306 Ga. 417
FINAL COPY
S19A0598. SCOTT v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Jeremy Scott was convicted of felony murder, aggravated
assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
and criminal use of a firearm with an altered identification mark in
connection with the death of Romondo Ashley.1 Scott contends that
1 The shooting occurred on December 20, 2014. On March 18, 2015, a
Chatham County grand jury indicted Scott for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder (Count 2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Counts 3, 5, 7, 9), aggravated assault (Counts 4, 6, 8), and criminal use of a
firearm with an altered identification mark (Count 10) in connection with the
shooting death of Romondo Ashley and the aggravated assaults of Arianna and
Dionna Kearse. Following a jury trial held on October 27-30, 2015, Scott was
found guilty of felony murder (Count 2), possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Counts 3, 5), aggravated assault (Count 4), and
criminal use of a firearm with an altered identification mark (Count 10). The
jury acquitted him of the remaining counts, which included those counts
alleging crimes against Arianna and Dionna Kearse. On January 5, 2016, the
trial court sentenced Scott to serve life in prison for felony murder; five years
in prison for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to run consecutively
to his murder conviction; and five years on probation for criminal use of a
firearm with an altered identification mark, to run concurrently with his
firearm possession sentence. The remaining counts merged. Scott filed a timely
motion for a new trial on January 6, 2016, which he later amended on August
28, 2018. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on October 1,
2018. Scott filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case was docketed in this
his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court erred by
giving the jury an incomplete and misleading charge on accident.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the record
shows the following. On December 20, 2014, Ashley was visiting his
girlfriend, Arianna Kearse, and their daughter at Arianna’s house.
Arianna’s sister, Dionna Kearse, and others were also present.
Around 1:00 a.m., Ashley woke Arianna and told her that her ex-
boyfriend, Scott, was outside her house in his brother’s truck.
Arianna had dated Scott briefly after being in a relationship with
Ashley, but she and Scott broke up in November. Thereafter, she
resumed her relationship with Ashley.
When Arianna heard that Scott was outside, she woke her
sister. The two women went outside to ensure that there was no
friction between Scott and Ashley, given that Ashley had gone onto
the front porch to wait for a ride home from a friend. As Arianna and
Court for the April 2019 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.
2
Dionna tried to convince Ashley to come back inside, Scott walked
toward the porch. The sisters told Scott to leave, but Scott started
cursing, asking Arianna if she was having sex with Ashley. Angered,
Ashley swung his fist at Scott, but missed. The sisters pulled Ashley
away by his arms, attempting to get him back inside. Scott followed,
pulled a gun from behind him, and shot Ashley twice in the head.
Scott then walked back to his brother’s truck and left.
Ashley collapsed onto the porch, bleeding profusely and
shouting his daughter’s name. Neighbors called the police while
Arianna and Dionna tried to comfort Ashley until help arrived.
Ashley later died at the hospital. One bullet entered his cheek and
exited through the back part of his ear; another entered his forehead
and passed through his brain before lodging in his skull.
Arianna and Dionna told the responding officers what had
happened and both identified Scott as the shooter. The sisters also
later identified Scott from a photographic lineup. Arianna took the
police to Scott’s home and showed them the truck that he had driven
to her house. While Arianna was aiding the police with the
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investigation, Scott called her and asked her if she had “told on him.”
Officers secured search warrants for Scott’s property. During their
search, the officers found a revolver hidden under a shed. The
weapon contained three empty shell casings and part of its serial
number had been filed away. A ballistics expert determined that the
bullet the medical examiner had removed from Ashley’s skull had
been fired from the revolver. The weapon was functional and it took
about ten-and-a-half pounds of pressure to pull the trigger. The
expert testified that it is “highly unlikely” that the revolver would
have fired absent pressure on the trigger.
In a recorded interview, Scott told the police that he felt
threatened by Ashley. He claimed that he took the gun from his
pocket, pointed it at Ashley, and then, using the revolver as a blunt
instrument, struck Ashley on the head with it in self-defense. He
claimed that the gun accidentally discharged during the altercation.
