Jackson v. State

FINAL COPY

               S19A0343. JACKSON v. THE STATE.


     NAHMIAS, Presiding Justice.

     Appellant Jaramus Jackson was convicted of felony murder

and a firearm offense in connection with the fatal shooting of Carlos

Wallace in 2015. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at

his trial was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court

erred by allowing the State to present evidence under OCGA § 24-4-

404 (b) that Appellant had shot at someone else in 2005 and the trial

court improperly instructed the jury on how to consider this

evidence; the trial court erred in failing to give various jury

instructions and his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ask for

them; the trial court erred by preventing the defense from cross-

examining accomplice witness Ronney Jackson about his 1997

arrest for murder, the State committed a Brady violation by failing

to timely disclose the 1997 arrest, and trial counsel was ineffective

in failing to question Ronney about the arrest and to object to the
Brady violation; trial counsel failed to convey the State’s proposed

sentence recommendation if Appellant pled guilty; and trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to object to certain questions asked during

his cross-examination. Although it takes many pages to work

through all these claims, we find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm.1

      1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the



      1  Wallace was shot on November 25, 2015, and died as a result of
complications from his gunshot wound on December 19, 2015. On July 6, 2016,
a Clayton County grand jury indicted Appellant and Ronney Jackson for malice
murder; three counts of felony murder; the underlying felonies of aggravated
assault, criminal damage to property in the first degree, and aggravated
battery; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Ronney
entered a negotiated guilty plea to the aggravated assault count in September
2016 and was sentenced to serve 20 years (two in confinement, three on
probation, and a suspended sentence of 15 years conditioned upon truthful
testimony against Appellant). Appellant was then tried from January 9 to 13,
2017. The jury found him not guilty of malice murder but guilty of all the other
counts. The trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole for felony murder based on aggravated assault plus five
years for the firearm offense. The other two felony murder counts were vacated
by operation of law, and the trial court purported to merge the remaining
counts; the State has not challenged the sentences. See State v. Dixon, 

 (

) (2017). On February 9, 2017, Appellant filed a motion
for new trial with new counsel. Over the next year, he filed numerous amended
and supplemental motions for new trial, and the trial court held evidentiary
hearings on February 6 and 21, 2018. On April 23, 2018, the trial court denied
the motion for new trial. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court,
and the case was docketed to the term beginning in December 2018 and
submitted for decision on the briefs.
evidence presented at Appellant’s trial showed the following.

Appellant and his cousin Ronney worked together at Brenntag Mid-

South, an industrial chemical distributor in East Point. Ronney had

a 15-year-old son who had a tense relationship with Wallace, the

victim. In early 2015, Ronney’s son and daughter lived with their

mother, Candice Lowery, and Wallace. Lowery and Wallace also had

a child together. In mid-2015, Wallace refused to let Ronney’s son

continue living in their home, and the son then moved in with

Ronney. On November 24, 2015, Ronney’s son and Wallace had an

altercation that involved “hand to hand combat.” Ronney and

Wallace exchanged verbal threats after the fight. On the morning of

November 25, while Appellant and Ronney were both at work,

Ronney’s son called Ronney and said that Wallace and four other

guys were at the car wash where the son was working.

     According to Ronney’s trial testimony and a statement he made

to the police after his arrest, he then asked Appellant to tell his

supervisor that he was taking an early lunch, but he and Appellant

did not clock out. Appellant drove Ronney in Appellant’s black
Mustang to the car wash to confront Wallace. As they arrived,

Ronney saw Wallace get into a gold Malibu and drive away. Ronney

told Appellant, “don’t worry about it, I’ll see him another time,” but

Appellant said, “[I] didn’t drive all the way out here for nothing.”

The two men then followed Wallace’s car for about two minutes until

Wallace parked in the driveway in front of his house.

     According to Ronney, Appellant parked his Mustang on the

street, blocking half of the driveway, and Ronney got out of the car.

Ronney walked up to the driver’s side door of Wallace’s car and

banged on the car doors and windows. Ronney also tried to open

Wallace’s car door, but it was locked. Wallace, who was unarmed,

started slowly backing his car out of the driveway while laughing.

Appellant, who was standing behind the parked Mustang, then

started shooting at Wallace. Wallace accelerated, backing over his

mailbox and into a neighbor’s yard across the street. Appellant took

a few steps toward Wallace’s car and continued shooting as Wallace

drove away. Appellant and Ronney then got into the Mustang, and

Appellant drove them in the opposite direction to return to
Brenntag.

      Through the open blinds on his roommate’s bedroom window,

Ashton Holman saw Wallace’s gold Malibu parked in the driveway

in front of Wallace’s house and a black Mustang parked near the

street end of the driveway. Holman saw two black men who were

outside the Malibu and one man sitting in the driver’s seat. The first

man outside the Malibu, a heavyset man wearing a white t-shirt and

blue jeans, attempted to pull the driver out of his open car door while

the second man stood next to the driver’s door of the Mustang. The

second man was slimmer and taller than the heavyset man. The

second man also “appeared to have dredlocks [sic] or cornrows, or it

might have been like a do-rag but he had something on his head,”

and he was wearing “some reflective pants and a dark shirt.”

Holman explained that the pants looked like mechanics overalls

with a reflective stripe down the side.2 When the Malibu began


      2 Brenntag required its employees to wear navy uniforms with bright

green reflective stripes. Ronney testified that on the day of the shooting, he
wore a grey hoodie and blue work pants with reflective stripes. Appellant
testified that he wore the same style of reflective pants and a navy jacket with
backing out of the driveway, the man standing near the Mustang

started shooting at the car, and he continued shooting while the

driver backed the Malibu over a mailbox and into another neighbor’s

yard. The shooter then stepped toward the Malibu and continued

shooting as the car moved forward, turned right onto a nearby

street, and drove away.3 The two men then got into the Mustang,

turned left on the same nearby street and drove away.4 Brenntag

was about a 20-minute drive from Wallace’s home. Records from a

thumbprint scanner at Brenntag showed that Appellant and Ronney

clocked out together for their lunch breaks at 11:52 a.m.

