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306 Ga. 626

State v. Jackson

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided August 5, 2019

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 2019-08-05

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently December 2024

4 state decisions

Relies on Powell v. State · Jones v. State · State v. Thomas

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2019-08-05

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306 Ga. 626
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              S19A0646. THE STATE v. JACKSON.


     PETERSON, Justice.

     The trial court granted a mistrial in the murder case against

Monquez Jackson, finding that the prosecutor’s closing argument

included an improper comment on matters not in evidence. After

making extensive findings that the prosecutor made that improper

comment intentionally in hopes that the comment would lead to a

mistrial, and thus an opportunity to retry the case, the trial court

determined that double jeopardy prohibited the State from retrying

Jackson. The State appeals. We conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its considerable discretion in granting the mistrial. We also

conclude that the trial court’s factual findings supported its jeopardy

ruling, and that those findings must stand given the deference we

afford them. We affirm.

     Jackson was indicted with co-defendants Sade Britt (his wife),

Dwayne Britt (Sade’s brother), and Tomeka Porter for various
crimes against Anthony Westbrook. Jackson alone was charged with

malice murder, while he, Sade, and Dwayne were charged with

felony murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery,

kidnapping, financial transaction card theft, financial transaction

card fraud, and theft by taking. Porter was charged only with

conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Prior to Jackson’s trial, his

three co-defendants all entered into agreements with the State, with

the Britts pleading guilty to certain non-murder crimes and the

State saying it would dismiss the charge against Porter after she

testified.

     Sade testified at trial that Jackson shot Westbrook after

Jackson held Westbrook at gunpoint and she used Westbrook’s ATM

card to withdraw money from his bank account. Sade testified that

Dwayne was also present when she made the ATM withdrawals and

was nearby when Westbrook was shot. Sade testified that Porter

and Jackson dropped her off near Westbrook’s van a few days later

so that Sade could attempt to clean the vehicle of any inculpatory

evidence.

                                 2
      Dwayne also testified for the State, but his testimony differed

from his sister’s in several respects. Dwayne said that he was high

on drugs and did not see Jackson with a gun that night. As

summarized by the district attorney before the trial court, Porter

stated in a pre-trial allocution under oath that Sade had confessed

to killing Westbrook. But Porter did not testify at Jackson’s trial.

      This appeal concerns the State’s handling of its failure to call

Porter to testify. The DA served as lead counsel for the State at trial.

The defense made multiple hearsay objections at trial as to

statements allegedly made by Porter; for instance, a hearsay

objection was sustained by the trial court when the State attempted

to introduce prior statements by Porter during the direct testimony

of the State’s lead investigator.1 After the close of evidence, the State

made an oral motion seeking to preclude the defense from making

any reference to Porter during its closing arguments, adding that




      1 At the time, the DA represented to the trial court, “I may or may not

call Ms. Porter.” He later testified at the hearing on the plea in bar that he
“had no intentions of calling” her because he “anticipated that [she] was going
to try to aid Mr. Jackson.”
                                      3
the State would say nothing about her other than that “the State

elected not to call her.” Jackson’s lawyer responded that she should

be able to “talk about what [the DA] said in his opening statement,

that he planned to call her and that her charges have already been

resolved.” The trial court agreed with the defense that the defense

could “refer back to what was said in opening.”2 The discussion

concluded when the DA withdrew his motion and said that he would

“just adjust [his] argument accordingly.”

      In her closing argument, defense counsel noted that the State

had not called Porter to testify, adding, “I wonder what she would

have had to say.” In his closing, the DA stated the following:

      Everything is not needed to be proven. Every witness
      doesn’t need to be called. You have got direct evidence.
      There is other evidence through testimony that has told
      you what happened. Even Tomeka Porter, all she could
      tell you is[,] “yeah, we went back to the car to clean it up.”
      You have got the evidence to support that already that
      that happened. That is corroborated. Tomeka Porter
      wasn’t needed. All she can do is say, “Yeah, I went back
      and I saw her clean up the car.”


