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306 Ga. 532

Moore v. State

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided August 19, 2019

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2019-08-19

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently February 2024

6 state decisions

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Jackson v. Virginia · Suggs v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2019-08-19

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306 Ga. 532
FINAL COPY

                  S19A0618. MOORE v. THE STATE.


      BENHAM, Justice.

      Appellant David Frank Moore was convicted of felony murder

and related offenses in connection with the shooting of Delray

Crittenden, Nyriek Williams, and Aaron Byfield; Crittenden died as

a result of the shooting.         On appeal, Appellant contends that

insufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s verdicts,

that the trial court erred in several respects, and that trial counsel

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.1



      1 In October 2014, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Appellant for

malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, felony murder
predicated on possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, three counts of aggravated assault
(Crittenden, Williams, and Byfield), and three counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (the aggravated assault of Crittenden,
Williams, and Byfield). Following a jury trial conducted December 14-23, 2015,
Appellant was acquitted of malice murder, but found guilty on all remaining
counts. Appellant was ultimately sentenced to serve life in prison for felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault, twenty consecutive years for the
aggravated assaults of Williams and Byfield, five consecutive years for each of
the three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
and five consecutive years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The
      Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the

evidence presented at trial showed the following. On the night of

June 30, 2014, Crittenden, Williams, and Byfield were at a house

party in DeKalb County. During the party, Crittenden and Williams

went to purchase marijuana from Appellant. They returned to the

party after the purchase. However, as the party ended in the early

morning hours of July 1, Crittenden, Williams, and Byfield went to

Appellant’s house to purchase more marijuana.

      Byfield drove, Williams sat in the front passenger seat, and

Crittenden rode in the rear, driver’s-side seat. Once they arrived at

Appellant’s house, Crittenden told Byfield to back into the driveway.

Williams saw Crittenden pull out a pistol and place it in his lap as

they backed in. Both Byfield and Williams observed Appellant

approaching Crittenden’s window, and Williams noted the two had


aggravated assault of Crittenden was merged into the felony murder conviction
predicated thereon, and the felony murder conviction predicated on possession
of a firearm was vacated by operation of law.
       Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial on January 29, 2016, and
amended it on April 13, 2018. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the
motion as amended on October 10, 2018. A timely notice of appeal was filed
on October 11, 2018; this case was docketed to the April 2019 term of this Court
and was orally argued on April 16, 2019.
                                       2
a heated discussion about Appellant giving Crittenden less

marijuana than Crittenden paid for.

     When Byfield heard a shot, he tried to pull away but was then

shot in the back and blacked out. When he regained consciousness,

he was alone in the car but the car had moved across the street.

Williams was also shot and fell to the ground in the yard across the

street. Williams lay on his back and saw Appellant come and stand

over him. Appellant then wiped Williams’ fingers on the cylinder of

a revolver as Williams heard Appellant say into his phone “I just

shot these n*****s.” Appellant’s neighbor observed a man holding a

revolver while standing over a younger man who had been shot. The

younger man, later determined to be Crittenden, was bleeding and

leaning against the neighbor’s car. Crittenden died of his wounds

during surgery; Appellant was not wounded during the incident.

     A .40-caliber semi-automatic pistol was recovered from the

front seat of Byfield’s vehicle and a .38-caliber revolver was

recovered from near Appellant’s driveway, along with five spent

cartridge casings from the revolver. Testing showed that bullets

                                 3
recovered from the street, Williams’ body, and Crittenden’s body

were fired from that same .38-caliber revolver. No .40-caliber spent

shell casings or projectiles were recovered at the scene.          No

marijuana was found either.

     1. Appellant contends that the evidence presented was

insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder and related

offenses. However, we review the sufficiency of the evidence in the

light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and defer to the jury’s

assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.         See

Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U. S. 307
 (III) (B) (
99 SCt 2781
, 61 LE2d

560) (1979). The evidence, as set forth above, was sufficient to

authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the offenses for which he was convicted. See id.

     2. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in four ways.

For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

     (a) Appellant first argues that the trial court erred by refusing

to bifurcate his trial on the charge of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. However, Appellant’s felon-in-possession charge

                                  4
was directly related to one of his felony murder charges because it

served as a predicate felony. Therefore, his motion to bifurcate was

properly denied as the motion “should be denied where the count

charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon might serve as

the underlying felony supporting a felony murder conviction.”