      One .40-caliber bullet had struck Wallace in the torso. He drove

about two miles before crashing his car into a light pole. Someone




reflective stripes that day. Two of Appellant’s co-workers testified that
Appellant, who is a black man, often wore a black do-rag with black strings
that hung down his neck.
       3 The police found three bullet casings in the yard next to the end of the

driveway, one in the street very close to the driveway, and one in the street
several feet from the driveway.
       4 Two people who heard the gunshots called 911, and the recordings of

those calls were played for the jury. One caller said that he saw two black men
who “had hoods on” speed off in a black Mustang. The other caller, a child,
described the shooter as a black man wearing a black jacket with “green on it
that said Nike,” but did not mention seeing anyone else.
nearby called 911 at 11:31 a.m., and police arrived at the scene of

the crash a few minutes later. An officer asked Wallace who shot

him, and Wallace said it was his “baby’s mother’s other baby daddy”

and spelled out the name “Q-U-A-N-Z-E-E Jackson.” (Ronney, whose

full name was Ronney LaQuanzee Jackson, was often referred to as

“Quanzee.”) Wallace was taken to a hospital, where he was put into

a medically induced coma from which he did not awaken. In the

ensuing weeks, Wallace underwent numerous surgeries, and doctors

had to amputate both of his legs above the knees. He died of

complications related to the gunshot wound on December 19, 2015.

     Soon after the shooting, Appellant began driving his

girlfriend’s car to work instead of his Mustang. According to Ronney,

he and Appellant talked about the shooting almost every day, and

Appellant always took responsibility for the shooting. At some point,

Charles Thompson, Appellant’s supervisor at Brenntag, overheard

Ronney tell Appellant, “I didn’t know that you was going to start

shooting,” and Appellant respond, “cuz, I’m not going to let you go

down for something I done.”
     Two weeks after the shooting, on December 9, the police

questioned Ronney; he claimed that he was not at the scene of the

shooting. On the morning of December 18, the police searched

Appellant’s residence. They found one live .40-caliber bullet inside a

plastic tub and several items of reflective clothing. During the

search, Appellant claimed that he did not own a gun or a black

Mustang. That same day, Appellant made a phone call to Ronney,

who put the call on speakerphone; the call was overheard by their

co-worker Donald Jaffee. Appellant told Ronney that “folks had just

left his house” and that Ronney needed to remove a box from the

boiler room at Brenntag; Jaffee testified that he understood “folks”

to mean the police. Appellant also called his supervisor Thompson

to ask if he would be “willing to remove a weapon,” but Thompson

refused. That afternoon, Appellant went to the police station and

admitted that he owned a black Mustang; he claimed that a

mechanic had been looking at it during the search, but he refused to

provide the mechanic’s name. When the police arrested Ronney the

next day, he told them that he was at the crime scene but Appellant
was the shooter.

     On December 21, Jaffee reported the telephone conversation he

had overheard to Arthur Welch, his supervisor. Jaffee and Welch

then went to the boiler room and found a box that contained a .40-

caliber Ruger handgun and .40-caliber bullets. Ballistics testing

showed that this gun fired the bullet found in Wallace’s body. The

box had on it three fingerprints from Jaffee and one fingerprint each

from Appellant, Welch, and the police officer who opened it.

Appellant admitted that the gun was his.

     At trial, Appellant testified as follows. He did not go with

Ronney to confront Wallace and was not at Wallace’s house at the

time of the shooting. Although Appellant, who took pride in his

Mustang, had never let Ronney or anyone else at Brenntag drive the

car before, on the day of the shooting, he let Ronney borrow it to

confront Wallace. Appellant was persuaded to do so because Ronney

said his own car was almost out of gas, and he wanted to take a car

that Wallace would not recognize. Appellant kept his .40-caliber

Ruger in the Mustang’s glove compartment. Before Ronney left that
morning, Appellant briefly got into the Mustang with Ronney to

ensure that Ronney could drive a stick-shift, but he got out at

Brenntag’s back entrance before Ronney drove away.5 Appellant

knew when Ronney returned to work because he heard the

Mustang’s distinctive sound; Appellant then met Ronney in front of

Brenntag and they clocked out for lunch together.

     According to Appellant, several days later, Ronney called and

told Appellant that he had shot Wallace. Appellant later saw Ronney

remove the gun from the Mustang, wipe it down, and put it in a box,

but Appellant did not know what Ronney did with the gun after that.

Appellant handled many boxes during his work at Brenntag like the

one bearing his fingerprint that contained the gun. At some point

after Ronney removed the gun from the Mustang, Appellant called

Jaffee’s phone to speak with Ronney. Jaffee put the call on

speakerphone, and Appellant told Ronney to get rid of the gun,


     5 Appellant and Ronney both testified that another co-worker tried to get

in the car to accompany Ronney on the morning of the shooting. Ronney was
not asked who that was; Appellant identified the co-worker as Jaffee and
claimed that he saw Jaffee drive out of Brenntag’s parking lot in another car
soon after Ronney left.
which Appellant believed Ronney had hidden somewhere at

Brenntag. During this conversation, Jaffee offered to melt the gun

with a welding torch. Appellant denied making the incriminating

statement to Ronney that his supervisor Thompson overheard,

although he could offer no reason why Thompson would lie about

that, other than vague speculation that Thompson thought

Appellant played some role in getting him demoted.

    Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial and

summarized above was legally insufficient to support his

convictions. When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdicts, however, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to

find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder

and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (

, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979). The jury was entitled to disbelieve Appellant’s account of the

events leading to Wallace’s fatal shooting and to rely instead on,

among other things, Ronney’s testimony, the presence of Appellant’s

car and gun at the scene of the shooting along with a man matching
his description, and his incriminating statements and actions after

the shooting. See McKinney v. State, 

 (

) (2017). See also Vega v. State, 

 (

)

(2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the

witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the

evidence.’” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the

State to present evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) that he shot at

someone else a decade before the shooting in this case. Under OCGA

§ 24-4-404 (b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not

be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show

action in conformity therewith,” but such evidence may be

admissible for other purposes, including to prove intent. We hold

that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 2005

shooting evidence, but we also conclude that this error was harmless

in light of the other evidence of Appellant’s guilt.