      2 In fact, although the DA mentioned Porter several times in his opening

statement, including that she had received her “day in court,” he did not tell
the jury that he planned to call her to testify.
                                      4
The defense promptly objected on the basis that the State was

arguing facts not in evidence. The trial court agreed with the State

that its statement to the jury about Porter was a reasonable

inference from Sade’s testimony, but ruled that it would instruct the

jury that it could not consider any suggestion about what Porter

would have said had she testified. After a short recess, the defense

moved for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. After

arguments of counsel and multiple breaks, the trial court granted

the motion pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-75, saying a curative

instruction was insufficient.

     Jackson filed a “Plea of Double Jeopardy, Plea in Bar, and

Motion to Dismiss,” arguing that a retrial would constitute double

jeopardy because the State’s closing argument was an attempt to

goad defense counsel into seeking a mistrial so that the State could

retry the case. After a hearing, the trial court granted Jackson’s

motion, citing the DA’s “shifting and conflicting explanations” as to

his closing argument — which the trial court said “was in violation

of the Court’s order on the District Attorney’s own motion in limine”

                                 5
— and noting that it had admonished the DA three times prior to

his closing argument that he should not inject Porter’s statements

into the trial without first calling her to testify. The court cited the

“certainly not overwhelming” evidence presented against Jackson,

particularly given the “glaring inconsistencies” between the

testimony of Sade and Dwayne and the lack of corroboration of their

testimony. And the court cited the DA’s considerable experience as

indicating that the DA would be well aware that his comments

would lead to a mistrial, noting that the DA was also in that role

when we reversed an aggravated assault conviction out of his circuit

because of the trial court’s failure to take appropriate action in

response to another prosecutor addressing matters outside of the

record during closing argument. See Jones v. State, 
292 Ga. 656, 660-662
 (2) (
740 SE2d 590
) (2013). The State appeals, arguing that

the trial court erred both in ordering a mistrial and granting the

plea in bar.

     1. The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering a mistrial. We disagree.

                                    6
     “Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of

prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the

court to interpose and prevent the same . . .” OCGA § 17-8-75. On

objection, the trial court has the discretion to order a mistrial if the

prosecutor is the offender. Id. A decision whether to grant a mistrial

based on an improper argument is reserved to the broad discretion

of the trial court. See Harvey v. State, 
296 Ga. 823, 831
 (2) (a) (
770 SE2d 840
) (2015). The question of whether a remedy for an improper

comment during closing argument is sufficient depends on the

degree of prejudice created by the comment. See Jones, 
292 Ga. at 662
 (2). And assessing that degree of prejudice involves

consideration of the weight of the evidence. See 
id.
 (finding that

general instruction about arguments not being evidence was an

inadequate cure for prosecutor’s improper argument where evidence

was not overwhelming). “A trial judge’s decision to declare a mistrial

based on his assessment of the prejudicial impact of improper

argument is entitled to great deference on appeal, and we will affirm

the trial court’s rejection of possible alternatives to a mistrial if

                                   7
reasonable judges could differ about the proper disposition.” Harvey,

296 Ga. at 835
 (2) (d) (citations and punctuation omitted).

     The State argues that the trial court erred in ordering a

mistrial because the comment at issue was both a reasonable

inference from the evidence and an invited response to the defense’s

reference to Porter in closing. The State notes that, when the defense

objected to the State’s argument, the trial court’s initial response

was to agree with the State that its argument was a reasonable

inference from Sade’s testimony. But the trial court also indicated

that it would instruct the jury that it could not consider any

suggestion as to how Porter might have testified. And it would not

be reasonable for the jury to assume from Sade’s testimony “all” of

what Porter would have said had she testified.

     As for the State’s argument that the DA’s statements

amounted to a permissible invited response, the cases the State

relies on do not hold that it is proper for a prosecutor to reference

matters not in evidence simply because the reference is responsive



                                  8
to a defense argument.3 Rather, we have said that such prosecutorial

comments ordinarily are not prejudicial “if, taken in context, they

were ‘invited’ by defense counsel’s opening salvo and did no more

than respond substantially in order to right the scale.” Powell v.