Ballard v. State, 
297 Ga. 248, 251
 (
773 SE2d 254
) (2015) (citation

and punctuation omitted); see also Brown v. State, 
295 Ga. 804
 (3)

(
764 SE2d 376
) (2014).

     (b) Appellant then argues that the trial court erred by refusing

to allow him to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon because

admitting the certified conviction for possession of a firearm by a

first offender probationer into evidence unfairly prejudiced him.

The failure to allow such a stipulation may be an abuse of discretion

where “‘(1) a defendant’s prior conviction is of the nature likely to

inflame the jury’s passions and raise the risk of a conviction based

on improper considerations, and (2) the purpose of the evidence is

solely to prove the defendant’s status as a convicted felon.’” Morris

v. State, 
297 Ga. 426, 428
 (
774 SE2d 665
) (2015) (Citation omitted.).

                                 5
However, neither Appellant’s conviction for possession of a firearm

by a first offender probationer nor the various other minor offenses

included in the certified copy of the final disposition of that offense

were likely to inflame the jury’s passions in this case.2 See 
id.
 (prior

convictions    for   aggravated      assault    and    interference     with

government property were not of the nature likely to inflame the

passions of the jury during trial for murder and aggravated assault).

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by preventing

Appellant from stipulating to his conviction for possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon. See 
id.

      (c) Appellant also contends, relying on McKenzie v. State, 
293 Ga. App. 350
 (2) (
667 SE2d 142
) (2008), that the trial court erred

because it instructed the jury to consider the “intelligence” of

witnesses. Appellant did not object at trial, so the matter is before

this Court only for plain error review. See Sanders v. State, 
290 Ga. 2
 The certified copy of Moore’s final disposition showed that Moore was

convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by the possession
of less than one ounce of marijuana, fleeing or attempting to elude a police
officer, reckless driving, driving without a license, driving with no proof of
insurance, and improper tag.
                                      6
637, 640 (2) (
723 SE2d 436
) (2012). In McKenzie, although the Court

of Appeals suggested that considering intelligence as a factor in

determining witness credibility “can be problematic,” that court

concluded that the charge was not so “harmful as to require a

reversal.” McKenzie, 
293 Ga. App. at 352
 (2). Since McKenzie, this

Court has noted the same concern but determined such a charge not

to be reversible or plain error. See Ingram v. State, 
297 Ga. 854, 857

(
778 SE2d 781
) (2015); Gamble v. State, 
291 Ga. 581, 583
 (
731 SE2d 758
) (2012). Therefore, Appellant has failed to show plain error.

     (d) Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it refused

to instruct the jury on his sole defense of justification because there

was evidence that Crittenden may have attempted to rob Appellant.

To support his claim, Appellant cites witness statements that

Crittenden told Byfield to back into the driveway and that Williams

testified that he saw Crittenden pull out a pistol as they arrived at

Appellant’s house. However, in Woodard v. State, 
296 Ga. 803
 (3)

(b) (
771 SE2d 362
) (2015), this Court held that the crime of

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon can preclude a

                                  7
justification defense under OCGA § 16-3-21. Id. Although a felon

may be able to possess a firearm in the case of a sudden emergency

for the purpose of defending himself, see Cauley v. State, 
260 Ga. 324
 (2) (c) (
393 SE2d 246
) (1990), no evidence of a sudden emergency

has been presented here. There was no evidence presented that

Crittenden attempted to rob Appellant or that the gun was visible

to Appellant. See Hunter v. State, 
281 Ga. 693
 (2) (
642 SE2d 668
)

(2007) (holding that an instruction on self-defense was not necessary

even though there was evidence there was a gun under the victim’s

leg when he was shot because “there [was] no evidence of any threat

so as to give rise to a reasonable belief” that the defendant had to

shoot the victim to avoid death or great bodily injury to himself).

     3. Lastly, Appellant makes four claims that his trial counsel

was constitutionally ineffective. We disagree.