     (a) Before trial, the State proffered police reports that showed

the following. In January 2005, Appellant saw Jeffrey Swans leave
the apartment of Appellant’s ex-girlfriend Chandre Sorrells, and

Appellant then confronted Sorrells inside her apartment. Swans

returned to the apartment when he saw Appellant go inside, and the

two men argued. Swans then left the apartment, and Appellant

followed him outside. After Swans got into his truck, Appellant shot

at him as he drove away. Swans was not hit, although one bullet hit

his rear fender and another hit his back tire. Appellant pled guilty

to aggravated assault under the First Offender Act and received a

10-year probated sentence, which he completed before the shooting

in this case.

     At a hearing to determine the admissibility of the 2005

shooting evidence, the State argued:

           [The 2005 incident] involves the exact same intent
     to assault somebody that is leaving a crime scene in a
     vehicle, firing at a vehicle. This also happened at a
     location that was not [Appellant’s] residence. And, he
     again transported a handgun — firearm to an area away
     from his residence where he used that handgun to fire at
     this man, Jeffrey Swans. The nature of the domestic
     dispute is a little bit different in that situation because it
     was more of a jealousy thing. . . . And, that intent being
     to commit an aggravated assault by firing a weapon at an
     occupied vehicle. In both incidents, occupied by men who
     were unarmed and posed no threat whatsoever to
     [Appellant] and his willingness to assault individuals in
     that type of situation.

     Over Appellant’s objection, the trial court admitted evidence of

the 2005 shooting solely for the purpose of proving Appellant’s intent

to commit the shooting in this case. The court ruled, however, that

no one should refer to Appellant’s “conviction” related to the

shooting, because he received first-offender treatment so there was

no conviction. Before the State called witnesses to testify about the

2005 shooting, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction,

explaining that the evidence about to be presented was to be

considered only “for a limited purpose.” The court neglected to

inform the jury what that purpose was, although the court told the

jury that it would give more instructions later.6 Swans then testified

about the 2005 incident, giving an account consistent with the



     6 The court’s instruction was, in full:



           Sometimes evidence is admitted for a limited purpose. Such
     evidence may be considered by you, the jury, for the sole purpose
     for which the evidence is limited and cannot be used for any other
     purpose. The Court will give you additional instructions in this
     regard in the Charge of the Court prior to your deliberations.
State’s proffer, and Appellant stipulated to a responding officer’s

written testimony, which was read to the jury, about finding two

bullet casings in the parking lot.

     When Appellant testified later in the trial, his counsel did not

ask him about the 2005 shooting. On cross-examination, the

prosecutor began his questions about the 2005 shooting by saying,

“And I suppose it’s just a coincidence that ten years earlier . . .

Jeffrey Swans accused you of shooting into the vehicle while he was

fleeing in a vehicle,” to which Appellant responded, “Can you let me

explain that situation, too?” Appellant said that he shot at Swans

because he “was in love and made a bad decision,” and he thought

he saw Swans reaching for a weapon. The prosecutor asked

Appellant to “demonstrate . . . how you pulled your gun out of your

pocket and shot [at Swans],” and Appellant complied. The

prosecutor then asked where Appellant was standing with the gun,

and Appellant described the positions of the cars and demonstrated

his position behind Swans’s truck. The prosecutor continued to ask

Appellant questions about the 2005 shooting, including asking again
whether it was a “coincidence” that Appellant shot at a retreating

vehicle before and was now charged with killing someone by

shooting at a retreating vehicle, and whether Appellant was mad at

Wallace and “just lost his temper like [he] did back in 2005 with

Jeffrey Swans.”

     As part of the jury charge given before deliberations began, the

trial court instructed the jury on the admission of other-act evidence

for a limited purpose, this time explaining that the limited purpose

was to show Appellant’s intent with regard to the crimes alleged in

this case.7 Closing arguments were not transcribed.


     7 The trial court gave the following instruction:

             Sometimes evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, ladies
     and gentlemen. Such evidence may be considered by the jury — by
     you, the jury, for the sole purpose for which the evidence is limited
     and not for any other purpose. In order to prove its case, the State
     must show intent. To do so, the State has offered evidence of
     another act allegedly committed by the accused. You are permitted
     to consider that evidence only insofar as it may relate to the State
     meeting its burden to show intent in this case and not for any other
     purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that the defendant
     is of a character that would commit such crimes. The evidence may
     be considered only to the extent that it may show the element of
     intent that the State is required to prove in the crimes charged in
     the case now on trial. Such evidence, if any, may not be considered
     by you for any other purpose. The defendant is on trial for the
     offenses charged in this Bill of Indictment only and not for any
     (b) We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence under

OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) for clear abuse of discretion. See Kirby v. State,

 (

) (2018). Evidence of an act extrinsic

to the charged crimes is admissible if

     (1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other
     than the defendant’s character; (2) the probative value of
     the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its undue
     prejudice; and (3) there is sufficient proof for a jury to find
     by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
     committed the other act.

. Appellant does not dispute that the State satisfied the

third part of this test, so we will address only the first and second

parts.

     (i) Whether the evidence offered is relevant to an issue in the



     other acts. Before you may consider any other alleged acts for the
     limited purpose stated, you must first determine whether the
     accused committed the other alleged acts. If so, you must then
     determine whether the act sheds any light on the elements of the
     offense for which the act was committed and the crimes — excuse
     me, the act was admitted in the crimes charged in the indictment
     in this trial. Remember to keep in mind the limited use and the
     prohibited use of this evidence about other acts of the defendant.
     By giving this instruction, ladies and gentlemen, the court in no
     way suggests to you that the defendant has or has not committed
     any other acts, nor whether such acts, if committed[,] prove
     anything. This is solely a matter for your determination.
case other than the defendant’s character is governed in large part

by OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as evidence

that “ha[s] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence.” Appellant put his

intent at issue by pleading not guilty, and he did not take any

affirmative steps to relieve the State of its burden to prove intent.