State, 
291 Ga. 743, 749
 (2) (b) (
733 SE2d 294
) (2012) (citation and

punctuation omitted; emphasis added). Here, the State’s argument

went beyond a response that “right[ed] the scale.” In its closing

argument, the defense noted that the State did not call Porter to

testify, and the defense appeared to invite the jury to consider what

Porter might have said had she testified. The State did not respond

to the defense argument by telling the jury that it ought not

speculate about what Porter would have said if she testified.

Instead, the State purported to tell the jury “all” that Porter would

have said had she testified — while omitting that Porter had said

that Sade had confessed to killing Westbrook. Although the State


      3 Indeed, in the decision most heavily relied on by the State, we said that

the “invited” remarks at issue — in which the prosecutor implied in her closing
argument that prosecutors seek the indictment only of guilty people — were
“highly improper.” See Powell v. State, 
291 Ga. 743, 745-746
 (2) (
733 SE2d 294
)
(2012).
                                       9
contends that its comments about what Porter would have said if

called to testify were not prejudicial because they did not implicate

Jackson in particular and addressed events that occurred after the

murder, the trial court concluded that the State’s argument

effectively introduced a statement by Porter that the jury might

view as providing corroboration of the testimony of Sade, Jackson’s

accomplice, while omitting Porter’s significant exculpatory pretrial

statement. Finding that the evidence presented against Jackson at

trial was not overwhelming, the trial court concluded that the

State’s comments were so prejudicial as to create an unfair trial for

Jackson. Indeed, at the hearing on the plea in bar, the DA

acknowledged that the State’s lead investigator testified at trial

both (1) that there was no physical evidence to connect Jackson to

the victim’s vehicle or the crime and (2) that law enforcement was

unable to corroborate any of Sade’s statements regarding Jackson’s

involvement, and the DA also acknowledged that the only witnesses

who provided testimony about Jackson’s involvement were his co-

defendants Sade and Dwayne and that there were several

                                 10
inconsistencies between the testimony of those two witnesses. The

trial court was in the best position to judge the possible prejudicial

impact of the State’s argument. See Varner v. State, 
285 Ga. 334, 336
 (
676 SE2d 209
) (2009). The State has not shown that the trial

court abused its discretion in ordering a mistrial.

     2. The State also argues that the trial court erred in granting

the plea in bar. Given the deference we afford to the trial court’s

factual findings underlying its ruling, we cannot conclude that the

trial court erred.

     “Throughout history, people have worried about the vast

disparity of power between governments and individuals, the

capacity of the state to bring charges repeatedly until it wins the

result it wants, and what little would be left of human liberty if that

power remained unchecked.” Gamble v. United States, ___ U.S. ___

(
139 SCt 1960, 1996
, 204 LE2d 322) (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

As a result, both the United States and Georgia Constitutions

prohibit the government from placing a defendant “in jeopardy”

more than once for “the same offense.” See U.S. Const. Amend. V

                                  11
(“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put

in jeopardy of life or limb[.]”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par.

XVIII (“No person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than

once for the same offense except when a new trial has been granted

after conviction or in case of mistrial.”).4

      Although the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause

generally does not bar the State from retrying a case after a mistrial



      4 Jackson asserted both federal and Georgia constitutional arguments in

the trial court, but the trial court’s ruling references only the United States
Constitution. We note that the text of the federal and Georgia constitutional
provisions differed slightly the first time that a double jeopardy provision
entered the Georgia Constitution. Compare Ga. Const. of 1861, Art. I, Par. 12
(“No person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the
same offence.”) with U.S. Const. Amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]”). This difference
grew with the addition of the phrase “in case of mistrial” in 1865. See Ga.
Const. of 1865, Art. I, Par. 9 (“No person shall be put in jeopardy of life or
liberty more than once for the same offense, save on his or her own motion for
a new trial after conviction, or in case of mistrial.”). A substantially identical
provision has appeared in every Georgia Constitution since. See Ga. Const. of
1868, Art. I, Sec. 8; Ga. Const. of 1877, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIII; Ga. Const. of
1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIII; Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XV; Ga.
Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII. Given these textual differences, it is
possible that the federal and state provisions carry different meanings. But the
parties do not draw any meaningful distinctions between the two provisions in
their arguments before this Court, and we need not consider any such
distinctions given our resolution of this appeal in Jackson’s favor under the
federal provision. We also note that the Georgia Code imposes double-jeopardytype restrictions on prosecutions that exceed those of the federal Constitution
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See OCGA § 16-1-8.
                                       12
is granted at the defense’s request due to prosecutorial misconduct,