1. Scott does not dispute the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, as is this Court’s practice
in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that,
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when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence
presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize
a rational jury to find Scott guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S.
307, 319 (III) (B) (
99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega
v. State,
285 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (
673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“It was for the
jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any
conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)).
2. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the
jury could infer malice from Scott’s decision to leave the scene of the
shooting without calling the police, rendering aid, or giving any
explanation for what he had done.2 Scott contends that the
prosecutor’s argument improperly commented on his pre-arrest
2 Scott complains about this portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument:
And again, he walked away afterward. He didn’t stay to
check on anybody. He didn’t render aid. He matter-of-factly and at
a slow pace walks away, that’s an abandoned and malignant heart.
. . . Did he ask if anybody else was hurt? Did he stick around to
find out? Did he ask if any one of those stray bullets went into the
house and hit any one of these little bitty children that he had been
around? No.
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silence in violation of this Court’s holding in Mallory v. State, 261
Ga. 625, 629-630 (5) (
409 SE2d 839) (1991), and that, therefore, his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and preserve the
error for appellate review.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was
professionally deficient and that such deficient performance
resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U. S. 668, 687-695 (III) (
104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984);
Wesley v. State,
286 Ga. 355, 356 (3) (
689 SE2d 280) (2010). To
satisfy the first prong, deficient performance, a defendant must
show that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively
unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light
of prevailing professional norms.” (Citation omitted.) Romer v. State,
293 Ga. 339, 344 (3) (
745 SE2d 637) (2013); see also Strickland,
466
U. S. at 687-688 (III) (A). This requires a defendant to “overcome the
strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide
range of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s
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decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Simmons v. State,
299 Ga. 370, 375 (3) (
788 SE2d 494) (2016). To satisfy the second
prong, prejudice, the defendant must establish a reasonable
probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance,
the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland,
466 U.
S. at 694 (III) (B). “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. “If an
appellant fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of
the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine
the other prong.” (Citations omitted.) Lawrence v. State,
286 Ga.
533, 533-534 (2) (
690 SE2d 801) (2010).
When Scott was tried in 2015, the new Evidence Code was in
effect. At that time, whether the Mallory rule had been abrogated
by the new Evidence Code was unsettled and subject to dispute. See
Eller v. State, 303 Ga. 373, 384 (IV) (E) (
811 SE2d 299) (2018) (“We
have specifically declined thus far to decide whether Mallory applies
in trials after January 2013.” (citations omitted)). Shortly after
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Scott’s appeal was docketed, however, this Court expressly held that
“Mallory’s categorical, bright-line rule excluding all comment upon
a defendant’s silence or failure to come forward as far more
prejudicial than probative . . . was abrogated by the new Evidence
Code.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) State v. Orr,
305 Ga. 729, 739 (3) (
827 SE2d 892) (2019).
Now that we have squarely held that Mallory was abrogated
by Georgia’s new Evidence Code, it is clear that a defendant
cannot prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness on the basis that
his trial counsel failed to rely on a case that was not applicable
to his trial.
Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. ___, ___ (5) (a) (___ SE2d ___) (2019).
3. Scott contends the trial court erred by giving the jury
incomplete and misleading instructions on his defense of accident.
He argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that
accident was a legal defense to aggravated assault, the felony upon
which his felony murder and firearm possession counts were based.
Further, he argues that the trial court should have informed the jury
that if the jury found the defense of accident to be applicable to the
underlying felony of aggravated assault, the jury’s verdict should be
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not guilty on the charges premised on this predicate felony. Because
Scott did not object on this ground before the jury retired to
deliberate, his claim may be reviewed on appeal for “plain error”
only. OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). Plain error review has a four-part
analysis:
First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule — that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,
affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is
difficult, as it should be.
(Citations omitted.) Walker v. State, 301 Ga. 482, 485 (2) (
801 SE2d
804) (2017).
The record shows that the trial court fully and accurately
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charged the jury on the defense of accident.3 The trial court’s
instruction closely follows the language of OCGA § 16-2-2, which
provides that a person “shall not be found guilty of any crime
committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears
there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal
negligence.” It also tracked the pattern jury instruction on accident.