See Olds v. State, 

 (

) (2016). Because

the 2005 shooting and the aggravated assault (and resulting felony

murder) charged in this case involved an assault with a deadly

weapon, the 2005 shooting evidence was relevant to show intent. See

Olds, 

 (“[E]vidence that an accused committed an

intentional act generally is relevant to show . . . that the same

defendant committed a similar act with the same sort of intent[.]”).

See also Parks v. State, 

 (

) (2016).8


     8 Because the State offered the evidence of the 2005 shooting and defends

it on appeal only as showing Appellant’s intent in committing an aggravated
assault by shooting at Wallace, we do not consider whether the evidence was
relevant or probative to proving any of the other crimes with which Appellant
was charged.
     (ii) The second part of the admissibility test under OCGA § 24-

4-404 (b) invokes OCGA § 24-4-403, which says:

          Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
     value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
     prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury
     or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
     needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

The major function of OCGA § 24-4-403 is to “exclud[e] matter of

scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by its heels for the

sake of its prejudicial effect,” and exclusion of evidence under the

statute is “an extraordinary remedy which should be used only

sparingly.” Hood v. State, 

 (

) (2016)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

     Factors to be considered in determining the probative value of

other act evidence offered to prove intent include its overall

similarity to the charged crime, its temporal remoteness, and the

prosecutorial need for it. See Kirby, 

. As to similarity,

the State addressed that factor at a general level, pointing out that

both the 2005 shooting and the 2015 shooting at issue in this case

involved Appellant’s firing a handgun toward a car while it was
being driven away by a man who posed no immediate threat.

     A more careful and granular comparison of the two incidents,

however,   reveals   substantial   differences   between    them   —

differences that the State failed to acknowledge. See Brooks v. State,

, 725-726 & n.10 (

) (2016) (explaining that

a “major difference” between Georgia’s new Evidence Code and our

old “similar transaction” case law is the need under OCGA § 24-4-

404 (b) to consider the dissimilarities as well as the similarities

between the extrinsic act and the charged act). In the 2005 shooting,

the victim was a man who apparently was involved with Appellant’s

ex-girlfriend, and Appellant first argued with the man inside the ex-

girlfriend’s apartment before following him outside and shooting

toward his truck as he drove away. By contrast, the victim here was

a man who had a conflict with Appellant’s cousin Ronney and

Ronney’s son; Appellant appears to have had no dispute with the

victim before the shooting. And rather than occurring at a single

location and acting alone as in 2005, in this case Appellant acted

alongside Ronney and drove to two locations for Ronney to confront
the victim. These significant differences diminished the probative

value of the 2005 incident.

     The probative value was also diminished by the temporal

remoteness of the prior shooting, which took place a decade before

the crimes charged here, with Appellant not incarcerated during any

of the intervening years. See United States v. Pollock, 926 F2d 1044,

1047-1048 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the trial court has

“broad discretion in determining if an extrinsic offense is too remote

to be probative,” but citing two cases holding that ten-year-old acts

should have been excluded (citation and punctuation omitted)). Cf.

Kirby, 

 (explaining that an 11-year gap between the

prior and charged acts was not so remote “as to be lacking in

evidentiary value,” at least where the appellant was incarcerated for

much of the intervening period (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     Most telling, however, is the lack of any real prosecutorial need

for the 2005 shooting evidence. All of the evidence at trial indicated

that the person who repeatedly fired a gun toward Wallace had the

requisite general intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon.
See Booth v. State, 

 (

) (2017)

(explaining that assault with the “aggravating factor of use of a

deadly weapon is a general intent crime”).9 Neither party ever

contended that the shooting was unintentional. Thus, the

prosecutorial need for this evidence was negligible as to the only

purpose for which it was offered and admitted.10 See Jones v. State,

 (

) (2017) (“Logically, if the State’s



      9  The jury was instructed that it could find Appellant guilty of the
charged aggravated assault if, using a deadly weapon, he “attempted to cause
a violent injury” to Wallace or if he “intentionally committed an act that placed
[Wallace] in reasonable fear of immediately receiving a violent injury.”
       10 Appellant did dispute that he was the other man with Ronney at the

crime scene — the shooter. But that was an issue of identity, not intent, and
evidence of the 2005 shooting was not admitted for that purpose and likely
could not have been, because the degree of similarity required for extrinsic
evidence to show identity is much greater than that required to show intent.
See Brooks, 

 (“‘[E]vidence offered to prove identity must satisfy
a particularly stringent analysis. When extrinsic offense evidence is introduced
to prove identity, the likeness of the offenses is the crucial consideration. The
physical similarity must be such that it marks the offenses as the handiwork
of the accused.’” (citation omitted)). There was also a genuine question as to
motive — why Appellant would have shot Wallace, with whom Appellant
apparently had no personal dispute. But again, evidence of the 2005 shooting
was not admitted to show motive and likely could not have been, because
Appellant’s commission of a similar type of crime that shared the “all-toocommon elements” of guns and cars is generally “not enough to show motive
for the murder[ ] at issue.” Thompson v. State, 

 (

)
(2017). In any event, the jury was instructed that it could consider the 2005
shooting only for intent. See 

threshold to prove intent as an element of a crime is relatively low,

as it likely is when the charged crime is one of general intent, then

the probative value of the extrinsic act evidence would necessarily

be minimal.”); United States v. San Martin, 505 F2d 918, 923 (5th

Cir. 1974) (“[P]rior crimes involving deliberate and carefully

premeditated intent — such as fraud and forgery — are far more

likely to have probative value with respect to later acts than prior

crimes involving a quickly and spontaneously formed intent — such

as assault . . . .”).11

      Considering all of the circumstances, the probative value of the

2005 shooting evidence to prove Appellant’s intent was minimal at




      11 Compare Kirby, 

 (holding that a prior aggravated
assault had minimal probative value as to intent because there was little if any
need for extrinsic evidence to show that the victim, who had been stabbed
multiple times, had been stabbed intentionally), and Parks, 