a retrial may be barred where the misconduct was intended to goad

the defendant into moving for a mistrial. See Roscoe v. State, 
286 Ga. 325, 326
 (
687 SE2d 455
) (2009). In particular,

     the defendant must show that the State was purposefully
     attempting through its prosecutorial misconduct to secure an
     opportunity to retry the case, to avoid reversal of the conviction
     because of prosecutorial or judicial error, or to otherwise obtain
     a more favorable chance for a guilty verdict on retrial.

Yarbrough v. State, 
303 Ga. 594, 596
 (2) (
814 SE2d 286
) (2018)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Whether the prosecutor

intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial is a

question of fact that will not be overruled unless clearly erroneous.

Roscoe, 
286 Ga. at 327
. “A trial court’s findings of fact will not be

deemed to be clearly erroneous if there is any evidence to support

them, and this holds true even if the findings are based upon

circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which flow

from them.” 
Id.
 (citation and punctuation omitted).

     The State argues that the trial court erred by applying the

wrong legal standard in that it equated “egregious” prosecutorial

                                  13
conduct with the sort of intentional goading that bars a retrial. But

the trial court clearly found that the DA made the offending

comments in hopes that they would result in a mistrial. It found that

the DA made the comments “intentionally and strategically after

realizing the evidence was not overwhelming” and “well aware that

there was a high probability that this action would result in an

immediate motion for mistrial[.]” And the trial court in particular

found that the DA “acted with specific and deliberate intent to

subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause by

goading the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” The trial court

thus made the requisite findings, applying the correct standard.

     The State argues that the trial court’s finding that the DA

acted with the intent to goad the defense into moving for a mistrial

is not supported by the evidence. In particular, the State faults the

trial court for focusing on the DA’s lengthy experience as a

prosecutor without making any finding that he had acted similarly

in past cases, and argues that the trial court’s decision was

“predicated on a grossly speculative notion” about the DA’s ability

                                 14
to predict the outcome of the case had it gone to verdict. But we do

not find any clear error in the trial court’s assumption that an

experienced prosecutor is more likely than an inexperienced

prosecutor to know that comments to the jury on a matter not in

evidence may result in a mistrial. Nor do we find clear error in the

trial court’s consideration of the strength of the case the State had

presented in determining whether the DA intended to goad the

defense into moving for a mistrial. See State v. Thomas, 
275 Ga. 167, 167-168
 (
562 SE2d 501
) (2002) (concluding that trial court’s finding

that prosecutor intentionally provoked a mistrial was supported by

evidence that the prosecutor had been a member of the bar for nine

years and tried numerous felony cases, and that the prosecutor stood

to gain by aborting the trial due to testimony favorable to the

defense). And the State points to no authority that a finding that the

prosecutor acted with the requisite intent must be supported by

evidence that he had committed such an action in the past.

     The State also appears to complain that the trial court faulted

the DA for violating an order of the court when no such order had

                                 15
been issued. But no order was necessary to put a prosecutor on

notice that a comment to the jury on a matter not in evidence may

result in a mistrial; OCGA § 17-8-75 does that. And to the extent

that the trial court supported its finding about the DA’s intent with

reference to prior discussions among the parties and the court, those

discussions certainly were relevant at least to the extent that they

showed that the issues surrounding Porter were sensitive to the

defense such that improper comment about her would result in a

defense motion for a mistrial. On this record, and especially in the

light of weaknesses in the case presented against Jackson at trial,

we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that the DA acted with

the requisite intent was clearly erroneous. The State therefore has

not shown that the trial court erred in granting the plea in bar.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2019 – RECONSIDERATION DENIED SEPTEMBER 3,

                                 16
                              2019.

     Murder. Dougherty Superior Court. Before Judge Lockette.
     Gregory W. Edwards, District Attorney, Harold R. Moroz,
Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K.
Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
     Ingrid P. Driskell, for appellee.
     Lee Darragh, District Attorney, Robert W. Smith, Jr., amici
curiae.




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