See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: § 3.50.10 (4th ed.
2007, updated August 2018). Because the accident charge applies to
3 The trial court instructed the jury:
I charge you, ladies and gentlemen, that no person shall be
found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident in
which there is no criminal scheme[,] undertaking or intention. An
accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or
expectation[,] which takes place or begins to exist without design.
If you find from the evidence that the incident that is the subject
matter of this case occurred as the result of misfortune or accident
and not as a result of a criminal undertaking or criminal
negligence, then it would be your duty to acquit the Defendant.
When the issue of accident is raised[,] the burden is on the
State to negate or disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Any
evidence as to misfortune or accident should be considered by you
in connection with all the other evidence in this case. If in doing so
you should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused, it would be your duty to acquit the Defendant. On the
other hand, should you believe from the evidence as a whole that
the Defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt[,] you may
convict.
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“any crime,” with the exception of felony murder as explained below,
it necessarily applies to aggravated assault.
The court also charged the jury that, to convict Scott for felony
murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the homicide occurred during the commission of the predicate
offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Again, the court
gave instructions that tracked the pattern jury instructions for
aggravated assault and felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon.4 Finally, the court correctly
instructed the jury that the defense of accident did not apply to
felony murder based on aggravated assault if the jury found that the
aggravated assault was intentional.
With respect to the charge of felony murder, ladies and
gentlemen, if it is shown by the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the injury to the alleged victim
occurred by the discharge of a gun held by the accused
and used in an attempt to place the alleged victim in
reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a
violent injury, the accused would not be able to claim the
offense [sic] of accident or misfortune, even if the
4 See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: §§ 2.10.20, 2.10.30
(felony murder) and §§ 2.20.20, 2.20.22 (aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon) (4th ed. 2007, updated January 2019).
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discharge of the gun was unintentional.
Should you find that the Defendant was not able to
claim the defense of accident or misfortune with respect
to your consideration of felony murder, you would still be
authorized to consider whether or not his conduct was
justified as I have previously instructed you. Now, ladies
and gentlemen, if you do not believe that the Defendant
is guilty or if you have any reasonable doubt as to the
Defendant’s guilt on the offenses charged, then it would
be your duty to acquit the Defendant as to that offense.
Scott has not shown that this is an incorrect statement of the law or
that it would tend to mislead the jury in its application of the defense
of accident to the crime of aggravated assault. See Tessmer v. State,
273 Ga. 220, 223 (2) (
539 SE2d 816) (2000) (“[W]hile accident can be
a defense to the underlying felony of aggravated assault, it cannot
be a defense to a felony murder predicated upon the underlying
felony of aggravated assault” when the aggravated assault itself is
not accidental.).
Further, the charge was authorized by the evidence. In support
of his theory of self-defense, Scott presented evidence that he
intentionally drew a revolver, intentionally aimed it at Ashley, and
intentionally struck him with it. He alleged that, during the course
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of these intentional acts, the revolver discharged twice, and that
Ashley was mortally wounded. Although the resulting homicide
could have been justified under a theory of self-defense (and the jury
was so charged), the homicide could not be accidental, as a matter of
law, if the jury found that the actions giving rise to the predicate
offense of aggravated assault were intentional. See Tessmer, 273 Ga.
at 222-223 (2). See also Oliver v. State,
274 Ga. 539, 540 (2) (
554
SE2d 474) (2001) (“Unlike malice murder, felony murder does not
require intent to kill; rather, the defendant only must have intended
to commit the underlying felony.” (footnote omitted)).
Given that Scott has not shown that the trial court’s charge
was erroneous, he has failed to establish an essential prerequisite
for a finding of plain error. See Blake v. State, 292 Ga. 516, 517-518
(2) (
739 SE2d 319) (2013) (finding no error, much less any plain
error, where trial court’s instruction was an accurate statement of
the law); Dukes v. State,
290 Ga. 486, 489 (5) (
722 SE2d 701) (2012)
(same). Therefore, this claim of error is without merit.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2019.
Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Freesemann.
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Robert L. Persse, for appellant.
Meg E. Heap, District Attorney, Bradley R. Thompson,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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