(holding that a prior aggravated assault had no real probative value where the
defendant admitted shooting the victim but claimed self-defense), with Kirby,

 (explaining that the prosecutorial need to introduce a prior
rape-related incident to show the defendant’s intent was high because there
was little other evidence supporting the charge of aggravated assault with
intent to rape), and Castillo-Velasquez v. State, 

 (__ SE2d __)
(2019) (explaining that the prosecutorial need for other act evidence of intent
was high because the defendant claimed that his delusions negated his
criminal intent).
best. On the other side of the OCGA § 24-4-403 balance, it is

undoubtedly prejudicial to be labeled a short-tempered shooter in a

murder case based on an unprovoked shooting. And the prosecutor

enhanced the prejudice by extensively questioning Appellant about

the 2005 incident. Indeed, the State’s questioning seemed designed

to use the evidence for reasons it was not admitted to be used — to

establish Appellant as someone with a violent character who was

with Ronney and who shot at Wallace simply because he has a bad

temper and shoots at people in cars, which could not be “just a

coincidence.” In addition, no evidence was presented that Appellant

had been prosecuted, admitted his guilt, and served a ten-year term

of probation for the 2005 shooting. That increased the risk that the

jury would want to punish Appellant for his past conduct rather

than only for the charged crimes. See Kirby, 

.

     In sum, the unfair prejudice from the other act evidence clearly

and substantially outweighed its minimal probative value, and the

trial court therefore abused its discretion by admitting the evidence.
See Kirby, 

; Parks, 

.12

      (c) Although the evidence of the 2005 shooting should not have

been admitted, that error was harmless in light of the array of other

strong evidence demonstrating Appellant’s guilt. The error was

evidentiary and not of constitutional dimensions, and “[t]he test for

determining nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly

probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Kirby, 

 (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 24-

1-103 (a) (“Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits

or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is

affected[.]”). “‘In determining whether the error was harmless, we



      12 Given our finding of error under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) in this and other

recent cases, it is worth emphasizing that our holding in Jones that other act
evidence may be relevant to proving the general intent element of a charged
crime, see 297 Ga. at 160-161, when applied to the many violent crimes that
require only general intent, should not be viewed by prosecutors or trial courts
as an open invitation to admit evidence of marginally similar violent acts that
involve the same general intent. Because general intent is not meaningfully
disputed in many cases, while evidence that the defendant committed other
violent acts is often quite prejudicial, trial courts should be especially careful
in conducting the OCGA § 24-4-403 balancing in this context. Prosecutors and
courts should also be wary of the temptation to use evidence that was admitted
solely to show intent for other purposes, such as to argue identity or motive.
As discussed in footnote 10 above, admitting evidence for those purposes
requires different considerations than admitting evidence to show intent.
review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect

reasonable jurors to have done so.’” Kirby, 

 (citation

omitted).

     Although Appellant asserts in his brief that the evidence of the

2005 shooting was harmful because the “State made much of” this

evidence at trial, he refers only to the testimony about the incident

that the State elicited. Closing arguments were not transcribed, but

Appellant does not contend that the prosecutor emphasized (or even

mentioned) the improperly admitted evidence in his closing

argument. Compare Thompson, 302 Ga. at 542 (holding that an

error in admitting evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) was harmful

in part because the State emphasized the evidence in closing

argument). The prosecutor did not need to rely on the 2005 shooting

in his closing argument, because there was solid direct evidence that

Appellant shot Wallace: Ronney’s detailed testimony and prior

consistent statement to the police, as well as the essentially

unimpeached testimony of Appellant’s supervisor Thompson, who

overheard Ronney tell Appellant, “I didn’t know that you were going
to start shooting,” and Appellant reply, “cuz, I’m not going to let you

go down for something I done.”

     In addition, there was compelling circumstantial evidence of

Appellant’s involvement in the shooting. Appellant conceded that

his Mustang and his .40-caliber Ruger were used in the shooting,

and his testimony seeking to separate himself from his car and gun

at the time of the shooting was strained at best. Appellant also

admitted that he stopped driving the Mustang to work shortly after

the shooting, initially lied to the police about the car, and helped

hide the gun after the shooting, including telling Ronney and his

supervisor to move the gun after the police searched his house.

     Moreover, Holman and a 911 caller said that they saw two men

besides the victim at the crime scene. Holman’s description of the

shooter as a black man with “something [like a do-rag] on his head”

matched the testimony of Appellant’s co-workers that Appellant

often wore a black do-rag, and Holman’s description of the shooter’s

clothes matched the uniform that Appellant admitted he was

wearing on the day of the shooting. Appellant also admitted that he
was in his Mustang with Ronney shortly before the shooting and met

up with Ronney immediately after the shooting, and there was no

substantial evidence that anyone other than Appellant was with

Ronney during the intervening minutes.

     We recognize that Wallace told a responding officer that

Ronney shot him, but according to Holman (and consistent with

Ronney’s account), the shooter was positioned by the Mustang at the

end of the driveway, behind Wallace’s car, so Wallace may never

have seen Appellant and thus — reasonably but incorrectly — may

have assumed that the man who was arguing with him immediately

before the shooting was the shooter. We also recognize that the child

who called 911 described the shooter as a black man wearing a black

jacket with “green on it that said Nike,” but jurors could reasonably

construe that testimony as referring to a green reflective stripe on

Appellant’s navy jacket.

    In sum, given the overall strength of the other evidence of

Appellant’s guilt, we conclude that it is highly probable that the

erroneously admitted evidence of the 2005 shooting did not
contribute to the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., Kirby, 

;

Manning v. State, 

 (

) (2018); Parks,

.

     3. In a related enumeration, Appellant contends that the jury

was not properly instructed on how to consider the evidence of the

2005 shooting. Appellant asserts first that the jury was never told

that it could consider the evidence only to prove intent. As discussed

above, the trial court’s initial limiting instruction, given just before

the jury heard the evidence about the 2005 shooting, was obviously

incomplete; it told the jurors that their consideration of the evidence

was limited to a sole — but unidentified — purpose.

