction closely follows the language of OCGA § 16-2-2, which

provides that a person “shall not be found guilty of any crime

committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears

there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal

negligence.” It also tracked the pattern jury instruction on accident.

See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: § 3.50.10 (4th ed.

2007, updated August 2018). Because the accident charge applies to


     3 The trial court instructed the jury:

           I charge you, ladies and gentlemen, that no person shall be
     found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident in
     which there is no criminal scheme[,] undertaking or intention. An
     accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or
     expectation[,] which takes place or begins to exist without design.
     If you find from the evidence that the incident that is the subject
     matter of this case occurred as the result of misfortune or accident
     and not as a result of a criminal undertaking or criminal
     negligence, then it would be your duty to acquit the Defendant.
           When the issue of accident is raised[,] the burden is on the
     State to negate or disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Any
     evidence as to misfortune or accident should be considered by you
     in connection with all the other evidence in this case. If in doing so
     you should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
     accused, it would be your duty to acquit the Defendant. On the
     other hand, should you believe from the evidence as a whole that
     the Defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt[,] you may
     convict.



                                      10
“any crime,” with the exception of felony murder as explained below,

it necessarily applies to aggravated assault.

     The court also charged the jury that, to convict Scott for felony

murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the homicide occurred during the commission of the predicate

offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Again, the court

gave instructions that tracked the pattern jury instructions for

aggravated assault and felony murder predicated on aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon.4 Finally, the court correctly

instructed the jury that the defense of accident did not apply to

felony murder based on aggravated assault if the jury found that the

aggravated assault was intentional.

     With respect to the charge of felony murder, ladies and
     gentlemen, if it is shown by the evidence beyond a
     reasonable doubt that the injury to the alleged victim
     occurred by the discharge of a gun held by the accused
     and used in an attempt to place the alleged victim in
     reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a
     violent injury, the accused would not be able to claim the
     offense [sic] of accident or misfortune, even if the

     4 See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: §§ 2.10.20, 2.10.30

(felony murder) and §§ 2.20.20, 2.20.22 (aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon) (4th ed. 2007, updated January 2019).
                                    11
     discharge of the gun was unintentional.
           Should you find that the Defendant was not able to
     claim the defense of accident or misfortune with respect
     to your consideration of felony murder, you would still be
     authorized to consider whether or not his conduct was
     justified as I have previously instructed you. Now, ladies
     and gentlemen, if you do not believe that the Defendant
     is guilty or if you have any reasonable doubt as to the
     Defendant’s guilt on the offenses charged, then it would
     be your duty to acquit the Defendant as to that offense.

Scott has not shown that this is an incorrect statement of the law or

that it would tend to mislead the jury in its application of the defense

of accident to the crime of aggravated assault. See Tessmer v. State,

273 Ga. 220, 223
 (2) (
539 SE2d 816
) (2000) (“[W]hile accident can be

a defense to the underlying felony of aggravated assault, it cannot

be a defense to a felony murder predicated upon the underlying

felony of aggravated assault” when the aggravated assault itself is

not accidental.).

     Further, the charge was authorized by the evidence. In support

of his theory of self-defense, Scott presented evidence that he

intentionally drew a revolver, intentionally aimed it at Ashley, and

intentionally struck him with it. He alleged that, during the course


                                  12
of these intentional acts, the revolver discharged twice, and that

Ashley was mortally wounded. Although the resulting homicide

could have been justified under a theory of self-defense (and the jury

was so charged), the homicide could not be accidental, as a matter of

law, if the jury found that the actions giving rise to the predicate

offense of aggravated assault were intentional. See Tessmer, 
273 Ga. at 222-223
 (2). See also Oliver v. State, 
274 Ga. 539, 540
 (2) (
554 SE2d 474
) (2001) (“Unlike malice murder, felony murder does not

require intent to kill; rather, the defendant only must have intended

to commit the underlying felony.” (footnote omitted)).

     Given that Scott has not shown that the trial court’s charge

was erroneous, he has failed to establish an essential prerequisite

for a finding of plain error. See Blake v. State, 
292 Ga. 516, 517-518

(2) (
739 SE2d 319
) (2013) (finding no error, much less any plain

error, where trial court’s instruction was an accurate statement of

the law); Dukes v. State, 
290 Ga. 486, 489
 (5) (
722 SE2d 701
) (2012)

(same). Therefore, this claim of error is without merit.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 13
              DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2019.

Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Freesemann.

                        14
     Robert L. Persse, for appellant.
     Meg E. Heap, District Attorney, Bradley R. Thompson,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.




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