     To succeed on these ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a

defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland v. Washington

test. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U. S. 668
 (III) (
104 SCt 2052
,

80 LE2d 674) (1984). First, the defendant must show counsel’s

                                  8
performance was deficient by showing counsel made errors so

serious that it was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.               See 
id.
   “The criminal

defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial

counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable

professional conduct.” Domingues v. State, 
277 Ga. 373
 (2) (
589 SE2d 102
) (2003). Second, the defendant must show the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that

counsel’s errors were so serious that they likely affected the outcome

of the trial. See 
id.

     Since a defendant must satisfy both prongs, this Court does not

need to “approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address

both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an

insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 
466 U. S. at 697
. The trial

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations are reviewed

under   a   clearly     erroneous   standard,    but   this   Court   will

independently apply the legal principles to the facts. Suggs v. State,

272 Ga. 85
 (4) (
526 SE2d 347
) (2000).

                                    9
     (a)   Appellant    first   claims   that   trial   counsel   was

constitutionally deficient because counsel failed to honor Appellant’s

right to be present at the acceptance of the jury. Specifically, the

jury in this case was accepted during a bench conference while

Appellant was in the courtroom. “Proceedings at which the jury

composition is selected or changed are a critical stage at which the

defendant is entitled to be present.” Sammons v. State, 
279 Ga. 386, 387
 (
612 SE2d 785
) (2005).       Even assuming that trial counsel

performed deficiently by allowing Appellant to be absent at the time

the jury was accepted, the evidence against Appellant was strong,

and he has made no showing that his absence from the bench

conference prejudiced him in any way. See Peterson v. State, 
284 Ga. 275, 280
 (
663 SE2d 164
) (2008); see also Bridges v. State, 
286 Ga. 535
 (3) (
690 SE2d 136
) (2010).

     (b) Appellant next contends that trial counsel was deficient

because he failed to request a limiting instruction after the trial

court denied his motion to bifurcate the trial or redact Appellant’s

felony conviction for possession of a firearm. Contrary to Appellant’s

                                  10
claims, the record shows that trial counsel assisted in crafting the

limiting instruction that was read to the jury, which stated the prior

conviction could only be considered as it “relate[d] to the required

element of conviction of a felony for [possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon] and not for any other purpose.”           Therefore,

Appellant has failed to show trial counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.

     (c) Appellant also argues that trial counsel was constitutionally

deficient because trial counsel failed to present any evidence in

support of a defense for Appellant after advising Appellant not to

testify.   Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to properly

investigate the case and that counsel misunderstood the law that

would have warranted Appellant a justification defense even though

he was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm.

     However, Appellant rests on Heard v. State, 
261 Ga. 262
 (
403 SE2d 438
) (1991), which this Court overruled in Woodard, 
296 Ga. at 803
 (3) (b), months before Appellant’s trial. As noted above, in

Woodard, this Court held that the crime of possession of a firearm

                                 11
by a convicted felon can preclude a justification defense under OCGA

§ 16-3-21. Id. Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing

to request an instruction on justification.

     Appellant also contends counsel erroneously withdrew a

request for a jury instruction on the lesser charge of voluntary

manslaughter. This argument also fails. A heated argument over

money for drugs is not a serious provocation that warrants a

voluntary manslaughter instruction. See Johnson v. State, 
297 Ga. 839, 844
 (2) (
778 SE2d 769
) (2015). Therefore, this contention is

without merit.

     (d) Finally, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective

because he did not adhere to the Georgia Rules of Professional

Conduct for attorneys. Appellant claims trial counsel violated the

rules because he told the jury it was a self-defense case in his

opening argument and then presented no evidence of self-defense

due to what Appellant contends was an erroneous interpretation of

the law. Even assuming that trial counsel breached his ethical

obligations, “[a]n ethics violation . . . does not necessarily establish

                                  12
a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.” Blackshear v. State, 
274 Ga. 842, 843
 (
560 SE2d 688
) (2002). While “compliance with the Rules

of Professional Conduct should always be maintained, attorney

discipline for a violation of those Rules is not before us, but only the

issue whether [Appellant] has established ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. . . .” Green v. State, 
299 Ga. 337, 342
 (
788 SE2d 380
)

(2016).   As such, Appellant has failed to show trial counsel’s

performance was constitutionally ineffective for failing to adhere to

the Rules of Professional Conduct.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                  DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019.
     Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Barrie.
     Dwight L. Thomas, for appellant.

                                  13
     Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Lenny I. Krick, Assistant
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B.
Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.




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