     At the end of that instruction, however, the jury was told that

it would receive additional instructions on the matter before

beginning deliberations, and, as promised, the jury was instructed

in detail in the final charge that it could consider the evidence only

with regard to the issue of intent. Appellant seems simply to have

overlooked this additional instruction in making his argument.

Although it certainly would have been preferable for the trial court
to identify the limited purpose of the evidence in the initial

instruction, “‘[w]hen considering whether error exists in the

instructions to the jury, this Court considers the instructions as a

whole.’” Manning, 

 (citation omitted). So viewed,

Appellant’s argument fails.

     Appellant also argues that the trial court should have

instructed the jury that, before considering the other act evidence to

prove intent, the jury must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellant committed the acts alleged in the indictment. Appellant

did not request such an instruction at trial, so we review this claim

only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) (“Failure to object [to

the failure to charge the jury] shall preclude appellate review of such

portion of the jury charge, unless such portion of the jury charge

constitutes plain error which affects substantial rights of the

parties. . . .”). “An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling

authority on point.” State v. Herrera-Bustamante, 

(

) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Appellant

cites two federal cases in support of his argument. In both of those
cases, the court approved in a footnote an instruction along the lines

of the one he now claims was necessary, but in neither case did the

court say (much less hold) that this specific instruction was required.

See United States v. Arbane, 

, 1226 n.4 (11th Cir.

2006); United States v. Beechum, 582 F2d 898, 917 n.23 (5th Cir.

1978). Nor have we found any controlling precedent that so holds.

Accordingly, although an instruction of this sort would not be an

incorrect statement of law — and might even be helpful in clarifying

the limited use of extrinsic evidence of intent — current Georgia law

does not require that such an instruction be given, so Appellant has

failed to show plain error. See Herrera-Bustamante, 

.

    4. Appellant contends that the trial court should have

instructed the jury that accomplice testimony must be corroborated,

pursuant to OCGA § 24-14-8, which says:

     The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to
     establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including . . .
     felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the
     testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient.
     Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense
     with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness,
     except in prosecutions for treason.
Because Appellant’s counsel did not request an accomplice

corroboration instruction at trial, Appellant raises the claim as plain

error and ineffective assistance of counsel.

     (a) We use a four-part test to evaluate a claim of plain error:

           First, there must be an error or defect — some sort
     of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been
     intentionally     relinquished   or    abandoned,     i.e.,
     affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
     error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
     reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
     the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
     case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the
     outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Fourth and
     finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
     appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error –
     discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
     seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public
     reputation of judicial proceedings.

Hawkins v. State, 

 (

) (2018) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

     There was clearly evidence that Ronney was Appellant’s

accomplice; indeed, Ronney was indicted as a party to the crimes,

and he acknowledged to the jury that he had pled guilty to the

aggravated assault of Wallace. Thus, the trial court’s failure to give
an accomplice-corroboration instruction was a clear and obvious

error, see Hawkins, 

, and Appellant did not

affirmatively waive the error.

     But even a clear error is plain error only if it likely affected the

outcome of the proceedings. See Hawkins, 

. Unlike in

cases where we have found the absence of an accomplice-

corroboration instruction to be plain error, see, e.g., State v.

Johnson, 

 (

) (2019); Stanbury v. State,

 (

) (2016), in this case the trial court

did not instruct the jury that the testimony of a single witness is

generally sufficient to establish a fact, thereby inviting the jury to

convict solely on the basis of the accomplice’s testimony.

     Moreover, the trial court correctly charged the jury on related

legal principles. See, e.g., Raines v. State, 

 (

) (2018) (discussing similar instructions in this context).

The jury was advised that the State had the burden of proving every

material allegation beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant

was presumed innocent until proven guilty. The jury was also
instructed that a witness may by impeached by disproving the facts

to which the witness testified and that the jury must determine the

credibility of witnesses and in doing so may consider factors

including the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their means and

opportunity of knowing the facts about which they testified, the

nature of the facts about which they testified, the probability or

improbability of their testimony, their interest or lack of interest in

the outcome of the case, and their personal credibility. Thus, the jury

was advised by the court of circumstances that could undermine

Ronney’s credibility, and among other things the jury heard Ronney

admit that he first told the police a story inconsistent with his trial

testimony, that he had been indicted along with Appellant, and that

he pled guilty to a single charge with a much lighter sentence.

     Where the jury instructions were merely incomplete rather

than overtly incorrect, we have not found plain error when there was

substantial evidence corroborating the accomplice’s testimony. As

discussed in Divisions 1 and 2 (c) above, that is certainly the

situation in this case, as there was ample evidence corroborating
Ronney’s testimony that Appellant went with him to confront

Wallace and ultimately shot Wallace. The absence of an accomplice-

corroboration instruction therefore was not plain error. See, e.g.,

Raines, 

; Robinson v. State, 

 (

) (2018); Hawkins, 

.

     (b) Appellant also argues that his trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective in failing to request an accomplice-

corroboration instruction. “To prevail on this claim, [A]ppellant

must show both that his counsel performed deficiently and that, but

for the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome

of his trial would have been more favorable.” Hampton v. State, 

 (

) (2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington,

 (

, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). We need

not review both parts of this test if Appellant fails to prove one of

them. See id. at 171.

     “[T]his Court has equated the prejudice step of the plain error

standard with the prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim.” Hampton, 

. Thus, even if we
assume that trial counsel performed deficiently in not requesting an

accomplice-corroboration instruction,13 Appellant has not shown

prejudice for the reasons explained in the previous subdivision.

      5. Appellant raises three more claims related to jury

instructions that he contends should have been given but were not

— instructions on party to a crime, obstruction and accessory after

the fact, and good character. Again, none of these instructions were

requested at trial, so Appellant raises the claims as plain error and

ineffective assistance of counsel.

      (a) Party to a Crime. The indictment, which charged Appellant

and Ronney “individually and as parties concerned in the




      13  But cf. Manner, 302 Ga. at 884 (explaining that trial counsel
reasonably withdrew her request for an accomplice-corroboration instruction
because she was concerned that the instruction would suggest that the person
she was trying to paint as the shooter was an accomplice to the appellant); Huff
v. State, 

 (

) (2017) (explaining that trial counsel
reasonably chose not to request an accomplice-corroboration charge because
the defense strategy was focused on showing that there was no connection
between the appellant and the alleged accomplice). Compare Fisher v. State,

 (

) (2016) (holding that not requesting an
accomplice-corroboration instruction was an unreasonable strategy in light of
the trial court’s decision to give a single witness instruction and the defense
theory that the accomplice was trying to shift blame from himself and should
not be believed).
commission of a crime” for each offense alleged, was read to the jury

at the outset of the trial and again before deliberations. In light of

the indictment and the substantial evidence that Appellant and

Ronney acted together at least to some extent, the jury probably

should have been charged on what it means for a defendant to be a

“party” in the commission of a crime. But Appellant has not shown

that the omission of this instruction likely affected the outcome of

the trial.

     OCGA § 16-2-20 explains that a person can be convicted of a

crime not only if he “[d]irectly commits the crime,” but also if he

“[i]ntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime” or

“[i]ntentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures

another to commit the crime.” Id. (b) (1), (3), (4). Moreover, the jury

may infer the shared criminal intent necessary to prove that the

defendant was a party to a crime from his “presence, companionship,

and conduct” with another perpetrator “before, during, and after the

crime.” Coley v. State, 

 (__ SE2d __) (2019) (citation

and punctuation omitted). In this way, an instruction on party to a
crime would have explained to the jury more theories that it could

use to find Appellant guilty.

     Although the jurors were told that Appellant and Ronney were

indicted “individually and as parties,” in the absence of an

instruction describing the expansiveness of party-to-a-crime

culpability, and given the strong evidence that Appellant — not

Ronney or anyone else — fired the shots at Wallace, the jury likely

found Appellant guilty because it concluded that he shot Wallace.

Appellant has not shown that the jury likely would have reached a

different verdict if it had been instructed that it could also find him

guilty if, for example, he merely intentionally aided or encouraged

Ronney in the shooting. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim of plain error

based on the omission of this jury instruction fails, as does his

related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, see Hampton, 

.

     (b) Obstruction and Accessory After the Fact. Appellant was not

indicted for accessory after the fact or any other obstruction of

justice offense, but he now contends that evidence that he conspired
to hide the murder weapon tended to prove that he was an accessory

after the fact. Appellant argues that in the absence of an instruction

explaining that acting after a crime to help cover it up may

constitute a separate crime, the jury may have convicted him of

murder based on those post-shooting actions alone.

     “The crime of being an accessory after the fact is not included

within a charge for murder,” however, “but is a separate offense in

the nature of obstruction of justice.” Huckabee v. State, 

 (

) (2010). Because Appellant was not charged with

accessory after the fact or any other obstruction offense, the trial

court did not err (much less plainly err) by omitting an instruction

about such an offense. See 

 (“Since appellant was not charged with

being an accessory after the fact, the trial court did not err when it

refused to give a charge on accessory after the fact.”). See also Nalls

v. State, 

 (

) (2018) (“[I]t is error to

instruct on the crime of accessory after the fact merely on the

[incorrect] premise that it is a lesser included offense of a murder

charged in the indictment.”). And because a jury instruction on
accessory after the fact was not warranted, “trial counsel cannot be

found ineffective for failing to request it.” Vergara v. State, 

 (

) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (c) Good Character. Appellant asserts that he introduced

evidence of his good character at trial, vaguely referring to several

pages in the transcript where Appellant described his general job

duties and testified that he had worked at Brenntag for over eight

years before the incident, had been promoted, and took care of his

stepdaughter. Appellant also argues that the State put his good

character at issue when the prosecutor asked witnesses who worked

at Brenntag whether they “liked” Appellant or had any “issues” with

him, to which each witness responded that they either liked him or

had no issues with him. Based on this evidence, he argues, the jury

should have been instructed that evidence of his good character

alone could provide reasonable doubt. See State v. Hobbs, 

 (

) (2010) (“‘Good character is a substantive

fact at trial, and can by itself create reasonable doubt as to a

defendant’s guilt and lead to an acquittal.’” (citation omitted)).
     We need not decide whether it was clear legal error for the trial

court not to give such an instruction (although we doubt it), or

whether Appellant’s trial counsel was deficient in not requesting the

instruction (although we again doubt it), because we have no doubt

that a good character instruction would not have changed the

outcome of Appellant’s trial. Even assuming that the testimony to

which Appellant points can be characterized as admissible evidence

of his good character, it was so scant and nebulous that it would not

likely have made any difference in the jury’s verdict had the jury

been told that such evidence alone could create reasonable doubt.

See Walker v. State, 

 (

) (2017).

Accordingly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate plain error or

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hampton, 

.

     6. Appellant raises four claims related to Ronney’s arrest for

murder in 1997. None of them have merit.

     (a)   During   Appellant’s   trial,   after   the   State’s   direct

examination of Ronney, the prosecutor informed the court that

Ronney had been arrested in 1997 for murder, but the charge was
ultimately dismissed; the State moved in limine to prevent

Appellant from questioning Ronney about the dismissed charge

during cross-examination. Appellant’s counsel responded that the

charge had not been dismissed, asserting that Ronney had simply

not been indicted. No evidence was proffered to the court on this

point. The court expressed its displeasure at the lateness of the

State’s motion, but indicated that it was leaning toward ruling that

the arrest could not be used. The court did not make a definite

ruling, however, and granted the defense’s request to recess until

the next day to allow time to research the issue.

     The next morning, Appellant’s counsel conceded that his

research led him to conclude that because Ronney was never

indicted for the 1997 murder, the defense could not use the arrest

for impeachment unless Ronney opened the door. Given that

concession, the trial court did not rule on the issue. Appellant’s

counsel then cross-examined Ronney at length, including about a

different arrest and jail stay for domestic violence and a prior

marijuana charge, but did not bring up the 1997 murder charge.
     During the motion for new trial hearing, Appellant offered into

evidence the statement Ronney gave to the police a few days after

being arrested for murder in 1997, in which Ronney identified the

shooter as a man called “Black.” Ronney testified during the hearing

that the charge against him was dismissed a few days after his

arrest and that he never testified against anyone in connection with

the 1997 incident. Appellant’s trial counsel testified at the hearing

that, in hindsight, showing that Ronney had previously “cut a deal”

and testified in a murder case might have helped undermine

Ronney’s credibility, but counsel offered no evidence — at either the

trial or the motion for new trial hearing — to support his apparent

belief either that Ronney had negotiated a deal or that Ronney

testified in connection with the 1997 arrest.

     (b) Appellant presents multiple theories under which he claims

the trial court should have admitted evidence of Ronney’s 1997

arrest. Because Appellant’s trial counsel did not assert any of these

theories at trial, Appellant suggests that the admissibility of this

evidence should be reviewed for plain error.
     To begin with, the trial court never actually ruled on the

admissibility or inadmissibility of Ronney’s 1997 arrest, because

after doing his own research, Appellant’s trial counsel announced

that he would not bring up the arrest, and he never did. But even if

the trial court had ruled that Appellant could not ask Ronney about

his 1997 arrest, Appellant’s claim of plain error would fail. Appellant

argues that showing that Ronney had testified against someone and

escaped a murder charge once before would have shown that he was

employing the same tactic in this case. The problem with that

argument is that its premise is unsupported: there was at trial and

remains today no evidence in the record that Ronney actually

testified against anyone with regard to the 1997 murder. And we are

not convinced that the jury’s decision likely would have been affected

if the jury had heard that many years earlier Ronney was arrested

for murder but then promptly released with the charge dismissed —

suggesting that the arrest was inappropriate — particularly because

Appellant was allowed to elicit that Ronney had been arrested and

jailed for a violent crime and also charged with a drug crime. Thus,
even assuming plain error review is available, Appellant has failed

to establish plain error. See Anthony v. State, 

(

) (2018).

     (c) Appellant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

in not questioning Ronney about the 1997 arrest. This claim fails for

the same reason just discussed: Appellant has failed to prove that

the minimal impeachment value of evidence that almost two

decades earlier Ronney was arrested but released within days

without being indicted or testifying against anyone would have cast

enough doubt on his testimony to create a reasonable probability

that the result of Appellant’s trial would have been different. See

Anthony, 303 Ga. at 408 n.13.

     (d) Appellant contends that the State committed a due process

violation under Brady v. Maryland, 

 (

, 10

LE2d 215) (1963), by providing the information about Ronney’s 1997

arrest to the defense during trial rather than before trial. However,

OCGA § 35-3-34 (a) (2) makes the criminal history records of

witnesses in a criminal case available to the defendant upon written
request, and we have accordingly held many times that Brady does

not “require the prosecution to turn over to the defense criminal

records of state’s witnesses.” Ballard v. State, 

 (

) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted).

     (e) Finally, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to raise the Brady claim. Because, as we just

explained, the Brady claim is meritless, this enumeration also fails.

See Blaine v. State, 

 (

) (2019) (“[T]rial

counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims that would

not have succeeded nor made any difference in the outcome of [the

appellant’s] case.”).

     7. Appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to timely convey to him that the State said it would

recommend a sentence of life with the possibility of parole if he pled

guilty. We disagree.

     At the beginning of the first day of trial, the court asked the

prosecutor what the State’s sentence recommendation was. The

prosecutor replied that the recommendation was life with the
possibility of parole for a guilty plea, but there was no

recommendation if Appellant was convicted at trial. The court asked

whether Appellant’s counsel had conveyed that recommendation to

Appellant, and counsel said that he had not. The court granted a 15-

minute recess to allow counsel to discuss the recommendation with

Appellant. There was no further discussion of the issue after the

recess or during the remainder of the trial.

     At the motion for new trial hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel

testified that when he discussed possible guilty pleas with

Appellant, Appellant made it “crystal clear” that “he wasn’t taking

anything.” Trial counsel added that he and Appellant discussed

pleading guilty to receive the State’s recommended sentence

numerous times during trial, but Appellant indicated that he would

not plead guilty even if the State agreed to reduce the charges to

manslaughter. Appellant did not testify at the hearing.

     Appellant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in not

conveying the State’s plea offer to him in advance of trial. For

Appellant to show prejudice from his counsel’s not conveying a plea
offer, however, he must show, among other things, “a reasonable

probability that [he] would have accepted the earlier plea offer.”

Missouri v. Frye, 

 (

, 182 LE2d 379)

(2012). Appellant has not presented any evidence that he was

inclined to plead guilty at any point. This enumeration is meritless.

See Brown v. State, 

 (

) (2012).

     8. Finally, Appellant claims that his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to object to certain questions posed by the State

during its cross-examination of him. “However, [Appellant] did not

raise this ineffective assistance claim when [he] was represented by

new counsel in [his] motion for new trial and the trial court did not

rule on it, so the claim was not preserved for review on appeal.”

Gomez v. State, 

 (

) (2017).

     9. As recounted above, Appellant has raised numerous claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although we have evaluated

each claim separately, we also recognize that “the effect of prejudice

resulting   from    counsel’s   deficient   performance     is   viewed

cumulatively.” Grant v. State, 

 (

)
(2019). To that end, we conclude that the cumulative prejudice from

any deficiencies assumed in Divisions 4 through 7 is insufficient to

create a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings

would have been different in the absence of the deficiencies alleged.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                         Decided June 3, 2019.

     Murder. Clayton Superior Court. Before Judge Carter.

     R. Allen Hunt; John W. Kraus, for appellant.

     Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker,

Jeffrey M. Gore, Jeffrey M. Hawkins, Assistant District Attorneys;

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton,

Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Ashleigh D. Headrick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.